INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES

INTO NATO

October 2000
NOTE

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
PREFACE

In March 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), marking a milestone in their

reintegration into the European mainstream. This enlargement of the alliance

occurred with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate in April 1998, following an

extensive debate on the three Central European countries’ qualifications for

membership. Proponents of enlarging NATO argued that the three countries would

enhance the security of the alliance and would contribute to its ability to carry out its

missions. Opponents feared that the enlargement would entail steep costs for the

United States and its allies, would make the alliance less secure by increasing its

commitments, and would antagonize Russia.

This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) paper examines the contribution

that the three Central European allies are making to the common defense of the

alliance. The paper looks at how they have progressed militarily since the end of the

Cold War—namely, the state of their defense budgets and their military reforms. It

also details NATO’s costs for incorporating the new members. The paper relies on

(1) interviews with defense experts who have worked with the new allies or have

examined their armed forces, (2) journal articles, (3) information provided by the

three countries themselves, and (4) conversations with and reports from officials at

the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Mission to NATO. While classified

materials from DoD and NATO were consulted, all information in this paper comes

from open sources.

The paper was requested by the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to

provide objective and nonpartisan analysis, it makes no recommendations.

The paper was prepared by John J. Lis and Zachary Selden under the

supervision of Christopher Jehn and R. William Thomas. Delia Welsh compiled the

appendix and drafted Chapter II, and Carolyn Leddy contributed invaluable research

and drafted sections of all three chapters. The authors wish to thank Jeffrey Simon,

Thomas S. Szayna, Daniel N. Nelson, Andrew Michta, Marybeth Ulrich, Paul Gallis,

Julie Kim, and Carl Ek for their insights and assistance. All responsibility for this

work, however, rests with the authors.
John Skeen edited the paper, and Christine Bogusz proofread it. Judith

Cromwell prepared it for publication, and Annette Kalicki prepared the electronic

versions for CBO’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).

Dan L. Crippen

Director

October 2000
CONTENTS

SUMMARY vii

I FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO 1

Framing the Current Enlargement of NATO 1

Overcoming the Legacy of the Warsaw Pact 2

II DEFENSE BUDGETS 5

Historical Trends and Projected Spending 6

New Allies’ Contributions to Recent NATO Missions 11

III RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 15

Military Restructuring and Modernization in Poland 16

Military Restructuring and Modernization in Hungary 17

Military Restructuring and Modernization in the

Czech Republic 19

NATO-Funded Common Capabilities 20

Conclusions 24

APPENDIX Information About Data Sources 27
vi INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

TABLES

1. Projected Defense Spending in NATO

as a Percentage of GDP, 2000-2003 5

2. Historical Defense Spending as a

Percentage of GDP, 1990-1999 6

3. Central European Allies’ Historical and

Projected Defense Spending, 1997-2003 9

4. Armed Forces of Central European Allies

and Comparable Allies, 1989-1999 10

5. Allied Contributions to NATO’s Common

Budgets in 1999 21

FIGURES

S-1. European Allies’ Defense Spending 

as a Percentage of GDP, 1993-2000 ix

1. Central European Allies’ Historical and

Projected Defense Spending, 1997-2003 8

2. Number of Personnel from Select Countries

Assigned to NATO’s Kosovo Force Mission

in 1999 12

BOX

1. Conscription in Europe 7
SUMMARY

In March 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became the latest members

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Just as NATO allies had done

three times previously, they extended to the new members their solemn guarantee

“that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall

be considered an attack against them all,” as stated in Article 5 of the Washington

Treaty. At the same time, the new allies pledged that they would contribute to the

common defense of the North Atlantic area. Working with NATO, they set out to

upgrade their militaries and to integrate their armed forces with those of the alliance.

Members of Congress have reason to be interested in the progress that Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made toward restructuring their armed forces

and integrating them into NATO. The United States can be expected to pay almost

$400 million over 10 years in common costs for enlarging the alliance, such as those

for providing command, communications, computers, and intelligence (C3I); air

defense; and reinforcement and training facilities for the new member states. The

Congress has also provided millions of dollars in assistance to the three new

members to help them modernize their forces. In addition, Senators may base a

decision to further enlarge NATO in part on their evaluation of the current expansion.

When the Senate voted in April 1998 in favor of enlargement, it implicitly

accepted the argument that the three new allies would contribute to the security of the

alliance, that they would become what some analysts call “net producers” of security

rather than simply consumers. Security, of course, has several components: internal

stability, good relations with neighbors, active diplomacy, and even a favorable

geographic location. (For example, Iceland—a NATO member since 1949—has no

military but offers a key strategic location that is home to NATO bases.)

This paper examines the progress that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic have made toward integrating into NATO. It looks at their progress in

restructuring their militaries, training their personnel, adopting NATO doctrine,

modernizing outdated equipment, and generally developing the capability to fight

alongside and communicate with existing NATO forces. It also gauges their current

contributions to NATO’s operations in the Balkans and other activities. Finally, it

examines the improvements that NATO itself has pledged to carry out in the three

countries to facilitate the alliance’s activities.

Some measures indicate that the new allies are moving toward making

appropriate contributions to the alliance. Poland and the Czech Republic have
viii INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

1. Czechoslovakia divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. 

increased their defense budgets relative to gross domestic product (GDP) to about the

average for the other European NATO members. All of the new allies are

contributing personnel to Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo at levels that are

comparable to those of similarly sized long-standing NATO members. All three have

successfully created Western-style command structures and are taking steps to

modernize their forces.

The new allies share some common challenges as well, especially in

restructuring their militaries and overcoming the debilitating legacy of Warsaw Pact

military doctrine. While the armed forces of all three new members are firmly in the

hands of civilian defense ministries, a lack of civilian defense experts in the

legislative branches has resulted in minimal parliamentary oversight. Moreover, all

of the new allies need to develop larger noncommissioned officer corps and junior

officer corps and to imbue those new officers with an ability to lead and take the

initiative—thus moving away from the Warsaw Pact model of absolute reliance on

top-down centralized authority. All three countries also share a need to modernize

their equipment, but according to many experts, this lesser problem can be addressed

mainly by upgrading weapons platforms and buying communications gear that is

interoperable with NATO’s systems.

Although the new allies are progressing along the same lines and facing

similar challenges, their current contributions to the alliance vary widely. Poland, the

largest of the three, brings a military that is twice the size of the combined militaries

of the Czech Republic and Hungary, along with a strong commitment to funding its

armed forces. The Czech Republic is increasing its defense budgets and has already

exceeded some of its spending goals. Hungary spends the least on defense, but it

does provide a key strategic position that has already aided NATO in its efforts to

stabilize the Balkans. On balance, Poland is better positioned than either Hungary

or the Czech Republic to play a substantial role in the alliance.

DEFENSE BUDGETS

Defense spending fell in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia following the end of

the Warsaw Pact. Expressed as a share of GDP, between 1989 and 1997 it fell from

2.5 percent to 2.3 percent in Poland, from 2.8 percent to 1.4 percent in Hungary, and

from 2.6 percent to 1.7 percent in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic.1

In preparation for membership in NATO, all three countries began to increase

their defense spending. Polish defense budgets increased (in 1999 U.S. dollars) from

$3.2 billion in 1996 to $3.4 billion in 1999, Hungarian budgets rose from $491 million
SUMMARY ix

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0 Percentage of GDP

Hungary

Other European NATO

Allies (Avg.)

