IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

CAROLYN ANN MILLER,

Plaintiff, 

vs. CASE NO. 4:20-CV-00514-MW-MAF

EBS SECURITY, INC.,

a Florida corporation, and 

PRINTELLA BANKHEAD,

Defendants.

________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Carolyn Ann Miller, initiated this employment discrimination 

complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act; and the Americans with Disabilities Act. ECF No. 1. Miller’s 

Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 12, is the operative complaint. 

Defendants filed an answer. ECF No. 22. This cause is currently before the 

Court upon “Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.” ECF No. 34. Miller 

filed a “Response in Opposition.” ECF No. 36. Defendants did not file a reply. 

After careful review, for the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 34, should be GRANTED; and the case 

should be closed.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 1 of 29
Page 2 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

I. Allegations in Miller’s Complaint, ECF No. 12.

Miller sued her former employer, EBS Security Inc. (EBS), and Printella 

Bankhead, the CEO. ECF No. 12. Generally, Miller alleges that EBS and a 

supervisor discriminated against her based on her race and gender; Miller is 

a black female. Id. Miller was a security guard at EBS for just twenty-six days, 

from August 15, 2019, until September 10, 2019. ECF No. 7.

According to Miller, on August 29, 2019, she sent a text message to 

Captain Manigault asking for information about the holiday schedule, but he 

avoided her, sent her to another co-worker for the answer, and gave her 

“paperwork.” Id., pp. 4-5. Miller does not indicate what the “paperwork” was 

but believes this somehow violated her rights under the Health Insurance 

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA). Id., p. 5. Miller alleges 

Manigault refused to communicate with her at all but said he would advise

Bankhead. Id.

Lieutenant Deaner also refused to communicate with Miller. Id. Miller 

only generally claims that beginning August 15, 2019, she “felt like [Deaner]

discriminated against [her] in every way such as scheduling, communication, 

code[s], rules, and ethics of the job.” Id., p. 6. Miller provided no explanation

or examples. The only encounter Miller raised in the complaint is that, on 

September 10, 2019, Miller arrived at her post at about 6:00 a.m. and asked 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 2 of 29
Page 3 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Deaner if he was the morning supervisor. Id., p. 5. Deaner responded that 

what he does was none of her business because he is the lieutenant. Id.

Miller asked Deaner for an incident report, but he refused to give her one 

and walked away. Id., pp. 5-6. A few minutes later, Deaner returned and 

ordered Miller to remove her duty belt. Id., p. 6. Miller was unaware that, at 

the time, Deaner had Bankhead on speaker phone and privy to the 

encounter. Id. Bankhead told Miller to follow the directive. Id. Miller asked 

Bankhead if she was fired; Bankhead responded, “no,” and promised to call 

Miller later. Id.

Bankhead called Miller back, explained that Deaner did not want Miller 

to return to work, and supported Deaner’s decision. Id. Miller asked 

Bankhead to come to the worksite to assess the situation before making a 

final decision. Id. Miller believes that Deaner treated her differently from other 

employees because she is a black female. Id.

After termination, Miller had to find new employment, which paid her 

less money. Id., p. 10. Miller claims she is “about to lose [her] home, lost 

[her] medical insurance,” and suffered from mild depression and mental 

stress as a result. Miller demands back pay, lost wages, and costs and fees. 

Id. Miller attached a copy of the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission’s (EEOC) denial of her claims. Id., p. 13.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 3 of 29
Page 4 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

II. Standard of Review

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 

summary judgment is proper: 

[i]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.

Accordingly, summary judgment should be entered only against

a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to 

any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof 

concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s 

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The 

moving party is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law’

because the non-moving party has failed to make a 

sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 

respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citations omitted).

Thus, pursuant to Celotex and its progeny, a movant for summary 

judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for 

her motion by identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the 

nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. This demonstration need 

not be accompanied by affidavits. Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 

1382 (11th Cir. 1990). If the party seeking summary judgment meets the 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 4 of 29
Page 5 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present sufficient evidence 

to rebut this showing with affidavits or other relevant and admissible 

evidence. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). 

