GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans’ 

Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m., 

EDT, Wednesday, 

June 23, 1999

COMBATING TERRORISM

Use of National Guard 

Response Teams Is Unclear

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, National Security 

Preparedness Issues, National Security and International 

Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here to discuss our report,1

 which this Subcommittee 

is releasing today, on the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial 

Detection (RAID) teams. The Department of Defense (DOD) is creating the 

teams to assist local and state authorities in assessing situations 

surrounding weapons of mass destruction emergencies (WMD),2

 advise 

these authorities regarding appropriate actions, and facilitate requests for 

assistance to expedite the arrival of additional state and federal military 

assets. As you know, over the past 3 years we have studied and reported on 

a number of issues concerning federal agencies’ programs and activities to 

combat terrorism for this Subcommittee and Representative Ike Skelton. 

For example, we reported in September 1997 that many federal agencies 

had duplicative or overlapping capabilities and missions in combating acts 

of terrorism,3

 including incidents involving WMD. We have also reported 

that the many and increasing number of participants and programs in the 

evolving counter-terrorism area across the federal government pose a 

difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program 

duplication, fragmentation, and gaps.

After a brief summary, my testimony will address three issues in more 

detail. First, I will describe the role of the RAID teams in response plans as 

understood by local, state, and federal officials. Second, I will discuss 

other response assets that can perform similar functions to the RAID 

teams. Finally, I will discuss the RAID teams’ responsibilities and how they 

plan to meet these responsibilities.

Summary While DOD has defined the specific mission for the RAID teams, the plans 

for these relatively new teams and their implementation continue to evolve. 

We found that there are differing views among federal and state officials on 

the role and use of the RAID teams and how they will fit into state and 

federal plans to respond to WMD incidents. Among the principal federal 

1

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, 

May 21, 1999).

2For purposes of this testimony, weapons of mass destruction are defined as biological, chemical, or 

radiological weapons.

3

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy

(GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

agencies involved, Army officials believe the teams can be valuable assets 

to federal authorities, if needed, as part of the federal response plan. They 

also believe that the teams will be a critical and integral part of the state 

and local response to such weapons. In contrast, officials with the two 

agencies responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist 

incidents--the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--do not see a role for the RAID 

teams in the federal response. They question the need for the RAID teams 

because of the federal structure already available to respond to WMD 

incidents. Instead, they see the National Guard, whether in state or federal 

status, responding with personnel and equipment as it does for natural 

disasters and other emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state 

level. Officials in some states without a RAID team question the teams’ 

utility primarily because of their response time; however, officials from a 

state with a RAID team are very enthusiastic about the concept and are 

making plans to use their team.

There are numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can perform 

similar functions to the RAID teams. For example, there are over 600 local 

and state hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams in the United States that 

assess and take appropriate actions in incidents almost daily involving 

highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials. As we 

discussed in our November 1998 report to this Subcommittee,4

 the 

Domestic Preparedness Program is providing teams from the largest 120 

cities in the United States with the opportunity to expand their capabilities 

to counter WMD incidents. In addition, there are numerous military and 

federal civilian organizations that can help local incident commanders deal 

with WMD incidents by providing advice, technical experts, and equipment.

Local, state, and federal officials expressed a number of concerns about the 

teams’ abilities to meet their mission and responsibilities. The most 

significant and frequently mentioned is the time it would take the RAID 

teams to respond to calls for assistance. Other concerns centered on 

recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues. For example, 

some officials believe that it will be difficult to fill vacancies in the highly 

specialized positions on the RAID teams and that the members of the teams 

will not get the type and level of training needed to maintain proficiency in 

the technical skills and team skills. DOD believes that no “show-stopping” 

4

See our report Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program

Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998) for a discussion of this program.
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

training or operational issues have been identified to date. For example, 

because of the significant number of exercises conducted by federal, state, 

and local authorities, they believe there will be ample opportunities for the 

teams to exercise their skills.

These issues further point to the need for a more focused and coordinated 

approach to the U.S. response to attacks involving WMD--an approach that 

capitalizes on existing capabilities, minimizes unnecessary duplication of 

activities and programs, and focuses funding on the highest priority 

requirements. Because of the differing views on the role and use of the 

RAID teams, the numerous organizations that can perform similar 

functions, and the potential operational issues that could impact the teams, 

our report recommends that the appropriate federal agencies determine 

the need for the teams before proceeding to expand the program in more 

states.

