3rd DivisionFebruary 19, 1997                                                                                No. 1-95-1779EVELYN HUNT, Special Administrator )of the Estate of JOHNIE HUNT,                                         )                                       )    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT     Plaintiff-Appellee,           )    COURT OF COOK COUNTY.                                   )v.                                 )                                   )RICHARD M. DALEY, MAYOR; CITY OF   )CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF POLICE; CITY )    THE HONORABLEOF CHICAGO MAYOR's LICENSE         )    ELLIS REID,COMMISSION; WINSTON L. MARDIS,     )    JUDGE PRESIDING.    Director, Mayor's License          )Commission,                        )                                   )     Defendants-Appellants.        )     JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:     This proceeding involves the 1982 Chicago Weapons Ordinance,passed by the Chicago City Council on March 19, 1982 (see ChicagoMunicipal Code �11.1 et seq. (1982), now amended and recodifiedat Chicago Municipal Code �8-20-010 et seq. (1990) (set forth inpertinent part in our Discussion, below)), rendering certainfirearms unregisterable in the City of Chicago.  Under thatordinance, several categories of firearms, including handguns,became unregisterable in the City of Chicago.  See ChicagoMunicipal Code �11.1-3 (1982) (now Chicago Municipal Code �8-20-050 (1990)).  However, pursuant to a grandfathering provisionprovided in the 1982 ordinance, handgun owners whose handgunswere validly registered prior to the effective date of thehandgun ban could continue to re-register their handguns.  SeeChicago Municipal Code �11.1-3(c)(1) (1982) (now ChicagoMunicipal Code �8-20-050(c)(1) (1990)).  The 1982 ordinance alsorequired that such re-registration take place every two years. See Chicago Municipal Code �11.1-18 (1982) (amended andrecodified in 1994 to require annual re-registration (see ChicagoMunicipal Code �8-20-200(a) (1994))).  The failure to re-registerfirearms every two years after the enactment of the 1982ordinance rendered such firearms permanently unregisterable, andthereby caused handgun owners to forfeit their right to possesssuch firearms within the City of Chicago.  See Chicago MunicipalCode �11.1-18 (1982) (now Chicago Municipal Code �8-20-200(c)(1990)).     In September 1993, the plaintiff's decedent, Johnie Hunt,(hereinafter Hunt) filed applications with the Gun RegistrationSection of the Chicago Police Department to re-register his threehandguns.  The Police Department denied Hunt's applications onthe ground that he had failed to renew his previous firearmregistrations upon their expiration every two years, in violationof section 8-20-200(a) of the Chicago Weapons Ordinance (ChicagoMunicipal Code �8-20-200(a) (1990)).  Hunt appealed that decisionto the Mayor's License Commission of the City of Chicago, whichalso denied re-registration based upon section 8-20-200(a).  Huntthen filed a complaint for administrative review of those ordersin the Circuit Court of Cook County against defendants Richard M.Daley, Mayor of the City of Chicago; the Chicago PoliceDepartment; and against the Mayor's License Commission and itsdirector, Winston L. Mardis.  The circuit court reverseddefendants' denial of Hunt's applications to re-register, on thegrounds that section 8-20-200(c) of the Weapons Ordinance isunconstitutional.  Defendants appeal from that order.     The underlying facts are undisputed.  As established in histestimony before the Mayor's License Commission, at the time ofthe enactment of the 1982 weapons ordinance, Hunt owned threehandguns which were validly registered.  He kept his handguns athome to protect himself and his wife.  Up to 1987, Hunt properlyre-registered his handguns every two years, as required under theapplicable provisions of the 1982 ordinance.  On each re-registration application, there was a notice to handgun ownersthat all firearms registration certificates would expire twoyears after the date of their issuance, at which time all subjectweapons would have to be re-registered.  Although there is somedispute as to whether he re-registered his handguns in 1989, theparties agree that after 1989, Hunt did not re-register hishandguns again until four years later, when he submitted theSeptember 14, 1993 re-registration applications at issue here. Hunt also testified at the administrative hearing, over theobjection of the City of Chicago, that he had been hospitalizedrepeatedly between 1986 and 1993 for treatment of diabetes,hypertension, prostatitis, and for the amputation of his leg andsurgery on his spine.     The Mayor's License Commission rejected Hunt's September1993 re-registration application.  