19–010

1This legislation amends various sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011

et seq.). It also amends Title II of the Energy Reorganzation Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5841 et

seq.).

Calendar No. 747

107TH CONGRESS REPORT

2d Session " ! SENATE 107–335

NUCLEAR SECURITY ACT OF 2002

NOVEMBER 12, 2002.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. JEFFORDS, from the Committee on Environment and Public

Works, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[to accompany S. 1746]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Environment and Public Works, to which was

referred a bill (S. 1746) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to strengthen security

at sensitive nuclear facilities, having considered the same, reports

favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the

bill, as amended, do pass.

GENERAL STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

This bill amends current law1 to enhance safety and security at

our nation’s commercial nuclear facilities, and to protect against

terrorist use of radiological materials.

The events of September 11, 2001, have required our nation to

reevaluate the adequacy of our existing security measures. The attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. invalidate many of

our past assumptions about the likelihood and method of terrorist

attack. It is clear that we must take new measures to protect

against those who would target American citizens and domestic infrastructure. We have a particular responsibility to ensure that our
2

2Atomic Energy Act of 1954, section 1a, 42 U.S.C. 2011a.

commercial nuclear resources, including our nuclear reactors and

radioactive materials used for research, medical and industrial purposes, are not used as weapons of destruction against us.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 assigned to the Atomic Energy

Commission responsibility for protecting public health and safety

from the hazards of radiation produced through nuclear technology.

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and created a new agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), to take over its regulatory functions.

The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works has jurisdiction over the nonmilitary environmental regulation and control of atomic energy. This includes both legislative and oversight

authority pertaining to the operations of the NRC.

Among the responsibilities entrusted to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission are regulation of the nation’s commercial nuclear

power plants, along with most other civilian uses of radioactive materials. The mission of the NRC is to conduct an effective regulatory program that promotes the safe use of nuclear energy and

materials, in a manner that protects the public health and safety

and the human environment, and promotes the common defense

and security.

As stated in the Atomic Energy Act:

. . . the development, use and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to

make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the

paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense

and security . . .2

As of December 2000, there were 104 commercial nuclear power

reactors licensed to operate by the NRC in 31 States. Additionally,

NRC has regulatory responsibility over seven fuel fabrication and

production facilities; two gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facilities; and 14 other facilities that possess significant quantities of

special nuclear material (other than reactors) or process source material (other than uranium enrichment facilities). The NRC also administers approximately 5,000 licenses for medical, academic and

industrial uses of nuclear materials; and has agreements under

which States will administer approximately 16,000 additional such

licenses.

While prevention of accidents necessarily remains a key component of nuclear safety, the events of September 11th bring a new

urgency to the need to deter and protect against attacks at our nation’s nuclear facilities, and against attempted theft of radioactive

materials.

Following the events of September 11th, the NRC took immediate action to respond to heightened threat levels and concerns. It

undertook intensive consultation with other Federal entities, including the FBI, the Office of Homeland Security, the Department

of Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration and others to

evaluate general and specific threats to NRC licensed facilities, and

to coordinate planning and responsive actions. The NRC has consulted with Governors regarding the deployment of State assets, including the National Guard. It has issued a series of Orders to licensees to enhance security at nuclear facilities. The NRC is also

in the process of conducting what it describes as a comprehensive
3

review of NRC policies and regulations relating to safeguards and

security.

Since September 11th, the committee has worked closely with

the NRC to monitor changing circumstances and to oversee activities of the NRC and its licensees. The committee will continue to

work with the agency to ensure that all actions necessary to protect

the public are taken in a timely and thorough manner.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LEGISLATION

The Nuclear Security Act of 2002 is an important step in ensuring protection of the public against potential terrorist activities

against commercial nuclear facilities or potential theft of nuclear

materials. While the NRC has voluntarily undertaken a number of

actions, these have been ad hoc responses to emergency events. The

purpose of this legislation is to codify those actions necessary to

protect against attack on our nation’s nuclear reactors and against

theft or terrorist use of radioactive materials, such as for so-called

‘‘dirty bombs.’’

The legislation directs the NRC, in consultation with other Federal agencies having experience in matters related to national security, emergency preparedness, and radioactive response, to undertake a series of actions to upgrade security at nuclear power plants

and to prevent the theft or terrorist use of sensitive radioactive materials. It also requires the NRC to update hiring and training

standards for plant employees; conduct and document security response evaluations at each nuclear facility; and to ensure adequate

emergency planning, evacuation, and other public safety measures

in the event of a radiological release from a sensitive nuclear facility. It also directs the President to ensure coordinated Federal action to prevent a terrorist attack.

The legislation gives clear and permanent direction to the NRC

and its licensees, and will provide greater assurance that NRC will

receive the funding it needs to fully implement essential security

measures. The Nuclear Security Act of 2002 will assure the American public that these nuclear facilities are as safe as they can reasonably be, and will clearly signal to would-be terrorists that our

nuclear facilities are heavily protected, hardened structures that

will make neither easy, nor desirable, targets.

The committee has worked closely with the NRC since September 11th to develop this legislation. The committee has taken

extensive testimony on the issues involved and has worked with industry, public interest groups, private security guards employed at

nuclear facilities, and members of the public. This legislation represents a carefully considered, bipartisan response to the threat of

U.S. nuclear resources being employed as weapons of destruction.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short Title

This section provides that the Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear

Security Act of 2002.’’
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Sec. 2. Definitions

This section amends section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

to provide definitions for ‘‘Homeland Security Officer,’’ ‘‘Private Security Force,’’ and ‘‘ Sensitive Nuclear Facility.’’

Sec. 3. Nuclear Facility Security

This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act by

adding a new section 170C, ‘‘Protection of Sensitive Nuclear Facilities.’’

New subsection 170C(a) provides definitions for ‘‘Antiterrorism

Team,’’ ‘‘Federal Security Coordinator,’’ ‘‘Task Force,’’ ‘‘Threat,’’ and ‘‘Threat Level.’’ New subsection 170C(b) establishes a task force, chaired by the

Chairman of the NRC, to examine and provide recommendations

and findings regarding a broad spectrum of security issues surrounding nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC, and the use of nuclear materials licensed by the NRC.

Paragraph (b)(2) specifies the membership of the task force. The

agencies included in the task force are intended by the committee

to include those which have expertise in intelligence; defense of air

space and waterways; road and transportation access; radiological

response; and emergency preparedness. The committee recognizes

that not every one of these agencies will have expertise in all of

the issues addressed in this subsection. The committee assumes

that the Chairman of the NRC, as chairperson, will structure the

task force so as to best utilize the expertise of each agency in relation to those issues within their respective jurisdiction. However,

the committee also expects that the task force’s report to Congress

and the President will reflect and incorporate the views of all agencies on the task force, as appropriate, and if necessary should provide for minority or dissenting views.

The committee is aware that, since September 11th, the NRC

has been in close consultation with most, if not all of these agencies. The committee intends that the work of the task force established in this subsection shall build upon, rather than duplicate or

interfere with, the process of consultation and coordination that the

NRC has already begun with these and other agencies.

Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the duties of the task force. The overall duty of the task force is to examine issues surrounding the protection of sensitive nuclear facilities against potential terrorist

threats, and to report to the President and Congress with its findings and recommendations. This paragraph directs the task force

to consult with other Federal, State and local agencies, stakeholders and members of the public, as appropriate, in making its

examination.

This paragraph sets out in detail the matters which the task

force is to examine. These are: how threats to sensitive nuclear facilities should be classified; how Federal, State and local security

efforts for protection of land, water, and ground access to sensitive

nuclear facilities should be coordinated; the adequacy of existing

emergency planning zones; the adequacy of Federal, State and local

emergency planning and evacuation zones, and other measures to

protect the public health and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility; the specific threats against

which security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities shall be re-
5

quired to protect; creation of a system of threat levels appropriate

to sensitive nuclear facilities; the development, implementation and

revision of security plans for sensitive nuclear facilities; the establishment of an antiterrorism team; the hiring and training standards that should be applied to private security forces at sensitive

nuclear facilities; how Federal resources should best be coordinated

to expedite and improve the process of performing employee background checks; and the creation of a program to provide technical

assistance and training for the National Guard, State law enforcement agencies, and local law enforcement agencies, to respond to

threats against a sensitive nuclear facility.

Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(III) requires the task force to examine

the adequacy of all existing emergency planning zones in the event

of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility. The committee intends for this to be a full examination in light of experiences derived from September 11th, including whether any planning zones should be facility-specific to take into account population densities or special obstacles to successful emergency evacuation. The committee recognizes that concerns have been raised

that existing emergency planning and evacuation zones may not be

adequate and could require expansion, perhaps up to 50 miles. In

light of the increased potential for a terrorist attack, it is expected

that the task force will examine whether such a change is warranted.

Subparagraph (b)(3)(i)(IV) requires the task force to evaluate the

adequacy and coordination of Federal, State and local emergency

planning, evacuation, and other measures to protect the public

health and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility. The issues of specific interest to the committee include whether actual capabilities are adequate for: warning the public; facilitating movement of populations; transporting

populations that are trapped without ground escape routes; providing shelter and medical care to those who have been relocated;

providing radiation monitoring to both individuals and the environment; assuring the availability of properly trained medical providers and emergency responders; and adequately quarantining

contaminated food and water supplies in the ingestion zone where

radiation has been deposited.

Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(V) requires the task force to examine

the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against to

prevent acts of radiological sabotage and theft of special nuclear

material. The committee intends that this constitute a thorough

and comprehensive review of the types of threats that are appropriate for sensitive nuclear facilities to protect against in light of

September 11th. The committee expects that this would include

aerial, ground or water-based attacks. The committee also intends

that the task force consider, as part of its examination, appropriate

changes to sensitive nuclear facilities in order to protect against

acts of radiological sabotage, including means to reduce the vulnerability of spent fuel storage and the consequences of a spent fuel

fire.

New subsection 170C(c) requires the NRC, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force, to

promulgate regulations identifying the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against to prevent acts of radiological
6

sabotage and the theft of special nuclear material. The committee

is aware that the design basis threats are currently the NRC’s primary regulatory framework for protecting against acts of sabotage

at sensitive nuclear facilities. The committee therefore assumes

that this section will result in a revision to the NRC regulations

covering the design basis threats. However, it is the intent of this

section that regulations promulgated by the NRC pursuant to this

section will also address any other regulatory or programmatic

changes as are necessary.

Paragraph (c)(2) addresses the recognition by the committee that

post-September 11th, the need may arise to reduce the amount of

specific information contained in regulations open to public dissemination, which address the design basis threat or other security

matters. For example, the NRC is considering revising current regulations to remove certain details that may now be considered safeguards information under section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act,

and include such details, as revised, instead in Orders to licensees.

This paragraph is intended to clarify that the requirements of section 147 continue to apply in full, including the need as appropriate

under existing law to protect safeguards and other sensitive information.

New subsection 170C(d) requires the NRC to promulgate regulations establishing a system for the determination of multiple threat

levels to describe the threat conditions at sensitive nuclear facilities. It is the intent of the committee that in meeting this requirement the NRC will utilize the Homeland Security Advisory System;

or such other information or guidance provided by the Office of

Homeland Security, other Federal agencies or other entities; as appropriate.

New subsection 170C(e) requires the NRC to review the security

plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. It specifies the aspects of

the review, requires the NRC to establish a priority schedule for

conducting reviews, requires the NRC to report to the President

and Congress, and requires the NRC to ensure that licensees upgrade security plans as necessary.

New subsection 170C(f) requires the NRC to review the emergency response plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. It specifies

the aspect of the review, requires the NRC to establish a priority

schedule for conducting the reviews, requires the NRC to report to

the President and Congress, and requires the NRC to ensure that

licensees revise emergency response plans as necessary.

Paragraph (f)(3) requires the NRC to establish a priority schedule for conducting reviews of emergency response plans based on

the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive nuclear facilities

and the proximity of sensitive nuclear facilities to large population

areas. Consequently, the committee anticipates that facilities near

major metropolitan areas such as New York City will be at the top

of this priority schedule.

New subsection 170C(g) requires the NRC to promulgate regulations establishing the circumstances under which the NRC shall request the President to deploy the Coast Guard or the antiterrorism

team created under subsection 170C(h) to a sensitive nuclear facility, or provide for the protection of air space in the vicinity of a

sensitive nuclear facility.
7

New subsection 170C(h) requires the President to establish a Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team, the purpose of which

shall be to provide protection for the perimeter of sensitive nuclear

facilities against the threats identified under subsection (c), in coordination with other Federal, State, local, and private entities, as

appropriate, and consistent with the security plan for each sensitive nuclear facility.

The nature, structure and specific duties of this Federal team are

left to the discretion of the President, with the caveat that they

shall be based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force created under subsection 170C(b).

This includes whether such ‘‘team’’ shall be regional or national in

nature or shall be specific to each sensitive nuclear facility. The

committee however intends that the team will consist of existing

agency structures and personnel, operating under existing Federal

authorities. The committee does not intend for the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team to be an NRC entity or under the

control of the NRC.

New subsection 170C(i) requires the President to establish a program to provide technical assistance and training for the National

Guard and State and local law enforcement agencies in responding

to threats against a sensitive nuclear facility. Such program may

include grants to State and local governments.

New subsection 170C(j) requires the NRC to review and upgrade

hiring and training standards for employees at sensitive nuclear facilities, and to establish qualifications and procedures to ensure

that no individual that presents a threat to national security is employed at a sensitive nuclear facility.

New subsection 170C(k) requires the NRC to promulgate regulations for the hiring and training of Federal security coordinators,

and to assign a Federal security coordinator at each sensitive nuclear facility. The subsection sets forth the duties of the Federal security coordinator.

New subsection 170C(l) provides that nothing in the section shall

be construed to supersede any existing law governing the disclosure of classified or safeguards information.

Sec. 4. Fingerprinting and Background Checks

This section was developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and added at the NRC’s request. It amends Chapter 12 of the

Atomic Energy Act by adding specific requirements for the performance of fingerprinting, and criminal history and other background

checks for persons having access to sensitive nuclear facilities.

Sec. 5. Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

This section amends Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974 by adding a new section 212, which establishes an Office of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response. This new office is intended to codify the office created by the NRC following the events

of September 11th.

New subsections 212(a) and 212(b) provide definitions for the

new section and establish the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

New subsection 212(c) provides for the appointment of a Director

to head the office, and specifies the duties of the Director.
8

New subsection 212(d) establishes a Security Response Unit

within the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to be

headed by an Assistant Director for Security Response. The section

details the functions of this unit, which shall include establishment

of a mock terrorist team, and a program for security response evaluations to assess the ability of each sensitive nuclear facility to defend against threats in accordance with the facility security plan.

It details elements of the security response evaluation program, including requiring the NRC to establish performance criteria for

judging the security response evaluations. It is the assumption of

the committee that the Assistant Director for Security Response

would have primary responsibility for carrying out this program.

This would include making recommendations as required under

this paragraph on the timing, conduct and evaluation of the security response exercises, including the establishment of performance

criteria for judging the evaluations.

New subsection 212(e) requires the NRC, in coordination with

the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to

conduct emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability of

Federal, State and local emergency response personnel to respond

to a radiological emergency at the sensitive nuclear facility. It sets

forth the factors which the emergency response exercises shall

evaluate, requires revisions to emergency response plans as necessary, and requires periodic reports to the President and Congress

on the results of the exercises and each revision to an emergency

response plan.

The committee notes that in section 3 of the Nuclear Security Act

of 2002, under new subsection 170C(b)(3)(i)(III) of the Atomic Energy Act, above, the task force is required to examine the adequacy

of all existing emergency planning zones. Section 3 of the Nuclear

Security Act of 2002, under new subsection 170C(f)(1), also requires

the Commission, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force, to review the emergency response

plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. New subsection 170C(f)(5)

of the Act, above, requires the Commission to ensure that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, the

emergency response plan for the sensitive nuclear facility. Therefore, the committee intends that the emergency response exercises

conducted by the Commission in coordination with FEMA under

this new subsection 212(e) will reflect the determinations made by

the task force under new subsection 170C(b)(3)(i)(III).

New subsection 212(f) provides that nothing in the section shall

limit any authority of the Department of Energy relating to the

safe operation of facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department.

Sec. 6. Carrying of Weapons by Licensee Employees

This section amends Chapter 14 of Title I of the Atomic Energy

Act.

