GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1999 MILITARY TRAINING

Management and 

Oversight of Joint 

Combined Exchange 

Training

GAO/NSIAD-99-173

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282835 Letter

July 23, 1999

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Pat Roberts

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman, Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Howard L. Berman

House of Representatives

This report responds to your requests that we review the management and 

oversight of U.S. Special Operations Forces’ overseas deployments to train 

with the armed forces and other security forces of friendly foreign 

countries. These deployments, called Joint Combined Exchange Training 

(JCET), raised concerns that U.S. forces may be training with foreign 

militaries without adequate civilian oversight and engaging in activities that 

are inconsistent with U.S. policy goals. Specifically, we addressed 

(1) whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented JCETs in 

accordance with legislation, (2) whether DOD and the Department of State 

are providing civilian oversight to ensure that JCET activities are 

consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives in countries that we included 

in our review, and (3) how DOD is implementing recent legislation that 

restricts it from training with foreign forces involved in human rights 

abuses.

Letr
B-282835

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

We are sending copies of this report to other congressional committees;

the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State; and the Honorable 

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense. Copies will also be made available 

to other interested parties upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at

(202) 512-5140 or Donald Patton at (202) 512-2898. Key contacts and other 

contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Mark Gebicke

Director, National Security Preparedness Issues

Letr
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Executive Summary

Purpose Overseas activities of U.S. Special Operations Command forces, 

specifically Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), have raised 

concerns on the part of Members of Congress and others that U.S. forces 

may be training with foreign militaries without adequate civilian oversight 

and engaging in activities that are inconsistent with U.S. policy goals. 

Human rights advocates have also called attention to JCETs because of 

their concerns that the United States may be training foreign military 

personnel who have committed human rights abuses. In response to these 

concerns, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, the Chairman of the House Committee on 

International Relations, and the Ranking Minority Member of the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on International 

Relations, asked GAO to examine the management and oversight of JCET 

activities. Specifically, GAO determined (1) whether the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has implemented JCETs in accordance with legislation,

(2) whether DOD and the Department of State are providing civilian 

oversight to ensure that JCET activities are consistent with U.S. foreign 

policy objectives in countries that GAO included in its review, and (3) how 

DOD is implementing recent legislation that restricts it from training with 

foreign forces involved in human rights abuses.

Background Special operations forces are generally organized into small units for 

military action focused on strategic or operational goals. They are tasked 

with a variety of missions ranging from training, advising, and organizing 

foreign groups for unconventional warfare to training coalition forces for 

multinational military operations. These missions require skills such as the 

ability to speak foreign languages, to understand regional cultural and 

environmental characteristics, and to quickly deploy and operate 

unsupported in sometimes hostile or politically sensitive areas. The U.S. 

Special Operations Command believes that the best way its forces can train 

for these missions is to train with the people in the places where they may 

have to operate. 

In 1991, the Congress clarified the authority of the U.S. Special Operations 

Command and other combatant commands to use operations and 

maintenance funds for overseas deployments in which special operations 

forces train and train with the armed forces and other security forces of 

friendly foreign countries. The legislation provided authority for DOD to 

pay training expenses for these activities, provided that the primary

Letr
Executive Summary

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purpose was to train the U.S. servicemembers.1 The legislation also 

requires that the Secretary of Defense annually submit a report to the 

Congress listing numbers of JCETs conducted, their purpose, cost, and 

relationship to counterterrorism and counternarcotics activities. Since 

enactment of this legislation, such training has commonly been referred to 

as Joint Combined Exchange Training. Recent legislation restricts DOD 

from training with a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the 

Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the 

Department of State that a member of the unit has committed a gross 

violation of human rights, “unless all necessary corrective steps have been 

taken.”2

While the primary purpose of JCETs is to train U.S. forces, they also have 

an ancillary benefit in that they can be used by the geographic U.S. 

commanders in chief and ambassadors to fulfill regional and country 

engagement objectives. In fiscal year 1998, JCETs represented between

2 and 6 percent of the foreign military interactions of the commanders in 

chief. In that same year, JCETs accounted for about 8 percent of the time 

special operations forces were deployed overseas.

Results in Brief GAO’s review of available JCET files, attendance at command training 

conferences, observations of pre-event meetings, and discussions with 

DOD officials confirmed that DOD has complied with the statutory 

requirement that JCETs’ primary purpose be the training of U.S. special 

operations forces. GAO found a direct link between the training special 

operations forces indicated they needed and the training conducted. 

However, DOD has not accurately reported to the Congress the number of 

JCETs that were conducted, their costs, or their relationship to 

counternarcotics and counterterrorism, as also required by statute. 

Inaccuracies in reporting have arisen because of confusion in the field 

regarding how to define a JCET, how to pay for and report costs incurred 

by host countries, and how to interpret the legislative requirement to report 

JCETs’ relationship to counternarcotics and counterterrorism. DOD’s 

recent changes in the JCET approval process and more explicit guidance, 

which it plans to issue shortly, should improve the accuracy of the reports 

1

10 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994).

2

Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 

(Oct. 17, 1998).

Letr
Executive Summary

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to the Congress. GAO is recommending further ways for DOD to improve 

its reporting to the Congress.

Regarding oversight of JCET activities in the six countries GAO visited—

Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand—

DOD conducted JCETs with the knowledge and support of U.S. 

ambassadors who believed that these activities were consistent with U.S. 

foreign policy objectives in each country. While embassy officials were 

involved prior to November 1998, neither Department of State nor DOD 

headquarters’ officials were routinely involved in overseeing JCETs. 

Neither DOD personnel overseas nor U.S. ambassadors believed that any 

problems occurred because of the lack of headquarters oversight. Even so, 

DOD’s new JCET approval procedures, which require Secretary of Defense 

approval and Department of State notification, will provide greater 

headquarters oversight and assurance that all factors are weighed in 

determining whether a JCET should proceed. 

The Departments of State and Defense have each issued guidance for 

implementing October 1998 legislation that restricts the use of DOD funds 

to train with members of foreign security force units who have been 

credibly alleged to have committed a gross violation of human rights unless 

all “necessary corrective steps have been taken.”3

 In the same six countries 

GAO visited, State Department and DOD personnel have instituted 

procedures to implement the new legislation. For example, the embassy in 

Colombia investigates each individual scheduled for training for allegations 

of human rights abuses. These procedures are based on their 

understanding of the Department of State and DOD guidance and the 

unique foreign policy goals and challenges they face in the countries where 

they conduct activities. However, a number of issues in implementing the 

law still remain. As a result, State and DOD personnel overseas were 

concerned that they might not be meeting the full intent of the legislation. 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of State, after consultation with 

the Secretary of Defense, provide more specific guidance to U.S. 

embassies.

3

Pub. L. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998).
Executive Summary

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Principal Findings

JCETs Are Used Primarily to 

Train U.S. Forces, but 

Reporting on These 

Activities Has Been 

Inaccurate

As required by 10 U.S.C. 2011, the primary purpose of the JCETs GAO 

reviewed for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 was to train U.S. special operations 

forces. While commanders in chief and ambassadors played a large part in 

determining where JCETs occurred, individual special operations forces 

units determined what mission-essential tasks were trained to during these 

events. Special operations personnel GAO interviewed believed that JCETs 

were critical to maintain proficiency in their mission-essential tasks. 

JCETs also provided other benefits that were invaluable to special 

operations forces, including language training, cultural immersion, and 

knowledge of the local terrain and weather. Files that GAO reviewed at the 

Pacific Command, the Southern Command, and various special operations 

forces units, which included programs of instruction and after-action 

reports, illustrate that JCETs provided special operations personnel with 

opportunities to meet their mission-essential tasks. For example, in 

Thailand, the 1st Special Forces Group trained for military freefall 

parachuting, and in Bolivia, special forces National Guard units trained in 

light infantry tactics. 

DOD has not accurately reported to the Congress the numbers of JCETs 

that were conducted, their costs, or their relationship to counternarcotics 

and counterterrorism. For example, while DOD reported that it conducted 

231 JCETs costing about $15 million in fiscal year 1997, even this basic 

information is incorrect. According to the Special Operations Command, 

data were inaccurate because no one person managed the reporting 

process and because field personnel lacked guidance on how to report 

JCETs. For example, for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, GAO was not able to 

determine how many JCETs occurred primarily due to different 

interpretations of what was and what was not a JCET. Similarly, the 

reported cost of JCETs was in error because (1) some activities appear to 

have been erroneously charged as JCETs when they should have been 

charged to other purposes such as the delivery of humanitarian activities 

and (2) the full cost to the United States of foreign nations’ participation 

had not been captured. Errors in the reporting of U.S. costs arose because 

DOD had not issued guidance on how to report JCET activities. Errors in 

the reporting of host nation costs occurred because DOD had used multiple 

appropriation accounts to pay for foreign nations’ participation without 

reporting each of them. Finally, because of different interpretations of the 

legislative requirement to report JCETs’ relationship to counternarcotics 
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

and counterterrorism, reporting has been inaccurate. For example, DOD 

did not report some activities as related to counterterrorism when file 

reviews indicated that the tasks and units involved in the training were 

related to counterterrorism.

In response to recent concerns about the extent of JCET activity, DOD 

changed its JCET approval process and is providing more specific guidance 

on JCET activities. These changes, which include providing a definition of 

a JCET and a standard format for reporting, should improve the accuracy 

of DOD’s reports to the Congress. However, DOD’s new guidance does not 

address how to determine the relationship of JCETs to counterterrorsim 

and counternarcotics activities. Neither does it fully clarify how 

incremental costs for host nation participation should be funded and 

accounted for.

More Headquarters 

Oversight Should Increase 

Assurances That JCETs Are 

Consistent With U.S. 

Foreign Policy 

To improve oversight and respond to legislation that mandated Secretary of 

Defense approval for each JCET, DOD, in November 1998, implemented 

procedures to ensure Secretary of Defense approval and State Department 

notification of JCETs. This increase in civilian oversight will promote 

departmental headquarters visibility over JCETs and help to ensure that all 

foreign policy issues are considered in the JCET approval process. 

Previously, neither State nor DOD headquarters officials were routinely 

involved in approving JCET activities. Notwithstanding the lack of 

headquarters oversight in the past, in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, U.S. ambassadors stated that 

JCETs—just as other military activities in country—have taken place with 

their support and knowledge. GAO found that embassies used one or more 

of the following activities to oversee U.S. military activities: (1) the country 

clearance approval process, through which U.S. government employees 

engaging in official travel must request and receive permission from the 

ambassador to enter the country; (2) regular country team meetings 

including the ambassador, the deputy chief of mission, and heads of each 

resident U.S. agency; (3) annual mission planning sessions; 

(4) DOD briefings to the ambassador and other State personnel; and 

(5) engagement plans and training calendars. 

Given these procedures, ambassadors believed that the JCETs that took 

place were consistent with the specific U.S. goals and objectives in each 

country that GAO visited. In some cases, JCETs were used as a strategy to 

achieve a specific country goal; in other cases, the relationship was more 

indirect. For example, in Bolivia, JCETs were used to help prepare the 
Executive Summary

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Bolivian military to assume peacekeeping operations, a stated U.S. goal. In 

Indonesia, JCETs were seen as one of a number of military-to-military 

activities used to maintain access to and develop greater influence in 

Indonesian military affairs to promote the development of a democratic 

government and reduce the involvement of the military in internal affairs.

Uncertainties Remain in 

Implementing the Law 

Restricting Training With 

Human Rights Abusers

All JCETs are covered by the recent legislation restricting DOD from using 

its funds to train with a foreign security force that has been credibly alleged 

to have committed a gross violation of human rights unless all necessary 

corrective steps have been taken. To date, DOD and the Department of 

State have developed separate sets of guidance for military components 

and embassies to implement the legislation. However, a number of 

practical concerns in implementing the legislation have not been resolved, 

and some U.S. ambassadors were concerned that they might not be 

meeting the intent of the legislation.

DOD has issued interim guidance implementing the legislative restriction 

from training with foreign forces involved in human rights abuses. 

Specifically, the guidance states that in cases in which the State 

Department advises DOD that it possesses information on gross human 

rights violations that it concludes is credible, the “proposed activity may be 

able to meet the requirements of the law because necessary corrective 

steps have been taken, e.g., through adjustments of the planned activity 

and/or adjustments to the host nation participants.” The guidance states 

further that if such adjustments are made and are judged adequate by the 

ambassador, the training may be approved. Thus, the DOD guidance has 

defined what “unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken” 

means.

However, while DOD’s guidance states that the corrective action must be 

judged adequate by the ambassador, GAO’s review shows that some 

ambassadors are unclear about the criteria to be used in making this 

assessment. Specifically, some embassy officials are concerned that the 

intent of “all necessary corrective steps” has not been clearly defined and 

that DOD’s guidance runs counter to the human rights policy governing 

foreign assistance. Under foreign assistance legislation, if State finds 

credible evidence of human rights abuses, assistance may proceed only 

after the embassy is assured that the recipient government is taking
Executive Summary

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“effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces 

to justice.”4

 While the respective statutes are written differently, some 

embassy officials believe that DOD and the Department of State should 

employ the same standard for addressing situations where State has found 

credible evidence of human rights abuses. The Department of State has 

told embassies to refer all cases in which credible evidence of human rights 

violations has been uncovered to State Department headquarters and 

unified commands for resolution.

