GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 27, 2006 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Military Pay: Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of Hostile 

Fire and Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army National Guard 

and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg 

Over the past several years, we have reported1

 on significant pay problems 

experienced by mobilized Army National Guard and Army Reserve (Army Guard and 

Reserve) soldiers in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack. These 

reports included examples of hundreds of soldiers receiving inaccurate and untimely 

payroll payments due to a paper-intensive, error-prone pay process and the lack of 

integrated pay and personnel systems. In response to our reports, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has taken some action to improve controls designed to pay Army 

Guard and Reserve soldiers accurately and on time, especially those who had become 

sick or injured in the line of duty. 

This report responds to your request that we investigate the allegation that 37 Army 

Guard and Reserve soldiers assigned to the Medical Retention Processing Unit 

(MRPU) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were overpaid for hostile fire and hardship 

duty pay while in an outpatient status.2

 Our objectives were to determine (1) whether 

the allegations were true, and if so, whether the pay issues were more widespread at 

Fort Bragg and (2) the key causes of the overpayments and the resulting impact on 

soldiers and their families. 

 

1

 GAO, Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured Army 

National Guard and Reserve Soldiers, GAO-05-125 and GAO-05-322T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 

2005); Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel Reimbursement 

Problems For Mobilized Soldiers, GAO-05-79 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2005) and GAO-05-400T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005); Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty 

Experienced Significant Pay Problems, GAO-04-911 (Washington, D.C: Aug. 20, 2004) and GAO-04-

990T (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004); and Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized 

to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems, GAO-04-413T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2004) 

and GAO-04-89 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2003). 

2

 For the purposes of this report, “outpatient” means a soldier who is being medically evaluated for 

specialized treatment. This may include surgery, which would require hospitalization at a later date. 
Page 2 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

 

Scope and Methodology 

To investigate the allegation that Army Guard and Reserve soldiers assigned to the 

MRPU while in an outpatient status received overpayments of hostile fire and 

hardship duty pay, we interviewed Fort Bragg MRPU and Finance Battalion staff and 

observed MRPU and finance in-processing procedures. We also used Defense 

Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) data extracts from monthly pay records and 

Fort Bragg MRPU records containing the dates soldiers arrived at the Fort Bragg 

MRPU to determine whether soldiers being treated at Fort Bragg during the period 

April 1, 2003, through June 30, 2005, improperly received hostile fire and/or hardship 

duty payments while at Fort Bragg. We performed procedures to assure ourselves 

that the data we used were sufficient for our purposes. The scope of our 

investigation did not include verification of the accuracy of soldiers’ entire pay 

accounts. In addition, our scope did not include inpatient soldiers assigned directly 

to the Womack Army Medical Treatment Facility (hospital) at Fort Bragg. 

Because of data reliability concerns we identified in our prior work,3

 we did not rely 

on DFAS records to calculate precise overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty 

pay. Instead, we estimated overpayments based on the time period starting with the 

date the soldier arrived at Fort Bragg until the date the soldier’s improper pays were 

stopped.4

 We provided Fort Bragg Finance Battalion officials an opportunity to 

confirm our estimates, identify the amount of debt established for the overpaid 

soldiers, and determine whether the debts had been collected. We did not review 

Fort Bragg’s debt collection processes and procedures for compliance with DOD 

regulations and requirements. In light of the Army’s lack of progress in integrating 

pay and personnel systems, we reviewed controls used by the MRPU and Fort Bragg 

Finance Battalion staff to stop hostile fire and hardship duty pay. We conducted this 

investigation from August 2005, through March 2006, in accordance with quality 

standards for investigations as set forth by the President’s Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency. 