It permits the NRC to authorize guards at certain NRC-licensed

or certified facilities, and guards transporting special nuclear materials, to carry and use firearms to prevent sabotage of such facilities or theft of nuclear explosive material. The section also authorizes the NRC to issue regulations shielding guards against State

prosecution for discharge of firearms in the performance of official

duties. These changes would enhance national security by pro-
9

viding NRC facilities and transport with authority equivalent to

the authority currently possessed by the Department of Energy for

the protection of its nuclear facilities and transport.

This provision was included at the request of the NRC, and is

similar to language that passed this committee and the Senate in

the 106th Congress in S. 1627

Sec. 7. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security

This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954 to add a new section 170E at the end.

New subsection 170E(a) contains definitions. Paragraph

170E(a)(1) defines ‘‘sensitive radioactive material.’’ This language is

broadly written to comprise material which could be used by a terrorist in a radiological dispersal device, or material that in any

other way could threaten the health or safety of the public due to

its radiological properties. It is the committee’s intent primarily to

improve protections on those radioactive materials that are in common industrial, medical, or research applications. The committee

specifically urges the task force to carefully examine protections on

source material, byproduct material or special nuclear material

which is stored in a sealed container to prevent leakage (otherwise

known as ‘‘sealed sources’’) and any other types of radioactive material that NRC license holders have reported lost or stolen. The

committee also specifically encourages the task force to consider radioactive materials that are not currently regulated by the United

States for their radioactive properties, such as naturally occurring

or accelerator produced radioactive materials (NORM).

New subsection 170E(b) expands the duties of the task force established under new section 170C(b), above, to include evaluation

of sensitive radiological material. It delineates the additional matters the task force should consider. The committee is aware that

there are a broad range of radioactive materials in public use and

not all present a significant threat to public health. As such, this

subsection requires the task force to identify and categorize those

materials that should be classified as sensitive radioactive material. The committee expects that the development of improved security recommendations under this section will be based on this categorization, providing the greatest security to those categories of

sensitive radiological material which present the greatest threat. In

developing recommendations for methods to ensure the return and

proper disposal of sensitive radiological materials required in paragraph 170E(b)(F), the task force may consider financial incentives

for achieving this goal.

New subsection 170E(c) requires periodic reports to the President

and Congress describing administrative and legislative actions recommended by the task force.

New subsection 170E(d) requires the NRC to take such actions

as are appropriate to revise the system for licensing radioactive

materials and to ensure that States have entered into appropriate

agreements establishing compatible programs.

Sec. 8. Unauthorized Introduction of Dangerous Weapons

This section expands section 229a of the Atomic Energy Act to

include facilities, installations or real property subject to the licensing or certification authority of the NRC.
10

This would allow NRC to apply the provisions of section 229a to

NRC licensed or certified activities, thereby allowing the NRC to

prohibit a person who has not obtained prior authorization from

carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be introduced any weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrumentality into any facility, installation or real property regulated or

subject to certification by the NRC. This provision was included at

the request of the NRC, and is similar to language that passed this

committee and the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.

Sec. 9. Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel

This section amends section 236a of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954 to expand existing Federal criminal sanctions for sabotage or

attempted sabotage of production or utilization facilities to include

sabotage or attempted sabotage during the construction stage of

those facilities, if the damage could affect public health and safety

during facility operation. This section also expands the sanctions to

include sabotage or attempted sabotage of operating fuel fabrication facilities. This provision was included at the request of the

NRC, and is similar to language that was reported from the committee and passed the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.

Sec. 10. Evaluation of Adequacy of Enforcement Provisions

This section requires the Attorney General and the NRC to submit to Congress a report that assesses the adequacy of the criminal

enforcement provisions in Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Sec. 11. Protection of Whistleblowers

This section amends section 212(a) of the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974 to extend whistleblower protection to NRC contractors

and subcontractors.

Sec. 12. Technical and Conforming Amendment

This section provides technical and conforming amendments.

Sec. 13. Authorization of Appropriations

This section provides that there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On November 1, 2001, the committee held an oversight hearing

on nuclear security. On November 29, 2001, Senators Reid, Clinton,

Lieberman, Jeffords and Torricelli introduced S. 1746. It was referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works. The

committee held a hearing on June 5, 2002. The committee held a

classified hearing on June 20, 2002. On July 25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746. The committee voted to report the

bill to the Senate with amendments. Sections 6, 8 and 9 of the bill

as agreed to are similar to provisions reported by the committee

and passed the Senate in S. 1626 in the 106th Congress.

HEARINGS

On November 1, 2001, the Committee on Environment and Public Works recieved testimony concerning infrastructure security,
11

recieving testimony from Michael Brown, Deputy Director, Federal

Emergency Management Agency; Joe Moravec, Commissioner, Public Building Service, General Services Administration; Dr. David

Sampson, Assistant Secretary for Economic Development, Economic

Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; Dr.

Richard Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Herbert Mitchell, Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance,

Small Business Administration; and Marianne L. Horinko, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,

Environmental Protection Agency.

On June 5, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public

Works held a hearing to receive testimony on S. 1586, a bill to

amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the carrying of

firearms by employees of licensees, and for other purposes, and S.

1746, a bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to strengthen

security at sensitive nuclear facilities. For this hearing the witnesses were Hon. Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representative from

Massaschusetts; Hon. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Chairman,

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety

Engineer, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, DC; Jack

Skolds, Chief Nuclear Officer, Excelon Corp., Washington, DC;

Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government Oversight, Washington, DC; Donna J. Hastie, Emergency Planning Consultant, Marrietta, GA; and Irwin Redlener, M.D., F.A.A.P., President, Children’s Health Fund, New York, NY.

On June 20, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public

Works held a classified hearing, receiving testimony from Federal

Government witnesses.

ROLLCALL VOTES

On July 25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746. The bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Senators Reid, Smith, Jeffords, Inhofe, Clinton, and Lieberman was

adopted for purpose of further amendment. An amendment offered

by Senator Smith, two amendments offered by Senator Clinton,

and an amendment offered by Senator Reid were agreed to by voice

vote. The committee voted by voice vote to report the bill, as

amended, to the Senate.

REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT

In compliance with section 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing

Rules of the Senate, the committee finds that S. 1746 does not create any significant additional regulatory burdens, nor will it cause

any adverse impact on the personal privacy of individuals.

MANDATES ASSESSMENT

In compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

(P.L. 104–4), the committee finds that the bill may require additional costs to the NRC, part of which may be passed along to ratepayers under existing law. The committee believes that such costs

have been kept to the minimum necessary to ensure adequate security at sensitive nuclear facilities and adequate protection of sensitive nuclear materials. There will not be significant additional

costs to State and local governments.
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COST OF LEGISLATION

Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act requires that a statement of the cost of the reported bill,

prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, be included in the report. That statement follows:

U.S. CONGRESS,

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,

Washington, DC, October 25, 2002.

Hon. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Chairman,

Committee on Environment and Public Works,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1746, the Nuclear Security

Act of 2002.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Lisa Cash Driskill, who

can be reached at 226–2860.

Sincerely,

DAN L. CRIPPEN.

Nuclear Security Act of 2002, as ordered reported by the Senate

Committee on Environment and Public Works on July 25, 2002

Summary

S. 1746 would establish several new security programs for the

nation’s nuclear infrastructure. Programs would include Federal security coordinators for designated nuclear facilities, antiterrorism

teams to protect nuclear facilities, mock terrorism drills, new rules

on security compliance at nuclear facilities, and a program to classify, track, and monitor radioactive sources throughout the country.

Based on information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC), CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a

gross cost of $486 million over the 2003–2007 period. However, the

NRC has the authority to offset a substantial portion of its annual

appropriation with fees charged to the facilities it regulates. Accounting for such collections, CBO estimates that implementing S.

1746 would result in a net cost of $126 million over the 2003–2007

period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.

The bill also would require all employees at nuclear facilities to

undergo background checks. Because the Department of Justice

(DOJ) would charge the applicant a fee to offset the cost of background checks required by the bill, we estimate that this provision

would have a negligible impact on direct spending.

In addition, S. 1746 would establish new criminal penalties for

the sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste storage facilities and for noncompliance with certain employee background

checks that would be established by the bill. CBO estimates that

these penalties would increase revenues and subsequent direct

spending of those collections by less than $500,000 a year.

S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-sector

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

(UMRA) by:
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• Effectively increasing the annual fees collected from NRC licensees; • Requiring new security standards and procedures at sensitive

nuclear facilities; and • Expanding the system for licensing sensitive radioactive materials.

Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not available,

CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of all mandates

contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that the costs to the

private sector would likely exceed the annual threshold for privatesector mandates ($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation) in fiscal year 2004, primarily because of the increase in annual fees imposed on NRC licensees. CBO expects that the aggregate costs to public entities of all mandates would not exceed the

intergovernmental threshold ($58 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation).

Estimated Cost to the Federal Government

The estimated budgetary impact of S. 1746 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 270 (energy) and 750 (administration of justice).

Basis of Estimate

For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by

the end of calender year 2002, that the necessary amounts will be

appropriated for each year, and that outlays will occur at historical

rates for similar programs.

Spending Subject to Appropriation

S. 1746 would establish several new security programs to be implemented at the nation’s sensitive nuclear facilities, including creating antiterrorism teams, running mock terrorism drills, and establishing Federal security coordinators at each site. For this estimate, we assume that 84 commercial nuclear sites in 35 States

would meet the bill’s definition of a ‘‘sensitive nuclear facility’’ and

thus would be subject to its requirements. In addition, the bill

would require the registration and tracking of radioactive material,

several new Federal rules concerning nuclear security, and it would

establish a training and grant program for the National Guard and

State and local law enforcement personnel.

By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION1

Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities:

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 73 88 64 64 64

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 58 85 69 64 64

National Guard and Law Enforcement Training:

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 11 17 14 14 14

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 9 16 15 14 14

Sensitive Radioactive Materials:

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 9 17 10 8 8

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 7 15 11 8 8
14

By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Security and Emergency Response Plan Review:.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 8 9 1 1 1

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 6 9 3 1 1

Security Rulemakings:.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 3 3 1 1 1

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 2 3 1 1 1

Estimated Gross Authorizations for the NRC under S. 1746:.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 104 134 90 88 88

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 83 128 99 88 88

Offsetting Collections2.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... ¥98 ¥124 ¥81 ¥29 ¥29

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... ¥98 ¥124 ¥81 ¥29 ¥29

Net New NRC Spending Under S. 1746:

Estimated Authorization Level1 ................................................... 6 11 9 59 59

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... ¥15 5 18 59 59

Note: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

1 A full-year appropriation has not yet been enacted for the NRC; in 2002, the agency received a gross appropriation of $553 million, and

offsetting collections totaled $474 million. 2Collections are authorized at declining percentages of the NRC’s budget: 94 percent in 2003, 92 percent in 2004, 90 percent in 2005,

and 33 percent after 2005.

Based on information from the NRC and other Federal agencies,

CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a gross cost

of $486 million over the 2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation

of the necessary amounts. However, the NRC has the authority to

offset a substantial portion of its annual appropriation with fees

charged to facilities it regulates. After accounting for such collections, we estimate that the net cost of implementing S. 1746 would

be $126 million over the 2003–2007 period.

Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities. S. 1746 would

authorize funding for Federal antiterrorism teams, mock terrorism

teams, and security coordinators for the nuclear facilities covered

by the bill. We estimate that implementing these three programs

would have a gross cost of $340 million over the 2003–2007 period

for additional staff, equipment, training, and consulting.

Antiterrorism Teams. Although the bill does not specify the scope

of the antiterrorism teams, for this estimate, we assume the NRC

would establish 16 antiterrorism teams of 10 people each (four

teams for each of NRC’s four regions). Those teams would be

trained in local topography, geography, nuclear infrastructure, and

security tactics and would be available to respond to security incidents 24 hours a day. Based on information from the NRC, we estimate that it could cost as much as $500,000 per person, initially,

to provide such specialized training, equipment, and staff support.

We expect that annual costs would be reduced by half that amount

once the program is established. CBO estimates that implementing

this provision would have a gross cost of $232 million over the

2003–2007 period.

Federal Security Coordinators. S. 1746 also would require that

the NRC hire and train security coordinators to be stationed at

each of the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities that would be covered by

the bill. They would coordinate all security programs at the nuclear

facility. We expect that it would take NRC 1 year to issue rules

and establish this new program. We assume that the agency would

need 110 additional people to staff and manage the Federal secu-
15

rity coordinator program at a cost of $11 million a year beginning

in 2004 and that NRC would spend an additional $3 million a year

on training and equipment. CBO estimates that implementing this

provision would cost $54 million over the 2003–2007 period.

Mock Terrorism Teams. Under S. 1746, mock terrorism teams

would be deployed to perform security drills at each nuclear facility

every 3 years. We estimate that the NRC would establish a team

of 30 people to conduct such drills at a cost of about $3 million a

year. In addition, we estimate the NRC would need $10 million for

support personnel, equipment, and travel over the 2003–2004 period, and that the initial cost for training and equipment would

drop by about half after the teams are established. We also would

expect the NRC to contract with private security firms or the Department of Defense for staff support and assistance in designing

the drills at a cost of about $5 million per year. We estimate that

this program would cost $54 million over the 2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.

National Guard and Law Enforcement Training. S. 1746 would

require the President to establish a program to provide technical

assistance and training to the National Guard and State and local

law enforcement agencies to respond to threats against the nation’s

nuclear facilities. Under this program, we expect that the NRC

would provide training at each of the covered 84 nuclear facilities

four times a year at a cost of about $120,000 a year (or a total cost

of about $10 million per year). In addition, we expect that the 35

States with sensitive nuclear facilities would receive grants of

$100,000 per year for technical assistance and training. Assuming

appropriation of the necessary amounts, we estimate that implementing these training and assistance programs would cost on average $14 million a year.

Sensitive Radioactive Material. S. 1746 would require the NRC

to establish a program to register, track, and control sensitive radioactive material. Currently, the NRC spends about $1 million per

year to regulate certain radioactive material used for industrial

purposes. S. 1746 would significantly expand that program to include a wide variety of sources and uses of radioactive material.

Based on information from the NRC we estimate this program

would cost an average of $10 million per year for evaluating,

classifying, and tracking of such materials. Funds would be used

for establishing new computer programs, hiring of additional staff,

and auditing sites with radioactive materials. Overall, we estimate

that implementation of this program would cost about $50 million

over the 2003–2007 period.

Security and Emergency Response Plan Review. S. 1746 would require the NRC to review the emergency response plans for each of

the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities in the United States within 9

months of enactment and their security plans within 21 months of

enactment. In addition, the bill would require the NRC to conduct

emergency response exercises every 2 years at each facility. After

each review and exercise, the NRC would submit a report to the

Congress and work with the facilities on any necessary improvements to plans and procedures. Based on information from the

NRC, we estimate those reviews would require 60 additional staff

at a cost of about $6 million in 2003, and that costs would drop significantly in the following years as the reviews and follow-up in-
16

spections are completed. We estimate that the agency would need

about $3 million in 2003 and 2004 for travel and contract services

to accomplish the reviews in the timeframe established in the bill.

We estimate emergency response exercises would cost about $1 million a year. In total, we estimate that implementing the security

and emergency response plan reviews required by the bill would

cost $20 million over the 2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.

Security Rulemakings. S. 1746 would require the NRC to establish several new rules to enhance security at the nation’s nuclear

facilities. The rulemakings would cover threat levels and threats

that facilities would be required to defend, the coordination of Federal agencies during a nuclear threat or attack, background checks

for employees at nuclear facilities, and weapons policies for security

personnel at nuclear facilities. We estimate that the NRC would

need an additional 25 people at a cost of about $2.5 million a year

to complete these rulemakings over the 2003–2004 period. We expect that staff needs would diminish as the rulemakings are completed, thus reducing the cost to about $1 million per year. CBO

estimates all of these rulemakings would cost $8 million over the

2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary

amounts.

Direct Spending and Revenues

CBO estimates that enacting S. 1746 would increase both offsetting receipts and direct spending of those receipts by $2.3 million

in 2003 for background checks on nuclear security personnel required by the bill; thus, the net budgetary impact of this requirement would be negligible. In addition, it would establish criminal

penalties for noncompliance with such background checks and penalties for the sabotage of nuclear facilities. We estimate that any

increase in penalties would be less than $500,000 per year.

