China’s Space and Counterspace 

Capabilities and Activities

Prepared for:

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

Prepared By:

Mark Stokes, Gabriel Alvarado, Emily Weinstein, and Ian Easton

March 30, 2020

Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is 

intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its 

ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as 

mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an 

endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed 

in this commissioned research report. 
1

Table of Contents

KEY FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................ 3

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................... 4

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 5

SECTION ONE: Drivers for Current and Future PLA Space/Counterspace Capabilities........ 8

Space-Related Policy Statements........................................................................................................... 9

Strategic Drivers and Doctrine ............................................................................................................ 13

General Trends since the Late 1990s .................................................................................................. 15

Space Support for Warfighting Campaigns....................................................................................... 16

Space, Distant Operations, and Outlook for the Future ................................................................... 19

SECTION TWO: PLA Space/Counterspace Infrastructure: The Role of the PLA Strategic 

Support Force............................................................................................................................... 21

Space Systems Department and Subordinate Base Commands....................................................... 23

Space Launch Operations.................................................................................................................... 24

Space Situational Awareness and Control.......................................................................................... 26

ISR, Navigation, Communications, and Meteorological/Hydrological Capabilities ...................... 28

Space-Based ISR ................................................................................................................................................ 28

Survey, Mapping, and Navigation...................................................................................................................... 33

Satellite Communications and Data Relay ......................................................................................................... 35

Meteorology, Oceanography, and Space Weather ............................................................................................. 36

Deep Space Operations......................................................................................................................... 37

Current and Future Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Counterspace Operations....................................... 39

Training ................................................................................................................................................. 41

SECTION THREE: Space/Counterspace Force Modernization............................................... 44

Research, Development, and Acquisition System.............................................................................. 44

Space Requirements Development and Program Management....................................................... 47

Defense Industry and Space Systems Engineering ............................................................................ 48

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation .................................................................................... 48

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation.......................................................................................... 49

Launch Vehicle RD&A ...................................................................................................................................... 49

Solid-Fueled Propulsion Systems....................................................................................................................... 51

New-Generation Aerospace Flight Vehicles/Reusable Launch Vehicles .......................................................... 53

Satellite Systems RD&A .................................................................................................................................... 54

Microsatellite Programs...................................................................................................................................... 55

Counterspace RD&A.......................................................................................................................................... 57
2

SECTION FOUR: Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Policies and International Cooperation ..... 59

Military-Civil Fusion and the PRC’s Space Program....................................................................... 59

Academia and Universities’ Role in Space-Related Basic Research and RD&A............................ 64

Cooperation with U.S. Institutions ..................................................................................................................... 68

International Recruitment Programs ................................................................................................. 72

PRC Non-State-Owned Space Business.............................................................................................. 74

Financing and Investment Vehicles.................................................................................................................... 74

Non-CASC/CASIC Launch Vehicle Companies ............................................................................................... 75

Non-CASC/CASIC Satellite Companies............................................................................................................ 78

PRC Provision of Satellite Infrastructure, Launch Services Overseas............................................ 80

Beidou Achieving Global Reach ........................................................................................................................ 88

Role in Overseas Tracking Stations.................................................................................................................... 91

Leveraging Foreign Technology and Knowhow ................................................................................ 94

Role of Hong Kong-Domiciled Companies......................................................................................... 97

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................. 101

APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................ 104

ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................................. 112
3

KEY FINDINGS

The development of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC, China) civilian and military space 

programs over the last few decades has proceeded alongside the PRC’s broader rise in the 

international system. Questions regarding China’s capabilities and intentions in space are 

indubitably linked to larger geostrategic questions about China’s role in the world. Buoyed by 

recent successes and impressive advancements in space technology, China has emerged as a 

leading player in space. The implications for United States policy are numerous, and the 

capabilities China either currently possesses or is in the process of developing certainly pose a 

strategic risk to the United States’ ability to operate in the Indo-Pacific region.

Investments into space-related research and development (R&D) drive military capabilities and 

fill gaps in intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance. Space-based infrastructure is 

increasingly important for People’s Liberation Army (PLA) out-of-area operations. An advanced 

presence in space is indicative of China’s renewed status as a great power in the international 

system.

The advent of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) Space Systems Department represents 

an organizational innovation that places all major components of China’s space program under a 

unified command structure, thereby increasing efficiency and efficacy. The SSF operates a vast 

bureaucratic apparatus that manages operations and allocates a sizable R&D budget to various 

aspects of its space program, all parts that move China closer toward achieving its stated goal of 

becoming a major space power.

China’s significant investments in space and counterspace capabilities may prove threatening to 

U.S. space assets and military efficacy. China’s space infrastructure is complemented by its 

growing capacity to deny adversarial powers access to the same space assets, as evidenced by 

advancements in kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities. China’s approach to 

modernizing its space presence includes an emphasis on military-civil fusion (MCF) and the 

development of dual-use technology that buoys both military and economic growth. Should

China’s capabilities surpass those of the United States, the erosion of the U.S. military’s ability to 

contest the PLA in a potential future conflict will be at risk.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is executing a long-term strategy to exploit U.S. technology, 

talent, and capital to build up its military space and counterspace programs and advance its 

strategic interests at the expense of the United States. China’s zero-sum pursuit of space superiority 

harms U.S. economic competitiveness, weakens U.S. military advantages, and undermines 

strategic stability. In short, it represents a threat to U.S. national security. Barring significant action 

to counter China’s space-related programs and activities of concern, it is likely that this strategic 

competitor’s efforts will continue to adversely affect U.S. interests.
4

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Congress should enact new or enhance existing laws to prohibit U.S. government 

departments and agencies, national labs, universities, companies, fund managers, and 

individual investors from supporting China’s space program and activities that are

inherently military in nature.

• Congress should consider mandating and funding the production of a routinely updated, 

publicly available list of entities supporting China’s space programs and activities.

• Congress should consider mandating and funding public education to enhance general 

knowledge of China’s space programs and activities, including more targeted 

congressional hearings and the allocation of grants for think tank and university research 

programs, public conferences, public-private consultative talks, and media outreach.

• Congress should consider reviewing the budgets of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the United States’ leading aerospace university programs to ensure they

have the education funding necessary to support young and emerging scientists and 

technology innovators.

• Congress should consider how funding the establishment of a potential new U.S. Space 

Force may better enable the military to organize, train, and equip future leaders needed to 

keep the United States competitive with China’s growing military space enterprise.

• Congress should pass legislation that incentivizes science, technology, engineering, and 

mathematics-focused high-skilled labor immigration from China (as well as other 

countries), including special visas earmarked for these students and a public-private effort 

to find them work.

• Congress should direct the U.S. Department of Defense to produce an annual unclassified

report on PLA space/counterspace developments and other major players in space security. 

This report should assess developments, setbacks, and efficacy of these powers’ space 

programs. The report should also outline methodologies to assess the source of sub-kinetic 

attacks on U.S. space assets and potential military responses. In addition, it should assess 

the vulnerabilities of U.S. space/counterspace systems and how best to improve U.S. space 

systems’ survivability in the event of disruption or conflict. 

• Congress should direct the U.S. Department of Education to produce an annual report on 

the proportion of doctoral graduates in space-related fields who are from China and other 

foreign countries and how many return home upon graduation. This information would be 

geared toward understanding how best to attract and retain foreign talent as well as how 

many students remain within the United States upon graduation.
5

INTRODUCTION

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerges as a global space power, the international 

economic and security implications of its strategic modernization are mounting. Growing 

investments in space and counterspace have raised questions concerning Beijing’s capabilities and 

intentions in space. Full of confidence in the wake of success in its lunar exploration and crewed

space programs, the PRC is emerging as a leading space player. What are the implications of 

China’s growing investment in military space technology for the United States? What is the 

potential to achieve disruptive breakthroughs, and what are the implications for the United States’

ability to operate in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond? What is known about China’s space and 

counterspace strategy and doctrine, and what organizational and bureaucratic dynamics within 

China help shape potential success or failure? How might Chinese space assets be employed in 

future joint military operations? How have the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and civilian 

counterparts leveraged foreign technology to advance China’s competitive position in space?

Managed by a diverse set of military and civilian organizations, Chinese political authorities view 

space power as one element of a broader international competition in comprehensive power and 

science and technology (S&T). With the preservation of its monopoly on power as an overriding 

goal, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains its legitimacy in part through achievements 

in space. Adopting an integrated civilian and military perspective in its plans and programs, the 

PRC’s investment in space technology supports economic development and advances national 

defense modernization. Successes in space signify the emergence of the PRC as a world power. 

The PRC’s programmatic successes in space are significant. Notable achievements include crewed

space platforms, reliable space launch vehicles and satellites, and landing a lunar probe on the far 

side of the moon. China has made substantial progress in developing peaceful and practical uses 

of space technology. In addition to supplying cost-effective international commercial launch 

services, the PRC’s space program supports economic development and humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief (HADR). At the same time, the space program facilitates the advancement of a 

modern, high-technology military force.

While the State Council produced space policy white papers in 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2016, 

China’s space ambitions are inherently dual-use in nature. Freedom of action in space offers the 

PLA potential military advantages on land, at sea, and in the air.1 In the past, PLA space and 

1 For examples of U.S. overviews of China’s space modernization, see Dean Cheng, “Prospects for China’s Military 

Space Efforts,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai , and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond The Strait: PLA Missions Other 

than Taiwan, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009, 211–252. 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub910.pdf; Gregory Kulacki, “A Space Race with China,” 

Harvard Asia Pacific, 12–15; Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments 

and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review 62:4 (Autumn 2009): 87–115; Andrew S. Erickson, “Eyes in the 

Sky,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 136:4 (April 2010): 36–41; Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey G. Lewis, “A Place 
6

counterspace programs did not appear integrated from an organizational, operational planning, or 

acquisition perspective. This has changed because the effects of the ongoing reform and 

reorganization are now bearing fruit. The PLA’s capacity for space and counterspace operations 

will advance significantly with the consolidation of research, development, and acquisition 

(RD&A); training; and operations under a single integrated command. Defense industrial 

development of key space technologies over the next 15 years is likely to provide a further boost 

to the PLA’s operational capabilities. Such advances will erode traditional advantages the United 

States has enjoyed in space.

A Taiwan contingency is the main strategic direction driving PLA force modernization. From the 

perspective of the PLA, success in such a scenario requires a credible ability to deter, delay, or 

deny possible intervention of U.S. forces in a cross-Strait conflict. Space assets enable extendedrange precision strike operations intended to deny the United States access to or an ability to 

operate within a contentious area in the Indo-Pacific region. 2 U.S. military experts tout 

sophisticated conventional ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles as an effective means of 

suppressing regional air defenses and military operations from airbases and carriers at sea. The 

PLA’s ability to complicate U.S. access to space assets is likely to grow over the next ten to 15 

years.

This report examines China’s national and military space program. The first section addresses 

strategic, doctrinal, and organizational drivers behind China’s civil and military space programs. 

The report then details the role of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in PLA space 

systems acquisition, transporting payloads, and maintaining space systems in orbit. The report also

outlines the role of the PLASSF in developing space requirements and, to some extent, leveraging 

space assets for integrated joint operations. The discussion then turns to China’s space research

for One’s Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956–2003,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2009.

http://www.amacad.org/publications/spaceChina.pdf; Kevin Pollpeter, “The Chinese Vision of Space Military 

Operations,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army, James Mulvenon and David Finklestein, eds., CNA Corporation, December 2005, 329–

369. http://www.defensegroupinc.com/cira/pdf/doctrinebook_ch9.pdf; Larry M. Wortzel, “The Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging United States-China Military Competition, “ American Enterprise 

Institute, 2007. http://www.aei.org/paper/26977; Michael P. Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s Anti-Satellite 

and Space Warfare Programs, Policies, and Doctrines,” Report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, January 19, 2007. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2007/FINAL_REPORT_1-19-

2007_REVISED_BY_MPP.pdf; Alanna Krolikowski, “China’s Civil and Commercial Space Activities and their 

Implications,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on the 

Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs, May 11, 2011.

http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/11_05_11_krolikowski_testimony.pdf; Dean Cheng, “China’s Space Program: 

Civilian, Commercial, and Military Aspects,” CNA Corporation Conference Report, May 2006; Phillip C. Saunders, 

“China's Future in Space: Implications for U.S. Security,” Ad Astra (Spring 2005): 21–23.

http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html; Joan Johnson-Freese, “China’s Space Ambitions,”

IFRI Proliferation Paper, Summer 2007. www.ifri.org/downloads/China_Space_Johnson_Freese.pdf. 2 Wayne A. Ulman, “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities,” testimony 

before the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Emergent Military 

Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities, May 20, 2010.

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/5.20.10Ulman.pdf.
7

and development (R&D) and industrial base and an overview of selected national and military 

programs. Finally, the report addresses the relevance of China’s military-civilian fusion policies 

and international space cooperation. All Chinese-language sources listed have been translated for 

the purposes of this analysis.
8

SECTION ONE

DRIVERS FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE PLA 

SPACE/COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES

Authoritative Chinese government documents and policy statements indicate that the CCP views 

space as a domain of strategic competition.3 The CCP considers itself to be in a space race with 

the United States—a race it intends to win.

4 To that end, the CCP is investing heavily across a 

broad range of programs that will expand its space capabilities and advance its associated political, 

economic, scientific, technological, and military objectives. 

As China has become a space power, it has developed a number of weapons systems targeting 

other countries' space capabilities. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), China is 

developing multiple counterspace capabilities intended to degrade and deny a potential enemy’s 

use of space. China’s counterspace capabilities include directed-energy weapons, satellite jammers, 

and antisatellite (ASAT) missiles.5 China’s current programs of record include a crewed space 

station operated by the PLA and dual-use space systems capable of rendezvous and proximity 

operations.6

The CCP conducts an active propaganda and deception campaign to conceal the drivers of its space 

program, capabilities, and operations. China’s latest white paper on space activities, released in 

2016, omitted any mention of the military and state security aspects of its space program.7 The 

PRC’s state media outlets routinely obscure the missions of military intelligence payloads, often 

3 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 2019, 19.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. See also: Ministry of Science and Technology, 

Notice Regarding the Release of “The 13th Five-Year Action Plan for the Development of Military-Civil Fusion in 

Science and Technology” (关于印发‘十三五科技军民融合发展专项规划’的通知), April 12, 2017. 

http://kyy.nuaa.edu.cn/2018/0109/c5794a96521/page.htm; PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and 

Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan (‘十三五’国家科技创新规划)July 28, 2016.

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-08/08/content_5098072.htm. 4 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 2019, 19. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. See also: Ministry of Science and Technology, 

Notice Regarding the Release of “The 13th Five-Year Action Plan for the Development of Military-Civil Fusion in 

Science and Technology” (关于印发‘十三五科技军民融合发展专项规划’的通知), April 12, 2017. 

http://kyy.nuaa.edu.cn/2018/0109/c5794a96521/page.htm; PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and 

Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan (‘十三五’国家科技创新规划) July 28, 2016. 

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-08/08/content_5098072.htm. 5 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 

Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, May 2, 2019, 49–50.

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 6 PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan

(‘十三五’国家科技创新规划), July 28, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-

08/08/content_5098072.htm. 7 PRC State Council, Full Text of White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2016, December 28, 2016.

http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm.
9

reporting them as civilian satellites launched for scientific or economic purposes.8 According to 

Chinese government sources, China’s national space program is largely managed by the PLA, and 

Chinese space assets are probably assigned as either military or dual-use (military-civil) assets to 

be mobilized in the event of a crisis or war.9

Space-Related Policy Statements

Although China’s space-related white papers and state media reporting are often vague, the CCP 

has publicly released some authoritative government policy documents that are candid. In July 

2016, the State Council released its State Plan for Science and Technology Innovation in the Period 

of the 13th Five-Year Plan, a planning document that provides authoritative, space-related policy 

statements. This plan states that China will develop next-generation space and near-space systems 

with a focus on improving satellites, launch vehicles, and “long duration near-space information 

support capabilities.”10 From 2016 to 2020, the plan aims to “strengthen comprehensive space 

technology applications supporting and serving national defense and state security, economic and 

social development, and the deployment of strategic power around the globe.”11

To meet the 13th Five-Year Plan objectives, CCP authorities at all levels have been told to focus 

on the development of new remote sensing payloads and platforms, “super agile satellites and 

smart space-earth networks,” precision positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services, big 

data analysis, and “earth simulation capabilities drawing from numerous sources.”12 The 13th 

8 For example, see Xinhua, “China Successfully Launches Yaogan 32 Group 01 Satellite” (我国成功发射遥感三十

二号01组卫星),October 9, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-10/09/c_1123533360.htm; China 

National Space Administration, China Successfully Launches Yaogan 29 Satellite (我国成功发射遥感二十九号卫

星), November 27, 2015. http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758838/c6770322/content.html. Yaogan 31 is almost 

certainly a military ocean surveillance satellite system used for tracking (and targeting) naval ships, and Yaogan 29 

a military SAR system capable of capturing imagery at night and through clouds. 9 For example, see Xinhua, “First Annual National Forum on the Standardization of Military-Civil Fusion Held in 

Qingdao” (全国首届标准化军民融合年会在青岛举行),December 21, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-

12/21/c_1210021739.htm; Zhu Hong et al., “An Initial Examination of China’s Standardization of Military-Civil 

Fusion Developments” (我国标准化军民融合发展初探),China Standardization9 (2018): 144–145; Ministry of 

Science and Technology, Notice Regarding the Release of The 13th Five-Year Action Plan for the Development of 

Military-Civil Fusion in Science and Technology (关于印发‘十三五科技军民融合发展专项规划’的通知), April 

12, 2017. http://kyy.nuaa.edu.cn/2018/0109/c5794a96521/page.htm. 10 PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan

(‘十三五’国家科技创新规划), July 28, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-

08/08/content_5098072.htm. 11 PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan

(‘十三五’国家科技创新规划), July 28, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-

08/08/content_5098072.htm. 12 PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan

(‘十三五’国家科技创新规划), July 28, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-

08/08/content_5098072.htm.
10

Five-Year Plan states that China will develop and test technologies for nuclear-powered 

spaceflight vehicles and new-concept space transportation systems.13

The plan specifies six primary lines of effort China will take related to the exploration, 

development, and exploitation of the space domain. 14 Many, but not all, are on track to be 

accomplished by the end of the five-year period. The six lines of effort are: 

• Space science satellite series: According to its five-year plan, China will launch satellites 

to explore dark matter particles and seek to make major discoveries and breakthroughs in 

the study of dark matter, quantum mechanics, black holes, microgravity, and space life 

sciences. By around the year 2020, China will endeavor to have produced and launched a 

satellite capable of taking panoramic images of the interaction between solar winds and 

magnetic layers, a global water cycle observation satellite, and an advanced space-based 

solar observatory satellite. The advanced space-based solar observatory satellite has been 

delayed and is currently scheduled to be launched in 2022.15

• Deep space exploration: Beijing achieved an important planning goal when it successfully 

landed its Chang’e-4 lunar probe on the far side of the moon on January 3, 2019.16 The 

five-year plan states that sometime in 2020, China will have made significant progress on 

the critical technologies needed for its future programs to explore an asteroid, explore 

Jupiter and its moons, and conduct follow-on lunar missions. 

• China’s first mission to Mars: In May 2019, Wang Chi, the director of China’s National 

Space Science Center in Beijing, said China was on schedule for launching its first Mars 

mission in 2020.17 If this mission is successful, Chinese scientists envision a future mission 

to bring back Martian soil samples to Earth by 2030.18 In the near term, a scientific probe, 

the Huoxing-1, is planned to survey Mars’ atmosphere, landscape, and geological and 

magnetic environment.19

13 PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan

(‘十三五’国家科技创新规划), July 28, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-

08/08/content_5098072.htm. 14 Unless otherwise noted, the following section draws from PRC State Council, State Plan for Science and 

Technology Innovation in the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan (‘十三五’国家科技创新规划), July 28, 2016. 

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-08/08/content_5098072.htm. 15 ASO-S Group, “The Advanced Space-Based Solar Observatory (ASO-S).” http://asos.pmo.ac.cn/english/index.php. 16 Paul Rincon, “Chang’e-4: Chinese Rover Now Exploring Moon,” BBC News, January 4, 

2019https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-46760729. 17 Andrew Jones, “China’s First Mars Spacecraft Undergoing Integration for 2020 Launch,” Space News, May 29, 

2019. https://spacenews.com/chinas-first-mars-spacecraft-undergoing-integration-for-2020-launch/. 18 Dave Mosher, “China Wants to Launch to Mars Next Year - Part of an Ambitious Plan to Bring the First Martian 

Soil Samples Back to Earth,” Business Insider, January 16, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/china-marsspacecraft-launch-2020-rover-sample-return-2019-1. 19 Leonard David, “This Is the 1st Photo of China’s Mars Explorer Launching in 2020,” Space, October 26, 2019. 

https://www.space.com/china-moon-lander-rover-first-picture.html.
11

• Earth observation and navigation: The five-year plan states that China will become selfreliant in earth observation and navigation and will make breakthroughs in the acquisition 

of precision information from space and the use of large-scale remote sensing capabilities.

In April 2019, the South China Morning Post reported that China was on track to deliver 

global Beidou satellite navigation services in 2020, which is ahead of schedule. Global

Beidou is an achievement Chinese space industry experts estimate will generate a services 

market worth $298 billion dollars (2 trillion RMB) and make China less reliant on the U.S.-

built and -maintained Global Positioning System (GPS). 20 In October 2019, China 

launched the Gaofen-10 earth imaging satellite.21 This followed the launch in March of two 

earth observation satellites, Gaofen-5 and Gaofen-6, and completed China’s goal of having 

a system of seven high-resolution satellites of this type in orbit.22

• New space vehicles: The plan states that China will develop super capable (超强性能) 

space vehicles and platforms, satellites that can be repaired on-orbit, satellites that can be 

reused, and space robots (空间机器人). In 2016, China launched the Aolong-1 and 

Tianyuan-1 spacecraft, which tested satellite robotic arm grappling and satellite refueling 

in orbit, respectively.23 From 2016 to 2018, China’s Shijian-17 satellite conducted a series 

of space rendezvous and proximity operations in geosynchronous orbit (GEO).24 These 

tests led U.S. military analysts and space experts to conclude this was a capability that 

could permit China to direct its spacecraft to rendezvous and interfere with U.S. early 

warning satellites.25

• Heavy-lift rockets: The plan states that to advance its deep space exploration and crewed

lunar landing goals, China will develop a rocket capable of lifting 100 tons into low-earth 

orbit (LEO). By 2020, China plans to make breakthroughs in the core technologies needed 

for a rocket with a diameter over 10 meters and rocket engines powered by 500 tons of 

liquid oxygen/kerosene and 220 tons of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, respectively.

Chinese space industry representatives have said that China’s LM-9 super-heavy-lift rocket 

20 Sarah Dai, “China’s Satellite Navigation System Beidou Expected to Generate $298 Billion Services Market by 

2020,” South China Morning Post, April 15, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3006172/chinassatellite-navigation-system-beidou-expected-generate-298. 21 Xinhua, “China Launches HD Observation Satellite, “October 5, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-

10/05/c_138448867.htm. 22 Xinhua, “Two Chinese Earth Observation Satellites Put into Service, “March 21, 2019.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/21/c_137913427.htm. 23 Todd Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2019,”Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2019, 

13. https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/SpaceThreatAssessment2019-compressed.pdf. 24 For details, see Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source 

Assessment,” Secure World Foundation, April 2019. 

https://swfound.org/media/206408/swf_global_counterspace_april2019_web.pdf. 25 Jim Sciutto, The Shadow War: Inside Russia’s and China’s Secret Operations to Defeat America, Harper-Collins, 

2019), 161, 179–181. See also Todd Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2019,”Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, April 2019, 13. https://aerospace.csis.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/SpaceThreatAssessment2019-compressed.pdf.
12

will be operational around 2030, and, if successful, will be the most powerful rocket in the 

world.26 According to U.S. company SpaceX, its Falcon Heavy rocket is currently the most 

powerful rocket available, with the ability to lift almost 64 tons into LEO.27

On December 15, 2016, the PRC State Council released its State Plan for Informationization in 

the Period of the 13th Five Year Plan. This planning document states that China will develop a 

space-based infrastructure to provide seamless internet and other information services to customers 

anywhere on the earth’s surface using a dispersed array of floating platforms (浮空平台) high in 

the atmosphere, communications satellites in LEO, and networked space capabilities in higher 

orbits.28

The informationization plan calls for China to integrate remote sensing and telemetry systems 

associated with the Beidou global navigation satellite system (GNSS), other satellites, near space 

flight vehicles, and crewed aircraft, while “coordinating the construction of ground-based 

infrastructure and the development of military-civil fusion, in order to obtain global service 

capabilities as fast as possible.”29 The document states that as part of this five-year effort, China 

will accelerate the deployment of broadband satellites in high-earth orbits (高轨) as well as LEO, 

and improve its use of the frequency spectrum to “satisfy the needs of the state’s major 

strategies.”30

Underscoring the military nature of China’s space program, the informationization plan says that 

CCP and state authorities at all levels will “accelerate the construction of military-civil and dualuse global mobile communications satellite systems,” and states that China will “advance militarycivil fusion in the space domain and construct an integrated space-to-earth cyberspace 

infrastructure” (天地一体网络空间基础设施).31 Notably, the Beidou GNSS “informationization 

programs” are primarily run by the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, the

Central Military Commission (CMC) Equipment Development Department (EDD), and the CMC 

Joint Staff Department. 32 According to the PRC State Council, China’s space-related 

26 Zhao Lei, “Super-Powerful Long March 9 Said to Begin Missions around 2030,” China Daily, March 11, 2019. 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/11/WS5c859b62a3106c65c34edcc0.html. 27 SpaceX, “Falcon Heavy.” https://www.spacex.com/falcon-heavy. 28 For details on the 13th Five-Year Plan (十三五国家信息化规划), see PRC State Council, State Plan for 

Informationization in the Period of the 13th Five Year Plan ('十三五'国家信息化规划), December 15, 2016.

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/27/content_5153411.htm. 29 PRC State Council, State Plan for Informationization in the Period of the 13th Five Year Plan ('十三五'国家信息

化规划), December 15, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/27/content_5153411.htm. 30 PRC State Council, State Plan for Informationization in the Period of the 13th Five Year Plan ('十三五'国家信息

化规划), December 15, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/27/content_5153411.htm. 31 PRC State Council, State Plan for Informationization in the Period of the 13th Five Year Plan ('十三五'国家信息

化规划), December 15, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/27/content_5153411.htm. 32 Other responsible authorities are listed as the National Development and Reform Commission; Ministry of 

Industry and Information Technology; Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Public 

Security; State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; and State Survey and 
13

“informationization programs” all involve the State Administration for Science, Technology, and 

Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) and “relevant military departments.”33

China’s July 2019 defense white paper highlights the relevance of space in its national 

competitiveness. It states:

Outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition. Outer space 

security provides strategic assurance for national and social development. In the 

interest of the peaceful use of outer space, China actively participates in 

international space cooperation, develops relevant technologies and capabilities, 

advances holistic management of space-based information resources, strengthens 

space situation awareness, safeguards space assets, and enhances the capacity to 

safely enter, exit and openly use outer space.34

Strategic Drivers and Doctrine

Chinese military writings indicate the PLA’s likely future direction as a space-enabled force. 

Internal PLA materials, which appear to be indicative of doctrine, point out that China’s space 

program has “national political significance” because it affects the country’s image and is a symbol 

of great power status. Moreover, these writings argue that China’s space assets will be critical 

enablers for the execution of future joint operations.35 They assert that China’s space program 

should focus on the warfighting missions and scenarios identified as national priorities.36 This is 

imperative, according to the writings, because space capabilities will be the “central pillar” upon 

which future joint operations rely.37

Writings produced by teams of Chinese military theorists at the PLA Army Command Academy 

and PLA Equipment Academy indicate that advanced space assets are perceived as vital to helping

the PLA overcome legacy operational problems.38 Presumably, these problems still exist. The 

theorists argue that the PLA had several challenges that negatively affected its ability to fight and 

win modern wars. One of the shortcomings was the difficulty of collecting battlefield intelligence 

Mapping Bureau. See Major Work Project Number 41 in the appendixes of PRC State Council, State Plan for 

Informationization in the Period of the 13th Five Year Plan ('十三五'国家信息化规划), December 15, 2016. 

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/27/content_5153411.htm. 33 See Major Work Project Number 6 and Number 8 in the appendixes of PRC State Council, State Plan for 

Informationization in the Period of the 13th Five Year Plan ('十三五'国家信息化规划), December 15, 2016. 

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/27/content_5153411.htm. 34 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, 2019, 13–14. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. 35 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 74–75. 36 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 27–32. 37 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 33–34. 38 Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 128; Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间

信息支援作战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 39.
14

in contested environments with legacy platforms. For example, they noted that the PLA’s groundbased intelligence collection centers monitoring enemy communications traffic and radar 

emissions could be defeated by hostile deception operations and electronic jamming, and 

reconnaissance aircraft could become easy targets for an enemy with modern air defenses.39 To 

fill coverage gaps, the theorists envision networks of satellites, space stations, and near-space 

vehicles capable of continuous reconnaissance and surveillance missions over potential 

battlefields.40

These Chinese military writings foresee future satellites working in tandem with advanced 

communications platforms and relay systems deployed aboard ships, tethered aerostats, and 

aircraft that would provide redundant communications networks.41 Another challenge the theorists 

anticipate is conducting air operations during inclement weather. They expect that China’s Beidou 

GNSS will overcome weather problems that might otherwise ground essential flight operations.42

Chinese military literature has emphasized the importance of space support for precision strike 

operations and special operations conducted behind enemy lines.43 In addition, PLA writings have 

frequently highlighted the use of military intelligence satellites for strategic early warning of 

possible U.S. intervention during a conflict against a third party like Taiwan. Chinese theorists 

seem to share a widely held view that satellite reconnaissance is the principal means available for 

assessing the intentions and operations of U.S. forces in a conflict or crisis.44 If true, Beijing is 

likely to consider space assets associated with this mission to be the most operationally valuable 

in its entire space enterprise.

Chinese military writings have identified perceived shortcomings in China’s space program. One 

frequently mentioned vulnerability is the possibility that essential Chinese satellites could be 

affected by hostile counterspace operations. They anticipate that in a conflict, enemy forces could 

39 Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 128; Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间

信息支援作战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 39. 40 Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 128; Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间

信息支援作战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 39. 41 Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 138–139. 42 Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 149–152. 43 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 194–197, 219–220. 44 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 169–171, 190–193, 240–242. See also Yuan Wenxian, ed., Course Book on Joint Campaigns and 

Information Operations [联合战役信息作战教程], National Defense University, 2009, 279–288; Cao Zhengrong, 

Wu Runbo, and Sun Jianjun,eds., Informatized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], Liberation Army Press, 

2008,45–163; Zhang Yuliang, ed., Science of Campaigns [战役学], National Defense University Press, 2007, 312–

330.
15

jam Chinese satellites in orbit and sabotage their ground support infrastructure.45 To mitigate this 

threat, PLA writings recommend hardening satellites, camouflaging and concealing their 

operations centers, maneuvering when under attack, and augmenting the protection of ground 

stations.46 They further recommend using civilian satellites for military missions and stockpiling 

military satellites as a reserve that can be launched to fill coverage gaps and meet wartime needs.47

Chinese military theorists express concern that Beidou satellites could be accidentally jammed by 

friendly air defense units. To reduce the risk of “red-on-red” jamming, they recommend that 

commanders coordinate operations and carefully control when and where electronic jamming is 

used.

48

General Trends since the Late 1990s

China’s space program has made tremendous progress over the past two decades. In 1999, China 

launched its first uncrewed spacecraft, Shenzhou-1, a test bed for future crewed spaceflights. In 

2003, China launched its first crewed mission. In 2007, it conducted a successful test of an ASAT

missile, and that same year a Chinese lunar probe orbited the moon. In 2008, Chinese taikonauts

completed their country’s first spacewalk, and China launched its first space lab in 2011, followed 

by a second lab in 2016.49 At the same time, China’s military space capabilities have grown rapidly 

and made progress across a broad range of applications. In 2018 alone, China successfully 

launched 38 space launch vehicles, putting approximately 100 satellites in orbit.50 China expects 

to carry out more than 40 launches in 2020.51

According to DOD:

China’s space industry is rapidly expanding its ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance), navigation, and communication satellite constellations and 

making substantial strides in its space lift capabilities, human spaceflight, and 

45 See Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 128; Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间

信息支援作战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 164–165, 187, 212, 232, 248. 46 See Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 128; Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间

信息支援作战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 164–165, 187, 212, 232, 248. 47 See Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 128; Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间

信息支援作战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 164–165, 187, 212, 232, 248. 48 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 239–240. 49 Jessica Meyers and Mitchell Landsberg, “A Growing Competition: China and the U.S. Space Program, Year by 

Year,” Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2007. https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-hainan-space-timeline2017-htmlstory.html. 50 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and 

Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, May 2, 2019, 50.

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 51 China Space News, “CASC Commences 2020 Model Work Meeting” (中国航天科技集团有限公司召开 2020

年型号工作会议), January 3, 2020. http://spacechina.com/n25/n2014789/n2014804/c2819421/content.html.
16

lunar exploration programs. China is looking to expand its space launch vehicle 

industry to support commercial launches and make rapid satellite launch services 

available to foreign customers. China is planning to launch, assemble in-orbit, and 

operate a crewed Chinese space station before 2025.52

Current trends suggest that China’s civilian officials and military officers may become 

increasingly reliant upon space for decision making during times of crisis—and more vulnerable 

to having it denied to them. 

Space Support for Warfighting Campaigns

To further understand the role of space in Chinese military operations, it may be useful to examine 

the nature of China’s envisioned warfighting operations.

53 PLA sources indicate that Chinese 

military strategists focus on five major conflict types, which may overlap as part of a larger war. 

Potential war plans constructed around these operations would require varying degrees of spaceenabled military forces. Generally referred to in Chinese literature as joint campaigns (联合战役) 

or joint operations (联合作战), it seems likely these imagined future wars drive China’s military 

space buildup to a significant degree.54 The PLA’s main joint operations are as follows: 

• Joint Firepower Strike Operations against Large Island (大型岛屿联合火力突击作战 )

55

• Joint Blockade Operations against Large Island (大型岛屿联合封锁作战)

• Joint Attack Operations against Large Island (大型岛屿联合进攻作战)56

• Joint Anti-Air Raid Operations (联合反空袭作战)57

• Joint Border Area Operations (边境地区联合作战)

52 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and 

Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Department of Defense, May 2, 2019, 98.

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 53 This section draws from Ian Easton, “China’s Top Five War Plans,” Project 2049 Institute, January 6, 2019.

https://project2049.net/2019/01/06/chinas-top-five-war-plans/. 54 See Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin, eds., Informatized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], 

National Defense University Press, 2014, 109–314; Yuan Wenxian, ed., Course Book on Joint Campaigns and 

Information Operations [联合战役信息作战教程], National Defense University Press, 2009, 271–326; Cao 

Zhengrong, Wu Runbo, and Sun Jianjun, eds., Informatized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], Liberation Army 

Press, 2008, 145–323. 55 While the direct translation of 大型岛屿 is simply “a large island or islands,” it is clear from PLA texts that they 

are referring specifically to Taiwan and not an abstraction or large islands in general. It might therefore be risky to 

assume the PLA would use the exact same planning assumptions for notional operations against Luzon, Okinawa, or 

Guam.

56 This is also sometimes referred to as Joint Landing Operations against Taiwan (大型岛屿联合登岛作战). 57 Note that some PLA writings, such as Informatized Joint Operations, refer to this as “Joint Coastal Area Defense 

Operations” (Binhai Diqu Lianhe Fangwei Zuozhan). It is also sometimes called “Counter-Intervention Operations.”
17

In the event of conflict, what types of space assets are likely to be assigned to PLA commanders,

and how would they notionally be used? The following descriptions briefly outline how Chinese 

military writings foresee the use of space capabilities in the future operations identified above.

Joint firepower strike operations: Chinese military writings portray space assets as critical for 

carrying out joint firepower strike operations against Taiwan. They portray ISR satellites as being 

particularly important. These satellites would be tasked with collecting intelligence used by the 

PLA to build and update lists of Taiwanese and U.S. targets, monitor and target U.S. ships and 

planes within 3,000 kilometers (km) of the PRC, and produce battle damage assessments after the 

initial wave of strikes.58

Joint blockade operations: If China’s leaders opted to blockade Taiwan in a coercive manner (as 

opposed to a prelude to an invasion), PLA theorists believe operations would be centralized and 

relatively constrained. Operations in this scenario would be prolonged and “highly political,” with 

Beijing likely interjecting to manage intensity levels and choose targets. Space capabilities would 

be expected to provide target intelligence and secure communications to commanders in the field, 

allowing the central leadership to “reach down” and micromanage the blockade in a manner they 

believed best advanced their strategic goals. If the blockade was intended to soften up Taiwan as 

a precursor to invasion, space assets would most likely be focused on assessing the optimal time 

for crossing the Taiwan Strait based on the weather and the status of Taiwanese and U.S. forces.

59

Joint attack operations: PLA writings portray the invasion of Taiwan as the most challenging and 

important future mission of the Chinese military. To prepare for this operation, China’s military 

space units are expected to continuously collect and analyze intelligence on Taiwan’s beaches, 

currents, tides, roads, bridges, waterways, electric power grid, reservoirs, oil and gas stocks, 

airports, seaports, command posts, ground force units, and air defense networks. During wartime 

operations, China’s space assets would be expected to provide 24/7 intelligence on the cross-Strait 

battlefield and strategic early warning should the United States intervene. Chinese satellites and 

near-space drones would be called upon to provide wideband, high-capacity, jam-resistant, 

encrypted communications to all the units involved in the operation. Envisioned future Chinese 

space architecture will allow the PLA to merge and link all joint forces together into an organic 

system that allows operational commanders to: (1) find targets,(2) decide how to strike them, (3) 

send strike orders to forward units,(4) neutralize targets, (5) assess battle damage, and (6) consider 

whether or not re-strikes are required.60

58 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 153–163. 59 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 174–176. 60 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 197–199.
18

Joint anti-air raid operations: PLA writings state that intelligence provided by satellites would be 

vital to the success of joint anti-air raid operations. In peacetime, PLA space forces are expected 

to collect intelligence on U.S. airbases and aircraft carriers within range of potential targets in 

China. Space capabilities are to provide PLA commanders information on the numbers, parking 

sites, and types of aircraft at each base, and gather intelligence on the ranges and stockpiles of their 

munitions. In addition, space assets would be tasked with monitoring the movements of U.S. ships, 

including destroyers and submarines, which could launch cruise missiles at targets in China.61 As 

such, PLA studies state that early warning of the first wave of U.S. strikes would be crucial for 

defending against an attack and disrupting follow-on operations. These PLA writings note that the 

United States could launch air raids from almost any direction, and assert that space assets should 

prioritize warning intelligence based on a three-tier system, with tier one representing critical 

political, economic, and military targets in the PRC’s major cities. Tiers two and three would be 

important but less vital potential targets, which would receive warning intelligence from space 

assets later or may not receive any warning at all.62

Joint border area operations: Chinese military theorists anticipate that in the event of a border 

war, India would be unlikely to attack until it had amassed superior forces at its forward bases. As 

such, the priority mission of Chinese space assets during these operations would be to provide 

early warning intelligence of hostile enemy deployments and ensure China’s leaders were not 

caught off-guard by a potential Indian surprise attack. After the outbreak of hostilities, the priority 

mission of China’s space forces would be to provide reliable satellite communications to combat 

units in the mountains and provide combat commanders with imagery intelligence.63

The following table shows how one internal PLA handbook published by China’s National 

Defense University envisions the role military-civil space assets will play in future joint operations. 