In his complaint foradministrative review before the circuit court, Hunt urged as hehad before the Mayor's License Commission that the denial of hisre-registration applications was an abuse of discretion, wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence, and was arbitraryand capricious.  Hunt then filed a motion for summary judgment,in which for the first time he argued that the denial of his re-registration was unconstitutional.  The circuit court denied thatmotion, stating that summary adjudication was an improper meansof disposition on administrative review.  The circuit court thenproceeded to hearing, pursuant to which it reversed the decisionof the Mayor's License Commission on constitutional grounds, toallow Hunt to re-register his handguns, stating as follows:     "With the inclusion of the grandfather clause, the     handgun ordinance is essentially a compromise position      between the interests of the City in eliminating     dangerous weapons from the street and the reliance     interests and vested property rights of Mr. Hunt.  ***      By declaring that Mr. Hunt may not renew the     registration in spite of his legislatively mandated     grandfathered status, simply because he failed to renew     his registration within two years of a previous     registration, *** the City of Chicago [has attempted]     to achieve retroactive application of a prospective     ordinance.  As such, the actions of the City of Chicago     in the case at bar serve no legitimate government     function *** [because they] attempt to give with one     hand and take away with the other."Defendants appeal from that order.DISCUSSION:     On appeal, defendants first contend that the circuit courterred in considering the constitutionality of the re-registrationrequirement, first raised before it, because the issue was waivedinsofar as Hunt failed to raise the issue before the Mayor sLicense Commission.  Defendants further contend that even absentwaiver, the circuit court was incorrect in finding section 8-20-200(c) of the Weapons Ordinance unconstitutional.  We reverse forthe reasons which follow.     We first address the waiver issue.  At the outset, we notethat the parties agree that, as is the case with administrativeagencies generally, the Mayor s License Commission did not havethe power to invalidate a statute in the first instance becauseof any substantive due process violation.  See generally 2 Am.Jur. 2d Administrative Law �77, at 99 (1994) ("it is axiomaticthat an administrative agency has no power to declare a statutevoid or otherwise unenforceable.").  See also Yellow Cab Co. v.City of Chicago, 938 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Ill. 1996)(administrative agencies lack power to determine theconstitutionality of legislation which they must enforce); PalmHarbor Special Fire Control District v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249(Fla. 1987) (administrative agency has no power to declare astatute void or unenforceable).  Consequently, plaintiff urgesthat since the Mayor's License Commission could not resolve theissue, there was no reason to raise it there.  Defendant,however, responds that notwithstanding that inability to rule onthe issue, the issue must be raised during the administrativehearing if for no other reason than that of creating a recordthat will better enable the reviewing court to address the issueon review.     There appears to be some support for defendants' position inthat regard.  Cf. Caauwe v. Police Pension Board, 216 Ill. App.3d 313, 576 N.E.2d 1078 (1991).  See also Miller v. Police Board,38 Ill. App. 3d 894, 349 N.E.2d 544 (1976).  However, we need nothere resolve this question, because the rule is clear that waiveris only an admonition to litigants, not a limitation upon thejurisdiction of a reviewing court.  American Federation of State,County & Municipal Employees v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475,584 N.E.2d 116 (1991); In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d273, 545 N.E.2d 731 (1989).  Therefore, the circuit court, whichfirst heard this administrative appeal, was well within thelatitude of its discretion to entertain this issue,notwithstanding any waiver contentions.  Accordingly, because thecircuit court was in any event acting properly within thelatitude of its discretion when it considered plaintiff'sconstitutional challenge, we now consider the merits of thatconstitutional issue.     Turning to the merits, defendants contend that the circuitcourt erred in holding section 8-20-200(c) of the 1982 WeaponsOrdinance unconstitutional.  