Summary of Investigation 

Our investigation confirmed that 28 of the 37 Army Guard and Reserve soldiers 

assigned to the MRPU in an outpatient status at Fort Bragg with alleged pay problems 

were in fact overpaid for hostile fire and hardship duty pay. We also identified at 

least 204 additional cases of sick or injured soldiers assigned to the MRPU who were 

overpaid for the same entitlements. An estimated $218,000 in hostile fire and/or 

hardship duty overpayments were made to a total of about 232 Army Guard and 

3

 GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability of Cost Data and Provide 

Additional Guidance to Control Cost, GAO-05-882 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 21, 2005); GAO-04-89; and 

GAO-04-911. 

4

 We did not estimate overpayment amounts for hostile fire and hardship duty pay prior to the soldier’s 

arrival to Fort Bragg. 
Page 3 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

 

Reserve soldiers in an outpatient status at Fort Bragg during the period April 2003 

through June 2005.5

As we have previously reported,6 internal control weaknesses in Army processes, 

human capital, and the lack of integrated systems caused the overpayments of hostile 

fire and hardship duty pay. Our investigation disclosed that the Fort Bragg Finance 

Battalion and MRPU controls often failed to detect the overpayments in a timely 

manner. A Fort Bragg Finance official acknowledged that the Finance Battalion 

“dropped the ball” by failing to promptly detect and stop the overpayments to sick or 

injured Army Guard and Reserve soldiers upon their arrival to the Fort Bragg MRPU. 

Further, in October 2005, DFAS completed an annual performance inspection of the 

Fort Bragg Finance Battalion that confirmed our conclusion about the problems 

soldiers were having with hostile fire and hardship duty pay. 

Our case studies showed that as a result of these overpayments, some soldiers and 

their families had to expend significant time and effort dealing with pay and resulting 

debt problems while recovering from their injuries. Several soldiers experienced 

large, unexpected deductions–as much as $1,172 from a single paycheck–for repaying 

the debt resulting from the Army’s failure to stop the overpayments. On the other 

hand, the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion did not consistently take action to recover 

overpayments from other MRPU soldiers during the time of our investigation. 

Background 

The MRPU at Fort Bragg is one of 23 MRPUs located throughout the United States. 

Soldiers are assigned to these units while receiving outpatient treatment for their 

illnesses or injuries under the Medical Retention Program. The objective of the 

Medical Retention Program is to heal injured soldiers and return them to their units 

or to discharge them from the Army Guard or Reserve if they are unable to perform 

their military duties. The Medical Retention Program is an option for mobilized 

National Guard and Reserve soldiers who become sick or injured. Soldiers who are 

injured or become ill during predeployment training or other predeployment 

activities can also apply for treatment through the Medical Retention Program. 

Before being injured, soldiers serving in certain locations were entitled to several 

types of special duty pay, including hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay. Soldiers 

are entitled to hostile fire pay when a commander certifies that they are subject to 

hostile fire or explosions of hostile mines; on duty in an area in close proximity to 

hostile fire incidents; or are killed, injured, or wounded by hostile fire, explosions, or 

5

 As a result of the lack of supporting documents and data reliability concerns, we likely did not 

identify precise overpayment amounts. We have provided information for the overpayments we 

identified to cognizant Fort Bragg officials for further research to determine the proper amounts that 

are owed to the government or the soldier. 

6

 See footnote 1. 
Page 4 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

 

other hostile actions.7

 Hostile fire pay is $225 a month while the above circumstances 

prevail. Any soldier injured under the above circumstances is entitled to hostile fire 

pay for up to 3 months’ of hospitalization after the month in which the injury 

occurred, unless the soldier is discharged sooner and does not return to a designated 

hostile fire or hardship duty location. 

Soldiers serving in designated areas are also entitled to hardship duty pay. This 

entitlement stops, however, as soon as the soldier leaves the designated area, 

whether or not the soldier is hospitalized for injuries that occurred there. The 

maximum amount of hardship duty pay for any designated area is $150 a month as 

long as the soldier serves in that area. If a soldier leaves the duty location before the 

end of the month, the hardship duty pay is prorated. 