It is the non-moving party’s burden to come forward with evidence on 

each essential element of her claim sufficient to sustain a jury verdict. Earley 

v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990). The nonmoving party cannot rely solely on her complaint and other initial pleadings 

to contest a motion for summary judgment supported by evidentiary material, 

but must respond with affidavits, depositions, or otherwise show there are 

material issues of fact which demand a trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Coleman 

v. Smith, 828 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1987). The trial judge, at the summary 

judgment stage, does not weigh the evidence but rather determines whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial: “if the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Baldwin Cty., Ala. v. Purcell 

Corp., 971 F.2d 1557, 1563 (11th Cir. 1992). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence 

supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be 

enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 5 of 29
Page 6 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 

supra).

The Supreme Court has stressed:

[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under rule 

56(c) its opponent must do more than simply show that 

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . 

. . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is 

no ‘genuine issue for trial.’

Matasushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 

(1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual 

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported 

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine 

issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Finally, “[w]hen 

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly 

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion 

for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 34

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because 

Miller failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment 

discrimination. ECF No. 34, pp. 15-16. According to Defendants, it is unclear 

what type of discrimination Miller alleges -- discriminatory, tangible

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 6 of 29
Page 7 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

employment action or discrimination in the form of a hostile work 

environment. Id., p. 16. Nonetheless, Defendants maintain that neither claim 

can survive. Id.

Miller does not show that EBS treated similarly situated employees 

outside her classification more favorably and that she was qualified to do the 

job; therefore, Miller’s claim of discriminatory action -- her termination -- fails. 

Id., p.17. Defendants argue that Miller was not qualified to do the job and 

was unable to perform her job without openly challenging and disrespecting 

her supervisor. Id., pp. 18-19. Defendants further argue that Miller presents 

no direct evidence of discrimination.

Even if Miller established a prima facie case, Defendants would still be 

entitled to summary judgment because there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment that was not a pretext 

for discrimination. Id., p. 20. Miller was insubordinate, failed to follow 

company policies and procedures, failed to respect and adhere to Deaner’s 

instructions; and other security officers complained about Miller’s 

performance and her creating a negative work environment. Id.

IV. Miller’s Response in Opposition, ECF No. 36.

Miller filed a response opposing the motion for summary judgment. 

ECF No. 36. Both parties agree that Miller is a member of a protected class 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 7 of 29
Page 8 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

and was subjected to adverse employment action when she was terminated 

by Defendants. Id., p. 3. Miller argues that the reason there is no similarly

situated comparator is because Defendants “manufactured allegations of 

misconduct.” Id., p. 4. Miller maintains her behavior was no different than her 

male coworkers. Id.

V. Discussion

A. Applicable Law

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 

discrimination based on a person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may prove discrimination 

through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence using the burden-shifting 

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973). Harris v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1083 (11th Cir. 

1996). 

First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. Id. To establish a 

prima facie case for disparate treatment, the employee must show that “(1) 

she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to adverse 

employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated employees 

more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” McCann v. Tillman, 

526 F.3d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 8 of 29
Page 9 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

220 F. 3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000). Next, if the plaintiff satisfies these 

elements, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a “legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action. Burke-Fowler v. Orange 

County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). If this burden is met, the 

plaintiff has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the reasons for the adverse action “are a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” 

McCann, 526 F.3d 1373 (citing Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323). At all times, 

a plaintiff has the burden to persuade the fact finder that the defendant 

intentionally discriminated against her. Id.

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and 

the defendants met their burden of articulating a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions, the inquiry then becomes 

“whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” Id.

The plaintiff must, by either direct or circumstantial 

evidence, demonstrate by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the employer had a discriminatory intent . . . 

Moreover, if the defendant’s proffered reasons are 

rejected, the trier of fact may infer the ultimate fact of 

intentional discrimination. Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330, 

1334 (11th Cir.1994). 

Id. Once the defendant has met the burden of production, the focus “is on 

the defendant's subjective intent and the motivation behind the defendant's 

adverse employment actions directed at the plaintiff.” Harris, 99 F.3d at 1083.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 9 of 29
Page 10 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

B. Undisputed Facts

Miller had a fifteen-year career in corrections, until 2015, when she 

resigned from the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC).1 ECF 

No. 34-1, pp. 13-14; ECF No. 36-2, pp. 3. Then, in 2017, Miller started 

working as a guard “for G4S” in Jacksonville and, a year later, in Lakeland.2

Id. Miller returned to Franklin County (Apalachicola), in 2019, to work as a 

guard for SYOTOS, a FEMA3 contractor. ECF No. 34-1, pp. 14, 17; ECF 

No. 36-2, p. 3. There was no supervisor at SYOTOS, but FEMA employees 

would check the worksites periodically. ECF No. 34-1, p. 17. 

