F PB98-916202

NTSB/HAR-98/02/SUM

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

ACCIDENT SUMMARY REPORT

COLLISION OF TRACTOR/CARGO TANK

SEMITRAILER AND PASSENGER VEHICLE AND

SUBSEQUENT FIRE, YONKERS, NEW YORK,

OCTOBER 9, 1997

6996
Abstract: On October 9, 1997, about 12:10 a.m., a truck tractor pulling a cargo tank semitrailer

was going under an overpass of the New York State Thruway when it was struck by a sedan. The

car hit the right side of the cargo tank in the area of the tank’s external loading/unloading lines,

releasing the gasoline they contained. The ensuing fire destroyed both vehicles and the overpass;

the thruway remained closed for approximately 6 months. The driver of the car was killed; the

driver of the truck was not injured. Property damage was estimated at $7 million.

The safety issue discussed in this report is the danger of operating a truck when its cargo

tank’s loading lines are carrying hazardous materials.

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a safety

recommendation to the Secretary of Transportation.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting

aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967,

the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to

investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety

recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of

government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and

decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety

recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Information about available publications may be obtained by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 487-4600
HIGHWAY/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENT SUMMARY REPORT

COLLISION OF TRACTOR/CARGO TANK SEMITRAILER AND PASSENGER VEHICLE AND

SUBSEQUENT FIRE, YONKERS, NEW YORK, OCTOBER 9, 1997

NTSB/HAR-98/02/SUM (PB98-916202)

The report number for this report was incorrectly cited on the cover of the previously printed

document as NTSB/HAR-98/01/SUM.

THESE CORRECTIONS ARE INCLUDED

IN THIS VERSION OF THE PUBLISHED REPORT:

	
	

	

	





	



	


HIGHWAY/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENT

SUMMARY REPORT

Adopted: May 5, 1998

Notation 6996



	




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Washington, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENT SUMMARY REPORT

Accident Number: HWY-98-F-H002

Accident Type: Collision and fire

Location: Yonkers, New York

Motor Carrier: Mystic Bulk Carriers, Inc.

Vehicle 1: 1994 Mack tractor and MC-306 cargo tank semitrailer

Vehicle 2: 1990 Eagle Premier sedan

Date: October 9, 1997

Time: 12:10 a.m.

Damage: Vehicles and overpass destroyed

Injuries: One fatality

INTRODUCTION

On October 9, 1997, about 12:10 a.m., a

1994 Mack truck tractor pulling a 1994

Fruehauf MC-306 cargo tank semitrailer was

heading south on Central Park Avenue in

Yonkers, New York. The truck, which was

loaded with 8,800 gallons of gasoline, was just

going under an overpass of the New York State

Thruway (thruway) when it was struck by a

southbound 1990 Eagle Premier sedan. The car

hit the right side of the cargo tank in the area of

the tank’s external/loading unloading lines

(loading lines), releasing the gasoline they

contained. The ensuing fire destroyed both

vehicles and the overpass of the thruway; the

thruway remained closed for approximately 6

months. The driver of the car was killed; the

driver of the truck was not injured. Property

damage was estimated at $7 million. At the time

of the accident, the weather was clear and dry

with no overcast.

In its investigation, the Safety Board identified as a safety issue the danger of operating a

truck when its cargo tank’s loading lines are

carrying hazardous materials. This report describes the accident, discusses the safety issue,

and lists conclusions and a safety recommendation that have been developed to help prevent

similar accidents in the future.
2

On October 8, 1997, about 4:30 p.m., the

truckdriver reported for work at Mystic Bulk

Carriers, Inc., (Mystic) in Astoria, Queens, New

York. His job was to deliver bulk gasoline from

refineries in New Jersey to customers in the

New York City area. He had worked 9 1⁄2 hours

on October 7 and had been off duty on October

5 and 6.

During the 7 1⁄2 hours that preceded the

accident, he had delivered four loads. He then

drove to the Texaco refinery in Newark, New

Jersey, to pick up his final load for the evening.

According to the bill of lading, he loaded the

truck with approximately 8,800 gallons of multigrade gasoline and left the refinery at 11:08 p.m.

He was going to deliver the gasoline to a Texaco

service station on Central Park Avenue.

According to the safety manager, the truckdriver

was familiar with the delivery route and had

made the trip many times before.