Fingerprinting and Background Checks. S. 1746 would require

that all employees of covered nuclear facilities undergo

fingerprinting and background checks within 60 days of passage of

the bill. Such checks would be performed by the Department of

Justice. Based on information from DOJ, we expect most checks

would cost about $22 per person. On average, about 1,250 people

work at each of the 84 covered facilities. Because DOJ would

charge a fee of $22 for each person that applies for a background

check, we estimate that the agency would collect about $2.3 million

in 2003. DOJ is authorized to spend such fees without further appropriation, and we expect that most of the money would be spent

in the year in which it is collected. Thus, the net impact on DOJ

spending would be negligible.

Penalties. S. 1746 would strengthen the criminal penalties for the

sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste storage facilities and for noncompliance with the background checks established

by the bill. CBO estimates that enacting these new penalties would

increase governmental receipts by less than $500,000 a year. Any

criminal fines collected would be deposited in the Crime Victims

Fund and spent in subsequent years. Any resulting change in direct spending from the fund also would amount to less than

$500,000 annually.
17

Intergovernmental and Private-Sector Impact

S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-sector

mandates as defined in UMRA by:

• Effectively increasing the annual fees collected from NRC licensees; • Requiring new security standards and procedures at sensitive

nuclear facilities; and • Expanding the system for licensing sensitive radioactive materials.

Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not available,

CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of all mandates

contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that the costs to

public entities would not exceed the intergovernmental threshold

($58 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation), while the cost

to the private sector would likely exceed the annual threshold for

private-sector mandates ($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually

for inflation) in fiscal year 2004.

Increasing Annual Fees for NRC Licensees

Under current law, the NRC collects annual fees from its licensees, both public and private, to offset a major portion of its general

fund appropriation. Because S. 1746 would require the NRC to engage in a variety of initiatives to augment security at licensed facilities, CBO expects that additional fees would be collected from

the licensees to cover the cost of such initiatives. The duty to pay

those fee increases would be considered both a private-sector and

an intergovernmental mandate under UMRA, as it results in an increase in the cost of an existing mandate. Assuming an appropriation level of amounts necessary to cover the costs of the NRC’s security initiatives starting in 2003, CBO estimates that the increment in fees would total approximately $98 million in fiscal year

2003, $124 million in fiscal year 2004, $81 million in 2005, and

drop to around $29 million in subsequent fiscal years. Because less

than 5 percent of nuclear facilities are publicly owned, CBO estimates that the increase borne by public nuclear facilities would not

be significant.

Security Procedures at Sensitive Nuclear Facilities

S. 1746 would establish new security procedures for nuclear facilities in order to prevent acts of radiological sabotage and the

theft of special nuclear material. Accordingly, the bill would require

the NRC to promulgate rules revising:

• The threats sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against; • The threat levels at which each facility must operate; and • The hiring and training standards for employees of the facilities.

Compliance with each of the rules would constitute a mandate as

defined by UMRA. The extent of those mandates would be based

upon future actions of the NRC, which would track the recommendations of an interagency task force on nuclear infrastructure security. At this time, the NRC could not give any indication

as to the scope of the rules to be issued and accordingly, CBO cannot determine the cost of compliance.
18

In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued

interim security measures for sensitive nuclear facilities, while further analysis regarding future regulatory action was undertaken.

The interim measures, which included determinations as to the

types of threats nuclear facilities must protect against, became

binding prior to, or in August of this year for the vast majority of

sensitive nuclear facilities. In addition, the NRC issued voluntary

guidelines on the threat levels at which facilities could operate,

which parallel the threat levels established by the Office of Homeland Security. The NRC indicates that most, if not all, NRC licensees adopted those guidelines. According to representatives of the

nuclear industry, sensitive nuclear facilities have already spent

about $90 million to upgrade security to comply with the NRC’s interim security measures. To the extent that future security and

threat level regulations mirror those that are currently in place,

sensitive nuclear facilities would not bear substantial additional

costs associated with the mandate.

In addition, S. 1746 would require that employees of sensitive

nuclear facilities undergo more extensive background investigations

that would include checks of fingerprint records located in the National Crime Information Center data sets, the United States National Central Bureau of Interpol, the National Instant Criminal

Background Check system, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service data sets. Employees are currently fingerprinted for an

FBI criminal history check. According to the Department of Justice,

the incremental cost of the expanded check would be approximately

$22, and based upon the number of individuals employed by the industry, CBO estimates that the cost that would be borne directly

by licensees would be roughly $2.3 million in 2003.

Licensing System for Sensitive Nuclear Materials

The bill would require the NRC to revise and expand the system

for licensing certain radioactive materials, such as those used in industrial, medical, and research applications, based on the recommendations of an interagency task force. Information from the

NRC suggests that some regulatory changes for sensitive radioactive material are already underway and that the agency does not

intend to impose a heavy burden on the entities affected. Consequently, CBO expects that the costs relating to this mandate

would not be significant.

Estimate Prepared By: Federal Costs: Lisa Cash Driskill; Impact on

State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Angela Sietz; Impact on the

Private Sector: Lauren Marks.

Estimate Approved By: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
19

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS SMITH, INHOFE, VOINOVICH, AND

CHAFEE

We appreciate the leadership of the chairman to report out a bipartisan bill aimed at ensuring our nations nuclear power facilities

remain among the most secured commercial facilities in the world.

We believe that this bill takes important steps in achieving that

goal. We are pleased with the inclusion of S. 1586, sponsored by

Senators Inhofe and Smith, in the bill reported by the committee.

S. 1586, provides enhanced security authority that the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission has specifically requested for many years.

We note that in the 106th Congress a nearly identical bill to S.

1586 was reported out of this Committee and passed the Senate by

Unanimous Consent.

In the days following the committee ordering S. 1746 to be reported, the committee received detailed comments from the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission on the amended version of S. 1746. These

constructive comments identified specific areas where the bill

should be improved in order to maximize security without delaying

or impeding current security efforts already undertaken by the

NRC and its licensees. We believe these comments warrant our attention and consideration prior to S. 1746 being voted on by the

full Senate. It is our hope to continue to work with the chairman

and members of the Committee to improve S. 1746 in order to ensure that the goals we all support will be achieved in an effective

and timely manner. We thank the chairmen of the full committee

and subcommittee for their leadership and for the bipartisan manner in which they have undertaken this very important security

matter. We look forward to continuing to work in a bipartisan manner to adequately address issues that have been raised.
20

1This Act consists of the Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 724, as amended by the Act of Aug. 30,

1954, ch. 1073 (68 stat. 921) and by subsequent amendments. The Act appears generally in the

United States Code at 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq. Bracketed notes are used at the end of each section

for the convenience of the reader to indicate the United States Code citation.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules

of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill as reported

are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in [black brackets], new matter is printed in italic, existing

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 1

An Act for the development and control of atomic energy.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

* * * * * * *

TITLE I—ATOMIC ENERGY

CHAPTER 1. DECLARATION, FINDINGS, AND PURPOSE

Sec. 1. Declaration.

* * * * * * *

Sec. 149A. Access to nuclear facilities.

* * * * * * *

Sec. 170B. Uranium supply.

Sec. 170C. Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities.

Sec. 170D. Carrying of weapons.

Sec. 170E. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security.

* * * * * *

*

CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS

SEC. 11. DEFINITION.—The intent of Congress in the definitions

as given in this section should be construed from the words or

phrases used in the definitions. As used in this Act:

a. The term ‘‘agency of the United States’’ means the executive

branch of the United States, or any Government agency, or the legislative branch of the United States, or any agency, committee,

commission, office, or other establishment in the legislative branch,

or the judicial branch of the United States, or any office, agency,

committee, commission, or other establishment in the judicial

branch.

* * * * * * *

øjj.¿ ii. LEGAL COSTS.—As used in section 170, the term ‘‘legal

costs’’ means the costs incurred by a plaintiff or a defendant in initiating, prosecuting, investigating, settling, or defending claims or

suits for damage arising under such section.

(jj) HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICER.—The term ‘‘Homeland Security Officer’’ means a Federal official with responsibility for coordi-
21

nating efforts to maintain homeland security against acts of terrorism, and designated by the President to perform the duties of the

Homeland Security Officer under this Act.

(kk) PRIVATE SECURITY FORCE.—The term ‘‘private security

force’’, with respect to a sensitive nuclear facility, means personnel

hired or contracted by the licensee of the sensitive nuclear facility

to provide security at the sensitive nuclear facility.

(ll) SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘sensitive nuclear facility’’

means a facility licensed by the Commission (or the portion of

a facility used in the conduct of an activity licensed by the Commission).

(2) INCLUSIONS.—The term ‘‘sensitive nuclear facility’’

includes—

(A) an operating commercial nuclear power plant;

(B) an independent spent fuel storage facility;

(C) a commercial nuclear power plant that is being decommissioned or a portion of a commercial nuclear power

plant that contains material licensed by the Commission;

(D) a category I fuel cycle facility; and

(E) a gaseous diffusion plant.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 149. FINGERPRINTING FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD

CHECKS.—

øa. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Commission’’) shall require each licensee or applicant for a license to operate a utilization facility under section 103

or 104 b. to fingerprint each individual who is permitted

unescorted access to the facility or is permitted access to safeguards information under section 147. All fingerprints obtained by

a licensee or applicant as required in the preceding sentence shall

be submitted to the Attorney General of the United States through

the Commission for identification and a criminal history records

check. The costs of any identification and records check conducted

pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be paid by the licensee or

applicant. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General may provide all the results of the search of the Commission, and, in accordance with regulations prescribed under this

section, the Commission may provide such results to the licensee

or applicant submitting such fingerprints.

øb. The Commission, by rule, may relieve persons from the obligations imposed by this section, upon specified terms, conditions,

and periods, if the Commission finds that such action is consistent

with its obligations to promote the common defense and security

and to protect the health and safety of the public.¿

a. FINGERPRINTING AND BACKGROUND CHECKS

(1) IN GENERAL—The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (referred to in this section as the ‘Commission’) shall require the

fingerprinting of each individual that is permitted—

(A) unescorted access to a facility, activity, radioactive

material, or property; or

(B) access to safeguards information under section 147.
22

(2) PERFORMANCE OF FINGERPRINTING.—The Commission

shall require fingerprinting under paragraph (1) to be performed by—

(A) a person that is licensed or certified by the Commission;

(B) a person that is an applicant for a license or certificate; and

(C) a person that is otherwise permitted— (i) to operate a utilization facility under section

103 or 104b.; or

(ii) to possess, use or transport— (I) radioactive material; or

(II) other property regulated by the Commission and determined by the Commission to be of

significance to the public health and safety or the

common defense and security.

(3) REPETITION OF FINGERPRINTING.—Fingerprinting shall

be repeated for each individual described in paragraph (1) at

least once every 5 years.

(4) SUBMISSION OF FINGERPRINTS— (A) IN GENERAL.—A licensee, certificate holder, or applicant shall submit to the Attorney General, through the

Commission, all fingerprints obtained under paragraph

(2)— (i) for identification and comparison against all

categories of individuals whose fingerprints appear

in— (I) the National Crime Information Center

data sets;

(II) the United States National Central Bureau of Interpol;

(III) the National Instant Criminal Background Check system; and

(IV) the Immigration and Naturalization Service data sets (including the Student and Exchange

Visitor Information System); and

(ii) for use to conduct a criminal history background check to determine past criminal history and

any outstanding arrest warrants on record with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(B) COST.—The cost of a background check conducted

under this paragraph shall be paid by the licensee, certificate holder, or applicant.

(C) PROVISION OF RESULTS.—

(i) ATTORNEY GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any

other provision of law, the Attorney General shall provide the pertinent results of the search to the Commission.

(ii) THE COMMISSION.—In accordance with regulations promulgated under this section, the Commission

may provide a licensee, certificate holder, or applicant

submitting the fingerprints the results of an identification and record check under this paragraph.

b. RELIEF FROM OBLIGATIONS.—
23

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission may, by regulation, relieve any person from the obligations imposed by this section,

under terms and conditions and for periods of time specified by

the Commission, if the Commission determines that the provision of relief is consistent with the responsibilities of the

Commission— (A) to promote the common defense and security; and

(B) to protect the health and safety of the public.

(2) REQUIREMENTS OF ANOTHER AGENCY.—A person that is

subject to the fingerprinting requirements of another agency of

the United States shall not be subject to the obligations imposed

by this section, if the Commission determines that those

fingerprinting requirements afford security protection similar to

that resulting from the application of this section.

c. For purposes of administering this section, the Commission

shall prescribe, subject to public notice and comment, regulations— (1) to implement procedures for the taking of fingerprints;

(2) to establish the conditions for use of information received from the Attorney General, in order— (A) to limit the redissemination of such information;

ø(B) to ensure that such information is used solely for

the purpose of determining whether an individual shall be

permitted unescorted access to the facility of a licensee or

applicant or shall be permitted access to safeguards information under section 147;¿

(B) to ensure that the information is used solely for the

purpose of determining whether an individual shall be permitted access to a facility or radioactive material or property of a licensee, certificate holder, or applicant, or shall

be permitted access to safeguards information under section

147;

(C) to ensure that no final determination may be made

solely on the basis of information provided under this section involving—

(i) an arrest more than 1 year old for which there

is no information of the disposition of the case; or

(ii) an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the

charge or an acquittal; and

(D) to protect individuals subject to fingerprinting

under this section from misuse of the criminal history

records; and

(3) to provide each individual subject to fingerprinting

under this section with the right to complete, correct, and explain information contained in the criminal history records

prior to any final adverse determination.

d. (1) The Commission may establish and collect fees to process

fingerprints and criminal history records under this section.

(2) Notwithstanding section 3302(b) of title 31, United States

Code, and to the extent approved in appropriation Acts—

(A) a portion of the amounts collected under this subsection in any fiscal year may be retained and used by the

Commission to carry out this section; and

(B) the remaining portion of the amounts collected under

this subsection in such fiscal year may be transferred periodi-
24

cally to the Attorney General and used by the Attorney General to carry out this section.

(3) Any amount made available for use under paragraph (2)

shall remain available until expended.

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 14. GENERAL AUTHORITY

SEC. 161. GENERAL PROVISIONS.—* * *

* * * * * * *

øk. authorize such of its members, officers, and employees

as it deems necessary in the interest of the common defense

and security to carry firearms while in the discharge of their

official duties. The Commission may also authorize such of

those employees of its contractors and subcontractors (at any

tier) engaged in the protection of property under the jurisdiction of the United States and located at facilities owned by or

contracted to the United States or being transported to or from

such facilities as it deems necessary in the interests of the

common defense and security to carry firearms while in the

discharge of their official duties. A person authorized to carry

firearms under this subsection may, while in the performance

of, and in connection with, official duties, make arrests without

warrant for any offense against the United States committed

in that person’s presence or for any felony cognizable under the

laws of the United States if that person has reasonable

grounds to believe that the individual to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. An employee of a contractor or subcontractor authorized to carry firearms under

this subsection may make such arrests only when the individual to be arrested is within, or in direct flight from, the area

of such offense. A person granted authority to make arrests by

this subsection may exercise that authority only in the enforcement of (1) laws regarding the property of the United States

in the custody of the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or a contractor of the Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or (2) any provision of

this Act that may subject an offender to a fine, imprisonment,

or both. The arrest authority conferred by this subsection is in

addition to any arrest authority under other laws. The Secretary, with the approval of the Attorney General, shall issue

guidelines to implement this subsection;¿

k. authorize— (1) to carry a firearm in the performance of official duties

such of its members, officers, and employees, such of the employees of its contractors and subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in the protection of property under the jurisdiction of the

United States located at facilities owned by or contracted to the

United States or being transported to or from such facilities,

and such of the employees of persons licensed or certified by the

Commission (including employees of contractors of licensees or

certificate holders) engaged in the protection of facilities owned

or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder that

are designated by the Commission or in the protection of prop-
25

erty of significance to the common defense and security located

at facilities owned or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder or being transported to or from such facilities, as

the Commission considers necessary, in view of site-specific conditions, in the interest of the common defense and security; and

(2) to carry and use any other weapons, devices, or ammunition in the performance of officials duties, any employees of

persons licensed or certified by the Commission (including employees of contractors of licensees or certificate holders) who are

trained and qualified as guards and whose duty is the protection of facilities or property described in paragraph (1), regardless of whether the employees are Federal, State, or local law

enforcement officers;

* * * * * * *

SEC. 170C. PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ANTITERRORISM TEAM.—The term ‘antiterrorism team’ means the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team established under subsection (h).