Other unresolved implementation issues include determining (1) whether 

every individual in a unit needs to be screened or whether screening the 

collective human rights record of a unit is sufficient, (2) what DOD-funded 

activities require human rights screening, (3) how far back in time 

embassies must screen for human rights abuses, and (4) the extent to 

which embassies must screen for human rights violations in countries with 

no history of such abuse. Because of these unresolved issues, the 

legislation has been implemented differently in the six countries GAO 

visited, and some officials were concerned that they might not be meeting 

the intent of the Congress. For example, in the Philippines, the embassy 

does not screen every individual. In Colombia, on the other hand, where 

there are serious human rights concerns, the embassy investigates each 

individual scheduled for training, to include a review of whether the 

individual has been the subject of judicial proceedings. However, each 

embassy has questioned whether its approach is sufficient, for example, 

whether participants in other military-to-military activities, such as 

seminars between U.S. and Colombian officers, must receive the same 

scrutiny as required for JCETs.

Recommendations To improve the accuracy of annual reports to the Congress and the 

financial management of JCETs, GAO recommends that the Secretary of 

Defense take the following actions and set milestones for completing them. 

• Issue guidance that provides criteria to use in determining whether 

JCETs are related to counterterrorism or counternarcotics and 

therefore need to be reported as such. 

• Issue guidance on how to pay for and report each JCET expense. 

(A more detailed recommendation appears in ch. 2.)

4

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, § 568, 

112 Stat. 2681-194-195 (Oct. 21, 1998).
Executive Summary

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

To clarify legislative requirements for human rights screening for all 

DOD-funded training programs with foreign security forces and to address 

the concern of overseas State Department officials that they lack complete 

policy guidance from headquarters, GAO recommends that the Secretary of 

State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, clarify (1) whether 

every individual in a unit needs to be screened or whether screening the 

collective human rights record of a unit is sufficient, (2) what DOD-funded 

activities require human rights screening, (3) how far back in time 

embassies must screen for human rights abuses, and (4) the extent to 

which embassies must screen for human rights violations in countries with 

no history of such abuse.

Agency Comments DOD and the Department of State provided written comments on a draft of 

this report (see apps. I and II). DOD agreed with the observations and 

recommendations contained in the report. DOD reiterated its belief that 

the JCET program is a critical tool that enables special operations forces to 

maintain proficiency in mission-essential tasks. In response to GAO’s 

specific recommendations, DOD responded that it will provide guidance to 

determine whether a JCET is related to counterterrorism or 

counternarcotics. DOD said that it has issued interim and will issue final 

guidance no later than December 31, 1999, regarding the proper 

appropriation to charge for each JCET. Finally, DOD said that it concurred 

with GAO’s recommendation that the Secretary of State, after consultation 

with the Secretary of Defense, clarify the issues GAO raised regarding 

screening foreign forces for gross violations of human rights abuses.

In its response, State disagreed with GAO’s recommendation regarding 

human rights screening of foreign troops scheduled to participate in 

training with U.S. forces. State believes that the guidance it previously 

issued sufficiently addresses the concerns raised in this recommendation. 

State responded that vetting of every individual in a unit would be 

warranted if information received merited a further review of the unit in 

question and that it is continuing to work with embassies to clarify 

implementation of new guidelines and address procedural questions, such 

as time period and extent of screening for human rights violations, as they 

arise.

GAO continues to believe that State’s policy guidance does not provide 

sufficient direction to embassies on how to implement the October 1998 

legislation requiring human rights screening for host nation participants in 

military training. As pointed out in the report, State has not resolved which 
Executive Summary

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

types of U.S. military training activities overseas require human rights 

screening before they proceed, how far back in time the embassy must go 

in investigating these abuses, and the extent to which countries must 

screen for human rights abuses in countries with no history of such abuse. 

The State Department intends to decide these issues on a case-by-case 

basis. Such flexibility does not negate the need to provide embassies with 

a framework and specific policy guidance on State’s interpretation of the 

legislation. GAO continues to believe that current ambiguities in the 

guidance cause implementation problems for embassy personnel. 

Moreover, the absence of a uniform policy inhibits the ability of the 

Congress to conduct oversight of JCET activities relating to human rights 

policy. Therefore, GAO continues to believe that its recommendation has 

merit.
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training
Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Contents

Executive Summary 4

Chapter 1

Introduction

Organization of U.S. Special Operations Forces 16

Unique Missions of Special Operations Forces 18

JCETs Are Used to Meet Unique Training Requirements 19

Geographic Commanders in Chief Use JCETs to Support Their Plans 19

JCETs Account for a Small Percentage of Special Operations Forces’ 

Overseas Activities 23

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24

Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used 

Primarily to Train U.S.

Forces, but Reporting 

on These Activities

Has Been Inaccurate

JCETs Have Complied With Legislation Requiring That Their Primary 

Purpose Be to Train U.S. Forces 27

DOD Reports to the Congress on JCET Activities and Costs Are 

Inaccurate 32

Proposed Changes to Guidance and Approval Process Are 

Designed to Improve Future Reports 39

Conclusions 40

Recommendations 40

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40

Chapter 3

More Headquarters 

Oversight Should 

Increase Assurances 

That JCETs Are 

Consistent With

U.S. Foreign Policy

New Procedures Should Enhance Headquarters Oversight

 and Knowledge of JCET Activities 42

U.S. Ambassadors Provided Extensive Civilian Oversight 

of JCET Activities 45

Ambassadors Believed That JCETs Were Consistent With 

U.S. Objectives for Their Specific Countries 47

Conclusions 49

Chapter 4

Uncertainties Remain 

in Implementing the 

Law Restricting 

Training With Human 

Rights Abusers

Legislation Restricts Conducting JCETs With Forces Involved

 in Human Rights Violations 51

DOD Has Issued Interim Guidance, but Implementation 

Issues Remain 52

Conclusions 62

Recommendations 62

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 63
Contents

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 64

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of State 66

Appendix III: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 67

Tables Table 2.1: JCET Activities for Fiscal Years 1995-97 33

Table 2.2: Problems in DOD’s Report to the Congress on 

Fiscal Year 1998 JCETs 35

Table 2.3: JCET Costs for Fiscal Years 1995-97 36

Figures Figure 1.1: Organization of U.S. Special Operations Forces 17

Figure 1.2: Areas of Responsibility Assigned to Geographic CINCs 20

Figure 1.3: Time Special Operations Forces Spent Overseas by

 Activity in Fiscal Year 1998 24

Abbreviations

CINC commander in chief

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

JAD JCET Authorization Document

JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training

JMETL joint mission-essential task list

METL mission-essential task list

O&M operations and maintenance

PACOM Pacific Command

SEAL Sea-Air-Land

SOF special operations forces

SOCOM Special Operations Command

SOUTHCOM Southern Command
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 1

Introduction Chapte1r

Special operations forces (SOF) are generally organized into small units for 

military action focused on strategic or operational goals. They are tasked 

with a variety of missions ranging from training, advising, and organizing 

foreign groups for unconventional warfare to training coalition forces for 

multinational military operations. These missions require special skills 

that conventional forces do not have, such as the ability to speak foreign 

languages, understand regional cultural and environmental characteristics, 

and quickly deploy and operate unsupported in sometimes hostile or 

politically sensitive areas. The U.S. Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) believes that the best way its forces can train for these types of 

missions is to train with the people in the places where they may have to 

operate. 

In 1991, the Congress clarified the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

authority to spend training funds in connection with SOF training overseas 

with friendly foreign forces, as long as the primary purpose was to train 

U.S. forces.1

 Since the enactment of this legislation, such training has 

commonly been referred to as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). 

The primary purpose of JCETs is to provide U.S. SOF training events to 

develop and maintain their skills. While advancement of the geographic 

commanders in chief (CINC) engagement strategies and incidental training 

benefits to friendly forces are expected, these results must always be 

secondary to the primary purpose of training U.S. SOF. 

Organization of U.S. 

Special Operations 

Forces

U.S. SOF are under the combatant command of SOCOM. The Congress 

mandated the creation of SOCOM in the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 1987, and in April 1987, the Secretary of Defense 

established the Command to prepare special operations forces to carry out 

assigned missions and other tasks directed by the President or the 

Secretary of Defense.2

 SOCOM has its own budget within DOD for 

operations and maintenance, military construction, military pay and 

research, development, and procurement of items unique to special 

operations. SOCOM receives about $3 billion in annual appropriations, or 

about 1.3 percent of the DOD budget. 

1

10 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994).

2

10 U.S.C. § 167 (1994).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

SOCOM manages a force of about 46,000 active duty, reserve, National 

Guard, and civilian personnel. SOCOM is organized into a headquarters; 

Army, Navy, and Air Force service component commands; and a joint 

command (see fig. 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Organization of U.S. Special Operations Forces

Source: U.S. Special Operations Command.

The Army Special Operations Command comprises special forces, 

psychological operations, civil affairs, Ranger, and aviation units, as well as 

a support command. The Naval Special Warfare Command comprises two 

naval special warfare groups, one naval special warfare development 

group, and two special boat squadrons. Each special warfare group 

includes three Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, one SEAL delivery vehicle team, 

and forward-deployed special warfare units. The Air Force Special 

Operations Command comprises one Special Operations Wing, two 

forward-deployed Special Operations Groups, and one Special Tactics 

S pecial Forces

Rangers

S p ecial O p eration s

A viation

P sychological

O perations

C ivil A ffairs

S p ecial O p eration s

Support Com m and

U .S . A rm y S pecial

W arfare C enter and

School

U.S. Arm y

S p ecial O peration s C om m and

Fort Bragg, NC

SEAL Teams

S E A L D elivery

V eh icle Team s

S p ecial W arfare

U nits

N aval S p ecial

W arfare G roups

S pecial B oat

Squadrons

S p ecial W arfare

D evelopm ent G roup

N aval S p ecial W arfare

Center

U.S. Naval

S p ecial W arfare C om m an d

Coronado, CA

S p ecial O peration s W in gs

S p ecial O peration s G rou p s

S p ecial Tactics G roup

U .S . A ir Force

S p ecial O peration s

School

U .S . A ir Force

S p ecial O peration s C om m an d

H u rlb ert Field , FL

U .S . Join t S pecial

O perations C om m and

Fort Bragg, NC

Headquarters

U .S . S p ecial O peration s C om m an d

M ac D ill A ir F orce B ase, F L
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Group in its active force and two Special Operations Wings in its Air Force 

Reserve and Air National Guard force. All three services have special 

operations centers and schools for leadership development, education, and 

training. The Joint Special Operations Command is a joint headquarters 

designed to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure 

interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special 

operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations 

tactics. The Joint Special Operations Command does not conduct JCETs. 

Unique Missions of 

Special Operations 

Forces

Special operations forces are charged with nine principal missions and, on 

the basis of their unique capabilities, conduct a variety of other activities. 

The principal missions are (1) to train and otherwise assist foreign 

militaries to combat insurgency and other threats to stability

(foreign internal defense); (2) to train, advise, and otherwise assist local 

forces for guerilla warfare (unconventional warfare); (3) to protect against 

and prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 

(counterproliferation); (4) to use offensive and defensive measures to 

prevent or resolve terrorist incidents (combating terrorism); (5) to obtain 

information concerning capabilities and activities of actual or potential 

adversaries (special reconnaissance); (6) to inflict damage on an adversary 

or recover personnel or material (direct action); (7) to target an adversary’s 

information system while defending U.S. systems (information operations); 

(8) to establish, maintain, or strengthen relations between U.S. and allied 

governments to facilitate military operations (civil affairs); and (9) to 

influence attitudes of foreign audiences (psychological operations).

Because of the unique capabilities derived from their principal missions, 

special operations forces are also tasked with participation in other 

activities. These collateral activities may change in response to the 

international environment. For example, special operations forces are 

involved in training foreign counterdrug forces and law enforcement 

agencies in skills needed to detect, monitor, and interdict drug production 

and trafficking. Special operations forces also participate in peacekeeping 

operations and provide training to multinational coalition partners on 

tactics and communications, and they provide training in support of 

legislated security assistance programs that provide U.S. defense articles 

and other defense-related services to foreign militaries. SOF also train 

foreign nations in humanitarian demining operations. During wartime or 

contingency operations, special operations forces may conduct personnel 

recovery deep within hostile territory, under adverse conditions.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

JCETs Are Used to 

Meet Unique Training 

Requirements

To develop and maintain the mission-essential skills SOF need to perform 

their principal and collateral missions, the U.S. special operations 

command believes that its forces must train overseas with foreign military 

forces. Training overseas with foreign forces enables special operations 

forces to practice their needed skills such as providing military instruction 

in a foreign language and maintaining language proficiency and familiarity 

with local geography and cultures, which are essential to foreign internal 

defense and unconventional warfare missions. 

SOCOM, like the military services, is authorized to use its training funds to 

train its own forces. However, because special operations training 

overseas involves the training of and training with foreign forces, SOCOM 

believed it needed clarified legislative authority to use its funds for these 

kinds of overseas training deployments. Special operations forces’ training 

with foreign militaries, funded with SOCOM’s operations and maintenance 

monies, resembled security assistance activities except that security 

assistance training’s primary purpose was to promote national security and 

foreign policy through training the host nation forces. Such host nation 

training was provided for in foreign assistance legislation. In the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the Congress, in 

response to a DOD request, included a provision explicitly granting DOD 

authority to use its funds for SOF to train with friendly foreign forces as 

long as the primary purpose was to train U.S. SOF.3

 Training under this 

authority became commonly referred to as JCETs.

Geographic 

Commanders in Chief 

Use JCETs to Support 

Their Plans

The five geographic CINCs—the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Central 

Command, the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM), and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)—use JCETs to 

help achieve foreign engagement objectives of the national security 

strategy in their designated areas of responsibility. Under the strategy, 

engagement in the international community is the preferred approach to 

addressing the new threats and challenges of today’s security environment. 

Each geographic CINC has its own special operations joint subordinate 

command to plan and control the employment of special operations forces 

in the region for training exercises and military operations. Figure 1.2 

shows the designated areas of responsibility for each geographic CINC.