Czech Republic

Poland

in 1997 to $802 million in 1999, and Czech spending grew from $860 million in

1997 to $974 million in 1999. Defense spending as a share of GDP is now 2.1

percent in Poland, 1.7 percent in Hungary, and 2.2 percent in the Czech

Republic—levels comparable to the average of 2.0 percent for the other European

members of NATO (see Summary Figure 1).

Before joining the alliance, Hungary and the Czech Republic both pledged to

increase the share of national income that they devote to defense by 0.1 percent a

year. Specifically, Hungary agreed to an increase from 1.4 percent in 1997 to 1.8

percent in 2001, and the Czech Republic agreed to go from 1.7 percent in 1997 to 2.0

percent in 2000 (which it has exceeded). By 2003, Hungary is expected to spend $1

billion on defense, and the Czech Republic $1.2 billion. Polish defense budgets are

projected to reach $4.1 billion in 2003, 2.3 percent of GDP. Poland and Hungary are

both enjoying strong economic growth, while the Czech Republic is just starting to

recover from a recession, which could affect its ability to further increase its defense

spending.

However, NATO’s future operations of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief

are likely to be conducted by “coalitions of the willing.” It is therefore important to

SUMMARY FIGURE 1. EUROPEAN ALLIES' DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE

OF GDP, 1993-2000

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Institute for National Strategic Studies and NATO.
x INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

2. Partnership for Peace is a NATO program that facilitates exchanges between NATO and non-NATO

militaries in Europe and coordinates joint exercises and training. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic were PfP members before joining NATO. PfP members are not covered by NATO’s

collective defense guarantee.

look beyond pure measures of spending and gauge the willingness of the new allies

to assume these tasks. In general, the new allies are taking on the burdens of

membership and contributing to NATO missions. They are contributing troops to the

Kosovo force and the Bosnia Stabilization Force at levels comparable to those of

other NATO allies of similar size. They are also helping to reach out to aspirants to

NATO by hosting Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises and thus further expanding

the “zone of stability” that the alliance creates.2

RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION

Integration into NATO will require the three new members to do more than increase

their defense spending. U.S. and NATO officials point out that Poland, Hungary, and

the Czech Republic also must train their personnel to exercise leadership and

initiative and to speak English, the functional language of the alliance. They also

must create and maintain highly ready and mobile units that can participate in NATO

missions beyond the alliance’s territory. Although all three countries face steep

modernization costs to replace obsolete or inadequate equipment, NATO has stated

that the new allies can defer purchases of expensive items such as fighter aircraft for

several years while they focus on procuring items deemed more essential to

integration, such as field radios, networked computers, navigation aids, and “identify

friend or foe” devices for aircraft.

Poland

Poland has made the greatest progress of the three new allies toward integrating its

military into NATO, according to analysts who have examined the efforts of all three

countries. Experts point to Poland’s larger defense budgets, detailed modernization

plan, and strong political support for the alliance in concluding that the country is

likely to contribute significantly to European security. While Poland faces challenges

in restructuring its forces, some observers already compare the Polish military

favorably with those of longtime NATO members such as Greece and Turkey.

In July 1999, the Polish government approved a set of regulations that will

reorganize its top military leadership along the lines of the U.S. Joint Staff. Current

plans call for drastically cutting the number of officers, particularly those in the higher

ranks, while doubling the number of sergeants by 2003. Altogether, the military is

projected to shrink from 200,400 in 2000 to 180,000 in 2003. Poland has pledged
SUMMARY xi

3. Immediate reaction forces would be the first to be deployed during a crisis. Rapid reaction forces

would follow within in a few days. 

four brigades for NATO’s high-readiness reaction forces and two divisions for the

main defense forces.

Hungary

Hungary’s geographic location allows the alliance to project stability into the most

volatile part of Europe. The country already has hosted NATO forces for operations

in Bosnia, and it is making a contribution to the ongoing NATO missions in Kosovo

and Bosnia that is comparable to the contributions of similarly sized allies such as

Portugal. Furthermore, military leaders have put forth a vigorous reform program.

Some analysts, however, point to Hungary’s small defense budgets, outmoded

equipment, and lack of a political commitment to improve the situation as indicators

that the country may not be prepared to shoulder a proportional share of the burdens

of membership in NATO.

The Czech Republic

Experts cite the Czech Republic’s specialized units, increasingly professional forces,

and modern communications system as signs that the Czech military will be able to

contribute to NATO forces in proportion to its size. But potential pitfalls loom,

particularly the challenge of maintaining government support for defense spending

and a potential “brain drain,” as talented young officers leave the military for the

private sector.

Nonetheless, the Czech Republic has pledged to make a combat brigade

available to NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps by 2002, and one light airborne infantry

battalion of that brigade is considered ready now. In addition, the Czech military has

gained a reputation for its work to defend against weapons of mass destruction; a

company with expertise in defending against nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons is assigned to NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force.3

NATO-Funded Common Capabilities

In addition to the national contributions, there are also common costs of enlargement

that NATO has agreed to bear as an alliance. According to a NATO study, these

programs will cost about $1.5 billion over the 10 years from 1999 through 2008.
xii INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

Those programs cover four broad issues: communications systems, an integrated air

defense, reception facilities for reinforcements, and training and field exercises.

According to NATO officials, the necessary communications links between

the Central European capitals and NATO headquarters and allied capitals were put

in place before Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO in March

1999. NATO has approved funding for upgrades and has established basic

communications links between each country’s operations center for air defense and

the alliance’s air-defense system. No work has yet begun on enhancing facilities for

receiving reinforcements, although $400 million was recently approved for that

purpose. Most of the work will involve improvements at air bases in the three

countries so that the bases can accommodate other allies’ aircraft. Finally, no action

has yet been taken on the relatively minimal improvements to training facilities that

NATO will underwrite.
CHAPTER I

FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO

When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) in March 1999, it marked a milestone in their transformation.

Ten years earlier, the three Central European countries had set in place the bloodless

revolutions that replaced communist governments and command economies with

democracy and free markets. For most of the ensuing decade, they sought to

reestablish the links to Western Europe that had been severed by the Nazi invasion

and Soviet occupation. In this sense, their admission to the Western alliance

signified a reentry into the European mainstream.

Of course, it is not enough for the three new allies to gain the security

provided by NATO’s umbrella; they must themselves contribute to the security of the

alliance. They must understand how other allies’ militaries operate and be able to

shoulder a proportional share of the burdens. And while they need not field the same

equipment as the other allies, they must be able to contribute modern, capable

military forces.

This paper examines the progress that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic have made toward integrating into NATO. It considers what the conditions

were when the Berlin Wall fell, what these countries accomplished in the ensuing

decade, and how they plan to fund their continuing integration into NATO. It then

looks at their progress in restructuring their militaries, training their personnel,

adopting NATO doctrine, modernizing outdated equipment, and generally developing

the capability to fight alongside and communicate with existing NATO forces. It also

gauges their current contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans and other

activities of the alliance. Finally, it examines the improvements that NATO itself has

pledged to carry out in the three new member countries to facilitate the alliance’s

activities.

