J-A01027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CAROLE THACKRAY-TADLEY AND 

WALTER THACKRAY 

Appellants

v.

WTA REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT 

COMPANY, WOODHAVEN 

INVESTMENT TRUST COMPANY, 

THACKRAY, INC., SOUTH JERSEY 

EQUIPMENT RENTAL AND REPAIR, 

INC., ORTHODOX STREET 

PROPERTIES, LLC, JAMES THACKRAY, 

COMLY STREET, LLC, CHARTER ROAD 

REALTY, LLC, BUENA BUSINESS 

PARK, LLC AND 7777 BREWSTER, LLC 

______________________________

CAROLE THACKRAY-TADLEY AND 

WALTER THACKRAY 

Appellants

v.

JAMES THACKRAY, WTA REAL ESTATE 

MANAGEMENT COMPANY, 

WOODHAVEN INVESTMENT TRUST 

COMPANY, THACKRAY, INC., SOUTH 

JERSEY EQUIPMENT RENTAL AND 

REPAIR, INC., ORTHODOX STREET 

PROPERTIES, LLC, COMLY STREET, 

LLC, CHARTER ROAD REALTY, LLC, 

BUENA BUSINESS PARK, LLC AND 

7777 BREWSTER, LLC

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1664 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 200500722, 

210202061
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BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2023

Appellants Carole Thackray-Tadley and Walter Thackray appeal from the 

order granting the motion to compel filed by Appellee WTA Real Estate 

Management Co., et al (collectively Appellees). Appellants argue that the trial 

court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to compel discovery because there 

are alternative sources for the information sought and the order in question 

failed to adequately protect Appellants’ privacy rights. Following our review, 

we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:

Thackray Crane Rental (“TCR”) is a family-owned business that 

operates a crane rental company. TCR made investments in 

commercial properties for the purposes of storing its equipment 

and created single purpose entities to hold title to the properties 

with TCR as the tenant. [Appellants], percentage owners of []

TCR and the single purpose entities, bring case captioned 

Thackray et. al. v. WTA Real Estate Management, et. al., 

2005-722 to dissolve [Appellees,] WTA Real Estate Management 

Realty, LLC (“WTA”) and Orthodox Street Properties, LLC (“OSP”) 

alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, oppression, illegality, 

mismanagement, incompetence, disregard for affairs and 

corporate formalities, failing to act in the best interests of the 

companies and owners and failing to fulfill the entities stated 

purpose. Additionally, [Appellants] bring case captioned 

Thackray et. al. v. Thackray, et. al., 2102-2061 against their 

four siblings and entities alleging breach of contract, breach of 

fiduciary duty, shareholder oppression, illegality, 

mismanagement, and disregard for corporate form.
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In these actions, [Appellants] alleged that a 1033 Exchange[1]

made in connection with a condemnation of property owned by 

OSP by the city of Philadelphia in 2012 is flawed. In discovery, 

[Appellees] propounded discovery on [Appellants] seeking copies 

of their personal income tax returns for the years 2012, 2015[,]

and 2018, and any other year in which [Appellants] made any 

reports relating to the condemnation and/or 1033 Exchange. The 

production of [Appellants’] 2012, 2015[,] and 2018 tax returns 

was the subject of prior discovery practice as evidenced by this 

court’s orders dated April 14, 2021, July 21, 2021, and November 

16, 2021. 

On December 21, 2021, [Appellants] served supplemental 

responses and objections to [Appellees’] first set of requests for 

production of documents and objected to producing the tax 

returns for [Appellants] for the years 2012, 2015[,] and 2018 on 

the grounds that the requests sought “confidential, personal, 

financial information.” On March 25, 2022, [Appellees] filed a 

motion to compel the production of the tax returns and requested 

sanctions. [Appellants] filed a response in opposition and on April 

26, 2022, the court heard oral argument. After hearing the 

parties’ arguments and reviewing the parties’ papers, the court on 

April 26, 2022[,] granted [Appellees’] motion to compel and 

ordered [Appellants] to provide their income tax returns for the 

years 2012, 2015[,] and 2018 within ten days of docketing the 

order. Additionally, the court ordered that [Appellants] provide 

all tax information related to reporting to the IRS and ordered that 

all production was confidential and for attorneys’ eyes only.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/22, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).

____________________________________________

1 The term “1033 Exchange” refers to an exchange of property under Section 

1033 of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 1033. Under certain 

circumstances, Section 1033 allows taxpayers to defer tax liability on a 

property that is involuntarily converted due to destruction or loss of the 

property through casualty, theft, or condemnation action pursuant to 

government powers of eminent domain, and the resulting compensation from 

such destruction or condemnation. See 26 U.S.C. § 1033(a).
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Appellants subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal and a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) 

opinion addressing Appellants’ claims.

On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in entering an order compelling 

the production of personal tax returns where the information 

sought is available from other sources, including deposition?