3

10 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Figure 1.2: Areas of Responsibility Assigned to Geographic CINCs

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

Pacific Ocean

Atlantic Ocean

Indian Ocean

Pacific Ocean

Pacific Command

Southern Command

Atlantic Command

European Command

Central Command

On October 1, 1999, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

and Uzbekistan will be added to the Central Command's area of responsibility.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

On the basis of the national security strategy and other documents, each of 

the five geographic CINCs prepares a regional strategy that provides the 

foundation for contingency planning and peacetime engagement. To 

support the engagement portion of their strategy, CINCs annually develop a 

Theater Engagement Plan that defines the type and scope of foreign 

military engagement, including exercises, continuing operations, and 

foreign military interaction for their area of responsibility. Foreign military 

interaction includes JCETs and a number of separate activities outside of 

operations and exercises that are conducted with foreign military forces. 

CINCs Have Other 

Congressionally Authorized 

Options to Support Foreign 

Military Interaction

In addition to JCETs, CINCs can use a variety of statutory authorities to 

conduct programs and activities to support the foreign military interaction 

portion of their theater engagement plans. These activities include 

bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs, educational exchanges, 

and humanitarian and security assistance programs. SOF participate in 

those foreign military interaction activities described below.

• CINC Initiative Fund. These funds, which may be provided to CINCs 

based upon statutory priorities, can be used to conduct activities such 

as force protection, force training, contingencies, selected operations, 

military education and training to military and related civilian personnel 

of foreign countries, and expenses of defense personnel for bilateral and 

multilateral cooperation programs.4

 

• Military-to-military contacts. CINCs can also fund military-to-military 

contacts with foreign nations for such activities as seminars, 

conferences, and educational exchanges of civilian and military 

personnel.5

 These are often called traditional CINC activities. 

• Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. DOD is authorized to provide 

humanitarian and civic assistance in conjunction with military 

operations in a CINC’s area.6

 These activities must be designed to 

promote the security interests and the operational readiness skills of the 

U.S. and host country servicemembers. They must also serve the basic 

economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned, 

including activities such as medical care in rural areas, well-drilling, and 

4

10 U.S.C. § 166a (1994).

5

10 U.S.C. § 168 (1994).

6

10 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

basic sanitation facilities construction. They may also include training 

the host nation cadre on land mine detection and clearance. 

• Cooperative Threat Reduction activities. These DOD-funded programs 

are designed to encourage military reductions and reforms and reduce 

nuclear proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union.7

 They include 

expanded military-to-military and defense contacts, demilitarization of 

defense industries, and prevention of the proliferation of weapons 

technology and expertise. 

• Security assistance. A range of assistance programs support U.S. 

objectives by providing aid to other nations to defend and preserve their 

national security. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes 

International Military Education and Training, which provides training 

to foreign military forces and related civilian personnel of foreign 

countries.8

 The Arms Export Control Act (formerly Foreign Military 

Sales Act) authorizes two assistance programs: (1) the Foreign Military 

Sales Program, which allows countries to purchase defense articles and 

training from the United States and (2) the Foreign Military Financing 

Program, which provides grants and loans to foreign governments to 

purchase U.S. defense goods and services, including training.9

 Security 

assistance programs and funding levels are determined through 

consultation between the Department of State and the Congress and are 

implemented by DOD but funded by and subject to the overall policy 

supervision of the Department of State. Unlike JCETs, the primary 

beneficiary of any military training provided under these programs is the 

recipient nation.

JCETs Are a Small Portion 

of the CINCs’ Foreign 

Military Interaction and All 

Special Operations’ 

Overseas Deployments

According to CINC engagement plan information, JCETs do not represent a 

large part of the geographic CINCs’ overall foreign military interaction 

activity. As discussed later in this report, the CINCs’ data on JCETs and 

foreign military interactions are not entirely accurate. However, the data 

provide an overall perspective of JCETs’ relationship to these other 

engagement activities. In fiscal year 1998, JCETs represented between

2 and 6 percent of all foreign military interactions for the four geographic 

CINCs that had JCET deployments in their areas. According to the CINCs, 

JCETs in PACOM, the European Command, and SOUTHCOM in fiscal year 

7

22 U.S.C. § 5951-5958 (1994); Pub. L. 105-261, Div. A, Title XIII, 112 Stat. 1920, 2161-2167 (Oct. 17, 1998).

8

Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C).

9

Pub. L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified as amended in scattered sections 22 U.S.C.).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

1998 represented less than 3 percent of all foreign military interaction 

events. In PACOM and the European Command, military contacts such as 

personnel and unit exchanges and regional conferences accounted for 

most of the foreign military interaction activity. In SOUTHCOM, combined 

education events such as foreign defense personnel’s attendance at U.S. 

schools accounted for most of the foreign military interaction activity. 

According to the U.S. Central Command, JCETs represented less than 6 

percent of foreign military engagement activities in fiscal year 1998. 

Military contacts accounted for most of the foreign military interactivity in 

this theater. The U.S. Atlantic Command did not conduct JCETs in fiscal 

year 1998.

JCETs Account for a 

Small Percentage of 

Special Operations 

Forces’ Overseas 

Activities

Available data from SOCOM indicates that JCETs do not make up a large 

part of the total time all special operations forces are deployed overseas 

(see fig. 1.3). In fiscal year 1998, JCETs accounted for only about 8 percent 

of the time special operations forces spent on overseas deployments (see 

fig. 1.3).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Figure 1.3: Time Special Operations Forces Spent Overseas by Activity in Fiscal Year 1998

Source: U.S. Special Operations Command.

About 60 percent of the time special operations forces spent overseas was 

for military operations such as counterdrug operations and peacekeeping 

missions. About 16 percent of special operations forces’ time overseas was 

spent doing joint exercises, during which they prepare with other U.S. and 

foreign forces for military operations. Another 16 percent of special 

operations forces’ time overseas was spent conducting non-JCET training 

and other activities such as conferences, school courses, and command 

visits.

Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

In April 1998, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, 

Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Chairman of the House 

Committee on International Relations, and the Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on International 

Relations, asked us to examine JCETs. In March 1999, the Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate Committee on 

Armed Services, also requested that we undertake this work. Specifically, 

we sought to determine (1) whether DOD has implemented JCETs in 

Training and other activities 16%

JCETs 8%

Operations 60%

JCS exercises 16%
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

accordance with legislation, (2) whether DOD and the Department of State 

are providing civilian oversight to ensure that JCET activities are 

consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives in countries that we included 

in our review, and (3) how DOD is implementing recent legislation that 

restricts it from training with foreign forces involved in human rights 

abuses.

To determine whether DOD has implemented JCETs in accordance with 

the authorizing legislation, we examined the law and the legislative history 

and met with congressional committee staff members who were 

instrumental in developing the authorizing legislation. Because the statute 

states that the primary purpose of the training must be to train U.S. SOF, we 

evaluated the JCET approval process and its consideration of special 

operations forces’ mission training requirements. To accomplish this 

objective, we reviewed JCET files for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 at various 

special operations units, the Pacific Command, and the Southern 

Command’s subordinate theater special operations commands. During this 

file review, we examined available documentation of the training 

objectives, the planned programs of instruction, and the after-action 

reports that summarized the entire training event, including the 

mission-essential tasks that were planned and actually conducted. We also 

interviewed officials at SOCOM, the Army and the Air Force Special 

Operations Commands, the Naval Special Warfare Command, the Pacific 

Command and the Southern Command, and these commands’ subordinate 

theater special operations commands. We attended semiannual JCET and 

training planning conferences for SOCOM, the Southern Command, and the 

Central Command. We also observed pre-JCET conferences between U.S. 

special operations and host nation forces from the Philippines and 

Thailand and observed a JCET event conducted by U.S. and Philippine Air 

Force pararescue units in the Philippines. To verify the accuracy of DOD’s 

reports to Congress on JCETs, we compared annual reports for fiscal years 

1997 and 1998 to JCET files in various locations in SOUTHCOM and 

PACOM. This verification included attempts to confirm how many JCETs 

took place in these two commands, how U.S. and host nation incremental 

costs were recorded, and how DOD reported JCETs’ relationship to 

counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

To determine whether DOD and the Department of State have provided 

civilian oversight to ensure that JCET events were consistent with U.S. 

foreign policy objectives, we met with officials in the offices of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 

Conflict, the Joint Staff, SOCOM, and the Department of State’s Regional 
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

and Political Military Bureaus and country desk officers. To obtain 

information on how ambassadors and their country teams approve JCETs 

and ensure that they are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives, we 

visited three countries in the Pacific Command and three in the Southern 

Command. We chose to visit Colombia and Indonesia because of 

congressional interest in military activities and human rights issues in these 

two countries, and we chose to visit Bolivia, Ecuador, and Thailand 

because large numbers of JCETs were conducted in these countries in 

fiscal years 1997 and 1998. We chose to visit the Philippines because JCETs 

have been used as the primary military contact since the status of forces 

agreement expired in 1996. To identify the major foreign policy objectives 

in each country we included in our study, we reviewed the Department of 

State’s mission performance plans. To identify the level of JCET oversight 

at each embassy and determine how JCETs have supported the embassies’ 

objectives, we spoke with ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and 

other embassy staff at the U.S. embassies in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 

To determine how DOD and the Department of State have implemented 

legislation restricting DOD from training with human rights abusers, we 

first reviewed DOD’s interim guidance and State Department cables setting 

out guidance for overseas embassies. We interviewed officials from the 

Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low-Intensity Conflict. We also interviewed officials from the 

Department of State’s political military and regional bureaus involved in 

issuing guidance to embassies regarding DOD’s human rights statute. We 

also met with officials at U.S. embassies in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand to discuss the impact of the new 

law and the adequacy of the guidance provided to the embassies by the 

Department of State’s headquarters offices. We also obtained information 

on the verification procedures used at the embassies both before and after 

the new requirements became effective and the nature of the information 

available in those countries for human rights verification.

While our review was in progress, DOD, in response to congressional 

concerns about JCETs, implemented a new JCET approval process in 

November 1998 to ensure greater oversight by senior personnel in the 

Departments of Defense and State. We revisited the relevant officials in the 

two departments to identify the impact of the new approval process. 

We conducted our work from June 1998 to May 1999 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train U.S.

Forces, but Reporting on These Activities

Has Been Inaccurate Chapte2r

DOD has complied with the statutory requirement that JCET activities have 

as their primary purpose the training of U.S. special operations forces. 

However, DOD has not accurately reported to the Congress the numbers of 

JCETs that were conducted, their costs, or their relationship to 

counternarcotics and counterterrorism, as required by statute. 

Inaccuracies in annual reports have arisen because of confusion in the field 

regarding how to define a JCET, how to report the incremental costs 

incurred by the host countries, and how to interpret the legislative 

requirement to report JCETs’ relationship to counternarcotics and 

counterterrorism. Recent and proposed changes in DOD’s guidance and 

processes are designed to improve DOD’s ability to provide the Congress 

with more accurate and complete reports.

JCETs Have Complied 

With Legislation 

Requiring That Their 

Primary Purpose Be to 

Train U.S. Forces

Our review of how JCETs have been developed and conducted indicates 

that their primary purpose has been to train U.S. special operations forces. 

JCETs provided opportunities for SOF personnel to remain proficient. For 

JCETs conducted in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, we found a direct link 

between the training special operations forces units indicated they needed 

and the training conducted. In general, the special operations community 

determines what training is appropriate during a JCET to help maintain 

their proficiencies in meeting missions. Because JCETs may also 

simultaneously meet the engagement goals of the CINCs and the 

ambassadors in the countries where they take place, these individuals, 

after negotiations with the special operations community, largely 

determine where the JCET occurs. Our review of JCET files and our 

attendance at pre-JCET meetings confirmed that these activities retained 

their primary purpose of training U.S. forces.

Legislation Authorizes 

Special Operations Forces 

to Train Overseas With 

Friendly Foreign Forces

Under 10 U.S.C. 2011, the commander of SOCOM or the commander of any 

other unified or specified combatant command may use command funds to 

pay for special operations forces training with the armed forces and other 

security forces of a friendly foreign country, provided that the primary 

purpose of the training is to train the U.S. special operations forces. 

Section 2011(a)(3) also authorizes the payment of certain incremental 

expenses of friendly developing countries. All expenses incurred in 

conducting training of special operations forces under this authority, 

including incremental expenses of friendly developing countries paid by 

DOD, must be included in annual reports to the Congress, as provided for 

in section 2011(e).
Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train 

U.S. Forces, but Reporting on These 

Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

SOCOM Components 

Determine Training Needs 

and Initiate JCETs

The link between JCETs and SOF training needs is first demonstrated by 

the process used to design JCETs. While the process of developing JCETs 

varies by service, it essentially begins with the special operations 

community’s preparation of a list of mission-essential tasks required for 

individual units. For example, the Naval Special Warfare Command 

empowers each platoon to develop a Plan of Operations and Management 

to serve as a 2-year training plan. The plan designates which 

mission-essential task lists are to be considered “core,” or required for all 

forces, and which are to be considered “focused,” or unique to the theater 

the unit is deploying to. For example, core mission-essential tasks for a 

member of a SEAL platoon might include close combat search and rescue, 

close quarters combat, and helicopter insertion and extraction. Its focused 

mission-essential tasks might include naval gunfire support, military 

free-fall insertion, or riverine infiltration and exfiltration. 

