alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 5001.514 Lender failure. ( a ) *General.* In the event a lender fails or ceases to service a guaranteed loan, the Agency will make the successor lending entity aware of the statutory and regulatory requirements and will provide instruction to the successor lending entity on a case-by-case basis. Such instructions may include the Agency's determination that the Agency will service the entire loan or the guaranteed portion of the loan. ( 1 ) Any successor lender must take such action that a reasonable lender would take if it did not have a loan note guarantee to protect the lender and Agency's mutual interest.
( 2 ) A successor entity approved by the Agency as a lender will be afforded the benefits of the loan note guarantee in the sharing of any loss and eligible expenses subject to the limits that are set forth in the regulations governing the loan guarantee.
( b ) *Non-regulated lender.* If the successor lending entity is a non-regulated lender, the lending entity is prohibited from making changes to the lender's agreement and related documents on the guaranteed loan. The successor lending entity must comply with the provisions of this part, including promptly applying to become a lender if not already an eligible lender. If the successor lending entity is not or fails to become a lender as set forth in § 5001.130 of this part within 60 calendar days, the loan note guarantee will not be enforceable.
( c ) *Regulated lender.* Where the failed lending entity is an FDIC regulated lender, the FDIC and the Agency will enter into an Inter-Agency Agreement regarding the FDIC's role as the successor lending entity, and all parties are to abide by this agreement or successor document(s). This agreement sets forth the duties and responsibilities of each Agency when a lender fails. When the FDIC is not the successor to a failed regulated lender, the regulatory agency serving as the successor lending entity and the Agency will abide by terms of the lender's agreement as executed by the originating lender. The Agency reserves the right to request a meeting with the successor lending entity to further define the duties and responsibilities of each agency when a lender fails.
( d ) *No successor entity.* In the event no successor lending entity can be determined, the Agency reserves the right to enforce the provisions of the loan documents on behalf of the lender or to purchase the lender's interest in the loan.
§ 3565.204 Maximum loan amount. ( a ) *Section 207(c) limits and exceptions.* For that part of the property that is attributable to dwelling use, the principal obligation of each guaranteed loan must not exceed the applicable maximum per-unit limitations under section 207(c) of the National Housing Act.
( b ) *Loan-to-value limits.* ( 1 ) In the case of a borrower that is a nonprofit organization or an agency or body of any State, local or tribal government, each guaranteed loan must involve a principal obligation that does not exceed the lesser of 97 percent of: ( i ) The development costs of the housing and related facilities, or
( ii ) The lender's determination of value not to exceed the appraised value of the housing and facilities.
( 2 ) In the case of a borrower that is a for-profit entity or other entity not referred to in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, each guaranteed loan must involve a principal obligation that does not exceed the lesser of 90 percent of: ( i ) The development costs of the housing and related facilities, or
( ii ) The lender's determination of value not to exceed the appraised value of the housing and facilities.
( 3 ) To protect the interest of the Agency or to further the objectives of the program, the Agency may establish lower loan-to-value limits or further restrict the statutory maximum limits based upon its evaluation of the credit quality of the loan.
( c ) *Necessary assistance review.* ( 1 ) A lender requesting a loan guarantee must review all loans to determine the appropriate amount of assistance necessary to complete and maintain the project. The lender shall recommend to the Agency an adjustment in the loan amount if appropriate as a result of this review.
( 2 ) Where the project financing combines a guaranteed loan with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits or other Federal assistance, the project must conform to the policies regarding necessary assistance in 7 CFR 3560.63 (d) or successor provision.
[63 FR 39458, July 22, 1998, as amended at 69 FR 69176, Nov. 26, 2004]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-7167

SHONDELL M. FLETCHER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WOMEN’S CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; SOUTH

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Medical,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Falcon B. Hawkins, Senior District

Judge. (CA-02-1663-4-11-B)

Submitted: December 19, 2002 Decided: December 31, 2002

Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Shondell M. Fletcher, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Shondell M. Fletcher appeals the district court’s order

dismissing without prejudice her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint.

The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The magistrate judge

recommended that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice and

advised that failure to file specific written objections shall

constitute a waiver of a party’s right to further judicial review,

including appellate review. The magistrate judge also noted that

“any written objections must specifically identify the portions of

the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the

basis for such objections.” Despite this warning, Fletcher failed

to note specific objections to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation.

The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge’s

recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the

substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned

that failure to object will waive appellate review. Wright v.

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 844-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Orpiano v.

Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (failure to file specific

objections to particular conclusions in magistrate judge’s report,

after being warned of consequences waives further review). Because

Fletcher was warned of the consequences of failing to file specific

objections and because she failed to specify the portions of the
3

magistrate judge’s report to which she objected, we find that

Fletcher has waived appellate review. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

WALTER S. FUNDERBURK, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-148 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed March 15, 2019. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Hunter W. Carroll, Judge. Walter S. Funderburk, pro se. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeffrey H. Siegal, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
CASANUEVA, KHOUZAM, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
JEREMY JOSEPH WILLIAMSON

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 0349

_____________________________/

Opinion filed June 14, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Russell L. Healey , Judge

.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public

Defender, Tallahassee , for A ppellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, C.J., WOLF and RAY, JJ., CONCUR.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000796226
<NAME>                        THE LESLIE FAY COMPANY, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JAN-03-1998
<PERIOD-START>                  DEC-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    JAN-03-1998
<CASH>                           19,813
<SECURITIES>                      2,989
<RECEIVABLES>                    12,983
<ALLOWANCES>                      3,236
<INVENTORY>                      26,701
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                 60,057
<PP&E>                              859
<DEPRECIATION>                       14
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                   61,051
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>            20,604
<BONDS>                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                             34
<OTHER-SE>                       29,180
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>     61,051
<SALES>                         271,075
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                271,075
<CGS>                           205,995
<TOTAL-COSTS>                    46,403
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                1,708
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  16,969
<INCOME-TAX>                      1,128
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              15,841
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 132,962
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                    148,803
<EPS-PRIMARY>                         0
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</TABLE>
#### Fanny Goldsmith, Respondent-Appellant, v. State of New York, Appellant-Respondent.

(Claim No. 46611.)

Judgment unanimously modified on the law and facts in accordance with the Memorandum herein, and as so modified affirmed, without costs. Memorahdum: Both parties accept the trial court’s finding that the value of claimant’s property before the appropriation was $56,000. The award of $5,000 direct damages for the taking of 2,135 square feet of land and 90% reduction in the value of 654 square feet burdened by the drainage easement shows that the land was valued by the court at $1.835 per square foot. Claimant’s premises contained 19,000 square feet of land before the appropriation which at $1.835 per square foot had a value of $34,865 leaving $21,135 of the $56,000 before value found by the court attributable' to improvements. The lowest value of improvements after the appropriation was given by claimant’s appraiser as $13,700. The highest award that could be made for consequential damages to improvements was, therefore, $21,135 (before value) less $13,700 (after value) or $7,435. The basis of such damage was the impairment of access to the north entrance of claimant’s building by the nearness of the south appropriation line .thereto. Claimant introduced evidence to show that the condition could be cured by building an addition on the east side of the building at a cost of $27,000. The trial court erroneously awarded consequential damages to improvements in that amount. While evidence of the cost to cure a condition resulting from an appropriation is admissible such cost cannot be allowed in an amount greater than the amount of consequential damages otherwise supported by the record. (5 Nichols, Eminent Domain [3d ed.] § 23.2). Such prospective expenditures are not the measure of damages but are only an aid in determining the difference in the before and after value of the property *(Arkansas State Highway Comm.*v. *Speck,*230 Ark. 712) and cannot operate to increase the damages above what they could be without the expenditure *(Pima County*v. *De Concini,*79 Ariz. 154). The State consents that consequential damages of 90% of before value be allowed to 1,070 square feet of land adjacent to the building and 10% of such value be allowed to the remaining 15,141 square feet of unappropriated land. The award should therefore be: Direct damage *608$5,000, Consequential damage to improvements $7,435, Consequential damage to land $4,595. The total award should he $17,030. (Appeals from judgment of Court of Claims -in action for damages for permanent appropriation.) Present—Del Vecchio, J. P., Marsh, Gabrielli, Bastow and Henry, JJ.
#### In the Matter of The People of the State of New York v Henry Cannon.

— Motion for a writ of habeas corpus, the assignment of counsel, a free transcript of trial minutes and for reargument denied in all respects. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Sandler, Bloom, Yesawich and Ross, JJ.
(May 25, 2006)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Antonio D. Rodriguez, Appellant.

[816 NYS2d 211]

Mugglin, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.), rendered August 14, 2003, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of assault in the first degree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the violent felony of assault in the first degree stemming from an incident wherein he shot the victim in the face, back and arm. Prior to sentencing, defendant sought to withdraw his plea, proclaiming his innocence and asserting that he had only pleaded guilty because he feared exposure to a potentially longer prison term. County Court denied defendant’s application, finding that the plea had been entered into voluntarily, and sentenced him in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement to 20 years in prison. Defendant now appeals and we affirm.