When SYOTOS lost the FEMA contract, EBS “picked up” and “took 

over” effective August 15, 2019; so, Miller became an EBS employee, as did 

all SYOTOS employees. ECF Nos. 34-1, pp. 14, 17, 19, 102; 34-2; and 36-2, 

p. 3.4 Lieutenant Deaner was the worksite supervisor for EBS. Deaner 

reported to Manigault; and Manigault, in turn, reported directly to the CEO, 

Printella Bankhead. Id. On August 15, 2019, the hiring date, Bankhead and 

1 Miller worked for the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office beginning in 2000 and then went 

to work for the FDOC in 2007. ECF No. 34-1, pp. 13-14; ECF No. 36-2, p. 3.

2 G4S is a private security company. ECF No. 36-2, p. 3.

3 Federal Emergency Management Agency.

4 EBS terminated Miller on September 10, 2019; accordingly, Miller worked for the 

company for just 26 days.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 10 of 29
Page 11 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Manigault were present to facilitate the process of onboarding the SYOTOS 

security guards with EBS. 34-2. Miller’s worksite was in Panama City, but 

Manigault and Bankhead were based in Jacksonville.5 ECF Nos. 34-1, 

pp. 19-21; 34-2.

Manigault and Bankhead are both black; and five of the eight male 

guards at the Panama City worksite are black. ECF Nos. 34-2, 36-1. At the 

time, of the events in question, Miller was the only black female guard at the 

Panama City worksite. ECF Nos. 34-1, p. 18; 36-2, p. 4. 7. Miller repeatedly 

called Bankhead to complain about Deaner. ECF No. 34-2. Given various 

complaints, Bankhead visited the worksite to meet with each security guard 

separately. Id. Miller was replaced by a black female, Angeleen Sutton. ECF 

Nos. 34-2, p. 4; 36-2, p. 39.

C. Miller’s Deposition Testimony and Affidavit

1. Miller’s Employment with EBS

Miller provided sworn testimony in the form of a deposition and an 

affidavit. ECF Nos. 34-1 and 36-2. According to Miller, the change from 

SYOTOS to EBS was significant, at least for her, because, at SYOTOS, no 

one “really actually checked on [employees], besides the FEMA or head of 

5 Miller’s worksite was, approximately, 60-65 miles from her home in Apalachicola. 

ECF No. 34-1, pp. 20-21. Miller stated that she would often stay at her sister’s house to 

be close to work, which was approximately a ten-minute commute. Id., pp. 15, 21.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 11 of 29
Page 12 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

security.” ECF No. 34-1, p. 18. EBS, however, had a lieutenant and a captain 

supervising the employees. Id. Miller’s fellow guards at the worksite were all 

male; and she was likely “older than all of them.” Id.

In Miller’s opinion, “[] Deaner was . . . a very young person, and [she]

felt . . . he wasn’t really ready for a lot of that responsibility.” Id. Miller claimed

she did not share her opinion with anyone else. Id. According to Miller, during 

the first week, Deaner made negative comments about women, but this

related to his ex-wife. Id., pp. 32-33. The following week, Deaner started 

avoiding Miller. Id., p. 33.

Miller claimed that Deaner “would get very offended when [she] . . . 

asked certain questions concerning the job” but not with “the guys.” Id. For 

example, on the occasion Miller asked Deaner if he was the supervisor for 

the day, he responded it was “none of [her] business what he does, and he’s 

the lieutenant.” Id., p. 19. When Miller asked about anything related to the 

job, Deaner walked away without answering her. Id. Miller said she had to 

get the answers “from the guys.” Id. She gives no details about what 

questions Deaner refused to answer. ECF No. 36-2, p. 4. On at least one 

occasion, Deaner told Miller that he was “not going to answer any of [her] 

questions” and, if she needed to know anything, to contact Bankhead. ECF 

No. 34-1, pp. 19, 31.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 12 of 29
Page 13 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Miller felt Deaner discriminated against her by the way he spoke to her, 

which she described only as “dissing,” “hard and harsh.” Id., p. 68. Deaner 

gave employees improper directives like instructing them to go “outside the 

gates to say something to people” when that area was not FEMA property. 