The car driver was a resident of Valhalla,

New York, and a doctor at the Bronx House of

Detention in New York City. While his

activities during the hours just before the

accident are unknown,1

 he was still 9 miles

away from his place of employment and already

10 minutes late for work when the accident

occurred. The driver’s son later told the police

that the road on which the accident occurred

was part of his father’s regular route to work.

Thus, the driver probably was familiar with the

roadway and may have been in a hurry to get to

work.

About 12:10 a.m., the truckdriver left the

thruway, which is a seven-lane, limited access

road that crosses over Central Park Avenue and

is a major north-south transportation corridor of

New York City. He went north on Central Park

Avenue and entered a 13-foot-wide, downgrade

U-turn lane for Central Park Avenue south. (He

planned to turn left on Central Park Avenue and

 

1

Additional information was unavailable because the

car driver’s family refused to cooperate with Safety Board

investigators.

go south, under the thruway overpass.) The exit

from the U-turn lane to Central Park Avenue is

controlled by a yield sign. The posted speed

limit on Central Park Avenue in the area of the

accident is 40 mph.

The driver of a car that was stopped at a

traffic signal on Central Park Avenue, which is

630 feet north of the U-turn lane, witnessed the

accident.

According to the witness, the truckdriver

entered the U-turn lane and stopped at the yield

sign. After stopping, the truckdriver turned to

the left and began to go under the overpass. (See

figure 1.)

The witness stated that as the truck was

turning, an Eagle Premier sedan came from

behind him (the witness) and passed him on the

right without stopping for the red light. The

witness estimated the Premier’s speed to be

between 40 and 45 mph. He stated that the car

continued toward the truck without making any

attempt to avoid it. He said he did not see the

car’s brake lights go on “until a second before”

the car struck the truck.

The police interviewed the truckdriver at the

scene of the accident. He told them that as he

reached the U-turn lane he stopped, looked to

the right, and saw that no vehicles were

approaching. He said that he then swung the

truck wide in order to make the turn and that

when the truck had almost straightened, he felt

the car strike the right side of the cargo tank. He

applied his brakes, jumped from the truck, and

ran back to the car.

After the car struck the truck, the two

vehicles came to rest under the thruway

overpass. The truckdriver said that when he

reached the car, a fire had already started and

the heat was too intense for him to approach it.

The witness said that a fire began inside the car

almost immediately and that several seconds

later the fire spread to the ground under the

cargo tank. The truckdriver said that he ran to

the Texaco service station and called 911.

THE ACCIDENT

4

Within several minutes both vehicles were

fully engulfed in a massive fire, as was the

thruway overpass.

The first fire fighters from the Yonkers Fire

Department arrived within 8 minutes of the

department being notified of the accident and

immediately requested additional fire apparatus.

A total of 17 fire department vehicles and 58

employees responded to the scene before the fire

was extinguished, about 1:30 a.m.

The car driver, who had been killed, was

found in the rear seat area of his vehicle. The

rear passenger-side door was ajar, unobstructed,

and operational. About 3:15 p.m., he was

extricated from his vehicle and taken to the

Westchester County Medical Examiner’s Office

for an autopsy and toxicological testing.
5

Several hours after the fire had been

extinguished and the fumes cleared from the

underpass, Safety Board investigators inspected

the scene and the accident vehicles. Due to the

fire, the investigators were unable to find any

physical evidence, such as skid marks, on the

road. (See figure 2.) The investigators later

examined the truck and the passenger car more

thoroughly at the New York State Department

of Transportation’s maintenance yard in

Yonkers. The inspection revealed little about the

mechanics of the vehicles because they had been

so extensively damaged by the fire.

Car

The impact pushed the left front quarter

panel of the car to the right about 15 inches. A

narrow, penetrating gouge ran along the left

edge of the hood. The left front wheel assembly

was displaced rearward approximately 18

inches, and the outboard edge of the wheel was

damaged. The driver’s side door was pushed

inward and rearward, and the length of the door

was gouged horizontally. Because of the intense

heat of the fire, the entire roof had buckled

inward. The interior and exterior of the car were

destroyed by the fire. (See figure 3.)

Figure 2.—Vehicles after fire.

POSTACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
6

The accident had not intruded into the

passenger’s compartment, and there was no

evidence that the car driver had suffered from

blunt trauma or fractures. According to the

autopsy report, he died from burns and smoke

inhalation. That he was able to crawl into the

rear seat area after the accident, in an apparent

attempt to flee the car and the gasoline, also

suggests that he was not seriously hurt by the

impact. Consequently, the Safety Board

concludes that the car driver would have

survived the accident had there not been a fire.