(2) FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATOR.—The term ‘Federal

security coordinator’ means the Federal security coordinator assigned to a sensitive nuclear facility under subsection (k).

(3) TASK FORCE.—The term ‘task force’ means the task force

on nuclear infrastructure security established by subsection (b).

(4) THREAT.—The term ‘threat’ means a threat identified

under subsection (c).

(5) THREAT LEVEL.—The term ‘threat level’ means a threat

level determined under subsection (d).

(b) TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY.— (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a task force on

nuclear infrastructure security.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The task force shall be comprised of— (A) the chairman of the Commission, who shall serve

as chairperson of the task force;

(B) the Secretary of Defense;

(C) the Secretary of Transportation;

(D) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency;

(E) the Attorney General;

(F) the Secretary of State;

(G) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;

(H) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;

(I) the Director of the Federal Emergency Management

Agency; and

(J) the Homeland Security Officer.

(3) DUTIES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The task force, in consultation with

other Federal, State, and local agencies, stakeholders, and

members of the public, as appropriate, shall examine the

protection of sensitive nuclear facilities from potential terrorist threats.

(B) SECURITY REVIEW.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall examine—
26

(I) the classification of threats as— (aa) an act— (AA) by an enemy of the United States

(whether a foreign government or other

person); or

(BB) otherwise falling under the responsibilities of the Federal Government;

or

(bb) an act involving a type of risk that

the licensees of the Commission should be responsible for guarding against;

(II) coordination of Federal, State, and local

security efforts for protection of land, water, and

ground access to sensitive nuclear facilities in the

event of a terrorist attack or attempted terrorist attack;

(III) the adequacy of existing emergency planning zones to protect the public health and safety

in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive

nuclear facility;

(IV) the adequacy and coordination of Federal,

State, and local emergency planning, evacuation,

and other measures to protect the public health

and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against

a sensitive nuclear facility;

(V) the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities

must protect against to prevent acts of radiological

sabotage and theft of special nuclear material;

(VI) the system of threat levels, consistent with

the Homeland Security Advisory System, used to

categorize the threats against a sensitive nuclear

facility, including— (aa) procedures to ensure coordinated Federal, State, and local responses to changing

threat levels for sensitive nuclear facilities;

(bb) monitoring of threats against sensitive nuclear facilities; and

(cc) procedures to notify licensees of a sensitive nuclear facility of changes in threat levels;

(VII) the development, implementation, and revision of security plans for sensitive nuclear facilities;

(VIII) the establishment of the antiterrorism

team under subsection (h);

(IX) the hiring and training standards for

members of private security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities, in accordance with subsection (i);

(X) the coordination of Federal resources to expedite and improve the process of performing background checks on employees with access to sensitive nuclear facilities; and

(XI) the creation of a program to provide technical assistance and training for the national
27

guard, State law enforcement agencies, and local

law enforcement agencies to respond, as appropriate, to threats against a sensitive nuclear facility, including recommendations for the establishment of a grant program for State and local governments to carry out any recommended requirements under this section.

(ii) THREATS.—The threats to be examined

include—

(I) threats comparable to the events of September 11, 2001;

(II) cyber or biochemical threats;

(III) attacks on a sensitive nuclear facility by

multiple coordinated teams of a large number of

individuals;

(IV) attacks from several persons employed at

the sensitive nuclear facility, some of whom may

have sophisticated knowledge of the operations of

the sensitive nuclear facility;

(V) attacks from individuals willing to commit

suicide to carry out the attacks;

(VI) water-based and air-based attacks;

(VII) attacks using explosive devises of considerable size and modern weaponry;

(VIII) fire, especially fire of long duration; and

(IX) any combination of those threats.

(4) REPORT.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the

date of enactment of this section, the task force shall submit

to the President and Congress, in classified form and unclassified form, a report with recommendations and findings.

(B) REVISION.—The task force shall revise the recommendations periodically, but not less than once every 3

years.

(c) THREATS TO SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 150 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and consistent with

the findings and recommendations of the task force, identifying

the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against

to prevent acts of radiological sabotage and the theft of special

nuclear material at sensitive nuclear facilities.

(2) PROTECTION OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.—In promulgating regulations under this subsection, the Commission shall

ensure protection of safeguards information in accordance with

section 147.

(d) THREAT LEVELS.—Not later than 150 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission

shall promulgate regulations, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force, establishing a system

for the determination of multiple threat levels to describe the threat

conditions at sensitive nuclear facilities.

(e) SECURITY PLANS.—
28

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on

which the Commission establishes the threats under subsection

(c), the Commission shall review, based on and consistent with

the findings and recommendations of the task force, the security

plan for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure that each sensitive nuclear facility protects against those threats.

(2) ASPECTS OF REVIEW.—The Commission shall ensure

that the security plan provides for— (A) the deployment and capabilities of the private security force at the sensitive nuclear facility for each threat

level;

(B) coordination between the private security force and

the antiterrorism team for the sensitive nuclear facility, as

appropriate for each threat level;

(C) secure operation of vital equipment, such as control

room equipment and backup warning systems;

(D) access restrictions;

(E) security cameras, fire protection barriers, and other

physical security measures;

(F) protection of spent fuel, including options such as

placement of spent fuel in dry cask storage;

(G) background security checks for employees and prospective employees; and

(H) coordination among licensees of sensitive nuclear

facilities and appropriate Federal, state, and local emergency response personnel.

(3) SCHEDULE.—The Commission shall establish a priority

schedule for conducting reviews of security plans based on the

vulnerability of each sensitive nuclear facility and the proximity

of the sensitive nuclear facility to large population areas.

(4) FINDINGS.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the review of each security plan, the Commission shall submit to

Congress and the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility

recommendations, findings, and a schedule for implementation of changes to security that shall be made not later

than 18 months after completion of the review of the security plan.

(B) FORM.—The report submitted to Congress under

subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.

(5) UPGRADES TO SECURITY PLAN.—Not later than 30 days

after the review of each security plan, the Commission shall ensure that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility revises,

as necessary, its security plan consistent with the findings

under paragraph (4).

(6) UPGRADES TO SECURITY.—The Commission shall ensure

that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility makes any

changes to security required by the security plan according to

the Commission schedule.

(f) EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 150 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission shall review, based on and consistent with the findings
29

and recommendations of the task force, the emergency response

plans for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure that each

emergency response plan provides protection for persons living

in the emergency response planning zones.

(2) ASPECTS OF REVIEW.—The Commission shall ensure

that each emergency response plan provides for—

(A) the protection of public health and safety, including

the ability to implement protective measures;

(B) clear definition and assignment of responsibilities

of emergency response personnel;

(C) notification procedures;

(D) communication and coordination among emergency

response personnel;

(E) dissemination of information to the public, including both pre-emergency education and in the event of a radiological emergency;

(F) adequate emergency facilities and equipment at

and around the sensitive nuclear facility;

(G) the use of methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential impacts of a radiological emergency;

(H) appropriate evacuation and sheltering and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide;

(I) means for controlling radiological exposures;

(J) appropriate medical services;

(K) plans for recovery and reentry; and

(L) radiological emergency response training.

(3) SCHEDULE.—The Commission shall establish a priority

schedule for conducting reviews of emergency response plans for

sensitive nuclear facilities based on the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive nuclear facilities and the proximity of

sensitive nuclear facilities to large population areas.

(4) FINDINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the review of each emergency response plan, the Commission

shall submit to Congress and the licensee of each sensitive

nuclear facility recommendations and findings.

(B) FORM.—The report submitted to Congress under

subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.

(5) UPGRADES TO EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN.—Not later

than 30 days after completion of the review of each emergency

response plan, the Commission shall ensure that the licensee of

each sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, the emergency response plan for the sensitive nuclear facility consistent

with the findings under paragraph (4).

(g) FEDERAL COORDINATION.—Not later than 90 days after the

task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and consistent with the

findings and recommendations of the task force, establishing the

circumstances under which the Commission shall request the President to—

(1) deploy the Coast Guard to a sensitive nuclear facility;
30

(2) provide for the protection of air space in the vicinity of

a sensitive nuclear facility; or

(3) deploy the antiterrorism team.

(h) NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE ANTITERRORISM TEAM.— (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 1 year after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the President

shall establish, based on and consistent with the findings and

recommendations of the task force, the Nuclear Infrastructure

Antiterrorism Team.

(2) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the antiterrorism team shall

be to provide protection for the perimeter of sensitive nuclear facilities against the threats identified under subsection (c), in coordination with other Federal, State, local, and private entities,

as appropriate, consistent with the security plan for each sensitive nuclear facility.

(i) TRAINING PROGRAM.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4)(B), the President shall establish, based on and consistent with findings and

recommendations of the task force, a program to provide technical assistance and training for the National Guard and State

and local law enforcement agencies in responding to threats

against a sensitive nuclear facility.

(2) GRANTS.—The President may provide grants, consistent

with the findings and recommendations of the task force, to

State and local governments to assist in carrying out this section.

(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out

this subsection.

(j) EMPLOYEE SECURITY.— (1) REVIEW.—Not later than 90 days after the task force

submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission, taking into consideration recommendations of the task force, shall

review and update the hiring and training standards for employees of a sensitive nuclear facility.

(2) DISQUALIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS THAT PRESENT NA- TIONAL SECURITY RISKS.—The Commission, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force,

shall establish qualifications and procedures, in addition to any

background check conducted under section 149, to ensure that

no individual that presents a threat to national security is employed at a sensitive nuclear facility.

(k) FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATORS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission, based on and consistent with findings and recommendations of the task force, shall promulgate regulations for the hiring and training of Federal security coordinators.

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATORS.— Not later than 60 days after the Commission promulgates regulations under paragraph (1), the Commission shall assign a

Federal security coordinator, under the employment of the Commission, at each sensitive nuclear facility.
31

(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Federal security coordinator

shall be responsible for—

(A) communicating with the Commission and other

Federal, State, and local authorities concerning threats, including threats against the sensitive nuclear facility;

(B) ensuring that the sensitive nuclear facility maintains security consistent with the security plan in accordance with the appropriate threat level; and

(C) ensuring full and active coordination of security

measures among—

(i) the private security force at the sensitive nuclear

facility;

(ii) the antiterrorism team; and

(iii) other Federal, State, and local authorities, as

appropriate.

(l) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Nothing in this section shall be

construed to supersede any existing law (including a regulation)

governing the disclosure of classified information or safeguards information.

SEC. 170D. CARRYING OF WEAPONS.

(a) AUTHORITY TO MAKE ARREST.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A person authorized under section 161k.

to carry a firearm, other weapon, device, or ammunition may,

while in the performance of, and in connection with, official duties, detain or arrest an individual without a warrant for any

offense against the United States committed in the presence of

the person or for any felony under the laws of the United States

if the person has a reasonable ground to believe that the individual has committed or is committing such a felony.

(2) LIMITATION.—An employee of a contractor or subcontractor or of a Commission licensee or certificate holder (or a

contractor of a licensee or certificate holder) authorized to make

an arrest under paragraph (1) may make an arrest only after

the Commission, licensee, or certificate holder has applied for

and been granted authorization from the Commission—

(A) when the individual is within, or is in flight directly from, the area in which the offense was committed;

and

(B) in the enforcement of—

(i) a law regarding the property of the United

States in the custody of the Department of Energy, the

Commission, or a contractor of the Department of Energy or Commission or a licensee or certificate holder

of the Commission;

(ii) a law applicable to facilities owned or operated

by a Commission licensee or certificate holder that are

designated by the Commission under section 161k.;

(iii) a law applicable to property of significance to

the common defense and security that is in the custody

of a licensee or certificate holder or a contractor of a

licensee or certificate holder of the Commission; or

(iv) any provision of this Act that subjects an offender to a fine, imprisonment, or both.
32

(3) OTHER AUTHORITY.—The arrest authority conferred by

this section is in addition to any arrest authority under other

law.

(4) GUIDELINES— (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary and the Commission,

with the approval of the Attorney General, shall issue

guidelines to implement section 161k. and this subsection.

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The authority to carry and use

weapons, devices, or ammunition provided to employees described in section 161k.(2) and the authority provided to

those employees under this subsection shall not be effective

until the date on which guidelines issued under subparagraph (A) become effective.

SEC. 170E. SENSITIVE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SECURITY.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) SENSITIVE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘sensitive radioactive material’ means— (i) a material— (I) that is a source material, byproduct material, or special nuclear material; and

(II) that is any other radioactive material (regardless of whether the material is or has been licensed or otherwise regulated under this Act) produced or made radioactive before or after the date

of enactment of this section; and

(ii) that is in such a form or quantity or concentration that the Commission determines, based on and

consistent with the recommendations of the task force,

should be classified as ‘sensitive radioactive material’ that warrants improved security and protection against

loss, theft, or sabotage.

(B) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘sensitive radioactive material’ does not include nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel.

(2) SECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘security threat’ means— (A) a threat of sabotage or theft of sensitive radioactive

material;

(B) a threat of use of sensitive radioactive material in

a radiological dispersal device; and

(C) any other threat of terrorist or other criminal activity involving sensitive radioactive material that could harm

the health or safety of the public due primarily to radiological properties of the sensitive radioactive material, as

determined by the Commission based on and consistent

with the recommendations of the task force.

(3) TASK FORCE.—The term ‘task force’ has the meaning

given the term in section 170C(a).

(b) DUTIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall—

(A) evaluate the security of sensitive radioactive material against security threats; and

(B) recommend administrative and legislative actions

to be taken to provide the maximum practicable degree of

security against security threats.
33

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the

task force shall make recommendations to—

(A) determine the radioactive materials that should be

classified as sensitive radioactive materials;

(B) develop a classification system for sensitive radioactive materials that—

(i) is based on the potential for use by terrorists of

sensitive radioactive material and the extent of the

threat to public health and safety posed by that potential; and

(ii) takes into account—

(I) radioactivity levels of sensitive radioactive

material;

(II) the dispersibility of sensitive radioactive

material;

(III) the chemical and material form of sensitive radioactive material; and

(IV) other appropriate factors;

(C) develop a national system for recovery of sensitive

radioactive material that is lost or stolen, taking into account the classification system established under subparagraph (B);

(D) provide for the storage of sensitive radioactive material that is not currently in use in a safe and secure manner;

(E) develop a national tracking system for sensitive radioactive material, taking into account the classification

system established under subparagraph (B);

(F) develop methods to ensure the return or proper disposal of sensitive radioactive material;

(G) modify current export controls on sensitive radioactive materials so that, to the extent feasible, exports from

the United States of sensitive radioactive materials are

made only to foreign recipients that are willing and able to

control the sensitive radioactive materials in the same manner as recipients in the United States; and

(H) establish procedures to improve the security of sensitive radioactive material in use, transportation, and storage.

(3) PROCEDURES TO IMPROVE SECURITY.—The procedures to

improve the security of sensitive radioactive material under

paragraph (2)(H) may include—

(A) periodic audits or inspections by the Commission to

ensure that sensitive radioactive material is properly secured and can be fully accounted for;

(B) evaluation by the Commission of security measures

taken by persons that possess sensitive radioactive material;

(C) imposition of increased fines for violations of regulations relating to security and safety measures applicable

to licensees that possess sensitive radioactive material;

(D) conduct of background checks on individuals with

access to sensitive radioactive material;
34

(E) measures to ensure the physical security of facilities

in which sensitive radioactive material is stored; and

(F) screening of shipments of sensitive radioactive material to facilities that are particularly at risk for sabotage

to ensure that the shipments do not contain explosives.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment

of this section, and not less frequently than once every 3 years thereafter, the task force shall submit to the President and Congress a

report in unclassified form (with a classified annex, if necessary) describing the administrative and legislative actions recommended

under subsection (b)(1).