61 In addition, note that other U.S. targets in the Pacific would include communications sites, command posts, 

intelligence collection centers, radars, fuel dumps, ammunitions dumps, aircraft repair hangars, spare parts garages, 

and other logistical facilities. See Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作

战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 240–247. 62 Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战], National Defense University 

Press, 2014, 241–242. For further details, see Yuan Wenxian ed., Course Book on Joint Campaigns and Information 

Operations [联合战役信息作战教程], National Defense University, 2009, 314–326; Cao Zhengrong, Wu Runbo, 

and Sun Jianjun, eds., Informatized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], Liberation Army Press, 2008, 236–262; 

Zhang Yuliang, ed., Science of Campaigns [战役学], National Defense University Press, 2007, 312–330. 63 Note that the PLA writings reviewed focus primarily on the Sino-Indian border rather than other conceivable 

flashpoints along the PRC border. Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作

战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 220–222. For further details, see Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and 

Yang Yin, eds., Informationized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战], National Defense University Press, 2014, 

216–314; Yuan Wenxian ed., Course Book on Joint Campaigns and Information Operations [联合战役信息作战教

程], National Defense University, 2009, 302–313; Cao Zhengrong, Wu Runbo, and Sun Jianjun, eds., Informatized 

Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], Liberation Army Press, 2008,263–323.
19

Figure 1: PLA Space Missions in Support of Joint Operations

Source: Wang Yongping, ed., Space Information Support Operations(空间信息支援作战), National Defense 

University Press, 2014, 126.

Space, Distant Operations, and Outlook for the Future

The primary near-term focus of China’s military space program is to enable successful joint 

operations along the PRC’s periphery. Space capabilities being developed and fielded will 

increasingly allow the PLA to operate globally. The PLA Navy already has demonstrated an ability 

to sail and operate naval task forces around the world, including in the Mediterranean, Baltic, 

Bering, and Caribbean seas.

64 The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is currently capable of conducting 

bomber operations past the first island chain and has deployed transport aircraft and airborne units 

as far from China as Turkey, Australia, and Venezuela.65 RAND analysts expect that by the 

earlytomid-2020s, the PLAAF will deploy a next-generation long-range strategic bomber capable 

of threatening Hawaii, Australia, and possibly the U.S. mainland.66

64 Ridzwan Rahmat, “Chinese Navy Expands HADR Footprint with Medical Mission in Caribbean,” Jane's Navy 

International, October 24, 2018. https://www.janes.com/article/84035/chinese-navy-expands-hadr-footprint-withmedical-mission-in-caribbean; Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy 

Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2018, 56.

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf; BBC News, “Five Chinese Ships Seen Off Alaska Coast, Pentagon Says,” 

September 3, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34131429. 65 Cristina L. Garafola and Timothy R. Heath, “The Chinese Air Force’s First Steps toward Becoming an 

Expeditionary Air Force,” RAND Corporation,2017,36–37.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2000/RR2056/RAND_RR2056.pdf. 66 Derek Grossman et al., “China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights: Drivers and Implications,” RAND Corporation, 

2018, 55. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2567.html. See also Derek Grossman, “Envisioning a 

‘World-Class’ PLA: Implications for the United States and the Indo-Pacific,” RAND Corporation, July 1, 2019.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT514.html.
20

As China’s space capabilities improve, so too will its ability to conduct larger and more complex

operations at greater distances from China. U.S. policymakers should expect that by the early 

2020s, space-based communications, navigation, and intelligence assets will enhance the PLA’s 

lethality across a range of scenarios and allow China to project power in West Africa, Central 

America, South America, Antarctica, and the Arctic. Improved space architecture will enable the 

PLA to conduct precision strikes on targets at greater range, will guarantee Chinese forces access 

to PNT services provided by Beidou instead of GPS, and could significantly expand the operational 

ranges of Chinese strategic forces. Secure satellite communications could support long-distance 

nuclear submarine patrols. They may also enable strategic bomber patrols and ground-based 

missile deployments overseas. 

Since 2016, China’s government has sought to acquire airbases and other facilities in Greenland 

and the Azores that could be used for military power projection operations against the continental 

United States and U.S. forces in the North Atlantic and Europe.67 While these efforts have been 

unsuccessful to date, China will likely continue making attempts to gain basing rights in 

unexpected geographical areas. Future Chinese overseas bases will require global satellite 

communications, precise PNT, and regularly updated remote sensing information on enemy targets. 

In addition to supporting peacetime presence and humanitarian operations, Chinese space assets 

will enhance the ability of Chinese marines and special operations forces to carry out 

unconventional missions around the world using satellite services, something they are beginning 

to include in their training.68

67 Michael Rubin, “Beware China’s Inroads into the Atlantic,” National Interest, June 26, 2019.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/beware-chinas-inroads-atlantic-64391; Aaron Mehta, “How a Potential ChinaBuilt Airport in Greenland Could Be Risky for a Vital US Air Force Base,” Defense News, September 7, 2018. 

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/09/07/how-a-potential-chinese-built-airport-in-greenland-couldbe-risky-for-a-vital-us-air-force-base/. 68 For example, in July 2018, it was reported that PLA special operations forces were utilizing satellite imagery in 

their exercises. See Yang Qingmin and Xu Chunlong, “PLA Army Conducts First Assessment of Its Special

Operations Forces,” Ministry of Defense, July 17, 2018. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2018-

07/17/content_4819487.htm.
21

SECTION TWO

PLA SPACE/COUNTERSPACE INFRASTRUCTURE:

THE ROLE OF THE PLA STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE 

In early 2016, the Chinese military undertook a sweeping reorganization and reform program with 

the stated objective of molding a joint force capable of a broad range of contingencies. Several 

drivers have influenced the Central Military Command’s (CMC) ongoing restructuring and reform 

initiative. The reform and restructuring involved elimination of the four general departments: the

General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics 

Department (GLD), and General Armaments Department (GAD). In their place, the CMC 

established new departments, transformed the PLA Second Artillery Force into the PLA Rocket 

Force (PLARF), and established a new PLA Army headquarters and the PLASSF. The seven 

Military Regions were consolidated into five Theater Commands (TCs). Each of the service 

headquarters has reinforced their organizing, training, and equipping missions.

The ongoing reform and reorganization effort likely will improve China’s ability to realize its 

space ambitions. First, the establishment of the PLASSF integrates space-related RD&A, 

operations, and training under a single authority. Discussion of an independent space force had 

been underway since the 1990s.69 Before 2016, both the former GSD and GAD managed RD&A 

associated with their respective missions. The merger of space missions under a single authority 

is likely to create a more efficient and effective system for overseeing development and integration 

of new capabilities into the active force. With space-related training managed by a central authority, 

the reorganization also will likely create operational synergies that did not exist before 2016.70

The PLA is seeking to improve its space situational awareness and making rapid advances in its 

space-based early warning capabilities. China reportedly has been cooperating with Russia in 

69 Larry M. Wortzel, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging United States-China 

Military Competition,” American Enterprise Institute, 2007. http://www.aei.org/publication/the-chinese-peoplesliberation-army-and-space-warfare/. 70 The PLASSF is one of the most significant components of the ongoing military reform and reorganization.

Established in December 2015 and still in a state of transition, the PLASSF is not a service, such as the PLA Army, 

PLA Air Force, PLA Navy, and PLA Rocket Force. However, as a force with the same grade as the four services 

and five TCs, the PLASSF is treated as a service. For background on the PLASSF, see Kevin L. Pollpeter, Michael 

S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham, “The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese 

Military Space Operations,” RAND Corporation, 2017; Elsa Kania, “PLA Strategic Support Force: The ‘Information 

Umbrella’ for China’s Military,” Diplomat, April 1, 2017; Rachael Burton and Mark Stokes, “The People’s 

Liberation Army Strategic Support Force Leadership and Structure,” Project 2049 Occasional Paper, September 25, 

2018. https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/180925_PLA_SSF_Leadership-andStructure_Stokes_Burton.pdf; John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a 

New Era,” China Strategic Perspectives13 (October 2, 2018).

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1651760/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-a-new-era/; 

Marcus Clay, “Supporting the Infinitive Battlefield,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019. 
22

developing an early warning capability.71 China has cooperated with Ukraine on space debris 

monitoring and research on deep space issues.72

PLASSF senior officers manage at least three first-level administrative departments, two systems 

departments, and at least 12 corps leader-grade or corps deputy leader-grade base commands. The 

PLASSF Space Systems Department is central to China’s ambitions in space. The PLASSF 

maintains space situational awareness through a corps leader-grade command headquartered in 

Xian, a corps leader-grade maritime space tracking command, and a control center in Beijing. This 

network integrates space tracking data from ground-based assets in China, sea-based units, and a 

number of international ground stations located in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere (see 

below).

The PLASSF also oversees an expanding space-based ISR network that enables monitoring of U.S. 

activities in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The expansion of this network is likely to enhance 

China’s ability to conduct military operations farther from shore. Over the years, the PLA has 

fielded electro-optical (EO), radar, and other space-based sensor platforms that can transmit 

images of the Earth’s surface to ground stations in near-real-time. China is investing heavily in 

EO, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and electronic reconnaissance surveillance capabilities. Future 

deployments of potential sea-based imagery receiving stations, additional data relay satellite 

systems, or the further establishment of ground stations abroad could enhance China’s extendedrange near-real-time targeting capability.

Importantly, a growing body of Chinese military-technical literature suggests planning for a

counterspace capability. The PLA also has deployed or is developing jamming and cyberspace 

capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based ASAT missiles that 

can deny an adversary unimpeded use of its own satellite systems. The specific PLA service 

responsible for direct ascent ASAT operations remains unknown. However, technology

demonstration testing of a space intercept system has been carried out since at least 2005. Testing 

of kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs), high-powered lasers, co-orbital satellites, electronic jamming, 

and—possibly—cyberattacks have been reported. The opacity surrounding China’s space 

programs suggests other clandestine counterspace weapons programs may also exist.

The PLASSF plays a critical role in supporting national- and theater-level command and control. 

The CMC Joint Staff Department (JSD) manages the national military command system, with the 

CMC JSD Operations Bureau functioning as the core duty staff within the CMC Joint Command 

Center. PLASSF staff officers probably augment the CMC Joint Command Center’s duty office 

during peacetime, and in higher readiness levels. CMC Joint Command Center operations are also 

71 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Russia to Help China Develop an Early Warning System,” Diplomat, October 25, 2019.

https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/russia-to-help-china-develop-an-early-warning-system/. 72 Embassy of Ukraine in the People’s Republic of China, A Meeting of the Ukrainian-Chinese Subcommission on 

Cooperation in Space Field Was Held in Beijing, November 12, 2018. https://china.mfa.gov.ua/en/news/68681-upekini-vidbulosy-zasidannya-ukrajinsyko-kitajsykoji-pidkomisiji-z-pitany-spivrobitnictva-v-galuzi-kosmosu.
23

augmented by at least ten dedicated support groups (保障大队) that are responsible for mission 

planning/targeting; survey, mapping, and navigation; network/electronic countermeasures; 

battlespace awareness; meteorology/hydrography; and other functions. Support groups likely rely 

heavily on PLASSF space assets.73

Space Systems Department and Subordinate Base Commands

The PLASSF Space Systems Department was created through the merger of the former General

Armaments Department (GAD) China Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC) and spacerelated organizations previously under the General Staff Department (GSD) Operations 

Department and GSD Intelligence Department. The Space Systems Department oversees at least 

six corps or corps deputy leader-grade operational commands responsible for space launch, 

tracking, and control. The PLASSF tracks and controls space assets through the Xian Satellite 

Control Center (Base 26) and the Beijing Space Command and Control Center in the northern 

suburbs of Beijing, which integrates space tracking data from ground- and sea-based units. Three 

corps leader-grade space launch base commands are in Jiuquan (Base 20, aka Shuangchengzi), 

Taiyuan (Base 25, aka Wuzhai), and Xichang (Base 27). Base 27 probably oversees the launch 

complex on Hainan Island. These space launch centers also support ballistic missile and kinetic 

space interceptor testing. New units, possibly corps deputy leader-grade and related to space 

applications, have been formed in Beijing and Wuhan. Newly established PLASSF corps-level 

units suggest possible direct operational support to TC leaders in a contingency.

Other base commands are responsible for space situational awareness. The Xian Satellite Tracking 

and Control Center (Base 26) is a corps leader-grade organization responsible for ground-based 

space tracking, telemetry, and control. Although unconfirmed, Base 26 may oversee the Beijing 

Space Flight Command and Control Center and its subordinate entities. The China Satellite 

Maritime Tracking and Control Department (Base 23, Jiangyin) is a corps leader-grade 

73 The former designation of the Target Control Center (目标控制中心) was 61683 部队. For reference, see CMC 

Joint Command Center Survey and Navigation Group (军委联合作战指挥中心测绘导航大队)(依法履行检察监

督职责体现使命担当), 人民监督, May 18, 2017. http://www.fyfzw.cn/html/2017/jd_0518/25904.html.The 

Network/Electronic Countermeasures Group appears to be founded upon a core element of the former GSD Fourth 

Department ECM Center. With most of the former 4PLA transferred to the PLASSF, the Network ECM Support 

Group may be an interface dedicated to joint command and control. For references to a CMC Joint Command Center 

Network/ECM Support Group, see (军委联指网电对抗大队)(31003 部队视频信息系统竞争性谈判采购公告), 

October 19, 2016. http://www.bidchance.com/calggnew/2016/10/19/16801361.html and (北京市人民检察院召开驻

京部队市人大代表座谈会), People’s Procurator of Beijing Municipality, December 5, 2016.

http://www.bjjc.gov.cn/bjoweb/jcyw/90801.jhtml. The Battlespace Awareness Support Group (战场态势大队) may 

be assigned a Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) of 31004. For references, see (朱玉萍), (王海), and (路征), 

PLA Daily, “Electromagnetic Situation Fuses into Battlefield Situation—The Operational Situation Can Be 

Forecasted to Determine Enemy Intent” (电磁态势融入战场态势可预测作战态势判断敌方企图), February 8, 

2018. http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0208/c1011-29812995.html. The precise mission of the Battlespace 

Awareness Group (possible Unit 31004) remains unclear. However, it appears related to intelligence/reconnaissance. 

The Meteorological and Hydrological Group (Unit 31010) may be staffed by officers from the CMC Joint Staff 

Department Battlefield Environment Support Bureau. The group could be an outgrowth of the former GSD 

Meteorological, Hydrological, and Space Weather Command (Unit 61741), a division leader-grade unit.
24

organization that is responsible for sea-based satellite tracking, control, and launch vehicle 

transportation to Hainan.

The PLASSF’s first-level departments are responsible for structural integration (or “cross-domain 

fusion”) of space and network operations. The PLASSF Space Systems Department appears 

responsible for space launch operations, space tracking and control, and applied space operations. 

The Space Systems Department leaders are supported by headquarters staff, specifically the Staff 

Department, Political Work Department, Logistics Department, and Equipment Department.

Senior PLASSF leaders are responsible for military space operations. The PLASSF commander 

and political commissar have extensive experience in operations and theater-level leadership 

positions. Both are TC leader-grade officers, which extends significant stature within the PLA.

74

The PLASSF is equal in grade to the PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLAAF, PLA Rocket Force, and the 

five TCs. The PLASSF’s first-level departments―Staff, Political Work, Logistics, Space Systems, 

and Network Systems―and the Discipline Inspection Commission are responsible for structural 

integration (or “cross-domain fusion”) of space and network operations. A limited number of 

sources suggest the existence of a PLASSF Equipment Department as well.75

Space Launch Operations

PLASSF space launch operations are carried out from four launch complexes. Each is led by a 

corps or corps deputy leader-grade officer. The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (PLASSF Base 

20) supports LM-2C, LM-2D, and LM-4 launches into LEO, as well as crewed space missions on 

the LM-2F. Base 20 is also a key facility for short-range ballistic missile, land attack cruise missile, 

and space intercept testing. Subordinate units are responsible for space launch operations, launch 

tracking, missile testing, impact area management, transportation, propellant loading, and 

communications.76

74 The commander, Lieutenant General Li Fengbiao, is a career PLAAF officer with a background in the airborne 

corps. The political commissar, General Zhang Weiping, previously served as political commissar of the Eastern 

Theater Command. At least three deputy commanders and two deputy political commissars support the commander 

and political commissar in their duties. The PLASSF chief of staff previously directed the former GSD Operations 

Department, reflecting a merging of operations and strategic ISR.

75 Harbin Institute of Technology, “Assisting Military-Civil Fusion, The Important Tool for Casting the Nation: 

Changzhou Military-Civil Fusion Industrial Park Formally Established, Businesses Entering the Park Enjoy 

Comprehensive One-Stop Service!” (助军民融合、铸国之重器:常州军民融合产业园正式开园,入园企业享

受全方位、一站式服务!), May 24, 2017. http://edp.hit.edu.cn/2017/0524/c7876a178695/page.htm. As a side 

note, the PLASSF is an anomaly because the Space Systems Department and Network Systems Departments are 

both first-level departments at the same grade as the Staff Department, Political Work Department, and Discipline 

Inspection Commission. As such, they cannot be subordinate to any of those departments. Furthermore, because of

their grade, each of the directors serves as a concurrent PLASSF deputy commander and their political commissars 

serve as concurrent PLASSF deputy political commissars. Each of their second-level bureaus are corps deputy 

leader-grade organizations. 76 As of 2019, the commander/director of Base 20 was Major General Zhang Zhifen (张志芬). The Impact Area 

Department is probably headquartered in Korla. 
25

The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (PLASSF Base 25), headquartered in Shanxi’s Kelan County,

functions as China’s primary platform for satellite launches into sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) as 

well as testing of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Like Base 20, subordinate 

units are responsible for space launch operations, missile testing, propellant loading, launch 

tracking, and communications.77 More recently, Taiyuan established a maritime team and was 

responsible for the launch of the LM-11 in June 2019.78

The Xichang Satellite Launch Center (PLASSF Base 27) is China’s primary platform for launch 

of communication and weather satellites into GEO. At one point, Xichang reportedly had capacity 

to launch between eight and ten satellites a year.79 Base 27 was the launch point of the PLA’s 

January 2007 test of a KKV against an aging Chinese weather satellite.80 Although unconfirmed, 

Base 27 may oversee launch operations from the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Center on Hainan 

Island. The Wenchang complex is responsible for LM-5 and LM-7 launch operations in support 

of China’s crewed space program. Launch vehicles are transported to Hainan via ship from 

assembly facilities in Tianjin. Initial launches of the LM-5 and LM -7 took place in 2016 and 

2017.81 It is possible the LM-9 heavy-lift vehicle, scheduled to be operational before 2030, may 

also be launched from Hainan.

The PLASSF space launch infrastructure has improved its efficiency and effectiveness over time. 

DOD indicates China marked its largest space launch year to date in 2018, successfully launching 

77 As of 2019, the commander/director of Base 25 was Yu Zhijian (于志坚) and political commissar was Wan 

Minggui (万明贵). 78 Lu Jun (路俊) and Zou Weirong (邹维荣), “Commemorating Taiyuan Space Launch Center’s Maritime Launch 

Mission Team” (记太原卫星发射中心海上发射任务团队), PLA Daily, June 11, 2019.

http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-06/11/content_235682.htm. 79 China Space News, “Xichang Satellite Launch Center Can Launch at Least 10 Satellites” [西昌卫星发射中心年

发射能力达 10 颗以上], August 4, 2010.Launch campaigns average 25 days. Also see Fu Zhiheng (Vice President, 

China Great Wall Industry Corporation), “Chinese Launchers and COMSATs: Development & Commercial 

Activities,” World Space Risk Forum, Dubai, February 28–March 1, 2012. Major General Zhang Xueyu (张学宇; b. 

1963) is cited in 2017 reporting as the commander of the Xichang Space Launch Center. He previously directed the 

PLASSF Space Systems Department Equipment Department. Previous assignments include GAD deputy chief of 

staff (2013–2016) and commander of the GAD Base 32 (华阴兵器试验基地). As of 2019, the political commissar

is Dong Chongqing (董重庆). 80 Craig Covault, “Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2007.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xml. 81 Wenchang appears to still carry a designation of the 078 Engineering Command [078 工程指挥部]. Some 

reporting implies an operational subordination to Base 20 at Jiuquan. The Wenchang Space Launch Center Director 

is Major General Wang Weichang [王维昌]. For reference to the LM-5 Tianjin manufacturing facilities, see Xin 

Dingding, “New Carrier Rocket Series to Be Built,” China Daily, October 31, 2007. 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/31/content_6217880.htm.
26

38 of 39 space launch vehicles and orbiting approximately 100 spacecraft.82 In 2019, China 

successfully carried out 32 of 34 launches.83

Space Situational Awareness and Control

As China’s presence in space expands, so too does the importance of space situational awareness 

(SSA). The PLASSF manages a well-established SSA infrastructure. SSA entails near-real-time 

knowledge of a space flight vehicle’s location, the ability to track and predict a space flight 

vehicle’s future location, and cataloguing of all space objects. SSA also includes understanding a 

potential adversary’s intent for their spacecraft. China’s SSA system is gradually expanding in 

scope and sophistication to accommodate its own growing presence in space, and to address 

perceived challenges from other space-faring nations.84

The PLASSF’s SSA network is probably able to search, track, and characterize satellites in all 

earth orbits, supporting both space operations and counterspace systems. The PLASSF space 

surveillance and control system consists of a tracking center in Xian, fixed land-based sites, at 

least one mobile system, and as many as seven Yuanwang tracking ships capable of operating 

throughout the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans. The PLASSF also operates foreign satellite 

ground stations (discussed in following section).85

Xian Satellite Tracking and Control Center: Headquartered in Shaanxi’s Weinan City, the Xian 

Satellite Tracking and Control Center (PLASSF Base 26) is a corps leader-grade command 

responsible for land-based space tracking, telemetry, and control. Base 26 likely plays a role in 

monitoring and identifying debris and other objects in space. Although unconfirmed, Base 26 may 

oversee the Beijing Space Flight Control Center and its subordinate entities.86 The Base 26 space 

surveillance system may fuse data from other sources, including the China Academy of Science’s 

Space Target and Debris Observation and Research Center in Nanjing. 87 Passive satellite 

82 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and 

Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, May 2, 2019, 48. 83 Stephen Clark, “China’s First Launch of 2020 Lofts Mystery Payload,” Spaceflight Now, January 7, 2020. 

https://spaceflightnow.com/2020/01/07/chinas-first-launch-of-2020-lofts-mystery-payload/. 84 Among various sources, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations (Joint Publication 3-14), April 10, 2018.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14.pdf. 85 The Xian Satellite Measurement and Control Center, which carries a military cover designator of Unit 63761, 

appears to be a subordinate to the Base 26 command in Weinan. Other subordinate elements are collocated with or 

near Base 26 general headquarters in the Weinan area: Qingdao (63756 Unit), Xiamen (63758 Unit), Nanning 

(63760 Unit), Xian (63761 Unit),and Shaxian (Fujian Province) Yangfang Village (63762 Unit). 86 In years past, the Base 26 network included the 7010 space and missile radar system mounted on the side of 

Huangyang Mountain in Xuanhua County, north of Beijing. The PLA Air Force originally operated the system when 

first entering initial operating capability in 1976, but later was resubordinated to Base 26 (old MUCD of 89851 

Unit). The system was dismantled in the late 1980s/early 1990s.For an excellent overview of Base 26, see

Wangchao Network, “Loudouzi (The Leaker): Overview of Xian Measurement and Control Center” [漏斗子:西安

测控中心概览], October 10, 2005. http://www.1n0.net/Article/Print.asp?ArticleID=6279.The author has a record of 

reliable reporting.

87 The commander of Base 26 (63750 Unit) is equivalent in grade to a corps leader. Yu Peijun (余培军) was cited in 

2017 reporting as director of the Xian Satellite Control Center. He previously served as deputy director.
27

surveillance information may be provided by the PLASSF Network Systems Department. 88

China’s R&D community also has been exploring options for space-based SSA platforms.

89 Base 

26 oversees deep space tracking facilities in northeast China. Base 26 may also oversee a tracking 

and control station on Duncan Island in the South China Sea. Construction on the site began in 

2011.90

China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department: The China Satellite Maritime 

Tracking and Control Department (Base 23, Jiangyin) is a corps leader-grade organization that is 

responsible for sea-based satellite tracking, control, and launch vehicle transportation to Hainan. 

As many as seven Yuanwang ships are in operation as of 2019.91

Beijing Space Command and Control Center: During peacetime, the PLASSF likely directs 

space operations from the Beijing Space Command and Control Center. Established in 1996, the 

center appears to be a division leader-grade unit manned 24 hours a day, with a PLASSF deputy 

chief of staff serving as a watch officer. Located on Beiqing Road in Beijing’s northern suburbs, 

the facility hosts senior CMC, PLASSF, and civilian leaders during major events.92

Regarding international SSA cooperation, China is a member of the Asia-Pacific Space 

Cooperation Organization (APSCO). The organization manages a space surveillance initiative 

known as the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System (APOSOS). 

In support of the initiative, China provided telescopes to Peru, Pakistan, and Iran that are capable 

of tracking objects in LEO and GEO. Tasking and data are funneled through the Chinese Academy 

88 Although speculative, space tracking data from PLA Air Force radar systems may also contribute to a single 

integrated space picture. Very-long-baseline interferometry (VLBI) sites track space objects simultaneously via 

telescopes that are combined, emulating a telescope with a size equal to the maximum separation between the 

telescopes. Using electronic intelligence (ELINT) methodology, VLBI measures the time difference of arrival 

(TDOA) of radio waves at separate antennas. VLBI sites, presumably subordinate to the brigade or regimental-level 

61540 Unit, are in Shanghai Sheshan; Kunming; Guizhou Qiaodongnan Huangping County; Wulumuqi Nanshan; 

and Beijing Miyun. See China Surveying and Mapping Yearbook [中国测绘年鉴编], PLA 61540 Unit Successfully 

Joins Moon Satellite Tracking and Control [解放军 61540 部队成功参与探月卫星测控], July 29, 2008. 

http://zgchnj.sbsm.gov.cn/article//ljnjll/lbnj/tz/zdsj/200807/20080700039517.shtml. 89 Lu Jie, Wu Li, and Sun Bo[利用天基雷达观测低地轨道上的危险空间碎片], “Remote Sensing Technology and 

Application,” April 2006, 103–108. http://www.lw23.com/pdf_f45463dc-17f0-4895-b2ac-c9f054db3d58/lunwen.pdf. 90 Zou Weirong (邹维荣),Jia Baohua (贾保华), and Wang Tonghua (王通化),“Launch Complex ‘Heart’ Deals with 

Malfunctions on Eve of Launch” (发射场“心脏”发射前夜突现故障,变电站技师如何应对), PLA Daily, June 

27, 2016. http://www.81.cn/2016cz7h/2016-06/27/content_7120862.htm; Zou Weirong (邹维荣),Jia Baohua (贾保

华), and Wang Tonghua (王通化), “Expressing Confidence in the “‘New Long March’” (“新长征”路上的自信

表达), PLA Daily, August 18, 2016. http://81.cn/2016wycz/2016-08/18/content_7214178_6.htm. 91 For PLASSF reporting on the Yuanwang, see Zou Weirong (邹维荣) and Wei Rong (魏龙), “Yuanwang-7 New 

Generation Survey Ship Officially Commissioned” (我国新一代远洋航天测量船远望 7 号船正式入列), PLA 

Daily, July 12, 2016. http://zz.81.cn/content/2016-07/12/content_7149563_2.htm. 92 The center may be assigned a designation of 63920 部队.
28

of Science’s (CAS) National Astronomical Observatory. APOSOS has near-full coverage of LEO 

and GEO, and is planning an improvement to its optical capabilities.93

ISR, Navigation, Communications, and Meteorological/Hydrological

Capabilities

The PLASSF has launched a range of satellites that have significantly enhanced ISR capabilities, 

fielding advanced communications satellites able to transmit large amounts of data, space systems 

able to provide precise PNT services, and new weather and oceanographic satellites. PLA longrange precision strikes within the Indo-Pacific region would rely in part on high-resolution, dualuse space-based SAR, EO, and possibly electronic intelligence satellites for surveillance and 

targeting. Existing and future data relay satellites and other beyond-line-of-sight communications 

systems could convey targeting data to and from TC centers.94 The PLASSF also manages the 

application of data from space-based systems. Corps or corps deputy leader-base commands 

appear responsible for managing the ground segments of the PLA’s space-based ISR architecture, 

satellite communications network, China’s Beidou GNSS, and space-based meteorological and 

oceanographic system. PLA officers have been noted engaged in international cooperation 

meetings with Russia.95

Space-Based ISR

The PLASSF has focused its resources on increasingly capable remote sensing satellites 

employing digital camera technology, as well as space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour 

coverage. These capabilities are being augmented with electronic reconnaissance satellites able to 

monitor radar and radio transmissions. Electronic reconnaissance satellites monitor radiofrequency 

emissions from U.S. and other naval forces. Electronic reconnaissance systems can cue EO and 

SAR satellites. 96 The PLASSF Space Systems Department Space Reconnaissance Bureau 

probably

93 Members include Iran, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Indonesia, Peru, Turkey, and Thailand. See the APSCO website at 

http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/APSCOCouncil/2019-02-28/74-260-1.shtml. 94 Xinhua, “China Blasts Off First Data Relay Satellite,” April 26, 2008. For an example of the data relay satellite 

being used for missile guidance, see Chen Lihu, Wang Shilian, and Zhang Eryang, “Modeling and Simulation of 

Missile Satellite-Missile Link Channel in Flying-Control Data-Link” (基于卫星中继的导弹飞控数据链链路分析), 

Systems Engineering And Electronics29:6 (2007).The chief designer of the satellite was Ye Peijian [叶培建]. Also 

see Wu Ting-yong, Wu Shi-qi, and Ling Xiang, “A MEO Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System Constellation 

Scheme for China,” Journal of Electronic Science and Technology of China (December 2005). 95 See Beidou Navigation Satellite System(中俄卫星导航重大战略合作项目委员会第六次会议在俄罗斯喀山举

行), August 31, 2019. http://beidou.gov.cn/zt/gfhd/201909/t20190909_18847.html. Yang Changfeng (杨长风) and 

Ran Chengqi (冉承其) appear to be dual hatted as PLA officers and members of a national-level working group on 

satellite navigation.

96 See Pan Changpeng, Gu Wenjin, and Chen Jie, “An Analysis on the Capabilities of Military Satellites to Support 

an ASBM in Offense and Defense Operations” [军事卫星对反舰导弹攻防作战的支援能力分析] No. 5 (2006). 

See also Gao Fei et al., “An Analysis on the Influence of Military Satellite Information Systems on Missile 

Operations” [军事卫星信息系统对导弹作战的影响分析] 29:4 (2008); Hu Xujie et al., “An Analysis on the 
29

probably manages PLA equities in remote sensing satellites.

97

Electro-Optical ISR: China’s first experimental imagery system was launched in November 1975, 

and China has since gradually expanded its EO satellite network. EO satellites appear to be 

assigned Yaogan and Gaofen designations. SASTIND manages the Gaofen satellite engineering 

program, suggesting its dual-use nature. At least eight Gaofen satellites, many equipped with an 

EO sensor, have been launched since 2013, with the latest (Gaofen-11) launched in 2018. Other 

Gaofen satellites are equipped with SAR and hyperspectral sensors.98 The PLA also has launched 

a number of what are probably EO satellites with Yaogan designations. The Yaogan-28 was 

launched in November 2015and at least two of the Yaogan-30 series satellites launched in 

2016/2017 are believed to carry EO payloads. The China Aerospace Science and Technology 

Corporation (CASC) Fifth Academy (China Academy of Space Technology [CAST]) appears to 

serve as lead systems integrator for EO satellites.99

Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellites: SAR satellites are a core component of the militarily

relevant surveillance architecture supporting over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting of surface assets. 

SAR satellites use a microwave transmission to create an image of maritime and ground-based 

targets. They can operate night or day and in all weather conditions, and are therefore well suited 

Effectiveness of Space-Based Information to Support Missile Offense and Defense Operations” [天基信息支援对

导弹攻防作战的效用分析]18:1 (2009); Huang Xuan et al., “Graph Modeling Influence of Space-Based 

Information Supporting Aerospace Force Anti-Ship Missile Assault” [天基信息支援下航空兵对海导弹攻击的影

响图模型], Vol. 2 (2007). 97 The Space Reconnaissance Bureau likely is assigned an external designation of 61646 部队. It oversees the 

Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Information (北京遥感信息研究所). As of 2018, Major General Jiang Bitao 

(江碧涛; b. 1967) serves as a deputy director or possibly director of the PLASSF Space Reconnaissance Bureau. 

She served as a chief designer for a satellite ground application system and played a key role in program validation 

for a number of programs. Jiang previously served as chief engineer (总工程师) and carries a researcher (研究员) 

designation. She has been affiliated with Unit 61646, the Space Reconnaissance Bureau, and the Beijing Institute of 

Remote Sensing Information. Among various sources, see Scientist Committee (学术委员会), CAS Key Lab for 

Space Utilization website. http://lsu.csu.cas.cn/sysgk/xswyh/. Also see “Xie Dong, Member of the Branch Party 

Committee, Leads Team to Visit PLA Strategic Support Force Bureau Director Jiang” (分行党委委员谢东带队拜

会解放军战略支援部队某局江局长), August 8, 2018. https://www.meipian.cn/1ibgek24. 98 See the Gaofen program information portal at http://gaofenplatform.com/channels/487.html. Among other 

sources, see China National Space Administration, Successful Launch of China’s Gaofen High-Resolution Earth 

Observation System, (我国高分辨率对地观测系统重大专项首星发射成功航天发射任务迎来开门红), April 24, 

2014. http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n1081/n7529/n308593/526166.html. For reference to the PLA’s role in the Gaofen 

program, see China Transport Telecommunications & Information Center [中国交通通信信息中心], “PLASSF 

Aerospace Reconnaissance Bureau Discusses Gaofen Remote Sensors Applications and Requirements for ‘One Belt 

One Road’ [战略支援部队航天侦察局交流高分遥感“一带一路”应用需求],” February 22, 2017.

https://www.cttic.cn/info/1613. As of 2011, Chen Jianxiang (陈建祥), who was assigned to the former GAD Space 

Reconnaissance Bureau, served as chief engineer of the former GAD Gaofen program office. 

99 S. Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, “China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites & the Anti-Ship Ballistic 

Missile,” National Institute of Advanced Studies, May 2016, 8–11. http://isssp.in/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/Yaogan-and-ASBM-May-2016-Report.pdf. For example, Li Jindong (李劲东)was cited in 

2008 reporting as assigned to the Fifth Academy design department and appointed as chief designer of a user 

interface program in 2005. He is cited as chief designer of the Yaogan-28 and Gaofen-11. He was appointed as 

deputy chief designer of the CBERS (中巴地球资源卫星) program in 2004. 
30

for the detection of ships in a wide area. SAR imagery is key for automated target recognition of 

ships at sea.100 China is expected to have multiple types of space-based SAR systems in orbit over 

the coming years, often catering to various users. The PLA’s first dedicated military SAR satellite 

likely was deployed in 2006.101 Since then, remote sensing satellites with a SAR package include 

the Gaofen-3, Yaogan-1, Yaogan-6, Yaogan-10, Yaogan-13, Yaogan-18, and Yaogan-23, and 

possibly the Yaogan-29.

102 The CASC Shanghai Academy of Space Technology (SAST) likely 

serves as lead systems integrator for SAR satellites.103

Electronic Reconnaissance Satellites: To augment its SAR and EO systems, the PLA likely has 

fielded a space-based electronic reconnaissance architecture. 104 The PLA experimented with 

electronic reconnaissance satellites in the mid-1970s.

105 Design studies on a modern electronic 

reconnaissance satellite constellation for geolocation of surface targets began in the mid-1990s.106

100 Chen Deyuan and Tu Guofang, “SAR Image Enhancement Using Multi-Scale Products for Targets Detection, 

Remote Sensing Journal [Yaoganxuebao] (March 2007):185–192. The authors are from the Institute of Electronics, 

CAS. 101 In development for a decade, the Yaogan-1 was launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center on April 27, 

2006. A subsequent system, the Yaogan-6, was launched on April 22, 2009, and at least three follow-on variants 

have been launched to date. Among these are theYaogan-8, developed over a four-year period, and the Xiwang-1 

microsatellite, launched on an LM-4C from Taiyuan on December 16, 2009.Other possible follow-on variants, 

designated Yaogan-10 and Yaogan-13, were launched from Taiyuan in August 2010 and November 2011,

respectively. See China Ministry of Science and Technology, CASC Eighth Academy Successfully Launches 

Yaogan-10 Satellite [航天八院为遥感卫星十号发射成功奋战发射场], November 1, 2010. 

http://kjj.boluo.gov.cn/show.asp?id=481. 102 See, for example, Rui C. Barbosa, “Long March 2C Conducts Surprise Yaogan-23 Launch,” NASA Spaceflight, 

November 14, 2014. https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2014/11/long-march-2c-surprise-yaogan-23/. 103 For example, Chen Junli (陈筠力; b. 1972) was cited in 2007 reporting as director of the 509th Research 

Institute’s general design lab (总体室主任), and as directing designer on the Yaogan-1 satellite. Chen has published 

on distributed and synchronized SAR satellite architecture control issues. Chen was also chief designer for both the 

Yaogan-6 (遥感六号), which was launched from Taiyuan in April 2009, and the Yaogan-13 satellite, which was 

launched from Taiyuan on November 30, 2011.

104 For early assessments on the utility of space-based electronic reconnaissance systems, see Yuan Xiaokang, 

“Satellite Electronic Reconnaissance, Antijamming,” Shanghai Hangtian, October 9, 1996,32–37, in FBIS-CST-97-

011; Yuan Xiaokang, “Some Problems of Space Electronic Reconnaissance,” Hangtian Dianzi Duikang, March 

1996,1–5, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 4. Yuan is a key engineer involved space-based antenna systems design, including 

both ELINT and SAR, from the SAST 509th Research Institute (Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering).

105 The first electronic satellite was launched from Jiuquan in July 1975 on an FB-1 launch vehicle, which was 

specifically designed to meet the weight and orbital accuracy requirements of electronic reconnaissance platforms. 

The FB-1 launched two more experimental satellites in December 1975 and August 1976. For unknown reasons, the 

program was discontinued. Before the reorganization, the former GSD ECM and Radar Department (GSD Fourth 

Department) had the ELINT portfolio within the PLA’s SIGINT apparatus. ELINT receivers are the responsibility 

of the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment. The former GSD 54th Research Institute supported the ECM 

Department in development of digital ELINT signal processors to analyze parameters of radar pulses. See Ping

Kefu, “Capabilities of The GSD Third Department in Technical Intelligence,” East Asian Diplomacy and Defense 

Review 96:5, 6. Information on China’s SIGINT apparatus drawn from Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in 

China,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1, 1995, 365–375; Robert Karniol, “China Sets Up Border SIGINT 

Bases in Laos,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 19, 1994, 5. 106 Also see Yuan Xiaokang, “Satellite Electronic Reconnaissance, Antijamming,” Shanghai Hangtian, October 9, 

1996, 32–37, in FBIS-CST-97-011; Yuan Xiaokang, “Some Problems of Space Electronic Reconnaissance,” 

Hangtian Dianzi Duikang, March 1996, 1–5, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 4. Yuan was a key engineer involved space-
31

The PLA appears to be investing resources into constellations of two, three, or four satellites using 

time difference of arrival direction finding or geolocation techniques.107 Leading candidates for 

electronic reconnaissance satellites include the Shijian-6, Yaogan-9, and Yaogan-16.

108

The Yaogan-30 satellite series appears to be the most recent electronic reconnaissance system. As 

of October 2019, China had 15 Yaogan-30 military satellites in orbit.109 These satellites appear to 

be part of a naval ocean surveillance system that enables the PLA to triangulate and target U.S. 

aircraft carrier strike groups and other warships of interest.110 These satellites operate in trios and 

likely support China’s antiship weapons programs, which include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, 

and armed drones designed to evade or destroy the air defenses surrounding U.S. aircraft 

carriers.

111 According to one analysis of orbital data, China’s 15 Yaogan-30 satellites provide the 

PLA with near-continuous global coverage of all U.S. naval activities relevant to Chinese security 

based antenna systems design, including both ELINT and SAR, from the SAST 509th Research Institute (Shanghai 

Institute of Satellite Engineering).