The Army Special Operations Command has a similar process for 

developing tasks to be completed on its JCETs. First, the command assigns 

each operations team, generally made up of 12 persons, primary and 

secondary countries of concentration and primary, secondary, and tertiary 

missions. An Army special forces team, for example, might have El 

Salvador as its primary country of assignment and Paraguay as its 

secondary country. Its primary mission might be foreign internal defense, 

with direct short-term military action as a secondary mission. For each 

assigned mission, the Army has a corresponding list of mission-essential 

tasks. For example, foreign internal defense involves organizing, training, 

advising, and assisting host country militaries to protect their societies 

from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Essential tasks include, 

among others, analyzing the needs of the foreign forces, training and 

advising these forces in counterinsurgency operations, and evaluating their 

ultimate performance. Each team must be certified in its assigned skills 

once every 18 months. Certification in assigned skills involves the 

completion of certain designated tasks at stated intervals. Because each 

team specializes in different countries and missions, team leaders tailor 

their programs of instruction. 

Overall, special operations personnel we interviewed believed that JCETs 

were critical to their teams’ abilities to remain proficient in their 

mission-essential tasks. In some cases, JCETs provide an opportunity for 

special operations forces to train in mission-essential skills that the host 

nation restricts or prohibits at U.S. bases in their countries. For example, 

Air Force special operations forces based in Okinawa, Japan, are restricted 

from low-level night flying. JCETs conducted in Thailand and Malaysia give 
Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train 

U.S. Forces, but Reporting on These 

Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

these units access to areas where they can train in this core mission skill. 

Navy SEALs and Army special forces based in the Pacific use JCETs in 

Singapore, Australia, and Sri Lanka to gain access to training areas to 

practice skills such as close quarters combat and advanced demolitions, 

which are prohibited at their forward base in Guam and Okinawa. Because 

of environmental restrictions and controls in the United States, Navy 

special boat units are able to train to certain mission-essential tasks only in 

countries available to them through the JCET program. 

Finally, JCETs provide other benefits that are invaluable to special 

operations forces. These benefits include language training, cultural 

immersion, an understanding of the environment and host nation forces’ 

capabilities, exposure to non-U.S. equipment and techniques, and teaching 

experience. JCETs give special operations forces opportunities to acquire 

information on the local terrain, geography, and weather, while fostering 

positive professional relationships with host nation military forces.

Geographic Commands 

Determine Location of 

JCETs but Do Not Change 

Essential Training Goals

At least once a year, each service component compiles an annual training 

plan that will satisfy requirements to train for its mission-essential tasks. 

These training plans are melded with lists of the engagement requirements 

of the various ambassadors and CINCs at planning conferences held by the 

CINCs. Essentially, special operations personnel determine what training 

takes place, and the CINCs and ambassadors determine where the training 

occurs. 

While each command operates differently, all commands develop their final 

lists of JCETs after holding a conference. For example, at the U.S. 

SOUTHCOM conference, special operations personnel present briefings of 

their missions and capabilities to military group representatives from the 

embassies. Representatives from the theater Special Operations Command 

then provide military group representatives with a list of the JCETs each 

service proposes for the year. Service representatives discuss these 

proposals and their timing with military group representatives. During the 

conference, the special operations, embassy, and CINC representatives 

work out the details of the agreed-upon training. Other commands operate 

similarly. In addition, once a year, SOCOM holds a JCET conference to plan 

activities for the entire special operations community. 
Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train 

U.S. Forces, but Reporting on These 

Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Pre-JCET Meetings Also 

Indicate That Special 

Operations Forces Maintain 

Focus on U.S. Training 

Needs

Our attendance at pre-JCET meetings, which are held in the host nation 

just before a JCET takes place, also confirmed that JCETs retain their 

primary purpose of training U.S. forces. During one such conference, the 

U.S. special operations unit worked with Philippine host nation 

representatives to ensure that mission-essential skills training was the 

focus of the event. Specifically, the Philippine representatives were asked 

to ensure that their JCET participants had no medical training, thereby 

allowing the U.S. special forces the opportunity to teach basic medical 

skills and evaluate their own teaching progress. In another conference, 

also in the Philippines, the U.S. unit explained that during the upcoming 

JCET, the U.S. special forces participants would prefer to conduct their 

airborne operations at dusk, which was something they were not allowed 

to do at their home base in Okinawa. In both cases, we witnessed 

negotiations between U.S. special operations units and host nation 

representatives that illustrated that the JCET benefited both the U.S. and 

host nation participants but that the focus was primarily to train U.S. 

special forces in their mission-essential tasks.

JCET Files Reveal Primary 

Purpose

Files for JCETs conducted in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 that we reviewed at 

the unified commands, the subordinate service commands, the geographic 

CINCs, individual special operations units, and U.S. embassies provide a 

direct link between the training special operations forces said they needed 

and the training conducted. For example, these files contain documents 

that include descriptions of the concept of operations for each JCET and 

outline what mission-essential tasks will be included in the training. In 

some cases, the files also contain lesson plans, or programs of instruction, 

used by the special operations instructors to teach the mission-essential 

tasks. These files also contain after-action reports detailing what the 

special operations teams did and how well they accomplished their 

missions. Our review of available after-action reports suggests that SOF 

did in fact train to their mission-essential tasks as planned. 

To illustrate, files indicated that JCETs conducted during fiscal years 1997 

and 1998 provide special operations personnel with opportunities to meet 

their mission-essential task requirements in the following ways:

• Counterterrorism is a fundamental mission of special operations forces 

attached to SOUTHCOM. They need to be skilled in such tasks as 

reconnaissance, marksmanship, and close quarters combat. To train for 

its mission, these forces conducted JCETs with counterterrorism units 

in host countries throughout the region. We viewed the lesson plans for 
Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train 

U.S. Forces, but Reporting on These 

Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

one of these JCETs, which consisted of 380 hours of training. The 

training included pistol and rifle firing, shooting while moving, engaging 

multiple targets, clearing hallways, and medical training. This JCET 

ended with a 5-day live-fire scenario.

• The 20th U.S. Army Special Forces Group, which is a National Guard 

unit, conducted JCETs that routinely served as their annual 2-week 

training requirement. For each of these JCETs, an active-duty special 

forces member served as a training evaluator and prepared a detailed 

report on how well the unit trained for its mission-essential tasks. Seven 

of these JCETs for the 20th Group took place in fiscal year 1998, in 

Bolivia, Honduras, Suriname, and Venezuela. Mission-essential tasks for 

these JCETs included light infantry tactics, small unit tactics, combat 

lifesaving, marksmanship, grenade training, and patrolling. 

• The 1st Special Forces Group trained for many different 

mission-essential tasks by conducting JCETs in various countries within 

PACOM’s area of responsibility. Specifically, this group trained in small 

unit tactics, military freefall parachuting, close quarters battle, and 

maritime operations in Thailand. In the Philippines, it trained in 

airmobile and tracking/countertracking skills, and in Sri Lanka, it 

trained in leadership and mission planning. This group believed that its 

critical warfighting skills would suffer without access to the multitude 

of countries covered by the JCET program.

• In May 1998, the 7th Special Forces Group was able to immediately apply 

the skills they had practiced during a JCET in Bolivia. The JCET, which 

lasted from April 27 to May 22, involved training with 80 host nation 

personnel in light infantry skills needed for peacekeeping operations. 

On May 22, training was curtailed when an earthquake struck a province 

in Bolivia. The U.S. forces deployed with the Bolivian unit they had just 

trained with to assist in rescue and recovery operations. The forces 

removed rubble, searched for survivors, disseminated information, 

organized a chain of command, delivered supplies, assisted with the 

wounded, and buried the dead.

• In July and August 1997, Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations 

forces participated in a large JCET in multiple locations in Thailand. 

With a combined total of 300 individuals, the JCET included training for 

the foreign internal defense mission, military parachuting, and 

conducting medical and engineering and civic action projects. During 

the medical portion of the JCET, a total of 2,492 medical patients were 

seen, 549 dental patients were treated, and 847 teeth were extracted.
Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train 

U.S. Forces, but Reporting on These 

Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

DOD Reports to the 

Congress on JCET 

Activities and Costs 

Are Inaccurate

The legislation authorizing SOF to train overseas with friendly forces also 

requires that the Secretary of Defense annually submit a report to the 

Congress specifying the following:

• all countries in which the training was conducted;

• the type of training conducted, including whether the training was 

related to counternarcotics or counterterrorism, the duration of the 

training, the number of members of the armed forces involved, and 

expenses paid;

• the extent of participation by foreign military forces, including the 

number and service affiliation of foreign military personnel involved and 

the physical and financial contribution of each host nation to the 

training effort; and

• the relationship of the training to other overseas training programs 

conducted by the armed forces, such as military exercise programs 

sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military exercise programs 

sponsored by a combatant command, and military training activities 

sponsored by a military department (including deployments for training, 

short duration exercises, and other similar unit training events).1

To satisfy these requirements, DOD has provided annual data to the 

Congress on JCETs conducted in each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 

1992. According to SOCOM, however, these data have been inaccurate. 

Our review confirmed this. In fact, we could not (1) arrive at a definitive 

number of JCETs that occurred in PACOM or SOUTHCOM in fiscal years 

1997 and 1998, (2) determine which of these events were related to 

counternarcotics or counterterrorism, or (3) determine how much was 

actually spent on JCETs. Primarily, the data were inaccurate because there 

were different interpretations of what was and what was not a JCET, 

because units were uncertain how to determine whether a JCET was 

related to counternarcotics or counterterrorism, and because host nation 

costs were paid for from different appropriations. 

1

10 U.S.C. § 2011 (e) (1994). Another reporting requirement was added to 10 U.S.C. § 2011(e) by Pub. L. 

105-261, § 1062, 112 Stat. 1920, 2129-30 (Oct. 17, 1998). This added requirement is discussed at the end 

of this chapter.
Chapter 2

JCETs Have Been Used Primarily to Train 

U.S. Forces, but Reporting on These 

Activities Has Been Inaccurate

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Confusion About the 

Definition of JCETs Makes 

It Difficult to Determine 

How Many JCETs Took 

Place

Table 2.1 shows the numbers of JCETs listed in annual reports to the 

Congress for fiscal years 1995-97. SOCOM reviewed this data for accuracy 

and found that for the entire period, the number of JCETs earlier reported 

had been overstated by about 21 percent. SOCOM’s revised figures on the 

numbers of JCETs performed are also shown in table 2.1. For example, 

SOCOM’s revision shows that it conducted 223 JCETs, rather than 231 

JCETs, in fiscal year 1997, or 8 fewer than earlier reported. 

Table 2.1: JCET Activities for Fiscal Years 1995-97

According to SOCOM officials, data were inaccurate because no one 

person managed the reporting process and because field personnel lacked 

guidance on how to report JCETs. Service components were uncertain 

about even the definition of a JCET. For example, annual reports of JCETs 

included activities that were not JCETs, such as counterdrug deployments 

and exercises involving special operations forces. These activities have 

their own funding sources and statutory authorities that are different from 

those for JCETs.

We attempted to verify the revised data SOCOM provided us. In doing so, 

we examined JCET files in several locations in PACOM and SOUTHCOM 

for fiscal year 1997. We found that SOCOM’s revised data were overstated. 

For example, DOD’s annual report to the Congress indicated that 65 JCETs 

took place in PACOM in fiscal year 1997. SOCOM said there were 69, 

adding that the JCETs were conducted in 22 countries. Our review of all 

JCET-related files maintained in PACOM indicated that for fiscal year 1997, 

PACOM conducted 40 JCETs in 18 countries—29 fewer JCETs, or 

42 percent fewer than the 69 reported by SOCOM. We found that the 

annual report contained several events that were not JCETs, including one 

civil affairs event and one Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise. In addition, 

several JCETs had been double- or triple-counted, and the annual report 

contained several training events that had been canceled. In SOUTHCOM, 

the annual report indicated that 70 JCETs took place in fiscal year 1997. 

SOCOM revised this number to 71. Though we believe both numbers are 

overstated, we are not confident that our revised count of 62 JCETs in

Number of JCETs Fiscal year

1995 1996 1997 Total

As reported in annual report 200 279 231 710

As revised by SOCOM 166 200 223 589
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20 countries is accurate because SOUTHCOM did not have complete 

records.

PACOM’s files indicated that 39 JCETs took place in 21 countries in fiscal 

year 1998. We attempted to verify this number of JCETs, and after 

reviewing all available JCET files, we determined that 37 JCETs were held 

in 19 countries in fiscal year 1998. PACOM officials confirmed our 

determination as correct. As in fiscal year 1997, the JCET branch had 

miscategorized two events as JCETs when they had actually paid for these 

activities with funds budgeted for Cooperative Threat Reduction activity.

For fiscal year 1998 JCETs in SOUTHCOM, we compared files at four 

locations and determined that 52 JCETs occurred in 21 countries. 

However, because of discrepancies among files at different locations about 

whether one JCET had been canceled and whether an additional nine 

training activities were JCETs or some other type of event, such as 

humanitarian civic actions or counterdrug training, we are not confident 

about our count. 

After we completed our review of files, DOD issued its fiscal year 1998 

report on JCETs to the Congress. We evaluated this report in light of past 

reporting problems to determine whether SOCOM’s provisional guidance to 

the commands on reporting had resulted in improvements. DOD’s fiscal 

year 1998 JCET report indicates that in many ways the information 

reported to the Congress had improved. For example, DOD gave much 

greater detail on what types of training were provided during JCETs. Also, 

better information on the numbers of U.S. and host nation participants in 

JCET events was provided. Prior to 1998, for example, many reported 

JCETs did not include information on host nation participation. 