Id., p. 69. Miller assumed Deaner’s attitude with her was because he felt 

intimidated by “a woman [that] could possibly . . . know a little bit more than 

[him].” Id., p. 70. Miller admitted she probably questioned Deaner more than 

other employees and that her questions implied Deaner failed to make 

considerations or was not operating in the right way. Id., pp. 38, 71.

During the second week of August, Miller reported Deaner was treating 

her differently.6 Id., p. 33. In her affidavit, Miller vaguely states than she “felt 

like [Deaner] discriminated against her in every way such as [s]cheduling, 

[c]ommunication, [c]ode, [r]ules, and [e]thics of the [j]ob. He treated no other 

employee like that.” ECF No. 36-2, p. 5. However, Miller does not provide 

any example other than Deaner did not inform her that a prospective new 

employee was not hired because he failed the background check. Id., p. 4. 

Deaner advised the male employees that this person might pose a security 

6 This time frame is implausible given that (1) EBS took over the contract on Thursday, 

August 15, 2019, (2) Deaner’s conversation with Miller about his ex-wife was during 

Deaner’s first week of employment, and (3) Deaner stopped talking with Miller one week 

later. If Miller reported Deaner was treating her differently, it would have been near the 

end of the month.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 13 of 29
Page 14 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

risk when returning the pre-issued equipment, which included a gun, but did 

not advise Miller. Id.

On August 29, 2019, Miller sent a text message to Manigault about 

Deaner. Id., pp. 34, 53-54. Manigault told Miller he would forward her text to 

Bankhead to call Miller back. Id. When Bankhead did not call, Miller reached 

out directly to her to see if Manigault forwarded the text message. Id., p. 35.

Bankhead confirmed she received the text, would visit the worksite, and 

planned to speak to Deaner because other employees complained about 

him. Id., pp. 33-35. Miller admitted she called Bankhead constantly after 

sending the text. Id., p. 61. At one point, Miller confirmed she “complain[ed]”

to Bankhead about “job related problems” nearly every day even though her

employment lasted just twenty-six days. Id., p. 78. In contradiction, in her 

affidavit, Miller stated Bankhead “never” called her. ECF No. 36-2.

Miller waivered back and forth during her deposition about the number 

of times Bankhead came to the worksite. At one point Miller stated Bankhead 

never came back to the worksite. ECF No. 34-1, p. 61. Then Miller said

Bankhead “came down one time within the first couple of weeks or so . . . 

talked to everyone about the phone calls from me and I’m pretty sure the 

other workers.” Id., p. 60. Apparently, the only other time Bankhead came to 

the worksite was when EBS signed the FEMA contract. Id., pp. 60, 64. In 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 14 of 29
Page 15 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Miller’s opinion, Bankhead should have come to the worksite more often --

even if it required the four-hour drive each way from Jacksonville -- given the 

employee complaints and despite Miller’s short employment. Id., p. 62.

Manigault also visited the worksite. Id., p. 64.

During deposition, Miller was presented with the statements of two 

coworkers, Samuel Best and Hal Premer. Id., pp. 23-30. Mr. Best provided 

the following statement: 

I have told Lieutenant Deaner that Mrs. Miller keeps asking 

all the guards in the morning what Deaner said to the 

guards during the workday, gathering information and rally 

at regards in a negative way and talk disrespectful about 

Deaner and EBS security.

Id., pp. 23-24. According to Mr. Best, Miller was “disrespectful to [] Deaner 

by challenging his authority in front of staff verbally and on the radio [by] not 

answering [] Deaner’s calls and [with her] rude behavior in person.” 

Allegedly, Miller told the guards one morning, “[] Deaner has authority over

the guards” but no experience working for FEMA, unlike herself; and Deaner 

should not have authority because Miller was there longer. Id., p. 26. Miller 

denied Mr. Best’s allegations. ECF No. 36-2, pp. 5-6.

According to Mr. Premer’s statement, Miller “would take longer than 

necessary to relieve [him] from his post on hot days.” Id., pp. 26-27. Miller 

outright denied Mr. Best’s and Mr. Premer’s claims, stating their assertions 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 15 of 29
Page 16 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

are “not true,” and denied discussing anything with coworkers about Deaner.