FRAMING THE CURRENT ENLARGEMENT OF NATO

Providing its advice and consent in April 1998, the U.S. Senate approved the

protocols admitting the Central European countries to NATO with the understanding

that the three countries would make the alliance more secure and that enlarging the

alliance would not place an undue financial burden on U.S. taxpayers. NATO’s own

study placed the common costs at $1.5 billion over 10 years, to be divided among the

allies through the alliance’s military and infrastructure budgets. Because the United
2 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

States pays almost a quarter of each budget, the expected cost for this country is

about $400 million through 2008. While modest relative to the overall defense

budget, that sum is a significant contribution nonetheless.

Given those considerations, it is understandable that the Congress would be

interested in the progress that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are making

as NATO members. The Congress must appropriate money over the next decade to

pay the common costs, and Senators will be asked to give their advice and consent

if additional countries seek membership in NATO. Certainly, the Congress’s

evaluation of Poland’s, Hungary’s, and the Czech Republic’s integration will inform

these future decisions. If the Congress determines that the Central European allies

are taking advantage of the security guarantee while contributing little themselves,

it may be reluctant to support membership for other new democracies. But if the

Congress believes that the new allies are progressing well and shouldering their fair

share toward the common defense, then it is likely to look more favorably on the

candidacy of additional countries.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all stated that they favor

further enlargement to integrate their neighbors into a common European defense and

to create a larger “zone of stability” beyond their own borders. Historically, Central

Europe has been a region of instability, a source of contention between empires, and

the flash point for two world wars. The new NATO members look at the example

of France and Germany, which have enjoyed more than 50 years of peace following

three wars in the previous 80 years, and see the alliance as an umbrella that promotes

stability and prosperity. Whether another round of enlargement that takes in

countries bordering Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic comes to pass may

well hinge on how this first round is viewed.

It is unrealistic to expect the Central European countries to achieve the same

level of sophistication as the U.S. military, but some experts believe that they can

match or exceed the contributions of certain NATO allies. In particular, these

analysts note that Poland’s population of nearly 40 million is comparable with

Spain’s. Hungary and the Czech Republic, with roughly 10 million citizens each,

have approximately the population of Portugal. Accordingly, the argument goes, if

the Central European allies can make contributions similar to the ones made by those

comparable members of NATO, they would be bearing their fair share.

OVERCOMING THE LEGACY OF THE WARSAW PACT

During the Cold War, Moscow dictated security and defense strategies for its allies,

including concentrating troops along western borders. With the collapse of the Berlin

Wall, the Central European countries confronted the task of building new military

organizations to serve the national interest and not the aims of the now-defunct Soviet
CHAPTER I FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO 3

Union. However, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact did not mean the immediate

end of Soviet influence in Central European militaries; in fact, the legacy continues

to hamper reforms.

Military reform measures varied from country to country as Central and

Eastern European states began the transition from communism to democracy. One

of the most extensive reforms was redefining civil-military relations. The communist

regimes subordinated their militaries to the communist party rather than to state

institutions. Party officials used the militaries to subdue perceived external or

internal threats. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, however, each nation was left

to reconcile the role of the military to the demands of a democratic society and to

define the relationship between military institutions and political entities. The

militaries in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic struggled to overcome the

legacy of the Soviet era while simultaneously developing the ability to work with

other NATO allies in nontraditional military operations, such as peacekeeping and

providing humanitarian relief.

After the 1993 breakup of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic embraced a

“shock therapy” approach to defense reform and became the first Central European

state to place its military fully under civilian control, which it accomplished by the

summer of 1994. The Czechs early on exhibited the desire to purge the military of

communist influence. As of 1998, all but one of the 10 generals in the Czech

military had been newly appointed since the fall of the communist regime. The

transition to civilian control of the military in Hungary and Poland is proceeding

more slowly. Many of the top posts in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense are still

occupied by military officers, and Poland’s top officers were reluctant to cede control

to a civilian defense minister.

The Soviet military model, which served as the basis for the Hungarian, Polish,

and Czech armed forces during the Cold War, is still deeply embedded in their

organization and mentality. Some military analysts characterize this “intellectual

legacy” of Soviet rule as the greatest challenge to reform efforts. Soviet doctrine

emphasized absolute reliance on orders, making it difficult to complete assigned

tasks without detailed instructions from superiors. This reliance on superior authority

clashes with Western procedures, which allow much more initiative by junior officers.

In the latter half of the 1990s, the new allies drew up comprehensive

programs of military reform focusing on modernizing and restructuring forces to

overcome the Soviet legacy. Such programs emphasize retraining officers and

noncommissioned officers in modern Western strategy, tactics, and operations.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are being challenged to transform their

militaries into lighter forces capable of rapid deployment. While the state of the new

allies’ restructuring of their armed forces varies, all are organizing according to

NATO’s configurations of corps, brigades, and battalions.
4 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

The new allies are taking many steps toward making proportional

contributions to NATO. However, they face the significant obstacle of overcoming

the 50-year legacy of the Warsaw Pact and its lingering effects on doctrine,

leadership, and training.
CHAPTER II

DEFENSE BUDGETS

In their negotiations to join the alliance, the new allies agreed to increase defense

spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). In particular, the Czech

Republic pledged to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2000, and Hungary

pledged 1.8 percent by 2001. Poland pledged to increase defense spending to 3

percent of GDP, but Polish officials now say that that is a long-term goal over the

next 15 years and that near-term budgets will remain in the range of 2.1 to 2.4

percent. All three countries appear to be on track to meet or exceed those goals (see

Table 1).

Depending on economic performance, the new allies may have more funds

available for defense. But there are constraints on their spending imposed by their

desire to join the European Union (EU). To be eligible, the three countries will have

to reform their political and economic systems to conform to the EU’s criteria for

democratic and legal stability, a functioning market economy, and the administrative

responsibilities of membership. In addition, they must meet the EU’s requirement

to keep deficit spending under 3 percent of GDP.

TABLE 1. PROJECTED DEFENSE SPENDING IN NATO AS A PERCENTAGE

OF GDP, 2000-2003

2000 2001 2002 2003

Poland 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3

Hungary 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8

Czech Republic 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0

United States 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1

NATO, Western Europe 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9

Overall Average for NATO 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Ministries of Defense of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the Economist Intelligence Unit; and

the U.S. Department of Defense.
6 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

HISTORICAL TRENDS AND PROJECTED SPENDING

The Central European nations significantly cut their defense budgets after the

Warsaw Pact crumbled (see Table 2). Hungary's defense spending fell from 2.8

percent of GDP to 1.4 percent between 1989 and 1997. After Czechoslovakia

divided in 1993, defense spending as a share of GDP in the Czech Republic fell from

2.6 percent that year to 1.7 percent in 1997. Poland's decrease in spending as a share

of GDP was less striking. In 1988, Poland spent about 2.5 percent of GDP on

defense; by 1997 that figure had dropped to 2.3 percent. All three nations spend the

largest share of their defense budgets on personnel costs. As these countries make

deep cuts in personnel, they may free up resources for modernization, although the

cost of maintaining a smaller professional military may not be less than the cost of

maintaining a much larger conscript-based force (see Box 1).