Background Operationally, federal efforts to combat terrorism are organized along a 

lead agency concept. The Department of Justice, through the FBI, is 

responsible for crisis management of domestic terrorist incidents and for 

pursuing, arresting, and prosecuting the terrorists. State governments have 

primary responsibility for managing the consequences of domestic 

disasters, including major terrorist incidents; however, the federal 

government can support state and local authorities if they lack the 

capabilities to respond adequately. FEMA manages this federal support 

through a generic disaster contingency plan known as the Federal 

Response Plan, which outlines the roles, responsibilities, and emergency 

support functions of various federal agencies, including DOD, for 

consequence management. The National Coordinator for Security, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, created in May 1998 by 

Presidential Decision Directive 62, is responsible for coordinating the 

broad variety of relevant policies and programs, including such areas as 

counter-terrorism, preparedness, and consequence management for WMD.

According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives and firearms 

continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. Many familiar with 

industrial chemicals, such as officials from the FBI, the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), the Coast Guard, and local HAZMAT teams, 

believe that industrial chemicals may also be a weapon of choice in 

terrorist attacks because they can be easily obtained and dispersed. They 

believe that terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological 

weapons than conventional explosives, at least partly because these 
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

materials are more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable. 

Agency officials have noted that terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons is the 

least likely scenario, although the consequences could be disastrous. 

According to the FBI, the threat from chemical and biological weapons is 

low, but some groups and individuals of concern are beginning to show 

interest in such weapons.

This fiscal year, DOD started fielding 10 RAID teams. According to Army 

officials, the Secretary of Defense plans that the RAID teams will be 

dedicated forces for domestic incidents. The initial 10 teams are located in 

Washington, California, Colorado, Texas, Illinois, Missouri, Georgia, 

Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. Each of these states is within 

a defined FEMA region and was selected based on state demographics, 

proximity to Air National Guard units that could provide airlift, presence of 

other federal/military assets, transportation networks, and other criteria. 

Consideration was also given to the level of congressional interest in the 

teams’ locations. Currently, the team is an asset of the state in which it is 

located, but can be deployed as a regional asset to other states. The DOD 

plan that created the teams suggested that there eventually should be a 

RAID team in each state, territory, and the District of Columbia, for a total 

of 54 teams. Until this occurs, the Army Guard is establishing RAID (Light) 

teams in the other 44 locations to provide limited chemical/biological 

response capabilities.

The Army Guard is responsible for implementing the concept and has 

developed the plans for organizing, staffing, training, and equipping the 

teams for their mission. State National Guard organizations receiving the 

teams are hiring and training personnel in their individual skills. The 

10 RAID teams are scheduled to be operational in January 2000. Funding 

for the teams will be through the Army Guard and includes personnel costs 

for the full-time positions, as well as training, equipment, and maintenance 

costs. DOD allocated about $52 million for the RAID program in fiscal year 

1999 and has requested about $37 million for fiscal year 2000. Specifically, 

DOD allocated about $19.9 million from the fiscal year 1999 Defense 

Appropriations Act for the first year of the program, which covered the 

startup costs for the first 10 teams. An omnibus supplemental 

appropriation followed, from which DOD allocated an additional 

$19.2 million for RAID team equipment and $13 million to establish the 

RAID (Light) teams. The DOD budget request for fiscal year 2000 includes 

about $37.2 million to support the 10 existing RAID teams and create 

5 more. It also includes about $0.5 million to support the RAID (Light) 

teams.
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Each RAID team is to be staffed with 22 full-time National Guard members 

organized into 6 functions: command, operations, administration and 

logistics, communication, medical, and survey. Members are to be on call 

24 hours a day, 365 days a year. All but the survey function have a primary 

mission of RAID team support. For example, the medical unit primarily 

provides medical support to RAID personnel, but can provide guidance to 

the incident commander on the medical implications of a WMD event and 

coordinate with health care facilities for follow-on support requirements. 

Each function will have personnel trained to perform their particular 

mission. There will be two survey units that have the mission of 

conducting search, survey, surveillance, and sampling of a WMD incident 

site and advising the incident commander of appropriate response 

protocols. Members are to be cross-trained so that a full unit can be fielded 

at any one time.

