RAB/98-18

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Railroad Accident Brief Report

ATL 97 FR 003

EMPLOYEE FATALITY

MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

RUGGLES STREET STATION

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

JANUARY 30, 1997

On January 30, 1997, about 9:42 a.m., eastern standard time, a

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) system track repairman

was fatally injured when he was struck by northbound MBTA subway train No.

1285, north of the Ruggles Street Station.

The repairman was performing maintenance at the crossover switches

north of the Ruggles Street Station. The motorman said he did not see the track

repairman until the train was about 4 feet away. The motorman placed the train

into emergency braking, but was unable to stop before striking the repairman.

The repairman was fatally injured. No passengers or crewmembers were

injured. No hazardous material releases occurred. At the time of the accident it

was cloudy, with an ambient temperature reported at 13° F.

Postaccident investigation revealed that the MBTA uses monthly Safety

Bulletins to convey operational and safety messages to its employees. The

Safety Bulletins’ purpose is to reinforce right-of-way safety practices to protect

employees and others on MBTA right-of-way in order to prevent loss of life or

injury to passengers or employees.

Safety Board investigators discovered that the MBTA does not have a

track department Safety Rule Book and they do not conduct periodic safety rules

training for the track department employees.

The MBTA had issued a monthly Safety Bulletin dated June 1, 1995. The

bulletin requires that work crew, officials, and operating personnel obtain

permission from the Operations Control Center (OCC) before entering the rightof-way area and notify the OCC when they leave the area. The bulletin also

requires persons entering upon the right-of-way area to wear an approved high

visibility safety vest or coat and be equipped with a flashlight in proper working

order. The MBTA had no sign-up sheet indicating that the track repairman had

received and understood the bulletin dated June 1, 1995.
2

Postaccident investigation revealed that the repairman was wearing a

MBTA highly visible safety vest and a hood covering his head. The safety vest

had only highly visible material on the front and back of the vest. However, this

safety vest provided no safety visibility when the person wearing it is sideways to

oncoming equipment. The MBTA has no rule prohibiting the wearing of hooded

clothing. The hood may have limited both the hearing and peripheral vision of

the workman.

The radio tapes between the trains and the OCC revealed that the track

repairman did not arrange or request protection from OCC. Safety Board

investigation also revealed that the track repairman was not issued a company

radio. Radios were issued to supervisors and foremen.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

this accident was the inadequate oversight of track maintenance employees on

the right-of-way by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.

Contributing to the accident was the lack of a Safety Rule Book and periodic

safety rules training for the track department employees by the Massachusetts

Bay Transportation Authority. Additionally, the MBTA had no procedures that

assured that all employees read and understand the Monthly Safety Bulletins.

Adopted: August 18, 1998