Id., pp. 24-27. Miller denied she ever had an argument or dispute with any 

employees about any issue. Id., p. 27. Miller claimed that Mr. Premer was 

distant and stopped talking to her because, while at SYOTOS, he was 

directed to apologize for making negative statements to her. Id., p. 28. Miller 

said she “didn’t even talk to the guys in the morning. They would talk 

amongst themselves men stuff.” Id., p. 30. Miller maintained no one

counseled her about her attitude towards Deaner, rather, she informed 

Manigault and Bankhead about Deaner’s attitude toward her. Id., pp. 13, 25, 

45-49; see also ECF No. 36-2, p. 6.

On her last day of employment, Miller asked Deaner if he would be the 

supervisor for the day. Id., p. 51. Deaner responded he did not have to 

answer to Miller and that she was on “thin ice.” Id., p. 51. When Miller asked 

Deaner what he meant by that, he walked off. Id. Miller then went to Deaner 

and asked for a grievance form, but he denied her request. Id. Miller 

returned, “Yeah? We are all allowed to have a grievance . . . if we disagree 

with something on the job.” Id. Deaner walked away from Miller. Id., 

pp. 51-52. Later, Deaner returned and told Miller to remove her duty belt

three times. Id., p. 52. At Deaner’s first request, Miller asked, “why,” and, 

then, whether she was fired. Id. By Deaner’s third demand, Miller heard

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 16 of 29
Page 17 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Bankhead order, “just do what he said to do.” Id. Unbeknownst to Miller, 

Deaner had Bankhead on speaker phone listening to the entire encounter. 

Id. Miller asked Bankhead if she was being sent home or fired. Id. Bankhead 

said “no . . . just go home for today.” Id.

Three hours later, Bankhead called Miller to inform her Deaner did not 

want Miller back on the job; and Bankhead supported that decision. Id. Miller 

asked Bankhead to visit the worksite and “assess the situation.” Id. But 

Bankhead refused, stood by Deaner’s decision, and terminated Miller’s 

employment. Id., pp. 14-15, 52. Within three or four weeks, Miller returned to

her previous employer, G4S. Id., pp. 14-15. EBS replaced Miller with another

black female guard, Angeleen Sutton. Id., p. 39. Miller later learned that 

Deaner was terminated sometime in 2021. Id., p. 63.

2. Miller’s Testimony Regarding her EEOC7 Claim

Miller filed an EEOC claim for discrimination. Laneetra Harris

documented Miller’s claims. Id., pp. 72-77. At deposition, Miller was 

presented with her EEOC claim form, filed in December 2019, which reported

Bankhead contacted Miller offering her employment at a different EBS 

worksite, but Miller declined for fear of termination without cause again. Id., 

p. 76. But during her testimony, Miller denied ever reporting to EEOC the 

7 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 17 of 29
Page 18 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

offer of reinstatement or ever speaking with Bankhead after termination. Id.

Similarly, when questioned about a text message from Bankhead “good 

morning, ma’am, did you consider coming back? Thanks, Chief,” Miller could

not recall receiving the text and insisted she and Bankhead never discussed 

a return to work. Id., p. 89.

Miller testified that her termination caused her to suffer “emotional 

distress . . . from trying to stabilize [her] bills” since she would make less 

money and the cost of gas increased because the commute to her new job 

was 60 miles and she didn’t stay with her sister. Id., pp. 77-78. Miller did not 

seek any treatment for emotional distress. Id., p. 78.

3. Miller’s Contradictory Testimony

Overall, Miller’s deposition is a long-winded set of contradictions. Miller 

accused Deaner of ignoring her, speaking to her harshly, and giving her 

incorrect instructions on the job. Id., pp. 19, 33-35. But Miller also maintained 

that Bankhead confided that other employees complained about Deaner’s 

leadership, so much so that Bankhead was “willing to make a trip down 

there.” Id., pp. 62, 68. Miller emphasized that the reason Manigault and 

Bankhead made the trip was because of “all our complaints,” not just hers.

Id., pp. 35-36. This contradicts Miller’s assertion that she was somehow 

singled out by Deaner for maltreatment. In fact, Manigault had to come to 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 18 of 29
Page 19 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

the worksite “to counsel Mr. Deaner” (not Miller) because Manigault 

“do[es]n’t like the way that . . . he is doing things . . . [and] Deaner was not 

doing things the way that he was supposed to be doing them.” Id., p. 53. In 

fact, EBS fired Deaner sometime after Miller was terminated. Id., p. 63.