Truck

The truck was dark green; reflective tape

had been used as part of the motor carrier’s logo

on the sides and rear. The cargo tank also had

reflective tape on both sides and on the rear. The

cargo tank had four 7 1⁄2-inch amber turn signals;

they were mounted at a 35-degree rearward

angle at mid-point and rear locations. The gross

weight of the truck and cargo was

approximately 77,950 pounds.

The tractor had an EM7-300 diesel engine

and a 7-speed transmission. Because the shifter

linkage coupler had been damaged by the fire, it

was not possible to determine the gear position.

Mystic’s records indicated that the tractor had

been serviced a month before the accident and

was in good mechanical condition. (See figure

4.)

The cargo tank was a 1994 Fruehauf, type

MC-3062

 model. It was made of aluminum and

had five internal compartments. It had a 9,200-

gallon capacity and was 42.5 feet long. When it

was empty, it weighed 10,270 pounds; however,

at the time of the accident, it weighed about

53,680 pounds because it carried 8,800 gallons

of gasoline.

Most compartments of the MC-306 model

are loaded and unloaded through an opening at

the bottom. Each opening has an internal valve

that keeps the product inside the compartment.

 

2

As of September 1, 1995, MC-306 cargo tanks were

no longer authorized for construction; they have been

replaced with DOT-406 cargo tank construction designs.

The DOT-406 cargo tank incorporates the same

specifications for external loading lines as its predecessor,

the MC-306.

Each compartment is connected to an outlet

valve by a 4-inch-diameter aluminum loading

line. Each loading line is attached to a device

that is designed to break during an accident to

prevent the loading line from tearing a hole in

the bottom of the compartment and releasing the

contents. (See figures 5a and 5b.)

When the accident car was observed in its

final position, it was wedged between the cargo

tank and the curb, in the area of the cargo tank’s

loading lines; the left side of the car was

touching the right side of the cargo tank in the

area of the loading lines, and the car’s right

wheels were against the north curb line. A

section of aluminum from the cargo tank had

melted and become attached to the car. The

aluminum was near the firewall at the driver’s

position and at the base of the “A” pillar (the

pillar to which the left side of the windshield is

attached). Two sections of chain (typically used

to attach end caps to loading lines) had melted

onto the car. One section had become attached

to the car’s upper door trim in the area just

behind the spot where the side view mirror had

been mounted, and the other section was

attached to the upper edge of the left quarter

panel at a point near the center of the panel. The

investigators also found an end-cap cam-lock

arm on the support cross member of the car’s

radiator; the carrier later identified the cam-lock

arm as having secured an end cap to a loading

line.

Based on the way in which the vehicle was

damaged and on the statement of the witness,

the Safety Board believes that the car probably

struck the cargo tank near the loading lines. The

positions of the sections of the aluminum and

the chains that had melted onto the car were

adjacent to the loading lines of the cargo tank.

The loading lines, which the Safety Board

calculated held approximately 28 gallons of

gasoline, had been heavily damaged by the fire

and were fractured and deformed. Because the

front-end left side of the car hit the loading

lines, it is reasonable to believe that the impact

broke the driver’s side window, allowing

gasoline from the loading lines to enter the car’s

passenger compartment. Therefore, the Safety

Board concludes that the car struck and

fractured one or more of the loading lines of the

cargo tank, thus releasing up to 28 gallons of
7

Figure 3.— Car after fire.

Figure 4.—Truck after fire.
8

Figure 5a.—View of loading lines.

Figure 5b.—Schematic of tank truck showing location of loading lines.
9

gasoline. The Safety Board believes that the

immediate result was a fire inside and below the

car.

The heat of the fire had partially consumed

the cargo tank, melting much of the shell in the

upper half of the tank. (See figure 6.)

Consequently, the fuel for the initial fire was the

gasoline that was released from the cargo tank’s

loading lines during impact. The fire was then

fed with gasoline from the cargo tank’s

compartments. The Safety Board concludes that

had the loading lines been empty, the fire would

likely not have occurred.

Truck’s Visibility

On January 22, 1998, the Safety Board

conducted tests to determine the amount of time

it took the truck to complete the U-turn and to

determine whether the car had been visible to

the truckdriver during this time. The tests were

done at the accident site, and the investigators

used a Mystic truck that was similar to the

accident truck and loaded with approximately

the same amount of gasoline. The time and

distance calculations for the relative positions of

the vehicles were based on estimates of the car’s

speed (ranging from 35 to 50 mph) and of the

average rate of acceleration for the truck.