Soldiers assigned to the Fort Bragg MRPU in an outpatient status were not entitled to 

either hostile fire pay or hardship duty pay because Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is not 

a designated location for these pay entitlements. Additionally, soldiers who were 

assigned to the MRPU during their predeployment phase were never entitled to 

hostile fire pay or hardship duty pay. Finally, MRPU outpatient soldiers whose 

medical evaluations indicated a need for future hospitalization were not entitled to 

receive hostile fire pay or hardship duty pay for subsequent hospital stays. 

It should be noted that our previous reports demonstrate that finance offices in 

theater were often unable to start or stop hostile fire pay or hardship duty pay as 

required because of problems with human capital, processes, and lack of integrated 

pay and personnel systems. Accordingly, installations processing soldiers from in 

theater have a responsibility to confirm that the soldiers’ pay is accurate and to 

adequately inform soldiers about their responsibilities regarding their military pay. 

For example, soldiers are responsible for reviewing their leave and earnings 

statements and for prompt and accurate reporting of changes in their personal 

circumstances that affect their entitlement pay to their commander and servicing 

finance office. 

Allegation Regarding Overpayments 

of Hostile Fire and Hardship 

Duty Pay Was Confirmed 

The allegation that some Army Guard and Reserve outpatients assigned to the Fort 

Bragg MRPU were receiving hostile fire and hardship duty pay they were not entitled 

to receive was true, and these were not isolated instances of overpayments. We 

found that 28 of the 37 soldiers with alleged pay problems were overpaid an 

estimated $32,000 for hostile fire and/or hardship duty pay. We selected 10 of these 

28 soldiers for our case studies during this investigation. Nine told us that they had 

7

 Additionally, soldiers in certain designated locations face what has been determined to be imminent 

danger and are therefore entitled to imminent danger pay. Notably, soldiers are entitled to either 

hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay but not both. We mention the imminent danger pay for 

background information only because the paperwork that we reviewed for the soldiers in the MRPU at 

Fort Bragg only mentions hostile fire pay. 
Page 5 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

 

contacted the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion in an attempt to stop the overpayments in 

order to avoid escalating debt accumulation. 

Our investigation also disclosed that the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion failed to timely 

detect and stop hostile fire and hardship duty pay for at least 204 additional 

outpatient soldiers. Fort Bragg Finance Battalion’s delays resulted in overpayments 

of about $218,000 for 232 sick or injured Army Guard and Reserve soldiers in the 

MRPU. To the extent that some of these payments should have been stopped before 

the soldiers arrived at Fort Bragg, the total overpayments may have been higher. 

MRPU records showed that these 232 soldiers arrived at the Fort Bragg MRPU over a 

3-year period: 23 soldiers from April 2003 through December 2003, 187 soldiers in 

calendar year 2004, and 22 soldiers from January 2005 through June 2005. 

The Fort Bragg MRPU classified the 232 outpatient soldiers whom we identified as 

receiving overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay while in an outpatient 

status as follows: 8

 

• 161 soldiers were medically evacuated out of theater generally before their 

active duty assignment period was completed and were assigned to the MRPU, 

• 31 soldiers were found to need medical evaluation during the demobilization 

process at Fort Bragg and were assigned to the MRPU, 

• 19 soldiers were found to need medical evaluation during predeployment 

training or other activities and were assigned to the MRPU, and 

• 21 soldiers were not classified into a specific category. 

For 9 of the 10 MRPU soldiers in our case studies, it took pay technicians at the Fort 

Bragg Finance Battalion from 14 to 203 days to stop the overpayments once the 

MRPU soldier visited the Finance Battalion. We could not determine the amount of 

time it took the pay technician to stop overpayments for one of our case studies 

because there was no documentation supporting the date he visited the Finance 

Battalion. Due to such delays, overpayment amounts ranged from $553 to $2,300. 

Two of the 10 soldiers never deployed and therefore should have never received any 

hostile fire and hardship duty pay. The following case study illustrates one of these. 

