GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

A

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at time 2:30 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, March 16, 2005

FORCE STRUCTURE

Preliminary Observations 

on Army Plans to 

Implement and Fund 

Modular Forces 

Statement of Sharon Pickup

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Janet St. Laurent

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-05-443T
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-443T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Sharon L. 

Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or Janet A. 

St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402. 

Highlights of GAO-05-443T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, House Committee on 

Armed Services 

March 16, 2005

FORCE STRUCTURE

Preliminary Observations on Army Plans 

to Implement and Fund Modular Forces 

The Army has embarked on a major initiative to create modular units to 

better meet the near-term demand for forces and improve its capabilities to 

conduct full-spectrum operations. Modularity is a major undertaking 

because it affects both the active and reserve components as well as combat 

and support forces. Successfully implementing this initiative will require 

many changes such as new equipment and facilities, a different mix of skills 

among Army personnel, and significant changes to training and doctrine. By 

the end of fiscal year 2006, the Army plans to reorganize its 10 active 

divisions, expanding from 33 brigades to 43 modular brigade combat teams, 

and by fiscal year 2010, create new types of command headquarters. The 

Army has completed or is in the process of establishing modular brigades in 

four of its active divisions. 

While the Army has made progress in establishing modular brigades, it is 

likely to face several challenges in providing its new modular units with 

some required skilled personnel and equipment that are needed to achieve 

planned capabilities. For example, the Army has not provided its new 

modular brigades with required quantities of critical equipment such as 

unmanned aerial vehicles, communications equipment, and trucks because 

they are not currently available in sufficient quantities. Moreover, it may take 

years to meet increased requirements for critical skills such as military 

intelligence analysts because they are in high demand and take years to 

train. In addition, the Army has not yet made a number of key decisions that 

could further increase requirements for equipment and personnel. First, the 

Army has not yet decided whether to recommend an increase in the number 

of active brigade combat teams from 43 to 48. Also, it is assessing the costs 

and benefits of adding one more combat maneuver battalion to its new 

modular brigades. Finally, the Army has not yet finalized the design of higher 

echelon and support units. Until designs are finalized and key decisions are 

reached, the Army will not have a complete understanding of the equipment 

and personnel that are needed to fully achieve its goals. 

The costs associated with modularizing the entire Army are substantial, 

continuing to evolve, and likely to grow beyond current estimates. As of 

March 2005, the Army estimated it will need about $48 billion to fund 

modularity—representing an increase of 71 percent from its earlier estimate 

of $28 billion in 2004. However, this estimate may not reflect all potential 

costs, such as for fully equipping the modular force as designed. Also, if the 

Army decides to add additional brigades or make other design changes, 

additional costs may be incurred. Furthermore, some costs are uncertain. 

For example, it will be difficult for the Army to determine facility 

requirements and related costs until DOD finalizes plans for restationing 

forces from overseas. Until the Army provides a better understanding of the 

requirements and costs associated with modularity, DOD will not be well 

positioned to weigh competing priorities and make informed decisions nor 

will the Congress have the information it needs to evaluate funding requests.

Modularity is a major restructuring 

of the entire Army, involving the 

creation of brigade combat teams 

that will have a common design 

and will increase the pool of 

available units for deployment. 

The Army is undertaking this 

initiative at the same time it is 

supporting the Global War on 

Terrorism, and developing 

transformational capabilities such 

as the Army Future Combat 

Systems. To achieve modularity, 

the Army currently estimates it will 

need $48 billion. The Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) request for 

fiscal year 2005 supplemental funds 

includes $5 billion for modularity. 

The Army plans for another 

$5 billion to be funded from fiscal 

year 2006 supplemental funds and 

the remaining $38 billion from 

DOD’s annual appropriation from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2011. 

Our testimony addresses: (1) the 

Army’s goals and plans for 

modularity, (2) challenges the 

Army faces in staffing and 

equipping its modular combat 

brigades, (3) key decisions that 

could affect requirements, and 

(4) the Army’s cost estimates and 

funding plans. 

