**Railroad Accident Brief**[PDFversion ]

**LAX-97-FR-005DERAILMENTAPACHE RAILWAY COMPANY HOLBROOK, ARIZONA JANUARY 27, 1997**

Accident Description

At approximately 8:00 p.m., mountain standard time, on January 27, 1997,Apache Railway train APA No. 81 derailed 46 cars, 2 miles south of Holbrook,Arizona. The 46 cars were part of a 78-car train. The crew was removingone car from the train when the remainder of the train rolled down a 1.7-percentdescending grade, finally derailing on a 6 degree curve. Two tank carsderailed. One tank car containing hydrogen peroxide was compromised andreleased its entire contents. A fire ignited in the wreckage; it was generallyconfined to cars containing waste paper. Local emergency responders evacuated150 people from a nearby residential area until the morning of January28, 1997. There were no fatalities or injuries. Damages were estimatedat $2.06 million. 

At 6:25 p.m., train No. 81 had departed Holbrook, Arizona, milepost(MP) 0, on a return trip to the railroad's main yard, 38 miles away. AtMP 16, the crew stopped the train to set out one loaded car of feed fora pig farm. The car was five cars behind the engine. 

The conductor explained that he turned the angle cock at the rear ofthe fifth car. Then he said he closed the angle cock at the lead end ofthe sixth car, which was part of the train that would be left standingon the main track. When the conductor closed the angle cock on the leadend of the sixth car, he trapped the air in the portion of the train thatwould be left standing. This procedure is commonly called "bottlingthe air" in the railroad industry and is prohibited by carrier operatingrules. Had the conductor not bottled the air, the brakes on the remainingportion of the train would have had an emergency application that wouldnot have been released until the locomotives were reattached. 

Later, during the interview with the crew, investigators found thatthe conductor and engineer had discussed the bottling the air before performingthe switching. They concluded that when the initial stop at the pig farmwas made, it would be important for the engineer to make a heavy brakeapplication on the train before the conductor separated the cars. The conductorand engineer agreed that this heavy brake application should prevent thetrain from unintentional movement, even though the air pressure would betrapped in the brake pipe. 

When the conductor had completed the necessary tasks to place the rearcar onto the side track, he instructed the engineer to back the locomotivesand four remaining cars toward the location where the brakeman was waitingon the main track. The rear brakeman boarded the leading end of the fourthcar and proceeded toward the location where they had left the train. Thebrakeman stated that he looked back toward the train they had left on themain track. The train was not there. The brakeman remarked that he notifiedthe engineer that the train was no longer standing where they had leftit. The brakeman suggested they increase the speed and maybe they could"catch" the train. When they had gone approximately 1 mile, thebrakeman expressed concern that if the free-moving train suddenly stopped,they might collide with it. The brakeman further explained that since hewas on the front of the four cars attached to the locomotives, the rearheadlight of the locomotives was unavailable to assist in the darkness.

When the conductor closed the angle cock on the remainder of the train,the brake pipe initiated an increase in pressure that propagated back towardthe rear of the train and released the brakes. Because the train was standingon an ascending grade, once the brakes were released, the 73 cars rolledaway freely. The accident would probably have been avoided if the conductorhad left the angle cock open. 

**Probable Cause**

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probablecause of this accident was the conductor's closing of the angle cock andbottling the air on the remaining portion of the train which preventedthe emergency brakes from being applied. Contributing to the accident wasthe engineer supporting the actions of the conductor. 

**Adopted: April 23, 1998**

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