The tests showed that the accident truck had

probably occupied the entire area within the Uturn lane while it was stopped and that to

complete the U-turn, the truck had probably had

to occupy both lanes and the shoulder of Central

Park Avenue.

The tests showed that the average amount of

time that it took the truck to reach the area of

impact was 14.6 seconds; the distance from the

yield sign to the area of impact was

approximately 50 feet. The tests also showed

that a car traveling 39 mph or more would not

have been visible to the truckdriver when he

began to make the U-turn. (See the appendix for

details.) Because the accident car was traveling

at least 39 mph, the Safety Board concludes that

when the truckdriver made his U-turn, he could

not have seen the car.

At the time of the accident, the southbound

entrance of the thruway overpass was

Figure 6.—Melted tanker truck.
10

illuminated by the parking lot lights of a

restaurant that was next to the roadway. The

Safety Board believes that the accident truck

was visible to any approaching vehicle on

Central Park Avenue. The truck was so visible

to the witness that he was able not only to verify

that the truck’s lights were on, but was also able

to identify the truck’s color and markings.

Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the

driver of the accident car should have been able

to see the truck and avoid the accident.

Truckdriver

The truckdriver was 41 and had been

employed by Mystic since November 1993. He

held a Class A New York Commercial Vehicle

Driver’s License with endorsements that

licensed him to operate the accident truck. His

records showed that his license had been

suspended twice, once in 1989 and once in

1990. Since being employed by Mystic, he had

not received any additional traffic citations.

However, he had been involved in three minor

traffic accidents. His records also showed that at

the time of the accident he was in compliance

with the hours-of-service regulations.

The truckdriver told the police at the scene

of the accident that he had taken some cocaine

about 8 a.m. the previous morning. The police

later stated that he did not exhibit any obvious

signs of physical or cognitive impairment.

Approximately 2 hours after the collision, he

was taken to a local hospital, where he gave

blood for toxicological testing. The Westchester

County Medical Examiner’s Office tested his

sample and found 0.023 micrograms/milliliter of

cocaine and 1.23 micrograms/milliliter of

benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of cocaine.

The level of cocaine in his blood was

indicative of relatively recent use, probably

before or during his shift. Nevertheless, he had

stopped his vehicle before entering the

intersection. Safety Board tests established that

he could not have seen the southbound car when

he began the turn. Once the truck had entered

the southbound lanes, he was committed to

completing the turn and did so without delay.

There is no reason to believe that an unimpaired

truckdriver would have performed the U-turn

any differently. Therefore, the Safety Board

concludes that the truckdriver’s use of cocaine

did not cause or contribute to the accident.

Car Driver

According to the records of the New York

Motor Vehicle Department, the 62-year-old car

driver had a valid driver’s license. He had been

involved in two accidents that had resulted in

injuries and in one accident that had resulted in

property damage. One of the accidents that

resulted in injuries happened on October 11,

1994, in the Bronx; the other one happened on

April 5, 1995, in Queens. The accident resulting

in property damage happened on April 28, 1996,

in Westchester County. He had also been cited

for disobeying a traffic control device in

Manhattan on March 6, 1996.

His toxicology test was negative for alcohol

and other specified drugs.3

 After the accident, he

was found in the rear seat of his vehicle,

suggesting that he was trying to escape from the

vehicle and fire, evidence that he was not

seriously injured immediately after the collision.

The Safety Board could not determine the

cause of the car driver’s actions. He could have

(1) stopped for the red light, (2) reduced his

speed while he was approaching the truck,

and/or (3) applied his brakes soon enough to

avoid the collision. Instead, for unknown

reasons, he continued driving until his car struck

the truck. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes

that the car driver’s actions were inappropriate

and caused the accident.

Motor Carrier

Mystic is an interstate common carrier, a

New York corporation that has served New

York and New Jersey with flammable and

combustible petroleum products since 1973.

Mystic is registered with New York and New

Jersey, the Department of Transportation

(DOT), the Federal Highway Administration’s

(FHWA’s) Office of Motor Carriers, and the

Research and Special Programs Administration4

(RSPA) as a hazardous materials carrier.

 

3

Cocaine (metabolites), amphetamine, cannabinoid

carboxy, opiates, and phencyclidine.