In another contradiction, Miller alleged Deaner ignored her so much 

that she had to go and get job information from her male coworkers but then 

maintained she “didn’t even talk to the guys in the morning”; they would all 

talk “amongst themselves men stuff.” Id., p. 19. Still, Mr. Best and Mr. Premer

did not speak to Miller at least stemming from their SYOTOS employment.

Id., p. 30.

Miller claimed she had multiple conversations with Bankhead and 

Manigault but then denied, refused to admit, or otherwise could not recall a 

series of text messages to and from them even when presented with actual 

copies of those messages. Id., pp. 34-110. When presented with various 

exhibits, Miller denied her signature on nearly every document including

receipt of EBS’s associate handbook, employee paperwork, and the job

description. Id., pp. 40-45. She denied being written up about her behavior

on September 10, 2019. Id., pp. 48-49. Miller denied any communication with 

Bankhead about her return to work for the company after termination even 

when presented with the EEOC forms and text messages documenting 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 19 of 29
Page 20 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Bankhead’s offer to return to work at another EBS worksite. Id., p. 72, 76, 

80. Miller outright denied reporting the return-to-work offer to the EEOC

despite the forms presented to her. Id., p. 80.

When presented with text message exhibits, Miller would alternate 

between admitting to and then denying having sent or received texts from 

Bankhead relating to continued employment, time adjustments, and 

receiving her pay. Id., pp. 83-88, 91-99. This is true even though the 

messages came from her phone. Id. At one point, Miller was unwilling to 

admit that any of texts came from her phone at all. Id., pp. 99-108. Miller 

claimed at some point she gave her phone to her daughter, but as the 

deposition progressed, Miller eventually claimed that the phone was stolen 

from her daughter by a relative so the texts could have been from either one 

of them. Id., pp. 88, 109. Finally, Miller returned to her previous posture that

she did not recall sending Bankhead any text messages. Id., p. 110.

D. Bankhead’s Sworn Declaration, ECF No. 34-2

When Bankhead told Miller that Deaner would be the supervisor, Miller 

responded that Deaner “seems a little too young.” ECF No. 34-2. During the 

first two weeks of employment, both Miller and Deaner complained to

Bankhead about the other. Id. On August 21, 2019, Mr. Premer complained 

to Bankhead about Miller not relieving him from his post on time; Miller had 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 20 of 29
Page 21 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

remained indoors and left Mr. Premer “outside in the sweltering heat longer 

than necessary.” Id. Mr. Premer also reported to Bankhead that Miller “had 

been openly questioning . . . Deaner’s instructions to the group.” Id.

According to Bankhead, on several occasions, security guards called her 

complaining that Miller was “trying to rally them up in a negative way against” 

Deaner. Id., p. 3. FEMA also contacted Bankhead to inform her that 

employees were “huddled up talking with” Miller about the things she 

disliked. Id. As a result, Deaner changed his hours to be present at the 

beginning of the second shift to ensure the guards remained on task. Id.

Bankhead stated that in response to Miller’s repeated complaints, she 

instructed Deaner to have a meeting with all the security guards to get on 

the same page. Id. Bankhead attended this meeting and met with the guards

separately but spent the most time with Miller. Id. Following this investigation

and the discussions with Manigault, Bankhead determined Miller’s 

discrimination claims were unfounded. Id. The following week, Bankhead 

received a report that Miller was rude on the radio with Deaner and other 

officers. Id. Bankhead spoke with Miller and told her to stop because FEMA 

employees might hear it and it was not the image EBS wanted to present. Id.

On September 10, 2019, Bankhead spoke with Deaner on the phone 

and decided to terminate Miller’s employment for several reasons: Miller 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 21 of 29
Page 22 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

exhibited insubordinate behavior toward Deaner and did not respect and 

adhere to Deaner’s instructions; she failed to follow company policies and 

procedures; there were complaints from fellow officers about Miller’s 

performance and creating a negative work environment; and Miller’s inability 

to correct her behavior after counseling from Bankhead and Manigault on 

multiple occasions. Id., pp. 3-4. The next day, EBS replaced Miller with 

another black female, Angeleen Sutton. Id., p. 4.