In opposition, plaintiff appears toargue that Hunt had vested property rights in his handguns underarticle I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, �22), which provides individual citizens with a rightto bear arms subject to the police power, and that he had a vestedright to retain his ownership in those weapons, and in his right touse them for personal security purposes.  The plaintiff wouldfurther urge that by punishing Hunt's failure to re-register hishandguns every two years with unregisterability, section 8-20-200(c) of the 1982 ordinance violated his substantive due processrights.  Contrary to the circuit court, we find no merit inplaintiff's constitutional contentions.     The pertinent provisions of the 1982 ordinance are as follows:     "8-20-040 Registration of firearms.          (a) All firearms in the city of Chicago shall be     registered in accordance with the provisions of this     chapter."  Chicago Municipal Code section 8-20-040(a)     (1990) (formerly �11.1-2(a)).     "8-20-050 Unregisterable firearms.     No registration certificate shall be issued for any of     the following types of firearms:* * *              (c) Handguns, except:          (1) those validly registered to a current owner in     the city of Chicago prior to the effective date of this     chapter ***."  Chicago Municipal Code �8-20-050 (1990)     (formerly �11.1-3).                                   * * *     "8-20-200(a) Renewal of Registration.          (a) Every registrant must renew his registration     certificate annually [every two years under �11.1-     18(a)].* * *              (c) Failure to comply with the requirements for     renewal of registration of a firearm shall cause that     firearm to become unregisterable.   Chicago Municipal     Code �8-20-200(c) (1990) (formerly ��11.1-3(a), (c)).As noted above, handguns registered prior to the enactment of the1982 ordinance were grandfathered under section 8-20-050(c)thereof, but such handguns became unregisterable if owners failedto re-register those firearms every two years.  The failure totimely re-register in that regard was penalized withunregisterability under section 8-20-200(c).     The decision of our supreme court in Kalodimos v. Village ofMorton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984) is pivotal. In Kalodimos, the plaintiffs challenged the comprehensive handgunban of Morton Grove, Illinois, under article I, section 22 of theIllinois Constitution, arguing, inter alia, that the Morton Groveordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of the police power. The Morton Grove handgun ban provided that no person couldpossess a handgun in Morton Grove unless the gun had beenrendered permanently inoperative.  The Kalodimos court held thatthe right to bear arms under article I, section 22 was not afundamental right, stating as follows:     "Not every right secured by the State or Federal     constitutions is fundamental, however, but only those     which 'lie at the heart of the relationship between the     individual and a republican form of nationally     integrated government' [citation].  While the right to     possess firearms for purposes of self-defense may be     necessary to protect important personal liberties from     encroachment by other individuals, it does not lie at     the heart of the relationship between individuals and     their government.  The right to arms guaranteed by the     Federal Constitution has never been thought to be an     individual right, as distinguished from a collective     right [citation]; moreover, the right to arms secured     by the Illinois Constitution, which did not exist prior     to 1970, is subject, as we have explained, to     substantial infringement in the exercise of the police     power even though it operates on the individual level.      [Citation.]"  Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 509, 470 N.E.2d     at 277-278.     The Kalodimos court therefore concluded that the relevanttest to be applied in their due process and equal protectionanalysis of the Morton Grove ordinance was one of rational basis,and not of strict scrutiny.  In holding that the Morton Groveordinance met the criteria of the rational basis test, the courtnoted that the stated purpose of the Morton Grove ordinance, asreflected in its preamble, was to reduce firearm-related deathsand injuries caused by the convenient availability of certaintypes of firearms.  In that regard, the Kalodimos court said,     "a ban on handguns under the conditions set forth in     the ordinance could rationally have been viewed by the     village as a way of reducing the frequency of     premeditated violent attacks as well as unplanned     criminal shootings in the heat of passion or in     overreaction to fears of assault, accidental shootings     by children or by adults who are unaware that a handgun     is loaded, or suicides."  Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at     510, 470 N.E.2d 278.     