4

RSPA is a regulatory agency within the DOT; RSPA
11

Mystic is associated with Mystic Transportation, Inc., which is also an interstate common

carrier of dry non-bulk goods. The same principal owns both companies, and they share mechanics, vehicles, and drivers. The companies

employ about 175 drivers and operate 24 hours a

day, 7 days a week, making deliveries to residential and commercial customers. Mystic owns

157 truck tractors, 220 cargo tank semitrailers,

and 57 straight tank trucks, which travel a total

of approximately 9.6 million miles a year.

All Mystic drivers are required to participate in random and “for cause” drug screens. In

his time with Mystic, the truckdriver had passed

one drug screen that was part of his bi-

 

promulgates hazardous materials regulations in Title 49

Code of Federal Regulations.

annual medical examination and four random

drug screens that were for the drugs, including

cocaine, that are specified in DOT regulations.5

(The drug screens were on November 16, 1993,

March 10, 1994, November 2, 1995, and June

11, 1996.)

Although the truckdriver tested positive for

cocaine after the accident, the Safety Board

believes that the motor carrier screened its

drivers for drugs in accordance with applicable

regulations. Since 1993, the truckdriver had

been tested for drugs five times. Each time, the

results were negative. Thus, Mystic, through its

drug screening program, had made a reasonable

effort to oversee the truckdriver.

 

5

Cocaine (metabolites), amphetamine, cannabinoid

carboxy, opiates, and phencyclidine.
12

While investigating the Yonkers accident,

the Safety Board found that the accident’s most

significant element was not its cause, but its

severity. A similar error on the part of a car

driver might have had far less serious

consequences—such as some damage to the car

and truck, slight injuries, or both. In this case,

however, one person died and the property

damage was substantial. The crucial difference

was the presence of gasoline in the loading

lines. Therefore, the Safety Board considered

whether and how the effects of the accident

could have been reduced.

Most MC-306 and DOT-406 cargo tanks

used to transport petroleum distillate fuels are

loaded through bottom loading lines and then

operated on the roads with cargo in these lines.

However, because of their design, location, and

vulnerability to being hit by other vehicles on

the road, the practice of transporting hazardous

materials in loading lines significantly increases

the potential seriousness of any accident

because cargo may be released from the

damaged lines.

Safety Board investigators demonstrated the

vulnerability of loading lines by placing 12

passenger vehicles (varying in type and size)

near the loading lines of a cargo tank that was

similar to the accident cargo tank. Each vehicle

was placed so that the angle between it and the

truck was approximately the same as the angle

between the accident car and the accident truck.

The investigators found that each of the 12

vehicles would have struck the loading lines of

the truck had the vehicle moved forward. (See

figure 7.) Therefore, the Safety Board believes

that most vehicles currently in use are capable

of striking the loading lines of cargo tanks.

Five months after this accident, the Safety

Board investigated a similar accident that

happened on February 15, 1998, in Wilmington,

Delaware. A 1995 Freightliner tractor pulling a

Heil MC-306 cargo tank carrying 8,900 gallons

of gasoline was on I-495. As the truck crossed a

bridge, the right front of the tractor struck the

left rear of a 1988 Chevrolet parked on the right

shoulder, pushing it into a concrete barrier bordering the shoulder of the bridge. A fire ensued

that destroyed the car and moderately damaged

the truck. The car occupant was killed by the

impact; the truckdriver was not injured. The estimated property damage was $90,000. The

Safety Board determined during its investigation

that three of the four loading lines fractured

during the collision, releasing approximately 12

gallons of gasoline.

In 1978, an FHWA memorandum

established the FHWA policy of allowing

gasoline to be carried in loading lines because of

“economic and practicality considerations.”

In 1985, RSPA issued a Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM) (Docket Nos. 183 and

183A) that increased bottom accident damage

protection for cargo tanks, including the loading

lines. In the process of developing the final rule,

the RSPA staff prepared an issue option

memorandum in 1988 that discussed the

external piping issue. The internal memo noted:

It is unreasonable and illogical to allow

the piping to be considered as an acceptable container for the transport of

gasoline. Therefore, the petroleum industry’s decision to bottom load in

compliance with the Clean Air Act

[CAA] and their unwillingness or inability to drain the cargo lines has resulted in widespread noncompliance

with the intent and letter of the Hazardous Material Regulations as interpreted

by RSPA for the transportation of gasoline.