This testimony is based on ongoing 

GAO work examining Army 

modularity plans and costs. Our 

work has been primarily focused 

on the Army’s active forces. 
Page 1 GAO-05-443T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our ongoing work on the Army’s 

modular force initiative. The Army considers modular force transformation 

to be the most extensive reorganization of its force since World War II, 

requiring large investments in personnel and equipment to restructure its 

force, now organized in divisions, to a modular brigade-based force. 

Because the Army is undertaking this effort while executing the Global War 

on Terrorism and developing other new capabilities such as the Future 

Combat Systems, the Department of Defense (DOD) may face some longterm affordability challenges as it moves forward with these and other

initiatives. In other testimony today, we will address our ongoing work on 

Future Combat Systems.1

As part of this hearing, you asked us to discuss our preliminary 

observations based on our ongoing work that focuses on the Army’s 

implementation and challenges of achieving a modular force, and the cost 

implications of this major initiative. Specifically, our testimony today will 

address (1) the Army’s goals for modularity and its plan for carrying out 

this reorganization, (2) potential challenges the Army may face in staffing 

and equipping brigades that are being created from the Army’s existing 

division-based force, (3) key decisions that could further affect modularity 

requirements, and (4) the Army’s cost estimates for modularity and its plan 

for funding these costs. 

The information we will discuss on modularity is based on our preliminary 

work focusing on the active Army. We plan to issue a report later this year. 

To address Army implementation plans and costs, we conducted interviews 

with and reviewed documents from the Army Staff, the Army Budget 

Office, U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, and the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency. In 

addition, we visited the 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne 

Division, which are among the first active combat divisions to undergo 

modular conversion. 

We conducted our work from August 2004 to March 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

1

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects for 

Success, GAO-05-428T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
Page 2 GAO-05-443T 

Summary While the Army has made progress in establishing modular brigades, it is 

likely to face several challenges in providing its new modular units with 

some required skilled personnel and equipment that are needed to achieve 

planned capabilities. For example, the Army has not provided its new 

modular brigades with required quantities of critical equipment such as 

unmanned aerial vehicles, communications equipment, and trucks because 

they are not currently available in sufficient quantities. Moreover, it may 

take years to meet increased requirements for critical skills such as military 

intelligence analysts because they are in high demand and take years to 

train. In addition, the Army has not yet made a number of key decisions 

that could further increase requirements for equipment and personnel 

beyond those that have been identified by the Army to date. First, the Army 

has not yet decided whether to recommend to the Secretary of Defense an 

increase to the number of active brigade combat teams from 43 to 48. Also, 

it is refining its analysis of design requirements and assessing the costs and 

benefits of adding one more combat maneuver battalion to its new modular 

brigades. Finally, the Army has not yet finalized the design of higher 

echelon and support units. Until designs are finalized and key decisions are 

reached, the Army will not have a complete understanding of the 

equipment and personnel that are needed to fully achieve its goals for a 

more capable modular force. 

The costs associated with modularizing the entire Army are substantial, 

continuing to evolve, and likely to grow beyond current estimates. As of 

March 2005, the Army estimated it will need a total of about $48 billion to 

fund modularity—representing an increase of 71 percent from its earlier 

estimate of $28 billion in 2004. Our preliminary work suggests that this 

revised estimate may still not reflect all potential costs, including fully 

equipping the modular force as designed. Also, if the Army decides to add 

additional brigades or maneuver battalions to the modular force, as it is 

considering, it may incur additional costs. Furthermore, some costs are 

uncertain. For example, it will be difficult for the Army to determine facility 

requirements and related costs until DOD finalizes plans for restationing 

forces from overseas. Until the Army provides a better understanding of 

the requirements and costs associated with modularity, DOD will not be 

well positioned to weigh competing priorities or make informed decisions 

and the Congress will not have all the information it needs to evaluate 

funding requests for modularity. 
Page 3 GAO-05-443T 

Army Modularity 

Is a Significant 

Undertaking

The Army’s modular force initiative, which has been referred to as the 

largest Army reorganization in 50 years, encompasses the Army’s total 

force--active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve—and directly 

affects not only the Army’s combat units, but related support and command 

and control. Restructuring its units is a major undertaking and requires 

more than just the movement of personnel or equipment from one unit to 

another. The Army’s new designs are equipped and staffed differently than 

the units they replace. Therefore, successful implementation of this 

initiative will require many changes such as new equipment and facilities, a 

different mix of skills and occupational specialties among Army personnel, 

and significant changes to training and doctrine.