107 Li Wenhua, “Research on Configuring Three-Satellites and Time Difference of Arrival for Precise GeoLocation” [三星构型设计与时差定位精度研究], Journal of Astronautics [宇航学报] (March 2010): 701–705. The 

author is affiliated with the Jiangnan Electronic Communication Institute in Jiaxing; Li Jianjun, “Research on FourSatellite TDOA Location Algorithm” [四星时差定位算法研究], Electronic Warfare Technology [电子对抗技术]

(July 2004): 3. The author is affiliated with the Southwest China Research Institute of Electronic Equipment (29th

Research Institute) in Chengdu; Gao Qian et al., “A Correcting Algorithm of Single Source Reference Source for 

Three-Satellite TDOA Location System” [一种三星时差定位系统的校正算法研究], Aerospace Electronic 

Warfare [航天电子对抗]23:5 (2007). The authors are affiliated with the National University of Defense 

Technology. Wu Shilong, Zhao Yongsheng, and Luo Jingqing, “Performance Analysis of Two-Satellite Joint FDOA 

and TDOA Location System” [双星时差频差联合定位系统性能分析], Aerospace Shanghai [上海航空], No. 2

(2007): 47. Wu and Zhao are affiliated with the GSD Fourth Department 61541 Unit in Beijing, and Luo is affiliated 

with the PLA Electronic Engineering Institute in Hefei. The 61541 Unit is said to be located in “Space City” [航天

城]north of the Zhongguancun section of Beijing, and appears to serve as an information fusion and R&D center 

focusing on phased lock loop receiving technology, among other issues. 108 The Shijian-6A and Shijian-6B technology demonstration satellites were launched in tandem in September 2004. 

A second pair of Shijian-6 satellites (SJ-6C and SJ-6D) was launched in October 2006. A third pair (SJ-6E and SJ6F) was launched in October 2008, and a fourth pair (SJ-6G and SJ-6H) was launched in October 2010.Responsible 

for the A satellite, Shen Cong [沈琮] had previously worked on programs previously believed to be related to 

electronic reconnaissance in the 1970s. CASC Fifth Academy’s Wu Kailin [吴开林] was chief designer of the SJ-6B 

satellite [实践六号 B], which operated in conjunction with the SJ-6A. 109 Xinhua, “China Successfully Launches Yaogan-30 Group 05 Satellites” (我国成功发射遥感三十号 05 组卫星

),July 26, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-07/26/c_1210215704.htm; Gunter’s Space Page,“Yaogan-30-

01, 30-02, 30-03, 30-04, 30-05, 30-06 (CX 5).”https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/yaogan-30-01.htm. 110 For background on China’s naval ocean surveillance system, see Ian Easton and Mark A. Stokes, “China’s 

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations,” Project 

2049 Institute, February 23, 2011. https://project2049.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/china_electronic_intelligence_elint_satellite_developments_easton_stokes.pdf. 

111 Ian Easton and Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications 

for U.S. Air and Naval Operations,” Project 2049 Institute, February 23, 2011. https://project2049.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/china_electronic_intelligence_elint_satellite_developments_easton_stokes.pdf. See also 

Ian Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: 

Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” Project 2049 Institute, March 11, 2013.

https://project2049.net/2013/03/11/the-chinese-peoples-liberation-armys-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-projectorganizational-capacities-and-operational-capabilities/.
32

interests. 112 Major surface vessels, such as aircraft carriers, have prominent electromagnetic, 

acoustic, and infrared signatures and large radar cross sections. Although controlling emissions 

from carriers is feasible for limited periods of time, air operations depend on electromagnetic 

radiation.113

Organizations most likely responsible for space-based electronic reconnaissance, such as CASC 

Eighth Academy 509th Institute and the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment, have 

published detailed assessments of how best to track and target aircraft carriers and other large 

naval ships. 114 Chinese writings have indicated that while the numbers of electronic 

reconnaissance satellites are increasing, they have been unable to meet the demands placed on 

them from different intelligence consumers.115 Technical studies also have assessed the utility of 

electronic reconnaissance payloads on satellites in GEO.

116 An electronic reconnaissance satellite 

112 Gosnold, “The Yaogan-30 High-Revisit Constellation, Satellite Observation Blog, October 26, 2019.

https://satelliteobservation.net/2017/12/03/the-yaogan-30-high-revisit-constellation/. 113 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of the Aircraft Carrier, October 2002, 52–53. 114 Huang Hanwen, “Maritime Target Surveillance Satellite System Analysis and Development Assumptions” [卫星

海洋目标监视系统分析与发展设想], Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command & Technology [装备指挥

技术学院学报], October 2004, 44–48. http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/periodical_zhjsxy200405011.aspx.The author is 

affiliated with the Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering, or SAST 509th Research Institute. Also see Gao Fei et 

al., “An Analysis on the Influence of Military Satellite Information Systems on Missile Operations” [军事卫星信息

系统对导弹作战的影响分析], National Defense Science and Technology [国防科技]29:4 (2008); Hu Xujie et al., 

“An Analysis on the Effectiveness of Space-Based Information to Support Missile Offense and Defense Operations” 

[天基信息支援对导弹攻防作战的效用分析], Spacecraft Engineering [航空器工程]18:1 (2009); Huang Xuan et 

al., “Graph Modeling Influence of Space-Based Information Supporting Aerospace Force Anti-Ship Missile 

Assault” [天基信息支援下航空兵对海导弹攻击的影响图模型], Tactical Missile Technology [战术导弹技术], 

Vol. 2 (2007). 115 Wang Huilin et al., “Design and Implementation of Area-Covering Electronic Reconnaissance Satellite Planning 

System” [面向区域的电子侦察卫星规划系统设计与实现], Computer Engineering and Applications [计算机工程

与应用]46:26 (2010): 209. The authors are affiliated with the National University of Defense Technology’s 

National Key C4ISR Technology Laboratory in Changsha. Their research was conducted as part of the 973 

Program.

116 Dong Qiaozhong and Zhu Weiqiang, “Research on ELINT Satellite Techniques in GSO” [静止轨道电子侦察卫

星技术研究], Electronic Warfare [电子对抗],July 30, 2009, 13.The authors are affiliated with the CASIC 8511 

Research Institute in Nanjing; Lu An’nan, “Thoughts on Developmental Problems of ELINT Satellite Passive Geolocation Techniques” [对电子侦察卫星无源定位技术发展问题的思考], Communications Countermeasures [通信

对抗], March 2008, 19–20. The author is affiliated with the 36th Research Institute of CETC in Jiaxing, Zhejiang; 

Li Hengnian et al. “The Strategies and Algorithm Study for Multi-GEO Satellite Collocation” [地球静止轨道共位

控制策略研究], Journal of Astronautics [宇航学报]30:3 (2009).Also see Dong Qiaozhong and Zhu Weiqiang,

“Study on Electronic Reconnaissance Satellites in Geostationary Orbit” [静止轨道电子侦察卫星技术研究], 

Electronic Countermeasures, June 2009. http://www.cqvip.com/qk/91679x/200906/32557007.html. The authors are 

from the CASIC 8511 Research Institute in Nanjing. A cluster of three Yaogan-9 satellites were launched from 

China’s Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center on March 5, 2010. The formation orbits in a 1080 km x 1100 km x 63.4 

degree position, strikingly reminiscent of earlier generations of the U.S. “White Cloud” Naval Ocean Surveillance 

System (NOSS) satellite triplets described in detail by Chinese writings. Among various sources, see Jane’s Defense 

Weekly, “China’s Yaogan-9 May Be Ocean Surveillance Satellite,” March 11, 2010. 

http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Defence-Weekly-2010/China-s-Yaogan-9-may-be-ocean-surveillance-
33

constellation would offer the PLA the ability to geolocate U.S. and allied naval ship activity. The 

latest Yaogan-30 satellite was launched in July 2019.117

In short, increasingly greater spatial resolution and an ability to monitor U.S. activity in the IndoPacific region (including the locations of U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups) in all weather 

conditions is likely to enhance China’s ability to conduct military operations farther from shore. 

Space-based sensors also provide the data necessary for mission planning functions, such as 

terminal guidance for ballistic and land attack cruise missiles.

Survey, Mapping, and Navigation

The PLASSF also is responsible for space-based military survey, mapping, and navigation 

operations. Survey, mapping, and navigation systems facilitate force movement and logistics, and 

are used for ballistic and cruise missile targeting and precision-guided munitions. A corps leadergrade base command, probably designated as Base 35, is headquartered in Wuhan and may have 

integrated a range of survey, mapping, and navigation missions previously carried out by the GSD 

Operations Department and Military Regions. Division leader-grade “battlefield environment 

support” (战场环境保障) units previously under GSD include the Beidou GNSS ground segment, 

which previously was managed by the GSD Operations Department Survey and Mapping

Bureau.118 Base 35 appears to have a working relationship with Wuhan University’s Collaborative 

satellite.html. The initial indication that the Yaogan-9 may be a NOSS system came from a number of amateur 

astronomers who reported that the Yaogan-9 mission saw the launch of not one, but rather a constellation of three 

satellites that are now orbiting together in a highly choreographed triangular formation. For example, see Gunter’s 

Space Page, “Yaogan 9A, 9B, 9C.” http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/yaogan-9.htm; NASA Spaceflight.com,

“Yaogan Weixing-9 CZ-4C Launch March 5, 2010,” March 5, 2010. 

http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=20567.30; Robert Christy, “Space Events of 2010,” Zarya. 

http://www.zarya.info/Diaries/2010.php; Jonathan’s Space Report, “Yaogan Weixing 9,” No. 625, April 6, 2010. 

http://planet4589.org/space/jsr/back/news.625. 117 Rui C. Barbosa, “Long March 2C Lofts Yaogan-30 Group 05 Satellites,” NASA Spaceflight.com, July 25, 2019. 

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2019/07/long-march-2c-yaogan-30-group-05-satellites/. 118 Base 35 may carry an external designation of 32020 部队. For reference to Unit 32020 on Wuhan’s Donghu East 

Road (武汉市武昌区东湖东路), see (32020 部队 54#楼整修工程招标公告) at 

http://cn.jixiexinxi5.com/supply/201710/17/492280.html. For reference to PLASSF Base 35 (战略支援部队 35 基) 

and Base 35 Staff Department division directors Liu Chenglai and Li Hengyuan (35 基地参谋部处长刘成来、处长

李鹤元)—the latter was previously with the Survey and Mapping Technology Command (测绘信息技术总站; Unit 

61363) in Xian—see (蔡列飞), “Joining Hands with the Wuhan Donghu New Technology Development Zone” (与

武汉东湖新技术开发区携手共进), State Key Lab for Engineering in Survey, Mapping, and Remote Sensing (测绘

遥感信息工程国家重点实验室) website, September 22, 2017.

http://www.lmars.whu.edu.cn/index.php/kydt/2029.html. Among other sources, see Zou Weirong (邹维荣) and Zong

Zhaodun (宗兆盾), “Commemorating Tan Shusen of Beidou Satellite Navigation Command” (记投身北斗事业的

某卫星导航定位总站高级工程师谭述森院士), PLA Daily, February 27, 2016.

http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0227/c64104-28155004.html. The Beidou satellite navigation and positioning 

command carries an external designation of 61081 部队. Also see Marcus Clay, “Supporting the Infinitive 

Battlefield,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019, 38–41.
34

Innovation Center of Geospatial Technology.

119

Three generations of Beidou satellites have been in operation since 2000. China’s first-generation 

navigation satellite system, the Beidou-1, consisted of two geosynchronous satellites (plus spares) 

for civilian and military purposes and was limited to coverage within the Asia-Pacific region. This 

was an active location system, with a signal from a handheld unit transmitted to the two 

geosynchronous satellites, which then transmitted the signal to an earth station. The earth station 

measured the differential in the two signals (one per satellite), determined the location that fit, and 

then transmitted that data back to the handheld unit. 

Planning for a second generation of navigation satellites, Beidou-2 (Compass), began in April 

1999 under the sponsorship of the former GSD First Department and with participation from 

civilian entities. The eighth Beidou-2 satellite was launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center 

in April 2011, with another 24 satellites expected. An emphasis was placed on system survivability, 

division of military and civilian bandwidth usage, laser ranging, and integration of micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) technology.120 The first launch of a third-generation Beidou satellite 

took place in 2017 from Xichang Satellite Launch Center. The Tianhui mapping satellites augment 

the Beidou system. The PLA-managed China Tianhui Satellite Center directs operations and is

located in Beijing’s Xibeiwang township.121

119 For example, Unit 32020 appears to have cooperated with Wuhan University on the Luojia-1 satellite program. 

The satellite is a prototype for a future 60-80 earth observation satellite constellation. Luojia 1 features an imager 

with 100-meter ground resolution. See Xintiandi, “Luojia-1-01 On-Orbit Evaluation Meeting and Night Illumination 

Remote Sensing Application Research Meeting Convene” (珞珈一号 01 星在轨测试评审会暨夜光遥感应用研讨

会召开), July 10, 2018. http://www.sohu.com/a/240202947_650579. For reference to Unit 32030 cooperation with 

Wuhan University and responsibility for “Space Information Support” (空天信息保障), see “Academicians and 

Experts Collaborate to Construct the Military-Civil Fusion Laboratory of Aerospace Information” (院士专家共谋空

天信息军民融合实验室建设), Wuhan University Collaborative Innovation Center of Geospatial Technology(地球

空间信息技术协同创新中心) website, December 6, 2017. 

http://innogst.whu.edu.cn/newsnoticedetail.jsp?id=y0jfrlvv5j (link no longer active). 120 Key engineers included Liu Jiyu, a leading engineer from the Wuhan University of Survey and Mapping 

Technology. See University Network, “Liu Jiyu” [刘基余], November 2009.

http://www.daxue1g.cn/fengyunrenwu/200911/4570.html. 121 The Tianhui Satellite Center (中国天绘卫星中心) carries a military unit cover designation of 61618. For 

reference to Tianhui and the PLA, see 梁蓬飞, 张能华, and 张振威, “Crack Surveying Team Matures and Walks 

the “Green Road,” Resolving the Whole Military’s Problems” (测绘奇才部队成长走“绿色通道” 破解全军难题), 

PLA Daily, June 22, 2016. http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-06/22/content_7112522.htm. For reference to Ren Shujun 

(任树军) as Tianhui Satellite Center director, see “Focus on the Frontier, Practice Grand Strategy: Wang Yuxiang, 

Chairman of Aerospace Hongtu, Leads a Delegation to Attend the Songshan Remote Sensing Forum” (聚焦最前

沿,实践大战略——航天宏图董事长王宇翔博士率团参加嵩山遥感论坛), Piesat website, April 28, 2018. 

http://www.piesat.cn/portal/article/1524904480648.html. For affiliation of Ren Shuwang with Unit 61618, see 

“2017 Internal Evaluation and Assessment Meeting of National Special Environmental and Special Function 

Observation Research Station Shared Service Platform Convenes” (国家特殊环境、特殊功能观测研究台站共享

服务平台 2017 年内部评价考核工作会议召开). http://www.crensed.ac.cn/portal/news/detail/fba029e9-74cc4bae-aa26-ce2515db09d0. 
35

Satellite Communications and Data Relay

Satellite communications (SATCOM) enable beyond-line-of-sight connectivity between joint 

commanders and subordinate units, and between operational units. SATCOM will become 

particularly important as the PLA operates farther from China’s borders. Since the launch of 

China’s first experimental communications satellite in January 1984 and the first operational 

system in March 1988, the country’s SATCOM capacity has grown in sophistication. Before the 

development and launch of dedicated military communications satellites, the PLA most likely 

leased civilian transponders operating in the C- and Ku-bands, such as SinoSat and ChinaSat. The 

PLA likely continues to lease transponder space, but this cannot be confirmed at the current time.

The PLASSF Space Systems Department develops operational and technical requirements for 

dedicated military communications satellites, such as the Fenghuo and Shentong systems. 

Fenghuo-1 (ChinaSat-22) was launched in January 2000 and functioned as the PLA’s first

dedicated military communications satellite. Weighing 2,300 kilograms (kg) and designed to 

operate for eight years, Fenghuo-2 (ChinaSat-22A) was launched in September 2006. Shentong-1

(ChinaSat-20), was launched in November 2003, and is said to incorporate steerable spot beams 

operating in the Ku-band. Follow-on satellites were launched from Xichang in 2010, 2015, and 

January 2018.122 Since 2017, China also has carried out verification testing of a wideband (Kaband) communications satellite. The SJ-20 satellite was launched from Wenchang on an LM-5 in 

December 2019, and validated a new-generation communications satellite bus, the DFH-5. The 

DFH-5 is China’s heaviest satellite to date. The same platforms have been used for testing of laser 

communications and electronic propulsion.123

The PLASSF Space Systems Department manages the PLA’s SATCOM network. A new base 

command, notionally designated Base 37, was established in 2017 in the Beijing suburb of 

Mentougou.124 To expand the scope of its communications satellite architecture, China has fielded 

122 Sun Jiadong is said to have played a leading role in the Fenghuo satellite. The chief designer of the Fenghuo is 

said to be Peng Shoucheng [彭守诚]. Peng has a background in the 504thResearch Institute and has a background in 

electronic reconnaissance. The chief designer of the Shentong-1 was Wang Jiasheng [王家胜]. Born in 1953, Wang 

served as deputy chief designer of the DFH-3 COMSAT and chief designer of the Tianlian-1 data relay satellite. For

reference to the January 2018 launch, see https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2019/01/long-march-3b-lofts-chinasat2d/. 123The SJ-13 was launched from Xichang in April 2017 using a DFH-3 satellite bus. See CASC Fifth 

Academy ,CASC Fifth Academy-Developed SJ-13 Successfully Launched(我院研制的实践十三号卫星成功发射), 

April 12, 2017. http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/4/373300.shtm. The SJ-18, launched on an LM-5 in June 

2017, failed to reach proper orbit. For reference to the SJ-20, see S&T Daily, “SJ-20 Satellite Launched, First Flight 

of DFH-5 Platform” (实践二十号卫星上岗东五平台首飞成功), January 6, 2020. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2020-01/06/c_1125424476.htm. 124 Base 37 may carry a military unit cover designation of 32039. The base headquarters appears to be located in the 

compound housing of the former GSD Satellite Communications Command (Unit 61096). In 2017 reporting, Huang 

Huiming (黄惠明) was cited as director and Lu Guiqi is political commissar (鲁贵齐). Huang Huiming previously 

directed the GAD Data Relay Control and Management Center (总装备部中继卫星控制管理中心) in the 2012 

timeframe. Among various sources, see “Mentougou District and Troops Stationed in the District Discuss Promoting 

The Common Development of Both” (门头沟区与驻区部队座谈促进双方共同发展), (京西时报), June 6, 2017. 
36

a data relay capability. Operations are directed by the PLASSF Data Relay Satellite Control Center. 

While the exact hierarchy is unclear, the Data Relay Control Center may be subordinate to the 

Space Control Center.

125 China’s first-generation data relay satellite, the Tianlian-1, was launched 

in April 2008 and a second was launched in July 2011. Theoretically, the satellites, using a basic 

DFH-3 bus, support the crewed space program. The satellites also could allow sensors to operate 

beyond line of sight of ground stations in China.126

Meteorology, Oceanography, and Space Weather

The PLASSF also manages military meteorological satellite data and oversees a specialized unit 

responsible for space weather analysis and forecasting.127 These conditions can influence the 

performance and reliability of space-borne and ground-based systems and can endanger human 

life or health. These conditions can cause disruptions of satellite operations, communications, radar, 

navigation, high-altitude crewed flight, and electrical power distribution. Since its inception in 

1988, China’s Fengyun (FY) weather satellite program began with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s 

1970 approval of a CMC proposal to initiate R&D on meteorological satellites.128 With the launch 

of the first FY-1A in 1988, China became the third country to launch its own meteorological 

satellites. Nominally administrated by the China Meteorological Administration (CMA), the FY 

series appear to be roughly analogous to those associated with the U.S Defense Meteorological 

Satellite Program. The FY-4, equipped with space weather sensors, is China’s most advanced 

space asset providing meteorological support to PLA and other users. As a dual-use asset, FY 

satellite requirements appear to have been developed by both the PLASSF and CMA, although 

their respective responsibilities remain unknown. The system also could provide measurement and

signature intelligence data for PLA targeting.129 The PLASSF has launched at least 16 FY satellites.

http://www.bjmtg.gov.cn/jrmtg/yw/201706/t20170606_66168.html. Also see Marcus Clay, “Supporting the Infinitive 

Battlefield,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019, 44–45. 125 The Data Relay Satellite Control Center probably carried an external designation of 63999 部队. 126 Xinhua, “China Blasts Off First Data Relay Satellite,” April 26, 2008; Xinhua, “China Successfully Launches 

First Data Relay Satellite, the Tianlian-1 (01)” [中国首颗数据中继卫星“天链一号 01 星”发射成功], April 26, 

2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-04/26/content_8053374.htm. Also see Xinhua, “China Launches New 

Data Relay Satellite,” July 12, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/sci/2011-07/12/c_13978690.htm.For an 

example of the data relay satellite being used for missile guidance, see Chen Lihu, Wang Shilian, and Zhang Eryang, 

“Modeling and Simulation of Missile Satellite-Missile Link Channel in Flying-Control Data-Link” [基于卫星中继

的导弹飞控数据链链路分析],Systems Engineering and Electronics29:6 (2007). The chief designer of the satellite 

was Ye Peijian [叶培建]. 127 See Renminwang, “GSD Weather and Oceanographic Space Weather Command Supports Shenzhou-8 Launch” 

[总参某气象水文空间天气总站保障“神八”发射], November 1, 2011.

http://military.people.com.cn/GB/172467/16087308.html. The former GSD Meteorological, Hydrological, and 

Space Weather Command (总参气象水文空间天气总站) was a division leader-grade unit and carried a designation 

of 61741 部队. 128 China Meteorological Newspaper [中国气象报社],“Premier Zhou En-lai: We Shall Establish Our Own Weather 

Satellites” [周恩来总理提出“要搞我们自己的气象卫星”], March 15, 2011.

http://www.cma.gov.cn/ztbd/20110104/20110314/2011031405/201103/t20110315_88685.html. 129 See Sina News, “Delivery of Four FY-3 Payloads and Satellite Testing” [风云三号气象卫星 4 项有效载荷交付

总体装星测试], August 8, 2006. http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2006-08-08/15291076129.shtml.
37

Oceanographic satellites, like meteorological satellites, support military operations. 

Oceanographic satellites are useful for disaster warning, recovery, and response, support for 

fishing, and exploitation of maritime resources, as well as for military operations. Multispectral 

sensors may be able to detect ships at sea. The Haiyang (HY) series of satellites was first launched 

in 2002. An initial follow-on variant, the HY-2, was launched in 2009, with subsequent launches 

expected in 2012, 2015, and 2019. Requirements were developed by the State Oceanic 

Administration, presumably with PLA input. HY satellites, integrating EO and other sensors, are 

mainly used for monitoring watercolor, water environment, and temperatures.130 HY-2 integrates 

microwave technology to detect sea surface wind field, sea surface height, and sea surface 

temperature. R&D on a more advanced ocean monitoring system incorporating SAR technology, 

the HY-3, is well underway.131 One study noted that the FY-3 includes a prototype package 

intended to support other sensors, such as OTH radar systems, to compensate for sea clutter when 

tracking aircraft carriers and other moving targets at sea. Greater resolution enables more precise 

targeting.132

In short, Fengyun and Haiyang satellites collect and provide strategic weather and oceanographic 

data for civilian and military purposes. An accurate assessment of current and future weather 

conditions, such as cloud cover, atmospheric moisture, winds, temperature, and ocean currents, is 

critical for a range of military operations. Weather satellites can measure electromagnetic 

conditions in the ionosphere that could affect OTH radar and communication systems. They also 

can provide militarily useful data associated with complex maritime environments and terrains, 

including observation of targets under camouflage or perhaps even underground. Meteorological 

and hydrographic satellites would facilitate PLA operations at sea at increasingly long ranges.

Deep Space Operations

The PLA and its civilian counterparts are moving beyond Earth’s orbit and into deep space. PLA 

ambitions in deep space are intimately linked with China’s lunar program. The China National 

Space Administration (CNSA) administers China’s lunar exploration program. The former PLA 

Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense began detailed planning 

in 1998. By 2004, the State Council and CCP Central Committee directed the formation of a Lunar 

Exploration Project Leading Small Group to coordinate efforts across the bureaucracy. In 2013, 

China became the first space power to land on the moon since the Soviet Union’s mission in 1976. 

China’s various motivations include mining of helium-3 as a replacement for fossil fuels and solar 

130 Oceanographic monitoring is a focus area within the 863 Program, specifically the maritime area [海洋领域]. 

Also see China Great Wall Industry Corporation, “China’s Three-Dimensional Oceanographic System.”

http://www.cgwic.com/In-OrbitDelivery/RemoteSensingSatellite/SEA.html. 131 Jiang Xingwei, Lin Mingsen, and Tang Junwu, “The Programs of China Ocean Observation Satellites and 

Applications,” National Satellite Ocean Application Service briefing, February 26, 2008 (in English). 132 Fudan University Project Overview, “Theory and Application of Collection and Fusion of Information Regarding 

Complex Natural Environments” [复杂自然环境时空定量信息获取与融合处理的理论与应用], June 2004.

http://www.guochengzhi.com/gx/Print.asp?ArticleID=371.
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power. Four lunar exploration spacecraft—designated Chang’e—have been launched to date.133

In December 2018, the Chang’e-4 mission deployed an initial lunar rover that explored the far side 

of the moon. The mission also entered a “parking orbit” at Lagrangian Point-2 on the moon’s far 

side.134 China seeks to lead internationally in lunar research, also investing in Mars and asteroid 

exploration. By 2020, China intends to launch its first Mars exploration vehicle that will land on 

the surface of the planet. A future mission will bring back samples from Mars.135

The direct benefits to the PLA of the lunar exploration program, including activities on the far side 

of the moon, are unclear. However, the PLA manages significant components, including space 

launch, tracking and control, and benefits from the scientific research stemming from investments 

into the program. The CMC Equipment Development Department oversees an expert working 

group for validating a manned lunar landing program.136 As part of its lunar exploration program, 

China has demonstrated critical military capabilities in space, such as proximity operations and 

loitering.

In support of the lunar exploration and other programs, the PLA maintains a dedicated deep space 

tracking and communications network. Deep space tracking and communications stations are

located in Kashgar, Kunming, Beijing, Qingdao, and Jiamusi. Overseas stations are in Namibia 

and Argentina.137 The PLA’s deep space surveillance system is augmented by very-long-baseline 

133 Leading advocates included Ouyang Ziyuan and Chu Guibo. For an excellent overview of the lunar program 

policy, see Patrick Besha, “Policy Making in China’s Space Program: A History and Analysis of the Chang’e Lunar 

Orbiter Project,” Space Policy 26 (2010). http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Besha_article_2010.pdf.Also see 

Xinhua, “China to Launch 2nd Lunar Probe before End of 2011,” November 12, 2008.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-11/12/content_7199005.htm. For reference to potential of Helium-3, see 

John Lasker, “Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel,” Wired, December 15, 2006.

http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2006/12/72276. Also see Namrata Goswami, “China Has a Head Start in 

the New Space Race,” Diplomat, May 29, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/china-has-a-head-start-in-thenew-space-race/. 134 Patrick Tucker, “China’s Moon Missions Could Threaten US Satellites: Pentagon,” Defense One, October 16, 

2018. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/10/chinas-moon-missions-could-threaten-us-satellitespentagon/152084/. 135 For background on China’s lunar program, see the CNSA China Lunar Exploration Program website at 

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758844/n6760026/index.html. Also see National Air and Space Intelligence 

Center, Competing in Space, December 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-

F-NV711-0002.PDF. 136 For reference to the CMC/EDD Manned Lunar Landing Program Validation Expert Working Group (载人登月

综合论证专家组), see Xian Jiaotong University, “Professor Yang Yikang” (杨宜康教授), November 20, 2018.

http://mail.sei.xjtu.edu.cn/html/tt/dmt/p/2018/1120/10.html. Also see Renminwang, “Manned Lunar Landing Expert 

Meeting Convenes in Beijing” (载人登月专题研讨会议在京召开), May 11, 2010.

http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/11567265.html. 137 For a detailed examination of China’s deep space tracking and control system, see Dong Guangliang (董光亮) et 

al., “Construction and Technical Development of Chinese Deep Space Exploration Systems” (中国深空测控系统建

设与技术发展), Journal of Deep Space Exploration, December 30, 2017.

http://jdse.bit.edu.cn/html/sktcxbcn/2018/2/20180201.htm. The authors are from the Beijing Institute of Tracking 

and Telecommunications Technology (BITTT; 北京跟踪与通信技术研究所). A precursor of the PLASSF Space 

Systems Department—China Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC; 中国卫星发射测控系统部)—manages 
39

interferometry sites controlled by the China Academy of Sciences.138 Little if any information is 

available regarding jamming capabilities in deep space.

Current and Future Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Counterspace Operations

China has an operational counterspace capability that will evolve through 2020 and out to 2035. 

These capabilities include antisatellite KKV and space electronic countermeasures. The former 

GAD and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) demonstrated a space 

intercept KKV in January 2007. According to U.S. government reporting, China allegedly has 

military units that have begun training with antisatellite missiles. While speculative, one possibility 

is that the PLA Rocket Force, given its synergistic relationship with the PLASSF, has been 

assigned space intercept as a secondary mission. 

On the non-kinetic side, the PLA has an operational ground-based satellite electronic 

countermeasures (ECM) capability designed to disrupt adversary use of SATCOM, navigation, 

SAR, missile early warning, and other satellites through use of jamming.

139 The PLA initially 

acquired ground-based satellite jammers from Ukraine in the late 1990s and has indigenously 

developed satellite ECM since then. The PLA is capable of carrying out ECM to disrupt, deny, 

deceive, or degrade space services. Jamming prevents users from receiving intended signals and 

can be accomplished by attacking uplinks and downlinks. The PLA and defense industry are 

developing and deploying jammers capable of targeting satellite communications over a large 

range of frequencies, including dedicated military communication bands. The PLASSF also has 

advanced cyber capabilities that could be applied in parallel with counterspace operations. While 

the PLA capabilities have improved, the U.S. is assumed to maintain a lead in counterspace.

China also is carrying out R&D and testing on potential space-based counterspace systems. The 

PLASSF and defense industry have carried out advanced satellite maneuvers and are likely testing 

orbital technologies that could be applied to counterspace operations. For example, in 2013, the 

Shiyan-7 (SY-7) released an object that performed maneuvers and tested a telerobotic arm. In June 

2016, the PLASSF launched the Aolong-1 spacecraft—which included a robotic arm—on a space 

the deep space tracking site in Argentina. Among various sources, see “Argentina Allies with China in Moon Plan” 

(阿根廷加盟中国探月计划), August 28, 2012. http://news.china.com.cn/space/2012-08/28/content_26352388.htm; 

Victor Robert Lee, “China Builds Space-Monitoring Base in the Americas,” Diplomat, May 24, 2016. 

https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-builds-space-monitoring-base-in-the-americas/. 138 For discussion of China’s VLBI (甚长基线干涉) network see Space Daily, “China Building Large Radio 

Telescope for Space Observation,” January 4, 2010.

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_Building_Large_Radio_Telescope_For_Space_Observation_999.html.

Also see International Space Science Institute Beijing, “Space Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) Forum.” 

http://www.issibj.ac.cn/Program/Forums/SVLBI/201403/t20140321_118148.html. 139 For a good early theoretical discussion of “space information countermeasures,” see 周家波, 杨凯, and 吴贤良, 

“Primary Study of Information Resistance in Space” (空间信息对抗初探), Radar and Electronic Warfare 1 (2007). 

http://www.defence.org.cn/aspnet/vip-usa/UploadFiles/2008-01/200801201525496093.pdf. Also see 汤泽滢, 孙希

刚, 程静, “Study of Information Resistance Equipment Systems in Space” (空间信息对抗装备体系研究), Space 

Electronic Countermeasures (航天电子对抗), 2014 年 03 期, at http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTALHTDZ201403005.htm.
40

debris-related mission. Between November 2016 and August 2018, the Shijian-17 carried out 

rendezvous and proximity operations with Chinese satellites in geostationary orbit, ostensibly for 

the purposes of monitoring space debris. Satellites also could serve as platforms for space-based 

ECM.140

The PLASSF Network Systems Department probably oversees satellite jamming operations, 

though this cannot be confirmed at the current time. At a minimum, the PLASSF Network Systems 

Department appears to support the PLA space mission.141 The Network Systems Department 

integrated PLA technical reconnaissance and probably ECM missions previously under the former 

GSD Technical Reconnaissance Department (Third Department or 3PLA) and ECM and Radar 

Department (Fourth Department, or 4PLA).142 The Network Systems Department probably has 

integrated the former GSD Third Department 12th Bureau, which is responsible for the intercept 

of foreign satellite communications from sites throughout China and possibly from space-based 

collection assets.143 It appears to maintain a close linkage with the PLASSF’s Beijing Institute of 

Remote Sensing Information. 144 Subordinate offices under the 12thBureau operate satellite 

140 For reference to the SJ-17 (实践十七号) and space debris monitoring (空间碎片观测), see China Academy of 

Space Technology, “SJ-17, Developed by CAST, Achieves Launch” (我院研制的实践十七号卫星成功发射), 

November 4, 2016. http://www.cast.cn/3g/show.asp?m=1&d=5369. Also see Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and 

Thomas Roberts, “Space Threat Assessment 2019,” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

https://aerospace.csis.org/space-threat-assessment-2019/; David D. Chen, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” testimony 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 23 February 2017.

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Chen_Testimony.pdf. 141 The Network Systems Department is led by a commander and a political commissar. Both carry TC deputy 

leader grades. Deputy commanders and deputy political commissar of the Network Systems Department (and/or 

chief of staff and director of the Political Work Department) presumably carry corps leader grades. Senior PLASSF 

Network Systems Department officers presumably exercise at least administrative authority over corps leader, corps 

deputy leader, division leader, and division deputy leader-grade units previously subordinate to the former GSD 

Third and Fourth Departments. Selected divisions under former Military Region, PLAN, and PLAAF technical 

reconnaissance bureaus may have been integrated into at least six corps leader or corps deputy leader-grade base 

commands. Corps leader-grade base leaders would report to officers at the next-higher grade, in this case directly to 

the PLASSF chief of staff and/or PLAASF deputy commander overseeing the Network Systems Department. While 

administratively subordinate to the PLASSF, five of these base commands could provide national-level ISR support 

to TCs during peacetime. They could be formally assigned to TC operational control during a contingency. 142 As a corps leader-grade organization, the GSD Third Department consisted of administrative third-level 

departments, 12 operational bureaus, a computing center, and three research institutes. GSD Third Department 

operational bureaus carried a division leader grade (or possibly corps deputy leader grade in some cases) and were

separate and distinct from technical reconnaissance bureaus under the PLA’s then seven military regions, the PLAN,

and PLAAF.

143 The 12th Bureau carries a cover designator of the 61486 Unit. For linkage of the 12th Bureau with the MUCD, 

see http://www.kshr.cn/ksasp/unit/SHOWEMPL.ASP?employee_id=660550.The Third Department 12th Bureau 

Headquarters appears to be located on 46 Yuexiu Road in Shanghai’s Zhabei District [闸北区粤秀路 46 号].See 

http://www.isee.zju.edu.cn/attachments/2011-04/01-1302228510-41734.xls. The Jiangnan Institute of Remote 

Sensing Applications [江南遥感应用研究所]shares the same address. The 12th Bureau’s former designation was 

the 57394 Unit.

144 The 61486 Unit Commander, Senior Colonel Ju Qiansheng [巨乾生], has been affiliated with both the GSD 

Second Department Remote Sensing Institute and the GSD Third Department’s 12th Bureau. See “District Standing 

Committee, Deputy Mayor Yan Jianping Visits 61486 Unit for a Social Visit” [区委常委、副区长颜建平率队赴

驻区 61486 部队开展军地互动联谊活动], February 8, 2010. 

http://www.shmzj.gov.cn/gb/mzzbq/mzxw/zxxw/userobject1ai486.html.
41

monitoring facilities in Changchun (Jilin Province), Fuzhou and Xiamen (Fujian Province), 

Hangzhou (Zhejiang Province), Guangzhou (Guangdong Province), Kunming (Yunnan Province), 

and in Xinjiang.145

The PLASSF absorbed at least two strategic ECM brigades and a satellite ECM command 

previously subordinate to the GSD Fourth Department. The satellite ECM command likely 

oversees the development and operation of capabilities designed to disrupt adversary use of 

SATCOM, navigation, SAR, and other satellites. The satellite ECM command is headquartered on 

Beiqing Road in Beijing’s northern suburbs.146 A possible new base command consolidating 

strategic ECM units may have been established in Henan’s Kaifeng City. The PLASSF also 

incorporated a unit previously subordinate to the GAD that is responsible for directed energy 

testing.147

Today, the PLA can carry out both kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace activities. Few details are

known about operational infrastructure for ground-based kinetic counterspace operations. 

However, looking out to 2035, and as the effects of the ongoing reform and reorganization bear 

fruit, PLASSF capacity for counterspace operations is likely to advance significantly with the 

consolidation of RD&A, training, and operations under a single integrated command. PLASSFmanaged defense industrial development of key technologies over the next 15 years—such as 

active millimeter-wave and imaging infrared sensors, artificial intelligence, and automated target 

recognition—are likely to provide a further boost to the PLA’s operational capabilities. Such 

advances may erode traditional advantages the United States has enjoyed in space.

Training

The PLASSF has emphasized education and training, although little information is available 

regarding integration into the PLA’s annual training cycle. Force-wide training plans likely are 

managed by the PLASSF Staff Department Training Bureau or perhaps a similar bureau within 

the Space Systems Department. For example, the PLASSF has carried out joint reconnaissance 

and counter-reconnaissance training and mobility training, and it has participated in command 

145 See Mark A. Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals 

Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Project 2049 Institute, November 11, 2011, 11. 

http://project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hsiao.pdf. 146 Military cover designations associated with the Satellite ECM Command (电子对抗卫星总站) include 61276, 

61651, 61541, 61764 (Hainan), and more recently 32032. 147 Among various sources, see Marcus Clay, “Supporting the Infinitive Battlefield,” China Aerospace Studies 

Institute, 2019, 42–43. The satellite ECM command may carry a designation of 61276 部队, 61541 部队, or 32032

部队. A subordinate unit is located on Hainan Island and appears to have either operational or experimental satellite 

jamming responsibilities. One indication of the unit having satellite jamming responsibilities is the number of 

articles published by its members. See, for example, Li Bin and Jin Guodong, “Analysis on GPS Jamming” [浅析

GPS 干扰技术], Electronic Countermeasures, January 2009, 39–42; Jin Guodong and Li Suoku, “On Broadband 

Communications Satellites [宽带卫星通信探析], Electro-Optical Systems, April 2008, 16–31; Zhang Ming and Li 

Suoku, “Space Information Warfare and International Space Law [空间信息作战与国际空间法], Armament 

Command and Technology Academy Journal, February 2003; Xiang Hanfei, Li Suoku, and Han Honglin, “Analysis 

of GPS System Countermeasures,” [GPS 系统对抗若干分析], Tracking and Communications, October 2008.
42

center exercises.148 PLASSF units also have carried out training in contingency response and 

integrating into a TC joint command and control structure.149 A three-day field training exercise 

included integrated command and control, execution of contingency combat operations, wartime 

political work, and maintaining communications support.