Using information on fiscal year 1998 JCET activities obtained at 

SOUTHCOM and PACOM, we compared our data with that reported to the 

Congress. This comparison demonstrated that problems similar to those in 

past reports continue. For example, some JCETs were double- or 

triple-counted in the 1998 report. Also, completed JCET events were not 

included in the report. Table 2.2 illustrates the types of problems we saw in 

the report’s listing of JCETs.
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Table 2.2: Problems in DOD’s Report to the Congress on Fiscal Year 1998 JCETs

Different Interpretations of 

What Must Be Reported on 

JCETs’ Relationship to 

Counternarcotics and 

Counterterrorism

Under 10 U.S.C. 2011(e), DOD must report whether JCET training is related 

to counternarcotics or counterterrorism. There are no instructions on 

what this requirement means, however. As a result, officials within the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict had different interpretations of what information 

should be included. One official said that this requirement was to report 

JCETs’ funding source and that because JCETs funding source is different 

from that for counternarcotics and counterterrorism events, JCETs will 

never be related to counternarcotics or counterterrorism. On the other 

hand, another official said that JCETs are related to counternarcotics or 

counterterrorism when they involve host nation participants that are 

involved in counterdrug or counterterrorism activities and should be 

reported as such. 

During our review of the fiscal year 1997 annual report to the Congress on 

JCETs, we found that neither PACOM nor SOUTHCOM had reported that 

any JCET was related to counternarcotics. PACOM reported one JCET that 

was related to counterterrorism, and SOUTHCOM also reported one. Both 

the JCETs reported as related to counterterrorism involved what were 

described to us as counterterrorism JCETs, performed by U.S. special 

operations units with a counterterrorism mission. However, there were 

other similar counterterrorism JCETs that were not identified as related to 

counterterrorism in the annual report. For example, in fiscal year 1997, 

PACOM had 8 other counterterrorism JCETs, and SOUTHCOM had 11. 

None of these 19 events were reported as related to counterterrorism. 

In the annual report to the Congress for fiscal year 1998, several JCETs 

were conducted by the same SOF units with a counterterrorism mission, 

but the JCETs were again not noted as related to counterterrorism. These 

JCETs included training in mission-essential tasks relating to the 

Problem Command

SOUTHCOM PACOM

Number of JCETs double- or triple-counted 2 7

Number of events counted as JCETs that were not 

JCETs 2 0

Number of JCETs listed for which we found no files 7 0

Number of JCETs not included in the annual report 

for which we saw files 12 10
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counterterrorism mission, including close-quarters battle, sniper training, 

room/building clearing, and breaching. DOD’s proposed new guidance 

does not address how to determine when a JCET is related to 

counterterrorism or counternarcotics.

Inaccurate Reporting of the 

Cost of JCETs

Our review of JCET activities revealed that JCET costs were not accurately 

captured in annual reports to the Congress. Table 2.3 shows the costs of 

JCETs that were initially reported to the Congress and SOCOM’s revised list 

of costs. However, while the SOCOM revisions might have more closely 

identified costs associated with the program, our review showed that these 

revised costs are also inaccurate. 

Table 2.3: JCET Costs for Fiscal Years 1995-97

SOCOM’s revised cost figures indicate that U.S. expenses reported for 

fiscal years 1995-97 have been overestimated by about $17 million, or about 

42 percent. SOCOM officials explained that this difference resulted from 

the removal of a number of JCETs from the report that it identified as being 

non-JCETs. This confusion was due to the absence of a standard definition 

of a JCET. 

Fiscal year

JCET expenses 1995 1996 1997 Total

U.S. expenses as 

reported in annual 

report $23,625,000 $18,409,000 $15,003,000 $57,037,000

U.S. expenses as 

revised by SOCOM 12,022,000 13,753,000 14,295,000 $40,070,000

Difference in 

reported and revised 

U.S. expenses 11,603,000 4,656,000 708,000 $16,967,000

Host country 

expenses as 

reported in annual 

report 1,126,000 135,000 220,000 $1,481,000

Host country 

expenses as revised 

by SOCOM 621,000 594,000 300,000 $1,515,000

Difference in 

reported and revised 

host country 

expenses 505,000 (459,000) (80,000) ($34,000)
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Because DOD did not capture all appropriated funds used to pay foreign 

country incremental expenses in its annual reports to the Congress, DOD 

also understated the cost of host nation participation during this same 

period. DOD’s annual reports to the Congress stated that $1,481,000 was 

spent worldwide during fiscal years 1995-97 to pay for certain incremental 

expenses of host nations. After reexamining the data, SOCOM raised this 

amount slightly to $1,515,000, or about 2 percent (see table 2.3). We 

selected PACOM to do a more in-depth look at how JCET-related expenses 

of host nations were funded by DOD in fiscal year 1997. Our work 

disclosed that DOD’s support for host country incidental expenses was 

significantly understated. Specifically, we found that, while DOD reported 

that it had spent $220,000 on host country incidental expenses for all 

commands in fiscal year 1997, PACOM alone spent $256,247 for JCET host 

nation expenses. 

Incremental Expenses May 

Be Underreported Because 

of Lack of Guidance on Use 

of Appropriated Funds

Section 2011(a)(3) authorizes the payment of the incremental expenses 

incurred by a host nation as a direct result of participating in JCETs. 

However, our review indicates that the amount of such costs reported to 

the Congress may be underreported because DOD reported only costs paid 

by SOCOM, which uses a Defense-wide appropriation, while it appears that 

other appropriations were used as well to pay these costs. During the 

period covered by our review, these incremental expenses have been paid 

from four separate and distinct operation and maintenance (O&M) 

appropriations: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense-wide. According to a 

DOD official, approximately 50 percent of the expense authorized to be 

paid under 10 U.S.C. 2011(a)(3)—incremental expenses—are paid by 

SOCOM from its O&M budget, which is funded from the Defense-wide 

O&M appropriation. The remaining 50 percent of these expenses are paid 

by the regional combatant commands from their O&M budgets, which are 

funded from either the Army’s O&M appropriation (in the case of European 

Command and the Southern Command), the Navy’s O&M appropriation (in 

the case of Atlantic Command and the Pacific Command), or the Air 

Force’s O&M appropriation (in the case of Central Command). DOD 

explained that some JCETs are fully funded by SOCOM; some are fully 

funded by the regional combatant commands; and some are funded jointly 

by SOCOM and the regional combatant commands, usually with SOCOM 

paying the expenses of special operations forces and the regional 

commands paying the incremental expenses of the participating host 

country.
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Where two or more lump-sum appropriations (such as the various O&M 

appropriations here) are broad enough to cover costs of an activity (such 

as JCETs), agencies must determine which appropriation it will charge, 

document its determination, and charge the appropriation consistent with 

its determination throughout the particular fiscal year.2

 In the 

circumstances described here, DOD should have issued written guidance 

or instructions articulating the criteria for selecting the proper 

appropriation to charge for each JCET expense. DOD informed us that to 

date, it has issued no guidance or instruction setting forth criteria to 

determine which appropriation should be charged for which JCET expense 

but that it plans to do so in the future. However, DOD officials have 

informed us that in the interim, DOD has included language in the message 

authorizing May 1999 JCETs that indicates that incremental expenses 

incurred by the friendly developing country as the direct result of training 

with U.S. special operations forces must be paid for using SOCOM’s O&M 

funds. Moreover, it stipulates that other funding sources, such as those 

used to conduct exercises, should not be used for JCETs and that the Joint 

Staff will not provide funding. DOD officials have informed us that they 

intend to include this language in all future monthly JCET approval 

documents until permanent guidance is issued.

In response to deficiencies described above, DOD has been actively 

considering permanent guidance requiring that each JCET deployment be 

funded entirely from the same appropriation. This guidance would require 

that SOCOM fund all JCETs that it initiates and runs entirely from SOCOM 

O&M monies (i.e., Defense-wide O&M) and would require the regional 

combatant command CINCs to fund the activities authorized under section 

2011 that they initiate and run entirely from CINC O&M monies (i.e., Army, 

Navy, or Air Force O&M appropriations). We believe that such guidance, if 

properly implemented and consistently applied, would meet DOD’s 

responsibility for funds control described previously.

2

See Funding for Army Repair Projects (B-272191, Nov. 4, 1997) and Unsubstantiated DOE Travel

Payments (GAO/RCED-96-58R, Dec. 28, 1995).
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Proposed Changes to 

Guidance and Approval 

Process Are Designed

to Improve Future 

Reports

SOCOM and their component officials believed that because of the minimal 

management attention on annual JCET reports, the data were not 

challenged as they moved from the service components to SOCOM 

headquarters. Mistakes made at lower levels were passed forward. We 

agree that this, along with the absence of a clear definition of a JCET and 

SOCOM guidance on how to report on JCET activities, is the source of the 

reporting problem. In the near future, SOCOM plans to issue a directive 

that will provide guidance on the planning, execution, and reporting of 

JCETs. This proposed guidance will include a definition of a JCET that 

provides in part that a JCET is primarily funded by SOCOM and uses no 

security assistance funds. Also, the proposed guidance will recognize that 

the commanders of the combatant commands may pay section 

2011-authorized expenses, including incremental expenses incurred by 

friendly developing nations. SOCOM officials believed that this new 

directive should improve post-fiscal year 1997 reports to the Congress on 

JCET activities.

SOCOM and its components have three other initiatives aimed at improving 

JCET reporting. First, SOCOM plans to issue a directive that will provide 

the services with a standard reporting format to promote consistency and 

completeness. Second, in fiscal year 1999, SOCOM began to assign a 

unique code to each scheduled JCET. Assignment of one code to be used 

by all services participating in a JCET should eliminate the double- and 

triple-counting of JCETs that has occurred in past reporting. Third, the 

component commands are initiating improvements in their accounting 

systems to better capture JCET costs. For example, the Air Force Special 

Operations Command now assigns extraordinary and special program 

codes to individual JCETs. Any costs incurred for a particular JCET will be 

entered into this accounting system under that unique code. The Army 

Special Operations Command and the Naval Special Warfare Command 

have initiated similar accounting systems to track JCET expenditures.

In addition to SOCOM-developed improvements, on October 17, 1998, the 

Congress amended section 2011 to improve the level of reporting and 

require that any related training receive the prior approval of the Secretary 

of Defense.3

 The amendment to 2011(e) requires that the reports now 

include “a discussion of the unique military training benefit to United States 

special operations forces derived from the training activities for which 

3

Pub. L. 105-261, § 1062, 112 Stat. 1920, 2129-30 (1998).
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expenses were paid under this section.” DOD’s new approval process for 

JCETs has been designed to collect this required information.

Conclusions Our discussions with DOD officials and our review of files, including 

planning documents and after-action reports, reveal that the JCETs we 

reviewed met the primary purpose requirement of 10 U.S.C. section 2011(b) 

in that their primary purpose was to train U.S. special operations forces. 

Notwithstanding that JCETs we reviewed complied with this provision, 

little attention was paid to accurately reporting these activities to the 

Congress as required by 10 U.S.C. section 2011(e). As a result, the 

Congress received a lot of erroneous information on such basic 

information as how many JCETs were conducted. We believe that the 

changes DOD and SOCOM’s components have proposed to their guidance 

and have made to the JCET approval process should improve the accuracy 

of their reporting to the Congress in this area. In two areas, however, 

contemplated changes may be insufficient. First, field personnel do not 

have the criteria needed for determining when a JCET is related to 

counternarcotics or counterterrorism. Second, it is unclear to field 

personnel how to report and account for host nations’ incremental 

expenses incurred during JCETs.

Recommendations To improve annual reporting to the Congress on JCETs, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance that provides criteria to use in 

determining whether JCETs are related to counterterrorism or 

counternarcotics and therefore need to be reported as such. To improve 

financial management and the accuracy of the reporting of JCET costs, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance (1) articulating 

the criteria for selecting the proper appropriation to charge for each JCET 

expense, (2) specifying that any such selection must be documented, and 

(3) clarifying that the selection must be consistently applied throughout the 

applicable fiscal year. Finally, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense set a milestone for the issuance of final guidance on these issues. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In official comments on our draft report, DOD concurred with these 

recommendations. It plans to issue guidance in a forthcoming instruction 

defining criteria to be used to determine whether a JCET is related to 

counterterrorism or counternarcotics. In already issued interim guidance, 

DOD has defined the proper appropriation to charge for JCETs. This 
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guidance will be repeated in the monthly JCET approval documents until 

DOD’s instruction containing final guidance is issued. DOD expects to 

issue this final instruction no later than December 31, 1999.
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Chapter 3

More Headquarters Oversight Should Increase 

Assurances That JCETS Are Consistent With

U.S. Foreign Policy Chapte3r

U.S. embassy State Department officials in the six countries we visited 

exercised extensive oversight of JCET activities and believed that these 

activities were consistent with U.S. policy objectives in each country. This 

was the case despite the fact that prior to November 1998, neither 

Department of State nor DOD headquarters’ officials were routinely 

involved in overseeing JCETs. While neither DOD personnel overseas nor 

U.S. ambassadors believed that any problems occurred because of the lack 

of headquarters oversight, new JCET approval procedures, which require 

the Secretary of Defense’s approval and the Secretary of State’s 

notification, will provide greater assurances that all foreign policy factors 

are considered before determining whether a JCET should proceed.

New Procedures 

Should Enhance 

Headquarters 

Oversight and 

Knowledge of JCET 

Activities

Before 1998, DOD civilian headquarters personnel were not routinely 

involved in approving or overseeing JCETs. Approval and oversight were 

assigned to the geographic CINCs and SOCOM components and units, 

consistent with other DOD training activities. Similarly, State Department 

headquarters officials rarely learned of JCET activities. New legislation 

and procedures will ensure that civilian headquarters personnel are 

significantly involved.1

DOD Headquarters Was Not 

Routinely Involved in 

Managing JCETs

In August 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low-Intensity Conflict provided guidance on how to implement the 

legislation enabling special operations forces to train overseas with foreign 

security forces.2

 The guidance states that, while the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense is responsible for policy guidance, the CINCs of the unified 

geographic or specified commands are responsible for the operation of 

JCETs. The decision to delegate operational responsibility for managing 

JCETs to service component and unified commands is consistent with the 

approach used for other DOD training activities, where the parent unit 

must ensure that troops are obtaining the training they need to meet their 

mission. In the case of special operations forces, SOCOM is

1

Pub. L. 105-261, § 1062, 112 Stat. 1920, 2129-30 (Oct. 17, 1998).