The foundation of Army modularity is the creation of brigade combat 

teams—brigade-sized units that will have a common organizational design 

and will increase the pool of available units for deployment. The Army 

believes a brigade-based force will make it more agile and deployable and 

better able to meet combatant commander requirements. Not only does the 

Army expect to produce more combat brigades after its restructuring, it 

believes the brigades will be capable of independent action by the 

introduction of key enablers, such as enhanced military intelligence 

capability and communications, and by embedding various combat support 

capabilities in the brigade itself instead of at a higher echelon of command. 

The Army’s goal is for each new modular brigade combat team, which will 

include about 3000-4000 personnel, to have at least the same combat 

capability as a brigade under the current division-based force, which 

ranges from 3000 to 5000 personnel.2

 Since there will be more combat 

brigades in the force, the Army believes its overall combat capability will 

be increased as a result of the restructuring, providing added value to 

combatant commanders. 

By the end of fiscal year 2006, the Army plans to reorganize its 10 active 

divisions, expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular, standardized 

brigade combat teams and creating new types of command headquarters to 

replace the current division headquarters structure. According to Army 

officials, this is a very quick pace for a restructuring of this magnitude. The 

Army has already begun the conversion with 4 divisions: the 3rd Infantry 

2

 The Army’s plan calls for three variants of the modularized brigade combat team. The 

infantry variant will have about 3300 personnel, the armored variant 3700 personnel, and the 

Stryker variant 4000 personnel. 
Page 4 GAO-05-443T 

and the 101st Airborne Divisions, which we have visited, the 4th Infantry 

Division which we plan to visit this spring, and the 10th Mountain Division. 

The 3rd Infantry Division has redeployed back to Iraq in its new 

configuration, and the 101st is scheduled to redeploy later this year. 

The Army’s organizational designs for the brigade combat teams have been 

tested by its Training and Doctrine Command’s Analysis Center at Fort 

Leavenworth against a variety of scenarios and the Army has found the new 

designs to be as effective as the existing brigades in modeling and 

simulation. During the next few years, the Army plans to collect lessons 

learned from deployments and major training exercises and make 

appropriate refinements to its unit designs, equipment requirements, and 

doctrine. 

By fiscal years 2009-10, the Army plans to complete the creation of 

modular, standardized supporting brigades as well as a reorganization of its 

Corps and theater-level command and support structures. Ninety-two 

support brigades and five higher echelon headquarters will be included in 

this initiative—yet another indication of the far-reaching nature of the 

Army’s modularity plan.

Although our work has focused on the active component, restructuring of 

the reserve component into modular units will also be a major undertaking. 

The Army plans to convert the National Guard’s existing 38 brigades into 34 

modular brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010. However, the Army is 

considering accelerating this schedule, according to Army officials. In 

addition, the Army Reserve will have to realign its support units in 

accordance with new modular designs. Like the active component, the 

reserves will have to manage these conversions to the new modular 

organizations while continuing to provide forces to Iraq. 

Because of the high degree of complexity associated with establishing a 

modular force while managing deployments to ongoing operations, the 

Army has developed a number of plans and processes, such as the Army 

Campaign Plan3

 and has held periodic meetings within the Army 

headquarters and its components and major commands, to manage these 

3

 The Army Campaign Plan, dated April 12, 2004, and updated October 27, 2004, guides the 

planning, preparation, and execution of the restructuring of the Army into a brigade-based 

modular force.
Page 5 GAO-05-443T 

changes. The Army’s senior leadership is playing a key role in these 

processes.