150 During Stride-2017 exercises, the 

PLASSF is noted to have provided joint reconnaissance support during field training.151 In 

March 2019, the PLASSF completed an unnamed exercise that focused on enemy combat 

methods and countermeasures.152 The U.S. Air Force indicates that “China has military units that 

have begun training with anti-satellite missiles,” although no details are offered.153 At least one 

PLASSF test and training base has increased emphasis on combat training.154 PLASSF units also 

have trained in restoring command communications that have been cut off.155 The PLA Space 

Engineering University and Information Engineering University are both military training 

institutions directly subordinate to the PLASSF.156 The PLA Space Engineering University

148 For discussion of general PLASSF training, see PLA Daily, “PLA Daily Takes You to See Strategic Support

Force Troops” (军报带你走进战略支援部队看一看), June 5, 2017. http://www.81.cn/jwsj/2017-

06/05/content_7628476_3.htm. Also see Hu Ruizhi (胡瑞智) and Xia Wei (夏昊), “Cross-Service Joint Training: 

PLA Army and PLASSF Conduct Confrontation Exercise” (跨军种联合训练:陆军与战略支援部队开展对抗演

练), PLA Daily, October 15, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-10/14/c_129970955.htm. For reference to 

mobility training, see 徐雅静 and 蒋玥, “A Certain Strategic Support Force Department: A Strong Military First 

Strengthens the ‘Chinese Military Account’” (战略支援部队某部 -- 强军先强“中军帐”), PLA Daily, April 29, 

2019. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/29/content_232741.htm. 149 See Ma Wei (马璟) and Wang Bin (王斌), “PLASSF Base Prepares for Battle: A Look at Your Expedition” (战

略支援部队某基地练兵备战:望着你出征的背影), PLA Daily, February 20, 2018.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-02/20/c_129814052.htm. 150 Xinhua, “A Certain Department of the Strategic Support Force Begins Open Country Joint Exercises” (战略支援

部队某部开展野外联合演训), May 4, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-05/04/c_129864636.htm. 151 杨庆民 and 吴科儒, “Stride-2017 Zhurihe: The New Changes in Training after the Reconstruction of the Army 

System from the Action of the Red Army Brigade(“跨越-2017·朱日和”:从红军旅动作看陆军体制编制重塑后

演训新变化). http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-09/07/c_1121625327.htm. Also see Elsa Kania, “China’s 

Strategic Support Force at 3,” Diplomat, December 29, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/chinas-strategicsupport-force-at-3/. 152 “A Certain Strategic Support Force Department: A Strong Military First Strengthens the ‘Chinese Military 

Account’” (战略支援部队某部强军先强’中军帐), PRC Ministry of National Defense, April 29, 2019.

http://mod.gov.cn/power/2019-04/29/content_4840768.htm/. The PLASSF also conducted an unnamed simulated 

exercise in mid-July 2019. See “Nearly 80% of Key Technical Posts in a Certain Strategic Support Force 

Department Are Held by Young Cadres” (战略支援部队某部近八成关键技术岗位由年轻干部担纲,) China 

Military, August 9, 2019. http://www.81.cn/zlzy/2019-08/09/content_9584300.htm. 153 See National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Competing in Space, December 2018.

https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF. 154 Zou Weirong (邹维荣)and Cheng Zilong (成子龙),“PLASSF Base Integrates Testing and Combat Training” (战

略支援部队某基地战试训一体联动融合推进), PLA Daily, February 9, 2018. http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-

02/09/content_4804534.htm. 155 Lu Jun (路俊), “PLASSF Communications Support Training in Complex Environment” (战略支援部队某部—

复杂环境演练通信保障), PLA Daily, January 5, 2018. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-

01/05/content_196236.htm. 156 PRC Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of National Defense Announces Names of Post-Reform Military 

Academies (国防部公布调整改革后军队院校名称),June 29, 2017. http://www.mod.gov.cn/shouye/2017-

06/29/content_4783975.htm.
43

houses facilities, including a space simulation center, space testing center, and space measure 

and control station, and functions as the PLASSF’s command college and noncommissioned 

officer academy.157 PLASSF space-related participation in military exercises with international 

partners has not been noted. 

157 PRC Ministry of National Defense,(2017 军校巡礼第二十五站:航天工程大学(附报考指南),June 15, 2017.

http://www.mod.gov.cn/services/2017-06/15/content_4783023.htm; Wang Yajun (王亚军), “A New Generation in 

Aerospace Engineering University Space Science and Technology Emerges” (航天工程大学航天科技“新生代”崭

露头角), PLA Daily, June 14, 2018. http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0614/c1011-30057365.html; PRC 

Ministry of National Defense(2017 军校巡礼第二十五站:航天工程大学), June 15, 2017.

http://www.mod.gov.cn/services/2017-06/15/content_4783023.htm; Marcus Clay, “Supporting the Infinitive 

Battlefield,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019, 16–18. 
44

SECTION THREE

SPACE/COUNTERSPACE FORCE MODERNIZATION

The CMC oversees a well-established structure and process for PLA weapons and space systems 

RD&A. The CMC/EDD and CMC S&T Committee develop and oversee broad RD&A policies 

and regulations, advise on technical solutions to satisfy operational requirements, and oversee 

formal coordination mechanisms between the PLA and the defense industrial system. Based on 

CMC-approved mid- to long-term strategic guidelines, the CMC/EDD, like its predecessor, the 

GAD, coordinates the drafting of a PLA Equipment Development Strategy. The strategy 

establishes PLA-wide priorities for long-term (e.g., 20–30 years), mid-term (e.g., 10 years), and 

short-term (e.g., five years) force modernization investments. The strategy is reviewed every five 

years. Within this process, the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support 

Force likely compete within a set budget. The CMC S&T Committee, which functions as the 

senior-level defense technology advisory group, is supported by at least 20 national-level 

technology working groups that advise on defense technology policy and priorities.158 Civilian 

space organizations, such as SASTIND and defense industrial enterprises, support the PLA in the 

development of technical requirements and engineering R&D.

Research, Development, and Acquisition System

Under CMC/EDD and CMC S&T Committee guidelines, end users, such as the PLA Army 

(PLAA), PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and PLA 

Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) manage weapons and space systems RD&A programs. More 

specifically, PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF equipment departments manage RD&A 

programs in close coordination with the civilian defense S&T and defense industry community.159

The consolidation of space-related RD&A management under a single end user—the PLASSF—

probably has improved the efficiency of the requirements development process, program 

validation, engineering R&D, and integration of military space systems.

As a reflection of China’s military-civil fusion policy, PLA end users work closely with SASTIND 

and defense industrial enterprises in managing space systems RD&A. RD&A generally consists 

of five phases: (1) preliminary research,(2) program validation,(3) concept design,(4) engineering 

158 For reference to the Equipment Development Strategy (装备发展战略), Ten-Year Equipment Development Plan

(装备建设十年规划), Five-Year Equipment R&D Plan (军装备研制五年计划), and other force modernization 

documentation, see Tu Hengzhang (屠恒章), “Military Equipment Development” (军事装备发展), China 

Encyclopedia Publishing, 2008, 31–35. Another term for five- and ten-year force modernization plans is 装备建设

规划计划. For a brief discussion on the Strategic Planning Department, see Tai Ming Cheung, Forging China’s 

Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014, 52–53. 159 For the PLASSF, RD&A is handled by two second-level departments: The Space Systems Department and the 

Network Systems Department. For the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, RD&A is managed by their 

respective equipment departments with support from dedicated research academies.
45

R&D,(5) design finalization, and (6) low-rate/full production. Each phase presumably requires 

individual contracts between the end user and civilian service provider.160

Preliminary Research: PLA-funded preliminary research (预先研究) invests resources into the

development of advanced technologies that could be applied to multiple weapons system programs 

or to overcome a bottleneck on a specific program. In addition to national-level initiatives, such as 

the 863 Program, end users such as the PLASSF Systems Department probably oversee a dedicated 

office responsible for preliminary research planning, awarding grants for studies, and 

disseminating research results. PLA research institutes and universities, defense industrial research 

centers, and civilian universities can compete for preliminary research projects.161

Concept/Program Validation: During the concept program validation (方案论证) phase, end 

users develop detailed operational and technical requirement documentation for CMC/State 

Council approval. Validation involves the development of mockups and assessment of alternatives, 

along with cost and operational effectiveness assessments. Operational and technical requirements 

for major weapons systems are validated by a special committee consisting of representatives of 

the CMC and State Council. It is unclear is this committee evaluates military programs, civilian 

programs, or both. If approved, new programs are included in the five-year plan (FYP). In some 

cases, a program may be approved but not included in the FYP. In this case, an end user would be 

expected to fund R&D from its own budget. PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force Equipment 

Research Academies, as well as the PLASSF counterparts, presumably are responsible for 

overseeing program validation. The civilian defense industry contributes to the process through 

detailed feasibility studies. The validation process also includes the development of a program 

budget. The validation phase concludes with a CMC/State Council committee approval of 

operational and technical requirements, referred to as a Tactical Technology Index. 

Engineering R&D: Engineering R&D involves the management of a complex supply chain 

overseen by a dual command system that divides technical and administrative aspects of a program. 

SASTIND functions as a coordinating body for defense industrial enterprises supporting military 

R&D, manufacturing, and follow-on support. Among the 97 central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 

listed on the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC, 国有资

产监督管理委员会) website, the first ten are considered defense industrial enterprises. However, 

160 For a general overview of satellite engineering R&D, see PRC State Council Information Office, Civilian 

Satellite Engineering Management Guidelines (民用卫星工程管理暂行办法), November 29, 2016. 

http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/35861/36552/xgzc36558/Document/1549898/1549898.htm. Also see 

Guo Baozhu (郭宝柱), “Process for Space Program R&D” (空间项目的研制程序), Spacecraft Engineering 23:2 

(April 2011). http://www.ccose.org/static/files/gbz5.pdf. Guo Baozhu (b. 1945) was the engineering chief designer 

(工程总设计师) of the SJ-9 (实践九号) satellite. 161 Before the reorganization, the GAD Comprehensive Planning Department oversaw a Preliminary Research 

Bureau (总装综合计划部预研局). GAD also managed a Preliminary Research Management Center (总装备部预研

管理中心).
46

most engineering R&D programs are assigned to one of ten central defense industrial enterprises 

administered by SASAC. 

A central defense industrial enterprise, a specific business division, or a research academy is 

assigned systems integration responsibilities. Research academies function as second-tier units 

under defense industrial enterprises. In the case of large national-level projects that cut across two 

or more central defense industrial enterprises, such as the lunar exploration program, SASTIND 

may host an engineering office that exercises dual command responsibilities.

Technical aspects of a space program are the responsibility of the chief designer and his/her design 

team. The chief designer, deputy chief designers, and directing designers bridge a complex 

network of research institutes and manufacturers. Deputy chief designers and directing designers 

are responsible for subsystems, assemblies, and manufacturing/final assembly. A chief designer 

may be housed within an academy’s design department. The department hosts the chief designer, 

who oversees a dedicated office to coordinate with research institutes, other academies, and 

program managers. Deputy chief designers are often selected from research institutes or factories, 

rather than within a design department. Engineering R&D includes a test prototype phase (试样阶

段). Design and program management teams work closely together with end user acquisition 

offices to ensure an economy of effort, timely production, and cost-effective use of resources. PLA 

end users manage industrial representative offices to monitor aspects of engineering R&D to 

ensure quality control.162

Design Finalization: During the design finalization phase, the CMC, State Council, end users, 

and industrial program managers evaluate whether or not a satellite or launch vehicle meets 

operational and technical requirements. Testing is carried out and evaluated in accordance with 

operational and technical requirements, including the Tactical Technology Index and R&D 

Mission Document. End user Equipment Research Academies appear to play a role in the design 

finalization process. After successfully completing testing, the system is reviewed by two 

certification boards. The program management team produces a systems R&D report for review 

by a senior end user committee. If approved, the system is reviewed by a first-level Design 

Finalization Committee comprising members of the State Council (Premier or Vice Premier) and 

CMC.163

162 See 花兴来 and 刘庆华,eds., Equipment Management Engineering (装备管理工程), Defense Industry 

Publishing, 2002, 9. 163 Among various sources outlining the design finalization process, see Military Products Design Finalization 

Process and Requirements (军工产品定型程序和要求), PLA Directive GJB-1362A (2007). Until 1979, the 

committee was known as the Military Product Design Finalization Leading Small Group (国务院、中央军委军工

产品定型工作领导小组). The first-level design finalization committee, which maintains a standing office, may also 

be known as the Central Special Committee. Senior PLA Navy authorities comprise a second-level design 

finalization committee (二级定委). According to one corporate source, the certification process proceeds through a 

series of reviews: (1) Second-Level Design Finalization Review Committee (二级定委会审查会); (2) Second-Level 
47

Space Requirements Development and Program Management

The PLASSF supports the CMC in the development of technical and operational requirements for 

space systems. The requirements development process likely is informed by the CMC Office for 

Strategic Planning (former GSD Strategic Planning Department), which may conduct a long-term 

analysis of the international security environment and space-related trends. The office also appears 

responsible for organizational transformation, strategic resource allocation, and departmental and 

“domain” coordination (e.g., between GSD and GAD). Although speculative, the office may play 

a central role in force planning for future space operations.164

The process for how the PLASSF develops operational requirements remains opaque. The 

PLASSF Space Systems Department develops requirements for and manages joint military use of 

ISR, communications, navigation, mapping, metrological, and oceanographic space systems. The 

Space Systems Department Equipment Department Program Management Center most likely 

oversees key PLASSF space-related RD&A initiatives.165 Other organizations likely supporting 

requirements development and RD&A management include the PLASSF Space Equipment 

Integrated Technology R&D Center, Space Engineering Research Institute (航天系统部航天工

程研究所), Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering, Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing 

Information, and the Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications Technology. The 

Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Information, previously subordinate to the GSD Intelligence 

Department Space Reconnaissance Bureau, appears to be primarily focused on developing EO and 

SAR remote sensing requirements. The Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications 

Technology is a critical player in the design of tracking and control stations, and has been involved 

in international projects in Venezuela and Nigeria.

166

Design Finalization Committee (二级定委会); (3) First-Level Design Finalization Committee Expert Advisory 

Committee (一级定委会专家咨询会); and (4) First-Level Product Design Finalization Committee (一级定委会产

品定型会). See (东风“猛士”通过定型审查), Dongfeng Vehicle Company, June 26, 2007. 

www.dfmc.com.cn/news/show.aspx?ID=10003237. 164 Xinhua, “Ceremony Held for Establishment of the PLA Strategic Planning Department, Chairman Guo Boxiong 

Speaks” [解放军战略规划部成立大会举行郭伯雄出席并讲话], November 22, 2011.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-11/22/c_111187194.htm. 165 For reference to the PLASSF Space Systems Department Equipment Department Program Management Center 

(航天系统部装备部项目管理中心), see http://my.yingjiesheng.com/xjh-003-057-033.html. 166 The military unit cover designator of the Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Information may be 61646. Its 

former GSD alter ego, the GSD Space Reconnaissance Bureau (总参航天侦察局) managed an R&D center directed 

by Zhou Zhixin [周志鑫]. For reference to Zhou, see [杜善义院士、曲久辉、栾恩杰和周志鑫校友获 2009 年度

何梁何利奖], Harbin Institute of Technology Today. http://today.hit.edu.cn/articles/2009/11-

11/1115372591.htm.For reference to Zhou with the Second Department’s Space Remote Sensing, see 

http://www.ciomp.cas.cn/jgsz/kyxt/klomt/sysgk_klomt/xswyh_klomt/.For reference to Zhou as 61646 Unit Deputy 

Bureau Director, see [胡锦涛签署通令给军队 1 个单位 22 名个人记功] at 

http://www.wpeu.net/html/china/2010/1225/18703.html. For reference to the 61646 Unit ground station (presumably 

an imagery downlink site), see [2007 年度首都文明单位候选名单(1908 个)], at 

http://jbhg.bjwmb.gov.cn/public/info_selinfo.asp?Info_ID=27680&Bar_ID=123. For discussion of the BITTT and 
48

Defense Industry and Space Systems Engineering

The CMC and PLASSF rely upon state-owned defense industrial establishments for research, 

development, and manufacturing of space systems. Administrative oversight of China’s defense 

industry is exercised by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and 

SASTIND. Formed in summer 2008, SASTIND is administratively in charge of defense industrial 

enterprises that support military-related R&D, manufacturing, and follow-on support. SASTIND 

seeks to foster greater competition within the defense industry to better meet the requirements of 

the PLA, as well as encourage greater military-civil fusion. SASTIND provides policy guidance 

to at least ten state-owned defense industrial enterprise groups responsible for space and missiles, 

electronics, aviation, nuclear-related products, shipbuilding, and other sectors.

The two large SOEs that make up the space and missile industry include CASC and CASIC. CASC 

and CASIC receive government subsidies, although efforts have been made to introduce marketbased incentives. The aerospace industry enjoys a historical legacy with a proven record of success, 

well-established channels and methods for overcoming technological bottlenecks, and the prestige 

needed to recruit some of China’s best and brightest. 

Both CASC and CASIC are organized in a manner similar to U.S. defense corporations, with a 

corporate-level structure and various business divisions, referred to as academies. Like U.S. 

defense industrial business divisions, each academy focuses on a core competency, such as 

medium-range ballistic missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, intercontinental-range ballistic 

missiles and satellite launch vehicles, cruise missiles, and satellites. While U.S. defense companies 

tend to specialize further within a business division, CASC/CASIC academies are organized into 

R&D and/or design departments; research institutes focusing on specific subsystems, 

subassemblies, components, or materials; and then testing and manufacturing facilities. Each 

academy is accountable for profit and loss and includes an information collection and 

dissemination institute that diffuses technical information.

167

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation

CASC develops and manufactures space launch vehicles, strategic ballistic missiles, satellites, and 

other space flight vehicles.168 CASC employs more than 100,000 engineers, technicians, and 

workers. Its functional business divisions specialize in ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles, 

large solid-rocket motors, liquid-fueled engines, satellites, and related subassemblies and 

components. Anew division was established in 2008 that consolidated CASC institutes and 

involvement in Nigeria and Venezuela, see State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National 

Defense, (北京跟踪与通信技术研究所), September 30, 2013.

http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n132/n230/n18113/c42724/content.html. 167 See, for example, Mark Stokes, “Appendix One and Appendix Two: China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic 

Strike Capability: The Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western Pacific and 

Beyond,” Project 2049 Occasional Paper, September 2009.

http://project2049.net/documents/chinese_anti_ship_ballistic_missile_asbm.pdf. 168 See “Company Profile” on CASC’s official website at 

http://english.spacechina.com/n16421/n17138/n17229/index.html.
49

factories specializing in inertial measurement units, telemetry, and missile-related 

microelectronics, such as the high-performance digital signal processors and field programmable 

gate arrays that are needed for long-range precision strikes at high speeds and extreme temperature 

conditions. The CASC S&T Committee advises the State Council, CMC, and CASC leadership 

on space technology issues. CASC’s dedicated export management and international contracting 

entity is China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC).

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

The second major industrial enterprise engaged in space-related R&D and production is CASIC. 

CASIC employs more than 100,000 engineers, technicians, and workers within its headquarters, 

academies or business divisions, subordinate design departments, research institutes, factories, and 

commercial enterprises. CASIC specializes in conventional defense and aerospace systems, 

including tactical ballistic missiles, antiship and land attack cruise missiles, air defense missile 

systems, direct ascent ASAT interceptors, operationally responsive tactical microsatellites, and 

associated tactical satellite launch vehicles. While academies and subordinate institutes appear to 

conduct independent international business transactions, CASIC’s principle export management 

enterprise is the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Company (CPMIEC).169

Launch Vehicle RD&A

The PLASSF’s space launch infrastructure depends upon a well-established and increasingly 

reliable family of launch systems to deploy payloads into space for military and civilian users. The 

CASC First Academy and CASC Eighth Academy are leading suppliers of liquid-fueled launch 

vehicles. To date, seven basic series of Long March (LM) liquid-fueled launch vehicles deliver 

payloads to orbits at varying altitudes and inclinations around the earth. 170 The CASC First 

Academy, also known as the China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT), is China’s largest 

entity involved in the development and manufacturing of space launch vehicles and related ballistic 

missile systems. CALT is also a leading organization in China’s crewed space program. Launch 

vehicle systems engineering responsibilities reside within the First Academy First Design 

Department. Various research institutes specialize in guidance, navigation, and control subsystems, 

reentry vehicles, and launch systems. The 211 Factory in Nanyuan is the academy’s primary 

169 For background on CASIC, see http://www.casic.com/n189298/n189314/index.html. The CEO/president/director

of CASIC (航天科工集团) is Gao Hongwei(b. 1956). He was assigned in 2013. He previously directed the CASIC 

Third Academy, served as CASIC deputy director, and directed the former 066 Base (Sanjiang) in Hubei. He has 

roots in the Hongfeng Factory. Gao Hongwei is supported by six vice presidents. 170 For the most comprehensive background on China’s ballistic missile program, see John Lewis Wilson and Hua 

Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security 17:2 (Fall 1992).

The LM launch vehicle family has roots in the country’s ballistic missile program, specifically the Dongfeng-4 (DF4) and Dongfeng-5 (DF-5) ICBM systems. Based on a March 1965 CMC decision, formal design work on the two 

missile systems commenced in May 1966. By 1970, initial technical designs were completed. The first DF-5 

prototype was assembled in May 1971, and tested from Base 20 on September 10, 1971. Its design was certified in 

1973.Both the 211 and 7102 factories in Sichuan assembled prototypes for testing. The warhead design, however, 

was not completed until July 1986.
50

launch vehicle assembly plant. The Long March Machinery Factory (7102 Factory) in Sichuan 

may augment the 211 Factory in assembling launch vehicles.

Figure 2: Chinese Space Launch Vehicles

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space,16.

The CASC Eighth Academy, also known as the Shanghai Academy of Space Technology (SAST), 

also designs, develops, and assemblesliquid-fueledLM-4 launch vehicles. SAST’s Eighth Design 

Department is responsible for overall design and systems engineering.

CALT and SAST rely upon a vast supply chain for subsystems and components. The CASC Sixth 

Academy, also known as the Academy of Space Propellant Technology (or 067 Base), is China’s 

primary organization engaged in research, development, and production of liquid-fueled engine

systems. Among its more recent products are the YF-77 and YF-100, currently China’s most 

powerful liquid oxygen and kerosene rocket engines. The CASC Sixth Academy is also a key 

organization involved in the development of LM-5 engines.

171

The LM-2 series has been used for delivering both remote sensing and communications satellites 

from Jiuquan and Xichang Satellite Launch Centers. The LM-2F is China’s most powerful launch 

171 Originally centered in the Qinling mountain range west of Xian, the CASC Sixth Academy employs around 

10,000 people in four research institutes and one factory, and is now headquartered in Xian. For background on the 

CASC Sixth Academy, see China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation,(航天推进技术研究院), 

September 26, 2011. http://www.spacechina.com/n25/n142/n152/n12989/n13957/c25220/content.html.
51

vehicle to date, able to boost more than 8,000 kg into LEO. Sharing the same first and second 

stages as the LM-2C, the LM-3 series integrates a cryogenic third stage that has been used for 

boosting heavier payloads into space from Xichang Satellite Launch Center.

Other launch vehicles include the LM-2D and LM-4 series, which have transported remote sensing, 

weather, and other payloads to SSO from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. The LM-2D has 

launched more than 40 payloads into both LEO and SSO from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch 

Center.172

Since 2008, China has been investing resources into a new generation of launch vehicles, including 

the LM-5, LM-6, LM-7, LM-8, and LM-9. The LM-5, first launched in November 2016, is 

designed to lift a 23+ ton payload to LEO, or a 14-ton payload into geosynchronous transfer orbit. 

The second LM-5 launch in July 2017 failed due to a first-stage engine problem. A CGWIC official 

noted that a follow-on launch is slated for late 2019.173 With R&D beginning in September 2009, 

SAST’s LM-6 is a smaller launch vehicle capable of boosting 500–1000 kg into orbit. The LM-7, 

first launched in 2016, is designed to place a 5.5-ton payload into SSO at an altitude of 700 km.

The LM-8 is intended to be China’s first reusable launch vehicle.174

Solid-Fueled Propulsion Systems

Over the last 20 years, CASIC and CASC have invested resources into R&D and production of

operationally responsive solid-fueled satellite launch systems. The CASIC Fourth Academy has 

designed and produced another family of other tactical solid-fueled launch vehicles. Established 

in 2002, the CASIC Fourth Academy specializes in design, development, and manufacturing of 

the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile and associated variants, including the PLA’s firstgeneration antiship ballistic missile.

175

The CASIC Fourth Academy developed the Kaituozhe (KT) small launch vehicle to serve the 

domestic and foreign market for boosting small and microsatellites with weights less than 100 kg 

into low-earth or sun-synchronous orbit. The developmental program is said to have begun in June 

2000, with the third-stage motor successfully tested on February 25, 2001.

176 Aerospace industry 

172 China Great Wall Industry Corporation “The LM-2D,” April 1, 2010. 

http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchVehicle/LM2D.html. 173 Xinhua, (长征五号飞行故障原因查明), March 3, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2018-

03/03/c_1122480716.htm. Also see Debra Werner and Andrew Jones, “China Could Launch Another Long March 5 

by Year’s End,” Space News, September 11, 2019. https://spacenews.com/china-great-wall-wsbw-2019/. 174 Xinhua, “High Altitude Simulation Testing of the LM-8 Launch Vehicle, First Flight Scheduled for Next Year” 

(长征八号运载火箭芯二级氢氧发动机高空模拟试验成功预计明年), December 2, 2019. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2019-12/02/c_1125299157.htm. 175 The Fourth Design Department was formerly subordinate to the Second Academy, one of the few academies that 

has managed more than one subordinate design department.

176 Shi Fashu, “Kaituozhe-1 Solid Launch Vehicle Development Planning and Implementation,” China Aerospace

(zhongguohangtian), August 2003, 13–16.
52

reporting indicated that an initial test of the 1.4-meter diameter first-stage motor on September 15, 

2002, failed to achieve the anticipated outcome.177

Development of a follow-on Kaituozhe launch vehicle centered upon a new 1.7-meter solid rocket 

motor. The KT-2was a three- or four-stage launch vehicle designed for geosynchronous transfer 

orbit and polar orbit missions with an estimated payload capacity of 300 kg. Plans for a KT-2 were 

based upon the CASIC Sixth Academy’s ability to develop and produce a larger 1.7-meter

diameter motor, presumably based on the foundation of the SpaB-17 perigee kick motor for 

communication satellite programs. The KT-2A planned to add external motors for lifting over 400 

kg into polar orbit. The ultimate requirement appeared to be the deployment of a 500-kg payload 

to a 700-km orbit. The KT program appears to have been discontinued and succeeded by the 

Kuaizhou program, also designed and developed by the CASIC Fourth Academy’s Ninth Design 

Department. The Kaituozhe’s first flight took place in 2013 from Jiuquan.178 Subsequent launches 

took place in 2019 and 2020.179

The CASC First Academy designed a larger solid-fueled launch vehicle, the LM-11 launch vehicle. 

The main supplier of solid rocket motors is the CASC Fourth Academy. The CASC Fourth 

Academy is developing large high-thrust solid rocket motors for delivering large payloads. Initial 

ground tests were conducted in 2009.180 A two-stage solid motor was successfully flight tested on 

September 25, 2010. While unconfirmed, a large high-thrust solid rocket motor with a diameter 

greater than two meters could serve as the basis for a new mobile intercontinental ballistic missile.

Its first flight took place in 2015, and the first LM-11 sea launch took place in June 2019.181

177 The test involved the launch of the 35.8-kg KT-1PS microsatellite, manufactured by CASIC First Academy, from 

Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center into an intended 300-km altitude orbit. Tian Zhiqiang, [小型固体运载火箭], Space 

Exploration [太空探索], October 2003.For background on the microsatellite payloads, see CASIC Satellite 

Technology Company,“KT-1PS/PS2/PS3 载荷星.”http://www.casic-sat.com.cn/operation5.asp.The satellite passed 

its final factory certification on August 24, 2002, approximately five weeks before launch. Gu Ti, “Kaituozhe: New 

Choice for Small Satellite Launches,” Aerospace China, November 2002, 2. There are indications the KT-2 has 

been redesignated as the KT-1B. 178 Liang Jiqiu (梁纪秋; b. 1974) is with the CASIC Ninth Design Department and recruited by Hu Shengyun in 

August 2002 to serve as directing designer, and subsequently deputy chief designer, of a user interface program. 

Liang Jiqiu is cited in 2014 reporting as chief designer of the Kuaizhou small solid-fueled launch vehicle (快舟小型

固体运载火箭). The Kuaizhou-2 was launched on November 21, 2014. 179 Rui C. Barbosa, “China Conducts Double Kuaizhou-1A Launch from Taiyuan,” NASA Spaceflight.com, 

December 7, 2019. https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2019/12/china-double-kuaizhou-1a-launch-taiyuan/. 180 China Space News, “China Aerospace Entities Actively Develop Heavy Solid Launch Vehicle [中国航天部门将

积极发展重型固体运载火箭], June 12, 2010. http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_06/12/1616757_0.shtml; 

Shaanxi Defense Industry Information Network, “Gan Xiaosong: ‘Forrest Gump’s’ Run on the Innovation Road” 

[甘晓松:奔跑在创新路上的“阿甘”], May 4, 2009. http://www.jungong.net/_info/content/con-ren_12982.htm. 181 China Space News, “CASC Fourth Academy Achieves Four Breakthroughs within Two Years in New Motor 

R&D” [航天科技四院某新型发动机研制两年攻坚实现四大新突破], December 27, 2010.

http://www.spacechina.com/xwzx_jcdt_Details.shtml?recno=72512.The program manager was Fourth Academy 

Deputy Director Wang Jinglin [王景林] and the chief designer was Gao Bo [高波], director of the CASC Fourth 

Academy’s Design Department. Also see Lu Jun (路俊) and Zou Weirong (邹维荣), “Commemorating Taiyuan 
53

New-Generation Aerospace Flight Vehicles/Reusable Launch Vehicles

China’s defense industry is investing considerable resources into new modes of space launch, 

including transatmospheric and reusable launch vehicles. Theoretically, both would be capable of 

delivering payloads to LEO and returning to earth at less cost than single-use launch vehicles.182

Basic research and an assessment of alternative reusable launch vehicles was initiated in 1987 

under the 863 Program in parallel with technical assessments of the crewed space program. In July 

1989, the 863-204 Expert Group (863-204 专家组) completed a feasibility assessment for a large 

reusable launch vehicle (大型运载火箭及天地往返运输系统).183 Among the various options 

was a space shuttle design.184 China allegedly is targeting 2030 for a two-stage-to-orbit reusable 

launch vehicle.185 A transatmospheric vehicle appears to be in the preliminary stage of R&D, 

including ground testing of propulsion systems, and notionally would leverage advanced 

propulsion technologies, such as a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) or combined-cycle 

engines. The CASIC Third Academy 301st Research Institute (Beijing Institute of Aerospace 

Technology; 北京空天技术研究所) appears to be one of the leading design departments engaged 

in transatmospheric R&D. Established in 2012, the CASIC 301st Institute’s principle effort is the 

Tengyun Engineering (腾云工程) program.186 CASC also has reported intent to develop a nuclearpropelled space vehicle by 2040.187 As a final note, little information is available regarding RD&A 

of space-to-air vehicles, or space-to-ground weapons capable of directly engaging, defeating, or 

destroying a target.

Space Launch Center’s Maritime Launch Mission Team” (记太原卫星发射中心海上发射任务团队), PLA Daily, 

June 11, 2019. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-06/11/content_235682.htm. 182 For general discussion of reusable launch vehicle R&D, see (我国将加强可重复天地往返运输系统研发), S&T 

Daily, September 24, 2013. http://www.nsfc.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab446/info65565.htm. 183 Among various sources, see http://www.csaspace.org.cn/n2505504/n2505531/c2524224/content.html. 184 See Legal Evening News (法制晚报), (秘而不宣的“921”工程), October 28, 2013.

http://www.ldyx.org/html/2013/lectureHall_1028/7626.html. For explicit linkage between Tengyun and the 301st 

Institute, see Ren Zhiwei (任志伟), (打造满载人类梦想的空天飞行器), China Space News (中国航天报), May 

22, 2018. https://new.qq.com/omn/20180522/20180522A19YBF.html. 185 See (航天专家提出中国发展重复使用航天运输系统路线图) at http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/04-

25/8499746.shtml. 186 Among various sources, see CCTV, “New Generation of Reusable Space Flight Vehicle in R&D” (新一代天地

往返飞行器“空天飞机”正在研制), March 6, 2018. 

http://m.news.cctv.com/2018/03/06/ARTIpsmrJVGPEsI1WxHA0ADL180306.shtml. For reference to ground testing 

of propulsion systems, see 付毅飞, (我国正研发可重复使用天地往返飞行器), Xinhua, June 7, 2017. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com//science/2017-06/07/c_136830662.htm.As of 2018, Guan Chengqi (关成启) directed the 

CASIC 301st Institute. He previously served as deputy director of the Third Academy Third Design Department. 187 See (中国旨在 2040 年建造一艘核动力航天飞机), 核能研究展望 NPRV), at 

http://www.sgcio.com/eduinfo/hd/2017/1208/38513.html. Another key 301st Institute engineer is Luo Jinling (罗金

玲). Reference to Luo Jinling and CASC 11th Academy support for testing, see (建院十周年空气动力学术研讨会

圆满结束) at http://www.caaa-spacechina.com/n301/c2101/content.html. Also see Gabe Collins and Andrew 

Erickson, “Spaceplane Development Becomes a New Dimension of Emerging U.S.-China Space Competition,” 

China Signpost, August 17, 2012. http://www.chinasignpost.com/2012/08/17/spaceplane-development-becomes-anew-dimension-of-emerging-u-s-china-space-competition/.
54

Satellite Systems RD&A

The CASC Fifth Academy, CASC Eighth Academy, and CASIC First Academy are lead systems 

integrators for satellite systems. Established in February 1968, the CASC Fifth Academy, or China 

Academy of Space Technology (CAST), is China’s primary organization engaged in satellite 

design, development, and manufacturing. Based in Beijing’s northwestern suburbs, CAST 

institutes, factories, and other enterprises are centered upon the 501st Design Department, which 

functions as CAST’s overall systems engineering organization.

188 Established in 1975, the 502nd

Research Institute (also known as Beijing Institute of Control Engineering) designs, researches,

and develops satellite attitude and orbit control systems, including jet propulsion and various 

guidance, navigation, and control subsystems. The 508th Research Institute designs and develops 

EO and other satellite sensors. The principle assembly facility is the 529 Factory. Other institutes 

specialize in vacuum and cryogenic technologies, antenna systems, and modeling and 

simulation. 189 A subsidiary in Shenzhen is expected to develop and produce a number of 

navigation satellites on behalf of the CASC Fifth Academy.190 The CASC Fifth Academy is the 

industrial lead systems integrator for major communications satellite programs. CAST has a 

number of international cooperation programs, including with entities from the Netherlands, 

Germany, and Pakistan, to name a few.

191

The CASC Eighth Academy, also known as the Shanghai Academy of Space Technology (SAST), 

designs, develops, and manufactures satellites, along with specialized launch vehicles and other 

aerospace systems. SAST oversees a dedicated design department—the 509thResearch Institute—

that focuses on weather, SAR, and electronic reconnaissance satellites. Established in August 1961, 

188 Established in 1968, the 501st Research Institute is also known as the China Spacecraft Integrated Design 

Department [中国空间技术研究院总体部]. 189 CAST’s Dongfanghong Satellite Company [航天东方红卫星公司] appears to be a significant commercial entity.

It was established in August 2001 as a wholly owned satellite research and production subsidiary of China Spacesat. 

The enterprise is a publicly traded company that offers satellite-related solutions to military and civil users. Its 

activities include manufacturing of satellite ground equipment, and satellite services, such as satellite integrated 

applications, satellite navigation, satellite remote sensing and image transmission, satellite communication, 

television broadcasting, etc. It has eight subsidiaries, including ones in Xiamen, Yungang, and Xian. Dongfanghong 

lays claim to the CAST968 platform as a common bus for small and microsatellites. 190 Established in 2000, Shenzhen Academy of Aerospace Technology is a joint venture between CASC, the 

Shenzhen City government, and Harbin Institute of Technology. It specializes in radio frequency identification 

(RFID), digital trunking communication systems, GPS vehicle location, radio frequency monitoring systems, and

systems integration services. It has a relationship with a number of organizations, including the Bauman Institute in 

Russia, Samara State Aerospace University (SSAU), Russian Academy of Sciences (Far East Branch), Far East 

Technical University, Novosibirsk State Technical University, National Technical University of Ukraine, and Saint 

Petersburg Electrotechnical University.

191 DSTI.net, “CASC Fifth Academy and Netherlands Measurements Systems Company Sign Cooperative 

Agreement” (航天科技五院总体部与荷兰测量系统公司签署合作协议), April 8, 2019.

http://www.dsti.net/Information/Viewpoint/79156; China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, “CASC 

Fifth Academy and Germany’s Pfeiffer Vacuum Cooperate on Development” (航天科技五院 510 所与德国普发真

空公司共谋合作发展), February 16, 2017. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588124/c3837825/content.html.

For Pakistan, see State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission,(开启中巴航天合作新篇章—

—中巴两国研制资源一号 04A 卫星纪实), February 14, 2020.

http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2641616/c13766817/content.html.
55

the CASC Eight Academy is the aerospace industry’s largest and most diverse business division. 

Employing around 16,800 people, the institution was in large part formed through the 

consolidation of several defense industry research institutes in the mid-1960s. 

CASIC’s First Academy, also known as the Academy of Information Technology, has designed 

and fielded microsatellites. Working with the academic community, the CASIC First Academy is

one of a number of entities within China focused on operationally responsive tactical 

microsatellites that ostensibly could be launched on solid-fueled launch vehicles. It also is engaged 

in R&D satellite applications and Beidou and GPS/inertial guidance units. Serving as a test bed 

for MEMS-based guidance and navigation systems, its most prominent products are the HangtianTsinghua-1 (HT-1) 50-kg microsatellite that operates in SSO, and the 25-kg NS-1 microsatellite.

One institute under the Academy of Information Technology specializes in space-based and 

missile-borne ECM research and development.192

Microsatellite Programs

In a crisis situation, China may have the option of augmenting existing space-based assets with 

microsatellites launched on solid-fueled launch vehicles. Weighing between 10 and 100 kg, past 

microsatellite programs appeared experimental in nature, but competency and experience could 

translate into a lower cost, operationally responsive space capability.193 Microsatellites also serve 

as experimental technology test beds for MEMS and formational flight as an integrated 

constellation that could offer greater survivability due to their numbers and potentially reduced 

radar cross section. While speculative, microsatellites may function in part as technology 

demonstrations for counterspace operations, including ASAT KKVs. A number of R&D 

organizations in China have entered the microsatellite field, including CAS, CASIC First Academy, 

CASC Fifth Academy, CASC Eighth Academy, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics, Harbin Institute of Technology, and Tsinghua and Zhejiang Universities.194

Initial technology demonstration programs include the Tsinghua-1 satellite, an ostensibly privately 

funded program carried out in conjunction with the United Kingdom’s (UK) University of Surrey. 

Launched in June 2000, the Tsinghua-1 weighed 50 kg and conducted experiments on satellite192 Formed in 1978 in Nanjing, the 8511 Institute is the aerospace industry’s main electronic and infrared 

countermeasures entity. It manages an integrated test and manufacturing facility in Nanjing’s Jiangning Science 

Park.