(d) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.—Not later than 60 days after the

date of submission of the report under subsection (b), the Commission shall, based on and consistent with the recommendations of the

task force, take such actions as are appropriate to— (1) revise the system for licensing sensitive radioactive materials based on and consistent with the recommendations of the

task force; and

(2) ensure that States that have entered into an agreement

under section 274b. establish compatible programs in a timely

manner.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 229. TRESPASS UPON COMMISSION INSTALLATIONS.— a. The Commission is authorized to issue regulations relating to the entry upon or carrying, transporting, or otherwise

introducing or causing to be introduced any dangerous weapons, explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or property, into or upon any facility, installation, or real property

subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or in the custody of

the Commission. Every such regulation of the Commission

shall be posted conspicuously at the location involved or subject

to the licensing authority of the Commission or to certification

by the Commission under this Act or any other Act.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 236. SABOTAGE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES OR FUEL.—

a. Any person who intentionally and willfully destroys or

causes physical damage to, or øwho intentionally and willfully attempts¿ or who attempts or conspires to destroy or cause physical

damage to—

(1) any production facility or utilization facility licensed

under this Act;

(2) any nuclear waste østorage facility¿ storage, treatment,

or disposal facility licensed under this Act;

(3) any nuclear fuel for such a utilization facility, or any

spent nuclear fuel from such a facility; øor¿

(4) any uranium enrichment øfacility licensed¿ a utilization facility licensed under this Act by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commissionø.¿ ; or

(5) any production, utilization, waste storage, waste treatment, waste disposal, uranium enrichment, or nuclear fuel fabrication facility subject to licensing or certification under this

Act during construction of the facility, if the destruction or
35

damage caused or attempted to be caused could adversely affect

public health and safety during the operation of the facility; shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more

than ten years, or both.

b. Any person who intentionally and willfully causes or attempts to cause an interruption of normal operation of any such facility through the unauthorized use of or tampering with the machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, shall be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than ten years,

or both.

* * * * * * *

ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974

[Public Law 93–438]

* * * * * * *

SEC 203. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

(a) ESTABLISHMENT; APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR.—There is

hereby established in the Commission an Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards under the direction of a Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, who shall be appointed by

the Commission, who may report directly to the Commission as

provided in section 5849 of this title, and who shall serve at the

pleasure of and be removable by the Commission.

(b) FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTOR.—Subject to the provisions of this

chapter, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

shall perform such functions as the Commission shall delegate including:

(1) Principal ølicensing and regulation involving¿ licensing,

regulation, and, except as otherwise provided under section 212,

carrying out safety reviews, safeguards, and physical security of

all facilities and materials, licensed under the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), associated

with the processing, transport, and handling of nuclear materials, øincluding¿ not including the provision and maintenance

of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sabotage of such licensed facilities, øand materials¿ and materials, to the extent

that the safeguards and security functions are delegated to the

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response under section

212.

(2) Review safety øand safeguards¿ of all such facilities and

materials licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, øas

amended, and such review shall include, but not be limited

to—

ø(A) monitoring, testing, and recommending upgrading

of internal accounting systems for special nuclear and

other nuclear materials licensed under the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended;

ø(B) developing, in consultation and coordination with

the Administration, contingency plans for dealing with

threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear

materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facili-
36

ties resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

ø(C) assessing the need for, and the feasibility of, establishing a security agency within the office for the performance of the safeguards functions, and a report with recommendations on this matter shall be prepared within one

year of the effective date of this chapter and promptly

transmitted to the Congress by the Commission¿ (42

U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).

(3) Recommending research to enable the Commission to

more effectively perform its functions.

(c) Responsibility for safeguarding special nuclear materials;

high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities Nothing in this

section shall be construed to limit in any way the functions of the

Administration relating to the safeguarding of special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting

from all activities within the jurisdiction of the Administration pursuant to this chapter.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 211. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION

(a) Discrimination against employee

(1) No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise

discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request

of the employee) -

(A) notified his employer of an alleged violation of this

chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011

et seq.);

(B) refused to engage in any practice made unlawful by

this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if the employee has identified the alleged illegality to the employer;

(C) testified before Congress or at any Federal or State

proceeding regarding any provision (or proposed provision)

of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;

(D) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to

commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under

this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement

of any requirement imposed under this chapter or the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

(E) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding

or;

(F) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any

other manner in such a proceeding or in any other action

to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

(2) For purposes of this section, the term ’’employer’’ includes

-

(A) a licensee of the Commission or of an agreement

State under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

(42 U.S.C. 2021);
37

(B) an applicant for a license from the Commission or

such an agreement State;

(C) a contractor or subcontractor of such a licensee or

applicant; øand¿

(D) a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of

Energy that is indemnified by the Department under section 170 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2210(d)), but such term shall not include any contractor or

subcontractor covered by Executive Order No. 12344ø.¿ ;

and

(E) a contractor or subcontractor of the Commission.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 212. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ANTITERRORISM TEAM.—The term ‘antiterrorism team’

has the meaning given the term in section 170C(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(2) ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.—The term ‘Assistant Director’

means the Assistant Director for Security Response.

(3) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘Director’ means the Director of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response appointed under subsection (c).

(4) MOCK TERRORIST TEAM.—The term ‘mock terrorist team’

means the mock terrorist team described in subsection (d)(3).

(5) OFFICE.—The term ‘Office’ means the Office of Nuclear

Security and Incident Response established by subsection (b).

(6) SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITY.—The term ‘sensitive nuclear facility’ has the meaning given the term in section 11 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014).

(7) THREAT.—The term ‘threat’ has the meaning given the

term in section 170C(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(8) UNIT.—The term ‘Unit’ means the Security Response

Unit established under subsection (d)(1).

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE.—There is established in the

Commission the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

(c) DIRECTOR.—

(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Commission may appoint and terminate a Director of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to

head the Office.

(2) DUTIES.—The Director shall perform any duties delegated by the Commission to the Director, including—

(A) carrying out security, safeguards, and incident responses relating to—

(i) any facility owned or operated by a Commission

licensee or certificate holder;

(ii) any property owned or in the possession of a

Commission licensee or certificate holder that—

(I) is significant to the common defense and

security; or

(II) is being transported to or from a facility

described in clause (i); and
38

(iii) performing any other activity of a Commission

licensee or certificate holder that is significant to the

common defense and security;

(B) for a facility or material licensed or certified under

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)— (i) developing contingency plans for dealing with

threats, thefts, and sabotage; and

(ii) monitoring, reviewing, and evaluating security

and safeguards;

(C) recommending upgrades to internal accounting systems for special nuclear and other materials licensed or certified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011

et seq.);

(D) developing and recommending standards and

amendments to the standards of the Commission relating

to the duties described in subparagraphs (A) through (C);

and

(E) carrying out any other safeguards and physical security functions that the Commission determines to be appropriate.

(3) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out the duties under paragraph (2), the Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, consult and coordinate with— (A) other officers of the Commission; and

(B) other Federal agencies.

(d) SECURITY RESPONSE UNIT.— (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Office the

Security Response Unit.

(2) HEAD OF UNIT.—The Unit shall be headed by an Assistant Director for Security Response.

(3) MOCK TERRORIST TEAM.—The personnel of the Unit

shall include a mock terrorist team comprised of— (A) a number of individuals, consistent with the threat,

who have advanced knowledge of special weapons and tactics comparable to special operations forces of the Armed

Forces;

(B) nuclear engineers, as appropriate;

(C) individuals with knowledge of the operations of the

sensitive nuclear facility who are capable of actively disrupting the normal operations of the sensitive nuclear facility; and

(D) any other individual that the Commission determines should be a member of the mock terrorist team.

(4) SECURITY RESPONSE EVALUATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date

of enactment of this section, the Commission shall establish

a security response evaluation program to assess the ability

of each sensitive nuclear facility to defend against the

threats in accordance with the security plan for the sensitive nuclear facility.

(B) FREQUENCY OF EVALUATIONS.—Not less than once

every 3 years, the Commission shall conduct and document

security response evaluations at each sensitive nuclear facility to assess the ability of the private security force, in co-
39

operation with the antiterrorism team, at the sensitive nuclear facility to defend against the threat.

(C) SECURITY EXEMPTION.—The Commission may suspend activities under this section if the Commission determines that the security response evaluations would compromise security at any sensitive nuclear facility in accordance with a heightened threat level.

(D) ACTIVITIES.—The security response evaluation shall

include force-on-force exercises by the mock terrorist team

against the sensitive nuclear facility that simulate air,

water, and land assaults, as appropriate.

(E) PERFORMANCE CRITERIA.—The Commission shall

establish performance criteria for judging the security response evaluations.

(F) CORRECTIVE ACTION.— (i) IN GENERAL.—When any of the performance criteria established under subparagraph (E) are not

satisfied—

(I) the licensee shall promptly correct any defects in performance identified by the Commission

in the security response evaluation; and

(II) the Commission shall conduct an additional security response evaluation within 6

months to confirm that the licensee satisfies the

performance criteria established under subparagraph (E).

(ii) 2 CONSECUTIVE FAILURES TO SATISFY ALL PER- FORMANCE CRITERIA.— (I) IN GENERAL.—If a sensitive nuclear facility

fails to satisfy all of the performance criteria established under subparagraph (E) in 2 consecutive security response evaluations, the Commission shall

issue an order specifying the corrective actions that

must be taken by the licensee of the sensitive nuclear facility.

(II) FAILURE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION.—If

the licensee of a sensitive nuclear facility does not

take the corrective action specified by the Commission within 30 days after the date of issuance of an

order under subclause (I), the Commission shall

assess a civil penalty under section 234.

(G) REPORTS.—Not less often than once every year, the

Commission shall submit to Congress and the President a

report, in classified form and unclassified form, that describes the results of each security response evaluation

under this paragraph for the previous year.

(e) EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less than once every 2 years, the

Commission, in coordination with the Director of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, shall conduct emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability of Federal, State, and

local emergency response personnel to respond to a radiological

emergency at the sensitive nuclear facility in accordance with

the emergency response plans.
40

(2) ACTIVITIES.—The emergency response exercises shall

evaluate—

(A) the response capabilities, response times, and coordination and communication capabilities of the response

personnel;

(B) the effectiveness and adequacy of emergency response and evacuation plans; and

(C) the availability of potassium iodide or other prophylactic medicines.

(3) REVISION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS.—The Commission shall ensure that the emergency response plan for a

sensitive nuclear facility is revised to correct for any deficiencies

identified by an evaluation under this subsection.

(4) REPORTS.—Not less than once every year, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a report, in

classified form and unclassified form, that describes— (A) the results of each emergency response exercise

under this subsection conducted in the previous year; and

(B) each revision of an emergency response plan made

under paragraph (3) for the previous year.

(f) EFFECT.—Nothing in this section limits any authority of the

Department of Energy relating to the safe operation of facilities

under the jurisdiction of the Department.

* * * * * * *

Æ
19–010

1This legislation amends various sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011

et seq.). It also amends Title II of the Energy Reorganzation Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5841 et

seq.).

Calendar No. 747

107TH CONGRESS REPORT

2d Session " ! SENATE 107–335

NUCLEAR SECURITY ACT OF 2002

NOVEMBER 12, 2002.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. JEFFORDS, from the Committee on Environment and Public

Works, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[to accompany S. 1746]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Environment and Public Works, to which was

referred a bill (S. 1746) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to strengthen security

at sensitive nuclear facilities, having considered the same, reports

favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the

bill, as amended, do pass.

GENERAL STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND

This bill amends current law1 to enhance safety and security at

our nation’s commercial nuclear facilities, and to protect against

terrorist use of radiological materials.

The events of September 11, 2001, have required our nation to

reevaluate the adequacy of our existing security measures. The attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. invalidate many of

our past assumptions about the likelihood and method of terrorist

attack. It is clear that we must take new measures to protect

against those who would target American citizens and domestic infrastructure. We have a particular responsibility to ensure that our
2

2Atomic Energy Act of 1954, section 1a, 42 U.S.C. 2011a.

commercial nuclear resources, including our nuclear reactors and

radioactive materials used for research, medical and industrial purposes, are not used as weapons of destruction against us.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 assigned to the Atomic Energy

Commission responsibility for protecting public health and safety

from the hazards of radiation produced through nuclear technology.

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and created a new agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), to take over its regulatory functions.

The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works has jurisdiction over the nonmilitary environmental regulation and control of atomic energy. This includes both legislative and oversight

authority pertaining to the operations of the NRC.

Among the responsibilities entrusted to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission are regulation of the nation’s commercial nuclear

power plants, along with most other civilian uses of radioactive materials. The mission of the NRC is to conduct an effective regulatory program that promotes the safe use of nuclear energy and

materials, in a manner that protects the public health and safety

and the human environment, and promotes the common defense

and security.

As stated in the Atomic Energy Act:

. . . the development, use and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to

make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the

paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense

and security . . .2

As of December 2000, there were 104 commercial nuclear power

reactors licensed to operate by the NRC in 31 States. Additionally,

NRC has regulatory responsibility over seven fuel fabrication and

production facilities; two gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facilities; and 14 other facilities that possess significant quantities of

special nuclear material (other than reactors) or process source material (other than uranium enrichment facilities). The NRC also administers approximately 5,000 licenses for medical, academic and

industrial uses of nuclear materials; and has agreements under

which States will administer approximately 16,000 additional such

licenses.

While prevention of accidents necessarily remains a key component of nuclear safety, the events of September 11th bring a new

urgency to the need to deter and protect against attacks at our nation’s nuclear facilities, and against attempted theft of radioactive

materials.

Following the events of September 11th, the NRC took immediate action to respond to heightened threat levels and concerns. It

undertook intensive consultation with other Federal entities, including the FBI, the Office of Homeland Security, the Department

of Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration and others to

evaluate general and specific threats to NRC licensed facilities, and

to coordinate planning and responsive actions. The NRC has consulted with Governors regarding the deployment of State assets, including the National Guard. It has issued a series of Orders to licensees to enhance security at nuclear facilities. The NRC is also

in the process of conducting what it describes as a comprehensive
3

review of NRC policies and regulations relating to safeguards and

security.

Since September 11th, the committee has worked closely with

the NRC to monitor changing circumstances and to oversee activities of the NRC and its licensees. The committee will continue to

work with the agency to ensure that all actions necessary to protect

the public are taken in a timely and thorough manner.

OBJECTIVES OF THE LEGISLATION

The Nuclear Security Act of 2002 is an important step in ensuring protection of the public against potential terrorist activities

against commercial nuclear facilities or potential theft of nuclear

materials. While the NRC has voluntarily undertaken a number of

actions, these have been ad hoc responses to emergency events. The

purpose of this legislation is to codify those actions necessary to

protect against attack on our nation’s nuclear reactors and against

theft or terrorist use of radioactive materials, such as for so-called

‘‘dirty bombs.’’

The legislation directs the NRC, in consultation with other Federal agencies having experience in matters related to national security, emergency preparedness, and radioactive response, to undertake a series of actions to upgrade security at nuclear power plants

and to prevent the theft or terrorist use of sensitive radioactive materials. It also requires the NRC to update hiring and training

standards for plant employees; conduct and document security response evaluations at each nuclear facility; and to ensure adequate

emergency planning, evacuation, and other public safety measures

in the event of a radiological release from a sensitive nuclear facility. It also directs the President to ensure coordinated Federal action to prevent a terrorist attack.

The legislation gives clear and permanent direction to the NRC

and its licensees, and will provide greater assurance that NRC will

receive the funding it needs to fully implement essential security

measures. The Nuclear Security Act of 2002 will assure the American public that these nuclear facilities are as safe as they can reasonably be, and will clearly signal to would-be terrorists that our

nuclear facilities are heavily protected, hardened structures that

will make neither easy, nor desirable, targets.

The committee has worked closely with the NRC since September 11th to develop this legislation. The committee has taken

extensive testimony on the issues involved and has worked with industry, public interest groups, private security guards employed at

nuclear facilities, and members of the public. This legislation represents a carefully considered, bipartisan response to the threat of

U.S. nuclear resources being employed as weapons of destruction.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short Title

This section provides that the Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear

Security Act of 2002.’’
4

Sec. 2. Definitions

This section amends section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

to provide definitions for ‘‘Homeland Security Officer,’’ ‘‘Private Security Force,’’ and ‘‘ Sensitive Nuclear Facility.’’

Sec. 3. Nuclear Facility Security

This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act by

adding a new section 170C, ‘‘Protection of Sensitive Nuclear Facilities.’’

New subsection 170C(a) provides definitions for ‘‘Antiterrorism

Team,’’ ‘‘Federal Security Coordinator,’’ ‘‘Task Force,’’ ‘‘Threat,’’ and ‘‘Threat Level.’’ New subsection 170C(b) establishes a task force, chaired by the

Chairman of the NRC, to examine and provide recommendations

and findings regarding a broad spectrum of security issues surrounding nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC, and the use of nuclear materials licensed by the NRC.