Poland

Poland has the largest military and the only navy among the new allies. In relation

to its neighbors, historically it has spent the most on defense and the most as a

proportion of GDP. As Poland prepared itself for membership in NATO, the

government increased defense spending (in 1999 U.S. dollars) from $3.2 billion in

1996 to $3.5 billion in 1997 and almost $3.6 billion in 1998. The increase was

assisted by vibrant economic growth. During the mid-1990s the economy grew at an

TABLE 2. HISTORICAL DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1990-1999

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Poland 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1

Hungary 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6

Czech Republica 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.9

United States 5.6 5.0 5.2 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3

NATO, 

Western Europe 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1

Overall Average

for NATO 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Institute for National Strategic Studies and NATO.

a. The Czech Republic was established on January 1, 1993, when Czechoslovakia divided into Slovakia and the Czech

Republic.
CHAPTER II DEFENSE BUDGETS 7

BOX 1.

CONSCRIPTION IN EUROPE

Most NATO and Warsaw Pact members maintained large numbers of conscripts

in their militaries during the Cold War. Recently, however, many of those countries have begun to follow the examples of the United States and the United Kingdom and are phasing out conscription.

It is difficult to compare conscript militaries with all-volunteer forces in terms

of either cost or quality. Conscription usually reduces the budgetary costs of maintaining a military force by shifting some costs from taxpayers to conscripts, who

serve for lower wages than volunteers. Although such forces are less costly, they

are generally less capable. Because of their shorter term of service, conscripts are

unlikely to develop the same skills as professional soldiers. 

Nonetheless, some European leaders claim that conscription is worth maintaining for its social aspects. They argue that conscription better spreads the burden of defending the nation across all social strata and binds the military to the

society it protects. In addition, because conscription pushes some of the costs of

the military onto the conscripts, the military can maintain its numerical strength at

lower budgetary costs than with an all-volunteer force. For those reasons, Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic are maintaining conscription but reducing the

total number of conscripts and their term of service.

annual rate of more than 5 percent, although successive Russian economic crises

reduced the demand for Polish exports. Nonetheless, Poland’s GDP is projected to

grow by 4.5 percent in 2000.

Polish defense spending is expected to remain between 2.1 and 2.4 percent

of GDP over the next several years. Given the predictions of economic growth,

Poland is expected to increase its defense budgets (in 1999 U.S. dollars) from $3.4

billion in 1999 to $4.1 billion in 2003 (see Figure 1 and Table 3). More than 13

percent of its fiscal year 2000 defense budget has been devoted to NATO-related

projects, and 10.7 percent has gone to modernization. High popular support for

NATO may also translate into higher military budgets in the future.

Hungary

Defense spending in Hungary is the lowest of the three new allies’, both as a share

of GDP and in terms of total spending (see Figure 1). In general, there is less public

support for the military and for NATO membership than in Poland. Whereas Poles

have historically viewed their military as the protector of the nation, even under
8 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

0

1

2

3

4

5

Billions of 1999 U.S. Dollars

Hungary

Czech Republic

Poland

communist governments, Hungarians have long been wary of their military, which

was widely viewed as an accomplice in the Soviet Union’s domination of Hungary.

Hungary has made a relatively successful political and economic transition

in comparison with its neighbors. In 1995, the government undertook important

austerity measures, including a currency devaluation and cuts in social programs.

The reform package caused a short-term economic slowdown, but the country’s

economic development, fueled by an aggressive privatization effort, has attracted

more foreign investment to Hungary than to any other country in the region since

1990. The Hungarian economy is expected to grow by at least 4.5 percent in 2000.

The austerity program kept defense budgets lower than those in the Czech

Republic even as the military prepared for membership in NATO, although the

defense budgets increased from $491 million in 1997 to $804 million in 2000 (in

1999 U.S. dollars; see Figure 1 and Table 3). In the 2000 budget, $47 million is

allocated for modernization and improvements specifically to meet the demands of

belonging to NATO.

FIGURE 1. CENTRAL EUROPEAN ALLIES' HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED

DEFENSE SPENDING, 1997-2003 (In billions of 1999 U.S. dollars)

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from NATO, the Congressional Research Service, the embassies of

Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Economist

Intelligence Unit, and the U.S. Department of Defense.
CHAPTER II DEFENSE BUDGETS 9

1. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline, July 15, 1999.

TABLE 3. CENTRAL EUROPEAN ALLIES' HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED DEFENSE

SPENDING, 1997-2003 (In millions of 1999 U.S. dollars)

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Poland 3,520 3,546 3,377 3,582 3,684 3,889 4,093

Hungary 491 620 802 804 963 1,004 1,048

Czech Republic 860 912 974 1,041 1,069 1,107 1,157

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from NATO, the Congressional Research Service, the embassies of

Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the

Economist Intelligence Unit, and the U.S. Department of Defense.

The Hungarian government has pledged to raise defense spending by 0.1

percent of GDP each year until 2001, when it would reach 1.8 percent. The military

maintains that it can bring its equipment up to NATO’s standards with minor

modifications and has not placed a high priority on acquiring the latest weapons

technology. However, Hungary may face larger challenges than the other two new

members in modernizing its military because its defense budgets have been so low

for so long. In addition, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has stated that the costs of

supporting the air campaign against Yugoslavia and the subsequent peacekeeping

mission have exhausted the current defense budget and that “development projects

promised upon accession to NATO have been halted.”1

The Czech Republic

Defense spending in the Czech Republic declined from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1993

to 1.7 percent in 1997 before rebounding to 1.8 percent in 1998 in anticipation of

membership in NATO. The country’s 2000 defense budget is $1.02 billion, or 2.2

percent of GDP. Nearly a third of that, 31 percent, is allocated for modernization,

of which 89 percent is designated for NATO-related upgrades. The Czech Republic

inherited about two-thirds of the federation’s military personnel when

Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1993; since then, the Czech government has reduced

the number of active-duty personnel from roughly 106,700 to 61,000 (see Table 4).

During the early years of transition, the Czech Republic was a model of

economic success, posting strong growth rates and low levels of unemployment.

The country fell into a recession in 1997, however, which prevented increases in

defense spending despite increases in the percentage of GDP spent on defense. The
10 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

TABLE 4. ARMED FORCES OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN ALLIES AND COMPARABLE

ALLIES, 1989-1999 (Total active-duty personnel)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Central European Allies

Poland

Professional 181,000 108,800 113,900 129,100 125,100 123,600 120,500 101,400 100,150 99,050 79,100

Conscript 231,000 204,000 191,100 167,400 162,400 160,000 158,100 147,100 141,600 141,600 126,128

Total 412,000 312,800 305,000 296,500 287,500 283,600 278,600 248,500 241,750 240,650 205,228

Hungary

Professional 30,500 29,700 28,700 22,900 22,000 22,100 21,911 24,099 21,346 20,700 19,800

Conscript 91,900 81,000 65,300 51,100 52,340 51,560 46,350 37,595 34,385 33,000 32,400

Total 122,400 110,700 94,000 74,000 74,340 73,660 68,261 61,694 55,731 53,700 52,200

Czech Republica

Professional 38,049 33,282 30,413 27,800 25,821 25,821 26,163

Conscript 68,630 54,326 43,178 38,000 32,693 31,191 34,717

Total 106,679 87,608 73,591 65,800 58,514 57,012 60,880

Comparable NATO Allies

Spain

Professional 103,500 75,000 73,600 99,400 58,900 67,200 73,300 80,000 78,000 94,250 83,800

Conscript 206,000 210,000 200,900 158,000 158,100 133,500 133,200 126,000 128,800 99,700 102,700

Total 309,500 285,000 274,500 257,400 217,000 200,700 206,500 206,000 206,800 193,950 186,500

Portugal

Professional 29,100 28,100 24,900 28,500 25,500 37,100 37,100 36,600 36,600 42,060 43,230

Conscript 44,800 47,200 43,100 33,300 32,800 17,600 17,600 17,600 17,600 11,540 6,470

Total 73,900 75,300 68,000 61,800 58,300 54,700 54,700 54,200 54,200 53,600 49,700

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the

International Institute for Strategic Studies.

a. The Czech Republic was established on January 1, 1993, when Czechoslovakia divided into Slovakia and the Czech

Republic.