Army May Face 

Challenges in Staffing 

and Equipping Modular 

Brigade Combat Teams 

The Army is likely to face a number of challenges in fully staffing and 

equipping modular combat brigades as designed. Although somewhat 

smaller in size, the new modular brigades are expected to be as capable as 

the Army’s existing brigades because they will have different equipment, 

such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment, and a 

different mix of personnel and support assets. Although the Army has an 

approved and tested design for the new modular brigades, it has also 

established a modified list of equipment and personnel that it can 

reasonably expect to provide to units undergoing conversion based on its 

current inventory of equipment, planned procurement pipelines, and other 

factors such as expected funding. The Army expects to use this modified 

list of equipment and personnel to guide the conversion of existing 

divisions to modular brigades for the foreseeable future. Our preliminary 

work indicates significant shortfalls in the Army’s capacity to equip and 

staff units, even at modified levels. 

For example, according to Army officials, modular brigade combat teams 

will require additional soldiers in personnel specialties such as military 

intelligence, truck drivers, civil affairs, and military police to achieve the 

planned capability. Military intelligence is one of the most critical of these 

specialties because military intelligence enables brigade combat teams to 

conduct 24-hour combat operations, cover highly dispersed battlespaces, 

and increase force protection. According to Army officials, the Army needs 

to add 2800 military intelligence specialists by the end of fiscal year 2005 to 

meet near-term military intelligence shortages. Moreover, the Army needs 

an additional 6200 military intelligence specialists through fiscal year 2010 

to meet modular force requirements. Providing additional military 

intelligence specialists, particularly at the more senior levels, may take 

several years because of the extensive training required. At the time of our 

visit, the 3rd Infantry Division’s four brigade combat teams each had less 

than 50 percent of their military intelligence positions filled. Although the 

Army was later able to fill the division’s needs by reassigning military 

intelligence specialists from other units prior to its deployment to Iraq in 

January 2005, many of these soldiers were redeployed after just having 

returned from overseas. Moreover, transferring soldiers from other units 

may make it more difficult for the Army to fill positions in the remaining 

divisions scheduled to be restructured. We are continuing to follow up on 

Army actions to address these shortages. 
Page 6 GAO-05-443T 

Similarly, modular brigade combat teams require significant increases in 

the levels of equipment, particularly command, control, and 

communications equipment; wheeled vehicles; and artillery and mortars. 

Examples of command, control, and communications equipment that are 

key enablers for the modular brigade combat teams include advanced 

radios, Joint Network Node systems, ground sensors such as the 

Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System, and Blue Force Tracker, 

among others. This critical equipment makes possible the joint network 

communications, information superiority, and logistical operations over a 

large, dispersed battlespace in which modular forces are being designed to 

effectively operate. Although the Army has some of this equipment 

on hand, the levels being fielded to brigade combat teams are well below 

the levels tested by the Training and Doctrine Command. As a result, 

officials from both divisions we visited expressed concern over their 

soldiers’ ability to train and become proficient with some of this high-tech 

equipment because the equipment is not available in sufficient numbers. 

Moreover, it is not clear yet how the Army plans to bring brigades that have 

already undergone modular conversion up to Training and Doctrine 

Command tested levels of personnel and equipment following their 

deployments. For example, the design requires a division with four 

modular brigade combat teams to have approximately 28 tactical 

unmanned aerial vehicle systems. These systems provide surveillance and 

reconnaissance for soldiers on the battlefield and enable them to more 

safely carry out their missions. However, because of current shortages, the 

3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division are only authorized to 

have 4 systems, and at the time of our visits, the 3rd Infantry Division had 

1 and the 101st Airborne had none on hand. The Army requested funding for 

only 13 of these systems in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriation 

request to the Congress; thus, it remains unclear as to when the 3rd Infantry 

Division or the 101st Airborne Divisions will receive their full complement 

of tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems. Also, the Army may continue 

to provide other divisions undergoing conversion with limited quantities 

that fall short of the design requirement.4

4

 We recently testified that DOD needs a strategic plan to guide all UAV development and 

fielding efforts, which would include UAVs needed for modularity. See GAO, Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address 

Emerging Challenges, GAO-05-395T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2005).
Page 7 GAO-05-443T 

Army Faces a 

Number of Key 

Decisions That Could 

Affect Modular Force 

Requirements

According to Army modularity plans, the Army is continuing to assess its 

requirements and may make some key decisions in the future that will 

affect the size and composition of the modular force as well as its cost. 