When RSPA published its final rule in 1989,

it noted that loading lines are not appropriate

packaging for hazardous materials:

Bottom loading and unloading outlets

on cargo tanks, although very useful,

present the inherent risk that if damaged

the entire contents of the tank may be

released. Piping attached to the outlet

valve is provided with a sacrificial

SAFETY ISSUE
13

Figure 7.—Two views of cars next to loading lines.
14

device that is designed to break under

accident loads.... Because such piping

under the current regulation is not specifically a part of the product containment vessel and is designed to fail in an

accident, RSPA’s position is that piping

between the tank outlet valve and any

loading valves is not an appropriate

packaging for the transportation of hazardous materials.

As a part of the implementation of the

CAA, the Environmental Protection

Agency required that cargo tanks used

in areas operating under the Environmental Protection Agency’s State Implementation Plan for the CAA must be

equipped with a vapor recovery system.

The petroleum industry chose to use

bottom loading in conjunction with tank

top vapor recovery as their method of

compliance with the CAA. All motor

fuels must be metered for tax purposes.

Unfortunately, in implementing this

system the industry did not provide for a

way to drain product from the cargo

tank piping back into the loading facility

and maintain proper accounting for tax

purposes. As a result, cargo tanks are

currently operated with gasoline in

external piping that is designed to fail in

an accident. The operation of cargo

tanks with lading retained in external

piping is generally limited to petroleum

distillate fuels metered for road fuel tax

purposes and transported in bottom

loaded MC-306 type cargo tanks. The

scope of these operations encompasses

the vast majority of all gasoline transported.

RSPA strongly believes the practice of

transporting hazardous materials in exposed unprotected piping designed to

fail, if impacted in an accident, is an

unnecessary risk.... Accordingly, RSPA

proposed in the NPRM a prohibition on

the transportation of hazardous materials in external piping unless the piping

is protected by very substantial guards.

Commenters for the petroleum industry,

represented by the American Petroleum

Institute (API)6

 and several large petroleum companies, argued that the need

for bottom damage protection structures

to protect piping containing lading is

not justified. They argued that, based on

statistical data showing the infrequency

of accidents involving these lines, the

relatively small amounts of product exposed, and the integrity and operation of

current self-closing valves, the loss of

lading from piping is not a significant

problem. [Footnote added.]

RSPA agrees that accidents resulting in

damage to unprotected external piping

carrying lading are infrequent, but the

consequences of such accidents can be

substantial, particularly if the material

released has inherent hazards greater

than that of gasoline....[W]ith the exception of gasoline, the transportation of

hazardous materials in external unprotected piping is prohibited. For hazardous materials other than gasoline, transportation in external unprotected piping

is less common and thus the prohibition

of such transportation will have a much

lower cost impact. However, if the

transportation of gasoline in external

unprotected piping were prohibited, the

impact on the petroleum industry could

be substantial.

Although we have very serious concerns

with the practice of transporting gasoline in external unprotected piping, we

do not have sufficient data regarding incidents that can be attributed to the dislodging of piping to justify prohibiting

the practice for gasoline at this time.

Nor do we have adequate information

concerning possible alternative procedures or equipment for accomplishing

vapor recovery and road fuel tax

metering and the costs associated with

these alternatives. Many of the potential

cost effective ways to eliminate the risk

 

6

The API is the trade association that represents the

petroleum industry in exploration and production,

transportation, refining, and marketing.
15

associated with the transportation of

gasoline in external unprotected line

may entail alterations to the cargo tank

piping, fixed loading and unloading

equipment, or both. For these reasons

we are excepting gasoline from the prohibition on the transportation of hazardous materials in external unprotected

piping. However, we encourage the petroleum industry to consider the risk

they accept in employing this practice,

and work to eliminate it. We believe the

petroleum industry is best positioned to

consider and evaluate all the possible

ways to eliminate this risk in the most

cost effective manner.

In response to RSPA’s encouragement to

eliminate this practice, the API analyzed the

risks of carrying hazardous materials in loading

lines. It reported to RSPA in 1994 that:

The analysis of wet line [loading line]

accident statistics indicates that the

probability is quite low that a fatality

will be directly attributable to a wet line

failure in an MC-306 tank truck accident. Twenty-four of the 25 MC-306

accidents involving wet line releases did

not result in an injury (11 years of data).

The wet lines are most vulnerable to

side-on impacts.... The majority of reported wet line spills are under 20 gallons.... For this spill size of 20 gallons

the calculated maximum injury radius is

36 feet. The potentially hazardous areas

are then limited to the immediate vicinity of the tank truck and do not directly

threaten the public in the neighboring

community.