Paragraph (b)(2) specifies the membership of the task force. The

agencies included in the task force are intended by the committee

to include those which have expertise in intelligence; defense of air

space and waterways; road and transportation access; radiological

response; and emergency preparedness. The committee recognizes

that not every one of these agencies will have expertise in all of

the issues addressed in this subsection. The committee assumes

that the Chairman of the NRC, as chairperson, will structure the

task force so as to best utilize the expertise of each agency in relation to those issues within their respective jurisdiction. However,

the committee also expects that the task force’s report to Congress

and the President will reflect and incorporate the views of all agencies on the task force, as appropriate, and if necessary should provide for minority or dissenting views.

The committee is aware that, since September 11th, the NRC

has been in close consultation with most, if not all of these agencies. The committee intends that the work of the task force established in this subsection shall build upon, rather than duplicate or

interfere with, the process of consultation and coordination that the

NRC has already begun with these and other agencies.

Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the duties of the task force. The overall duty of the task force is to examine issues surrounding the protection of sensitive nuclear facilities against potential terrorist

threats, and to report to the President and Congress with its findings and recommendations. This paragraph directs the task force

to consult with other Federal, State and local agencies, stakeholders and members of the public, as appropriate, in making its

examination.

This paragraph sets out in detail the matters which the task

force is to examine. These are: how threats to sensitive nuclear facilities should be classified; how Federal, State and local security

efforts for protection of land, water, and ground access to sensitive

nuclear facilities should be coordinated; the adequacy of existing

emergency planning zones; the adequacy of Federal, State and local

emergency planning and evacuation zones, and other measures to

protect the public health and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility; the specific threats against

which security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities shall be re-
5

quired to protect; creation of a system of threat levels appropriate

to sensitive nuclear facilities; the development, implementation and

revision of security plans for sensitive nuclear facilities; the establishment of an antiterrorism team; the hiring and training standards that should be applied to private security forces at sensitive

nuclear facilities; how Federal resources should best be coordinated

to expedite and improve the process of performing employee background checks; and the creation of a program to provide technical

assistance and training for the National Guard, State law enforcement agencies, and local law enforcement agencies, to respond to

threats against a sensitive nuclear facility.

Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(III) requires the task force to examine

the adequacy of all existing emergency planning zones in the event

of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility. The committee intends for this to be a full examination in light of experiences derived from September 11th, including whether any planning zones should be facility-specific to take into account population densities or special obstacles to successful emergency evacuation. The committee recognizes that concerns have been raised

that existing emergency planning and evacuation zones may not be

adequate and could require expansion, perhaps up to 50 miles. In

light of the increased potential for a terrorist attack, it is expected

that the task force will examine whether such a change is warranted.

Subparagraph (b)(3)(i)(IV) requires the task force to evaluate the

adequacy and coordination of Federal, State and local emergency

planning, evacuation, and other measures to protect the public

health and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility. The issues of specific interest to the committee include whether actual capabilities are adequate for: warning the public; facilitating movement of populations; transporting

populations that are trapped without ground escape routes; providing shelter and medical care to those who have been relocated;

providing radiation monitoring to both individuals and the environment; assuring the availability of properly trained medical providers and emergency responders; and adequately quarantining

contaminated food and water supplies in the ingestion zone where

radiation has been deposited.

Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(V) requires the task force to examine

the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against to

prevent acts of radiological sabotage and theft of special nuclear

material. The committee intends that this constitute a thorough

and comprehensive review of the types of threats that are appropriate for sensitive nuclear facilities to protect against in light of

September 11th. The committee expects that this would include

aerial, ground or water-based attacks. The committee also intends

that the task force consider, as part of its examination, appropriate

changes to sensitive nuclear facilities in order to protect against

acts of radiological sabotage, including means to reduce the vulnerability of spent fuel storage and the consequences of a spent fuel

fire.

New subsection 170C(c) requires the NRC, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force, to

promulgate regulations identifying the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against to prevent acts of radiological
6

sabotage and the theft of special nuclear material. The committee

is aware that the design basis threats are currently the NRC’s primary regulatory framework for protecting against acts of sabotage

at sensitive nuclear facilities. The committee therefore assumes

that this section will result in a revision to the NRC regulations

covering the design basis threats. However, it is the intent of this

section that regulations promulgated by the NRC pursuant to this

section will also address any other regulatory or programmatic

changes as are necessary.

Paragraph (c)(2) addresses the recognition by the committee that

post-September 11th, the need may arise to reduce the amount of

specific information contained in regulations open to public dissemination, which address the design basis threat or other security

matters. For example, the NRC is considering revising current regulations to remove certain details that may now be considered safeguards information under section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act,

and include such details, as revised, instead in Orders to licensees.

This paragraph is intended to clarify that the requirements of section 147 continue to apply in full, including the need as appropriate

under existing law to protect safeguards and other sensitive information.

New subsection 170C(d) requires the NRC to promulgate regulations establishing a system for the determination of multiple threat

levels to describe the threat conditions at sensitive nuclear facilities. It is the intent of the committee that in meeting this requirement the NRC will utilize the Homeland Security Advisory System;

or such other information or guidance provided by the Office of

Homeland Security, other Federal agencies or other entities; as appropriate.

New subsection 170C(e) requires the NRC to review the security

plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. It specifies the aspects of

the review, requires the NRC to establish a priority schedule for

conducting reviews, requires the NRC to report to the President

and Congress, and requires the NRC to ensure that licensees upgrade security plans as necessary.

New subsection 170C(f) requires the NRC to review the emergency response plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. It specifies

the aspect of the review, requires the NRC to establish a priority

schedule for conducting the reviews, requires the NRC to report to

the President and Congress, and requires the NRC to ensure that

licensees revise emergency response plans as necessary.

Paragraph (f)(3) requires the NRC to establish a priority schedule for conducting reviews of emergency response plans based on

the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive nuclear facilities

and the proximity of sensitive nuclear facilities to large population

areas. Consequently, the committee anticipates that facilities near

major metropolitan areas such as New York City will be at the top

of this priority schedule.

New subsection 170C(g) requires the NRC to promulgate regulations establishing the circumstances under which the NRC shall request the President to deploy the Coast Guard or the antiterrorism

team created under subsection 170C(h) to a sensitive nuclear facility, or provide for the protection of air space in the vicinity of a

sensitive nuclear facility.
7

New subsection 170C(h) requires the President to establish a Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team, the purpose of which

shall be to provide protection for the perimeter of sensitive nuclear

facilities against the threats identified under subsection (c), in coordination with other Federal, State, local, and private entities, as

appropriate, and consistent with the security plan for each sensitive nuclear facility.

The nature, structure and specific duties of this Federal team are

left to the discretion of the President, with the caveat that they

shall be based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force created under subsection 170C(b).

This includes whether such ‘‘team’’ shall be regional or national in

nature or shall be specific to each sensitive nuclear facility. The

committee however intends that the team will consist of existing

agency structures and personnel, operating under existing Federal

authorities. The committee does not intend for the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team to be an NRC entity or under the

control of the NRC.

New subsection 170C(i) requires the President to establish a program to provide technical assistance and training for the National

Guard and State and local law enforcement agencies in responding

to threats against a sensitive nuclear facility. Such program may

include grants to State and local governments.

New subsection 170C(j) requires the NRC to review and upgrade

hiring and training standards for employees at sensitive nuclear facilities, and to establish qualifications and procedures to ensure

that no individual that presents a threat to national security is employed at a sensitive nuclear facility.

New subsection 170C(k) requires the NRC to promulgate regulations for the hiring and training of Federal security coordinators,

and to assign a Federal security coordinator at each sensitive nuclear facility. The subsection sets forth the duties of the Federal security coordinator.

New subsection 170C(l) provides that nothing in the section shall

be construed to supersede any existing law governing the disclosure of classified or safeguards information.

Sec. 4. Fingerprinting and Background Checks

This section was developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and added at the NRC’s request. It amends Chapter 12 of the

Atomic Energy Act by adding specific requirements for the performance of fingerprinting, and criminal history and other background

checks for persons having access to sensitive nuclear facilities.

Sec. 5. Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

This section amends Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974 by adding a new section 212, which establishes an Office of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response. This new office is intended to codify the office created by the NRC following the events

of September 11th.

New subsections 212(a) and 212(b) provide definitions for the

new section and establish the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

New subsection 212(c) provides for the appointment of a Director

to head the office, and specifies the duties of the Director.
8

New subsection 212(d) establishes a Security Response Unit

within the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to be

headed by an Assistant Director for Security Response. The section

details the functions of this unit, which shall include establishment

of a mock terrorist team, and a program for security response evaluations to assess the ability of each sensitive nuclear facility to defend against threats in accordance with the facility security plan.

It details elements of the security response evaluation program, including requiring the NRC to establish performance criteria for

judging the security response evaluations. It is the assumption of

the committee that the Assistant Director for Security Response

would have primary responsibility for carrying out this program.

This would include making recommendations as required under

this paragraph on the timing, conduct and evaluation of the security response exercises, including the establishment of performance

criteria for judging the evaluations.

New subsection 212(e) requires the NRC, in coordination with

the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to

conduct emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability of

Federal, State and local emergency response personnel to respond

to a radiological emergency at the sensitive nuclear facility. It sets

forth the factors which the emergency response exercises shall

evaluate, requires revisions to emergency response plans as necessary, and requires periodic reports to the President and Congress

on the results of the exercises and each revision to an emergency

response plan.

The committee notes that in section 3 of the Nuclear Security Act

of 2002, under new subsection 170C(b)(3)(i)(III) of the Atomic Energy Act, above, the task force is required to examine the adequacy

of all existing emergency planning zones. Section 3 of the Nuclear

Security Act of 2002, under new subsection 170C(f)(1), also requires

the Commission, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force, to review the emergency response

plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. New subsection 170C(f)(5)

of the Act, above, requires the Commission to ensure that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, the

emergency response plan for the sensitive nuclear facility. Therefore, the committee intends that the emergency response exercises

conducted by the Commission in coordination with FEMA under

this new subsection 212(e) will reflect the determinations made by

the task force under new subsection 170C(b)(3)(i)(III).

New subsection 212(f) provides that nothing in the section shall

limit any authority of the Department of Energy relating to the

safe operation of facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department.

Sec. 6. Carrying of Weapons by Licensee Employees

This section amends Chapter 14 of Title I of the Atomic Energy

Act.

It permits the NRC to authorize guards at certain NRC-licensed

or certified facilities, and guards transporting special nuclear materials, to carry and use firearms to prevent sabotage of such facilities or theft of nuclear explosive material. The section also authorizes the NRC to issue regulations shielding guards against State

prosecution for discharge of firearms in the performance of official

duties. These changes would enhance national security by pro-
9

viding NRC facilities and transport with authority equivalent to

the authority currently possessed by the Department of Energy for

the protection of its nuclear facilities and transport.

This provision was included at the request of the NRC, and is

similar to language that passed this committee and the Senate in

the 106th Congress in S. 1627

Sec. 7. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security

This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954 to add a new section 170E at the end.

New subsection 170E(a) contains definitions. Paragraph

170E(a)(1) defines ‘‘sensitive radioactive material.’’ This language is

broadly written to comprise material which could be used by a terrorist in a radiological dispersal device, or material that in any

other way could threaten the health or safety of the public due to

its radiological properties. It is the committee’s intent primarily to

improve protections on those radioactive materials that are in common industrial, medical, or research applications. The committee

specifically urges the task force to carefully examine protections on

source material, byproduct material or special nuclear material

which is stored in a sealed container to prevent leakage (otherwise

known as ‘‘sealed sources’’) and any other types of radioactive material that NRC license holders have reported lost or stolen. The

committee also specifically encourages the task force to consider radioactive materials that are not currently regulated by the United

States for their radioactive properties, such as naturally occurring

or accelerator produced radioactive materials (NORM).

New subsection 170E(b) expands the duties of the task force established under new section 170C(b), above, to include evaluation

of sensitive radiological material. It delineates the additional matters the task force should consider. The committee is aware that

there are a broad range of radioactive materials in public use and

not all present a significant threat to public health. As such, this

subsection requires the task force to identify and categorize those

materials that should be classified as sensitive radioactive material. The committee expects that the development of improved security recommendations under this section will be based on this categorization, providing the greatest security to those categories of

sensitive radiological material which present the greatest threat. In

developing recommendations for methods to ensure the return and

proper disposal of sensitive radiological materials required in paragraph 170E(b)(F), the task force may consider financial incentives

for achieving this goal.

New subsection 170E(c) requires periodic reports to the President

and Congress describing administrative and legislative actions recommended by the task force.

New subsection 170E(d) requires the NRC to take such actions

as are appropriate to revise the system for licensing radioactive

materials and to ensure that States have entered into appropriate

agreements establishing compatible programs.

Sec. 8. Unauthorized Introduction of Dangerous Weapons

This section expands section 229a of the Atomic Energy Act to

include facilities, installations or real property subject to the licensing or certification authority of the NRC.
10

This would allow NRC to apply the provisions of section 229a to

NRC licensed or certified activities, thereby allowing the NRC to

prohibit a person who has not obtained prior authorization from

carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be introduced any weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrumentality into any facility, installation or real property regulated or

subject to certification by the NRC. This provision was included at

the request of the NRC, and is similar to language that passed this

committee and the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.

Sec. 9. Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel

This section amends section 236a of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954 to expand existing Federal criminal sanctions for sabotage or

attempted sabotage of production or utilization facilities to include

sabotage or attempted sabotage during the construction stage of

those facilities, if the damage could affect public health and safety

during facility operation. This section also expands the sanctions to

include sabotage or attempted sabotage of operating fuel fabrication facilities. This provision was included at the request of the

NRC, and is similar to language that was reported from the committee and passed the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.

Sec. 10. Evaluation of Adequacy of Enforcement Provisions

This section requires the Attorney General and the NRC to submit to Congress a report that assesses the adequacy of the criminal

enforcement provisions in Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Sec. 11. Protection of Whistleblowers

This section amends section 212(a) of the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974 to extend whistleblower protection to NRC contractors

and subcontractors.

Sec. 12. Technical and Conforming Amendment

This section provides technical and conforming amendments.

Sec. 13. Authorization of Appropriations

This section provides that there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On November 1, 2001, the committee held an oversight hearing

on nuclear security. On November 29, 2001, Senators Reid, Clinton,

Lieberman, Jeffords and Torricelli introduced S. 1746. It was referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works. The

committee held a hearing on June 5, 2002. The committee held a

classified hearing on June 20, 2002. On July 25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746. The committee voted to report the

bill to the Senate with amendments. Sections 6, 8 and 9 of the bill

as agreed to are similar to provisions reported by the committee

and passed the Senate in S. 1626 in the 106th Congress.

HEARINGS

On November 1, 2001, the Committee on Environment and Public Works recieved testimony concerning infrastructure security,
11

recieving testimony from Michael Brown, Deputy Director, Federal

Emergency Management Agency; Joe Moravec, Commissioner, Public Building Service, General Services Administration; Dr. David

Sampson, Assistant Secretary for Economic Development, Economic

Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; Dr.

Richard Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Herbert Mitchell, Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance,

Small Business Administration; and Marianne L. Horinko, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,

Environmental Protection Agency.

On June 5, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public

Works held a hearing to receive testimony on S. 1586, a bill to

amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the carrying of

firearms by employees of licensees, and for other purposes, and S.

1746, a bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to strengthen

security at sensitive nuclear facilities. For this hearing the witnesses were Hon. Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representative from

Massaschusetts; Hon. Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Chairman,

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; David Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety

Engineer, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, DC; Jack

Skolds, Chief Nuclear Officer, Excelon Corp., Washington, DC;

Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government Oversight, Washington, DC; Donna J. Hastie, Emergency Planning Consultant, Marrietta, GA; and Irwin Redlener, M.D., F.A.A.P., President, Children’s Health Fund, New York, NY.

On June 20, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public

Works held a classified hearing, receiving testimony from Federal

Government witnesses.

ROLLCALL VOTES

On July 25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746. The bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Senators Reid, Smith, Jeffords, Inhofe, Clinton, and Lieberman was

adopted for purpose of further amendment. An amendment offered

by Senator Smith, two amendments offered by Senator Clinton,

and an amendment offered by Senator Reid were agreed to by voice

vote. The committee voted by voice vote to report the bill, as

amended, to the Senate.

REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT

In compliance with section 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing

Rules of the Senate, the committee finds that S. 1746 does not create any significant additional regulatory burdens, nor will it cause

any adverse impact on the personal privacy of individuals.

MANDATES ASSESSMENT

In compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

(P.L. 104–4), the committee finds that the bill may require additional costs to the NRC, part of which may be passed along to ratepayers under existing law. The committee believes that such costs

have been kept to the minimum necessary to ensure adequate security at sensitive nuclear facilities and adequate protection of sensitive nuclear materials. There will not be significant additional

costs to State and local governments.
12

COST OF LEGISLATION

Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act requires that a statement of the cost of the reported bill,

prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, be included in the report. That statement follows:

U.S. CONGRESS,

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,

Washington, DC, October 25, 2002.

Hon. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Chairman,

Committee on Environment and Public Works,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1746, the Nuclear Security

Act of 2002.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Lisa Cash Driskill, who

can be reached at 226–2860.

Sincerely,

DAN L. CRIPPEN.

Nuclear Security Act of 2002, as ordered reported by the Senate

Committee on Environment and Public Works on July 25, 2002

Summary

S. 1746 would establish several new security programs for the

nation’s nuclear infrastructure. Programs would include Federal security coordinators for designated nuclear facilities, antiterrorism

teams to protect nuclear facilities, mock terrorism drills, new rules

on security compliance at nuclear facilities, and a program to classify, track, and monitor radioactive sources throughout the country.

Based on information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC), CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a

gross cost of $486 million over the 2003–2007 period. However, the

NRC has the authority to offset a substantial portion of its annual

appropriation with fees charged to the facilities it regulates. Accounting for such collections, CBO estimates that implementing S.

1746 would result in a net cost of $126 million over the 2003–2007

period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.

The bill also would require all employees at nuclear facilities to

undergo background checks. Because the Department of Justice

(DOJ) would charge the applicant a fee to offset the cost of background checks required by the bill, we estimate that this provision

would have a negligible impact on direct spending.

In addition, S. 1746 would establish new criminal penalties for

the sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste storage facilities and for noncompliance with certain employee background

checks that would be established by the bill. CBO estimates that

these penalties would increase revenues and subsequent direct

spending of those collections by less than $500,000 a year.

S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-sector

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

(UMRA) by:
13

• Effectively increasing the annual fees collected from NRC licensees; • Requiring new security standards and procedures at sensitive

nuclear facilities; and • Expanding the system for licensing sensitive radioactive materials.

Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not available,

CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of all mandates

contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that the costs to the

private sector would likely exceed the annual threshold for privatesector mandates ($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation) in fiscal year 2004, primarily because of the increase in annual fees imposed on NRC licensees. CBO expects that the aggregate costs to public entities of all mandates would not exceed the

intergovernmental threshold ($58 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation).

Estimated Cost to the Federal Government

The estimated budgetary impact of S. 1746 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 270 (energy) and 750 (administration of justice).

Basis of Estimate

For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by

the end of calender year 2002, that the necessary amounts will be

appropriated for each year, and that outlays will occur at historical

rates for similar programs.

Spending Subject to Appropriation

S. 1746 would establish several new security programs to be implemented at the nation’s sensitive nuclear facilities, including creating antiterrorism teams, running mock terrorism drills, and establishing Federal security coordinators at each site. For this estimate, we assume that 84 commercial nuclear sites in 35 States

would meet the bill’s definition of a ‘‘sensitive nuclear facility’’ and

thus would be subject to its requirements. In addition, the bill

would require the registration and tracking of radioactive material,

several new Federal rules concerning nuclear security, and it would

establish a training and grant program for the National Guard and

State and local law enforcement personnel.

By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION1

Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities:

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 73 88 64 64 64

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 58 85 69 64 64

National Guard and Law Enforcement Training:

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 11 17 14 14 14

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 9 16 15 14 14

Sensitive Radioactive Materials:

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 9 17 10 8 8

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 7 15 11 8 8
14

By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Security and Emergency Response Plan Review:.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 8 9 1 1 1

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 6 9 3 1 1

Security Rulemakings:.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 3 3 1 1 1

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 2 3 1 1 1

Estimated Gross Authorizations for the NRC under S. 1746:.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... 104 134 90 88 88

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... 83 128 99 88 88

Offsetting Collections2.

Estimated Authorization Level .................................................... ¥98 ¥124 ¥81 ¥29 ¥29

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... ¥98 ¥124 ¥81 ¥29 ¥29

Net New NRC Spending Under S. 1746:

Estimated Authorization Level1 ................................................... 6 11 9 59 59

Estimated Outlays ....................................................................... ¥15 5 18 59 59

Note: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

1 A full-year appropriation has not yet been enacted for the NRC; in 2002, the agency received a gross appropriation of $553 million, and

offsetting collections totaled $474 million. 2Collections are authorized at declining percentages of the NRC’s budget: 94 percent in 2003, 92 percent in 2004, 90 percent in 2005,

and 33 percent after 2005.

Based on information from the NRC and other Federal agencies,

CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a gross cost

of $486 million over the 2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation

of the necessary amounts. However, the NRC has the authority to

offset a substantial portion of its annual appropriation with fees

charged to facilities it regulates. After accounting for such collections, we estimate that the net cost of implementing S. 1746 would

be $126 million over the 2003–2007 period.

Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities. S. 1746 would

authorize funding for Federal antiterrorism teams, mock terrorism

teams, and security coordinators for the nuclear facilities covered

by the bill. We estimate that implementing these three programs

would have a gross cost of $340 million over the 2003–2007 period

for additional staff, equipment, training, and consulting.

Antiterrorism Teams. Although the bill does not specify the scope

of the antiterrorism teams, for this estimate, we assume the NRC

would establish 16 antiterrorism teams of 10 people each (four

teams for each of NRC’s four regions). Those teams would be

trained in local topography, geography, nuclear infrastructure, and

security tactics and would be available to respond to security incidents 24 hours a day. Based on information from the NRC, we estimate that it could cost as much as $500,000 per person, initially,

to provide such specialized training, equipment, and staff support.

We expect that annual costs would be reduced by half that amount

once the program is established. CBO estimates that implementing

this provision would have a gross cost of $232 million over the

2003–2007 period.

Federal Security Coordinators. S. 1746 also would require that

the NRC hire and train security coordinators to be stationed at

each of the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities that would be covered by

the bill. They would coordinate all security programs at the nuclear

facility. We expect that it would take NRC 1 year to issue rules

and establish this new program. We assume that the agency would

need 110 additional people to staff and manage the Federal secu-
15

rity coordinator program at a cost of $11 million a year beginning

in 2004 and that NRC would spend an additional $3 million a year

on training and equipment. CBO estimates that implementing this

provision would cost $54 million over the 2003–2007 period.

Mock Terrorism Teams. Under S. 1746, mock terrorism teams

would be deployed to perform security drills at each nuclear facility

every 3 years. We estimate that the NRC would establish a team

of 30 people to conduct such drills at a cost of about $3 million a

year. In addition, we estimate the NRC would need $10 million for

support personnel, equipment, and travel over the 2003–2004 period, and that the initial cost for training and equipment would

drop by about half after the teams are established. We also would

expect the NRC to contract with private security firms or the Department of Defense for staff support and assistance in designing

the drills at a cost of about $5 million per year. We estimate that

this program would cost $54 million over the 2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.

National Guard and Law Enforcement Training. S. 1746 would

require the President to establish a program to provide technical

assistance and training to the National Guard and State and local

law enforcement agencies to respond to threats against the nation’s

nuclear facilities. Under this program, we expect that the NRC

would provide training at each of the covered 84 nuclear facilities

four times a year at a cost of about $120,000 a year (or a total cost

of about $10 million per year). In addition, we expect that the 35

States with sensitive nuclear facilities would receive grants of

$100,000 per year for technical assistance and training. Assuming

appropriation of the necessary amounts, we estimate that implementing these training and assistance programs would cost on average $14 million a year.

Sensitive Radioactive Material. S. 1746 would require the NRC

to establish a program to register, track, and control sensitive radioactive material. Currently, the NRC spends about $1 million per

year to regulate certain radioactive material used for industrial

purposes. S. 1746 would significantly expand that program to include a wide variety of sources and uses of radioactive material.

Based on information from the NRC we estimate this program

would cost an average of $10 million per year for evaluating,

classifying, and tracking of such materials. Funds would be used

for establishing new computer programs, hiring of additional staff,

and auditing sites with radioactive materials. Overall, we estimate

that implementation of this program would cost about $50 million

over the 2003–2007 period.

Security and Emergency Response Plan Review. S. 1746 would require the NRC to review the emergency response plans for each of

the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities in the United States within 9

months of enactment and their security plans within 21 months of

enactment. In addition, the bill would require the NRC to conduct

emergency response exercises every 2 years at each facility. After

each review and exercise, the NRC would submit a report to the

Congress and work with the facilities on any necessary improvements to plans and procedures. Based on information from the

NRC, we estimate those reviews would require 60 additional staff

at a cost of about $6 million in 2003, and that costs would drop significantly in the following years as the reviews and follow-up in-
16

spections are completed. We estimate that the agency would need

about $3 million in 2003 and 2004 for travel and contract services

to accomplish the reviews in the timeframe established in the bill.

We estimate emergency response exercises would cost about $1 million a year. In total, we estimate that implementing the security

and emergency response plan reviews required by the bill would

cost $20 million over the 2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.

Security Rulemakings. S. 1746 would require the NRC to establish several new rules to enhance security at the nation’s nuclear

facilities. The rulemakings would cover threat levels and threats

that facilities would be required to defend, the coordination of Federal agencies during a nuclear threat or attack, background checks

for employees at nuclear facilities, and weapons policies for security

personnel at nuclear facilities. We estimate that the NRC would

need an additional 25 people at a cost of about $2.5 million a year

to complete these rulemakings over the 2003–2004 period. We expect that staff needs would diminish as the rulemakings are completed, thus reducing the cost to about $1 million per year. CBO

estimates all of these rulemakings would cost $8 million over the

2003–2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary

amounts.

Direct Spending and Revenues

CBO estimates that enacting S. 1746 would increase both offsetting receipts and direct spending of those receipts by $2.3 million

in 2003 for background checks on nuclear security personnel required by the bill; thus, the net budgetary impact of this requirement would be negligible. In addition, it would establish criminal

penalties for noncompliance with such background checks and penalties for the sabotage of nuclear facilities. We estimate that any

increase in penalties would be less than $500,000 per year.

Fingerprinting and Background Checks. S. 1746 would require

that all employees of covered nuclear facilities undergo

fingerprinting and background checks within 60 days of passage of

the bill. Such checks would be performed by the Department of

Justice. Based on information from DOJ, we expect most checks

would cost about $22 per person. On average, about 1,250 people

work at each of the 84 covered facilities. Because DOJ would

charge a fee of $22 for each person that applies for a background

check, we estimate that the agency would collect about $2.3 million

in 2003. DOJ is authorized to spend such fees without further appropriation, and we expect that most of the money would be spent

in the year in which it is collected. Thus, the net impact on DOJ

spending would be negligible.

Penalties. S. 1746 would strengthen the criminal penalties for the

sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste storage facilities and for noncompliance with the background checks established

by the bill. CBO estimates that enacting these new penalties would

increase governmental receipts by less than $500,000 a year. Any

criminal fines collected would be deposited in the Crime Victims

Fund and spent in subsequent years. Any resulting change in direct spending from the fund also would amount to less than

$500,000 annually.
17

Intergovernmental and Private-Sector Impact

S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-sector

mandates as defined in UMRA by:

• Effectively increasing the annual fees collected from NRC licensees; • Requiring new security standards and procedures at sensitive

nuclear facilities; and • Expanding the system for licensing sensitive radioactive materials.

Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not available,

CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of all mandates

contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that the costs to

public entities would not exceed the intergovernmental threshold

($58 million in 2002, adjusted annually for inflation), while the cost

to the private sector would likely exceed the annual threshold for

private-sector mandates ($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually

for inflation) in fiscal year 2004.

Increasing Annual Fees for NRC Licensees

Under current law, the NRC collects annual fees from its licensees, both public and private, to offset a major portion of its general

fund appropriation. Because S. 1746 would require the NRC to engage in a variety of initiatives to augment security at licensed facilities, CBO expects that additional fees would be collected from

the licensees to cover the cost of such initiatives. The duty to pay

those fee increases would be considered both a private-sector and

an intergovernmental mandate under UMRA, as it results in an increase in the cost of an existing mandate. Assuming an appropriation level of amounts necessary to cover the costs of the NRC’s security initiatives starting in 2003, CBO estimates that the increment in fees would total approximately $98 million in fiscal year

2003, $124 million in fiscal year 2004, $81 million in 2005, and

drop to around $29 million in subsequent fiscal years. Because less

than 5 percent of nuclear facilities are publicly owned, CBO estimates that the increase borne by public nuclear facilities would not

be significant.

Security Procedures at Sensitive Nuclear Facilities

S. 1746 would establish new security procedures for nuclear facilities in order to prevent acts of radiological sabotage and the

theft of special nuclear material. Accordingly, the bill would require

the NRC to promulgate rules revising:

• The threats sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against; • The threat levels at which each facility must operate; and • The hiring and training standards for employees of the facilities.

Compliance with each of the rules would constitute a mandate as

defined by UMRA. The extent of those mandates would be based

upon future actions of the NRC, which would track the recommendations of an interagency task force on nuclear infrastructure security. At this time, the NRC could not give any indication

as to the scope of the rules to be issued and accordingly, CBO cannot determine the cost of compliance.
18

In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued

interim security measures for sensitive nuclear facilities, while further analysis regarding future regulatory action was undertaken.

The interim measures, which included determinations as to the

types of threats nuclear facilities must protect against, became

binding prior to, or in August of this year for the vast majority of

sensitive nuclear facilities. In addition, the NRC issued voluntary

guidelines on the threat levels at which facilities could operate,

which parallel the threat levels established by the Office of Homeland Security. The NRC indicates that most, if not all, NRC licensees adopted those guidelines. According to representatives of the

nuclear industry, sensitive nuclear facilities have already spent

about $90 million to upgrade security to comply with the NRC’s interim security measures. To the extent that future security and

threat level regulations mirror those that are currently in place,

sensitive nuclear facilities would not bear substantial additional

costs associated with the mandate.

In addition, S. 1746 would require that employees of sensitive

nuclear facilities undergo more extensive background investigations

that would include checks of fingerprint records located in the National Crime Information Center data sets, the United States National Central Bureau of Interpol, the National Instant Criminal

Background Check system, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service data sets. Employees are currently fingerprinted for an

FBI criminal history check. According to the Department of Justice,

the incremental cost of the expanded check would be approximately

$22, and based upon the number of individuals employed by the industry, CBO estimates that the cost that would be borne directly

by licensees would be roughly $2.3 million in 2003.

Licensing System for Sensitive Nuclear Materials

The bill would require the NRC to revise and expand the system

for licensing certain radioactive materials, such as those used in industrial, medical, and research applications, based on the recommendations of an interagency task force. Information from the

NRC suggests that some regulatory changes for sensitive radioactive material are already underway and that the agency does not

intend to impose a heavy burden on the entities affected. Consequently, CBO expects that the costs relating to this mandate

would not be significant.

Estimate Prepared By: Federal Costs: Lisa Cash Driskill; Impact on

State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Angela Sietz; Impact on the

Private Sector: Lauren Marks.

Estimate Approved By: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
19

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS SMITH, INHOFE, VOINOVICH, AND

CHAFEE

We appreciate the leadership of the chairman to report out a bipartisan bill aimed at ensuring our nations nuclear power facilities

remain among the most secured commercial facilities in the world.

We believe that this bill takes important steps in achieving that

goal. We are pleased with the inclusion of S. 1586, sponsored by

Senators Inhofe and Smith, in the bill reported by the committee.

S. 1586, provides enhanced security authority that the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission has specifically requested for many years.

We note that in the 106th Congress a nearly identical bill to S.

1586 was reported out of this Committee and passed the Senate by

Unanimous Consent.