Differing Views on the 

Role and Use of 

National Guard RAID 

Teams in Response 

Plans

In designing the RAID teams, Army officials stated they tried to create a 

capability that would detect and identify WMD, which is critical to any 

effective response effort, and according to these officials, was missing from 

most local and state response units. According to these officials, having 

the RAID team in the National Guard gives the state governor an asset that 

can be rapidly deployed to provide this initial WMD detection and 

identification support, as well as technical advice on handling WMD 

incidents, to the local incident commander. Also, according to these 

officials, it is less expensive to have one state asset trained and equipped to 

deploy with this capability than to train and equip every HAZMAT team in 

the state. Other advantages cited include using the teams to identify and 

test new concepts and equipment in WMD detection and identification and 

filling a very important force protection role for other National Guard units 

deployed to assist in a WMD emergency.

Officials from the FBI and FEMA are concerned about the RAID team 

concept and how the teams would fit into any federal WMD response. They 

question the need for the RAID teams because of the federal structure 

already available to respond to WMD incidents. The FBI officials are 

concerned about a conflict between the RAID teams and their own 

Hazardous Materials Response Unit or other federal assets, if all arrive with 

the same capabilities and try to give advice to the incident commander. 

FEMA officials are also concerned about the duplication of capabilities 

between the RAID teams and the local and state HAZMAT teams, as well as 

other federal responders involved in the Federal Response Plan.
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Because the RAID teams are just getting established, there is not much 

information about the teams at the state and local levels. Therefore, we 

contacted only a few states, including Pennsylvania, which has a RAID 

team, and major metropolitan areas to obtain their opinion on the RAID 

team concept. Officials from larger local jurisdictions usually have very 

robust HAZMAT capabilities. Many of the officials we spoke with stated 

that they see no use for the RAID teams because their own experienced 

HAZMAT technicians can not only perform sufficient detection and 

identification of WMD chemical agents to begin to handle the situation, but 

also work in the stressful, dangerous environment. They also did not see 

the RAID team providing advice on situation assessment and management, 

which is another of the RAID team missions. These officials consider 

themselves very experienced in managing emergencies that involve 

hazardous chemicals and did not believe the RAID team could suggest 

anything they did not already practice every day. However, some of the 

officials did state that perhaps the RAID teams could be a useful asset for 

those locations with little or no HAZMAT capability. One state official 

stated that the RAID team could bring certain capabilities to a WMD event, 

such as expertise on military agents. Officials from Pennsylvania are not 

only integrating the RAID team into the state’s WMD response plan, but 

also plan to use it to respond to more common HAZMAT emergencies. 

According to DOD, other states have submitted requests for or expressed 

an interest in fielding their own RAID team.

The state and federal officials stated that the National Guard in its 

traditional role of assisting with personnel and equipment in natural 

disasters and other emergencies would be necessary and invaluable in a 

WMD emergency. They, as well as officials from the International 

Association of Fire Chiefs, agreed that the detection and identification 

capabilities in the RAID teams would be better placed in the local 

responder community, since the local responders will be on the scene first 

and need information quicker than the RAID team, or any federal assets, 

could get there to provide. According to some officials, an investment in 

more sophisticated detection and identification equipment and advanced 

training for HAZMAT teams would benefit the teams’ response to all 

HAZMAT emergencies, not just WMD incidents.
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

Similar Capabilities 

Exist at Local, State, 

and Federal Levels

According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, there are over 

600 local and state HAZMAT teams that will be the first to respond to an 

event involving hazardous materials, whether it is a WMD agent, industrial 

chemical, or other material. Although these teams vary in capability, 

ranging from basic to robust, they all have the basic capability to detect and 

identify industrial chemicals and mitigate the effects of a chemical 

emergency, either on their own or with help from nearby jurisdictions, 

private contractors, or federal organizations. Among the federal 

organizations that can help are EPA, Coast Guard, FBI, and DOD response 

teams.

Federal, state, and local officials generally agree that a WMD incident 

involving chemical agents would look like a major HAZMAT emergency. In 

such scenarios, the local HAZMAT team would be the first to respond and 

the local fire chief would usually be the incident commander. HAZMAT 

technicians are trained to detect the presence of highly toxic industrial 

chemicals and can use basic identification techniques and equipment to 

give them sufficient information to begin to assess and respond to the 

situation. For example, the chemical agent sarin is from the same 

organophosphate compound family of chemicals as pesticides. HAZMAT 

technicians can identify this chemical family using readily available kits. 