2. Whether the trial court erred in entering an order which 

compels the production of individuals’ tax returns and other tax 

information but allows opposing counsel to use those tax 

returns in separate actions against the individuals and in other 

business disputes against the individuals?

Appellants’ Brief at 9.

Before addressing Appellants’ claims, we must determine whether the 

trial court’s discovery order is appealable. It is well settled that questions 

concerning the appealability of an order implicate our jurisdiction. See

Jacksonian v. Temple Univ. Health Sys. Found., 862 A.2d 1275, 1279 

(Pa. Super. 2004). Generally, an appeal to our Court lies only from a final 

order. See Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 215 (Pa. Super. 2018); see 

also 42 Pa.C.S. § 742). A final order is any order that “disposes of all claims 

and of all parties[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). “Generally, discovery orders are 

deemed interlocutory and not immediately appealable, because they do not 

dispose of the litigation.” McIlmail v. Archdiocese of Phila., 189 A.3d 

1100, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2018). 
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However, an order is appealable if it satisfies the requirements for an

appealable collateral order under Pa.R.A.P. 313. This Court has held that the 

collateral order doctrine applies when an order “1) is separable from and 

collateral to the main cause of action; 2) involves a right too important to be 

denied review; and 3) presents a question that, if review is postponed until 

final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” In re 

Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 51 A.3d 224, 230 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted). “Absent the satisfaction of all three prongs of the collateral order 

test, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of an otherwise nonfinal order.” Spanier v. Freeh, 95 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Separable Claim

“For the first prong of the analysis under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b), a court must 

determine whether the issue(s) raised in the order are separable from the 

central issue of the ongoing litigation.” Bogdan v. American Legion Post 

153 Home Assoc., 257 A.3d 751, 755 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

“[I]f the resolution of an issue concerning a challenged trial court order can 

be achieved independent from an analysis of the merits of the underlying 

dispute, then the order is separable for purposes of determining whether the 

order is a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313.” Commonwealth v. 

Kennedy, 876 A.2d 939, 943 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court’s discovery order is separable from the main cause 

of action because it is possible to address the discoverability of Appellants’
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individual tax returns without analyzing the parties’ underlying claims 

regarding the dissolution of the single-purpose entities, Appellees’ alleged 

breach of fiduciary duty, or the validity of the 1033 property exchange by OSP. 

See Kennedy, 876 A.2d at 943. Therefore, we conclude that the order 

compelling Appellants to produce their individual tax returns is separable from 

and collateral to the underlying cause of action. See Bogdan, 257 A.3d at 

755. Accordingly, the order satisfies the first prong, and we proceed to the 

second part of the test.

Important Right

“Under the second prong, in order to be considered too important to be 

denied review, the issue presented must involve rights deeply rooted in public 

policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Bogdan, 257 A.3d at 

755 (citation omitted). Further, this Court has explained that “[a]n issue is 

important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without 

immediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the 

efficiency interests sought to be advanced by the final judgment rule.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

Here, we conclude that Appellants fulfill the second prong, importance, 

because they have a significant privacy interest in their individual tax returns. 

See Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Speer, 241 A.3d 1191, 1197 (Pa. Super. 

2020) (concluding that a discovery order met the importance prong of the 

collateral order test because the defendants had “a significant privacy interest 

in their tax returns” (citations omitted)); Dougherty v. Heller, 138 A.3d 611, 
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629 n.10 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam) (reiterating that individuals have “privacy 

interest in information contained in federal tax returns. . . . Such information 

is made confidential per federal statute” (citations omitted)); J.S. v. Whetzel, 

860 A.2d 1112, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2004) (finding that a defense witness’s 

privacy interest in the information contained in federal 1099 tax forms raised 

a “sufficiently important public policy concern” for purposes of the collateral 

order doctrine). Therefore, we will proceed to the third part of the collateral 

order test.

Irreparable Harm

The third prong of the collateral order test concerns “whether a right is

adequately vindicable or effectively reviewable, simply cannot be answered 

without a judgment about the value interests that would be lost through 

rigorous application of a final judgment requirement.” Bogdan, 257 A.3d at 

756 (citation omitted).

Appellants meet the third prong, irreparable harm, because Appellants’

privacy rights in their individual tax returns will be irreparably lost if review of 

this question is postponed until final judgment in this case. See Linde v. 

Linde, 222 A.3d 776, 786 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that the discovery 

order met the third prong of the collateral order doctrine because, “once [the 

defendants’] personal financial information has been disclosed to [the 

plaintiff], [the defendants’] privacy interests in that information will have been 

lost – and the action cannot be undone” (citation omitted)). Therefore, we

conclude that the trial court’s discovery order, directing Appellants to produce 
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their individual tax returns, is appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 

See Bogdan, 257 A.3d at 755-56. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to 

consider Appellant’s claims on appeal.