First, the Army’s Campaign Plan calls for a potential decision by fiscal year 

2006 on whether to create 5 additional modular brigade combat teams. 

Adding 5 brigades would provide additional capability to execute the 

defense strategy but would require additional restructuring of people and 

equipment. Second, according to the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, 

the Army is evaluating whether to add a third maneuver battalion to 

brigade combat teams in fiscal year 2007 to prepare for the fielding of the 

Future Combat Systems Units of Action, which are designed with three 

maneuver battalions. Additionally, according to the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command, early testing demonstrates that brigade combat teams 

with three maneuver battalions offer distinct advantages over two battalion 

formations because they provide robust, flexible, full-spectrum capability. 

The command is conducting additional analysis to assess the value and 

cost of adding a third combat maneuver battalion to the modular brigade 

combat teams. If the Army later decides to add a battalion to some or all of 

the 43 or potentially 48 modular brigade combat teams, it will need to 

assign thousands of additional soldiers and field additional equipment.

The Army also faces a number of decisions in finalizing its plans for 

creating modular support brigades. Modular support brigades that will 

replace the current division-based combat service and support structure 

are not scheduled to be fully in place until fiscal years 2009-10. The Army 

has finalized the designs and requirements for three of the five types of 

support brigades, but has not yet made final design decisions for the other 

two. The support brigades are key components of the Army’s concept of 

modular forces being more responsive and expeditionary than current 

forces. Until the modular support brigades are fully organized, equipped, 

and functional, the Army’s modular forces would not have these 

capabilities, and in the interim, combat service and combat service support 

would need to be provided by existing division-based support 

organizations. This means that for some time to come, even as the Army 

makes progress in achieving greater uniformity across the force, there will 

be a number of variations in the size and capability of available support 

units. Also, as with the decision to add additional battalions, until the Army 

completes all of its force structure designs for support brigades, it will not 

have a total picture of its personnel and equipment requirements. 
Page 8 GAO-05-443T 

Finally, by fiscal year 2010 the Army plans to complete a reorganization of 

its corps and theater-level command and support structure. The Army’s 

plans would eliminate an entire echelon of command, moving from four 

levels to three and freeing additional personnel spaces that can help meet 

some of its modular force personnel requirements. While the Army expects 

to achieve efficiencies resulting from the reduction of command and 

support structures, their magnitude is not yet known and they may not be 

realized for several years. Moreover, while potentially somewhat more 

efficient, the new command-level designs are likely to require new 

command, control, and communications equipment to enable them to 

function in their updated roles, such as providing the basic structure for a 

joint headquarters. 

Cost Estimates for 

Fully Implementing 

Modularity Have 

Increased Significantly 

and Are Still Evolving

The costs of modularity are substantial and are likely to grow. Since 2004, 

the Army’s cost estimates have increased significantly. In January 2004, the 

Army estimated that increasing the number of active modular brigade 

combat teams from 33 to 48 would cost $20 billion from fiscal years 2004 

through 2011 based on a “rough order of magnitude estimate.” As of 

July 2004, the Army added $8 billion to address costs for reorganizing the 

reserve component, bringing the total estimated cost for reorganizing the 

entire force to $28 billion. Our preliminary work highlighted several 

limitations in this estimate. For example, the July 2004 estimate: 

• included costs of adding 15 light infantry brigades for the active 

component to bring the total number of active brigades to 48, but these 

costs were based on the current brigade structure, not the tested 

modular design; 

• did not take into account the costs for upgrading existing active 

brigades, or other support and command elements; and 

• accounted for construction of temporary, relocatable facilities, but did 

not allow for permanent upgrades to facilities or increases to other 

services provided at Army installations to accommodate the increase in 

modular units.

As of March 2005, the Army has revised its earlier estimate, now estimating 

that modularity will cost a total of $48 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 

2011—an increase of 71 percent over its earlier $28 billion estimate. 