193 For an overview of CASC microsatellite development, see China Space Network, [集团公司组织召开微小卫星

关键技术研讨会], May 6, 2011.

http://www.space.cetin.net.cn/index.asp?modelname=new_space%2Fnews_nr&FractionNo=&titleno=XWEN0000

&recno=75869. 194 The China Academy of Sciences opened a microsatellite lab [中国科学院微小卫星重点实验室] in 2011. China 

Academy of Sciences, “CAS Microsatellite Key Laboratory Holds Inaugural Session of Academic Council” [中国

科学院微小卫星重点实验室举行揭牌仪式暨学术委员会第一届第一次会议], December 23, 2010.

http://www.cas.cn/hy/xshd/201012/t20101231_3052884.shtml.The NUAA project is the Tianxun-1 [天巡一号] 

intelligent network microsatellite system. See http://www.nuaa.edu.cn/nhb/997/b1.htm.
56

borne navigation, multispectral remote sensing, and store and dump downlink communications.195

The program appears to have been jointly managed by Tsinghua University and the CASIC First 

Academy.196 A subsequent Tsinghua/CASIC microsatellite program was the Naxing-1, launched 

on April 18, 2004, as a piggyback to the Shiyan-1. Naxing served as a MEMS test bed for an 

onboard miniature inertial measurement unit and complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor

digital imagery.197 Shiyan-1, developed by the Harbin Institute of Technology, was also launched 

on April 18, 2004, and followed by the Shiyan-3. Other organizations involved include CAST, 

CAS Changchun Institute of Opto-Electronics, and Xian Institute of Survey and Mapping.198

Another microsatellite is Pixing-1, a state-funded completed program developed by Zhejiang 

University, which has been involved in defense-related basic research. 199 The initial Pixing 

satellite was launched from Jiuquan in conjunction with the Yaogan-2 on May 25, 2007. Two 

additional Pixing microsatellites were launched as piggyback payloads on the Yaogan-11 in 

September 22, 2010, from Jiuquan. The satellite was intended to function as a test platform for 

digital imagery, data storage, and management; downlink communications; attitude control; 

MEMS inertial measurement unit; thermal control; and other missions.200

Other programs include Banxing-1 (BX-1), a payload of less than 40 kg that deployed from the 

Shenzhou-7 orbital module in September 2008 to test data relay and other payloads associated 

with Shenzhou-8. The BX-1 satellite was designed and manufactured by CAS’s Satellite 

Engineering Center. Another system, the 88-kg Chuangxin-1 (CX-1) satellite, was a prototype 

LEO telecommunication satellite launched in October 2003.A second was launched in November 

195 See “Aerospace Tsinghua 1 Satellite,” [“航天清华”一号卫星] on the CASIC Satellite Technology Ltd. official 

website [航天科工卫星技术有限公司]at http://www.casic-sat.com.cn/operation4.asp. 196 For background on the CASIC role, see the CASIC Satellite Technology Ltd. official website [航天科工卫星技

术有限公司]at http://www.casic-sat.com.cn/abouts.asp. 197 See China News [中新网], “Small Satellite R&D Receives Breakthrough: China Successfully Launched “One 

Rocket, Two Stars,” [中国成功发射“一箭双星” 小卫星研制取得突破], April 9, 2004.

http://news.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/news/6661/2011/20110225231431312562162/20110225231431312562162_.ht

ml. See S&T Daily, “The First Indigenously Made Nano-1 Satellite Has Been Launched Successfully” [第一颗自主

研制的纳星一号发射成功], April 18, 2004. http://www.stdaily.com/oldweb/gb/kjzg/2004-

09/28/content_305818.htm.Also see http://www.smallsat.org/proceedings/13/tech-ix/ts-ix-3.pdf. 198 Harbin Institute of Technology, [我国首颗高校自主研制的微小卫星“试验卫星一号”发射成功], July 7, 2008. 

http://news.hit.edu.cn/articles/2008/07-07/07140722.htm.For background on the Shiyan-3, see Harbin Institute of 

Technology, [揭秘哈工大“试验卫星三号”], November 11, 2008. http://news.hit.edu.cn/articles/2008/11-

11/11101604.htm. 199 Zhejiang University has been actively involved in research associated with strike technology, including the 863-

801 and 863-805 programs. 200 See Zhejiang University, “Zhejiang University’s Successful Launch of “Pixing-1A Satellite, Challenging 

Microsatellites” [浙江大学成功发射“皮星一号 A”卫星挑战微型小卫星], October 7, 2010.

http://mememama.cn/2010/1007/1334.html. Also see Xinhua, “Nation’s First Kilogram-Level Micro-Satellite 

Operating Smoothly for Eight Days and Nights”[我国首颗公斤级微小卫星平稳运行八天八夜], September 30, 

2010. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-09-30/222621204836.shtml. Also see 

http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/newsletters/2010/201010/t20101011_82540.htm.
57

2008.201 Yet another program was the Beijing-1, a miniature satellite designed and manufactured 

by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) for the Disaster Monitoring Constellation of the 

International Charter on Space and Major Disasters.Beijing-1 was delivered into polar orbit on a 

Russian launch vehicle from Plesetsk in October 2005. SSTL concluded an agreement for three 

additional satellites with one-meter resolution to be launched in 2014.202 Now an Airbus subsidiary, 

SSTL oversees a space debris removal satellite system.203

Counterspace RD&A

The CASIC First Academy (Academy of Aerospace Information Technology) is likely central to 

engineering R&D of space-based ECM systems. The First Academy’s R&D Center and 8511 

Institute are responsible for space ECM, with the latter publishing a leading journal entitled 

Aerospace Electronic Warfare ( 航天电子对抗 ). China Electronics Technology Group 

Corporation (CETC) appears to be a prominent player in ground-based satellite ECM systems.204

CASIC’s Second Academy is the principal enterprise responsible for kinetic kill counterspace 

systems and is China’s largest producer of air defense missile systems. Established in 1961, and 

with a growing emphasis on integrated air and space defense, the Second Academy consists of a 

design department, ten specialized research institutes, a simulation center, three factories, and nine 

commercial enterprises. The extent of the academy’s formal relationships with foreign enterprises 

remains unclear. With the PLAAF serving as a core customer, the Second Academy’s most 

prominent defense products include the Hongqi series of surface-to-air missile systems, including 

the missile, radar, and associated ground equipment. The Second Academy also likely designed 

the space intercept systems that were tested in January 2007 and January 2010. 205 CASIC 

201 For overview of the BX-1, see David Wright and Gregory Kulacki, “Chinese Shenzhou 7 ‘Companion Satellite’ 

(BX-1),”Union of Concerned Scientists, October 21, 2008. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/UCSShenzhou7-CompanionSat-10-21-08.pdf;Brian Weeden, “China’s BX-1 Microsatellite: A Litmus Test for Space 

Weaponization,” Space Review, October 20, 2008. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1. The chief 

designer of the BX-1 was Zhu Zhencai. 202 Among various sources, see Peter B. de Selding,“Surrey to Build Three Optical Imaging Satellites for Chinese 

Firm,” Space News, June 29, 2011. http://www.spacenews.com/contracts/110629chinese-firm-orders-three-opticalimaging-satellites-from-surrey.html.The Chinese company is Twenty-First Century Aerospace Technology Co. Ltd. 

A ground station affiliated with the Beijing-1 satellite is collocated with a GSD Third Department Seventh Bureau 

facility in the northern Beijing suburb of Shangzhuang [上庄]. 203 Airbus, “Testing Technology to Clear Out Space Junk.” https://www.airbus.com/space/spaceinfrastructures/removedebris.html.

204 The key R&D organization is probably the CETC 54th Research Institute (石家庄通信测控技术研究所). See 

(通信子集团 54 所 2019-2020 年度招聘简章). http://ccst.jlu.edu.cn/info/1094/9809.htm. 205 Zhang Yiqun, assigned to the CASIC Second Academy Second Design Department, is a possible subsystem 

designer for the ASAT/missile defense KKV. Cited as a deputy chief designer of an unnamed system, Zhang was 

granted a national “model worker” award in April 2010. For one account, see Chinese Military Network, 

“Preliminary Analysis on China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Intercept Technology” [中国“陆基中

段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析], January 13, 2010. 

http://military.china.com/zh_cn/critical3/27/20100113/15774945.html.
58

conducted successful tests of a KKV in January 2007 and January 2010.206 In doing so, they

demonstrated an ability to intercept polar orbiting satellites and rudimentary medium-range 

ballistic missiles during the mid-course of flight. Subsequent tests may have taken place in 2013, 

2014, and 2018. At least one KKV funding source during the late 1990s and earlier this decade 

appears to be the 863-409 program (and possibly the 863-706 program).207 These technologies 

include active millimeter wave and possible passive imaging infrared terminal guidance and 

automated target recognition software.

208 These technologies likely also have applications for 

increasingly accurate and lethal ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile systems.

206 Zhang Yiqun, assigned to the CASIC Second Academy Second Design Department, is a possible subsystem 

designer for the ASAT/missile defense KKV. Cited as a deputy chief designer of an unnamed system, Zhang was 

granted a national “model worker” award in April 2010. For one account, see Chinese Military Network, 

“Preliminary Analysis on China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Intercept Technology” [中国“陆基中

段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析], January 13, 2010. 

http://military.china.com/zh_cn/critical3/27/20100113/15774945.html. 207 For an excellent and reasonable analysis of the January 2010 missile defense interceptor test by a well-regarded 

independent Chinese military-technical analyst, see KKTT, “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based MidCourse Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” [我国“陆基中段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析], KKTT blog, 

January 12, 2010, at http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/12126421120100129195498/. Also see Mark A. 

Stokes, “China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for U.S. National Security,” Army War College, 1999, 115; 

Ian Easton, “The Great Game in Space: China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for 

Future U.S. Strategy,” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, June 24, 2009. 208 For an excellent and reasonable analysis of the January 2010 missile defense interceptor test by a well-regarded 

independent Chinese military-technical analyst, see KKTT, “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based MidCourse Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” [我国“陆基中段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析], KKTT blog, 

January 12, 2010. http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/12126421120100129195498/.Also see Mark A. 

Stokes, “China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for U.S. National Security,” Army War College, 1999, 115; 

Ian Easton, “The Great Game in Space: China's Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for 

Future U.S. Strategy,” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, June 24, 2009.
59

SECTION FOUR

MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL 

COOPERATION

Under General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping, the advancement of China’s domestic civilian 

space program is a central theme woven throughout many key PRC policies since the 18th Party 

Congress in 2012. In particular, the PRC’s military-civil fusion (MCF; 军民融合) strategy seeks 

to more effectively and efficiently integrate the use of both civilian and military-industrial 

economic resources to benefit the PLA. MCF builds on the well-established principles of civilmilitary integration, which sought to combine the defense and civilian industrial bases to meet 

military and commercial demands.209

Military-Civil Fusion and the PRC’s Space Program

The PRC State Council’s 2017 Opinions on Promoting the Deep Development of Military-Civil 

Fusion in the National Defense Science and Technology Industry states a need to “accelerate the 

overall planning of space infrastructure according to the needs of the military and civilian sectors” 

as well as increase the number of MCF projects in the realms of launch vehicles, deep space 

exploration, nuclear-powered space equipment, remote sensing satellites, and others.210 The recent 

influx of PRC non-state-owned “commercial” launch vehicle and satellite companies into China’s 

domestic market since 2015 suggests the PRC is successfully advancing MCF efforts, blurring the 

lines between civilian and military entities and obfuscating the ultimate end users of acquired 

foreign technology and knowhow, which in turn presents export control challenges for the United 

States.

China’s civilian space program is stewarded by PRC government organs under MIIT, including 

SASTIND and the CNSA (国家航天局). Some SASTIND leadership concurrently serve in the 

CNSA (see Tables 1 and 2 below), demonstrating that space is a critical aspect of MCF; SASTIND

plays a central role in MCF implementation.211 According to the PRC State Council, SASTIND is 

tasked with serving the needs of national defense, military forces, the national economy, and 

military-related organizations in the fields of nuclear weapons, aerospace, aviation, and others.212

The CNSA is the primary PRC government agency in charge of civil space management and 

209 Greg Levesque and Mark Stokes, “Blurred Lines: Military-Civil Fusion and the ‘Going Out’ of China’s Defense 

Industry,” Pointe Bello, December 2016. 210 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on 

Promoting the Deep Development of Military-Civil Fusion in the National Defense Science and Technology Industry

[国务院办公厅关于推动国防科技工业军民融合深度发展的意见], December 2017.

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-12/04/content_5244373.htm. 211 Greg Levesque and Mark Stokes, “Blurred Lines: Military-Civil Fusion and the ‘Going Out’ of China’s Defense 

Industry,” Pointe Bello, December 2016. 212 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for 

National Defense, October 6, 2014. http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/06/content_281474992893468.htm.
60

international space cooperation, according to its official website. 213 Subordinate CNSA 

departments hold a range of responsibilities and specialties, including earth observation, remote 

sensing, space debris monitoring, satellite research, and space law.214

Table 2: SASTIND Leadership

Name Position

Zhang Kejian(张克俭) Director

Zhang Jianhua (张建华) Deputy Director

Wu Yanhua(吴艳华) Deputy Director

Xu Zhanbin(徐占斌) Deputy Director

Tian Yulong (田玉龙) Deputy Director

Source: SASTIND official website.

215

Table 2: CNSA Leadership

Name Position

Zhang Kejian(张克俭) Director

Wu Yanhua(吴艳华) Deputy Director

Li Guoping(李国平) Secretary-General

Source: CNSA official website.

216

SASTIND and the CNSA often collaborate with PLA institutions to further MCF development in 

the aerospace field, as demonstrated by the June 2019 release of the Notice on Promoting the 

Orderly Development of Commercial Launch Vehicles by SASTIND and the CMC/EDD on 

CNSA’s official website. This document states that commercial rocket companies engaged in 

launch vehicle research and production must report to SASTIND and the EDD before launching 

any products.217

In addition, to launch vehicles, the PRC is actively pushing for MCF development in other 

“emerging fields” (新兴领域) in the civilian space industry, according to reporting from the China 

Electronics and Information Industry Development Research Institute’s (中国电子信息产业发展

研究院) CCID Think Tank (赛迪智库), which is under MIIT. 218 For instance, the CCID’s 

213 China National Space Administration [国家航天局], Institutional Function [机构职能], 

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758821/index.html#w_two. 214 China National Space Administration [国家航天局], Subordinate Units [直属单位].

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758821/index.html#w_two. 215 State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. Leadership Resumes [领导简

历]. http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n254046/n6115882/index.html.

216 China National Space Administration [国家航天局], Leadership Introduction [领导简介].

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758821/index.html#w_two. 217 China National Space Administration [国家航天局], Notice of SASTIND and the CMC Equipment Development 

Department on Promoting the Orderly Development of Commercial Launch Vehicles [国家国防科技工业局中央军

委装备发展部关于促进商业运载火箭规范有序发展的通知], June 10, 2019.

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758838/c6806484/content.html. 218 CCID Think Tank [赛迪智库], “About Us” [关于我们]. http://www.ccidwise.com/plus/list.php?tid=2.
61

Prospects for the Development of China’s Military-Civil Fusion in 2019(2019 年中国军民融合

发展形势展望) highlights progress on Beidou (北斗)—China’s indigenous GNSS—within the 

context of advancements in civilian space and launch activities.219 The CCID report stipulates that 

PRC breakthroughs in GNSS follow the mincanjun (民参军) model,220 a concept that refers to 

civilian participation in the defense industry.221

China’s Beidou program is a key example of MCF at work, demonstrating not only the 

indistinctness between civilian and military/defense entities but also the significance of civilian 

contributions to military and defense assets. Beidou is a PLA-coordinated program, which is made 

evident in the numerous CASIC entities that play a role in its development, including CASIC’s 

First,222 Second,223 Third,224 and Tenth225 academies, all of which provide unique contributions to 

Beidou development. CASIC touts itself as “adhering to the road of military-civil fusion with 

Chinese characteristics” (“...中国航天科工坚持走中国特色的军民融合发展之路...”).

226

Although collaboration between CASIC/CASC and the United States in space are prohibited by 

U.S. export regulations, both PRC entities have collaborated on space topics with U.S. allies, 

including Japan and the EU. For instance, CALT organized the International Academy of 

Astronautics (IAA) Academy Day in Beijing in November 2018, which was attended by former 

European Space Agency (ESA) administrator Jean-Jacques Dordain and Japan IHI Aerospace 

219 CCID Think Tank [赛迪智库], “Prospects for the Development of China’s Military-Civil Fusion in 2019” [2019

年中国军民融合发展形势展望], 2019. http://www.ccidwise.com/uploads/soft/181220/1-1Q220153F5.pdf. 220 CCID Think Tank [赛迪智库], “Prospects for the Development of China’s Military-Civil Fusion in 2019” [2019

年中国军民融合发展形势展望], 2019. http://www.ccidwise.com/uploads/soft/181220/1-1Q220153F5.pdf. 221 State Council Information Office of the PRC [中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室], SASTIND Holds Press 

Conference on the Situation of Military-Civil Fusion in the National Defense Science and Technology Industry [国

防科工局举行国防科技工业军民融合发展情况发布会], December 6, 2017.

https://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gbwxwfbh/xwfbh/hfkgw/Document/1612885/1612885.htm. 222 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation First Institute, “First Institute Beidou Navigation Products 

Achieve Usage in the Tourism Industry” [一院北斗导航产品实现在旅游行业规模应用], July 3, 2014.

http://www.casic.com.cn/n103/n135/c1870136/content.html. 223 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, “Our ‘Chinese Heart’ for Global Time and Positioning --

The Development Story of the Beidou Guided Navigation Satellite Atomic Clock Produced by Second Institute 203 

Institute” [我们的“中国心”为世界时间定位——二院 203 所北斗导航星载原子钟研制发展记], February 

23,2018. http://www.casic.com.cn/n103/n135/c6873806/content.html. 224 China Daily Net [中国日报网],“CASIC Third Institute 304 Institute Beidou Mission Software Evaluation Team 

Assists the Beidou Satellite Network” [航天科工三院 304 所北斗任务软件评测团队助力北斗卫星组网], May 

25, 2018. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1601424168891451161&wfr=spider&for=pc. 225 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, “CASIC’s Comprehensive Support Efforts for the 42nd and 

43rd Beidou Navigation Satellite Launches Meet with Complete Success”[中国航天科工全力保障第四十二、四

十三颗北斗导航卫星发射任务圆满成功], November 19, 2018.

http://www.casic.com.cn/n3053244/n3053530/n3053532/c10090392/content.html; Sun Zifa [孙自法], “China’s 

Newest Beidou Payload Is a New Generation Atomic Clock That Will Assist Precision Positioning” [中国最新北斗

双星装载新一代原子钟助力精准定位], China News Network [中国新闻网], November 19, 2018.

http://china.eastday.com/c/20181119/u1a14391653.html. 226 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, “Group Introduction” [集团简介], April 21, 2014.

http://www.casic.cn/n101/n119/c34628/content.html.
62

Corporation President Shigeki Kinai.227 Known PLA affiliates such as Northwestern Polytechnical 

University also attended the event.228

In addition to more traditional defense enterprises, ostensibly civilian-owned entities such as 

Beijing Unistrong Science and Technology (北京合众思壮科技股份有限公司) claim to play a 

leading role in Beidou development.229 Representatives from Unistrong appear throughout various 

aspects of Beidou development. For instance, Unistrong Independent Director Zhang 

Yongsheng(张永生) previously served as the director of the Institute of Remote Sensing and 

Aerial Survey Engineering of the PLA Institute of Surveying and Mapping,230 and Unistrong 

seems to have led the development of the first Beidou Overseas Center in Tunisia, which opened 

in April 2018.231 This center, also referred to as the China-Arab Beidou/GNSS Center (中阿北斗

/GNSS 中心), will bring together participants from Oman, Algeria, Nigeria, Kuwait, Sudan, Iraq, 

Tunisia, and others to partake in PRC-led training and R&D cooperation on global navigation 

satellite systems.232

Established by the Politburo Standing Committee in 1992, the China Manned Space Engineering 

Program (CMSP; 中国载人航天工程) is tasked with implementing a “three-step development 

policy” (三步走) for human spaceflight. These steps include:(1) launching crewed spacecraft and 

improving experimental civilian space engineering, (2) making technological breakthroughs in 

extravehicular activities (EVA) and launching a space laboratory, and (3) building a space 

station.233 MCF is most evident in CMSP leadership, which contains both high-level military 

personnel as well as leaders from some of China’s top civilian S&T organizations. According to 

CMSP’s official website, the positions of chief commander and deputy chief commander are filled 

by CMC/EDD, MIIT, CAS, CETC, and CASC leadership.234 Notably, PLA personnel hold the top

227 International Academy of Astronautics, “Academy Day Held in Beijing,” November 16, 2018.

https://iaaweb.org/content/view/757/995/. 228 International Academy of Astronautics, “Academy Day Held in Beijing,” November 16, 2018.

https://iaaweb.org/content/view/757/995/. 229 Beijing Unistrong Science and Technology Corporation [北京合众思壮科技股份有限公司], “About Us” [关于

我们]. http://www.unistrong.com/AboutUs/AboutUsShow_220.aspx. 230 Sina Finance, “Zhang Yongsheng Introduction” [个人简介:张永

生],http://vip.stock.finance.sina.com.cn/corp/view/vCI_CorpManagerInfo.php?stockid=002383&Name=%D5%C5%D3%C0%C9 %FA. 231 Beijing Unistrong, “Beijing Unistrong Fully Supports the Construction of the First Overseas Beidou Center to 

Help Beidou Go to the World” [合众思壮权力支持首个海外北斗中心建设助力北斗走向世界],April 13, 2018. 

http://www.unistrong.com/ news/NewsShow_2700.aspx. 232 Beijing Unistrong, “Beijing Unistrong Fully Supports the Construction of the First Overseas Beidou Center to 

Help Beidou Go to the World” [合众思壮权力支持首个海外北斗中心建设助力北斗走向世界], April 13, 2018. 

http://www.unistrong.com/ news/NewsShow_2700.aspx. 233 China Manned Space Program, Introduction to China’s Manned Spaceflight Project [中国载人航天工程简介], 

[中国载人航天工程], April 23, 2011. http://www.cmse.gov.cn/art/2011/4/23/art_24_1054.html. 234 China Manned Space Program, Management. http://en.cmse.gov.cn/col/col71/index.html.
63

two positions within CMSP (see Table 3), once again demonstrating the importance of the military 

in China’s space program.

Table 3: CMSP Leadership

Name (Chinese) Title CMSP Position

Li Shangfu(李尚福) Director, CMC EDD Chief Commander

Qian Weiping(钱卫平) Deputy Director, CMC EDD Deputy Chief Commander

Zhang Kejian(张克俭) SASTIND Deputy Chief Commander

Shang Hong (尚宏) Commander, PLASSF Space Systems Department Deputy Chief Commander

Xiang Libin(相里斌) Vice President, CAS Deputy Chief Commander

Wu Yansheng(吴燕生) Chairman, CASC Deputy Chief Commander

Gao Hongwei (高红卫) Chairman, CASIC Deputy Chief Commander

Xiong Qunli(熊群力) Chairman, CETC Deputy Chief Commander

Zhou Jianping(周建平) Chinese Academy of Engineering Chief Designer

Chen Shanguang(陈善广) International Academy of Astronautics Deputy Chief Designer

Zhou Yanfei(周雁飞) N/A Deputy Chief Designer

Source: China Manned Space Program official website.235

MCF also dovetails with other PRC national-level policies such as Made in China 2025 (中国制

造 2025). This 2015 leading industrial policy aims to promote the development of key strategic 

emerging industries as China seeks to end its reliance on international technology and upgrade its 

own domestic industrial capability. Made in China 2025 lays out ten “key areas” (重点领域) for 

targeted rapid development—including aerospace equipment (航空航天装备)—which are 

reiterated in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020). The 13th Five-Year Plan highlights a need to 

develop next-generation and heavy-lift launch vehicles as well as new types of satellites and other 

space platforms and payloads.236

235 China Manned Space Program [中国载人航天工程],Program Introduction [工程简介]. 

http://www.cmse.gov.cn/cmsp/. 236 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 

Development of the People’s Republic of China, March 2016. 

http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf.
64

Academia and Universities’ Role in Space-Related Basic Research and RD&A

China’s university system plays an important role in space-related R&D. State academic 

organizations such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) house units dedicated to various 

aspects of civilian space research. CAS is different from other traditional universities in China, 

functioning more like a think tank and academic governing institution directly under the 

supervision of the State Council. CAS’s link to the State Council means it develops policies and 

recommendations around state priorities and communicates them to academic institutions.237

CAS institutes such as the National Space Science Center (NSSC; 国家空间科学中心) and the 

Technology and Engineering Center for Space Utilization (CSU; 空间应用工程与技术中心) lead 

the institution in space-related research and development. The NSSC claims to be the primary PRC 

institution responsible for planning and developing space research in the fields of space physics, 

satellites, remote sensing, engineering technology, deep space exploration, and others.238 It has 

also made significant contributions to several key aspects of China’s aerospace industry, including 

its applied satellite, human spaceflight, and lunar exploration programs.239 In 2011, CAS approved 

the Strategic Priority Program on Space Science, making the NSSC a CAS pilot project.240

Select Projects from the NSSC Strategic Priority Program

Hard X-Ray Modulation Telescope (HXMT):Proposed by CAS academician Li 

Tibei(李惕碚), HXMT allegedly has the ability to survey black holes and other highenergy objects in space,241 where traditional telescopes would be blind to brighter energy 

sources. The first HXMT, dubbed Insight, was launched into an orbit of 550km above 

earth in June 2017.242 Chinese media reports note that the telescope will allow scientists 

to study how to use pulsars for spacecraft navigation.243

Quantum Experiments at Space Scale (QUESS):QUESS aims to implement longdistance quantum communication networks based on high-speed quantum key 

237 Chinese Academy of Sciences [中国科学院], “Introduction to Chinese Academy of Sciences” [中国科学院简

介]. http://www.cas.cn/zz/yk/201410/t20141016_4225142.shtml. 238 National Space Science Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “A Snapshot of NSSC.” 

http://english.nssc.cas.cn/au/ac/. 239 National Space Science Center [国家空间科学中心], Chinese Academy of Science [中国科学院], “History.”

http://english.nssc.cas.cn/au/histroy/. 240 National Space Science Center [国家空间科学中心], Chinese Academy of Science [中国科学院], “Historical 

Evolution” [历史沿革]. http://www.nssc.cas.cn/zxgk2015/lsyg2015/. 241 National Space Science Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “Strategic Priority Program on Space Science.” 

http://english.nssc.cas.cn/missions/FM/. 242 Xinhua, “China Launches Space Telescope to Search for Black Holes, Pulsars,” June 15, 2017. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/15/c_136367916.htm. 243 Xinhua, “China Launches Space Telescope to Search for Black Holes, Pulsars,” June 15, 2017. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/15/c_136367916.htm.
65

distribution between satellites and ground stations.244 Cited as a major breakthrough by 

CAS academician Pan Jianwei (潘建伟), QUESS is designed to establish “hack-proof” 

quantum communications by transmitting uncrackable keys from space to the ground.245

China is currently collaborating with Austria and other nations to establish the first-ever 

“global quantum communication network” by 2030.246 In February 2019, QUESS was 

awarded the Newcomb Cleveland Prize from the American Association for the 

Advancement of Science for “laying the groundwork for ultra-secure communication 

networks of the future.”247

The CSU also has played a major role in human spaceflight engineering R&D. The CSU conducts 

research on payloads, electronic information technology, electromagnetic technology, space 

manufacturing, deep space exploration, space software, space simulation technology, and other

areas.

248 It houses China’s Key Laboratory of Space Utilization (LSU; 太空应用重点实验室), a 

CAS-directed lab focused on finding new applications for advanced technologies in space, 

particularly in the field of human spaceflight engineering.249 Notably, the LSU has historically 

utilized plans and research from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and 

other international space programs as the basis for its research. For instance, in 2016 the LSU 

released a report titled NASA Technology Roadmap that analyzes potential development pathways 

over the next 20 years for key technologies such as remote sensing instruments and lasers, noting 

that this plan was adapted from the 2015 NASA Technology Roadmaps.

250 In this instance, the LSU 

appears to only be copying NASA, as Individual Technology Roadmaps are publicly available; 

there were no observable cases of formal collaboration between NASA and the LSU. However, 

more broadly this signals that PRC entities are paying close attention to U.S. space goals and 

policies in an attempt to replicate them. The CSU also collaborates with other space R&D 

academic institutions. It directs joint laboratories with Beihang University as well as China’s 

244 National Space Science Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “Strategic Priority Program on Space Science.” 

http://english.nssc.cas.cn/missions/FM/. 245 Yu Fei and Xu Haitao, “China Focus: China’s Quantum Satellite Achieves ‘Spooky Action’ at Record Distance,” 

Xinhua, June 16, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/16/c_136371668.htm; Mike Wall, “China 

Launches Pioneering ‘Hack-Proof’ Quantum-Communications Satellite,” Space.com. https://www.space.com/33760-

china-launches-quantum-communications-satellite.html. 246 Xinhua, “China Focus: China’s Space Satellites Make Quantum Leap,” PLA Daily, August 16, 2016.

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/today-headlines/2016-08/16/content_7210313.htm. 247 Chinese Academy of Science, “Chinese Study on Quantum Communications Wins Newcomb Cleveland Prize,” 

February 1, 2019. http://english.cas.cn/newsroom/news/201902/t20190201_205271.shtml. 248 Technology and Engineering Center for Space Utilization, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “Research 

Departments” [科研部门]. http://www.csu.cas.cn/gb/jggk/kybm/xtsjyjs/. 249 Key Laboratory of Space Utilization, Chinese Academy of Sciences [中国科学院太空应用重点实验室], 

“Laboratory Introduction” [实验室简介], http://lsu.csu.cas.cn/sysgk/jj/. 250 Key Laboratory of Space Utilization, Chinese Academy of Sciences [中国科学院太空应用重点实验室], 

“NASA Technology Roadmap – Scientific Instruments” [NASA 技术路线图 – 科学仪器], September 14, 2019.

http://lsu.csu.cas.cn/kxyylyjz/yxzhjsyj/201609/t20160914_348338.html; National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA), 2015 NASA Technology Roadmaps,2015.

https://www.nasa.gov/offices/oct/home/roadmaps/index.html.
66

National University of Defense Technology, the latter being the PLA’s military engineering 

university.251

CAS units are actively participating in international cooperation initiatives with foreign 

universities and institutions. In 2009, the NSSC collaborated on a Sino-Russian Joint Mars 

Exploration Program known as Firefly No. 1(萤火一号), the first Chinese vessel to conduct an 

interplanetary mission, according to the NSSC.252 CAS has also set up joint overseas laboratories 

like the CAS South America Center for Astronomy (CASSACA; 中国科学院南美天文研究中

心), also referred to as the China-Chile Joint Center for Astronomy (CCJCA). According to the 

center’s overview in vernacular Chinese, CASSACA’s main purpose is to “meet the strategic 

needs of the internationalization of S&T innovation and promote the ‘going out’ of CAS.”253

Through CASSACA, CAS seeks to exploit South America’s astronomical observation resources 

and its strategic location to achieve breakthroughs in space research.254 The program is housed by 

the University of Chile255 in Santiago and has received support from both the PRC and Chilean 

governments through high-level visits.256

In October 2017, CAS’s National Astronomical Observatory of China (NAOC; 中国科学院国家

天文台) announced a strategic cooperation agreement with the California Institute of Technology 

at a ceremony that included nearly 50 scholars from NAOC, CalTech, Peking University, Tsinghua 

University, China’s University of Science and Technology, Nanjing University, and others.257

According to NOAC, the agreement renewed NAOC’s ability to use CalTech’s telescopes at the 

251 Center for Space Utilization, Chinese Academy of Sciences [中国科学院空间应用工程与技术中心], “Unit 

Overview” [单位概况]. http://www.csu.cas.cn/gb/jggk/dwgk/; National University of Defense Technology [国防科

技大学], “School Profile” [学校概况]. https://www.nudt.edu.cn/xxgk/index.htm. 252 National Space Science Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, “Firefly One Mars Exploration Program” [萤火一

号火星探测计划]. http://www.cssar.cas.cn/zdkyhd/yh1h/. 253 Chinese Academy of Sciences South America Center for Astronomy [中国科学院南美天文研究中心], “Center 

Introduction” [中心简介]. http://www.cassaca.org/zh/%e4%b8%ad%e5%bf%83%e7%ae%80%e4%bb%8b/. 254 Chinese Academy of Sciences South America Center for Astronomy [中国科学院南美天文研究中心], “Center 

Introduction” [中心简介]. http://www.cassaca.org/zh/%e4%b8%ad%e5%bf%83%e7%ae%80%e4%bb%8b/. 255 Chinese Academy of Sciences South America Center for Astronomy [中国科学院南美天文研究中心], “Center 

Introduction” [中心简介]. http://www.cassaca.org/zh/%e4%b8%ad%e5%bf%83%e7%ae%80%e4%bb%8b/. 256 CASSACA, “Chinese Ambassador to Chile Xu Bu Unveiled the Office of CASSACA” [中国驻智利大使徐步为

中智联合文特峰天文项目办公室揭牌] August 14, 2018.

http://www.cassaca.org/zh/%E6%96%B0%E9%97%BB%E7%AE%80%E8%AE%AF/2018/08/%E4%B8%AD%E5

%9B%BD%E9%A9%BB%E6%99%BA%E5%88%A9%E5%A4%A7%E4%BD%BF%E5%BE%90%E6%AD%A5%

E4%B8%BA%E4%B8%AD%E6%99%BA%E8%81%94%E5%90%88%E6%96%87%E7%89%B9%E5%B3%B0%

E5%A4%A9%E6%96%87%E9%A1%B9%E7%9B%AE%E5%8A%9E/. 257 National Astronomical Observatory of China, “The First National Astronomical Observatory – California 

Institute of Technology Cooperation Seminar Held and Cooperation Agreement Signed” [第一届国家天文台 – 美

国加州理工学院合作研讨会举办并签署合作协议], October 27, 2017.

http://www.bao.ac.cn/xwzx/kydt/201710/t20171027_4879495.html.
67

Palomar Observatory in San Diego.258 In addition, representatives from the institutions agreed at 

the ceremony to pursue academic exchange programs.259

Beyond CAS, PRC universities play a prominent role in China’s space-related R&D. Many, 

including Harbin Institute of Technology and Beihang University (北京航天航空大学), claim to 

conduct research in support of the PLA and the state. Harbin Institute of Technology’s School of 

Astronautics (哈尔滨工业大学航天学院) states on its official website that it established its first 

two aerospace majors in satellite engineering and aircraft engineering in 1990 with assistance from 

the Ministry of Space (now the China National Space Administration) and the China Academy of 

Space Technology, a subordinate CASC institution.260 Beijing University of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics (BUAA) portrays itself as the “leader and backbone” of China’s national defense and 

aerospace industry and also claims to have trained various PLA military leaders throughout its 

history.261

PRC universities conduct “party building work” (党建工作) in their various aerospace-oriented 

schools to ensure that research is conducted in accordance with Party guidelines. For instance, in 

October 2018 the Party Branch of the Spacecraft Technology Department at BUAA’s School of 

Astronautics held a meeting focused on “promoting the Party’s theoretical knowledge, propaganda, 

and practice in daily teaching and scientific research.”262

Space-oriented departments within universities also manage provincial, ministerial, and nationallevel R&D units. Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU; 西北工业大学) claims to 

oversee two national-level state key laboratories—the State Key Laboratory of Combustion, 

Thermal Structure and Internal Flow Fields (燃烧、热结构与内流场国家级重点实验室) and the 

State Key Laboratory of Aerospace Flight Dynamics Technology (陕西省微笑卫星工程实验

室)—as well as provincial-level organs like the Shaanxi Provincial Microsatellite Engineering 

Laboratory. NWPU also appears to conduct space-related R&D for the PLA; NWPU’s School of 

258 National Astronomical Observatory of China, “The First National Astronomical Observatory – California 

Institute of Technology Cooperation Seminar Held and Cooperation Agreement Signed” [第一届国家天文台 – 美

国加州理工学院合作研讨会举办并签署合作协议], October 27, 2017. 

http://www.bao.ac.cn/xwzx/kydt/201710/t20171027_4879495.html. 259 National Astronomical Observatory of China, “The First National Astronomical Observatory – California 

Institute of Technology Cooperation Seminar Held and Cooperation Agreement Signed” [第一届国家天文台 – 美

国加州理工学院合作研讨会举办并签署合作协议], October 27, 2017. 

http://www.bao.ac.cn/xwzx/kydt/201710/t20171027_4879495.html. 260 Harbin Institute of Technology School of Astronautics [哈尔滨工业大学航天学院], “College Introduction” [学

院简介]. http://sa.hit.edu.cn/xygk/list.htm. 261Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics [北京航空航天大学], “Today’s Aerospace” [今日宇航].

http://www.sa.buaa.edu.cn/xygk/jryh.htm. 262 Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics [北京航空航天大学], “The Party Branch of the Spacecraft 

Technology Department Held a Branch Party Assembly” [航天飞行器技术系党支部召开支部党员大会], October 

18, 2018. http://www.sa.buaa.edu.cn/info/1043/5536.htm.
68

Astronautics directs the Space Attack and Defense Technology Research Center (空间攻对抗技

术研究中心).

263

Cooperation with U.S. Institutions 

PRC universities working on space issues also have numerous cooperation agreements, joint 

programs, and partnerships with foreign universities, organizations, and firms, including in the 

United States. These partnerships may be leveraged to transfer technology or important knowhow 

back to the PRC, providing insight into how Beijing circumvents U.S. exclusionary space policies 

like the Wolf Amendment, including by collaborating with firms that maintain close relationships 

with NASA. The Wolf Amendment states the following:

None of the funds made available by this (House Appropriations) Act may be used 

for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Office of

Science and Technology (OSTP), or the National Space Council (NSC) to develop, 

design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, 

or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any 

way with China or any Chinese-owned company.264

The Wolf Amendment also prohibits the use of appropriations funding for hosting official Chinese 

visitors at NASA facilities. Limitations imposed by the Wolf Amendment do not apply to activities 

in which NASA, OSTP, or NSC have consulted with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) and ensured that the activities pose no risk of technology, data, or information transfer, and 

will not involve knowing interactions with officials “determined by the United States to have direct 

involvement with violations of human rights.”265

These collaborations and partnerships also allow PRC entities to gain access to and transfer key 

technology back to China, as well as broadcast PRC policies and standards to worldwide audiences. 

For example, the Institute of Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems (遥感与地理

信息系统研究所) at Peking University’s School of Earth and Space Sciences (北京大学地球与

空间科学学院) has international exchange and cooperation programs with the University of 

California, Santa Barbara; the University of Maryland; Columbia University; and Clark University;

as well as other institutions in the UK and Canada.266 Nanjing University of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics (NUAA; 南京航空航天大学) also offers three joint degree programs in avionics, 

263 Northwestern Polytechnical University School of Astronautics, “Research Institutions” [科研机构], 

http://hangtian.nwpu.edu.cn/kyysys/kyjg.htm. 264 House Appropriations Bill 2019-2020, 116th Congress, May 2019.

https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/FY2020%20CJS%20Sub%20Mark

up%20Draft.pdf. 265 House Appropriations Bill 2019-2020, 116th Congress, May 2019. 

https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/FY2020%20CJS%20Sub%20Mark

up%20Draft.pdf. 266 Peking University’s School of Earth and Space Sciences [北京大学地球与空间科学学院], “Institute of Remote 

Sensing and Geographic Information Systems” [遥感与地理信息系统研究所].

https://sess.pku.edu.cn/xszx/ygydlxxxtyjs/index.htm.
69

aviation manufacturing, and aeronautical engineering with City University of London (established 

in 2011), Australia’s Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (established in 2012), and the UK’s 

Cranfield University (established in 2018).267

Additionally, all PRC universities almost certainly participate in MCF research and projects. For 

instance, in June 2017 the Sichuan Academy of Safety Science and Technology (SCASST; 四川

省安全科学技术研究院) published an article stating that representatives from the Sichuan 

Provincial Defense S&T Industry Office, the CETC 29th Research Institute, CAS’ Institute of 

Remote Sensing and Digital Earth, and Peking University’s Institute of Remote Sensing and 

Geographic Information Systems visited SCASST to conduct a research exchange on the militarycivil fusion safety supervision applications. According to the report, SCASST had previously 

“applied more than 4000 high-resolution satellite images of Sichuan Province, processed 2950 

scenes of effective images, and obtained 850 high-resolution image fusion maps” used in several 

MCF arenas, including “non-coal mines, chemical parks, cultural relics protection, urban security,

airports, and highways.”268 SCASST Party Secretary Shi Fuqiang also proposed that in the future,

SCASST could apply its imagery technology to 3D laser scanning technology and ground 

observation technology to create “seamless coverage of multi-source data for risk warning.”269

Beijing Institute of Technology Partnership with George Washington University: Beijing

Institute of Technology’s (BIT) Institute of International Law (北京理工大学国家法研究所) is 

actively working to shape research and promote PRC standards in international space law with 

George Washington University’s (GWU) Elliott School of International Affairs. The two 

organizations signed a cooperation agreement in September 2013,270 and GWU currently lists 

BIT’s Institute of Space Law as one of its “proud affiliates,” according to the university’s official

website.271

267 Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, “Sino-Foreign Cooperative Education” [中外合作办学]. 

http://iced.nuaa.edu.cn/2019/0619/c10486a160251/page.htm. 268 Sichuan Academy of Safety Science and Technology [四川省安全科学技术研究院],“The Provincial Defense 

Science and Technology Industry Office and Four Departments Jointly Went to the Provincial Academy of Science 

and Technology Safety to Investigate the High-Scoring SpecialMilitaryCivilFusionSafetySupervisionApplicationDemonstration” [省国防科工办联合部门到省安科院调研高分专项军民

融合安监应用示范], June 9, 2017. http://www.scasst.com/News/Detail/c8ecd4d6-9864-499b-9004-e88becbb45f9. 269 Sichuan Academy of Safety Science and Technology [四川省安全科学技术研究院],“The Provincial Defense 

Science and Technology Industry Office and Four Departments Jointly Went to the Provincial Academy of Science 

and Technology Safety to Investigate the High-Scoring SpecialMilitaryCivilFusionSafetySupervisionApplicationDemonstration” [省国防科工办联合部门到省安科院调研高分专项军民

融合安监应用示范], June 9, 2017. http://www.scasst.com/News/Detail/c8ecd4d6-9864-499b-9004-e88becbb45f9. 270 Beijing Institute of Technology School of Law [北京理工大学法学院], “Our Institute of Space Law and the 

George Washington University Institute for Space Policy Signed a Cooperation Agreement and Held the US Space 

Law and Policy Forum” [我校空间法研究所乔治华盛顿大学空间政策研究所签署合作协议举行美国空间法律

与政策论坛], January 23, 2016. http://law.bit.edu.cn/xzzx/gjjl/74698.htm. 271 George Washington University Space Policy Institute. “About Us.” https://spi.elliott.gwu.edu/about-us/.
70

Through their cooperation agreement, the two universities conduct faculty exchanges and visits 

and host conferences and symposiums on international space policy and law. In June 2016, the 

two institutions held a symposium at the University of Vienna titled “Looking to the Future: 

Changing International Relations and Legal Issues Facing Space Activities.” According to BIT, a 

delegation from the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA; 外交部) attended the symposium 

along with representatives from the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs. BIT Institute of Space 

Law Secretary-General Zhang Zhenjun gave a keynote speech titled “New Developments in SinoU.S. Space Legal Relations.”272 Notably, GWU’s Space Policy Institute claims to be sponsored by 

a number of important U.S. defense contractors and federally funded R&D centers, including 

Aerojet Rocketdyne, Aerospace Corporation, Boeing, L3Harris Technologies, Lockheed Martin, 

Northrup Grumman, Raytheon, and others.273

BIT Partnership with NanoRacks, Connection to Kuang Chi-Duke University Case: U.S.-

based NanoRacks has previously collaborated with BIT to deploy PRC technology into space, 

despite its connections to the U.S. government and access to proprietary space-related information. 