8

 These categories are provided in this report for context only. We did not verify the classifications for 

accuracy. 
Page 6 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

Individual Case Illustration: Soldier Who Never Deployed Received Improper 

Payments of Hostile Fire and Hardship Duty Pay 

An Army National Guard soldier from Maryland who was initially mobilized with her unit for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom never made it overseas because she was diagnosed with anxiety and 

depression during her predeployment training. She arrived at the Fort Bragg MRPU on 

October 5, 2004, and visited the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion on October 13, 2004. She 

explained to us that, during her time at Fort Bragg, she told Finance that she was receiving 

improper hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay since she never deployed and was therefore 

ineligible to receive these entitlements. According to the soldier, the finance office told her 

that the improper payments would be collected from her later paychecks. Her hostile fire 

and hardship duty pay continued until March 10, 2005, 5 months after her initial visit to the 

Fort Bragg Finance Battalion. By this time, her improper hostile fire and hardship duty 

payments had grown to about $1,823, of which $986 was collected from her paychecks as of 

November 2005. 

According to MRPU records, 17 other soldiers whom we identified as having received 

hostile fire and hardship duty payments while at the MRPU also never deployed 

because of injuries being treated during the predeployment period for their unit. 

Figure 1 below shows delays for each of the 10 case study soldiers. 
Page 7 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

Figure 1: Length of Time Fort Bragg Finance Battalion Took to Stop 10 Soldiers’ Hostile Fire and

 Hardship Duty Pay and the Resulting Overpayments (as of June 30, 2005)

a Days elapsed = Number of days between date soldier visited Finance and date

ineligible pay was stopped. b Estimated overpayments = Hostile fire and hardship duty payments made to

soldier after arrival at Fort Bragg MRPU. 

 

Internal Control Weaknesses Hamper 

Accuracy of Army Guard 

and Reserve Soldiers’ Pay 

Fort Bragg did not have well-defined processes for ensuring that MRPU soldiers’ pay 

was accurate. While MRPU soldiers were provided a checklist for in-processing at 

Fort Bragg that was intended to channel them to the Finance Battalion9

 to validate 

 9

 The Fort Bragg Finance Battalion was one of nine locations the sick and injured soldiers had to 

personally visit in order to complete in-processing to the MRPU. The soldiers’ injuries ranged from 
Page 8 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

 

pay, neither that checklist nor the Battalion’s desk procedures offered adequate 

specificity regarding what was expected of the finance staff. Furthermore, according 

to an MRPU administrative staff member, some MRPU soldiers may not have gone to 

the Finance Battalion because they did not return completed checklists initialed by a 

pay technician to the MRPU as required to document their visit to the Finance 

Battalion. 

We interviewed the Finance Battalion officials and observed their processes. There 

was a requirement for pay technicians to review pay accounts of the MRPU soldiers 

for accuracy, including the identification of overpayments of hostile fire and hardship 

duty pay, and stop these unearned payments expeditiously. Pay technicians were 

also required to initial the in-processing checklist to signify that the MRPU soldier’s 

pay account was reviewed. Stopping hostile fire and hardship duty pay entailed 

entering the correct pay termination date and transaction codes for each of these pay 

entitlements into the Defense MilPay Office system, which would routinely be used 

by DFAS to correct soldiers’ pay accounts in the Defense Joint Military Pay System–

Reserve Component (DJMS-RC). However, as shown in figure 1 above, pay problems 

continued for soldiers who had their in-processing checklist initialed by a pay 

technician. 

For example, although the finance technician signed off on one MRPU soldier’s 

checklist on July 26, 2004, this soldier’s hostile fire and hardship duty pay continued 

until December 23, 2004, about 5 months after he made his initial visit to finance, and 

his hostile fire and hardship duty overpayments grew to $2,000. A Fort Bragg Finance 

official acknowledged that the Finance Battalion did not promptly detect and stop the 

overpayments to injured Army Guard and Reserve soldiers upon their arrival to the 

Fort Bragg MRPU. 