Czech Republic began to recover from the recession in the last half of 1999, but

economic growth is projected to be only 1.5 percent in 2000.

In contrast to the situation in Poland, there is very little public support for

increasing defense spending to carry out the obligations of NATO membership. As

in Hungary, the armed forces have historically been held in low regard. The ex-
CHAPTER II DEFENSE BUDGETS 11

periences of 1938, when neither Czechoslovakia’s military nor its allies prevented

Germany from dismembering the country, and 1968, when the Soviet Army crushed

liberalization with what many Czechs see as the complicity of the Czech military,

led to skepticism about the utility of the armed forces and about alliances for Czech

security. As a result, there is little interest in defense matters in the Czech

parliament and no strong domestic pressure to increase defense spending.

NEW ALLIES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO RECENT NATO MISSIONS

Total amounts spent on defense give some indication of the resources each of the

new allies is able to bring to the alliance. But those amounts do not indicate how

willing and able each is to actually place its troops in harm’s way for the common

defense. A gauge of this level of commitment is the contribution each of the new

allies is making to NATO’s ongoing missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. That

contribution is an important measure because future NATO operations are likely to

be conducted by “coalitions of the willing.”

Despite the difficulties that the new allies face in adjusting to the

requirements of NATO membership, all three are contributing to the missions in the

Balkans by participating in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Bosnia Stabilization

Force (SFOR). In general, the three new allies are contributing about the same

number of troops to those missions as are long-standing NATO allies of similar size

in terms of population and active-duty forces.

Poland, with a population of nearly 39 million and active-duty forces of

200,000, is comparable with Spain, which has a population of 40 million and an

active-duty military of 186,000. The Czech Republic and Hungary are comparable

with Portugal. All three countries have populations of approximately 10 million

and active-duty forces of about 50,000 (see Table 4).

The total number of troops from each of the participants in the KFOR

mission varies from month to month depending on rotations but is about 785 for

Poland (one air-assault battalion), 175 for the Czech Republic (one reconnaissance

company), and 325 for Hungary (one guard and security battalion). By comparison,

Spain averages about 960 personnel and Portugal about 325 (see Figure 2).

Although the Czech Republic’s contribution seems less than its comparable allies’,

the Czech army also supplied a field hospital with 98 personnel for humanitarian

relief operations in Albania until late 1999. In terms of the quality of personnel,

General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, notes that all

three new allies have contributed highly disciplined forces that are capable of per-
12 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

2. Interview with General Wesley Clark, June 1, 2000.

Poland Hungary Czech Republic Spain Portugal

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

Number

FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL FROM SELECT COUNTRIES ASSIGNED TO

NATO'S KOSOVO FORCE MISSION IN 1999

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense.

forming their mission and are “man for man as effective as those from other NATO

countries.”2

The new allies’ contributions to the SFOR mission present a more mixed

picture. As of June 28, 2000, Hungary had a total of 200 personnel assigned to the

SFOR mission; the Czech Republic had 500. Both sets of forces are comparable to

the Portuguese contingent of 350. Poland had a total of 250 personnel in Bosnia,

far fewer than Spain’s contribution of 1,350. It is important to note, however, that

these totals are a snapshot and may not represent the average number of personnel

over a longer period.

Another measure of contributions to the alliance is the degree of involvement

in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The PfP program establishes

associations and exercises between NATO and countries that seek to join the

alliance. As the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech experiences demonstrate, the

program is an important part of bringing countries that want to become NATO

members up to an adequate level of proficiency. All three new allies have remained

active in the PfP program since joining the alliance. Poland has hosted three

exercises, Hungary has hosted one, and the Czech Republic has hosted two. In

addition, the Czech Republic has included Slovakian troops in its exercises.
CHAPTER II DEFENSE BUDGETS 13

The new allies also participate in other cooperative ventures within NATO.

Poland is a member of the Multinational Corps-Northeast in conjunction with

Germany and Denmark. In addition to hosting the Corps headquarters, Poland

contributes a 17,650-strong mechanized division. Poland also participates both in a

Polish-Lithuanian battalion and in a Polish-Ukrainian battalion. The Czech

Republic does not participate in any such formal alliances within NATO but

recently established a joint commission with Poland to increase cooperation

between the countries’ defense industries. In addition to coordinating

modernization programs, the joint commission aims to expand its membership to

include Lithuania and Slovakia to help them develop NATO-compatible militaries.

Hungary also does not have any formal alliances within NATO but maintains close

military relations with Poland and the Czech Republic.

In sum, the new allies are actively participating in NATO’s ongoing

missions and are working to expand the alliance. Although their contributions in

personnel and materiel to the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are small, they are

generally comparable to those of similarly sized NATO allies.

1. Much of this information is based on interviews with U.S. scholars and defense analysts who work

with the militaries of the three countries or have studied them in depth, both for the U.S. government

and independently. Particularly helpful were Jeffrey Simon, of the Institute for National Strategic

Studies at the National Defense University (NDU); Thomas S. Szayna, of the RAND Corporation;

Daniel N. Nelson, of the consulting firm Global Concepts; Paul Gallis, Julie Kim, and Carl Ek, of the

Congressional Research Service; Andrew Michta, of Rhodes College; and Marybeth Ulrich, of the

Army War College. In addition, the defense attaché offices at the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech

embassies in Washington, D.C., provided information and insight into their countries’ defense plans.

The U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Mission to NATO also provided information about the

programs being funded out of the alliance’s common budgets. Few publications on this topic have

come out since March 1999, when the three countries acceded to NATO, and several of the experts

consulted provided copies of unpublished manuscripts and forthcoming publications for reference in

this paper. CBO particularly relied on Jeffrey Simon, “The New NATO Members: Will They

Contribute?” NDU Strategic Forum, April 1999, and Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe:

A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996); Lorenzo Forcieri, “The

Newcomers: Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary Entering NATO,” (report for the NATO

Parliamentary Assembly, April 1999); Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas S. Szayna, “NATO’s

Metamorphosis and Its New Members,” Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 1998; and David

M. Glantz, “Military Training and Education Challenges in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary,”

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, September 1998. In addition, the authors consulted classified

U.S. and NATO documents, but all information in this chapter comes from open sources.

CHAPTER III

RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION

For the new Central European allies, integration into NATO entails far more than

increasing defense budgets. The new allies need to overcome shortfalls in

personnel and training, which experts attribute to the legacy of the Warsaw Pact era,

as discussed in Chapter I. This chapter examines the progress that each of the three

new allies is making toward being able to operate alongside the other NATO allies.1

Some analysts note that the overall mentality of officers must change to

emphasize and reward initiative and leadership. Top-heavy militaries laden with

colonels and short on lieutenants need to lose deadweight at the top and be infused

with young officers eager to adapt to new ways of thinking.