The determination as to whether to allow a defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court *(see People v Leonard,*25 AD3d 925, 926 [2006]; *People v Thomas,*25 AD3d 879, 880 [2006]). Here, the record reveals that, prior to pleading guilty, defendant engaged in a thorough plea colloquy, wherein he acknowledged and waived his rights, indicated that he had sufficient time to discuss the matter with his attorney, and advised that he was entering the plea of his own volition. Defendant then freely admitted the underlying facts of the crime and his guilt. Given *1216these circumstances, we find that County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s plea withdrawal application, particularly in view of defendant’s failure to elicit any evidentiary support in connection with his protestation of innocence *(see People v Leonard, supra*at 926; *People v Thomas, supra*at 880; *People v Davis,*250 AD2d 939, 940 [1998]).

Nor are we persuaded that defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s conclusory claims that defense counsel was unfamiliar with and misunderstood the case, failed to engage in motion practice and failed to properly communicate with him are wholly unsupported by the record. Thus, noting that counsel negotiated “ ‘an advantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel’ ” *(People v Wright,*295 AD2d 806, 807 [2002], quoting *People v Ford,*86 NY2d 397, 404 [1995]), we conclude that defendant was afforded meaningful representation.

Crew III, J.P., Carpinello, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### §§ 4288.108-4288.109 [Reserved]
7.203  Solicitation provision.       Contracting officers shall insert the provision at 52.207-4, Economic Purchase Quantity-Supplies, in solicitations for supplies. The provision need not be inserted if the solicitation is for a contract under the General Services Administration’s multiple award schedule contract program, or if the contracting officer determines that-                                       (a)                    						            The Government already has the data;                                          (b)                    						            The data is otherwise readily available; or                                          (c)                    						            It is impracticable for the Government to vary its future requirements.    **Parent topic:** Subpart 7.2 - Planning for the Purchase of Supplies in Economic Quantities
# 7.404 Contract clause.

The *contracting officer**shall* insert a clause substantially the same as the clause in 52.207-5, *Option* to Purchase Equipment, in *solicitations* and contracts involving a rental or lease agreement with *option* to purchase.

**Parent topic:**Subpart 7.4 - Equipment Acquisition
Exhibit
31.2




CERTIFICATION




I,
William F. Lacey, certify that:




1. I have
reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Animal Health International,
Inc.;




2. Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;




3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;




4. The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:




(a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;




(b) Designed
such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control
over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles;




(c)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and




(d)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;
and




5. The
registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of
directors:




(a) All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and




(b) Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.




/s/
      William F. Lacey
              William
      F. Lacey
              Chief
      Financial Officer




September 9,
2008
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION 

JAMAAL BERNARD KING,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO.: 4:19-cv-00488-RH-MJF

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

______________________________/

MEDIATION REPORT

The parties to the above cause submitted their issues to mediation on November 18, 2020.

All issues have been resolved.

/s/ Jason O’Steen

JASON O’STEEN

Florida Bar No. 52783

O’STEEN & O’STEEN, P.L.

2900 East Park Ave.

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Email: jason@osteenosteen.com

(850) 877-1028

Mediator

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been

served by electronic email via the CM/ECF System to all counsel of record on this 3

rd day of 

December, 2020.

/s/ Jason O’Steen

Attorney

Case 4:19-cv-00488-RH-MJF Document 69 Filed 12/03/20 Page 1 of 1
#### § 54.5 Availability of service.

Service under these regulations may be made available to products shipped or received in interstate commerce. It also may be made available to the products not shipped or received if the Director or Chief determines that the furnishing of service for such products will facilitate the marketing, distribution, processing, or utilization of agricultural products through commercial channels. Service will be furnished for products only if they were derived from animals slaughtered in federally inspected establishments or establishments operated under state meat inspection in a state other than one designated in 9 CFR 331.2. Service may be furnished for imported carcasses only if an exemption to do so is granted by the Director as described in § 54.20.

[84 FR 48555, Sept. 16, 2019]
§ 3570.277 Audit or financial statement. The Grantee will provide an Audit report or financial Statement in accordance with 2 CFR 200.500-200.517 and as follows: ( a ) Grantees expending $750,000 or more Federal funds per fiscal year will submit an Audit conducted in accordance with 2 CFR parts 200, 215, 220, 225, 230 and 400, “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards.”
( b ) Grantees expending less than $750,000 will provide annual financial Statements covering the grant period, consisting of the organization's statement of income and expense and balance sheet signed by an appropriate Official of the organization. Financial statements will be submitted within 90 days after the Grantee's fiscal year.