The technicians are trained and experienced in the protocols used to 

handle this chemical family and can begin to mitigate the chemical 

immediately. The identification of biological agents requires a complex 

process performed in a lab and cannot, as yet, be done on scene by any 

unit, including the RAID teams. However, it is likely that detecting and 

identifying an actual biological agent will involve the medical community 

over a period of days rather than the HAZMAT community or the RAID 

teams over a matter of hours.

If the local responders are unable to manage the situation or are 

overwhelmed, the protocol is for the incident commander to contact 

nearby communities and the state emergency management office for 

assistance. The RAID team could be requested at that point. However, the 

local commander also can access the National Response System hotline, 

which is well publicized and known within the first responder community 

for reporting hazardous material accidents and obtaining advice and/or 

assistance from federal agencies like the FBI, the EPA, and Coast Guard. 

Although the system is primarily to report emergencies involving chemical 

or oil spills, it could also alert federal authorities to what could turn out to 

be a WMD event. If the incident commander suspects that the event is a 
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

WMD incident, they can also call the Chemical and Biological hotline to get 

information or federal assistance. This hotline links the caller to both the 

Army’s Soldier and Biological Chemical Command for advice and the FBI 

to begin the federal response. The incident commander can also call the 

local office of the FBI, which would trigger the federal response.

EPA is responsible for preparing for and responding to emergencies 

involving oil and hazardous substances, including radiological substances, 

for all natural and manmade incidents, including those caused by terrorism. 

The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for the same kinds of incidents as they 

impact the U.S. coastal waters. When a local or state responder calls via 

the National Response System for EPA or Coast Guard assistance, the call 

is immediately relayed to either agency’s on-scene coordinator. The EPA 

has about 270 on-scene coordinators across the United States and the 

Coast Guard has 44 Marine Safety Officers, who are coordinators. Most 

coordinators try to deploy within a half-hour of notice. The coordinators 

have HAZMAT training, can assist with situational assessment, and are the 

point of contact for the coordination of federal HAZMAT efforts with the 

local and state responders. If the state asks for assistance, the coordinator 

can bring both contractor and federal assets to the scene.

Both EPA and the Coast Guard have other assets that respond to HAZMAT 

emergencies with capabilities similar to the RAID teams. The EPA has two 

Environmental Response Teams, stationed in New Jersey and Ohio, and 10 

Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Teams that have similar 

HAZMAT capabilities and access to contractor support. EPA’s National 

Enforcement Investigations Center is the technical support center for EPA 

enforcement and compliance assurance programs, providing 

environmental forensic evidence collection, sampling, and analysis and can 

also assist the FBI with these activities. EPA has 12 labs that provide 

analytical support, field monitoring, and other environmental program 

support. Five of these labs have deployable mobile units that can provide 

chemical and biological analysis. Finally, the EPA has radiological 

response capabilities to handle some aspects of nuclear/radiological 

incidents.

The Coast Guard’s National Strike Force has three teams, located in New 

Jersey, Alabama, and California. These teams each have 36 members 

trained to the HAZMAT technician level, as well as trained members in the 

Coast Guard Reserve, and are equipped to handle major oil and chemical 

spills in coastal waters, but can also respond to other environmental 

HAZMAT emergencies.
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

As discussed previously, the FBI has the responsibility for crisis 

management in a WMD event. Its Hazardous Materials Response Unit is 

responsible for providing laboratory, scientific, and technical assistance to 

FBI investigations involving hazardous materials, including WMD, and 

environmental crimes. In support of both the FBI and the local incident 

commander, the unit can also sample, package, and transport hazardous 

material to labs for further analysis, provide decontamination capability 

and situational assessment, and assist with technical scientific support and 

advice. The unit can mobilize within 4 hours and has access to FBI aircraft 

if the emergency is too far to drive to.

The FBI has a new initiative to put operational HAZMAT teams in 15 of its 

56 field offices by June 1999. Each team will have 10 special agents trained 

at the HAZMAT technician level. Although these agents will not function as 

full-time HAZMAT technicians, they will be available as a quick response 

asset for gathering evidence in environmental crimes and WMD events. 