Improved training is also vital to the successful integration of Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Language instruction is a key part of

the training necessary for interoperability between the new allies’ militaries and other

NATO militaries. Because English is the main working language of the alliance, all

three of the new allies need to bring more of their officers’ English skills up to a

functional level to enable joint operations. Training must also include field exercises
16 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

that integrate larger units so they can operate smoothly with their support elements.

In addition, pilots must fly enough hours to maintain their proficiency.

Moreover, the new allies face steep modernization costs to replace obsolete

or inadequate equipment. While they cannot completely avoid this expenditure,

NATO has stated that the purchase of big-ticket items can be deferred for several

years while the new allies focus on procurement deemed more essential to

integration. Such procurement includes field radios, networked computers,

navigation aids, and “identify friend or foe” (IFF) devices for aircraft. Finally,

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic must have the facilities to support allied

forces should they be deployed to their territories during a crisis.

MILITARY RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION IN POLAND

Poland is undertaking an across-the-board restructuring of its armed forces. In July

1999, the government approved a set of regulations including a reorganization of

the general staff along the lines of the U.S. Joint Staff, and the overall size of the

military is projected to fall from 200,400 in 2000 to 180,000 in 2003. Currently, 47

percent of the professional force is made up of officers, two-thirds of whom hold

ranks of major or higher. Poland intends to reduce the proportion of officers in the

career contingent to 25 to 30 percent by 2003 and have fewer than a third of those

be majors or higher-ranking officers. The noncommissioned officer corps is to be

roughly doubled as a share of the professional force from its current 22 percent.

Although Poland is significantly scaling back its forces, it has pledged

30,000 troops to NATO missions; four brigades are earmarked for the immediate

and rapid reaction forces, including two airborne battalions that have served with

NATO forces in Bosnia. Two divisions are assigned to NATO’s main defense

forces, which are kept at lower readiness than the reaction forces, in accord with

NATO’s strategic concept.

Poland is also undertaking personnel and training reforms. While the

country is retaining the draft, it is reducing the term of conscription from 18 to 12

months. It is standardizing its tactical and physical training with that of other

NATO member countries. Toward that end, Polish officers are attending foreign

military institutions to learn about NATO procedures, and the number of officers

with English language skills is slated to increase from the approximately 7,000

officers with some proficiency in 1999.

Field training, however, shows some weakness. According to Polish defense

officials, most military exercises are conducted at the battalion level and in garrison

rather than in the field. Few units are able to exercise at the brigade level, although

such training is needed to ensure coordination with support elements. In addition,
CHAPTER III RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 17

cost considerations limit training time. Polish air force pilots, for example, fly less

than 60 hours a year on average, about a third of what U.S. military pilots fly.

According to the 15-year plan, modernization will cost Poland about $7.76

billion through 2012, and $1.26 billion of that is to be spent on improvements to

promote interoperability. For 2000, about $390 million was budgeted for

integration activities and $360 million for modernization (the latter of which

includes a $30 million U.S. loan for foreign military sales). Poland’s modernization

plan emphasizes the acquisition of new or upgraded command, control, and

communications (C3

) systems, air defense, antitank systems, helicopters, and

armored vehicles (particularly armored personnel carriers). Poland expects to retain

its 772 T-72 and 116 PT-91 tanks. Facilities for secure communications with

NATO headquarters and allied capitals already have been built. Since the mid1990s, Polish officials have expressed their desire to also purchase 100 to 150

fighters comparable with the F-16, but they lack the funding.

MILITARY RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION IN HUNGARY

American and British advisers are working with the Hungarian military to rewrite

its doctrine along Western models to harmonize its plans and strategy with NATO’s

goals. Hungary plans to cut its force size from 54,000 today to 38,000 in 2003, and

like the other new allies, Hungary is working to eliminate its surplus of senior

officers and to develop a junior officer and noncommissioned officer corps with

leadership skills. The general staff has been reorganized as a U.S.-style joint staff,

with six directorates reporting to a chief who is subordinate to the civilian defense

minister.

Hungary’s ground contribution to NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force (IRF)

consists of a combat battalion and an intelligence company, as well as two

antiaircraft platoons and a military police unit. All eight of its operational MiG-29s

are part of the IRF. Hungary has pledged an infantry brigade to the Allied Rapid

Reaction Corps, and the Hungarian contribution to NATO’s main defense forces

consists of one tank brigade and five infantry brigades, plus additional antiaircraft,

artillery, engineering, and support units. In addition, the Hungarian air base at

Tászár has been used by U.S. forces supporting the Bosnian peace mission since

late 1995, an experience that has helped the Hungarian military work with other

allies’ militaries and develop the support capability needed to sustain allied

reinforcements in case of crisis.

Hungarian defense officials admit that the target force goals they agreed to

with NATO prior to joining the alliance will be difficult to reach. (Those goals,

outlining the contribution to the alliance that each member intends to make, are

classified by NATO.) One defense official noted that Hungary promised to meet 14
18 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

of its initial 48 goals by its acceptance in March 1999 but as of June 2000 had

completed only six and was working on 40 others. Hungary now plans to meet only

23 of the goals by 2003, and the government is reviewing its initial proposal. “The

reason is not our commitment; the reason is money,” that official said, a view

shared by outside observers who credit the Hungarian military for putting forth a

vigorous reform program but criticize the government for failing to provide

sufficient funding to carry it out.

While the Hungarians are interested in building professional armed forces

and eliminating conscription, some analysts believe that Hungary cannot field

substantial forces with a solely professional military. In addition to the manpower

issue, many analysts believe conscription is critical to forging a positive connection

between Hungarian society and the military. Others, however, conclude that

Hungary would be better off putting its limited defense resources into a smaller,

more capable military, with an emphasis on support specialties such as combat

engineering and mine clearing. They argue that the current nine-month term of

conscription is far too short to adequately train soldiers.

Several analysts give Hungary high marks for reforming its organizational

structure, but they are less sanguine about the level of training. One expert said, “If

you put a Hungarian unit in the field, they’re going to be incapable.” One report

indicates that conscripts, who make up 60 percent of the personnel, are often idle.

Hungarian defense officials themselves say that the training of pilots is inadequate

because of the limited flying hours imposed by a lack of funding. However, since

1998 Hungary has concentrated training so that some pilots will accumulate 100

hours of flight time per year. As a result, 30 pilots are capable of flying NATO

missions.

Hungarian officials have discussed a $1.5 billion program to purchase 30

fighter aircraft, although that sum is roughly double the entire defense budget for

1999. Most of the military’s newer equipment has come from Russia as repayment

for Soviet-era debts, including its MiG-29 fighters and 356 BTR-80 armored

personnel carriers, with more on the way. Hungary also has received 100 T-72

tanks from Belarus under a similar barter arrangement. The major hardware

procured in 1999 was air-defense missiles, budgeted at $30 million. Hungary has

budgeted $3 million for integration-related activities, such as acquiring NATOcompatible communications equipment. Hungary also plans to replace 16,000

vehicles, most of the vehicle fleet, at a cost of $240 million through 2003.
CHAPTER III RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 19

MILITARY RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION

IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech officials say that 78 percent of their 60,000-strong military is being made

available for NATO missions, including 14 percent that will participate in the

alliance’s immediate and rapid reaction forces. The Czech Republic is likely to

meet its pledge to make a combat brigade available to the Rapid Reaction Corps by

2002. While one light airborne infantry battalion is considered ready today, the

remainder of the Czech 4th Brigade is not because of equipment shortfalls and

difficulties in attracting enough high-quality officers.