E. Sworn Declarations by Fellow Guards

Samuel Best, a black8 security guard who worked with Miller, stated 

that in August 2019, Miller asked him and other security guards what Deaner 

said during the workday. ECF No. 34-3, p. 1. In Mr. Best’s opinion, Miller was 

gathering information to rally them in a negative way and speaking 

disrespectfully about Deaner and EBS. Id., pp. 1-2. Mr. Best shared his 

observations and opinions with Deaner. Mr. Best stated that Miller would also 

challenge Deaner’s authority in front of others by correcting him while he was 

speaking on the radio and complained to Mr. Best and other officers about 

Deaner’s authority over them when he never worked for FEMA and she had 

been there longer. Id. Mr. Best stated that Miller did not like Deaner, was 

8 Samuel Best, Benjamin Sheffield, Ephraim Goodwin, Corwin Raymond, and Ricky Hall 

are black males who were under Deaner’s supervision. ECF No. 36-1, p. 6.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 22 of 29
Page 23 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

aggravated that Deaner had authority over her, and was insubordinate 

toward Deaner. Id.

F. Miller’s EEOC Claim

Miller filed a pre-charge inquiry with the EEOC. ECF No. 34-4. 

Although Miller claims both racial and gender discrimination in the instant 

case, in her EEOC filing, Miller alleged that EBS discriminated against her 

based on her gender only. Id., pp. 1-2. She did not check any other category 

(race, color, religion, national origin, age disability, genetic information) other 

than under “retaliation,” she complained to her employer about job 

discrimination. Id., p. 2. The EEOC form asks, “What happened to you that 

you think was discriminatory and when did it happen?” Id., p. 2. Miller limited 

her allegation to the events of September 10, 2019, when she asked for “a[n] 

incident report form to write up the way the supervisor was talking to [her] 

that morning” but was told to go home for the day; and Deaner was 

responsible. Id., p. 2. 

G. Miller Has Not Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

Miller does not allege that racial discrimination was the standard 

operating procedure at EBS. At best, Miller’s allegations involve the 

occurrence of isolated, “accidental” or sporadic discriminatory acts. See

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 23 of 29
Page 24 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

(1977). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate 

treatment, Miller must show that she is (1) a member of a protected class, 

(2) who was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) other similarly 

situated employees were treated more favorably, and (4) that she was 

qualified to do the job. McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 

2008) (citing EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., Miller simply cannot meet all 

four elements. 

Although the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Miller, she ultimately bears the burden of coming forward with evidence on 

each essential element of her claim sufficient to sustain a jury verdict. Earley, 

907 F.2d at 1080. The first two elements are easily established. Miller is, 

indeed, a member of a protected class both by her race and gender, as a 

black female, and was subjected to an adverse employment action when 

EBS terminated her. As to the fourth element, evidently, Miller was also 

qualified to do the job. Miller had a fifteen-year career as a correctional officer 

and then worked as a security guard for private companies for approximately

two years before she became an EBS employee.9 Miller also returned to 

9 In her Response, Miller states that she was a guard for a private security company for 

four years prior to her employment with EBS. ECF No. 36, pp. 6. Yet, in her affidavit, 

Miller states that even though she resigned from the FDOC in 2015, she began working 

for a private security company two years later, in 2017. ECF No. 36-2, p. 3. Miller’s 

employment with EBS began on August 15, 2019. Id.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 24 of 29
Page 25 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

work as a guard for one of her previous employers, just three weeks after 

EBS terminated her. Interestingly, during Miller’s deposition, it was 

suggested, if not revealed, that EBS offered Miller an opportunity to return to 

work. ECF No. 34-1, p. 76. It follows then that, if Miller was unqualified for 

her job, there would be no discussion of her return to EBS at any time. The 

position that EBS maintained at Miller’s deposition that they gave her an 

opportunity to return to work and the argument now that Miller was 

unqualified for the job so that she cannot meet the elements of a prima facie

case are simply incompatible. Miller was qualified for her position.

Nonetheless, Miller cannot satisfy the third element. Miller’s argument

in her response that “no similarly-situated comparator exists” is a bit 

misleading. ECF No. 36, p. 4. First, Miller was not the only black guard at the 

worksite at the time -- more than half of the male guards are black; and the 

remaining three guards are white males. ECF No. 36-1, p. 6. 