Our investigation also disclosed that there was no routine follow-up to assure that all 

MRPU soldiers reported to the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion as directed. For 

example, when we asked an MRPU clerk to provide copies of completed inprocessing checklists for the 37 soldiers alleged to have been overpaid, the clerk only 

provided 20 completed checklists. The MRPU clerk told us that soldiers did not 

always return the completed checklists to the MRPU administrative staff. Without a 

personal visit by the MRPU soldier to the Finance Battalion, pay technicians were 

provided no other routine means to initiate a review of the pay accounts of soldiers 

arriving at the Fort Bragg MRPU. 

Although the Army issued revised procedures that included the handling of sick and 

injured soldiers’ pay accounts by finance personnel on June 1, 2004, the Fort Bragg 

Finance Battalion and MRPU continued to operate under their own procedures, 

which emphasized the individual soldier’s responsibility regarding pay accuracy and 

personal visits to the Finance Battalion. In contrast, the Army’s revised procedures 

emphasize finance staff responsibility to proactively work with the MRPU to obtain 

those inflicted by improvised explosive devices (IED) to post-traumatic stress disorder. Soldiers with 

limited mobility were assigned a “buddy” to assist them in getting around post to complete their inprocessing. 
Page 9 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

 

information on all incoming soldiers that is to be used to ensure that all MRPU 

soldiers’ pay accounts are timely and appropriately updated as well as accurate. This 

is important to note because between June 2004 and June 2005, 146 of the 232 

soldiers, the majority of soldiers included in our investigation, arrived at Fort Bragg 

for medical evaluation and treatment. Had the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion followed 

Army guidance when the Army’s revised procedures were instituted in June 2004, the 

Finance Battalion may have identified overpayments of unearned entitlements more 

quickly for these sick or injured soldiers. 

Army’s Failure to Stop Hostile Fire 

and Hardship Duty Pay Expeditiously 

Resulted in Significant Time and Effort 

Spent Addressing Debts 

The Army’s failure to stop hostile fire and hardship duty pay expeditiously for Army 

Guard and Reserve soldiers resulted in significant time and effort spent addressing 

debts10 for some soldiers and their families. For example, some soldiers whose 

overpayments were detected and established as a debt experienced large, unexpected 

deductions--as much as $1,172 from a single paycheck--to repay the debt resulting 

from the Army’s failure to stop the overpayments. 

Our investigation did not include work to determine whether the Fort Bragg Finance 

Battalion complied with DOD policies and procedures for collecting overpayments 

from soldiers or whether these policies were reasonable under the circumstances. 

However, we noted that the longer it took the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion to stop 

the overpayments, the greater the amount of debt that accumulated for the soldier 

and the greater the financial impact since more money was eventually withheld from 

the soldier’s pay. Our past work clearly showed the ramifications of protracted 

payment errors. Establishing the exact amount owed and collecting overpayments of 

active duty pays and allowances erroneously provided to soldiers imposes a large 

administrative burden on DOD and a financial burden on the soldier. 

Even when overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay were stopped by the 

Fort Bragg Finance Battalion, it sometimes did not establish debts and collect the 

overpayments from the soldier’s pay in a timely manner. For example, 2 of the 10 

soldiers in our case studies described in figure 1 did not have any pay deductions for 

overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay as of June 30, 2005, 6 months after 

these overpayments were stopped. 

We referred the names of the 232 soldiers, including the 10 soldiers in our case 

studies, for which we estimated hostile fire and/or hardship duty overpayments to the 

Fort Bragg Finance Battalion for follow-up to determine whether correct amounts 

were established as debts and appropriate debt collection measures were taken. The 

10 Collection of overpayments is not pursued until a debt is established. To repay debts, the amount of 

the debt generally is deducted from a soldier’s pay in increments until the total debt is repaid, unless a 

waiver is granted. 
Page 10 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

Fort Bragg Finance Battalion had not completed its review at the time our 

investigation was completed. 