Thus, as determined in Kalodimos, the test which shouldcontrol the constitutionality of an ordinance, such as theChicago Weapons Ordinance, which seeks to restrict or toeliminate the use of handguns, is the rational basis test.  Underthis test, we must determine whether such ordinance is rationallyrelated to a legitimate governmental interest.  A rationalrelationship exists between legislation and a legitimategovernmental interest if legislation tends to prevent someoffense or evil or if it tends to preserve the public health,morals, safety and welfare to some degree.  Normal v. Seven Kegs,Two Tappers, & Two Barrels, 234 Ill. App. 3d 715, 599 N.E.2d 1384(1992).  If the law bears a reasonable relationship to a properlegislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,"the requirements of due process are met and the courts will notsubstitute their judgment for that of the legislature."  IllinoisGamefowl Breeders Ass'n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 454, 389 N.E.2d529, 533 (1979), quoting S. Bloom, Inc. v. Mahin, 61 Ill. 2d 70,77, 329 N.E.2d 213, 217 (1975).  If there is any conceivablebasis for finding a rational relationship, the law in questionwill be upheld.  People v. Windsor, 242 Ill.App.3d 1030, 611N.E.2d 596 (1993).  See also Bricklayers Union Local 21 v. Edgar,922 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (where there are plausiblereasons for a legislative enactment, a court's inquiry under therational basis due process test is at an end).       The overall purpose of the Chicago Weapons Ordinance here inquestion, as reflected in its preamble, is substantiallyidentical to the public policy purposes found in the preamble tothe Morton Grove ordinance, referred to above, held to belegitimate in Kalodimos.  See Chicago City Council Proceedings,Vol. IV, at 10049 (March 19, 1982) (setting forth preamble tonewly enacted Chicago Weapons Ordinance).  See also Sklar v.Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 640 n.9 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting CityCouncil's preamble to 1982 Chicago Weapons Ordinance andupholding the federal constitutionality of that ordinance). Thus, as was made clear in Kalodimos, there can be no questionwith respect to the Chicago Weapons Ordinance that itsconstitutional validity must be held to the standard of therational basis test and that the criteria for that test aresatisfied by the overall purpose of that ordinance.  See Sklar,727 F.2d 633 (upholding constitutionality of 1982 Chicago WeaponsOrdinance under United States Constitution).  See also Quilici v.Village of Morton Grove, 695 F. 2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholdingMorton Grove handgun ban under United States Constitution).     However, having determined that the overall purpose of the1982 ordinance satisfies the rational basis test, we must nextconsider specifically the constitutionality of section 8-20-200(c) thereof, which, as noted, renders unregisterablepreviously grandfathered handguns which were not re-registered ina timely fashion.  See Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266(rational basis test applied to specific provisions as well as tooverall purpose of Morton Grove ordinance).  Although the ChicagoCity Council did not explicitly articulate the purposes ofsection 8-20-200(c), we can conceive of several such purposes. See Ball v. Village of Streamwood, 281 Ill. App. 3d 679, 665N.E.2d 311 (1996) (court may hypothesize reasons for legislation,even if the reasoning advanced did not motivate legislativeaction); Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Ill. App. 3d 268,643 N.E.2d 1345 (1994).  As noted by defendants, section 8-20-200(c) may well have been enacted, among other things, to (1)maintain a census of handguns in Chicago, (2) to measure therelationship between handgun possession and violent crime, (3) tocatalog handgun ownership to track handgun theft as well aslawful transfers, and (4) to more readily associate a handgunwith its owner s current address.  These would constitutesufficient purposes under the rational basis test to enforcetimely re-registration using the unregisterability penalty ofsection 8-20-200(c).  These reasons are particularly cogentinsofar as they help implement the overall purpose of theordinance, which is to substantially eliminate or reduce thehazards engendered by the possession of handguns.     Plaintiff contends that section 8-20-200(c) isunconstitutional because the legislature could have usedalternative means to achieve the goals underlying the enactmentof the ordinance, including the imposition of a fine, or aprovision for the independent notification of each handgun owner prior to the expiration of their handgun registrationcertificates.  