The API also reported that based on the

results of this risk analysis, it had cancelled a

study to evaluate alternate means of loading

cargo tanks that would result in dry loading

lines.

In the interim, RSPA amended the regulations in 1990 to prohibit the transportation of

poison B liquids, oxidizer liquids, liquid organic

peroxides, and liquids corrosive to the skin in

loading lines unless there was adequate bottom

damage protection. The rulemaking permitted

carriers to continue to transport petroleum products and other hazardous materials in loading

lines without bottom damage protection.

The Safety Board concludes that transporting hazardous materials in loading lines creates

a hazardous condition. Therefore, the Safety

Board believes that the DOT should prohibit the

carrying of hazardous materials in external piping of cargo tanks, such as loading lines, that

may be vulnerable to failure in an accident.

The statistics that RSPA used in developing

its 1989 Final Rule came from the Hazardous

Materials Information System (HMIS), managed

by the DOT’s Office of Hazardous Materials

Safety. The HMIS is a data base of information

taken from Hazardous Materials Incident

Reports, the reports that interstate motor carriers

must file when hazardous materials are released

from packaging, including cargo tanks

Safety Board investigators reviewed the

HMIS data from January 1990 through August

1997 involving MC-306 cargo tanks. During this

period, 501 incidents were reported as

accidents; 47 involved loading line failures

caused by impact. Of the 47 failures, 27

involved collisions with other vehicles; 16

involved trucks hitting stationary objects; and 4

involved overturned vehicles.

While interstate carriers are currently

required to report hazardous materials releases,

wholly intrastate carriers are not. Therefore, the

data reviewed may not include all loading line

failures during accidents.

The Safety Board in its Cargo Tank

Rollover Protection Special Investigation Report dated February 4, 1992, noted, “In addition

to the underreporting of accidents, inadequately

reported and recorded information can also

mask trends or a specific pattern of performance.” The Yonkers accident is an example of

an inadequately reported and recorded accident.

The incident was reported to RSPA, but the

Hazardous Materials Incident Report did not

identify the incident as a loading line packaging

failure. Instead, the motor carrier marked

“other” on the report. In the description of

events, the motor carrier stated, “motorist collided with tanker.” The Safety Board’s Cargo

Tank Rollover Protection Special Investigation
16

Report concluded, “The FHWA and RSPA

accident data bases are not adequate to identify

important trends or potential problems related to

the design and construction of bulk, liquid cargo

tanks.” Therefore, the Safety Board believes that

the number of loading line accidents may be

underrepresented in the HMIS data base.

In its Cargo Tank Rollover Protection Special Investigation Report the Safety Board recommended that RSPA:

H-92-6

Implement, in cooperation with the

FHWA, a program to collect information necessary to identify patterns of

cargo tank equipment failures, including

the reporting of all accidents involving a

DOT specification cargo tank.

The Safety Board also recommended that

the FHWA:

H-92-9

Implement, in cooperation with RSPA, a

program to collect information necessary to identify patterns of cargo tank

equipment failures, including the reporting of all accidents involving a DOT

specification cargo tank.

On January 21, 1998, the FHWA responded

that it and RSPA agreed with the Safety Board

and were pursuing methods to improve the data

collection and analysis. The FHWA said the two

agencies were (1) revising the Hazardous Materials Incident Reports to identify patterns of

cargo tank failures; (2) developing a commercial

motor vehicle crash reconstruction course

that included a segment designed to educate investigators about documenting damage to cargo

tanks; and (3) requiring their field staffs to report significant crashes involving fatalities,

multiple injuries, road closures in excess of 4

hours, fire, explosions, evacuations, and other

significant occurrences involving cargo tanks.

The FHWA stated that it ultimately expected

these efforts to identify unsafe trends and to

measure the success of its safety programs.

The Safety Board is disappointed that after

6 years action has not been completed to identify and collect information needed to evaluate

cargo tanks and include this information on

RSPA and FHWA reports. The Safety Board

urges RSPA and the FHWA to expedite action

on these recommendations. Safety Recommendations H-92-6 and H-92-9 are classified

“Open—Unacceptable Response.” The Safety

Board reiterates Safety Recommendations H-92-

6 and -9.