The following case studies show the experiences of three MRPU soldiers with hostile 

fire and hardship duty overpayments. 

Case Illustration 1: Errors Made in One Soldier’s Pay Created Financial 

Hardship for The Soldier’s Family 

An Army Guard National soldier from North Carolina described his experience as 

follows: “In September 2003, my National Guard Unit received orders to report for 

duty in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Our federal orders were issued 10/1/03. 

We began training at Ft. Bragg in preparation for our deployment. The majority of 

soldiers were deployed in mid-February. I was deployed in March. After arriving in 

Iraq, I was injured when my vehicle hit a crater caused by an IED. I was airlifted to 

the hospital in Baghdad for treatment. I was returned to my unit for continued duty. 

My leg began to swell and it was determined that I should be returned home for 

treatment. I was medically evacuated out of Iraq in late May. 

“When I reached Germany, I scanned my ID through finance. When I reached Walter 

Reed Army Hospital, I scanned my ID card through finance. When I reached Ft. 

Bragg, I scanned my ID card through finance on several occasions. I continued to 

receive hazardous duty and hostile fire pay through 12/04. 

“When I was released from active duty in May 2005, I was processed out through Ft. 

Bragg finance. A clerical error was made and my start date for active duty was 

entered as 10/04. This created a debt of 1 years pay owed by me to the government. 

In the process of correcting this error, it was determined that I was paid hostile fire 

and hazardous duty in error. I am not convinced that my pay is correct now. 

“I attended drill twice in May and once in June. I did not receive drill pay. Monies 

were held to pay this debt. A debt remission package was finally submitted as the 

repayment of these funds would cause undo hardship to my family. While this error 

was being ‘corrected’, we used all of our accumulated savings to cover our normal 

bills. Since I did my part by swiping my card through finance on numerous 

occasions, I do not feel obligated to repay these funds.” 
Page 11 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

Case Illustration 2: Pay Deductions Result in Family’s Delay of Bill Payments 

An Army National Guard soldier from North Carolina suffered a stroke on June 26, 2004, 

while serving in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was flown to Germany and 

treated at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center before returning to the United States. He 

arrived at Fort Bragg in early July 2004. Our investigation revealed that the soldier visited the 

Fort Bragg Finance Battalion on July 30, 2004, as part of his in-processing into the unit, and 

had his checklist signed by the finance technician. The soldier returned his completed 

checklist to the MRPU. 

Despite adhering to the MRPU’s in-processing procedures, this soldier’s hostile fire and 

hardship duty pay continued until November 5, 2004, approximately 4 months after he made 

his initial visit to the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion. By this time, his hostile fire and hardship 

duty pay overpayments had grown to $1,300. The Fort Bragg Finance Battalion eventually 

collected about $972 of this total from the soldier in a single paycheck, which was about 50 

percent of his disposable pay. The collections had a negative financial impact on the soldier 

and his wife. The soldier’s wife told us that she had to call and defer some of their bills, 

including the monthly payment on their second mortgage. According to information 

provided by the Finance Battalion to us on January 7, 2006, the soldier still owes about $100.

Case Illustration 3: Soldier Frustrated by Efforts to Get His Pay Corrected 

An Army Reservist from California serving in Iraq in February 2004 in support of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom experienced cardiovascular problems while on duty in Baghdad. In October 

2004 he was sent to Kuwait and then later stateside for demobilization and assignment to the 

Fort Bragg MRPU in November 2004. 

Shortly after his arrival at Fort Bragg, he noticed that his Leave and Earnings Statement 

showed that he was still receiving hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay. He brought this 

error to the attention of a finance technician who said that his account would be corrected, 

and the combat entitlements would stop. He had accumulated overpayments for hostile fire 

pay and hardship duty pay totaling $553. According to the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion, as of 

January 9, 2006, $328 of the $553 in overpayments for hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay 

had not been deducted from the soldier’s pay. 