Second, Miller was not the only black female guard employed by EBS

even though she was the only one at the Panama City worksite. When Miller 

was terminated, EBS replaced Miller with Angeleen Sutton. ECF Nos. 34-2, 

p. 4; 36-1, p. 5. Ms. Sutton is a black female guard with experience at the

Panama City worksite. Furthermore, Manigault (Deaner’s supervisor) and

Bankhead (the CEO) are black. ECF No. 34-2, pp. 1-2. Miller makes no 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 25 of 29
Page 26 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

allegations that any other black employee was treated in a discriminatory 

way. Aside from her own personal opinion, Miller does not provide any 

evidence that the white employees were treated better than her or, for that 

matter, better than any of the black employees. Nor does Miller make any 

argument that male guards (regardless of race) were treated more favorably 

than her. In fact, Miller’s own testimony cuts against her argument. Miller 

alleged that because of “all our complaints” about Deaner, Bankhead was 

“willing to make a trip down there”; and, ultimately, Bankhead and Manigault 

visited the worksite for that reason. ECF No. 34-1, pp. 35-36, 62, 68.

Repeatedly, during her deposition, Miller maintained that everyone had 

complaints about Deaner.

Miller admitted that she asked Deaner more questions than her 

colleagues and implied that he was not doing his job properly. Id., pp. 38, 71.

Even assuming Deaner refused to respond to Miller’s inquiries directly, Miller 

admits that Deaner directed her to get information from another supervisor, 

namely, Bankhead. It is significant that Miller had frequent and direct access 

to Manigault and Bankhead about the conditions of her employment. Miller’s

general allegations that Deaner would not answer her questions or 

discriminated against her in “every way” with scheduling, rules, and

communications are, quite frankly, vague and unsupported. Miller maintains 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 26 of 29
Page 27 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

that Deaner offered other opportunities and information to male employees 

but not to her, which interfered with her ability to perform her job, but she 

fails to support that with evidence. ECF No. 36, p. 8. Miller states in her 

response that the only opportunity afforded to others but not her was

Deaner’s offer to work on Labor Day. Id., p. 5. The only information Deaner 

seems to have withheld from Miller is the fact that a person who was not 

hired, might pose a security risk when returning pre-issued equipment. Miller 

offers no explanation about how any of this interfered with her ability to 

perform her job. This without more does not support discrimination claims.

As outlined above, Miller’s entire case contains repeated, overly broad

generalizations of acts she believes are the result of discrimination. Miller

simply has not produced sufficient evidence to show that she was treated 

less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside her protected 

group. Miller’s general assertions, without more, are simply insufficient to 

survive a motion for summary judgment. Miller cannot rely solely on her

complaint and other initial pleadings to contest a motion for summary 

judgment supported by evidentiary material – her affidavits, depositions, or 

other evidence must show there are material issues of fact related to 

discrimination which demand a trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Coleman, 828 

F.2d at 717.

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 27 of 29
Page 28 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Ultimately, Miller fails to make out a prima facie case of racial and 

gender discrimination because she was replaced with a black female and

general allegations cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Here, 

Miller’s evidence is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative”; thus, 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment motion should be granted. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 at 249-50.

For the same reasons, Miller cannot support a claim of disparate 

treatment discrimination in the form of a hostile work environment. To 

establish such a claim, Miller must show that (1) she belongs to a protected 

group, (2) she has been subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the 

harassment was based on her race or gender, (4) the harassment was 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her 

employment and create an abusive working environment, and (5) there is a 

basis to hold the Defendants liable. See Reeves v. C.H. Robinson 

Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Miller belongs to a protected class but there is no indication that she 

was subjected to harassment based on her race or gender. Moreover, Miller 

fails to show that Deaner treated her differently from the other guards on the 

worksite, whether white or black. This is particularly so, if the Court accepts 

as true Miller’s claims that other guards at the worksite complained about 

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 28 of 29
Page 29 of 29

Case No. 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF

Deaner. Miller might be able to show that Deaner’s behavior was offensive, 

but she has not established it was discriminatory. See Richardson v. Bay 

Dist. Sch., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64279 at *10 (N.D. Fla. May 6, 2013). The 

Court need not address the remaining elements supporting a hostile work 

environment claim because Miller would need to prevail on all five elements. 

Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is proper.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 34, be GRANTED. It 

is further recommended that the case be CLOSED.

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida on October 17, 2022.

s/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report 

and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections 

to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 

A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other parties. A party may 

respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline 

that may appear on the electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only 

and does not control. If a party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s 

findings or recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in 

this Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on 

appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Case 4:20-cv-00514-MW-MAF Document 40 Filed 10/17/22 Page 29 of 29