2

Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, “DOD Implementation of the Provisions in the Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Relating to the Training of Special Operations Forces 

With Friendly Foreign Forces,” August 6, 1992.
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responsible by statute for their training;3 the service components are 

responsible for individual service training needs; and the CINCs of the 

geographic commands are responsible for all the training requirements of 

special operations forces assigned to that command.4

 

As a result of this delegation of authority, senior DOD officials became 

routinely involved in the JCET approval process only when the geographic 

commands requested deployment orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.5

 In 

those cases, the Joint Staff learned of JCET activities as they signed 

deployment orders for the JCET participants. However, only SOUTHCOM 

routinely requested deployment orders to ensure that it had operational 

control over forces in its theater. As a result, DOD estimates that the 

Secretary of Defense had visibility over 30 percent of all JCETs. 

State Department 

Headquarters Did Not Have 

an Oversight Role

In the past, Department of State headquarters personnel were not routinely 

apprised of planned JCET activities. State headquarters officials said that 

the only time they would have been notified of upcoming JCETs was when 

commands requested approval to use funds budgeted for the Developing 

Country Combined Exercise Program to pay the incremental costs of host 

country JCET participants.6

 Such a request triggered consultation with 

State headquarters under the program’s authorizing statute. The focus of 

State’s review, however, was on the host country funding, not the JCET 

activities. This decentralized approach is consistent with the overall 

absence of State’s involvement in approving military training deployments 

other than JCETs. For example, the State Department does not always 

review the approximately 175 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, exercises 

that take place each year. Rather, State headquarters is consulted only 

when the exercises are large and involve both U.S. and foreign forces, have 

particular political significance, will occur in politically sensitive areas, or 

are likely to receive prominent media attention. This process is consistent 

3

10 U.S.C. § 167 (e)(2)(D)(1994).

4

10 U.S.C. § 164 (1994).

5

SOUTHCOM was the only unified command that routinely requested deployment orders. It did so 

because it wanted operational control of the SOF who were stationed in the continental United States 

and entering the SOUTHCOM region to participate in a JCET. 

6

The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (10 U.S.C. § 2010) allows the Secretary of 

Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, to pay the incremental expenses that are 

incurred by a developing country while participating in a combined exercise under certain 

circumstances. (See ch. 2 for a discussion of the incremental costs of host nation participation in 

JCETs.)
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with Presidential Decision Directive 33, “Significant Military Exercises and 

Operations.”

Legislation and Approval 

Procedures Now Ensure 

That the Secretary of 

Defense and the 

Department of State Have 

an Oversight Role

In April 1998, DOD initiated a plan to improve JCET reporting and increase 

oversight of JCET activities. Although DOD believed that civilian oversight 

of JCETs was appropriate and adequate, it decided to make this oversight 

“more robust” because of media allegations and congressional concerns 

that JCETs did not have appropriate civilian oversight and in some 

instances may have contravened stated U.S. foreign policy goals. DOD’s 

plan entailed collecting and disseminating more accurate information on 

JCETs and requiring that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict review planned JCETs quarterly. 

The legislation enacted in October 1998, however, amended the JCET 

authority to require even more stringent approval and reporting 

requirements.7

 When coupled with the legislation restricting training with 

foreign personnel alleged to have committed human rights abuses 

(discussed more in depth in ch. 4 of this report), DOD determined it needed 

to develop a comprehensive process to manage and report JCET 

deployments.

To effectively implement the new approval and reporting requirements, in 

November 1998, DOD implemented a monthly JCET Authorization 

Document (JAD) process, which is used to approve JCETs and to collect 

and provide information. The JAD does not change how JCET 

opportunities are developed; service components still identify training 

needs, coordinate them with the geographic commands, and obtain 

approval from individual country ambassadors before a JCET may 

proceed. The JAD ensures that the Secretary of Defense has sufficient 

information to decide whether to approve a JCET, that the Department of 

State is notified of all JCET events, and that DOD can provide the Congress 

the information it requires.

Under the JAD process, each geographic CINC provides SOCOM with 

information on each planned JCET. Included is information on the training 

to be performed, U.S. and host country units, dates, location, skills to be 

trained, relationship to other exercises, and cost. To address human rights 

issues, the JAD documents that the embassy has investigated for human 

rights violations and who in the embassy determined that there was no 

7

Pub. L. 105-261, § 1062, 112 Stat. 1920, 2129-30 (Oct. 17, 1998).
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credible information that any individual had committed gross violations of 

human rights. Finally, the JAD shows who in the embassy approved the 

deployment. 

Each month, SOCOM consolidates the information on JCETs scheduled to 

occur at least 45 days later and provides it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 

schedule allows the Joint Staff time to review each deployment and 

forward the information to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, who coordinates the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense review. Once the Under Secretary for 

Policy concurs, the Joint Staff then forwards the documents to the 

Secretary of Defense, who personally reviews the documentation for 

approval. 

Under the current JAD process, the State Department will be notified up to 

four times of an impending JCET: (1) after JCET conferences, when lists of 

upcoming JCETs are compiled; (2) when country clearances are requested; 

(3) around 45 days prior to the event; and (4) around 15 days before the 

event, as final approval is being granted by the Secretary of Defense. At 

any one of these points, State could notify DOD that the proposed JCET 

would be inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

U.S. Ambassadors 

Provided Extensive 

Civilian Oversight of 

JCET Activities 

Each U.S. ambassador is responsible for ensuring that all activities 

conducted by U.S. agencies abroad support U.S. goals and objectives.8 

Ambassadors in each of the six countries we visited believed that they 

exercised extensive oversight over JCETs. The ambassador and country 

team members in each country believed that no special operations forces 

trained in country without their knowledge and concurrence. Embassies 

used a variety of methods to oversee JCET activities in the six countries we 

visited. 

Country Clearance Approval 

Process 

U.S. government employees must request clearance to enter a country and 

conduct a specific activity at a given time. The ambassador approves or 

disapproves the request through an official embassy cable. In the countries 

we visited, ambassadors and other State officials informed us that no DOD

member could conduct official business without country clearance. 

8

See 22 U.S.C. § 2321i (e) and 2382 (1994).
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Through file reviews, we found evidence that DOD’s JCET participants 

entered the country with country clearance. This process ensures that at a 

minimum, the ambassador is aware that a military deployment is planned 

and when it is to occur.

DOD Engagement Plans and 

Annual Training Programs 

DOD representatives in the embassy may prepare engagement plans and 

calendars that detail what activities they plan to initiate, what U.S. goals 

they will support, and with whom and when the training is expected to take 

place. For example, in Ecuador, DOD personnel prepared a 5-year 

engagement plan and an annual exercise and training calendar. The plan 

provided a long-term perspective on goals and objectives and what types of 

activities, such as JCETs, would be used to meet them. The calendar 

showed by quarter for each fiscal year how planned activities for the year 

supported U.S. goals and the dates, duration, type of training, and 

composition of each activity. We noted that the Ambassador in Ecuador 

personally approved the fiscal year 1998 plan in August 1997. Similarly, in 

Thailand, the military group develops a yearly training program, which is 

sent to the U.S. Ambassador for approval.

Annual Mission Planning 

Sessions 

Each embassy reviews DOD’s planned activities in preparation of the 

mission’s annual performance plan. This plan details the embassy’s 

strategic goals, objectives, and strategy to achieve them and discusses how 

activities of assigned U.S. agencies support specific objectives. To 

illustrate, the plan for Bolivia discusses how DOD activities such as JCETs 

and Traditional CINC Activities support U.S. goals and identifies increasing 

the number of JCET opportunities as an embassy strategy.

Country Team Meetings Country teams generally comprise the ambassador, deputy chief of 

mission, and heads of each resident U.S. agency such as the Department of 

Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Drug 

Enforcement Agency. Country team meetings are used to discuss and 

coordinate agency activities and discuss important embassy issues. In 

each of the countries we visited, we were informed that the ambassadors 

discussed JCETs at country team meetings. In Bolivia, for example, the 

Ambassador held meetings with the heads of agencies four times a week 

and felt confident that through this process she was fully informed of 

DOD’s JCET activities.
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DOD Briefings to the 

Ambassador and Other 

State Personnel

Special operations forces may brief embassy officials during the planning 

and execution phases of JCETs and other deployments. Our review of files 

and discussions with JCET participants and embassy officials indicate that 

teams brief embassy officials before and after deployments. For example, 

embassy officials in the Philippines stated that special operations unit 

commanders continuously try to brief embassy staff before and after JCET 

activities, and the Ambassador in Ecuador stated he often received three 

briefings per deployment.

Ambassadors Believed 

That JCETs Were 

Consistent With U.S. 

Objectives for Their 

Specific Countries

Although the principal objective of JCETs is to train U.S. special operations 

forces, JCETs also have an ancillary benefit in that they can be used to 

support U.S. foreign policy objectives. In the six countries we visited, 

ambassadors believed that the activities of the JCETs that occurred were 

consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. In some countries, the 

ambassador’s country plan and JCET activities were directly linked; in 

others, the relationship was more indirect. In all cases, officials could not 

point to any JCET activity that ran counter to U.S. objectives. The 

relationship of JCET activities to foreign policy objectives in the countries 

is discussed for each country we visited.

Bolivia A principal embassy goal is to promote Bolivian participation in 

international U.N. peacekeeping operations. To meet this goal, the 

embassy approved the deployments of National Guard special forces who 

needed to train themselves to teach basic military skills. For example, 

these JCETs involved training the Bolivian military to improve their basic 

military skills so they could participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. 

In one JCET that took place in Bolivia in fiscal year 1998, U.S. National 

Guard special forces trained themselves on how to conduct light infantry 

training while the Bolivians learned basic military skills such as patrolling 

and marksmanship. Additionally, the counterterrorism-focused JCETs 

supported the U.S. objectives of improving the capabilities of the Bolivian 

counterterrorism police unit. Increasing the number of JCET opportunities 

in country is a strategy the embassy employs to achieve its objectives.

Colombia A principal U.S. goal in Colombia is to reduce the flow of narcotics into the 

United States. This goal has been addressed through counternarcotics 

assistance on a large scale. The embassy believes that the few JCETs that 

have occurred were consistent with foreign policy objectives in country, 
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but because only one or two took place each year, they did not have a 

major impact on the achievement of U.S. goals. Nevertheless, these JCETs, 

as well as meeting SOF training requirements, addressed the U.S. 

counterterrorism objective of protecting U.S. personnel and assets by 

training with Colombian counterterrorism forces in breaching, integrated 

assaults, and helicopter operations, for example. 

Ecuador Principal U.S. objectives in Ecuador have been to secure a comprehensive 

peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru and to persuade the 

Ecuadorian military to retarget its scarce resources to address the looming 

drug problem. To achieve these goals, the U.S. embassy sought to preserve 

its influence within the Ecuadorian military through an extensive program 

of joint exercises and military-to-military contacts. The 12 JCETs that 

occurred in fiscal year 1997 and the 2 that we believe occurred in fiscal year 

1998 not only helped U.S. special operations forces train in their 

mission-essential tasks, such as combat lifesaver training and tactical 

decision-making, but also, embassy officials believed, helped demonstrate 

U.S. support for the Ecuadorian military. Embassy officials believed such 

support encouraged the Ecuadorian military to accept a peace agreement 

with Peru. Additionally, embassy officials believed that JCETs helped to 

provide skills the Ecuadorian military would need to address the threat 

posed by Colombian criminal and terrorist elements that have infiltrated 

the border region.

Indonesia A principal U.S. goal in Indonesia has been to encourage the development 

of a democratic government and reduce the involvement of the military in 

internal affairs. The Ambassador stated that the embassy has used JCETs 

to maintain access and develop greater influence in Indonesian military 

affairs to achieve these goals because of severe restrictions placed on other 

forms of military interaction, such as International Military Education and 

Training. However, officials said that the nature of the military engagement 

was less important than the engagement itself; in fact, other types of 

military engagements were used to achieve U.S. goals. In fiscal year 1998, 

for example, PACOM documents indicate that the United States engaged in 

8 military exercises and conducted 13 subject matter expert exchanges. 

The five JCETs that occurred, while targeted at meeting SOF skills such as 

ground/air communication and outdoor survival, supported the embassy’s 

military engagement strategy. Given the current political instability, the 

embassy is assessing whether, and if so how, to engage with the Indonesian 

military.
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The Philippines The embassy believes that maintaining a strong military relationship with 

the Philippines is important because the Philippines is a defense treaty ally, 

although it views economic and trade issues with the Philippines as more 

important. JCETs have been the major source of military training activity 

with the Philippines since 1996, when the Status of Forces Agreement 

expired. That agreement had provided a legal framework for U.S. forces 

visiting the country. Through an agreement with the Philippine 

government, legal protection is accorded to deployments consisting of 

fewer than 20 persons, which includes JCETs. Moreover, while U.S. SOF 

train in skills such as small unit tactics and demolition, embassy officials 

believed that through JCETs, relationships could be established with 

potential leaders in the Filipino military. Embassy officials informed us 

that if a visiting forces agreement is ratified by the Filipino legislature, 

JCETs will become one part of a larger military engagement strategy.