In addition to overpayments of hostile fire and hardship duty pay, this soldier told us that he 

also experienced overpayments of basic pay and benefits after he was released from the 

MRPU in July 2005 to return to his home unit in California. He then noticed on his July 2005 

leave and earnings statement that he was continuing to receive basic pay as if he was still on 

active duty status while assigned to the MRPU. These basic pay overpayments continued for 

an additional pay period after the soldier made repeated calls to Fort Bragg to correct his pay 

account. By September 9, the Army corrected the problem by deducting about $7,600 from 

other earned pay. He had participated in a 4-week training exercise in Korea in August 2005 

and had 33 days of accrued leave which the Army used to offset previous overpayments of 

basic pay and benefits. Had he not participated in the training exercise, it would have taken 

many monthly pays for weekend drills for him to be able to repay the $7,600. 
Page 12 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

 

We spoke with Army and DFAS officials in December 2005 and January 2006 about 

our observations at the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion and Fort Bragg MRPU. They 

told us that they were not surprised that we found pay account review deficiencies at 

Fort Bragg and that it was troubling that the proactive approach to pay management 

advocated by the Army in 2004 had not been instituted at Fort Bragg until we were 

completing our investigation. To help improve the skills of the finance staff at Fort 

Bragg, DFAS provided on-site training in late September 2005 as part of their efforts 

to improve pay account management for soldiers wounded in action. We were also 

told that the pay account management capabilities of finance offices at other 

installations varied and that they were taking steps to improve performance where 

needed.

Corrective Action Briefing 

On December 22, 2005, we discussed the results of our investigation with the Fort 

Bragg Finance Battalion command. The command pointed out that problems with 

ensuring timely termination of hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay are due in part 

to the medical evacuation process, and the existence of stove-piped pay and 

personnel systems that increase the likelihood of inaccurate pay accounts. They said 

that at least some of these pay problems should have been rectified before the soldier 

was assigned to Fort Bragg. 

 

The Battalion Commander stated that our identification of the 232 pay accounts11

provided his staff with a good snapshot of pay issues that MRPU soldiers were 

experiencing. The commander noted that since his battalion is responsible for 

ensuring the accuracy of the pay accounts for all soldiers who arrive at Fort Bragg, 

our investigation also provides his staff with an opportunity to improve their services 

to Army Guard and Reserve soldiers. 

The Fort Bragg Finance Battalion officials informed us that they are implementing 

the following corrective actions to provide reasonable assurance that overpayments 

for hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay do not affect future soldiers assigned to the 

MRPU at Fort Bragg: 

 Coordinating with MRPU personnel staff to obtain regular updated lists of new 

arrivals to the MRPU to review those pay accounts in order to confirm that 

hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay entitlements are stopped in a timely 

manner. 

 Coordinating with the MRPU personnel staff to identify MRPU soldiers who 

are unable to visit Finance due to their medical conditions and ensuring that 

11 We referred 259 MRPU soldiers’ pay accounts to the Finance Battalion in September 2005 for review. 

On December 22, 2005, Finance Battalion officials informed us that additional factors such as 

deployment from MRPU may have subsequently entitled some of the soldiers to hostile fire and/or 

hardship duty pay. We adjusted our estimated number of cases from 259 to 232 taking into account at 

least 27 instances where the MRPU data summary file noted that the MRPU soldier deployed 

subsequent to arrival at the Fort Bragg MRPU and as such, may have been entitled to some amount of 

hostile fire and/or hardship duty pay. The remaining 232 cases are those where we did not see any 

indication in the MRPU summary file that the MRPU soldier deployed. 
Page 13 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

Finance schedules personal visits with these sick or injured soldiers to 

individually review these soldiers’ pay accounts. 

 Regularly distributing Leave and Earnings Statement reports to the MRPU 

Commander in order to assist in the identification of MRPU soldiers who 

typically would not be receiving hostile fire pay and hardship duty pay. 