The team will be equipped to perform detection, monitoring, sampling, and 

decontamination. By the end of 1999, the FBI plans to have 4-person teams 

in the remainder of the field offices, trained to the HAZMAT technician 

level, but with very little equipment. Eight of the larger FBI teams will be in 

states that also have the National Guard RAID teams.

There are also highly specialized military assets to deal with the full range 

of WMD. These include the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, with three 

detachments stationed across the United States; the U.S. Marine Corps’ 

Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force stationed at Camp Lejune, 

North Carolina; the Army’s 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, 

stationed across the United States; military laboratories, such as the U.S. 

Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; and other assets, 

such as the Mobile Analytical Response System from the Edgewood 

Research, Development and Engineering Center. These units have been 

positioned at large events such as the Atlanta Summer Olympic Games, 

economic summits, and presidential inaugurations in case of a terrorist 

attack.

There are 89 Air National Guard civil engineering units spread throughout 

the 50 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia that the 

state governors or federal officials can access to help in a WMD event. 

These civil engineering units--Prime Base Engineering Emergency Forces, 

known as “Prime BEEF” units--have the wartime mission of supporting 

sustained air operations during a WMD attack and mitigating the 

consequences of an attack. The Air Guard also has 78 Prime BEEF fire 
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

fighting units that are trained in handling hazardous materials and 10 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal units that are capable of handling WMD 

devices. There are plans to increase the number of Disposal units to 44 in 

the next 5 years. According to Air Guard officials, these skilled units could 

be of great use to local incident commanders in a WMD attack on civilian 

targets, if their equipment and training were upgraded. This would allow 

these units to be available to the states, not only in a WMD event, but also 

in a major HAZMAT emergency.

The military services, both active and reserve, have units that could be used 

in a WMD emergency. For example, the U.S. Army Reserve has 63 percent 

of the chemical units in the U.S. Army, including 100 chemical 

reconnaissance/decontamination elements stationed across the United 

States that can perform basic detection and identification of chemical 

agents as well as decontamination operations. The U.S. Army Reserve also 

has two chemical companies that are specifically designed for nuclear, 

chemical, and biological reconnaissance and contains the only biological 

detection company in the Army today that is ready to deploy. Under the 

authority of Army Regulation 500-60, a Reserve commander can respond to 

an emergency in the local area when there is imminent danger of loss of life 

or critical infrastructure. Accordingly, the local authorities could request 

assistance from the local Reserve commander in a WMD emergency 

without an official deployment of the military.

Concerns About RAID 

Teams’ Ability to Fully 

Meet Their 

Responsibilities

Our discussions with local, state, and federal officials and our analysis of 

the information regarding the RAID teams surfaced a number of concerns 

that the teams may not be able to meet their mission and responsibilities. 

The most significant and frequently mentioned is the time it would take the 

RAID team to respond to an incident. Other concerns centered on 

recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues.

The goal for the RAID team, either in part or as a whole, is to be able to 

deploy to a WMD incident within 4 hours of notice. All local, state, and 

federal officials we met with expressed concern that this time frame would 

get the team there too late to be useful. They stated that, for the incident 

commander to benefit from the information they could produce, the RAID 

team would be needed at the scene within the first 1 to 2 hours. After that 

time, the local/state HAZMAT teams could have the basic detection and 

identification information that would allow them to begin to handle the 

situation. Then, the incident commander would either be in control of the 

situation and not need additional assessment input from the RAID team or 
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

so completely overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation that the FBI 

and FEMA already would have been notified, and in coordination with the 

state, federal assets already would be on their way to the scene.

The RAID teams will have dedicated vehicles to transport them and their 

equipment to the incident. The teams will also have access to Army 

National Guard helicopters and small, fixed-wing aircraft that could carry 

some team members with hand-held equipment. The remainder of the 

team and equipment would then follow in the vehicles. To transport the 

entire team to a distant location within the state or region, with all its 

equipment and vehicles, would require military airlift, like C-130 aircraft. 

However, there are no plans to dedicate ground crews, flight crews, or 

aircraft for on-call, immediate response to a RAID team deployment. If Air 

National Guard or Air Force aircraft were required to transport the RAID 

teams, authorization would have to be obtained from the U.S. 

Transportation Command.

The lack of dedicated airlift for the RAID teams adds to the concern about 

the delayed arrival. Some federal assets, including the FBI’s Hazardous 

Materials Response Unit, have immediate access to aircraft and flight 

crews. The EPA and Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinators have the ability 

to contract for civilian aircraft to get their assets, as well as contractor 

assets, to a scene quickly.