Thailand Thailand is one of five U.S. security treaty allies in Asia and, according to 

the State Department, one of the closest U.S. military partners in the 

region. One U.S. objective is to develop and maintain a Thai military 

committed to respecting and fostering democratic principles and capable 

of participating in international peacekeeping operations. As such, DOD 

has had a large military engagement program, and the embassy identified 

its continuance as an objective. For example, in one JCET alone 39 SOF 

personnel from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force trained with nearly 

250 Thai military in activities such as small unit tactics, maritime beach 

reconnaissance/landing, and psychological operations. The embassy 

viewed JCETs as a small, but cost-effective part of its total engagement 

strategy to maintain contacts and facilitate interoperability.

Conclusions Our review of oversight procedures in the six countries we visited suggests 

that DOD performed JCETs with the knowledge and support of the 

ambassadors and country teams and that such activities were consistent 

with U.S. foreign policy in those specific countries. Moreover, the 

ambassadors did not believe that any problems had occurred because of 

the lack of headquarters oversight. It is not possible to determine whether 

the number, location, or activities of JCETs would have changed if DOD 

and State headquarters had been involved in the approval process; nor is it 

possible to know whether a DOD or Department of State headquarters 

perspective might have changed a planned event. We agree with DOD, 

however, that civilian oversight will become “more robust” under its new 
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JCET approval process. The additional oversight should provide greater 

assurances that all factors are weighed in determining whether a JCET 

should proceed. Moreover, it is clear that the lack of headquarters 

oversight, when coupled with the general confusion and inaccurate 

reporting on JCET activity discussed earlier in this report, contributed to 

the dissemination of inaccurate information to the Congress. The new 

process should, at the minimum, reduce the amount of contradictory and 

erroneous information issued in the future.
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Chapter 4

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Law Restricting Training With Human Rights 

Abusers Chapte4r

Recent legislation restricts DOD from using its funds to train with a unit of 

a foreign security force that has been credibly alleged to have committed a 

gross violation of human rights unless all necessary corrective steps have 

been taken.1

 DOD has issued interim guidance to implement the legislation. 

The Department of State has also issued procedures to its embassies on 

their role in human rights screening. However, embassies overseas have 

encountered a number of implementation problems that the guidance has 

not yet resolved. 

Legislation Restricts 

Conducting JCETs 

With Forces Involved 

in Human Rights 

Violations

In past years, DOD has stated that it would not train with foreign security 

forces if those forces were known to be involved in human rights 

violations. Until October 1998, however, DOD was not legislatively 

prohibited from doing so. Until that time, the closest legislation resembling 

such a prohibition was in foreign operations appropriations legislation.2

 

This legislation specifies that no foreign operations funds (such as funds 

for International Military Education and Training Assistance or Foreign 

Military Financing to purchase equipment) are to be provided to units of 

security forces of a foreign country if there is credible evidence that units 

have committed gross violations of human rights unless the Secretary of 

State determines and reports to the Congress that the government of the 

country is taking “effective measures to bring the responsible members of 

the security forces unit to justice.” The process through which State 

Department investigates for potential human rights abusers is generally 

called vetting. 

Section 8130 of the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999

(Oct. 17, 1998) restricts DOD from using its funds to train with a unit of the 

security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has credible 

information that a member of those forces has committed a gross violation 

of human rights.3

 Specifically, the section

• prohibits DOD from training with a unit of the security forces of a 

foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible 

1

Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335

(Oct. 17, 1998).

2

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-133 (1996), 

reenacted in somewhat different form in Pub. L. 105-118, § 570, 111 Stat. 2429 (1997), reenacted again in 

Pub. L. 105-277, § 568, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-194-195 (1998).

3

Pub. L. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998).
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information from the Department of State that a member of the unit has 

committed a gross violation of human rights, “unless all necessary 

corrective steps have been taken”;

• requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 

State within 90 days of the enactment of the law, to establish procedures 

to ensure that prior to a decision to conduct any DOD-funded training 

program, full consideration is given to all information available to the 

Department of State relating to human rights violations by foreign 

security forces; and

• authorizes the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the 

Secretary of State, to waive the prohibition under extraordinary 

circumstances and report the waiver to the Congress within 15 days 

describing the extraordinary circumstances and providing related 

information.

DOD Has Issued 

Interim Guidance, but 

Implementation Issues 

Remain

Pursuant to legislation, in November 1998, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy issued interim guidance on how to 

implement section 8130 of Public Law 105-262. The guidance provides 

general procedures for ensuring that DOD-funded training activities do not 

take place with human rights abusers. Specifically, it states what DOD 

training activities are included and excluded and that State Department—

not DOD—personnel are responsible for determining whether credible 

evidence shows that a unit or a member within that unit is involved in a 

gross human rights violation. The guidance defines “gross” human rights 

violations and essentially relies on the ambassador or other non-DOD 

member of the country team to assure the Joint Staff that the Department 

of State possesses no credible information on gross human rights violations 

by the security units or their members with whom DOD plans to train. If 

the Department of State concludes that there is credible evidence of a gross 

violation of human rights, DOD guidance provides that the “proposed 

activity may be able to meet the requirements of the law because necessary 

corrective steps have been taken, e.g., through adjustments of the planned 

activity and/or adjustments to the host nation participants.” The guidance 

further states that “[i]f such adjustments can be accomplished with the host 

nation, or if other necessary corrective action has been taken, and are 

judged adequate by the Ambassador,” the training may be approved. Thus, 

the DOD guidance has defined the legislative language “unless all necessary 

corrective steps have been taken.” Information on corrective actions taken 

must be provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense with the JCET 

request. If the State Department determines that it has no credible 

evidence of abuses, DOD will continue with the JCET as planned. 
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Though not required to by legislation, the Department of State also issued 

guidance to its embassies because of its role in overseeing all official U.S. 

activities overseas in general and in particular for screening foreign troops 

for human rights abuses. Embassies overseas highlighted a number of 

problems that have arisen since they have begun implementing the 

legislation but that have not yet been addressed by the State Department. 

The Definition of a Unit Section 8130 of the 1999 Defense Appropriations Act states that DOD 

cannot train with a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if there is 

credible information that a member of the unit has committed a gross 

violation of human rights.4

 Defining “unit” is important from two 

standpoints. First, the definition of the unit determines the number of 

people State must investigate if the embassy screens all individuals in a unit 

associated with a JCET. During our visit, State and DOD personnel in 

Colombia questioned whether the embassy would have to investigate an 

entire brigade for possible human rights abuses if the U.S. special 

operations forces were planning to train with only one platoon from the 

brigade. Second, the definition of a unit determines the extent to which 

abuses committed by the unit’s leaders affect lower-level personnel. 

Specifically, if a unit is defined as a brigade, the abuses of the top official 

would adversely affect the ability of hundreds of lower-level personnel to 

train with the U.S. military. Defining a unit as the group actually doing the 

training, for example, a platoon, lowers the universe affected to only a few 

people. 

The State Department believes that the issue of the definition of a unit has 

been resolved. After consultation with DOD, in a May 8, 1999, cable to all 

overseas embassies, the State Department defined the unit to be trained as 

the unit to be vetted. Thus, for individual training, the individual will be 

vetted. For unit-level training, the unit itself will be vetted. For example, if 

the training is targeted at a platoon, only the platoon will be vetted, not the 

parent unit. 

The Screening of Individuals The May 8 cable does not clarify whether embassies must investigate every 

individual in the unit for human rights abuses or whether it is sufficient to 

determine whether there are allegations against the unit as a whole. In this 

cable, State provided guidance stating that “the vetting procedures should 

4

See id.
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ascertain that no one against whom there are credible allegations of gross 

violations of human rights is currently assigned to the units in question.” 

However, State officials believe that this guidance does not require 

screening every individual assigned to the unit in question. We believe that 

State’s written guidance and oral interpretation could be viewed as 

contradictory. Specifically, the written guidance appears to require 

individual vetting, while oral interpretation of this guidance suggested that 

individual vetting is not required. It is, therefore, not clear how embassies 

are to ascertain that there are no credible allegations of human rights 

abuses. Of the six countries we visited, only Colombia screens every 

individual scheduled to participate in a JCET. The embassy in Indonesia 

has determined that if it resumes JCETs in the future, it will also screen 

every individual scheduled to participate. 

The Definition of Training The definition of training is important as it establishes what DOD activities 

must undergo human rights screening. In its guidance, DOD defines 

training as the “instruction of foreign security force personnel with the 

specific purpose of improving the capabilities of foreign security forces.”5

 

It includes JCETs as “training,” even though their primary purpose is to 

train U.S. forces, but does not consider training to be military exercises and 

individual and collective interface activities (such as subject matter expert 

exchanges and seminars) during which the primary focus is 

interoperability or mutually beneficial exchanges and not training of 

foreign forces. With this definition of training, a broad array of 

military-to-military activities are not required to undergo human rights 

screening. Some State Department officials in Colombia, however, believe 

that all military-to-military activities should be included and have asked for 

clarification on the issue. These officials in Colombia believe it equally 

important to screen high-ranking Colombian officers selected to participate 

in a seminar as it is to screen lower-level officials scheduled to participate 

in a JCET. 

The Clearance of a Unit 

With Past Human Rights 

Abuses

Embassies do not have any guidance on how far back in time they must go 

to investigate human rights abuses. Also at issue is whether the passage of 

time since unresolved human rights abuses occurred is sufficient to permit 

training, and if so, how much time is necessary. For example, embassy 

5

See Joint Staff message dated Nov. 14, 1998, “Human Rights Verification for DOD-Funded Training 

Programs With Foreign Personnel.”
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officials in Colombia questioned whether an unresolved human rights 

allegation in the early 1990s would preclude DOD from training with the 

affected unit. 

The Implementation of “All 

Necessary Corrective Steps”

DOD’s guidance states that DOD may propose corrective action to address 

situations where there is credible information of gross human rights 

violations by a member of a unit by adjusting the planned activity or 

participants. The guidance states further that the corrective action must be 

“judged adequate” by the ambassador. Thus, DOD has defined this 

legislative provision. 

However, embassy officials have identified different understandings of 

what “all necessary corrective steps” entails as a major implementation 

problem. We found that some ambassadors do not clearly understand what 

criteria are to be used in making such an assessment. Some embassy 

officials believe that the requirement that no training may proceed “unless 

all necessary corrective steps have been taken” should be consistent with 

the foreign operations legislation requiring that the host country initiate 

judicial proceedings against the suspect before training can begin. DOD’s 

guidance, on the other hand, reflects its belief that removing the offending 

individual from the unit to be trained with before the training begins or 

changing the unit with which U.S. forces will train meets the intent of the 

legislation and permits the training. Moreover, DOD believes it is 

appropriate to have different human rights standards for foreign assistance 

and U.S. training activities and that DOD was never expected to hold 

training activities to the same standards set for foreign assistance funds 

because the purposes of the foreign assistance activities are so different. 

The Secretary of Defense believes it is inappropriate to apply foreign 

assistance human rights standards for U.S. training activities because in 

training activities, U.S. forces are the primary beneficiary and many 

important U.S. programs, such as humanitarian demining and counterdrug 

support, are furthered in many of these training events. 

In State’s November 1998 instruction to overseas embassies, it advised that 

until this provision of the law was more clearly defined, overseas posts 

should refer any questions on a particular deployment to both State and 

DOD headquarters. We met with embassy officials who believe it 

important that “all necessary corrective steps” be interpreted to mean that 

the host country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible 

parties to justice. Such an interpretation would ensure that there was one 

human rights standard for all military engagements, regardless of the 
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funding source or purpose of the activity, including the training of U.S. 

forces. For example, State officials in Colombia noted that if the embassy 

discovered that some of the potential recipients of counternarcotics 

assistance appeared to have committed human rights abuses, the embassy 

can provide the aid only after the embassy is assured that the host 

government is taking effective measures to bring to justice the charged 

individuals. The U.S. Ambassador in Colombia believes that this same 

standard should be applied to U.S. military training activities. Embassies in 

Colombia and Thailand have requested more instructions on this issue.

The May 8, 1999, guidance from the Secretary of State did not resolve the 

issue of how ambassadors should assess whether all necessary corrective 

steps have been taken, but it relieved the embassies of having to make final 

decisions on approving or disapproving military training. State Department 

officials told us that ambassadors are expected to assess the situation if 

screening reveals human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the guidance 

instructed all U.S. embassies that if screening reveals human rights abuses, 

embassies should forward their evaluation of whether the evidence is 

credible to the Department of State and unified commands for resolution 

and further guidance. Further, State Department officials told us they do 

not view the lack of a clear definition of all necessary corrective steps as a 

problem. Rather, their belief is that State generally will not allow any 

training to proceed if embassies discover any credible evidence of gross 

human rights abuse.

The Universe of Countries 

in Which Screening Is 

Required

The legislation requiring human rights screening for all DOD training 

neither names nor excludes countries in which such screening must take 

place. However, some State and DOD officials with whom we met 

questioned whether human rights screening needs to be done in countries 

where there is no record of human rights abuse. For example, officials 

question whether it is necessary to conduct a screening exercise before 

training with military units in NATO countries. 

The Effect of Information 

and Resource Constraints

Embassy and DOD officials identified the lack of reliable information on 

human rights abuses from which to make decisions regarding the 

appropriateness of training with an individual or a unit and limited staff to 

conduct investigations as two problems in implementing the legislation. 

For example, U.S. embassy officials in the Philippines, Thailand, and 

Indonesia noted that the host government does not have a centralized 

database on human rights abuses, and U.S. officials in Indonesia believed 
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that background checks conducted by the host nation police were 

unreliable. Of the six countries we visited, only the government of 

Colombia had a database that the embassy could use to determine whether 

charges had been brought against individuals. Colombia had this database 

only because they were required to develop one in an agreement they 

signed with United States to receive counternarcotics assistance. 