 Regularly distributing Unit Commander’s Financial Reports to the MRPU 

Commander to assist him in reviewing the accuracy of his soldiers’ pay. 

 Periodically briefing Fort Bragg units concerning combat pay entitlements. 

 Adhering to a December 2005 revision of Fort Bragg’s Finance Standard 

Operating Procedures that clarify how to review the pay accounts of MRPU 

soldiers to detect and stop hostile fire pay and hardship duty overpayments. 

In subsequent correspondence to us on January 6, 2006, the MRPU Commander 

informed us that the in-processing checklist will no longer be used as a tool to alert 

the Finance Battalion to stop any hostile fire and hardship duty pay to MRPU soldiers 

in a timely manner. Instead, beginning January 9, 2006, MRPU officials were to 

coordinate with the Fort Bragg Finance Battalion weekly to assure that newly 

arriving soldiers’ pay accounts are correct based on the agreed-upon corrective 

actions listed above. 

Conclusions 

Fort Bragg did not carry out its responsibilities to ensure that the Army Guard and 

Army Reserve soldiers assigned to the Fort Bragg MRPU received accurate pay. 

Given the number of ongoing pay problems experienced by these soldiers--problems 

that our investigation revealed extended far beyond the initial allegation–and the 

systemwide pay problems we have reported on in the past, it is conceivable that 

many other soldiers assigned to the other 22 MRPU locations may be experiencing 

the same pay problems. While soldiers have some responsibility to assist in 

correcting pay errors, including setting aside amounts not earned, the primary 

responsibility rests with DOD for timely pay adjustments to avoid the types of 

problems and hardships surfaced by this investigation. 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

In conjunction with the Army’s proactive efforts to improve Army Guard and Reserve 

pay account management, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army, in 

conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), follow up with finance offices 

supporting the other 22 MRPUs that were not part of our investigation to determine 

the extent to which hostile fire and hardship duty overpayments to outpatient Army 

Guard and Reserve soldiers had occurred and ensure that appropriate corrective 

action is taken. This review should include the pay accounts for outpatient soldiers 

who had been or are currently assigned to MRPU units, including those soldiers with 

nonbattle injuries and other illness. 
Page 14 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

DOD officials, in oral comments, partially concurred with our recommendation to 

review the pay accounts for outpatient MRPU soldiers. For example, DOD agreed to 

review the pay accounts for soldiers who are currently assigned to MRPU units, 

including those soldiers with nonbattle injuries and other illness, and take corrective 

action when required. In addition, DOD said it plans to review the pay accounts of all 

soldiers who received medical treatment in theater for serious injuries or illnesses 

since October 2001, which it expects will include a significant percentage of soldiers 

who were assigned to MRPUs after receiving initial treatment in theater. However, 

because the scope of our investigation did not include verification of the number of 

soldiers medically treated in theater, the comprehensiveness of DOD’s planned 

corrective actions is uncertain. 

DOD’s planned reviews of sick and wounded soldiers’ pay accounts are a step in the 

right direction. Our investigation at Fort Bragg though included a number of former 

MRPU soldiers who did not receive medical treatment in theater for serious injuries 

or illnesses or who never deployed and yet received overpayments of hostile fire and 

hardship duty pay. This is a potential population of soldiers who need to be covered 

as well when DOD reviews pay at other MRPUs. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and the 

Secretary of Defense. We will make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-7455 (kutzg@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff 

who made major contributions to this report are listed in the enclosure. 

Sincerely yours, 

Gregory D. Kutz 

Managing Director 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations 

Enclosure 
Page 15 GAO-06-384R Controls Fail to Stop Overpayments 

Enclosure I 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Gregory D. Kutz (202) 512-7455 

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Kord 

Basnight, Gary Bianchi, Mary Ellen Chervenic, 

Dennis Fauber, Daniel Kaneshiro, Jason Kelly, 

Barbara C. Lewis, Renee McElveen, Wayne 

Turowski, and John Ryan made key contributions 

to this report. 

(192182) 
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