As a result of a 1993 restructuring, combat support and combat service 

support functions were concentrated in the Army Reserve and combat 

functions in the Army National Guard. Therefore, except for the RAID 

teams, there are few promotion opportunities for chemical and medical 

specialists in the rest of the Army Guard. Some officials expressed concern 

that the Guard would not be able to maintain a “pipeline” of highly trained 

individuals to fill vacancies on the RAID teams, making it necessary for the 

teams to operate at less than full capability when vacancies occur. For 

example, it may be difficult to find the highly trained personnel with the 

necessary education and skills required to operate the sophisticated 

equipment planned for the RAID teams, such as the mass spectrometer. 

According to DOD, there are ample units in the Guard and Reserve from 

which to draw qualified candidates for the RAID teams and that can 

provide opportunities for team members who want to leave for 

promotions.

According to local and federal HAZMAT team leaders, it may be difficult for 

the RAID team members to maintain their proficiency after they receive 
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

their training. For example, the teams will have a mobile lab with very 

sophisticated, technical identification equipment. Many local HAZMAT 

team leaders stated that they would not have some of this equipment in 

their inventory, particularly the mass spectrometer, because it requires 

highly trained personnel to use and maintain it effectively. The federal 

HAZMAT team leaders stated that, while some of them have a mass 

spectrometer, it takes almost daily use to maintain competency and 

accuracy, which the RAID team may not get. All of the HAZMAT team 

leaders expressed concern that the RAID team members would lose their 

HAZMAT expertise if they did not have opportunities to continually 

practice their skills in more than just a simulated environment. All of the 

leaders stated that this on the job training is also critical to effective team 

operation. The stressful situation of an actual HAZMAT emergency cannot 

be replicated in a classroom or exercise and team members need to know 

that everyone on the team can operate in that environment. The 

Pennsylvania Guard officer responsible for developing that state’s RAID 

team stated that the Guard was concerned about this and realized the need 

to create these on-the-job opportunities, not only to maintain proficiency 

but to keep the team members from leaving to work on local HAZMAT 

teams. He added that the Guard was working with local HAZMAT teams so 

that the RAID team could participate in local training exercises and, at 

some later point, perhaps respond with the local teams on actual HAZMAT 

emergencies. According to DOD, there are a significant number of 

exercises conducted by federal, state, and local authorities that provide 

ample opportunities for the RAID teams to exercise their skills.

All of the HAZMAT team leaders discussed the need to have sufficient team 

members cross trained in each position to be able to field a complete team 

when an emergency arises. This process also alleviates the concern of 

having the entire team on call 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, which could 

cause significant hardships for the RAID team members as they try to 

maintain normal lives. The RAID team survey function is the only part of 

the team that has multiple individuals performing the same job. All other 

members of the RAID team who could not respond to a deployment call 

would create a loss of capability for the team. Also, the RAID team will 

have only one set of equipment for both training and deployment, which 

could make it difficult to both train on the equipment and be operationally 

ready to deploy.

Conclusions In conclusion, I would like to summarize our three major findings and 

reiterate the recommendation in our report. First, the fact that local, state, 
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-184

and federal officials responsible for implementing emergency response 

plans have differing views regarding the role for the RAID teams suggests 

that further clarification of their expected role and use is needed. Second, 

the fact that the RAID teams have capabilities similar to other local, state, 

and federal emergency response teams suggests that these teams might 

unnecessarily duplicate existing capabilities. Finally, concerns about 

whether they could arrive on the scene in a timely manner as well as other 

concerns related to recruiting, retention, and training raise questions about 

whether they could, in fact, effectively execute their responsibilities and 

missions. In view of these questions, we believe that a pause is warranted 

to more fully evaluate the need for these teams and more fully explore how 

they would fit into the total WMD response framework. Accordingly, we 

are recommending that the National Coordinator for Security, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism—in conjunction with the 

FBI, FEMA, and DOD—determine whether the teams are, in fact, needed 

before proceeding to expand the program in more states.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy 

to answer any questions at this time.

Contact and 

Acknowledgment

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Mr. Mark Gebicke 

at (202) 512-5140. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

include Robert Pelletier and Ann Borseth.

(702011) Letr
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