Moreover, we were informed that the limited number of State Department 

personnel overseas prohibits them from conducting active investigations of 

host nation personnel for each DOD training activity. Such a constraint is 

particularly problematic if embassies are required to conduct 

investigations of every individual in a unit scheduled to participate in a 

JCET. 

Difficulties in Complying 

With DOD’s JCET Approval 

Time Frames

Another problem area officials highlighted is the difficulty of conducting 

human rights screening within the time constraints DOD has imposed in its 

new approval process, especially if the embassies must screen individuals 

rather than units. Specifically, no later than 45 days before the event is 

scheduled to occur, DOD requires that the geographic CINCs provide to the 

Joint Staff verification that embassies have not uncovered human rights 

abuses. However, according to DOD officials overseas, host nation 

militaries have often not determined who will actually participate in the 

training until just before the activity starts. For example, the Thai military 

provides the names of its JCET participants about 1 month prior to the 

event. The embassy is attempting to obtain confirmation of Thai 

participants 2 months in advance to meet JCET approval time frames. 

Human Rights Screening 

Varies by Country

Embassies in the six countries we visited have developed policies and 

instituted procedures to implement section 8130 of Public Law 105-262 

based on their understanding of what is required, U.S. goals in the country, 

and constraints each embassy faces.6

 Each embassy has taken steps to 

ensure it will not be associated with human rights abusers and to abide by 

its understanding of the legislation. However, some embassy officials were 

concerned that their best efforts might not be consistent with what the 

Congress intended. They believed that more guidance is needed, 

particularly in those countries where human rights are an issue. The 

following summaries describe how the six embassies have implemented 

the legislation and what concerns they have raised.

6

Pub. L. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279, 2335 (Oct. 17, 1998).
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Bolivia According to U.S. embassy officials, human rights violations are not a big 

problem in Bolivia. Nevertheless, the embassy takes a conservative 

approach in screening JCET participants for derogatory information: it 

screens each police officer regardless of rank and military officers at the 

rank of major and above. Enlisted personnel are not screened because 

most are conscripts serving only a year and have had limited opportunities 

to engage in such abuse. 

DOD’s military group manages the vetting process and provides embassy 

officials, including the political officer and human rights officer and heads 

of the narcotics affairs section and Drug Enforcement Agency, the names, 

dates of birth, and ranks of scheduled officer participants. Each embassy 

official is expected to search files for any derogatory information. For 

example, the Defense Attaché maintains a database on persons known to 

have committed human rights abuses or to have engaged in narcotics 

activities. The embassy does not contact the host nation to obtain 

information on human rights violations. To date, there have been few 

allegations of any human rights abuses committed by the military. The 

embassy had excluded only one Bolivian military unit because of human 

rights concerns.

Colombia Ongoing U.S. programs in Colombia to reduce the flow of cocaine, heroin, 

and other drugs into the United States and to promote the protection of 

human rights govern how the embassy manages the screening of 

prospective JCET participants. Because numerous human rights 

allegations against the Colombian military have been documented, the 

embassy has instituted a formal procedure to screen for abuses before 

counternarcotics or other military training activities proceed. The embassy 

has elected to use this same procedure to vet unit leaders and individual 

Colombian troops scheduled to participate in JCETs. 

Because human rights is an embassy priority, all screening is managed and 

led by the Deputy Chief of Mission. Initially, the Deputy must approve or 

disapprove a unit scheduled to participate in training. If a unit is approved, 

the Colombian Ministry of Defense is asked to determine whether any 

criminal or administrative investigations (such as those conducted by the 

Inspector General) have been initiated against any of the individuals 

scheduled for training. The government of Colombia must then conduct 

local background checks and certify that they have not yielded any 

unsatisfactory information. As a further check, embassy personnel, 

including the human rights officer, regional security officer, and heads of 
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the Drug Enforcement Agency, screen each individual on the basis of 

information available to them. For example, the human rights officer 

maintains files on abuses committed by military units and individuals. 

Upon receipt of this information, the country team, led by the Deputy Chief 

of Mission, determines whether the unit is eligible for training. Only the 

Ambassador can grant final approval of any deployment. As a result of 

these procedures, DOD discontinued JCETs with a unit charged with 

counterterrorism responsibilities because the screening process revealed 

that the head of the unit might have committed human rights abuses. 

Although DOD guidance excludes other military-to-military activities such 

as seminars between U.S. and Colombian military officers, embassy 

officials believe that these activities should undergo the same human rights 

scrutiny. The embassy wants assurance from the Department of State that 

its position requiring human rights screening for all military-to-military 

activities is consistent with the intent of the legislation.

Ecuador According to U.S. embassy officials, the Ecuadorian military is one of the 

most respected and trustworthy institutions in the country and has a good 

human rights record. As such, the embassy has determined it is sufficient 

to conduct an in-house review of available information on the human rights 

records of the parent unit of the scheduled JCET participants. It does not 

consult with the host country to obtain information. This evaluation has 

generally been conducted at either the battalion or brigade level. The 

embassy does not believe it necessary to screen lower-level units such as 

the platoon actually conducting the JCET, individual unit commanders, or 

actual JCET participants. Moreover, DOD officials stated that such 

screening would not be cost-effective and that they would not have the 

resources to screen at that level unless they reduced the number of 

deployments.

The U.S. military group manages the process by providing embassy officials 

a list of all units with whom they plan to conduct JCETs for the year. Each 

embassy unit, such as the Defense Attaché, political section, and 

information section, is expected to review this list and determine whether 

they have credible evidence of human rights abuses. To date, no training 

events have been canceled because of allegations of human rights abuses. 

Indonesia Embassy officials stated that human rights have always been an embassy 

priority and are a major component of the U.S. and Indonesian policy 
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dialogue. Moreover, in 1995, the embassy established a human rights 

committee. The embassy said it has tried and will continue to try to ensure 

that the United States does not train with human rights violators and that it 

incorporates a greater respect for human rights as a major U.S. policy 

objective in Indonesia. 

The Secretary of Defense canceled all JCETs in Indonesia in April 1998 in 

response to information gathered at that time that the Indonesian military 

was involved in human rights violations. According to U.S. embassy 

officials, before that time, they did not have any credible evidence that host 

nation JCET participants were involved in human rights abuses. Under the 

prior Indonesian administration, public criticism of military activities was 

not tolerated. Because little information was available on the conduct of 

military members, the embassy applied a blanket policy not to train with 

Indonesian troops stationed in locations where abuses allegedly occurred. 

Nevertheless, embassy staff said that they still face constraints in obtaining 

credible evidence of abuse. 

The embassy does not support reinitiating JCETs until Indonesia has made 

greater progress in democratic reforms to include successful free elections, 

inauguration of the elected officials, and reforms within the military, 

including a reduction in its responsibility for internal security. Embassy 

officials said that if JCETs were to resume, the screening of participants for 

human rights abuses would be the same as the screening of Indonesian 

participants in other military-to-military activities. The human rights 

screening process is managed by the embassy human rights committee. 

This committee is made up of the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of 

Mission, and heads of major U.S. agencies in the embassy and State 

Department sections such as the political section. To initiate the 

investigation, the embassy requires candidates for training to provide 

complete biographic data to include assignments, dates and places of 

assignments, and positions held. The military group and human rights 

committee determine whether any of the candidates served in units when 

the unit allegedly committed human rights violations. Internal embassy 

records are also reviewed for any derogatory information. Throughout 

each step, members of the committee may decide whether further 

investigation is required. For example, staff may conduct further checks 

with local human rights organizations or other embassies. If the candidate 

was not a member of an offending unit and no other derogatory 

information was obtained, the candidate is approved for training.
Chapter 4

Uncertainties Remain in Implementing the 

Law Restricting Training With Human Rights 

Abusers

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

The Philippines According to embassy officials, the Philippine military has a generally 

positive human rights record. Because of resource and time constraints, 

the embassy screens parent units as a whole and only the unit commander 

as an individual before JCETs can proceed.

The embassy’s Labor Attaché manages the screening process. Initially, the 

embassy checks with the Filipino Human Rights Commission to determine 

whether it has any credible allegations of human rights abuses against the 

unit commander. If there are no allegations against the commander, the 

embassy assumes that the rest of the unit shares the commander’s 

professionalism and respect for the rights of others, and the screening 

process does not continue. If allegations against the commander surface, 

the embassy checks further with private human rights groups. 

To date, the embassy has uncovered credible evidence of gross human 

rights abuses committed by eight Filipino special forces officers, which 

makes them—and any members of their units on the dates of the human 

rights violations—ineligible for training with U.S. SOF. The embassy does 

not believe it is possible to vet every individual participating in a JCET 

because the Filipino military does not determine who will actually 

participate in the training until just before the event. Moreover, even if 

these names were available, there is not an extensive database within any 

of the human rights organizations to conduct a search on all prospective 

participants. Officials are unsure, however, whether this process meets 

State Department headquarters requirements and are awaiting further 

guidance.

Thailand According to the State Department, Thailand is an important U.S. military 

and economic partner in Asia and has an open and democratic society that 

does not have a systemic problem with human rights in the military. 

Embassy officials suspect that some low-level human rights problems have 

occurred with units operating at Thailand’s border with Burma. DOD 

avoids dealing with these units in general because of this suspicion. Given 

this environment, embassy officials determined that it was most 

appropriate to vet only the leadership of the parent unit of the potential 

JCET participants by checking embassy sources for any derogatory 

information. 

At the beginning of the fiscal year, the military group provides the embassy 

political section a list of the leaders of the Thai units that plan to participate 

in JCETs. The political section reviews its internal sources, which include 
Chapter 4

Uncertainties Remain in Implementing the 

Law Restricting Training With Human Rights 

Abusers

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

human rights data from different sections within the embassy. The 

embassy stated it does not seek outside sources of information because it 

does not have the staff or the time to do so. Moreover, embassy officials 

noted that the embassy uses the same procedures to screen for JCET 

activities as it does for other military-to-military activities and to prepare its 

annual country report on human rights practices. According to embassy 

staff, at the time of our review the embassy had vetted personnel scheduled 

for one JCET and had not found any human rights allegations. 

Nevertheless, embassy staff stated that they needed further guidance from 

State headquarters and have requested it in two separate cables. Embassy 

officials noted that they wanted to develop a human rights committee and 

reorganize their human rights section to best meet the needs of the vetting 

and annual human rights report requirements but wanted assurances that 

their approach met the law’s intent. They said they needed further 

guidance defining what is meant by a unit and how far back to look at a 

unit’s history. 

Conclusions In the six countries we visited, U.S. State Department and DOD personnel 

have taken steps to implement the legislation restricting training with 

persons believed to have committed human rights abuses. Each embassy 

has adopted policy and procedures that it believes address U.S. goals and 

take into consideration its resource and information constraints. 

Nevertheless, we found concern in the field regarding what the legislation 

requires and how it should be implemented. Given such concern, State and 

DOD personnel overseas clearly would benefit from more explicit 

instructions on the appropriate implementation of the law and guidance on 

whether the policy and procedures each embassy has adopted are 

acceptable to State and DOD officials in Washington. Such guidance would 

provide greater assurances not only to each embassy but also to the 

Congress that JCET activities are consistent with the law relating to human 

rights policies.

Recommendations To clarify the implementation of legislative requirements for human rights 

screening for all DOD-funded training programs with foreign security 

forces and to address the concern of overseas State Department officials 

that they lack complete policy guidance from headquarters, we recommend 

that the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of 

Defense, clarify (1) whether every individual in a unit needs to be screened 
Chapter 4

Uncertainties Remain in Implementing the 

Law Restricting Training With Human Rights 

Abusers

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

or whether screening the collective human rights record of a unit is 

sufficient, (2) what DOD-funded activities require human rights screening, 

(3) how far back in time embassies must screen for human rights abuses, 

and (4) the extent to which embassies must screen for human rights 

violations in countries with no history of such abuse.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOD and State provided written comments on a draft of our report (see 

apps. I and II). DOD concurred with our recommendation. The 

Department of State, however, disagreed, believing that its previously 

issued guidance sufficiently addresses the concerns raised in this report. 

In regard to the specific points in our recommendation, State responded 

that vetting every individual in a unit would be warranted if information 

received merited a further review of the unit in question and that it is 

continuing to work with embassies to clarify implementation of new 

guidelines and address procedural questions, such as time period and 

extent of screening for human rights violations, as they arise.

As we stated throughout this chapter, we do not believe that State’s policy 

guidance provides sufficient direction to embassies on how to implement 

this legislation, and State has not provided any additional information to 

change our opinion. State has not resolved which types of U.S. military 

training activities overseas require human rights screening before they 

proceed, how far back in time the embassy must go in investigating these 

abuses, and the extent to which countries must screen for human rights 

abuses in countries with no history of such abuse. The State Department 

intends to decide these issues on a case-by-case basis. Such flexibility does 

not negate the need to provide embassies with a framework and specific 

policy guidance on State’s implementation of the legislation. We continue 

to believe that current ambiguities in the guidance cause implementation 

problems for embassy personnel. Moreover, the absence of a uniform 

policy inhibits the ability of the Congress to conduct oversight of JCET 

activities relating to human rights policy. We, therefore, continue to believe 

that our recommendation has merit.
Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxIi
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Now on pp. 10 and 40.

Now on pp. 10 and 40.

Now on pp. 11 and 62-63.

Now on pp. 10 and 40.
Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Training

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of State ApendxIi
Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-99-173 Military Traning

Appendix III

GAO Staff Acknowledgments ApenIdxi

Acknowledgments Carol Schuster, Colin Chambers, Herbert Dunn, Beverly Schladt, and Joan 

Slowitsky made key contributions to this report.

(703251) Lert
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