According to the Army, this estimate includes costs for a total of 43 active 

component brigades—covering upgrades to the existing 33 brigades and 
Page 9 GAO-05-443T 

the creation of 10 new brigades—as well as 34 brigades in the reserve 

component. During our preliminary work we discussed and obtained 

summary information on the types of cost and key assumptions reflected in 

the Army’s estimates. However, we were unable to fully evaluate the 

estimates because the Army did not have detailed supporting information.

According to Army officials, the Army used the modular design, which has 

been informed by combat operations in Iraq, as the basis for developing the 

March 2005 revised estimate. They noted the estimate includes costs for 

the creation of new brigades as well as upgrades to existing brigades, costs 

for support and command elements, and costs for permanent facilities. 

However, unlike the original estimate, the current estimate does not 

include any personnel costs. According to Army officials, an increase in 

personnel endstrength is needed to simultaneously conduct operations and 

reorganize into a modular force. They told us these costs were excluded 

from the current estimate because it was difficult to differentiate between 

endstrength increases associated with conducting operations and those 

needed for modularity.

Based on our preliminary review of the Army’s revised estimate and 

potential costs associated with modularizing the active component, we 

believe there are certain factors that could affect the overall cost for 

modularity, including some that will likely make it grow higher than the 

current estimate of $48 billion. 

• First, the Army’s current cost estimate does not use the tested design as 

the basis for determining equipment costs. Rather, the estimate reflects 

costs for a lesser amount of equipment than called for in the tested 

design. According to Army officials, they estimated equipment costs in 

this manner because some equipment is not currently available or in 

production in sufficient quantities to meet modularity requirements. 

• Second, if the Army decides to add 5 brigade combat teams to the 

current plan and/or an additional maneuver battalion to some or all 

brigades, the cost for modularity will increase significantly. For 

example, each modular brigade combat team, under the current design, 

would require 3,300 to 3,700 soldiers, for a potential total of up to 

18,500 soldiers. While at least some of these personnel requirements 

could be offset with existing force structure, it is unclear how many 

additional soldiers, if any, would be needed. Nonetheless, adding these 

brigades to the force structure would add costs for equipment, facilities, 

and training. 
Page 10 GAO-05-443T 

• Finally, the Army’s current cost estimate includes costs for permanent 

facilities needed to accommodate the modularized brigade combat 

teams. However, according to Army officials, plans for constructing 

facilities are uncertain because of pending decisions related to the Base 

Realignment and Closure process and the planned restationing of forces 

from overseas.

The Army anticipates obtaining funds to pay for this restructuring through 

supplemental and annual appropriations. To cover the $48 billion estimate, 

current DOD budget plans indicate the Army would receive a total of 

$10 billion from supplemental appropriations in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, 

and a total of $38 billion from DOD’s annual appropriation for the period of 

fiscal years 2006 through 2011.5

 As part of our ongoing work, we will 

continue to review the Army’s estimates, cost implications, and funding 

plans for modularity. 

Concluding Remarks The Army views modularity as critical to improving the combat and 

support capability of its forces. Restructuring the entire force while 

continuing to support ongoing operations poses significant challenges and 

will require substantial funds. The magnitude of achieving modularity, 

coupled with other ongoing major transformation initiatives, raises 

long-term affordability issues for DOD. Until the Army more fully defines 

the requirements and potential costs associated with modularity, DOD will 

not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities and make informed 

decisions, and the Congress will not have all the information it needs to 

evaluate funding requests for modularity.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes our prepared 

remarks. We would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

5

 The annual appropriations totaling $38 billion include $13 billion that the Army reallocated 

from other programs. 
Page 11 GAO-05-443T 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

For future questions about this statement, please contact Sharon Pickup at 

(202) 512-9619, Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402, or Gwendolyn Jaffe at 

(202) 512-4691. Other individuals making key contributions to this 

statement include Margaret Best, Alissa Czyz, Kevin Handley, Joah 

Iannotta, Harry Jobes, Joseph Kirschbaum, Eric Theus, Jason Venner, and 

J. Andrew Walker.

(350683)
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