We disagree.  Under the rational basis test, theexistence of a less onerous or more equitable alternative meansof securing a governmental interest is not by itself sufficientto render an ordinance unconstitutional.  See Kalodimos, 103 Ill.2d at 509, 470 N.E.2d at 277 ("[i]nitially, we observe that thesearch for less onerous alternative means of securing agovernmental interest is a hallmark of strict scrutiny, whichcomes into play only when a fundamental right is invaded").  (Asnoted previously, the Kalodimos court further concluded that theright to bear arms is not a fundamental right.)  See alsoWindsor, 242 Ill.App.3d 1030, 611 N.E.2d 596.  We also note thatplaintiff has not demonstrated that the degree of enforcementwould be as effective with a fine as it would be with the loss ofregistration rights.  Furthermore, with respect to the contentionthat more adequate notice should have been provided, it is wellsettled that all citizens are presumptively charged withknowledge of the law.  See Singh v. Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 252 Ill. App. 3d 859, 625 N.E.2d 656 (1993). Moreover, in point of fact, notice of the two-year registrationrequirement was included in each re-registration applicationwhich Hunt filled out since 1982.     Plaintiff, however, contends that section 8-20-200(c) of theordinance is arbitrary because it did not take into considerationHunt's need for handguns to protect his family, nor the fact thathe suffered serious medical problems during the period in whichhe failed to re-register.  However, these contentions arelikewise without merit.  Hunt did not show that his need forhandguns was any greater than the needs of any other citizenswhose handguns were grandfathered subject to the provisions ofsection 8-20-200(c), or, for that matter, whose handguns were notgrandfathered at all.  Moreover, as fully discussed above, oursupreme court in Kalodimos validated the constitutionality of theMorton Grove ordinance which abolished the right to possessworking handguns for all of its citizens without grandfatheringany.  Nor is there anything in the record to establish thatHunt's medical condition prevented him from filing a timely re-registration application.  Even if it were shown to be otherwisedisabling, Hunt's medical condition would not have prevented himfrom renewing his registrations by mail.  Moreover, the recordreflects that notwithstanding his medical condition, Huntcontinued to work until his retirement in 1991, during which timehe could have satisfied the re-registration requirements of theordinance.     Plaintiff additionally contends, somewhat obliquely, thatsection 8-20-200(c) is unconstitutional because it would haveoperated retrospectively to vitiate Hunt's right to re-registerhis handguns provided by section 8-20-050(c), the grandfatheringprovision of the 1982 ordinance.  This argument incorrectlycharacterizes section 8-20-200(c) as having a retroactive effectupon the grandfathering provision.  The two sections were adoptedsimultaneously with the enactment of the 1982 ordinance.  SeeValdez v. Zollar, 281 Ill. App. 3d 329, 665 N.E.2d 560 (1996)(law not retroactive merely because it relates to antecedentevents or facts); Griffin v. City of North Chicago, 112 Ill. App.3d 901, 445 N.E.2d 827 (1983).  See also Harraz v. Snyder, 283Ill. App. 3d 254, 669 N.E.2d 911 (1996) (law not retroactiveunless it impairs vested right acquired under existing laws orattaches a new disability regarding past transaction); Klawitterv. Crawford, 185 Ill. App. 3d 778, 541 N.E.2d 1159 (1989).  Here,section 8-20-200(c) does not purport to retroactively modify thegrandfathering provision.  Having been enacted simultaneouslywith the grandfathering provision, section 8-20-200(c) merelyimposes a continuing condition which must be satisfied for thegrandfathering provision to remain in effect.     We also find no merit in plaintiff's reliance upon NachmanCorp v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 592 F. 2d 947 (7th Cir.1979); Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center v. UnitedStates, 684 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1988); and General Telephone Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 2d 363, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984) tosupport the contention that the ordinance here isunconstitutional because it is inequitable, harsh and burdensome. Those cases are wholly inapposite.  In all three cases, thecourts found that the statutes in question did not violate anyconstitutional due process rights.  Plaintiff has failed to showhow those cases may have any applicability to the instant case.     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Courtof Cook County is reversed.     COUSINS, Jr., P.J. and HOURIHANE, J., concur.