NanoRacks is located in Houston near NASA’s Johnson Space Center.274 The company was 

founded in 2009 to provide commercial hardware and services for the International Space Station’s 

(ISS) U.S. National Laboratory as part of the Space Act Agreement with NASA.275 The company 

has since grown, having deployed over 700 payloads as of June 2018.276 In June 2017, NanoRacks

announced it had launched and deployed the first-ever Chinese experiment to be brought aboard 

the ISS, despite regulations limiting Sino-U.S. collaboration in space. According to the official 

report from NanoRacks, the Chinese experiment came from BIT and was led by Deng Yulin, 

professor at Georgia Tech’s School of Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering(邓玉林).

277 The 

company claims the project was launched only after approval from the U.S. government, and the 

BIT NanoLab will remain confined to the NanoRacks platform on the ISS to ensure it can “in no 

way interface with the ISS or NASA’s IT infrastructure and systems.”278

NanoRacks has collaborated with additional Chinese entities on space-related R&D. In March 

2018, the company announced a partnership with Shenzhen-based Kuang-Chi Science Limited (光

272 Beijing Institute of Technology School of Law [北京理工大学法学院], “The Institute of Space Law of Our 

School and the Institute of Space Policy of the George Washington University Jointly Held an International 

Conference in Vienna” [我校空间法研究所与乔治华盛顿大学空间政策研究所在维也纳联合举办国际会议], 

June 20, 2016. http://law.bit.edu.cn/xzzx/gjjl/83855.htm. 273 George Washington University Space Policy Institute, “Our Supporters.”https://spi.elliott.gwu.edu/about-us/oursupporters/. 274 NanoRacks, “Our Story.” http://nanoracks.com/our-story/. 275 NanoRacks, “Our Story.” http://nanoracks.com/our-story/. 276 Crunchbase, “NanoRacks.” https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/nanoracks#section-overview. 277 NanoRacks, “NanoRacks Prepares Activation of Historic Chinese Research, 25+ Experiments Onboard 

International Space Station,” June 6, 2017. http://nanoracks.com/nanoracks-launches-historic-chinese-research-25-

experiments-to-international-space-station/. 278 NanoRacks, “NanoRacks Prepares Activation of Historic Chinese Research, 25+ Experiments Onboard 

International Space Station,” June 6, 2017. http://nanoracks.com/nanoracks-launches-historic-chinese-research-25-

experiments-to-international-space-station/.
71

启) to cooperate on Kuang-Chi’s Traveler program—the PRC’s first near-space commercial 

platform. Kuang-Chi’s Traveler program is likely a dual-use effort in support of not only 

commercial but also PRC government and PLA priorities. In February 2015, Kuang-Chi entered 

into a strategic cooperation agreement with the Hunan Space Bureau (068 Base) and CASIC’s 

7801 Research Institute to collaborate on aerostat R&D and production in near space.279 This 

collaboration, in conjunction with Kuang-Chi’s commercial “space tourism” platforms, may serve 

as a vehicle for collecting foreign technology and knowhow, as demonstrated by the company’s 

collaboration with NanoRacks. Specifically, the partnership will focus on the development of 

Traveler outside of China by leveraging Kuang-Chi’s near-space technology and NanoRacks’ 

expertise in in-space business development and customer marketing.280 In March 2018, KuangChi president and cofounder Liu Ruopeng noted that the Traveler program is being developed to 

create a “space vehicle that can be used both for scientific research and [to] provide commercial 

travel to near space.”281

Established in 2010, Kuang-Chi is regarded highly by the PRC government, as made evident by 

General Secretary Xi’s December 2012 visit to the company’s headquarters—his first official visit 

to a company as leader of China’s ruling party.282 Kuang-Chi is also involved in key PRC strategic 

initiatives thanks to its position as host and overseer of the State Key Laboratory of Metamaterial 

Electromagnetic Modulation Technology.283 The company notes on its website that “state key” 

denotes “funding or support by the Chinese government.”284

Separate from its connection to NanoRacks, Kuang-Chi is yet another example of PRC transfer of 

critical technology and knowhow from the United States to China via PRC recruitment programs. 

Kuang-Chi was founded by five Chinese scientists who returned to China after receiving advanced 

degrees from elite institutions in the United States and Europe.285 The company’s origins trace 

back to a Duke University research lab focused on cutting-edge stealth applications of 

metamaterials. Liu Ruopeng, often referred to as “China’s Elon Musk” in PRC official media,286

279 068 Base [068 基地], “068 Base and 7801 Institute Sign Strategic Framework Agreement with Shenzhen 

KuangChi Space Technology Co., Ltd.” [068 基地 7801 所余深圳光启空间技术有限公司签订战略合作框架协

议], February 28, 2015. http://guba.eastmoney.com/news,002625,179107736.html. 280 NanoRacks, “Kuang-Chi and NanoRacks Announce Agreement on Near Space ‘Traveler’ Program,” March 22, 

2018. http://nanoracks.com/near-space-traveler-program/. 281 NanoRacks, “Kuang-Chi and NanoRacks Announce Agreement on Near Space ‘Traveler’ Program,” March 22, 

2018. http://nanoracks.com/near-space-traveler-program/. 282 Kuang-Chi official website, “President Xi Jinping Visits Kuang-Chi,” June 3, 2016. http://www.kuangchi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=read&did=1080. 283 Kuang-Chi official website, “The State Key Laboratory of Metamaterial Electromagnetic Modulation 

Technology,” 2016. http://www.kuang-chi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=list&tid=289. 284 Kuang-Chi official website, “The State Key Laboratory of Metamaterial Electromagnetic Modulation 

Technology,” 2016. http://www.kuang-chi.com/en/index.php?ac=article&at=list&tid=289. 285 Daniel Golden, Spy Schools: How the CIA, FBI, and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s 

Universities, Henry Holt and Company, 2017. 286 Deng Zhangyu, “Innovator Liu Ruopeng Surges on with Dreams of the Future,” China Daily USA, July 8, 2016. 

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-07/08/content_26016060.htm.
72

allegedly arranged meetings with Chinese officials associated with Plan 111—a key PRC talent 

recruitment program—as a means to transfer the lab’s critical technological research back to 

China.287

International Recruitment Programs

The Thousand Talents Program (千人计划) encourages Chinese citizens working in high-tech 

strategic sectors overseas to return to China and boost the country’s S&T innovation capabilities. 

It has implemented subprograms for both young and non-ethnic Chinese experts (see Figure 3 for 

an example of a recruited individual).

288 The program is directed by several high-level PRC 

government and CCP Party organizations, including the PRC Ministry of Education (MOE), the 

CCP Central Organization Department, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the 

State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), MIIT, the United 

Front Work Department (UFWD), MOFA, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and others, 

according to the program’s official website.289 The website also states that Thousand Talents 

awardees receive special benefits, including the title of “National Distinguished Expert” and a 

guaranteed position at a university, R&D institute, or central state-owned enterprise.290 Awardees 

also receive a one-time monetary package of $140,000 (renminbi [RMB] 1 million) “from China’s 

central budget” as well as permanent residence status for them and their families, insurance, 

housing subsidies, guaranteed admission to schools for their children, job offers for spouses, and 

other perks.291 To qualify, individuals must meet the following criteria, according to declassified 

U.S. intelligence reporting:

• Expert or scholar with full professorship in a prestigious foreign university or research 

and development institute;

• Technical managerial professional in a senior position at an internationally known 

company or financial institution; or

• Entrepreneur holding intellectual property rights or key technologies and processes, as 

well as overseas experience.

292

287 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note: Chinese Talent 

Programs, September 2015. https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-ChineseTalentPrograms.pdf. 288 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note: Chinese Talent 

Programs, September 2015. https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-ChineseTalentPrograms.pdf. 289 Thousand Talents Program official website, “Thousand Talents Program Introduction” [千人计划介绍]. 

http://www.1000plan.org.cn/qrjh/section/2?m=rcrd. 290 Thousand Talents Program official website, “The Recruitment Program for Innovative Talents (Long Term).” 

http://www.1000plan.org.cn/en/. 291 Thousand Talents Program official website, “The Recruitment Program for Innovative Talents (Long Term).” 

http://www.1000plan.org.cn/en/. 292 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note: Chinese Talent 

Programs, September 2015. https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-ChineseTalentPrograms.pdf.
73

Figure 3: Example of Thousand Talents Recruitment

Source: Various.293

The 2006 Plan 111 aims to recruit foreign S&T experts and bring them to China to support the 

enhancement of China’s domestic innovation and S&T capabilities. The plan was jointly initiated 

by the MOE and the State Administration of Foreign Experts.294 In addition to acquiring overseas 

talent, Plan 111 also seeks to utilize overseas talent to build world-class universities and S&T 

disciplines within China’s domestic higher education. In line with this plan, the MOE selects 

domestic Chinese universities to participate based on achievements in specific disciplines; in 2018, 

MOE selected 62 universities to participate in Plan 111 (see Appendix for a detailed list).

295

China’s Hundred Talents Program (百人计划) is touted as China’s first overseas-oriented program 

for recruiting high-level S&T talent. This program appears to be a more specific precursor to the 

Thousand Talents Program in that it was exclusively designed for cultivating S&T talent for CAS 

and focuses on attracting younger individuals. 296 Programs like China’s National High-Tech 

Research and Development Plan (国家高技术研究发展计划) (hereinafter referred to as Plan 863; 

863 项目) offer an institutionalized extrabudgetary source of funding for PLA strategic advanced

technology initiatives.297

293 Multi-Modal Mobility Networks (M3Nets) at Beihang University, “Sebastian Wandelt.”

http://m3nets.de/group/sw.html; Research Gate, “Sebastian Wandelt.” 

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sebastian_Wandelt. 294 Phoenix Media [凤凰新媒体], “2018 National ‘111 Plan’ Project List Announced, 25 Colleges Selected” [2018

国家 “111 计划” 立项名单公布 25 高校入选], August 8, 2018.

http://tech.ifeng.com/a/20180808/45108928_0.shtml. 295 Sina, “62 Colleges and Universities Nationwide Were Selected for the National 111 Plan in 2018” [62 所高校入

选 2019 年国家 111 计划], January 23, 2018. http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2018-01-23/docifyquptv8808208.shtml. 296 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note: Chinese Talent 

Programs, September 2015. https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-ChineseTalentPrograms.pdf. University of 

Chinese Academy of Sciences, “The Hundred Talents Program.” http://english.ucas.ac.cn/index.php/join/jobvacancy/2133-the-hundred-talents-program. 297 Mark A. Stokes with Dean Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests,” 

prepared by the Project 2049 Institute for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 26, 

2012.

German scientist Sebastian Wandelt[小赛] was recruited by the PRC’s Young Thousand Talents 

Program [青年千人计划] in 2017, according to his biography on his official website. He was a 

postdoc at Humboldt University of Berlin from 2011 until he was recruited to work at Beihang 

University, focusing on efficient multimodal transportation engineering. He also works at the 

State Key Laboratory of Communications, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management 

(CNS/ATM), which is housed at Beihang University.
74

Table 4: Overview of Chinese Talent Recruitment Programs

Program Name Date 

Enacted

Associated 

Party/Government 

Body

Description

Plan 863 (863 计划) 1986 MOST Provides funding to leverage talent within 

China’s domestic university/research 

system.

Hundred Talents

Program(百人计划)

1994 CAS Aimed at transferring to China U.S. 

technology embodied in foreign 

scientists/experts working in foreign 

universities and businesses.

Plan 111 (111 计划) 2006 MOE Aimed at recruiting “foreign high-level 

talents and intelligence” from world-class 

universities to “serve China’s strategic 

needs.”

Thousand Talents

Program (千人计划)

2008 MOE Aimed at recruiting ethnic Chinese 

experts from foreign universities, 

research centers, and private companies 

to enhance China’s national capabilities 

in critical S&T fields.

Source: Various.298

PRC Non-State-Owned Space Business

Financing and Investment Vehicles

Beijing utilizes State-Industry Innovation Alliances (SIIAs; 产业创新联盟) as financing and 

investment vehicles to support its domestic civilian space industry. SIIAs are smaller groups within 

target sectors that provide a platform for PRC government departments, domestic and international 

scientific research institutes, academia, Chinese defense industries, SOEs, and private enterprises 

to interface within China. They also help to facilitate overseas collaboration to promote the rapid 

development of targeted technological sectors and MCF applications, putting foreign companies 

at risk of sharing or having key knowhow taken that contributes to PRC strategic—including 

military—priorities.299

298 State Administration of Foreign Experts [国家外国专家局] of the Ministry of Education [教育部],Notice of the 

State Administration of Foreign Experts of the Ministry of Education on Printing and Distributing the Measures for 

the Implementation and Management of Disciplinary Innovation and Incentives in Colleges and Universities [教育

部国家外国专家局关于印发《高等学校学科创新引智计划实施与管理办法》的通知], November 9, 2016.

http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A16/s3340/201611/t20161129_290299.html; Ministry of Science and Technology of 

the People’s Republic of China, National High-Tech R&D Program (863 Program).

http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/programmes1/200610/t20061009_36225.htm;University of Chinese Academy of 

Sciences,“ The Hundred Talents Program.”http://english.ucas.ac.cn/index.php/join/job-vacancy/2133-the-hundredtalents-program;Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Intelligence Note: 

Chinese Talent Programs, September 2015. https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBIChineseTalentPrograms.pdf;Thousand Talents Program official website, “Thousand Talents Program Introduction” 

[千人计划介绍]. http://www.1000plan.org.cn/qrjh/section/2?m=rcrd. 299 Greg Levesque and Mark Stokes, “Blurred Lines: Military-Civil Fusion and the ‘Going Out’ of China’s Defense 

Industry,” Pointe Bello, December 2016.
75

One such SIIA is the China Commercial Small Satellite Industry Innovation Alliance (中国商业

小卫星产业创新联盟). This alliance is led by the Ministry of Commerce; Harbin Institute of 

Technology; several CASC entities, such as Beijing Institute of Space Science and Technology 

Information; China Space Sat Co.; Xi’an Institute of Space Radio Technology; and others.300 The 

alliance claims to have more than 100 members and prioritizes projects in “One Belt, One Road” 

(OBOR 一带一路) regions.301 According to official PRC media reporting, the alliance’s purpose 

is to unite domestic and foreign commercial aerospace research institutes as well as private 

companies and SOEs to “jointly promote the rapid development of China’s commercial aerospace 

and military-civil fusion applications.” 302 It also aims to provide support and guidance for 

emerging players in China’s aerospace industry by encouraging private financing companies to 

invest in newer companies in the aerospace and satellite business.303 Notably, PLA official media 

states that the alliance will study and implement the policies, laws, and regulations of the CCP and 

the PRC government and guide its members—both domestic and foreign—to do so as well.304

Because the alliance is still fairly young—it was established in July 2018—only limited 

information about it is available.

Non-CASC/CASIC Launch Vehicle Companies

The following are examples of what the PRC touts as the leaders in its domestic “civilian” or 

“commercial” launch vehicle industry.305 Despite this claim, these three companies all have strong 

ties to the state and CCP. In addition, MIIT’s CCID Think Tank claims CASC is China’s sole 

supplier of launch vehicles,306 suggesting CASC is the primary—if not the exclusive—supplier of 

materials to PRC commercial launch companies.

300 China Daily, “China Commercial Small Satellite Industry Innovation Alliance Was Established” [中国商业小卫

星产业创新联盟成立], July 12, 2018. http://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-07/12/content_36562655.htm. 301 China Military Network, “China Commercial Small Satellite Industry Innovation Alliance Established” [中国商

业小卫星产业创新联盟成立], January 19, 2019. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-

07/13/content_210835.htm. 302 China Daily, “China Commercial Small Satellite Industry Innovation Alliance Was Established” [中国商业小卫

星产业创新联盟成立], July 12, 2018. http://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-07/12/content_36562655.htm. 303 China Daily, “China Commercial Small Satellite Industry Innovation Alliance Was Established” [中国商业小卫

星产业创新联盟成立], July 12, 2018. http://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-07/12/content_36562655.htm. 304 PLA Daily, “China Commercial Small Satellite Industry Innovation Alliance Was Established” [中国商业小卫

星产业创新联盟成立], July 13, 2018. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-07/13/content_210835.htm. 305 These three companies were cited in a CCID Think Tank [赛迪智库] report entitled “Prospects for China’s 

Commercial Aerospace Development in 2019” [2019 年中国商业航天发展形势展望]. For more information, see

CCID Think Tank [赛迪智库], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “Prospects for China’s 

Commercial Aerospace Development in 2019” [2019 年中国商业航天发展形势展望], 2019.

http://www.ccidwise.com/uploads/soft/181220/1-1Q220155A4.pdf. 306 CCID Think Tank [赛迪智库], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “Prospects for China’s 

Commercial Aerospace Development in 2019” [2019 年中国商业航天发展形势展望], 2019. 

http://www.ccidwise.com/uploads/soft/181220/1-1Q220155A4.pdf.
76

Notably, relevant companies have completed launches at Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center,

307

which is overseen by the PLA. Many of the PRC’s allegedly commercial launch vehicle companies 

operate out of the Beijing Economic Technological Development Zone308 (hereinafter referred to 

as E-Town, also called Yizhuang; 亦庄卡还区). Yizhuang is a high-level economic and 

technological development zone in the city that oversees six smaller parks, including the MilitaryCivil Fusion Industrial Park. 309 The zone is owned and operated by the Beijing E-Town 

International Investment and Development Co. (北京亦庄国际投资发展有限公司),

310 which is 

wholly owned by the State-Owned Assets Supervision Office of the Beijing Economic and 

Technological Development Zone (北京经济技术开发区国有资产管理办公室).

311

ExPace: PRC media portrays ExPace (航天科工火箭技术有限公司), also known as the CASIC 

Rocket Technology Company, as the country’s first commercial rocket launch company.312 The 

company is better known for its quick-reaction Kuaizhou family of orbital launch vehicles. Its 

products include smaller solid- and liquid-fueled rocket stages as well as larger versions that were 

first introduced in March 2018.313 National People’s Congress Deputy and Director of CASIC’s 

Hubei Provincial Science and Technology Committee Hu Shengyun stated that the new Kuaizhou 

series “is representative of China’s work to promote military-civil fusion and develop its 

commercial aerospace industry.”314 ExPace was jointly founded in February 2016 by CASIC and 

its subordinate, China Sanjiang Space Group.

315 CASIC is the majority-controlling shareholder.316

307 CCID Think Tank [赛迪智库], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “Prospects for China’s 

Commercial Aerospace Development in 2019” [2019 年中国商业航天发展形势展望], 2019. 

http://www.ccidwise.com/uploads/soft/181220/1-1Q220155A4.pdf. 308 One Space, “Begin to Pursue the Space Dream, the First Opening Day of One Space’s Event Ended

Successfully” [逐梦航天创响未来零壹空间首届开放日活动圆满收官], November 9, 2018.

http://www.onespacechina.com/news20181109/. 309 City of Beijing, “Beijing Economic Technological Development Area (BDA),” China Daily, December 8, 2018.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/beijing/2012-12/08/content_15998564.htm. 310 Beijing E-Town International Investment and Development Co. [北京亦庄国际投资发展有限公司], “Company 

Introduction” [公司简介]. http://www.etowncapital.com/nav/9.html. 311 Qichacha [企查查], “Entry for “State-Owned Assets Management Office of the Beijing Economic and 

Technological Development Zone” [北京经济技术开发区国有资产管理办公室], 2019.

https://www.qichacha.com/firm_g8b11dab6681a21c6a62360640560683.html. 312 Xinhua, “China’s First Commercial Rocket Launch Firm Raises 182 Mln USD,” December 19, 2017.

http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-12/19/c_136837164.htm. 313 Xinhua, “China’s ‘Kuaizhou No. 11’ Rocket Plan Is the First Flight of the Year” [我国 “快舟十一号“ 后见计划

年内首飞], March 5, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/05/c_1122489998.htm. 314 Xinhua, “China’s ‘Kuaizhou No. 11’ Rocket Plan Is the First Flight of the Year” [我国 “快舟十一号“ 后见计划

年内首飞], March 5, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/05/c_1122489998.htm. 315 Xinhua, “China’s First Commercial Rocket Launch Firm Raises 182 Mln USD,” December 19, 2017. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-12/19/c_136837164.htm. 316 Qichacha [企查查], “Entry for ExPace” [航天科工火箭技术有限公司]. 

https://www.qichacha.com/firm_26aa84759d854ac97338ef5660a5006d.html.
77

China Sanjiang Space Group (中国三江航天集团) is primarily engaged in solid-fueled ballistic 

missiles and stealth/counterstealth technology R&D, according to a U.S. think tank report.317

One Space: Beijing One Space Technology Co. (hereinafter referred to as One Space; 零壹空间

科技集团有限公司) was founded in 2015 by Beihang University alumnus Shu Chang (舒畅), 

who previously worked for Legend Holdings, the controlling shareholder of Lenovo Group.318

One Space’s business focuses mainly on three sectors: its M-series commercial launch vehicle, its 

X-series flight test platforms, and electrical and propellant products;319 however, its products 

include missile control and measurement control communications, uncrewed aerial vehicle 

integrated avionics, ground monitoring and control communications, and satellite and 

microsatellite measurement and control communications.320 It also aims to enter the commercial 

small and microsatellite business over the next few years. News outlets within China often tout 

One Space as China’s answer to SpaceX.321

Despite its claims to be privately owned, One Space maintains strong connections to both the PRC 

government and the CCP. In June 2019, One Space established a Communist Party committee, 

according to official reporting on One Space’s website.322 In 2018, the company also received 

$46.3 million in Series B financing led by China International Capital Corporation (CICC) Jiatai 

Equity Fund, a CICC subsidiary whose majority shareholder is the Central Huijin Investment Co. 

(中央汇金投资有限责任公司),

323 a wholly owned subsidiary of the State Council’s China 

Investment Corporation (中国投资有限责任公司).

324

LandSpace: LandSpace Technology Corporation (蓝箭航天空间科技股份有限公司), also 

referred to as Blue Arrow, was founded in 2015 by Tsinghua University MBA alumnus “Roger” 

Zhang Changwu (张昌武)and Wu Shufan, a former European Space Agency employee and 

317 Mark Stokes, “China’s Evolving Conventional Strike Capability,” Project 2049 Institute, September 14, 2009.

https://project2049.net/2009/09/14/chinas-evolving-conventional-strategic-strike-capability-the-anti-ship-ballisticmissile-challenge-to-u-s-maritime-operations-in-the-western-pacific-and-beyond/. 318 Deyana Goh, “Interview: One Space CEO on Its Progress, Plans, and China’s Space Industry,” Space Tech Asia, 

November 7, 2018). http://www.spacetechasia.com/interview-one-space-ceo-on-its-progress-plans-and-chinasspace-industry/. 319 One Space, “Introduction to One Space.” http://www.onespacechina.com/en/about/. 320 One Space, “Electronics.” http://www.onespacechina.com/en/electronics/. 321 China Daily, “Entrepreneur’s Rocket Dream Takes Off, “August 8, 2018.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/08/WS5b6a305fa310add14f3847bc.html. 322 One Space, “One Space Group Party Branch and General Branch Officially Established” [零壹空间集团党总

支、团总支正式成立], 25 June 25, 2019. http://www.onespacechina.com/news201900625/. 323 China International Capital Corporation, “Shareholding Structure of China International Capital Corporation 

Limited,” June 30, 2019.

http://www.cicc.com/portal/relations/stock/structure///156229379941878F16CFEA374EA689C7679982523EBD8.p

df.

324 Qichacha [企查查], “Entry for Central Huijin Investment Co., Ltd.” [中央汇金投资有限责任公司].

https://www.qichacha.com/firm_210b64792e1e20d8b2cd21a65720e471.html.
78

“expert of the National Thousand Talents Program,” according to PRC official media.325 The 

company’s official website states that LandSpace is a “Chinese private aerospace enterprise 

engaged in the R&D and operation of launch vehicles”326 and is focused on the development of 

liquid-fuel rocket engines and low-cost commercial launch vehicles with “independent intellectual 

property rights.”327

Non-CASC/CASIC Satellite Companies

Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co: Chang Guang Satellite (CGSTL; 长光卫星技术有限公

司), founded in December 2014, claims to be China’s first commercial remote sensing satellite 

company. Its satellites are being used to track foreign military assets; a May 2016 Sina report 

shows pictures of high-definition (HD) satellite imagery of the Philadelphia Naval Yard taken by 

Chang Guang’s Jilin 1A Satellite (吉林一号光学 A 星) in April of that year.328

CGSTL’s official website states in vernacular Chinese that its ownership comprises seven 

shareholding units and 32 people, including CAS’ Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics,

and Physics, in addition to Jilin provincial government small and medium enterprises;329 however, 

the company’s English-language site states that there are only five shareholding units.330 CGSTL 

asserts that the company’s main business scope comprises R&D and sales for satellite and UAV 

systems as well as their components, loading systems, monitoring and tracking systems, and other 

relevant services.331 The company’s official website also claims that the company maintains an 

internal CCP Party Committee in charge of “propagandizing and implementing the rules and 

resolutions of the CCP Central Committee” throughout the organization, according to the 

company’s official Party “Working Rules” (工作规则).

332 CGSTL’s Party Committee has also 

recently won honorary titles from the Changchun Municipal Government in April 2019 and 

2017.333 CGSTL is most well-known for developing the Jilin series of remote sensing satellites. 

325 Xinhua, “Elon Musks of China” [亦庄的马斯克们], June 21, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2018-

06/21/c_1123012838.htm. 326 LandSpace, “About Us.” http://www.landspace.com/site/about. 327 LandSpace, “About Us.” http://www.landspace.com/site/about. 328 Sina Military [新浪军事], “Chinese Commercial Satellites Captured the US Aircraft Carrier with Suspected 

Military-Level Precision” [中国商用卫星拍到美航母清晰图军用水平引猜想], May 26, 2016.

http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-05-26/doc-ifxsqxxs7647821.shtml. 329 For background on CAS’s Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics, and Physics [中国科学院长春光学精

密机械与物理研究所], see Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., “Company Profile” [企业简介].

http://charmingglobe.com/about_tw.aspx?id=9. 330 Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., “Profile.” http://charmingglobe.com/EWeb/about_tw.aspx?id=9. 331 Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., “Main Business Scope.” 

http://charmingglobe.com/EWeb/product1.aspx?id=20&tid=26. 332 Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. official website, “Working Rules” [工作规则]. 

http://charmingglobe.com/party1.aspx?id=42. 333 Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., “The Company’s Party Committee Won the Honorary Title of 2018 

Changchun Non-Public Enterprise and Social Organization Advanced Party Organization” [公司单位荣获 2018 年

长春市非公企业合社会组织先进党组织荣誉称号], April 28, 2019.
79

Jilin No. 1 (吉林一号) was first launched in October 2015 from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch 

Center. 

CGSTL has worked closely with provincial and local governments on the Jilin project, and in 2018 

jointly established the $70 million (RMB 500 million) “Jilin Aerospace Information Innovation 

Venture Capital Fund” (吉林省航天信息创新创业投资基金) with the Jilin provincial 

government and Changchun municipal government.334

A CGSTL media report states that in March 2019 the company provided disaster relief support as 

part of its China Group on Earth Observations (GEOSS) Disaster Data Response Mechanism,

following the January 2019 dam collapse at the Córrego do Feijão iron mine. China GEOSS 

program coordinator Li Gouging claims that the system is “complementary to the International 

Charter Space and Major Disasters,” and that the system is able to “mobilize high-resolution 

satellite resources operated by both government institutes and commercial sectors for international 

emergency response and make the data openly available to the public afterwards.” 335 CAS’ 

Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth is also a contributor to this regional initiative.336

Beijing PieSat Information Technology Co: Beijing PieSat(北京航天宏图信息技术股份有限

公司), founded in 2008, is a Chinese high-tech commercial firm that specializes in remote sensing 

and satellite technology.337 The company website states that PieSat independently developed its 

Pixel Information Expert (PIE) software that can be used for analyzing remote sensing imagery 

and data using advanced information extraction techniques and artificial intelligence.338 Its PIEMap software provides map navigation and geographic information system (GIS) services for the 

government, army, enterprises, and other clients, according to PieSat’s official website.339 The 

company also claims that PIE-Map software is compatible with China’s Beidou satellite system.340

Most notably, PieSat’s website states that its “typical customers” (典型客户) include: the National 

Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of State Security, the National 

Administration of State Secrets Protection (国家保密局), CASIC, CASC, the PLA General Staff 

Department, the PLA Logistics Department, the PLA Navy, the PLA Second Artillery Corps (now 

http://charmingglobe.com/party_view.aspx?id=1640; Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., “July 2017

Changchun Satellite Technology Co. Ltd. Party Branch Award Notice” [2017 年 7 月长春卫星技术有限公司党支

部获奖通知], November 10, 2017. http://charmingglobe.com/party_view.aspx?id=252. 334 Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., “Company Profile” [企业简介].

http://charmingglobe.com/about_tw.aspx?id=9. 335 Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd., “China GEO Supports Brazil Dam Collapse Disaster Response,” 

March 13, 2019. http://charmingglobe.com/EWeb/news_view.aspx?id=674. 336 Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd., “China GEO Supports Brazil Dam Collapse Disaster Response,” 

March 13, 2019. http://charmingglobe.com/EWeb/news_view.aspx?id=674. 337 PieSat, “About Us.” http://www.piesat.cn/en/About%20us.html. 338 PieSat, “PIE Product Overview.” http://www.piesat.cn/en/Pie.html. 339 PieSat, “PIE-Map Product Introduction.” http://www.piesat.cn/en/Piemap.html. 340 PieSat, PIE-Map Product Functions.” http://www.piesat.cn/en/Piemap.html.
80

the PLA Rocket Force), and others.341 The company’s initial public offering (IPO) report states 

that the company derived part of its income from PLA Unit 61741 in 2016, PLA Unit 61646 in 

2017, PLA Unit 61683 in 2017, and the PLA’s Army Engineering University in 2018.342

PieSat also maintains relationships with U.S. entities. For example, in October 2018PieSat met 

with faculty from the University of Maryland’s (UMD) Department of Geological Sciences to 

discuss strengthening cooperation with Wuhan University—which the UMD press release claims 

receives a large donation from PieSat—as well as ways to strengthen UMD’s undergraduate study 

abroad program in China.343 In addition, in August 2017 a blog run by the Laboratory of Remote 

Sensing and Hydrometeorology at Florida Atlantic University (FAU) claimed that FAU Geomatics 

started a partnership with PieSat to develop applications based on the company’s PieSat 4.1 

software package.344

PRC Provision of Satellite Infrastructure, Launch Services Overseas

China has provided launch services to several countries over the past decade. These satellites are 

launched from either the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province, the Jiuquan 

Satellite Launch Center, or the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi Province, all three of 

which various PLA units operate and oversee. Satellites are launched using CASC First Academy 

Long March launch vehicles. In addition to launch services, China has also assisted some countries 

with their domestic satellite development and manufacturing. Key players in China’s aerospace 

industry—like CASC and its subordinate CGWIC—have contributed significantly to satellite 

programs in Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and elsewhere (see Table 5 for a more exhaustive 

list).In many cases, PRC entities appeared to have secured agreements giving them a key role in 

all phases of joint space programs, from design and financing to launch and subsequent operation 

of satellites and ground stations, so that they may use what they deem necessary to their own 

advantage. 

Terms and conditions of contracts and agreements between China and other countries regarding 

ground stations and other space infrastructure appear to vastly benefit Chinese interests. For 

instance, the terms and conditions of the PRC’s agreement with Namibia to set up a telemetry, 

tracking, and command station for China’s Manned Space Program appear to benefit Beijing’s 

interests despite also allegedly being intended to help Namibia develop its own space program. As 

of 2019, it is unclear whether or not Namibia’s space program has benefited from its collaboration 

341 PieSat, “Typical Customers” [典型客户]. http://www.piesat.cn/alticle/htht_dxkh.html. 342 Guosen Securities Co., Ltd., “Regarding Beijing PieSat Information Technology Co., Ltd. Initial Public Offering 

of Shares and Listing on the Board, Reply to the Application Document Review Inquiry Letter” [关于北京航天宏

图信息技术股份有限公司首次公开发行股票并在科创板上市,申请文件审核问询函的回复], May 2019. 

http://qccdata.qichacha.com/Disclosure/8d405aac9f0a9a92dc236d2be3fc1f0a.pdf. 343 University of Maryland Department of Geological Sciences, “GEOG Faculty Meet with Representatives from 

China PIESAT and EMDO US.,” October 2018. https://geog.umd.edu/news/geog-faculty-meet-representativeschina-piesat-and-emdo-us. 344 Laboratory for Remote Sensing and Hydrometeorology at Florida Atlantic University, “Piesat 4.1 Software,” 

August 29, 2017. https://faculty.eng.fau.edu/suh/2017/08/29/piesat-4-1-software/.
81

with China. Between 2000 and 2012, the Namibian government claimed the station had 

participated in six space launches run by the China Manned Space Program. However, it was not 

until 2012 that the two sides signed an additional agreement to facilitate the employment of 

Namibian citizens at the Swakopmund station, suggesting that assisting Namibia likely was a 

secondary priority.345

For instance, in August 2019 Chinese taikonauts traveled to Namibia at the invitation of Namibian 

President Hage Geingob for a five-day visit. Although official PRC media reporting from the event 

mentions the delegation was expected to pay a courtesy call to President Geingob, meet “local 

middle school learners” at the space tracking, telemetry, and control station, and communicate 

with students at Namibia University of Science and Technology, it makes no mention of any 

concrete collaborations that would benefit the Namibian space program. 346 The article also 

discusses President Geingob’s 2018 visit to the Beijing Aerospace Control Center, although it does 

not specify any details of his visit except his interaction with three unnamed taikonauts.347

Sri Lanka’s SupremeSat is owned in partnership with China Satellite Communications Co., a 

subsidiary of CASC, according to SupremeSat’s official website.348 This ownership structure 

strongly suggests the PRC maintains access to the satellite’s data and bandwidth. In addition, at 

the first signing ceremony for SupremeSat in 2013, China and Sri Lanka also signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate on Beidou expansion in the Indian Ocean region.349

Specifically, SASTIND reporting claims Sri Lanka and China agreed to collaborate on improving 

Beidou’s commercial operations in the region, including applications in fisheries and 

transportation.350 The simultaneous signing of both the SupremeSat and Beidou agreements also 

suggests SupremeSat is meant to support Beidou’s expansion, and, therefore, that the PRC most 

likely has access to the satellite’s data at the very least.

Venezuela has collaborated with CGWIC since 2005. To date, the PRC has built and launched 

three satellites for Venezuela, with a fourth planned for 2022, according to an article by the China 

National Administration of GNSS and Applications (CNAGA; 中国卫星导航定位应用管理中

345 Republic of Namibia Ministry of Education, Arts and Culture, Namibia and China Sign an Employment

Agreement, March 29, 2012.

http://www.moe.gov.na/news_article.php?id=60&title=Namibia%20and%20China%20sign%20an%20employment

%20agreement. 346 Xinhua, “Chinese Astronauts Arrive in Namibia for Five-Day Visit,” August 21, 2019.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/21/c_138324264.htm. 347 Xinhua, “Chinese Astronauts Arrive in Namibia for Five-Day Visit,” August 21, 2019.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/21/c_138324264.htm. 348 SupremeSat, “SupremeSat-1.” http://www.supremesat.com/satellites/supremesat-i/. 349 PLA Daily, “China Will Deliver Communications Radio Satellite to Sri Lanka in Orbit” [中国将向斯里兰卡在

轨交付通信广播卫星], October 9, 2013. http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2013-10/09/content_5573657.htm. 350 State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, Ma Xingrui Participated in the 

Talks and Signing Ceremony with the Heads of State of China and Sri Lanka [马兴瑞参加中斯两国元首会谈合签

约仪式], May 28, 2013. http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n142/c11015/content.html.
82

心). 351 Venesat-1 was CGWIC’s first satellite in-orbit delivery contract signed with a Latin 

American customer, according to the company’s official website.352 Venezuela first signed a 

strategic cooperation agreement with CGWIC in November 2005 for Venezuela’s communication 

satellite, Venesat-1. The signing ceremony was attended by former Venezuelan President Hugo 

Chavez, as well as other high-level officials from CGWIC, the Venezuelan Ministry of Science 

and Technology, the CNSA, the Chinese Embassy in Venezuela, CASC First Academy, CLTC, 

and others.353

According to the agreement, CGWIC would act as the general contractor for the project, which 

included undertaking the design, manufacturing, final assembly, testing, and launching tasks for 

the satellite with unnamed subcontractors.354 The contract also stipulated that China would deliver 

relevant ground monitoring and control facilities.355 Venezuela’s VRSS-2 satellite was designed 

by CASC’s China Academy of Space Technology, according to official PRC media reporting.356

PRC media also states that the project was launched in October 2014 after the Venezuelan 

government signed an agreement with CGWIC.357 General Secretary Xi and Venezuelan President 

Nicolas Maduro were both present at the signing ceremony for VRSS-2, according to official PRC 

reporting.358 The Venezuelan government claimed in official reporting that it signed an agreement 

with the CNSA to exchange data and applications. Mariano Imbert, director of the Bolivarian 

Agency for Space Activities (ABAE; Agencia Bolivariana para Actividades Espaciales) also stated 

that, as per the agreement, Venezuela will have access to information from the PRC’s GF1 and 

GF2 satellites, and China will have the ability to view Venezuelan satellite imagery from Chinese 

territory.359

351 China National Administration of GNSS and Applications, Venezuela is Planning to Launch Its Satellites in 2022 

with the Help of China’s Technology, September 3, 2019. http://en.chinabeidou.gov.cn/c/1595.html. 352 China Great Wall Industry Corporation, “In-Orbit Delivery: VeneSat-1 Program.” 

http://www.cgwic.com/CommunicationsSatellite/project.html. 353 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Venezuela, “China and Venezuela Sign Communications Satellite

Project Contract” [中国合委内瑞拉签署通信卫星项目合同], 2005. http://ve.chinaembassy.org/chn/smwl/t219347.htm. 354 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Venezuela, “China and Venezuela Sign Communications Satellite

Project Contract” [中国合委内瑞拉签署通信卫星项目合同], 2005. http://ve.chinaembassy.org/chn/smwl/t219347.htm. 355 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Venezuela, “China and Venezuela Sign Communications Satellite

Project Contract” [中国合委内瑞拉签署通信卫星项目合同], 2005. http://ve.chinaembassy.org/chn/smwl/t219347.htm. 356 China Daily, “China Launches Second Remote-Sensing Satellite for Venezuela,” China Daily, October 10, 2017.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/10/content_33058430.htm. 357 China Daily, “China Launches Second Remote-Sensing Satellite for Venezuela,” China Daily, October 10, 2017. 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/10/content_33058430.htm. 358 People’s Daily, “Signing of the Venezuelan Remote Sensing Satellite Project No. 2” [委内瑞拉遥感卫星二号项

目合同签署], October 10, 2014. http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1223/c409002-28973164.html. 359 National Telecommunications Commission [Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones], Venezuela Moves

Towards Satellite Production [Venezuela caminahacia la producción de satélites], January 12, 2017.

http://www.conatel.gob.ve/venezuela-camina-hacia-la-produccion-de-satelites/.
83

China has also established programs with countries like Brazil to collaborate on satellite 

development and provide launch services. The China-Brazil Earth Resources Program (CBERS) 

dates back to 1988, and in October 1999 launched the first CBERS satellite, which it claims is 

utilized for observing and monitoring the earth’s resources and environment.