Despite those deficiencies, the Czechs have a reconnaissance company

operating with the NATO mission in Kosovo and could send up to a battalion. The

Czech military also has several units that have gained a reputation for their work in

defending against weapons of mass destruction, and these units are well-prepared to

operate alongside other NATO member countries because of past participation in

joint exercises and operations. A nuclear-biological-chemical defense company

already is assigned to NATO’s Immediate Reaction Force.

Efforts continue to reform the personnel structure but face serious problems.

“The need for personnel reforms has been there from the beginning,” one scholar

notes, “but the reforms never materialize. The legislation never passes. Junior

officers tell me that if it’s not fixed soon, they’re going to leave.” In essence, the

top-heavy officer corps blocks the career path of Western-trained junior officers.

The first Czech to graduate from West Point, for example, resigned from the

military in 1997 after only five months; of the 75 Czech officers who have spent a

significant amount of time training overseas, he was the 11th to resign. The Czech

Republic recognizes the need for a larger noncommissioned officer corps, which

currently stands at about 2,000, and plans to increase it to 10,000 by 2003.

Conscripts make up nearly half of the military, a proportion expected to drop only

to 40 percent by 2003.

Experts also point out that training remains a problem. Most Czech ground

forces do not conduct training in units larger than companies, which prevents

integrated exercises with support elements. Furthermore, the training of pilots

remains well below Western standards. While the Czech air force has increased its

training recently, low levels of flight hours combined with aging aircraft have led to

a spate of accidents. Czech ground forces have been active in training with other

NATO and Partnership for Peace countries but continue to have poor English

language skills.

Czech modernization plans suffer from a lack of expertise among responsible

civilians, both at the defense ministry and in parliament. This deficiency manifests

itself in procurement decisions that lack a coherent plan and, especially in the mid-
20 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

1990s, that were driven more by domestic political considerations and occasionally

outright corruption than by strategic considerations.

The situation has improved over the past few years, and Czech budget plans

call for procurement spending to make up 26 percent of the defense budgets over

the next six years, including $225 million in 2000. But there has been little

pressure for greater civilian integration with the defense ministry from the left-ofcenter government of Prime Minister Miloš Zeman, and a national security concept

paper released by the ministry in May 1999 was derided by Western analysts for its

lack of detail.

The Czech Republic currently has the least capable air force of the three

new members. It has 40 substandard MiG-21 fighter planes in the supersonic class,

which are expected to be scrapped in 2003. However, Czech officials plan to spend

$1 billion to purchase 72 Czech-made L-159 attack planes. The air force took

delivery of the first two aircraft in April 2000 and expects to receive 19 more by the

end of 2000. The Czech government plans to spend an additional $1.6 billion for as

many as 36 Western fighters, but the size of its defense budgets makes this a longterm proposition at best. Other planned purchases, which are more affordable,

include radars, night-vision devices, and “smart” munitions. Upgrades are planned

for the Czechs’ existing T-72 tanks, Mi-24 helicopters, and communications

systems.

According to the Czech military, before the country’s acceptance into

NATO, it implemented 14 target force goals for NATO (of the 52 that it plans to

fulfill in total), most aiming to improve the interoperability of communications

equipment, strengthen procedures, and increase the country’s ability to host allied

troops and equipment. The Czechs get good marks from defense experts in

working with NATO on the issues of command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence (C4

I). They are integrated into the NATO air-defense

system and have begun to equip planes with IFF equipment. Czech airfields,

however, are not able to accept reinforcements from NATO armies because the

runways are not long enough and fuel stores are inadequate.

NATO-FUNDED COMMON CAPABILITIES

Most of the costs of defending the new allies will be paid by the countries

themselves. Restructuring and modernization costs must be paid out of national

defense budgets, and each country’s contribution to the alliance will be determined

in large part by how it executes its national defense program. However, there are

also common costs of enlarging the alliance that NATO has agreed to bear

collectively. The United States pays about one-fourth of these costs (see Table 5).
CHAPTER III RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 21

TABLE 5. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO’S COMMON BUDGETS IN 1999

(In millions of 1999 U.S. dollars)

NSIP Military Civil

Percentage

of Total

Belgium 21.1 15.5 4.4 3.7

Canada 16.1 29.0 8.6 4.8

Czech Republic 0.2 3.8 1.4 0.5

Denmark 16.9 9.2 2.4 2.6

France 34.3 29.3 24.7 7.9

Germany 108.0 85.5 25.0 19.6

Greece 4.2 2.1 0.6 0.6

Hungary 0.1 2.7 1.0 0.3

Iceland 0 0.2 0.1 0

Italy 36.1 32.9 9.3 7.0

Luxembourg 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1

Netherlands 25.0 15.5 4.4 4.0

Norway 13.2 6.4 1.8 1.9

Poland 0.5 10.3 4.0 1.3

Portugal 1.5 3.5 1.0 0.5

Spain 6.5 19.5 5.6 2.8

Turkey 4.6 8.8 2.6 1.4

United Kingdom 53.6 91.3 27.9 15.5

United States 115.2 129.7 36.2 25.2

Total 458.0 495.7 161.1 100.0

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense.

NOTE: NSIP = NATO Security Investment Program.

In February 1998, the Department of Defense submitted to the Congress a

report on the military requirements and costs of enlarging NATO. That report

endorsed the findings of NATO’s own November 1997 classified study on the

resource implications of enlargement. The NATO study estimated that programs to

upgrade command and control, air defense, reception facilities, and training areas

would cost the alliance about $1.5 billion over the 10 years from 1999 through

2008. Of those costs, about $1.3 billion are for infrastructure improvements that

are to be financed by the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP).

By agreement, the U.S. share of NSIP costs is 22.33 percent. Therefore, the

U.S. share of the common costs of enlarging the alliance will be about $400 million

over 10 years. The Congress appropriates funding for the NSIP out of the Military

Construction Appropriations Act. The Clinton Administration, in its fiscal year

2001 budget, identified the incremental cost of appropriations for enlargement as $5
22 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

million in fiscal year 2000 and $12 million in fiscal year 2001. DoD estimates that

enlargement will cost this country $32 million in fiscal year 2002.

In addition, under its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International

Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, for fiscal year 2001 the State

Department has requested $10.7 million in aid for the Czech Republic, the same

amount for Hungary, and $14 million for Poland. The Congress earmarked a total

of $25 million in IMET and FMF assistance for the three countries in fiscal year

2000 and $30 million in fiscal year 1999. In fiscal year 1998, those countries

received $59.3 million in IMET and FMF money. While aid under these programs

is appropriated by the Congress and is not a formal obligation brought on by

enlarging NATO, the money is used for improvements that help the Central

European allies operate with other NATO countries.

The programs that NATO plans to implement to integrate the three new

members fall into four broad categories: command-and-control systems (C2

), an

integrated air defense, reception facilities for reinforcements, and training.