Substantive Claims

Both of Appellant’s claims challenge the trial court’s discovery order.2 

Specifically, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in compelling the 

production of personal tax returns where the information is available from 

other sources. Appellants’ Brief at 4-7. Further, Appellants contend that the 

trial court’s order failed to adequately protect Appellants’ privacy rights and 

allows Appellees to use those records in separate actions unrelated to the 

instant litigation. Id.

“In reviewing the propriety of a discovery order, we determine whether 

the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and, to the extent that we are 

faced with questions of law, our scope of review is plenary.” Pasquini v. 

Fairmount Behav. Health Sys., 230 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation omitted). 

____________________________________________

2 Appellees argue that Appellants waived their challenges to the trial court’s 

discovery order because Appellants raised these claims for the first time in 

their motion for reconsideration. See Appellees’ Brief at 20-21. However, 

the record reflects that Appellants challenged the discoverability of their tax 

returns in their response to Appellees’ motion to compel. See Appellants’

Resp. in Opp’n to Appellees’ Mot. to Compel, 4/8/22. Additionally, because 

the trial court did not issue a ruling at the hearing on Appellees’ motion, 

Appellants had no basis to object to the discovery order at that time. See

N.T. Hr’g, 4/26/22, at 14. Therefore, we conclude that Appellants preserved 

these issues by raising them before the trial court and in their motion for 

reconsideration after the trial court issued the order granting Appellees’ 

motion.
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Rule 4003.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, 

in general, “a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 

which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action[.]” 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.1(a). Although parties have a significant privacy interest in 

their individual tax returns, this Court has stated that “the right to privacy . . 

. is not an unqualified one; it must be balanced against weighty competing 

private and state interests.” Cabot Oil, 241 A.3d at 1200 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Further, this Court has explained that trial courts 

“can and should craft discovery orders that strike a proper balance between 

[a defendant’s] privacy interests and the rights of other parties.” Id.

Here, the trial court addressed the disclosure of Appellants’ individual 

tax returns follows:

As it relates to tax returns, public policy considers tax returns as 

confidential communications between the taxpayer and the 

government and thus favors their nondisclosure. Pennsylvania 

courts have outlined a two-part test to determine the 

discoverability of tax returns. The tax returns must be (1) 

relevant; and (2) a compelling need for such documentation must 

exist because the information is not available elsewhere. Here, 

[Appellants’] 2012, 2015[,] and 2018 tax returns are relevant and 

are not available elsewhere except from [Appellants].

The tax returns ordered to be produced are [Appellants’] tax 

returns for the years 2012, 2015, and 2018, the relevant years 

associated with the 1033 Exchange as alleged in the complaints 

in this consolidated action. . . . [Appellants] allege that the 

transaction is flawed and by inference any benefits received by 

the members of OSP, [Appellants] and [Appellees], because of the 

1033 Exchange are improper. While [Appellants] claim 

[Appellees] are already in possession of [information concerning] 

whether [Appellants] received a benefit from the 1033 Exchange 

since [Appellees] prepared the [K-1 tax forms] for [Appellants], 
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[Appellees] do not know what [Appellants] reported to the IRS. 

In fact, [Appellants] deny they received any benefit from the 1033 

Exchange. Whether [Appellants] received a benefit from the 1033 

Exchange is relevant and the information is only available in 

[Appellants’] 2012, 2015[,] and 2018 tax returns.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.

Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion in ordering Appellants to produce their full individual tax 

returns for 2012, 2015, and 2018. See Pasquini, 230 A.3d at 1194. First, 

we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants’ tax returns were 

the only source for information about the benefit Appellants received from the 

1033 Exchange. Indeed, Appellees concede in their brief that such information 

could be obtained through alternative sources. See Appellees’ Brief at 17-18. 

Additionally, although portions of Appellants’ tax returns may have contained 

information concerning the 1033 Exchange, the trial court did not appear to 

weigh Appellees’ right to that information with Appellants’ privacy interest in 

their personal tax returns. See Cabot Oil, 241 A.3d at 1200. Indeed, the 

trial court could have structured the discovery order to provide Appellees with 

access to relevant information without undermining Appellants’ right to 

privacy. See id. For these reasons, we vacate the trial court’s discovery order 

and remand for further proceedings.

On remand, we direct the trial court to fashion an appropriate discovery 

order which will permit Appellees to obtain information specific to the 1033 

Exchange, but which will protect the confidentiality of unrelated information

contained in Appellants’ personal tax returns. In crafting its discovery order, 
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the trial court shall consider whether information concerning the 1033 

Exchange may be obtained from sources other than Appellants’ individual tax 

returns. If the trial court concludes that it is necessary for Appellants to 

produce their individual tax returns, the trial court shall determine the method 

and manner in which Appellants’ confidential information will be excised or 

redacted from the documents prior to production.

Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/16/2023