360 CBERS is a joint 

initiative between CAST361 and Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE; Instituto 

Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais).362 For CBERS-1 and CBERS-2, China and Brazil agreed to split 

the over $300 million development costs 70-30, respectively. This agreement was revised in 2002 

to have each country cover 50 percent of the costs.363 In a presentation to the UN Office for Outer 

Space Affairs, Guo Jianning, director of the China Center for Resource Satellite Data and 

Application (CRESDA; 中国资源卫星应用中心) discussed his organization’s role in the CBERS 

program.364 CRESDA’s responsibilities include: CBERS application development strategy; design, 

construction, and operation of CBERS application system; application fields; technologies related 

to CBERS data; and international cooperation related to CBERS data and applications.365 In his 

presentation, Guo states that CRESDA is directed by the PRC’s National Development and

Reform Commission; CASC; and the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for 

National Defense, which later became SASTIND.366

360 Xinhua, “30 Years of Space Cooperation for China and Brazil: Joint Development of 6 Earth Resource Satellites, 

Providing More than 500,000Units of Remote Sensing Satellite Data” [中国巴西航天合作 30 年:联合研制 6 颗

地球资源卫星、提供 50 余万景遥感卫星数据], November 22, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-

11/22/c_1123754544.htm; European Space Agency’s Earth Observation Portal (EO Portal), “CBERS-1 (ChinaBrazil Earth Resources Satellites) – 1st Generation Satellite Series.” 

https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/c-missions/cbers-1-2. 361 Guo Jianning, “CBERS and Applications, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC),”

presentation prepared for United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, 2007.

http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2007/tech-01.pdf. 362 European Space Agency, “CBERS: Mission Facts and Figures.” https://earth.esa.int/web/guest/missions/3rdparty-missions/potential-missions/cbers. 363National Institute for Space Research: CBERS,“ Cooperation Background” [Antecedentes de Cooperação], 

February 5, 2018. http://www.cbers.inpe.br/sobre/historia.php. 364 Guo Jianning, “CBERS and Applications,” presentation for the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 

2007. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2007/tech-01.pdf. 365 Guo Jianning, “CBERS and Applications,” presentation for the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 

2007. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2007/tech-01.pdf. 366 Guo Jianning, “CBERS and Applications,” presentation for the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 

2007. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2007/tech-01.pdf.
84

Figure 4: CBERS-4 Capabilities

Source: Various.367

In 2010, Argentina’s Satellogic agreed to outsource it satellite launches to CGWIC, according to 

PRC official media.368 The company also received financial support in 2017 from Chinese internet 

giant Tencent, which led Satellogic’s Series B fundraising efforts.369 The company claims to have

clients in both the government sector as well as in industries such as forestry, agriculture, energy, 

finance and insurance, cartography, and critical infrastructure management. 370 Regarding 

government clients, in September 2019 Satellogic announced a partnership with PRC company 

ABDAS, headquartered in Henan Province. An official press release stated that the agreement will

provide ABDAS with access to a fleet of multispectral imagery satellites.371

Although little information exists about ABDAS, Satellogic CEO Emiliano Kargieman stated that 

“the commitment of Henan government to embrace innovations in space technology, aid 

development, and propel forward the competitiveness of its industry serves as a source of 

inspiration,” suggesting ABDAS is affiliated with the Henan government.372 The company’s 

products, which include affordable high-resolution satellites and microsatellites, have been 

367 World Meteorological Organization’s Observing Systems Capability Analysis and Review Tool 

(OSCAR),“Satellites: CBERS-4.” https://www.wmo-sat.info/oscar/satellites/view/29; Guo Jianning, “CBERS and 

Applications,” presentation for the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2007.

http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2007/tech-01.pdf. 368 Joel Richards, “Argentine Satellite Company Outsources Launches to China,” CGTN America, June 25, 2019.

https://america.cgtn.com/2019/06/25/argentine-satellite-company-outsources-launches-to-china. 369 Darrell Etherington, “Satellogic Raises $27M for Affordable, High-Resolution Imaging Satellites,” TechCrunch, 

June 23, 2017. https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/23/satellogic-raises-27m-for-affordable-high-resolution-imagingsatellites/. 370 Satellogic, “Custom Solutions for Every Industry.” https://satellogic.com/industries/. 371 Satellogic, “Press Release: Satellogic Signs Agreement with ABDAS to Deliver Dedicated Satellite Constellation 

for Exclusive Geospatial Analytics in Henan Province, China,” PR Newswire, September 9, 2019.

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/satellogic-signs-agreement-with-abdas-to-deliver-dedicatedsatellite-constellation-for-exclusive-geospatial-analytics-in-henan-province-china-1028508453. 372 Satellogic, “Press Release: Satellogic Signs Agreement with ABDAS to Deliver Dedicated Satellite Constellation 

for Exclusive Geospatial Analytics in Henan Province, China,” PR Newswire, September 9, 2019.

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/satellogic-signs-agreement-with-abdas-to-deliver-dedicatedsatellite-constellation-for-exclusive-geospatial-analytics-in-henan-province-china-1028508453.

• Power: 2300 W

• Orbit: Sun-synchronous 

• Altitude: 778km

• Direct reception at appointed ground stations 

(Beijing, Guangzhou, Urumqi, Brazil)

• Near-real-time selected data from GEONetCast

• Off-line data distribution from INPE
85

launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.373 According to Satellogic’s website, the 

company has seven global offices, including one in Beijing.374

In January 2019, the company signed an agreement with CGWIC to have it launch 90 satellites on 

its LM-6 carrier rocket, with the first 13 satellites reportedly being delivered in late 2019; it will 

be the first use case of anLM-6 rocket for an international customer.375 Satellogic’s founder and 

CEO noted that once in orbit, the 90 satellites would be able to capture a one-meter resolution 

image of the world every week. According to a 2019 U.S. Geological Survey report and a 

Satellogic presentation on the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) website, 

Satellogic’s Aleph-1 constellation consists of a total of eight multiresolution multispectral 

satellites that are all sun-synchronous. ÑuSat-1 to -5 satellites were launched between 2016 and 

early 2018. ÑuSat-6 to -8 were planned for 2018, but it is unclear whether these have already been 

launched.376

In addition, CGWIC’s website claims it signed strategic cooperation agreements with the Nigerian 

government (2004 and 2009), the Pakistani government (2008), the Laotian government (2010), 

the Bolivian Space Agency (2010), the Belarusian government (2011), and the Algerian 

government (2013) to cooperate with these countries on satellite development.377 Official PRC 

reporting notes that China Development Bank provided a preferential commercial loan to the 

Bolivian Space Agency to fund their satellite project.378 CGWIC was chosen for the NigComSat 

program because Russian and Israeli companies failed to meet contract requirements and U.S. and 

European companies allegedly questioned the Nigerian government’s ability to execute the 

contract.379 In April 2019, China and Pakistan strengthened their cooperation in space, signing a 

cooperation agreement on crewed space missions between CNSA director Hao Chun and Pakistan 

373 Darrell Etherington, “Satellogic Raises $27M for Affordable, High-Resolution Imaging Satellites,” TechCrunch, 

June 23, 2017. https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/23/satellogic-raises-27m-for-affordable-high-resolution-imagingsatellites/. 374 Satellogic, “Our Offices.” https://satellogic.com/about/. 375 Xinhua, “90 Argentine Satellites to Be Launched in China,” January 18, 2019. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/18/c_137754750.htm; China Great Wall Industry Corporation, “CGWIC 

and Argentina’s Satellogic Company Signed a Telescope Constellation Launch Service Contract” [长城公司与阿根

廷 Satellogic 公司签署遥感星座发射服务合同], January 15, 2019. http://cn.cgwic.com/news/2019/20190115.html. 376 Adrian Sinclair, “Commercial Grade Affordable Earth Observation in Real Time,” Satellogic presentation to the 

International Telecommunication Union, 2017. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/space/workshops/2017-

Bariloche/Presentations/30%20-%20Adrian%20Sinclair-%20Satellogic.pdf; U.S. Geological Survey, 2019 Joint 

Agency Commercial Imagery Evaluation—Land Remote Sensing Satellite Compendium,2019. 

https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1455/cir1455.pdf. 377 China Great Wall Industry Corporation, “In-Orbit delivery.” 

http://www.cgwic.com/CommunicationsSatellite/project.html. 378 People’s Republic of China, China Has Helped Us Achieve the Satellite Dream [中国帮我们圆了卫星梦],April 

7, 2016. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-04/07/content_5061830.htm. 379 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Nigerian Media Reports on the Launch of 

Communications Satellites [尼日利亚媒体关于尼发射通讯卫星的有关报道], May 25, 2007.

http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/jyjl/k/200705/20070504707894.html.
86

Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) chairman Amer Nadeem.380

CNSA and SUPARCO are expected to establish a China-Pakistan space committee chaired by top 

officials from both countries in order to address future collaborations and issues, according to PRC 

official media.381

Table 5: List of Countries That Have Had Satellites Launched in China

Country Satellite Project Name Launch Year Launch 

Location

Status

Venezuela Venesat-1* 2008 Xichang Plan to launch fourth 

satellite (Guaicaipuro) in 

2022. Venezuelan Remote Sensing 

Satellite-1 (VRSS-1)*

2012 Jiuquan

Venezuelan Remote Sensing 

Satellite-2 (VRSS-2)*

2017 Jiuquan

Nigeria Nigcomsat-1 2007 Xichang Two new satellites under 

development by CGWIC as 

of Feb 2019. Nigcomsat-1R 2011 Xichang

Bolivia Tupac Katari (TKSat-1)* 2013 Xichang Plan to launch second 

satellite in 2020–2021.

Ecuador NEE-01 Pegaso 2013 Jiuquan Last satellite launched by 

Russia in 2013.

Algeria Alcomsat-1* 2017 Xichang Considering launching 

second satellite under 

framework of 2020–2040 

space program.

Sri Lanka SupremeSAT-1* 2012 Xichang Second satellite 

(SupremeSAT-2) delayed 

but expected to be launched 

imminently.

Pakistan Badr-1 1990 Xichang Last satellite launched in 

PakSat 2018. -1R* 2011 Xichang

Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite1 (PRSS-1)2018 Jiuquan

PakTES-1A 2018 Jiuquan

Indonesia Palapa-D 2009 Xichang Last satellite launched in 

Palapa 2017. -N1* 2017 Xichang

Belarus Belintersat-1* 2016 Xichang Last satellite launched in 

2016.

Laos LaoSat-1* 2015 Xichang Last satellite launched in 

2015.

Brazil CBERS-1* 1999 Taiyuan Plan to launch CBER-4A 

CBERS during second half of 2019. -2* 2003 Taiyuan

CBERS-2B* 2007 Taiyuan

CBERS-3* 2013 Taiyuan

CBERS-4* 2014 Taiyuan

* Satellite was developed either partially or fully by PRC entities.

Source: Various. 382

380 Global Times, “China and Pakistan Sign Space Exploration Agreement,” April 28, 2019. 

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1147918.shtml. 381 Global Times, “China and Pakistan Sign Space Exploration Agreement,” April 28, 2019. 

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1147918.shtml. 382 China Science Communication [科普中国], China Association for Science and Technology [中国科

协]“Successful Launch of the ‘Venesat No. 1’ Communication Satellite on October 30, 2008” [2008 年 10 月 30
87

日 ”委内瑞拉一号” 通信卫星成功发射], Xinhua, October 30, 2008. http://www.xinhuanet.com//science/2017-

10/30/c_136714183.htm;Simon Garcia, “Venezuela and China Share Knowledge on Space Cooperation,” Ministerio 

del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, March 7, 2019. http://mppre.gob.ve/en/2019/07/03/venezuela-chinaspace-cooperation/;Xinhua,“China Launches Remote Sensing Satellite for Venezuela,” October 9, 2017. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/09/c_136666885.htm;State Administration of Science, Technology and 

Industry for National Defense (SASTIND),China Delivered Venezuela’s Satellite Project to Venezuela[中访问委内

瑞拉交付 “委遥二号” 卫星项目], March 23, 2018. http://www.sastind.gov.cn/n142/c6800277/content.html; 

Xinhua, “China Launches Remote Sensing Satellite for Venezuela,” October 9, 2017.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/09/c_136666885.htm;People’s Daily, “Secret of ‘Nigcomsat-1’” [“尼日

利亚卫星一号“ 密码], May 15, 2007. http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/5736151.html;Adam White, “China Will 

Remain Main Contractor for Nigerian Satellites,” Spaceflight News, February 6, 2019.

https://newsspaceflight.com/china-will-remain-main-contractor-for-nigerian-satellites/;People’s Daily, “China 

Successfully Launched Nigeran Communication Satellite 1R” [我国成功发射尼日利亚通信卫星 1R], December 

20, 2011. http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/16657000.html; People’s Republic of China, China Delivers

Communications Satellites to Bolivia [中国向玻利维亚交付通信卫星], April 3, 2014.

http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-04/03/content_2652647.htm;China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 

(CASC),“China Successfully Developed a Communications Satellite for Bolivia” [中国为玻利维亚研制发射的通

信卫星成功定点], January 2, 2014. 

http://www.spacechina.com/N25/n2018089/n2018131/c2379819/content.html;Agencia EFE, “Bolivia Sets Sights on 

Launching 2ndCommunicationsSatellite,” December 19, 2016. https://www.efe.com/efe/english/technology/boliviasets-sights-on-launching-2nd-communications-satellite/50000267-3129307; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 

People’s Republic of China, China’s Relationship with Ecuador[中国同厄瓜多尔的关系], March 2019. 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn//gxh/cgb/zcgmzysx/nmz/1206_5/1206x1/t7924.htm;NASA Space Science Data 

Coordinated Archive,NEE-02 Krysaor. https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=NEE02KRY;

China Great Wall Industry Corporation, “In-Orbit Delivery: Alcomsat-1 Program.” 

http://www.cgwic.com/CommunicationsSatellite/project.html; Space Watch Global, “Algeria Considering Second 

Alcomsat Communications Satellite,” December 2018. https://spacewatch.global/2018/12/algeria-consideringsecond-alcomsat-communications-satellite/; SupremeSAT, “SupremeSAT-1.” 

http://www.supremesat.com/satellites/supremesat-i/; SupremeSAT, “SupremeSAT-2.” 

http://www.supremesat.com/satellites/supremesat-ii/; Pakistan Space & Upper Atmosphere Research 

Commission,Badr-1 History. http://www.suparco.gov.pk/pages/badr1.asp?badr1linksid=1; Jane’s by IHS Markit,

“Satellite Ground Station Expansion Shows Pakistan’s Reliance on China,” 2019. 

https://www.janes.com/images/assets/308/86308/Satellite_ground_station_expansion_shows_Pakistans_reliance_on

_China.pdf; Xinhua, “China Successfully Launches Two Pakistani Satellites in ‘One Arrow Two Stars’” [我国 “一

箭双星” 成功发射两颗巴基斯坦卫星], July9, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-

07/09/c_1123098481.htm; China Great Wall Industry Corporation, “In-Orbit Delivery: PakSat-1R Program.” 

http://www.cgwic.com/CommunicationsSatellite/project.html; Xinhua, “China Successfully Launches Two Pakistani 

Satellites in ‘One Arrow Two Stars’” [我国 “一箭双星” 成功发射两颗巴基斯坦卫星], July 9, 2018.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-07/09/c_1123098481.htm;Xinhua, “China’s Domestic Communication

Satellites Enter the Indonesian Market” [中国国产通信卫星首进印尼市场], May 23, 2017. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2017-05/23/c_1121016537.htm; Caleb Henry, “China Great Wall Industry Corp 

Lands Indonesian Commercial Satellite Order,” Space News, May 17, 2017. https://spacenews.com/china-greatwall-industry-corp-lands-indonesian-commercial-satellite-order/; PLA Daily, “What Is the Significance of China 

Launching Satellites for Belarus?” [中国为白俄罗斯发射卫星意味着什么?], January 16, 2016.

http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-01/16/content_6859544.htm; LaoSat, “Satellite Info.” 

https://www.laosat.la/en/satellite-info.php; LaoSat, “Launching of LAOSAT-1.”http://www.laosat.la/en/newsdetail/1-21/Launching-of-LAOSAT-1; Earth Observation Portal, “CBERS – 1stGeneration.”

https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/c-missions/cbers-1-2; European Space Agency,
88

Beidou Achieving Global Reach

The PRC is actively pursuing the “going out” of its indigenous Beidou GNSS, which in December 

2018 reached the initial stages of global coverage with the launch of Beidou 3.383 Based on official 

Beidou reporting, it appears Beidou will now provide “basic” global coverage, meaning the PRC 

is still in the process of launching additional satellites to support “full” global coverage by the end 

of 2020.384 Beidou “basic” global coverage is currently only available to participating OBOR

nations, as the system is still under development.

385 “Basic” coverage is likely being offered only 

to OBOR countries as part of the Digital Silk Road (DSR; 数字丝绸之路) initiative, which 

prioritizes satellites and specifically promotes Beidou. In offering Beidou to OBOR partners, the 

PRC is undoubtedly attempting to gain influence as a regional technological power. Beidou 

nevertheless is currently being offered free of cost, similar to GPS and other GNSS, so the PRC is 

likely not gaining as much economically from these deals. However, the PRC is hoping to deploy 

Beidou as an alternative to U.S. GPS, suggesting it may eventually try to get countries to choose

its system over GPS. The Beidou system has a range of dual-use applications, including smart 

agriculture, land surveying and mapping, autonomous vehicles and drones, storage logistics, 

airport management, precision-guided munitions, and combat drones.386

Beijing has cooperated with the United States, Russia, and the EU387 on GNSS technology and 

interoperability throughout Beidou’s development.388 In 2003, China began collaborating with the 

“CBERS: Mission Facts and Figures.” https://earth.esa.int/web/guest/missions/3rd-party-missions/potentialmissions/cbers; Xinhua, “China, Brazil to Launch New Earth Resource Satellite Next Year,” November 22, 2018.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/22/c_137624776.htm; Earth Observation Portal, “CBERS – 3 and 4.” 

https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/c-missions/cbers-3-4. 383 Beidou, The Beidou No.3 Basic System Was Completed and Global Service Launch Meeting Was Held [北斗三

号基本系统建成及提供全球服务情况发布会召开],December 27, 2018.

http://www.beidou.gov.cn/yw/xwzx/201812/t20181227_16864.html. Also see Beidou, The BDS-3 Preliminary 

System Is Completed to Provide Global Services, December 27, 2018.

http://en.beidou.gov.cn/WHATSNEWS/201812/t20181227_16837.html. 384 Jiaqing Ma, “Update on Beidou Navigation Satellite System,” China Satellite Navigation System Office for the 

13th Meeting of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems, November 4, 2018.

http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/icg/2018/icg13/01.pdf. 385 Jiaqing Ma, “Update on Beidou Navigation Satellite System,” China Satellite Navigation System Office for the 

13th Meeting of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems, November 4, 2018.

http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/icg/2018/icg13/01.pdf. 386 Beidou, Beidou Satellite Navigation System Application Case Studies [北斗卫星导航系统应用案例],December 

2018. http://www.beidou.gov.cn/xt/gfxz/201812/P020181227583462913294.pdf; Yang Sheng, “Combat Drones Get 

Star Billing at Airshow as China Moves Closer to US Capability in Drone Design, Production,” Global Times, 

November 4, 2018. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1125864.shtml; Sina Military, “Is Beidou Mature Enough to 

Be Used by the Chinese Military? In Actual Combat, Its Hit Rate Is Over 97%, Indicating It Is [中国军用北斗是否

成熟?实战中命中率超 97%说明一切],” February 25, 2017. http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-02-25/docifyavvsh6571217.shtml. 387 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).” 

http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/psa/gnss/gnss.html. 388 Beidou, Beidou Satellite Navigation System Development Report, Version 3 [北斗卫星导航系统发展报告(3.0

版)],December 2018. http://www.beidou.gov.cn/xt/gfxz/201812/P020181227529525428336.pdf.
89

EU to develop both Beidou and the EU’s Galileo Satellite System;389 in 2003, the two signed 

strategic cooperation agreements to share Beidou’s technology with European developers in 

exchange for access to Galileo technology as the system matured.390 The following year, the 

United States and EU resolved lengthy negotiations on satellite R&D and interoperability, 

although the United States had allegedly expressed reservations about the EU’s engagement policy 

toward the PRC and what it viewed as an inefficient export control system.391 Analysis by the 

EU’s Institute for Strategic Studies assesses that the U.S.’s move to subject satellite technology to 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in the 1990s effectively blocked the Chinese 

market from Western launches and applicable technologies and pushed the PRC closer to the EU 

at a time when bilateral relationships between the two countries were already booming. 392

Attempts by U.S. policymakers to hinder China from acquiring satellite technology from the West 

arguably failed, as demonstrated by the April 2005 launch of the APSTAR VI communications 

satellite aboard a Chinese Long March rocket from Thales Alenia Space (then referred to as Alcatel 

Alenia Space) in Cannes, France.393 Collaborations and sales of dual-use technology between PRC 

and EU entities during this period likely resulted in technology transfers that led to major 

advancements in the development of the Beidou system and the PRC’s ASAT weaponry.394

The PRC and Russia have maintained a strong collaborative relationship on the mutual 

development of their respective GNSSs. First launched in 1982, Russia’s Global Navigation 

Satellite System (GLONASS) is currently one of four GNSS “core providers,” according to the 

UN’s International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG).395 Over the past 

decade, China and Russia have entered into several cooperation initiatives aimed at improving 

interoperability of their two systems and finding new applications. Many of these initiatives have 

come out of the China-Russia Committee on Important Strategic Cooperation(中俄卫星导航重

大战略合作项目委员会), including the Service Platform of Chinese-Russian Satellite Navigation 

Monitoring and Assessment, the Joint Demonstrations on Beidou and GLONASS-Based Cross389 Jose Carlos Matias, “E.U.-China Partnership on the Galileo Satellite System: Competing with the U.S. in Space,” 

Asia-Pacific Journal5:7July 3, 2007. https://apjjf.org/-Jose-Carlos-Matias/2473/article.pdf. 390 David Lague, “Special Report: In Satellite Tech Race, China Hitched a Ride from Europe,” Reuters, December 

22, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/breakout-beidou/special-report-in-satellite-tech-race-china-hitched-aride-from-europe-idUSL4N0JJ0J320131222. 391 May-Britt U. Stumbaum, “Risky Business? The EU, China and Dual-Use Technology,” European Union 

Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper 80, October 2009.

https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/op80.pdf. 392 Christopher J. Griffin and Joseph Lin, “China’s Space Ambitions,” Armed Forces Journal rehosted by the 

American Enterprise Institute, April 7, 2008. https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-space-ambitions/. 393 Christopher J. Griffin and Joseph Lin, “China’s Space Ambitions,” Armed Forces Journal rehosted by the 

American Enterprise Institute, April 7, 2008. https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-space-ambitions/. 394 May-Britt U. Stumbaum, “Risky Business? The EU, China and Dual-Use Technology,” European Union 

Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper 80, October 2009.

https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/op80.pdf. 395 The other three “core providers” are the United States, the EU, and China. For more information, see United 

Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG): 

Members.” http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/icg/members.html.
90

Border Transporters, the Joint Design Center of Chinese-Russian Navigation Chips, and others.396

The China-Russia Committee on Important Strategic Cooperation held its fifth meeting in 

September 2018 and expects to continue collaborating throughout 2019, according to a China 

Navigation Satellite Committee presentation for the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs

(UNOOSA).

397

The PRC has repeatedly highlighted U.S.-China cooperation on bilateral frequency coordination 

agreements at almost every annual presentation to the ICG.398 In addition, in December 2017 the 

Office of Space and Advanced Technology at the U.S. Department of State, alongside the China 

Satellite Navigation Office, reportedly jointly established the U.S.-China Civil GNSS Cooperation 

Dialogue, aimed at promoting cooperation between the U.S. GPS and China’s Beidou.399 The two 

sides also signed the Joint Statement on Civil Signal Compatibility and Interoperability between 

the GPS and the Beidou Navigation Satellite System.400 This agreement likely came in response 

to incentives on the part of the UN to encourage compatibility and interoperability among global 

and regional GNSS through organizations such as UNOOSA and the ICG.401

As of 2019, Beidou has been deployed in Indonesia, Kuwait, Uganda, Myanmar, Maldives, 

Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Pakistan, and Russia, demonstrating China’s increased 

willingness to share access to its homegrown satellite system.402 In an interview with the South 

China Morning Post, a Beidou expert from Wuhan University who took part in the Beidou 

negotiations with Thailand stated that the Chinese government “is eager to show the Thais that 

396 China Satellite Navigation Office, “Operation and Development of Beidou Navigation Satellite System,” 

presentation for the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2017.

http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/2017/copuos2017tech06E.pdf. 397 Jiaqing Ma, “Update on Beidou Navigation Satellite System,” China Satellite Navigation System Office for the 

13th Meeting of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems, November 4, 2018.

http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/icg/2018/icg13/01.pdf. 398 Reference to Sino-U.S. satellite cooperation can be seen as early as 2012. For example, see China Satellite 

Navigation Office, “Development of the Beidou Navigation Satellite System,” presentation for the Seventh Meeting 

of the International Committee on GNSS, November 5, 2012. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/icg/2012/icg-7/1.pdf. It 

was also mentioned at the latest ICG meeting in November 2018.Jiaqing Ma, “Update on Beidou Navigation 

Satellite System,” China Satellite Navigation System Office for the 13th Meeting of the International Committee on 

Global Navigation Satellite Systems, November 4, 2018.

http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/icg/2018/icg13/01.pdf. 399 Global Positioning System, Joint Statement on Civil Signal Compatibility and Interoperability between the 

Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Beidou Navigation Satellite System (BDS),December 4, 2017. 

https://www.gps.gov/policy/cooperation/china/2017-joint-statement/. 400 Global Positioning System, Joint Statement on Civil Signal Compatibility and Interoperability between the 

Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Beidou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), December 4, 2017. 

https://www.gps.gov/policy/cooperation/china/2017-joint-statement/; Beidou, Beidou and GPS Signal Compatibility 

and Interoperability Joint Statement [北斗与 GPS 信号兼容与互操作联合声明], December 9, 2017.

http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/gjhz/201712/t20171223_10893.html. 401 Jeffrey Auerbach, “U.S. GPS Civil Service and International GNSS Activities Update,” U.S. Department of State 

Office of Space and Advanced Technology rehosted by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 24–28 

June 2019. http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/psa/activities/2019/UN_Fiji_2019/S1-01.pdf. 402 Beidou, Beidou Satellite Navigation System Application Case Studies [北斗卫星导航系统应用案例],December 

2018. http://www.beidou.gov.cn/xt/gfxz/201812/P020181227583462913294.pdf.
91

Beidou can do anything GPS does, and in some areas, it can do better.”403 The researcher is also 

quoted as having claimed that “if Thailand can embrace Beidou, other countries may follow and 

the Americans’ political, economic, and military power in the region will be reduced.”404 As part 

of the Beidou agreement with Thailand, Wuhan Optics Valley Beidou Holding Group established 

the first batch of three overseas Continuously Operating Reference Stations (CORS) in Thailand’s 

Chonburi Province in December 2013 to improve Beidou networking.405 Wuhan Optics Valley 

Beidou also plans to build a CORS overseas station in Sri Lanka, according to official PRC media 

reporting.406

Pakistan was the first nation to deploy Beidou. As of 2018, the system was undergoing trial 

operations in Karachi.407 During a May 2014 visit to China, a representative from the Pakistan 

Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission stated that Beidou had successfully been 

applied to Pakistani urban management programs to assist with the urbanization process and 

allocation of resources. 408 He also stated that Beidou had improved agricultural production 

efficiency and reduced waste.409 Beyond Pakistan, the China-Arab Beidou/GNSS Center was also 

inaugurated in Tunisia in April 2018. Beijing Unistrong promotes Beidou through training and 

R&D cooperation. Participating countries include Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Nigeria, and 

Sudan.

410

Role in Overseas Tracking Stations

The PRC is also expanding its space R&D capabilities globally through the establishment of

foreign space tracking and downlink stations overseas. As of 2019, the PRC had established four 

of these stations in various strategic regions around the world, sometimes in collaboration with 

host nations, to improve its capacity. Notably, a number of these locations are being utilized by 

403 Stephen Chen, “Thailand Is Beidou Navigation Network’s First Overseas Client,” South China Morning Post, 

April 4, 2013. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1206567/thailand-beidou-navigation-networks-firstoverseas-client. 404 Stephen Chen, “Thailand Is Beidou Navigation Network’s First Overseas Client,” South China Morning Post, 

April 4, 2013. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1206567/thailand-beidou-navigation-networks-firstoverseas-client. 405 Xinhua, “China’s Beidou System to Expand Cooperation in SE Asia,” China Daily, April 1, 2017.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/01/content_28774844.htm. 406 Xinhua, “China’s Beidou System to Expand Cooperation in SE Asia,” China Daily, April 1, 2017.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/01/content_28774844.htm. 407 Xinhua, “China’s Domestic Navigation System Guides Pakistan,” People’s Daily, May 23, 2014.

http://en.people.cn/n/2014/0523/c202936-8731568.html. 408 Beidou, Syed Zahid Jamal: Introduction to Beidou in Pakistan [Syed Zahid Jamal: 北斗在巴基斯坦应用情况介

绍], May 22, 2014. http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/dhnh/dwjzgwxdhshnh/gdxw1/201712/t20171210_12585.html. 409 Beidou, Syed Zahid Jamal: Introduction to Beidou in Pakistan [Syed Zahid Jamal: 北斗在巴基斯坦应用情况介

绍], May 22, 2014. http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/dhnh/dwjzgwxdhshnh/gdxw1/201712/t20171210_12585.html. 410 Beidou, The First Overseas Beidou Center Was Completed and Operated to Help China-Arab Satellite 

Navigation Cooperation [首个海外北斗中心落成运行,助力中阿卫星导航合作],April 10, 2018. 

http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/gjhz/201804/t20180411_14353.html;Beijing Unistrong, “Beijing Unistrong Fully 

Supports the Construction of the First Overseas Beidou Center to Help Beidou Go to the World [合众思壮权力支持

首个海外北斗中心建设助力北斗走向世界],” April 13, 2018.

http://www.unistrong.com/news/NewsShow_2700.aspx.
92

entities with connections to the PLA; for example, the PLASSF’s China Satellite Launch and 

Tracking Control General manages the Patagonia Telemetry Tracking and Command Station 

located in Argentina’s Neuquén Province.

411 The Patagonia Station—referred to as the CLTC 

Station, according to the Argentine government412—was first announced in 2014 and construction 

was completed in 2017.413

PRC media claims China’s tracking station in Kiruna, Sweden, is the PRC’s first wholly owned 

overseas satellite ground station, whereas other ground stations are the products of joint 

ventures.414 The ground station equipment in Kiruna was built and delivered in December 2016 by 

Space Star Technology Co., Ltd., (航天恒星科技有限公司)

415 otherwise known as the CASC 

Fifth Academy (CAST) 503 Institute. Official PRC reporting states that the station’s location in 

Kiruna is ideal for remote sensing satellite data reception and will allow the PRC to acquire global 

data and respond to user application requirements more efficiently.416 Hong Kong media claim 

that no official representatives from the Swedish government attended the Kiruna station’s opening 

ceremony; however, Leif Osterbo, president of the Swedish Space Corporation’s (SSC) Satellite 

Management Services Division, was in attendance. Notably, SSC co-owns Australia’s Dongara

satellite ground station with a U.S. subsidiary that assists the U.S. military, and this station was 

leased to CLTC in 2011.417

411 Argentina Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology’s National Commission of Space Activities 

[Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, Ciencia y Tecnología], 

Background [Antecedentes]. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/centros-y-estaciones/antecedentes-1. 412 Argentina Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology’s National Commission of Space Activities 

[Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, Ciencia y Tecnología], 

Background [Antecedentes]. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/centros-y-estaciones/antecedentes-1. 413 People’s Daily, “China Will Build a Satellite Tracking Station in Argentina, Foreign Media Call It Intelligence 

Cooperation” [中国将在阿根廷建卫星跟踪站外媒体称或情报合作], February 27, 2015.

http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0227/c1011-26604126.html; Victor Robert Lee, “China Builds SpaceMonitoring Base in the Americas,” Diplomat, May 24, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-builds-spacemonitoring-base-in-the-americas/; Ernesto Londoño, “From Economic Aid to Space Programs, China Has ‘Landed’ 

in Latin America” [从经济援助到太空计划,中国 “登陆“ 拉丁美洲], New York Times (China Edition) [纽约时报

中文网]. https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20180730/china-latin-america/. 414 Stephen Chen, “China Launches Its First Fully Owned Overseas Satellite Ground Station near North Pole,” South 

China Morning Post, December 16, 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/2055224/china-launches-its-first-fully-owned-overseas-satellite. 415 China Academy of Space Technology, “Press Release: China Aerospace Science and Technology Group’s Space 

Star Technology Company Delivered High-Scoring Arctic Receiving Station Project” [航天科技集团所属航天恒

星公司民用高分北极接受站项目交付], State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 

State Council, December 21, 2016. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588124/c3835088/content.html. 416 Cheng Yingqi, “China’s Overseas Remote Sensing Satellite Station Starts Operation,” China Daily, December 

16, 2019. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-12/16/content_27687937.htm. 417 NASA Cybersecurity: An Examination of the Agency’s Information Security, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space and Technology of the House of Representatives, 

February 29, 2012. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72919/html/CHRG-112hhrg72919.htm.

Linda Reynolds and Mike Nahan, “Submission,” Review of Australia’s Space Industry Capability, August 2017.

https://consult.industry.gov.au/space-activities/review-of-australian-space-industrycapability/consultation/download_public_attachment?sqId=question.2017-07-27.4002791506-

publishablefilesubquestion&uuId=1025203759.
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The PRC also previously owned a space tracking station on Kiribati’s South Tarawa Island. 

Anecdotal reporting claims that the station, managed by CLTC, was used to monitor U.S. missile 

testing in the Marshall Islands; however, the station closed in 2003 following Kiribati’s decision 

to sever ties with Beijing and recognize Taiwan. 418 After 16 years, Kiribati announced in 

September 2019 that it was switching its diplomatic recognition back to the PRC over Taiwan. 

International media reports have speculated that the station will be reopened, but no official 

statement has been made by Beijing or the government of Kiribati to that effect.419

Figure 5: Chinese Space Tracking Station in Kiribati

Source: Liu Zhen, “Could Ties with Kiribati Be a Boost to China’s Space Ambitions?” South China Morning Post, September 

21, 2019.

It is likely that the data collected at Chinese overseas ground stations is subject to the PRC’s 

National Cybersecurity Law. The law stipulates that “critical information infrastructure operators 

that gather or produce personal information or important data during operations” outside of 

mainland China may be required to store that information within China where the PRC deems it 

“truly necessary for business requirements.”420

418 GlobalSecurity.org, “Kiribati – PRC Ground 

Station.”https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/kiribati.htm. 419 Reuters, “China Sees Kiribati Ties Soon, No Word on Space Tracking Station,” September 23, 2019.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-kiribati/china-sees-kiribati-ties-soon-no-word-on-space-tracking-stationidUSKBN1W80VG. 420 Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Graham Webster, “Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic 

of China [Effective June 1, 2017],” New America, June 29, 2018. https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurityinitiative/digichina/blog/translation-cybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/.
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Table 6: Chinese Overseas Tracking/Ground Stations

Location Date 

Established

Chinese Operator Local Partner

Dongara, Australia 2011 China Satellite Launch and 

Tracking Control General 

(CLTC)

Swedish Space Corporation

Swakopmund, Namibia 2000 China Manned Space 

Engineering Office (overseen by 

CMSP)

Ministry of Education of 

Namibia

Neuquén, Argentina 2014 China Satellite Launch and 

Tracking Control General 

(CLTC)

Comisión Nacional de 

Actividades Espaciales 

(CONAE)

Kiruna, Sweden 2016 CAS Swedish Space Corporation

Source: Various.421

Leveraging Foreign Technology and Knowhow

Examples of potential U.S. export control violations are hard to identify with certainty. However, 

within the space field, the PRC appears to have found ways around export limitations such as the 

Wolf Amendment, including through academic and international collaborations and partnerships 

(as covered previously in this section) as well as acquisitions and Hong Kong-domiciled 

companies covered below. These efforts almost certainly have allowed the PRC to secure 

knowhow and technology critical to the PRC’s space program development, including Beidou.

Large PRC SOEs are working to incorporate foreign knowhow and technology via strategic 

mergers and acquisitions and strategic cooperation agreements. Through these ventures, PRC 

companies gain necessary technologies and knowhow by transferring this information back to 

China to benefit Beijing’s domestic R&D efforts in strategic S&T fields. The Aviation Industry 

Corporation of China (AVIC), a key state-owned aerospace company, provides a useful case study. 

Additionally, cases involving AVIC are applicable to space due to the PRC’s history of targeting 

seemingly unrelated or innocuous aspects of various high-tech supply chains in order to gain 

access to key technology that may be applied in other instances.

In September 2010, AVIC entered into a strategic cooperation agreement with U.S. Aerospace Inc., 

a leading U.S. defense contractor. According to the official press release, under the agreement U.S. 

421 Sina Military News [新浪军事],“Western Australia Satellite Station Opened, Managed by a Swedish Company” 

[澳洲西部卫星跟踪站向中国开放由瑞典公司管理], December 1, 2011. http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-12-

01/1443675831.html;Republic of Namibia Ministry of Education, Arts and Culture, Namibia and China Sign an 

Employment Agreement, March 29, 2012.

http://www.moe.gov.na/news_article.php?id=60&title=Namibia%20and%20China%20sign%20an%20employment

%20agreement; Ernesto Londoño, “From Economic Aid to Space Programs, China Has ‘Landed’ in Latin America” 

[从经济援助到太空计划,中国 “登陆“ 拉丁美洲], New York Times (China Edition) [纽约时报中文网], July 

30, 2018. https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20180730/china-latin-america/; Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of 

Remote Sensing and Digital Earth [中国科学院遥感与数字地球研究所],“China’s First Overseas Terrestrial

Satellite Receiving Station Put into Trial Operation” [我国首个海外陆地卫星接收站投入试运行], December 15, 

2016. http://www.radi.ac.cn/dtxw/rdxw/201612/t20161215_4722293.html.
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Aerospace will provide AVIC with potential projects on which the parties can jointly bid, or 

specifications for aircraft components to be manufactured by AVIC. 422 The agreement also 

stipulates that AVIC will supply all personnel, materials, facilities, and other resources 

necessary.423 U.S. court documents state that U.S. Aerospace filed for bankruptcy in August 2017 

after failing to secure contracts, including one joint bid to work with AVIC on VXX, the new 

Marine One helicopter program.

424 The company also cited issues related to disputes with lenders, 

an inability to close acquisitions and obtain significant financing, limited liquidity and capital 

resources, and an anticipated company reorganization.

In March 2015, AVIC also acquired Align Aerospace, a California-based company that provides 

supply chain services for the aerospace industries in North America, Europe, and Asia,

425 after 

receiving approval from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

426

Since being acquired by AVIC, Align has formed partnerships with other firms operating in the 

defense technology sector in the United States. For instance, in 2015 Align announced a long-term 

agreement with Pennsylvania-based Triumph Group Inc. (TGI) to support TGI’s global efforts.427

TGI has collaborated with leading U.S. defense contractors on platforms such as Lockheed 

Martin’s F-35 and F-16, as well as Northrop Grumman’s MQ-4C and RQ-4 remotely piloted

vehicles,428 which are used by the U.S. Navy429 and U.S. Air Force,

430 respectively.