The Safety Board is unable to determine the

number of MC-306 and DOT-406 cargo tanks

currently in use. None of the government

agencies or industry associations, including the

FHWA, RSPA, the API, the Truck Trailer

Manufacturers Association,7

 and the National

Tank Truck Carriers,8

 are able to provide an

accurate count. In 1984, Dynamic Sciences

estimated for the DOT that the MC-306 cargo

tank population was approximately 57,900.

However, based on comments from the industry

during this investigation, the Safety Board

believes that the current number of MC-306 and

DOT-406 cargo tanks is larger than the 1984

estimate suggests.

 

7

The Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association is a

trade association. Its purpose is to establish confidence

between truck trailer, cargo tank, and intermodal container

manufacturers and their suppliers to bring about a mutual

understanding of the problems confronting all

manufacturers.

8

The National Tank Truck Carriers is a trade

association. It represents and promotes the interests of the

highway bulk transportation community before the U.S.

Congress and other Federal agencies.
17

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The car driver would have survived the

accident had there not been a fire.

2. The car struck and fractured one or more of

the loading lines of the cargo tank, thus

releasing up to 28 gallons of gasoline.

3. Had the loading lines been empty, the fire

would likely not have occurred.

4. When the truckdriver made his U-turn, he

could not have seen the car.

5. The truckdriver’s use of cocaine did not

cause or contribute to the accident.

6. The car driver’s actions were inappropriate

and caused the accident.

7. Transporting hazardous materials in loading

lines creates a hazardous condition.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

The National Transportation Safety Board

determines that the probable cause of this

accident was the failure of the car driver to (1)

stop for the red light or (2) reduce his speed or

(3) apply his brakes soon enough to avoid the

collision. Contributing to the severity of the

accident was the fire resulting from the release

of gasoline that the cargo tank’s loading lines

were carrying, as permitted by the U.S.

Department of Transportation.

FINDINGS
18

As a result of its investigation of this

accident, the National Transportation Safety

Board makes the following safety

recommendation.

--to the Secretary of Transportation:

Prohibit the carrying of hazardous

materials in external piping of cargo

tanks, such as loading lines, that may be

vulnerable to failure in an accident.

(H-98-27)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

May 5, 1998

RECOMMENDATION
19

Table 1: Time and Distance for the Eagle Premier:

Eagle Premier

Speed a

Approximate Distance

to Impact Area

Calculated

Time

35 mph (51.3 fps) 680 feet 13.3 seconds

40 mph (58.6 fps) 680 feet 11.6 seconds

45 mph (65.9 fps) 680 feet 10.3 seconds

50 mph (73.3 fps) 680 feet 9.3 seconds

a. Assumes a constant velocity for the passenger car.

Table 2: Time and Distance for the Exemplar Truck

Distance Truck Traveled

from a Stop to Impact Area

Measured

Time

Calculated Acceleration

Rate/Factor

176ft 17.17 sec 1.2/0.04

176 ft 15.27 sec 1.5/0.05

176ft 14.56 sec 1.6/0.05

176 ft 13.53 sec 1.9/0.06

176 ft 12.44 sec 2.3/0.07

Average 14.60 sec 1.6/0.05

APPENDIX
20

Table 3: Relative Time and Distance to Impact Area

Truck Eagle Premier Speed/Velocity Time

176 ft 749 ft 35 mph/51.3 fps 14.6 sec

176 ft 856 ft 40 mph/58.6 fps 14.6 sec

176 ft 962 ft 45 mph/65.9 fps 14.6 sec

176 ft 1070 ft 50 mph/73.3 fps 14.6 sec

Additional Calculation Information

According to the profile drawings of Central

Park Avenue that Yonkers gave the Safety Board,

the apex of the vertical curve was about 835 feet

from the position of the truck while it was

stopped in the U-turn. Safety Board investigators

measured the height from the ground to a position

relative to the center of the passenger side

window, representing the truckdriver’s seated

height; which was approximately 7 feet 9 inches

above the ground. With the truck stopped at the

U-turn, the driver’s field of view, looking

northbound through the passenger side window,

would be 2 feet 3 inches below the crest of the

hill.

Calculations were made to determine where

the Eagle Premier would have been 14.6

seconds before the accident and whether it

would have been visible to the truckdriver.

Several factors were considered in arriving at

appropriate speed estimates. First, the witness

estimated the speed of the Eagle Premier as

between 40 to 45 mph; second, the speed limit

on Central Park Avenue is 40 mph; and third,

the Eagle Premier driver was late for work.

Given this information, speed estimates ranging

from of 35 mph to 50 mph were used.