Command-and-Control Systems

NATO extended its C2 network into the three countries to link the governments and

military headquarters of the Central European allies to NATO headquarters and

other allied capitals. These links include secure fiber-optic cables from Poland and

the Czech Republic to a NATO hub in Germany and a secure satellite connection

for Hungary, which does not border any other NATO country. The establishment of

secure communications links was divided into two phases.

During the first phase, before the Central European countries joined NATO

in March 1999, communications links were put in place to provide a basic

capability. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the alliance’s top decision-making

body, approved funding in February 1999 to build on this basic capability and fully

integrate the Central European allies into NATO’s C2

 systems. The alliance

estimates infrastructure costs for the C2

 program at $51 million over 10 years and

operations and maintenance costs at $79 million over that same period. The U.S.

share of those 10-year costs is $11.4 million in infrastructure costs and $18.3

million in operating costs.

An Integrated Air Defense

Basic communications links established between each country’s air-defense

operations center and the alliance’s system have allowed the new allies to minimally

integrate operation with NATO’s Integrated Air Defense System. Further phases of
CHAPTER III RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 23

improvements will deepen the integration of the air-defense system, helping the

alliance gain a complete picture of the skies over the enlarged NATO territory.

NATO is beginning to implement an alliance-wide Air Command and

Control System that ultimately will include 15 of the 19 members (all but the

United States, Canada, Iceland, and Luxembourg). According to press reports, the

system, which ultimately could cost as much as $8 billion, will allow NATO to

combine air-defense data with targeting information. A NATO official said that

this program will absorb half of the alliance’s infrastructure budget over the next

decade alone—roughly $4 billion—with individual members paying the remaining

half of the cost of systems on their territories.

NATO estimates that the NSIP will provide $560 million for all costs

related to integrating the three new allies into the NATO air-defense system and

another $21 million over 10 years for air-defense operations in the three countries.

The proposed capabilities for air defense have been approved by the North Atlantic

Council. The U.S. share would be $125 million of the infrastructure costs and $4.9

million of the operating costs.

Reception Facilities for Reinforcements

NATO has identified infrastructure improvements necessary to enable alliance

members to reinforce the new allies during a crisis. Most of these improvements

are at air bases in the three countries, such as lengthening runways and constructing

reception areas, which will allow the countries to accommodate other allies’

aircraft. Those improvements also will allow the new allies to serve as intermediate

points or staging areas for NATO forces. NATO already has used Hungarian

airfields at Tászár and outside of Budapest to conduct operations in Bosnia and

Kosovo; improvements at Tászár were funded as part of the Bosnia mission. Polish

officials say that air bases near Pozna and Malbork are targeted for improvements.

More limited improvements are planned at the Polish ports of Gdynia and

2winouj3cie and at land facilities in all three countries. The alliance expects to use

existing road and rail links to provide reinforcements for ground forces and plans

only modest improvements at railyards. Improvements to Polish seaports include

the installation of equipment such as compatible water pipe connectors and

electrical sockets so that NATO ships can be unloaded and resupplied there.

NATO estimates that improvements to reception facilities will cost $694

million over 10 years and another $5 million in operating costs over the same

period. The U.S. share will be $155 million of the infrastructure costs and $1.2

million of the operating costs. So far, $400 million has been approved by the NAC

for improvements at bases in the three countries.
24 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000

Training and Exercises

To ensure that Polish, Hungarian, and Czech forces are capable of operating with

the other allies, they will have to conduct training exercises together. Although

NATO found that training facilities in the Central European countries were

generally adequate for this purpose, it estimated that it would provide $6 million for

infrastructure improvements and $36 million in operating costs over the period

from 1999 through 2008 to pay for transporting forces from other allies to exercises

in the Central European countries. No funding for training and exercises has yet

been approved. If those plans are carried out, the U.S. share would be $1.3 million

for the infrastructure costs and $8.3 million for the operating costs.

CONCLUSIONS

Of the three new allies, Poland has made the greatest progress toward integrating its

military into NATO, according to analysts who study all three countries. Those

experts point to Poland’s larger population and GDP, 15-year modernization plan,

and strong political support for the alliance in concluding that the country is likely

to contribute significantly to European security. Although Poland faces challenges

in modernizing its forces, some observers already compare the state of the Polish

military favorably with those of longtime NATO members Greece and Turkey.

The Czech Republic and Hungary are generally seen as being able to make

smaller contributions to the alliance than Poland, smaller than even their relative

size would suggest. Both countries lack the level of broad societal support for the

military that is found in Poland. Comparing the Czech Republic and Hungary,

some experts point to the former’s larger defense budget, specialized units, and

superior communications system as indicators that it will be able to make a larger

contribution to NATO forces than the latter. Potential pitfalls exist for the Czech

Republic, though, particularly the challenge of maintaining government support for

defense spending and a potential “brain drain,” as talented young officers leave for

more lucrative jobs in the private sector.

Some analysts cite Hungary’s relatively low defense budgets, outmoded

equipment, and the lack of a political commitment to improve the situation as

indicators that Hungary may not shoulder a proportional share of the burdens of

membership in NATO. The Hungarian army is limited in its capabilities, and units

exhibit low readiness levels. However, Hungary’s geographic location allows the

alliance to project stability into the most volatile part of Europe, and Hungary has

played an active role in the Bosnia and Kosovo operations as a host nation

supporting NATO’s deployments and logistics.
CHAPTER III RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 25

Perhaps the most concrete indicator of how the new allies will contribute to

future NATO operations is the degree to which they participate in existing

operations. All three of the new allies are making roughly proportional

contributions to the ongoing missions in Bosnia and Kosovo compared with other

long-standing NATO members with populations of similar size. Poland has

approximately the same number of troops in Kosovo as Spain has there. Hungary

and the Czech Republic are each contributing about the same number of personnel

as Portugal. The new allies are also taking on the burdens of further expanding the

alliance’s influence by participating in the Partnership for Peace and other

cooperative ventures with countries hoping to join the alliance.

APPENDIX

INFORMATION ABOUT DATA SOURCES

Data on defense spending, active-duty personnel, and population for this paper

came from several sources. Below is a description of those sources and the

methodologies used to compile the information.

Table 1. Projections of future defense spending as a share of the gross

domestic product (GDP) for Hungary and the Czech Republic are based on

information provided by Hungarian and Czech defense officials and reflect

spending pledges made to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by the

respective governments. Polish officials estimate that annual defense spending

through 2003 will be between 2.1 and 2.4 percent of GDP; the figures in the table

were determined by using the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) estimates of

future spending and dividing them by estimates of GDP based on projections by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the

Economist Intelligence Unit. Figures for the U.S. and NATO averages were

derived from data provided by DoD and the OECD.

Table 2. Data on historical defense spending as a share of GDP for Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic are from the Institute for National Strategic

Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. The figures for historical

defense spending as a share of GDP for the United States and NATO averages are

from NATO headquarters.

Table 3. Information on historical defense spending is from NATO headquarters and the Congressional Research Service. Projected spending for the Czech

Republic and Hungary was estimated from data provided by the embassies of the

Czech Republic and Hungary, the OECD, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.

Poland’s projected defense totals were estimated by DoD.

Table 4. Armed forces totals are from INSS for the Czech Republic and

Hungary. Poland’s total active-duty figures are from The Military Balance, a

publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 

Table 5. Data on the contributions to common budgets are from the DoD

publication Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, March 2000.