422 Business Wire, “U.S. Aerospace, Inc. and AVIC International Holding Corporation Enter into Strategic 

Cooperation Agreement,” September 20, 2010. 

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100920006106/en/U.S.-Aerospace-AVIC-International-HoldingCorporation-Enter. 423 Business Wire, “U.S. Aerospace, Inc. and AVIC International Holding Corporation Enter into Strategic 

Cooperation Agreement,” September 20, 2010. 

https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100920006106/en/U.S.-Aerospace-AVIC-International-HoldingCorporation-Enter. 424 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, “Declaration of Robert Craig in Support of Chapter 

11 Petition in re: USAE, LLC,” October 21, 2017. https://www.csbankruptcyblog.com/wpcontent/blogs.dir/375/files/sites/55/2017/08/First-Day-Declaration-1.pdf. 425 Align Aerospace, “Press Release: AVIC International Expands Commercial Aerospace Services Portfolio with 

the Acquisition of Align Aerospace,” March 2015. http://alignaero.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/PRESSRELEASE_Avic_3-31-15.pdf 426 Align Aerospace, “Press Release: AVIC International Expands Commercial Aerospace Services Portfolio with 

the Acquisition of Align Aerospace,” December 5, 2014. https://alignaero.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/PRESS-RELEASE_AVIC.pdf; Covington & Bruling LLP, “CFIUS Representative Matters: 

$200 Million Acquisition of Align Aerospace.”https://www.cov.com/en/practices-andindustries/practices/regulatory-and-public-policy/cfius?r=%7B162A8E92-C52D-4E01-B087-0EE9EB39697D%7D. 427 Align Aerospace, “Align Aerospace Announces Long Term Agreement with Triumph Group, Inc.,” PR 

Newswire, November 24, 2015. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/align-aerospace-announces-long-termagreement-with-triumph-group-inc-300184280.html. 428 Triumph Group Inc., “Markets We Serve.” https://www.triumphgroup.com/what-we-do/markets-weserve/#military. 429 United States Navy, Fact File: MQ-4C Triton.

https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4350&tid=500&ct=4. 430 U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk, October 27, 2014. https://www.af.mil/About-Us/FactSheets/Display/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk/.
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Similarly, in May 2016 AVIC acquired AIM Altitude, a UK-based engineering, design, and 

manufacturing firm focused on cabin interiors. In addition to providing services to commercial 

airlines like Boeing and Airbus, the AIM Altitude website claims it is a leading supplier of cabin 

interiors for the UK Ministry of Defense.

431 Three AVIC officials assumed leadership of AIM 

Altitude’s Board of Directors following the acquisition: Xu Tongyu, president of AVIC 

International; Liu Zhonghua, CFO of AVIC International; and Huang Jun, AVIC International’s 

director of Supply Chain Management and Procurement.432

In addition to AVIC, PRC development of its indigenous atomic clock provides insight into the 

PRC’s significant reliance on foreign knowhow and technology for its domestic space program, as 

evidence suggests China would not have succeeded in developing indigenous atomic clocks 

without purchasing necessary technology from overseas. Beijing has long viewed the development 

of atomic clocks as a key challenge to advancing its Beidou system and has pushed to achieve this 

goal since the December 2018 launch of Beidou 3. Authoritative PRC S&T sources have often 

referred to atomic clocks as the “heart” of navigation satellites and also a key stumbling block to 

Beidou’s development. 433 Beidou chief designer Yang Changfeng claimed in 2017 that the 

addition of atomic clocks would play a vital role in improving the system’s positioning accuracy.434

In line with this goal, the PRC appears to have purchased atomic clocks from Swiss-based Orolia 

Group subsidiary, Spectratime, and used these to develop its own domestic version. Orolia Group’s 

2010 IPO announcement states that the company entered into export contracts with China as 

recently as 2008—contracts that Orolia Group claims required a political risk guarantee from 

Swiss insurance firm Coface.435 A 2017 promotional article for CASIC’s 203 Institute boasts of 

its ultimate success following “14 years of struggle on the atomic clock battle front.”436 In August 

2019, CASIC 203 Institute announced it had started mass producing super-thin rubidium atomic 

clocks.437 Official PRC media reporting notes that CASIC 203 Institute is the only group in China 

431 AIM Altitude, “History.” https://www.aimaltitude.com/company/history/. 432 AIM Altitude, “Board of Directors,” January 1, 2018. https://www.aimaltitude.com/company/about-us/. 433 Xinhua, “Demystifying the ‘Chinese Heart’ of Beidou satellites” [揭秘北斗卫星的 “中国心”], February 13, 

2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2018-02/13/c_1122411317.htm. 434 Xinhua, “A New Generation of High-Precision Rubidium Atomic Clock Debuts on the Beidou 3 Satellite” [新一

代高精度铷原子钟亮相北斗三号首发双星], November 6, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com//science/2017-

11/06/c_136731539.htm. 435 Orolia Group, “Offering Circular,” June 21, 2010.

https://live.euronext.com/sites/default/files/Orolia_Offering_Circular_EN.pdf. 436 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, “Our ‘Chinese Heart’ for Global Time and Positioning --

The Development Story of the Beidou Guided Navigation Satellite Atomic Clock Produced by Second Institute 203 

Institute” [我们的“中国心”为世界时间定位——二院 203 所北斗导航星载原子钟研制发展记], February 23, 

2018. http://www.casic.com.cn/n103/n135/c6873806/content.html. 437 Xinhua, “CASIC Card-Sized Atomic Clock Goes into Mass Production” [航天科工 “卡片铷钟” 实现量产], 

August 7, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/tech/2019-08/07/c_1124845334.htm.
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that has developed this technology,438 further suggesting the PRC was reliant on the original 

purchase from Spectratime to get this crucial technology.

Role of Hong Kong-Domiciled Companies

Beijing also allows PRC companies to register subsidiaries and other ventures under Hong Kong 

domicile to take advantage of laxer market and trade regulations there while remaining under 

Beijing’s legal and political control. Furthermore, U.S. export controls consider the 

semiautonomous Hong Kong as separate from mainland China, allowing the PRC to use the island 

to skirt export control regulations. This provides PRC companies and their foreign business 

collaborators with a nominal veil over country-of-control, which—particularly in the case of 

strategic and dual-use S&T industries like aerospace—is frequently exploited to bolster 

representations made to foreign governments or businesses that these ventures have little to no 

connection to the PRC government. This, in turn, facilitates access to and acquisition of related 

knowhow and technologies that may otherwise be subject to U.S. export control regulations. 

For instance, CASC’s wholly owned Hong Kong subsidiary China Aerospace International 

Holdings Limited (CASIL; 中国航天国际控股有限公司) claimed in its 2018 annual report that 

as the only overseas listed company directly held by CASC, CASIL “will bring its unique 

advantages into play in the development of CASC and serve the internationalization strategy of 

CASC.” 439 The annual report also stated that CASIL “will be able to contribute to the 

establishment of the international business flagship of CASC,” suggesting its primary role as an 

intermediary between CASC and foreign entities.440

In November 2018, CASIL subsidiary CASC Import & Export Co., Ltd. (航天科技进出口有限

责任公司) held a “centralized procurement ceremony” (集中采购签约仪式) at the China 

International Import Expo in Shanghai with participants from the United States, Russia, France, 

Italy, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic, 

according to official reporting from SASAC.441 CNSA also claims the company established new 

business partnerships with airlines in the United States and Russia, including San Francisco-based 

SKY Leasing, during the November 2018 event.442 CNSA asserts that CASC Import & Export Co. 

438 Xinhua, “China’s Super-Thin Atomic Clocks Achieve Mass Production,” August 8, 2019.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/08/c_138293522.htm. 439 China Aerospace International Holdings Limited [中国航天国际控股有限公司],“Annual Report 2018,” April 

18, 2019. https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2019/0418/ltn20190418339.pdf. 440 China Aerospace International Holdings Limited [中国航天国际控股有限公司],“Annual Report 2018,” April 

18, 2019. https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2019/0418/ltn20190418339.pdf. 441 State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, At the Expo, Aerospace 

Accelerated Cooperation with International Partners [金博会尚 “航天号”加速牵手国际伙伴], November 8, 2018.

http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2641611/n4518442/c9797740/content.html. 442 China National Space Administration, CASC Group Held a Centralized Procurement Signing Ceremony during 

the Import Expo [航天科技集团在进口博览会期间举行集中采购签约仪式], November 8, 2018.

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758838/c6803795/content.html.
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had cooperated with Shanghai Bestar International Freight from July 2017 to July 2018 to rent a 

Boeing 747-400BCF freighter from the United States.443

California-based Loral Space and Communications has collaborated with both APT Satellite 

Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as APStar; 亚太通信街星有限公司) and Asia Satellite 

Telecommunications Limited (hereinafter referred to as AsiaSat; 亚洲街星有限公司 despite its 

previous controversial dealings with China’s space program. In May 2009, Loral subsidiary Space 

Systems/Loral (SS/L) was selected to provide a new communications satellite, named AsiaSat 5C, 

for AsiaSat.444 The same subsidiary was also selected two years later to construct AsiaSat 6 and 

AsiaSat 8.445 In addition to its connections with AsiaSat, Loral has been involved in APStar’s 

satellite development. APStar 5C, also referred to as TeleSat 18V, was a 2018 joint project by 

APStar and Canada-based Telesat—which is 62.7 percent owned by Loral Space and 

Communications446—and was built by Space Systems/Loral.447

In 2002, Loral Space and Communications Corporation agreed to pay a $20 million fine after it 

was found by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to have passed sensitive materials to China 

following a 1996 Loral satellite launch failure in China. Following the incident, China created an 

Independent Review Committee that included both Loral and U.S.-based Hughes Space and 

Communications to investigate the failure and report their findings to CGWIC, albeit without 

consent from the U.S. government. DOD concluded that both Loral and Hughes had committed a 

serious export violation “by virtue of having performed a defense service without a license”; DOD 

then recommended referral of the matter to DOJ for possible criminal prosecution, according to a 

report from the former Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial 

Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, otherwise known as the Cox Report.448

APStar was founded in 1992 and touts itself as a leading commercial satellite operator in the AsiaPacific region, with six in-orbit satellites covering approximately 75 percent of the world’s 

population, according to the company’s official website.449 However, the company’s 2018 annual 

443 China National Space Administration, CASC Group Held a Centralized Procurement Signing Ceremony during 

the Import Expo [航天科技集团在进口博览会期间举行集中采购签约仪式], November 8, 2018.

http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758838/c6803795/content.html. 444 Loral Space and Communications, “AsiaSat Selects Space Systems/Loral for AsiaSat 5C,” May 5, 2009. 

http://s21.q4cdn.com/335413995/files/doc_news/archive/LORL_News_2009_5_5_General_Releases.pdf. 445 Loral Space and Communications, “AsiaSat Selects Space Systems/Loral to Provide Two Communications 

Satellites,” November 11, 2011.

http://s21.q4cdn.com/335413995/files/doc_news/archive/LORL_News_2011_11_11_General_Releases.pdf. 446 Loral Space and Communications, “Company Profile.” http://www.loral.com/Company/CompanyProfile/default.aspx. 447 Telesat, “Telesat Orders New Telstar 18 VANTAGE High Throughput Satellite and Launch Services,” December 

23, 2015. https://www.telesat.com/news-events/telesat-orders-new-telstar-18-vantage-high-throughput-satellite-andlaunch-services. 448 Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s 

Republic of China, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral, January 2, 1999.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/html/ch6bod.html#anchor1645545. 449 APStar by APT Satellite, “Company Profile.” https://www.apstar.com/en/about-apstar/.
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report states that its two largest shareholders are CASC and China Satellite Communications 

Company, the latter of which is also 99.8 percent owned by CASC.450 APStar is incorporated in 

Hong Kong and wholly owned by APT Satellite Holdings Limited, which is registered in Bermuda 

and incorporated in Hong Kong.451 California-based Panasonic Avionics announced in March 

2018 that it was collaborating with APSATCOM, a wholly-owned APStar subsidiary formed in 

August 2016,452 on a new satellite—APStar-6—which Panasonic claims will help it to best serve 

its connectivity customers.453

Similarly, AsiaSat, founded in 1988, is advertised as a Hong Kong-based commercial satellite firm 

currently operating seven satellites and offering services in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the 

company’s website claims its two major shareholders are Carlyle Asia Fund IV and CITIC 

Group.454 CITIC Group is a wholly-owned PRC SOE managed by the PRC State Council;

455 its 

predecessor, the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (中国国际信托投资公司), 

was founded in 1979 with support from Deng Xiaoping, according to CITIC’s official website.456

In addition to its ownership, various aspects of AsiaSat’s historical business ventures are also 

indicative of its connections to the PRC government. For example, an April 2019 investigation by 

the Wall Street Journal claims that since AsiaSat launched its first satellite around 30 years ago, 

the PRC government has used the company to link state-run broadcasters to the provinces.457

Furthermore, the Wall Street Journal notes that the Ministry of Public Security allegedly relied 

on both the AsiaSat 4 and AsiaSat 5 satellites to build rapid-response forces “capable of 

providing real-time audio and video from the field.” 458 AsiaSat has consistently denied its 

connections to both the PLA and the PRC government; AsiaSat allegedly states that “China’s 

450 APT Satellite Holdings Limited, “2018 Annual Report,” Hong Kong Stock Exchange News, April 15, 2019.

https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2019/0415/ltn20190415959.pdf. 451 APStar by APT Satellite, “Company Profile.” https://www.apstar.com/en/about-apstar/; U.S. Securities and 

Exchange Commission, Transition Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Act of 1934: APT 

Satellite Holdings Limited, December 31, 2003.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1027229/000114554904000849/u99122e20vf.htm#124. 452 APT Satellite Holdings Limited, “2018 Annual Report,” Hong Kong Stock Exchange News, April 15, 2019. 

https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2019/0415/ltn20190415959.pdf. 452 APStar by APT Satellite, “Company Profile.” https://www.apstar.com/en/about-apstar/. 453 Panasonic Avionics Corporation, “Press Release: Panasonic Avionics and APSatCom Bring Extreme Throughput 

Satellite Technology to Asian Mobility Markets,” March 8, 2018. https://www.panasonic.aero/whats-new/pressreleases/panasonic-avionics-apsatcom-bring-extreme-throughput-satellite-technology-asian-mobility-markets. 454 Asia Satellite Limited [亚洲街星有限公司], “About Us” [关于我们]. https://www.asiasat.com/zh-hant/aboutus. 455 Qichacha [企查查], “Entry for CITIC Group” [中国中信集团有限公司].

https://www.qichacha.com/firm_227f47c376342dbaa0be61df2f5d5e94.html. 456 CITIC Group [中信集团], “Group Introduction” [集团简介].

https://www.group.citic/html/About_CITIC/Brief_Introduction/. 457 Brian Spegele and Kate O’Keefe, “China Exploits Fleet of U.S. Satellites to Strengthen Police and Military 

Power,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-exploits-fleet-of-u-s-satellites-tostrengthen-police-and-military-power-11556031771. 458 Brian Spegele and Kate O’Keefe, “China Exploits Fleet of U.S. Satellites to Strengthen Police and Military 

Power,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-exploits-fleet-of-u-s-satellites-tostrengthen-police-and-military-power-11556031771.
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military wasn’t a direct customer but used capacity that was first procured by 

telecommunications operators for disaster relief,” according to the WSJ investigation, and that 

the company “didn’t know how the authorities used its bandwidth in response to uprisings in 

Xinjiang and Tibet.”459 Although AsiaSat’s first few satellites (AsiaSat 1 and AsiaSat 2) were 

launched from China’s Xichang Satellite Launch Center, more recent models—including 

AsiaSat 4,460 AsiaSat 6,461 and AsiaSat 8462—were launched at Cape Canaveral, and both 6 and 8 

were launched by SpaceX with support from the U.S. Air Force Space Command’s 45th Space 

Wing.463

459 Brian Spegele and Kate O’Keefe, “China Exploits Fleet of U.S. Satellites to Strengthen Police and Military 

Power,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-exploits-fleet-of-u-s-satellites-tostrengthen-police-and-military-power-11556031771. 460 AsiaSat official website, “AsiaSat 4,” March 2015. 

https://www.asiasat.com/sites/default/files/AsiaSat%204%20Insert_March%202015_0_0.pdf. 461 U.S. Air Force Space Command, Air Force Space Command 45th Space Wing Public Affairs Office: SpaceX 

Launches AsiaSat 6 Satellite from Complex 40 at “The Cape,” September 2, 2014.

https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/731241/spacex-launches-asiasat-6-satellite-from-complex40-at-the-cape/. 462 Edwards Air Force Base, 45th Space Wing Supports SpaceX Launch of AsiaSat 8 Satellite, August 5, 2014. 

https://www.edwards.af.mil/News/Article/490712/45th-space-wing-supports-spacex-launch-of-asiasat-8-satellite/. 463 U.S. Air Force Space Command, Air Force Space Command 45th Space Wing Public Affairs Office: SpaceX 

Launches AsiaSat 6 Satellite from Complex 40 at “The Cape,” September 2, 2014. 

https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/731241/spacex-launches-asiasat-6-satellite-from-complex40-at-the-cape/; U.S. Air Force Space Command, Air Force Space Command 45th Space Wing Public Affairs 

Office: SpaceX Launches AsiaSat 6 Satellite from Complex 40 at “The Cape,” September 2, 2014. 

https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/731241/spacex-launches-asiasat-6-satellite-from-complex40-at-the-cape/.
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CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The PRC is a global space power. Its modernization is creating growing uncertainties, intentions,

and implications. Significant investments into space systems have the potential to deny the United 

States and its allies access to similar systems. China can achieve disruptive breakthroughs in space 

technology, including space launch, satellites, and counterspace capabilities. 

Chinese political authorities view space power—a domain managed by a diverse set of military 

and civilian organizations—as one element of a broader international S&T competition.. With 

preservation of the CCP’s monopoly on power as an overriding goal, a growing space presence 

consolidates the Party’s domestic and international legitimacy. Fusing civilian and military 

resources and administration, Chinese investment into space technology supports economic 

development and advances national defense modernization. 

China’s ambitions in space are inherently dual-use in nature. Space technology increases the 

capacity of the PLA to project military power vertically into space and horizontally beyond its 

immediate periphery. Freedom of action in space offers the PLA potential military advantages on 

land, at sea, and in the air. The establishment of the PLA Strategic Support Force appears to have 

integrated organizational interests, operational planning, and acquisition. The PLASSF likely is 

integral to national- and theater-level command and control. 

The PRC’s advances in space are significant. In addition to supplying low-cost commercial launch 

services to international customers, the PRC’s space program supports economic development 

through subsidized modernization of China’s high-technology industries. International 

cooperation offers China opportunities to accelerate its space technology.

China’s space program has matured rapidly. Looking out to 2030, the PLA and defense industry 

can be expected to expand its spacelift capacity and presence in space. An operational counterspace 

capability has significant implications for U.S. interests, including how these could be employed 

to target U.S. space assets or those of U.S. allies and partners. Space assets enable extended-range 

precision strike operations intended to deny U.S. access to or ability to operate within a contentious 

area in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Greater vigilance over U.S technology is needed. The PRC routinely uses Hong Kong-domiciled 

companies to circumvent export controls, particularly in cases pertaining to advanced technologies 

with dual uses in defense, as made evident in the AsiaSat and APStar examples. Therefore, the 

U.S. government should work to reassess export control waivers for Hong Kong to ensure the 

protection of critical U.S. technology.
102

The CCP is executing a long-term strategy to exploit U.S. technology, talent, and capital to build 

up its military space and counterspace programs and advance its strategic interests. China’s pursuit 

of space superiority harms U.S. economic competitiveness, weakens U.S. military advantages, and 

undermines strategic stability. In short, it represents a threat to U.S. national security. Barring 

significant action to counter CCP space-related programs and activities of concern, it is likely these

efforts will continue to harm U.S. interests. 

Given the findings of this report, seven important considerations for Congress stand out:

• The current laws to protect U.S. technology and prevent U.S. capital from funding China’s 

military space programs and activities appear to be inadequate. Congress should consider 

passing new laws or enhancing existing laws in order to make it illegal for U.S. government 

departments and agencies, national labs, universities, companies, fund managers, and 

individual investors to support China’s space program and activities, which are inherently 

military (not civil) in nature.

• To support U.S. government efforts to safeguard U.S. national interests, Congress should 

consider mandating and funding the production of a routinely updated, publicly available 

list of entities formally engaged with the PRC’s space-related ecosystem. Such a list would 

serve to identify organizations and individuals that merit the imposition of U.S. 

government licensing requirements or sanctions, while providing the public with a resource 

to inform their decisions.

• The CCP’s predatory space-related behavior thrives in permissive environments that allow 

for the exploitation of uninformed U.S. decision makers at all levels. Congress should 

consider mandating and funding a public education campaign directed at enhancing general 

knowledge of China’s space programs and activities. Such a campaign might include more 

targeted congressional hearings and the allocation of grants for think tank and university 

research programs, public conferences, public-private consultative talks, and media 

outreach.

• Given the expansive nature of the threat, enhanced U.S. space competitiveness may require 

a departure from status quo spending habits. Congress should consider reviewing the 

budgets of NASA and the United States’ leading aerospace university programs to ensure 

they have the education funding necessary to support young and emerging scientists and 

technology innovators.

• The creation of a newly empowered U.S. Space Command could significantly strengthen 

the U.S. pool of national security space experts. In DOD, powerful bureaucratic forces have 

long existed that militate against the development of a world-class space warfighting 

capability. Congress should consider how funding the establishment of a potential new U.S. 

Space Force may better enable the military to organize, train, and equip future leaders 
103

needed to keep our nation competitive with China’s rapidly growing military space 

enterprise.

• Like-minded allies and partners play an important role in giving the United States a 

strategic edge in the space domain. Congress should consider how to offer greater 

incentives to the executive branch to deepen and broaden international space cooperation 

favoring U.S. interests, while at the same time mitigating the expansion of global CCP 

influence in space science and technology.

• The space competition between the United States and PRC will be waged on a number of 

fronts, one of which is informational. CCP-controlled entities and front organizations have 

prioritized the insertion of Beijing’s space-related propaganda themes into Hollywood 

blockbusters. Congress should consider imposing regulations on the U.S. entertainment 

industry to forestall the continued infiltration of authoritarian propaganda and censorship 

in Hollywood. At a minimum, movies should have warning labels informing viewers if 

their content has been coproduced, funded, altered, or otherwise approved by CCPaffiliated entities and China’s state censors.
104

APPENDIX

List of Newly Established Higher Education Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Bases (Plan 111) in 2018

(2018 年度新建高等学校创新引智基地(111 计划)名单)

Number

(序号)

Base ID 

Number 

(编号)

Base Name 

(基地名称)

Support Unit

(依托单位)

Person in 

Charge

(负责人)

1 B18001 Post-Moore Era Micro-Nano 

Electronic Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(后摩尔时代微纳电子学科创新

引智基地)

Peking University 

(北京大学)

Huang Ru 

(黄如)

2 B18002 Aerospace Multi-Scale Mechanics 

and Thermodynamics Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(空天多尺度力学与热力学学科

创新引智基地)

北京航空航天大学

(Beihang University)

Wen 

Dongsheng

(文东升)

3 B18003 Advanced Manufacturing 

Disciplines for High-End 

Equipment and Medical Devices 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(面向高端装备及医学器件的先

进制造学科创新引智基地)

Beijing University of Chemical 

Technology

(北京化工大学)

Yang Weimin

(杨卫民)

4 B18004 High-Speed Rail Efficient 

Operation and Safety Assurance 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

高速铁路高效运营与安全保障学

科创新引智基地

Beijing Jiaotong University

(北京交通大学)

Nie Lei

(聂磊)

5 B18005 Medical Optical and Medical 

Imaging Disciplines Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(医用光学与医疗成像学科创新

引智基地)

Beijing Institute of Technology 

(北京理工大学)

Hao Qun

(郝群)

6 B18006 Basin Water Safety and 

Comprehensive Management 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(流域水安全与综合管理学科创

新引智基地)

Northeast Normal University

(东北师范大学)

Zhu Chen

(朱晨)

7 B18007 Stem Cell Storage Technology 

R&D and Industry Health 

Intervention Research Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

Peking Union Medical College

(北京协和医学院)

Zhao Chunhua

(赵春华)
105

(干胞储存库工艺技术研发及业

健康干预研究学科创新引智基

地)

8 B18008 Basic Theory of Internet of Things 

and the Innovation of Key 

Technology Disciplines Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(物联网基础理论与关键技术学

科创新引智基地)

Beijing University of Posts and 

Telecommunications

(北京邮电大学)

Ma Huadong

(马华东)

9 B18009 Dalian Maritime University 

Undersea Engineering Technology 

and Equipment Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(大连海事大学海底工程技术与

装备学科创新引智基地)

Dalian Maritime University

(大连海事大学)

Sun Yuqing

(孙玉清)

10 B18010 Environmentally Friendly Energy 

Development and Regulation 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(环境友好能源开发与调控学科

创新引智基地)

Dalian Institute of Technology

(大连理工大学)

Song 

Yongchen

(宋永臣)

11 B18011 Low-Power Microelectronics and 

Microsystems Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(低功耗微电子与微系统学科创

新引智基)

University of Electronic 

Science and Technology 

(电子科技大学)

Li Qiang

(李强)

12 B18012 Grid Material Chemistry 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(网格材料化学学科创新引智基

地)

Northeast Normal University

(东北师范大学)

Zhu 

Guangshan

(朱广山)

13 B18013 Modern Urban Intelligent 

Transportation Technology 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(现代城市智能交通技术学科创

新引智基地)

Southeast University

(东南大学)

Liu Pan

(刘攀)

14 B18014 Global Value Chain Research 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(全球价值链研究学科创新引智

基地)

Foreign Economic and Trade 

University

(对外经济贸易大学)

Zhao 

Zhongxiu

(赵忠秀)

15 B18015 Computational Neuroscience and 

Brain-Like Intelligence Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(计算神经科学与类脑智能学科

创新引智基地)

Fudan University

(复旦大学)

Feng Jianfeng

(冯建峰)
106

16 B18016 Ship Dynamics Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(船舶动力学科创新引智基地)

Harbin Engineering University

(哈尔滨工程大学)

Li Wanyou

(李玩幽)

17 B18017 Space Environment and Material 

Role Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(空间环境与物质作用学科创新

引智基地)

Harbin Institute of Technology

(哈尔滨工业大学)

Guo Bin

(郭斌)

18 B18018 Clean Energy and New Materials 

Technology Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(清洁能源新材料与技术学科创

新引智基地)

Hefei University of Technology

(合肥工业大学)

Wu Yucheng

(吴玉程)

19 B18019 Major Hydropower Project MultiField Coupling Mechanics 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(重大水电工程多场耦合力学学

科创新引智基地)

Hohai University

(河海大学)

Xu Weiya

(徐卫亚)

20 B18020 High-Performance Computing 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(高效能计算学科创新引智基地)

Hunan University

(湖南大学)

Li Kenli

(李肯立)

21 B18021 China Green Power Development 

Research Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(中国绿色电力发展研究学科创

新引智基地)

North China Electric Power 

University

(华北电力大学)

Niu Dongxiao

(牛东晓)

22 B18022 High-Efficiency “Intelligence” of 

Microbial Drugs Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(微生物药物的高效“智”造学科

创新引智基地)

East China University of 

Science and Technology

(华东理工大学)

Zhang Lixin

(张立新)

23 B18023 Soft Matter Science and 

Technology Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(软物质科学与技术学科创新引

智基地)

South China University of 

Technology

(华南理工大学)

Cheng 

Zhengdi

(程正迪)

24 B18024 Computational Intelligence and 

Intelligent Control Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(计算智能与智能控制学科创新

引智基地)

Huazhong University of 

Science and Technology

(华中科技大学)

Ceng Zhigang

(曾志刚)

25 B18025 Micro-Nano Information Materials 

and Devices Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(微纳信息材料与器件学科创新

引智基地)

Jilin University

(吉林大学)

Lu Geyu

(卢革宇)
107

26 B18026 Population Mobility and Labor 

Economics Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(人口流动与劳动经济学科创新

引智基地)

Jinan University

(暨南大学)

Feng 

Shuaizhang

(冯帅章)

27 B18027 Individual Experience Design 

Frontier Method and Technology 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(体验设计前沿方法与技术学科

创新引智基地)

Jiangnan University

(江南大学)

Zhang 

Linghao

(张凌浩)

28 B18028 Intractable Material Additive 

Manufacturing Technology and 

Equipment Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(难成形材料增材制造技术与装

备学科创新引智基地)

Nanjing University of 

Technology

(南京理工大学)

Liao Wenhe

(廖文和)

29 B18029 Characteristics Horticultural Crop 

Breeding and Quality Control 

Research Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(特色园艺作物育种与品质调控

研究学科创新引智基地)

Nanjing Agricultural University 

(南京农业大学)

Chen Fayang

(陈发樣)

30 B18030 Inorganic Solid Materials and 

Energy Chemistry Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(无机固体材料与能源化学学科

创新引智基地)

Nankai University

(南开大学)

Bo Xianhe

(卜显和)

31 B18031 Ecological River Dynamics 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(生态河流动力学学科创新引智

基地)

Tsinghua University

(清华大学)

Fang Hongwei

(方红卫)

32 B18032 Chan’an and Silk Road Cultural 

Communication Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(长安与丝路文化传播学科创新

引智基地)

Shaanxi Normal University

(陕西师范大学)

Zhang Xinke

(张新科)

33 B18033 Accounting Reform and 

Development Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(会计改革与发展学科创新引智

基地)

Shanghai University of Finance 

and Economics

(上海财经大学)

Li Zengquan

(李增泉)

34 B18034 Mental Health and Brain Science 

and Technology Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(精神健康与脑科学技术学科创

新引智基地)

Shanghai Jiaotong University

(上海交通大学)

He Lin

(贺林)
108

35 B18035 Targeted Drug and Drug Delivery 

System Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(靶向药物与释药系统学科创新

引智基地)

Sichuan University

(四川大学)

Huang Yuan

(黄园)

36 B18036 Integrated Energy and Power 

System Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(综合能源电力系统学科创新引

智基地)

Tianjin University

(天津大学)

Wang 

Chengshan

(王成山)

37 B18037 Evolution Mechanism and 

Adaptation Countermeasures of 

Hydrology and Water Resources 

System under Changing 

Environments Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(变化环境下水文水资源系统演

变机理及适应对策学科创新引智

基地)

Wuhan University

(武汉大学)

Xiong Lihua

(熊立华)

38 B18038 Environmentally Friendly Building 

Materials Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(环境友好建筑材料学科创新引

智基地)

Wuhan University of 

Technology

(武汉理工大学)

Zhao Xiujian

(赵修建)

39 B18039 Radar Cognitive Detection 

Imaging Recognition Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(雷达认知探测成像识别学科创

新引智基地)

Xidian University of Electronic 

Technology

(西安电子科技大学)

Liu Hongwei 

(刘宏伟)

40 B18040 Intelligent Aircraft Fluid Structure 

Coupling Mechanics and Bionics 

Technology Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(智能飞行器流固耦合力学与仿

生技术学科创新引智基地)

Xi’an Jiaotong University

(西安交通大学)

Shen 

Shengping

(申胜平)

41 B18041 Ocean Information Perception 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(海洋信息感知学科创新引智基

地)

Northwestern Polytechnical

University 

(西北工业大学)

Yang Yixin

(杨益新)

42 B18042 Crop Disease Resistance Breeding 

and Genetic Improvement 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(作物抗病育种与遗传改良学科

创新引智基地)

Northwestern Rural Science 

and Technology University

(西北农村科技大学)

Dan Weixing

(单卫星)

43 B18043 Financial Security and 

Development Discipline 

Southwestern University of 

Finance and Economics

(西南财经大学)

Yang Dan

(杨丹)
109

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(金融安全与发展学科创新引智

基地)

44 B18044 Citrus Pests and Diseases 

Continuous Control Basic 

Research Innovation and

Enlightenment Base

(柑桔主要病虫害持续控制基础

研究学科创新引智基地)

Southwest University

(西南大学)

Wang Jinjun

(王进军)

45 B18045 Optical Information Transmission 

Processing and Sensing 

Application Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(光信息传输处理与传感应用学

科创新引智基地)

Southwest Jiaotong University

(西南交通大学)

Yan Lianshan

(闫连山)

46 B18046 Western Geological Hazards and 

Geological Engineering Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(西部地质灾害与地质工程学科

创新引智基地)

Chang’an University

(长安大学)

Fan Wen

(范文)

47 B18047 Geotechnical Engineering LongTerm Service Performance and 

Regulation Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(岩土工程长期服役性能及调控

学科创新引智基地)

Zhejiang University

(浙江大学)

Chen Yunmin

(陈云敏)

48 B18048 Magma Origins and Continental 

Crust Formation Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(岩浆成因和大陆地壳形成学科

创新引智基地)

China University of 

Geosciences (Beijing)

(中国地质大学(北京))

Zhu Dicheng

(朱第成)

49 B18049 Environmental Hydrogeology 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base 

(环境水文地质学科创新引智基

地)

China University of 

Geosciences (Wuhan)

(中国地质大学(武汉))

Wang Yanxin

(王焰新)

50 B18050 Marine Biogenomics and 

Molecular Genetics and Breeding 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(海洋生物基因组学与分子遗传

育种学科创新引智基地)

Ocean University of China

(中国海洋大学)

Bao Zhenmin

(包振民)

51 B18051 Multi-Scale Dynamics of Complex 

Chemical Systems Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(复杂化学体系多尺度动力学学

科创新引智基地)

University of Science and 

Technology of China

(中国科学技术大学)

Yan Yijing

(严以京)
110

52 B18052 Carbon Dioxide Capture, 

Utilization, and Storage Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(二氧化碳捕捉、利用与封存学

科创新引智基地)

China University of Mining and 

Technology (Beijing)

(中国矿业大学(北京))

Peng Suping

(彭苏萍)

53 B18053 Food Nutrition and Health 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(食品营养与健康学科创新引智

基地)

China Agricultural University

(中国农业大学)

Ren Fazheng

(任发政)

54 B18054 Marine Oil and Gas Production 

Safety Engineering Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(海洋油气生产安全工程学科创

新引智基地)

China University of Petroleum 

(Beijing)

(中国石油大学(北京))

Zhang Laibin

(张来斌)

55 B18055 Deep/Super-Deep Oil and Gas 

Geophysical Exploration 

Discipline Innovation and 

Enlightenment Base

(深层-超深层油气地球物理勘探

学科创新引智基地)

China University of Petroleum 

(Huadong)

(中国石油大学(华东))

Fu Lijun

(符力耘)

56 B18056 Natural Active Molecular 

Discovery and New Drug 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(天然活性分子发现与新药创新

引智基地)

China Pharmaceutical 

University

(中国药科大学)

Kong Lingyi

(孔令义)

57 B18057 Rule of Law and Global 

Governance Discipline Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(法治与全球治理学科创新引智

基地)

China University of Political 

Science and Law

(中国政法大学)

Huang Jin

(黄进)

58 B18058 New Era of Scientific and 

Technological Revolution and 

Intellectual Property Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(新时代科技革命与知识产权学

科创新引智基地)

Central South University of 

Finance and Economics

(中南财经政府大学)

Wu Handong

(吴汉东)

59 B18059 Medical Big Data Analysis Theory 

and Application Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(医学大数据分析理论与应用学

科创新引智基地)

Central South University

(中南大学)

Zhang Yuxue

(张尧学)

60 B18060 Soil Environmental Pollution 

Control and Restoration Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

Zhongshan University

(中山大学)

Qiu Rongliang

(仇荣亮)
111

(土壤环境污染控制与修复学科

创新引智基地)

61 B18061 Drama, Film, Television, and Art 

Teaching and Creation Discipline 

Innovation and Enlightenment 

Base

(戏剧影视艺术教学与创作学科

创新引智基地)

Central Academy of Drama

(中央戏剧学院)

Hao Rong

(郝戎)

62 B18062 High-Performance Wind Power 

Facilities and Their Efficient 

Operation Disciplines Innovation 

and Enlightenment Base

(高性能风电设施及其高效运行

学科创新引智基地)

Chongqing University

(重庆大学)

Yang 

Qingshan

(杨庆山)

Source: Sina Education (新浪教育).464

464 Sina, “62 Colleges and Universities Nationwide Were Selected for the National 111 Plan in 2018” [62 所高校入

选 2019 年国家 111 计划], January 23, 2018. http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2018-01-23/docifyquptv8808208.shtml.
112

ACRONYMS

3PLA GSD Technical Reconnaissance Department (Third Department)

4PLA ECM and Radar Department (Fourth Department)

ABAE Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities (Agencia Bolivariana para Actividades Espaciales)

APOSOS Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System

APSCO Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization

ASAT Anti-Satellite

AVIC Aviation Industry Corporation of China

BIT Beijing Institute of Technology

BITTT Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications Technology

BUAA Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

BX Banxing

CALT China Academy of Launch Technology

CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences

CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation

CASIC China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

CASIL China Aerospace International Holdings Limited

CASSACA CAS South America Center for Astronomy

CAST China Academy of Space Technology

CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Program

CCJCA China-Chile Joint Center for Astronomy

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CETC China Electronics Technology Group Corporation

CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

CGSTL Chang Guang Satellite

CGWIC China Great Wall Industry Corporation

CICC China International Capital Corporation

CLTC China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General

CMA China Meteorological Administration

CMC Central Military Commission

CMSP China Manned Space Program

CNAGA China National Administration of GNSS and Applications

CNSA China National Space Administration

CONAE Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales (Argentina National Commission of Special 

Activities)
113

CORS Continuously Operating Reference Stations

CPMIEC China Precision Machinery Import-Export Company

CRESDA China Center for Resource Satellite Data and Application

CSU Technology and Engineering Center for Space Utilization

CX Chuangxin

DOD U.S. Department of Defense

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

DSR Digital Silk Road

ECM Electronic Countermeasures

EDD Equipment Development Department

EO Electro-optical

ESA European Space Agency

EU European Union

EVA Extravehicular Activities

FAU Florida Atlantic University

FY Fengyun

FYP Five-Year Plan

GAD General Armaments Department

GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit

GEOSS China Group on Earth Observations

GIS Geographic Information Systems

GLD General Logistics Department

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

GPD General Political Department

GPS Global Positioning System

GSD General Staff Department

GWU George Washington University

HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

HD High-Definition

HT Hangtian-Tsinghua

HXMT Hard X-Ray Modulation Telescope

HY Haiyang

IAA International Academy of Astronautics

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICG International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems
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INPE Brazil National Institute for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Especiais)

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

ISS International Space Station

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations

ITU International Telecommunication Union

JSD Joint Staff Department

KKV Kinetic Kill Vehicle

KT Kaituozhe

LEO Low-Earth Orbit

LM Long March

LSU Key Laboratory of Space Utilization

MCF Military-Civil Fusion

MEMS Micro-Electro-Mechanical System

MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

MOE Ministry of Education

MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOST Ministry of Science and Technology

MUCD Military Unit Cover Designator

NAOC National Astronomical Observatory of China

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOSS Naval Ocean Surveillance System

NSC National Space Council

NSSC National Space Science Center

NUAA Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

NWPU Northwestern Polytechnic University

OBOR One Belt, One Road

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

OTH Over-the-horizon

PIE Pixel Information Expert

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAA PLA Army

PLAAF PLA Air Force

PLAN PLA Navy

PLARF People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force

PLASSF People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force
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PNT Positioning, Navigating, and Timing

PRC People’s Republic of China

QUESS Quantum Experiments at Space Scale

R&D Research and Development

RD&A Research, Development, and Acquisition

RMB Renminbi

S&T Science and Technology

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

SAST Shanghai Academy of Space Technology

SASTIND State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense

SATCOM Satellite Communication

SCASST Sichuan Academy of Safety Science and Technology

SIIA State-Industry Innovation Alliances

SOE State-Owned Enterprise

SSA Space Situational Awareness

SSC Swedish Space Corporation

SSF Strategic Support Force

SSO Sun-Synchronous Orbit

SSTL Surrey Satellite Technology, Limited.

SUPARCO Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission

SY Shiyan

TC Theater Command

TGI Triumph Group, Inc.

U.S. United States

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UFWD United Front Work Department

UK United Kingdom

UMD University of Maryland

UN United Nations

UNOOSA United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs

VLBI Very-long-baseline interferometry