In the days following the committee ordering S. 1746 to be reported, the committee received detailed comments from the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission on the amended version of S. 1746. These

constructive comments identified specific areas where the bill

should be improved in order to maximize security without delaying

or impeding current security efforts already undertaken by the

NRC and its licensees. We believe these comments warrant our attention and consideration prior to S. 1746 being voted on by the

full Senate. It is our hope to continue to work with the chairman

and members of the Committee to improve S. 1746 in order to ensure that the goals we all support will be achieved in an effective

and timely manner. We thank the chairmen of the full committee

and subcommittee for their leadership and for the bipartisan manner in which they have undertaken this very important security

matter. We look forward to continuing to work in a bipartisan manner to adequately address issues that have been raised.
20

1This Act consists of the Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 724, as amended by the Act of Aug. 30,

1954, ch. 1073 (68 stat. 921) and by subsequent amendments. The Act appears generally in the

United States Code at 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq. Bracketed notes are used at the end of each section

for the convenience of the reader to indicate the United States Code citation.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules

of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill as reported

are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in [black brackets], new matter is printed in italic, existing

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 1

An Act for the development and control of atomic energy.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled,

* * * * * * *

TITLE I—ATOMIC ENERGY

CHAPTER 1. DECLARATION, FINDINGS, AND PURPOSE

Sec. 1. Declaration.

* * * * * * *

Sec. 149A. Access to nuclear facilities.

* * * * * * *

Sec. 170B. Uranium supply.

Sec. 170C. Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities.

Sec. 170D. Carrying of weapons.

Sec. 170E. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security.

* * * * * *

*

CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS

SEC. 11. DEFINITION.—The intent of Congress in the definitions

as given in this section should be construed from the words or

phrases used in the definitions. As used in this Act:

a. The term ‘‘agency of the United States’’ means the executive

branch of the United States, or any Government agency, or the legislative branch of the United States, or any agency, committee,

commission, office, or other establishment in the legislative branch,

or the judicial branch of the United States, or any office, agency,

committee, commission, or other establishment in the judicial

branch.

* * * * * * *

øjj.¿ ii. LEGAL COSTS.—As used in section 170, the term ‘‘legal

costs’’ means the costs incurred by a plaintiff or a defendant in initiating, prosecuting, investigating, settling, or defending claims or

suits for damage arising under such section.

(jj) HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICER.—The term ‘‘Homeland Security Officer’’ means a Federal official with responsibility for coordi-
21

nating efforts to maintain homeland security against acts of terrorism, and designated by the President to perform the duties of the

Homeland Security Officer under this Act.

(kk) PRIVATE SECURITY FORCE.—The term ‘‘private security

force’’, with respect to a sensitive nuclear facility, means personnel

hired or contracted by the licensee of the sensitive nuclear facility

to provide security at the sensitive nuclear facility.

(ll) SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘sensitive nuclear facility’’

means a facility licensed by the Commission (or the portion of

a facility used in the conduct of an activity licensed by the Commission).

(2) INCLUSIONS.—The term ‘‘sensitive nuclear facility’’

includes—

(A) an operating commercial nuclear power plant;

(B) an independent spent fuel storage facility;

(C) a commercial nuclear power plant that is being decommissioned or a portion of a commercial nuclear power

plant that contains material licensed by the Commission;

(D) a category I fuel cycle facility; and

(E) a gaseous diffusion plant.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 149. FINGERPRINTING FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD

CHECKS.—

øa. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Commission’’) shall require each licensee or applicant for a license to operate a utilization facility under section 103

or 104 b. to fingerprint each individual who is permitted

unescorted access to the facility or is permitted access to safeguards information under section 147. All fingerprints obtained by

a licensee or applicant as required in the preceding sentence shall

be submitted to the Attorney General of the United States through

the Commission for identification and a criminal history records

check. The costs of any identification and records check conducted

pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be paid by the licensee or

applicant. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General may provide all the results of the search of the Commission, and, in accordance with regulations prescribed under this

section, the Commission may provide such results to the licensee

or applicant submitting such fingerprints.

øb. The Commission, by rule, may relieve persons from the obligations imposed by this section, upon specified terms, conditions,

and periods, if the Commission finds that such action is consistent

with its obligations to promote the common defense and security

and to protect the health and safety of the public.¿

a. FINGERPRINTING AND BACKGROUND CHECKS

(1) IN GENERAL—The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (referred to in this section as the ‘Commission’) shall require the

fingerprinting of each individual that is permitted—

(A) unescorted access to a facility, activity, radioactive

material, or property; or

(B) access to safeguards information under section 147.
22

(2) PERFORMANCE OF FINGERPRINTING.—The Commission

shall require fingerprinting under paragraph (1) to be performed by—

(A) a person that is licensed or certified by the Commission;

(B) a person that is an applicant for a license or certificate; and

(C) a person that is otherwise permitted— (i) to operate a utilization facility under section

103 or 104b.; or

(ii) to possess, use or transport— (I) radioactive material; or

(II) other property regulated by the Commission and determined by the Commission to be of

significance to the public health and safety or the

common defense and security.

(3) REPETITION OF FINGERPRINTING.—Fingerprinting shall

be repeated for each individual described in paragraph (1) at

least once every 5 years.

(4) SUBMISSION OF FINGERPRINTS— (A) IN GENERAL.—A licensee, certificate holder, or applicant shall submit to the Attorney General, through the

Commission, all fingerprints obtained under paragraph

(2)— (i) for identification and comparison against all

categories of individuals whose fingerprints appear

in— (I) the National Crime Information Center

data sets;

(II) the United States National Central Bureau of Interpol;

(III) the National Instant Criminal Background Check system; and

(IV) the Immigration and Naturalization Service data sets (including the Student and Exchange

Visitor Information System); and

(ii) for use to conduct a criminal history background check to determine past criminal history and

any outstanding arrest warrants on record with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(B) COST.—The cost of a background check conducted

under this paragraph shall be paid by the licensee, certificate holder, or applicant.

(C) PROVISION OF RESULTS.—

(i) ATTORNEY GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any

other provision of law, the Attorney General shall provide the pertinent results of the search to the Commission.

(ii) THE COMMISSION.—In accordance with regulations promulgated under this section, the Commission

may provide a licensee, certificate holder, or applicant

submitting the fingerprints the results of an identification and record check under this paragraph.

b. RELIEF FROM OBLIGATIONS.—
23

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission may, by regulation, relieve any person from the obligations imposed by this section,

under terms and conditions and for periods of time specified by

the Commission, if the Commission determines that the provision of relief is consistent with the responsibilities of the

Commission— (A) to promote the common defense and security; and

(B) to protect the health and safety of the public.

(2) REQUIREMENTS OF ANOTHER AGENCY.—A person that is

subject to the fingerprinting requirements of another agency of

the United States shall not be subject to the obligations imposed

by this section, if the Commission determines that those

fingerprinting requirements afford security protection similar to

that resulting from the application of this section.

c. For purposes of administering this section, the Commission

shall prescribe, subject to public notice and comment, regulations— (1) to implement procedures for the taking of fingerprints;

(2) to establish the conditions for use of information received from the Attorney General, in order— (A) to limit the redissemination of such information;

ø(B) to ensure that such information is used solely for

the purpose of determining whether an individual shall be

permitted unescorted access to the facility of a licensee or

applicant or shall be permitted access to safeguards information under section 147;¿

(B) to ensure that the information is used solely for the

purpose of determining whether an individual shall be permitted access to a facility or radioactive material or property of a licensee, certificate holder, or applicant, or shall

be permitted access to safeguards information under section

147;

(C) to ensure that no final determination may be made

solely on the basis of information provided under this section involving—

(i) an arrest more than 1 year old for which there

is no information of the disposition of the case; or

(ii) an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the

charge or an acquittal; and

(D) to protect individuals subject to fingerprinting

under this section from misuse of the criminal history

records; and

(3) to provide each individual subject to fingerprinting

under this section with the right to complete, correct, and explain information contained in the criminal history records

prior to any final adverse determination.

d. (1) The Commission may establish and collect fees to process

fingerprints and criminal history records under this section.

(2) Notwithstanding section 3302(b) of title 31, United States

Code, and to the extent approved in appropriation Acts—

(A) a portion of the amounts collected under this subsection in any fiscal year may be retained and used by the

Commission to carry out this section; and

(B) the remaining portion of the amounts collected under

this subsection in such fiscal year may be transferred periodi-
24

cally to the Attorney General and used by the Attorney General to carry out this section.

(3) Any amount made available for use under paragraph (2)

shall remain available until expended.

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 14. GENERAL AUTHORITY

SEC. 161. GENERAL PROVISIONS.—* * *

* * * * * * *

øk. authorize such of its members, officers, and employees

as it deems necessary in the interest of the common defense

and security to carry firearms while in the discharge of their

official duties. The Commission may also authorize such of

those employees of its contractors and subcontractors (at any

tier) engaged in the protection of property under the jurisdiction of the United States and located at facilities owned by or

contracted to the United States or being transported to or from

such facilities as it deems necessary in the interests of the

common defense and security to carry firearms while in the

discharge of their official duties. A person authorized to carry

firearms under this subsection may, while in the performance

of, and in connection with, official duties, make arrests without

warrant for any offense against the United States committed

in that person’s presence or for any felony cognizable under the

laws of the United States if that person has reasonable

grounds to believe that the individual to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony. An employee of a contractor or subcontractor authorized to carry firearms under

this subsection may make such arrests only when the individual to be arrested is within, or in direct flight from, the area

of such offense. A person granted authority to make arrests by

this subsection may exercise that authority only in the enforcement of (1) laws regarding the property of the United States

in the custody of the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or a contractor of the Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or (2) any provision of

this Act that may subject an offender to a fine, imprisonment,

or both. The arrest authority conferred by this subsection is in

addition to any arrest authority under other laws. The Secretary, with the approval of the Attorney General, shall issue

guidelines to implement this subsection;¿

k. authorize— (1) to carry a firearm in the performance of official duties

such of its members, officers, and employees, such of the employees of its contractors and subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in the protection of property under the jurisdiction of the

United States located at facilities owned by or contracted to the

United States or being transported to or from such facilities,

and such of the employees of persons licensed or certified by the

Commission (including employees of contractors of licensees or

certificate holders) engaged in the protection of facilities owned

or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder that

are designated by the Commission or in the protection of prop-
25

erty of significance to the common defense and security located

at facilities owned or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder or being transported to or from such facilities, as

the Commission considers necessary, in view of site-specific conditions, in the interest of the common defense and security; and

(2) to carry and use any other weapons, devices, or ammunition in the performance of officials duties, any employees of

persons licensed or certified by the Commission (including employees of contractors of licensees or certificate holders) who are

trained and qualified as guards and whose duty is the protection of facilities or property described in paragraph (1), regardless of whether the employees are Federal, State, or local law

enforcement officers;

* * * * * * *

SEC. 170C. PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ANTITERRORISM TEAM.—The term ‘antiterrorism team’ means the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team established under subsection (h).

(2) FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATOR.—The term ‘Federal

security coordinator’ means the Federal security coordinator assigned to a sensitive nuclear facility under subsection (k).

(3) TASK FORCE.—The term ‘task force’ means the task force

on nuclear infrastructure security established by subsection (b).

(4) THREAT.—The term ‘threat’ means a threat identified

under subsection (c).

(5) THREAT LEVEL.—The term ‘threat level’ means a threat

level determined under subsection (d).

(b) TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY.— (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a task force on

nuclear infrastructure security.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The task force shall be comprised of— (A) the chairman of the Commission, who shall serve

as chairperson of the task force;

(B) the Secretary of Defense;

(C) the Secretary of Transportation;

(D) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency;

(E) the Attorney General;

(F) the Secretary of State;

(G) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;

(H) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;

(I) the Director of the Federal Emergency Management

Agency; and

(J) the Homeland Security Officer.

(3) DUTIES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The task force, in consultation with

other Federal, State, and local agencies, stakeholders, and

members of the public, as appropriate, shall examine the

protection of sensitive nuclear facilities from potential terrorist threats.

(B) SECURITY REVIEW.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall examine—
26

(I) the classification of threats as— (aa) an act— (AA) by an enemy of the United States

(whether a foreign government or other

person); or

(BB) otherwise falling under the responsibilities of the Federal Government;

or

(bb) an act involving a type of risk that

the licensees of the Commission should be responsible for guarding against;

(II) coordination of Federal, State, and local

security efforts for protection of land, water, and

ground access to sensitive nuclear facilities in the

event of a terrorist attack or attempted terrorist attack;

(III) the adequacy of existing emergency planning zones to protect the public health and safety

in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive

nuclear facility;

(IV) the adequacy and coordination of Federal,

State, and local emergency planning, evacuation,

and other measures to protect the public health

and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against

a sensitive nuclear facility;

(V) the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities

must protect against to prevent acts of radiological

sabotage and theft of special nuclear material;

(VI) the system of threat levels, consistent with

the Homeland Security Advisory System, used to

categorize the threats against a sensitive nuclear

facility, including— (aa) procedures to ensure coordinated Federal, State, and local responses to changing

threat levels for sensitive nuclear facilities;

(bb) monitoring of threats against sensitive nuclear facilities; and

(cc) procedures to notify licensees of a sensitive nuclear facility of changes in threat levels;

(VII) the development, implementation, and revision of security plans for sensitive nuclear facilities;

(VIII) the establishment of the antiterrorism

team under subsection (h);

(IX) the hiring and training standards for

members of private security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities, in accordance with subsection (i);

(X) the coordination of Federal resources to expedite and improve the process of performing background checks on employees with access to sensitive nuclear facilities; and

(XI) the creation of a program to provide technical assistance and training for the national
27

guard, State law enforcement agencies, and local

law enforcement agencies to respond, as appropriate, to threats against a sensitive nuclear facility, including recommendations for the establishment of a grant program for State and local governments to carry out any recommended requirements under this section.

(ii) THREATS.—The threats to be examined

include—

(I) threats comparable to the events of September 11, 2001;

(II) cyber or biochemical threats;

(III) attacks on a sensitive nuclear facility by

multiple coordinated teams of a large number of

individuals;

(IV) attacks from several persons employed at

the sensitive nuclear facility, some of whom may

have sophisticated knowledge of the operations of

the sensitive nuclear facility;

(V) attacks from individuals willing to commit

suicide to carry out the attacks;

(VI) water-based and air-based attacks;

(VII) attacks using explosive devises of considerable size and modern weaponry;

(VIII) fire, especially fire of long duration; and

(IX) any combination of those threats.

(4) REPORT.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the

date of enactment of this section, the task force shall submit

to the President and Congress, in classified form and unclassified form, a report with recommendations and findings.

(B) REVISION.—The task force shall revise the recommendations periodically, but not less than once every 3

years.

(c) THREATS TO SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 150 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and consistent with

the findings and recommendations of the task force, identifying

the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against

to prevent acts of radiological sabotage and the theft of special

nuclear material at sensitive nuclear facilities.

(2) PROTECTION OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.—In promulgating regulations under this subsection, the Commission shall

ensure protection of safeguards information in accordance with

section 147.

(d) THREAT LEVELS.—Not later than 150 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission

shall promulgate regulations, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force, establishing a system

for the determination of multiple threat levels to describe the threat

conditions at sensitive nuclear facilities.

(e) SECURITY PLANS.—
28

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on

which the Commission establishes the threats under subsection

(c), the Commission shall review, based on and consistent with

the findings and recommendations of the task force, the security

plan for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure that each sensitive nuclear facility protects against those threats.

(2) ASPECTS OF REVIEW.—The Commission shall ensure

that the security plan provides for— (A) the deployment and capabilities of the private security force at the sensitive nuclear facility for each threat

level;

(B) coordination between the private security force and

the antiterrorism team for the sensitive nuclear facility, as

appropriate for each threat level;

(C) secure operation of vital equipment, such as control

room equipment and backup warning systems;

(D) access restrictions;

(E) security cameras, fire protection barriers, and other

physical security measures;

(F) protection of spent fuel, including options such as

placement of spent fuel in dry cask storage;

(G) background security checks for employees and prospective employees; and

(H) coordination among licensees of sensitive nuclear

facilities and appropriate Federal, state, and local emergency response personnel.

(3) SCHEDULE.—The Commission shall establish a priority

schedule for conducting reviews of security plans based on the

vulnerability of each sensitive nuclear facility and the proximity

of the sensitive nuclear facility to large population areas.

(4) FINDINGS.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the review of each security plan, the Commission shall submit to

Congress and the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility

recommendations, findings, and a schedule for implementation of changes to security that shall be made not later

than 18 months after completion of the review of the security plan.

(B) FORM.—The report submitted to Congress under

subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.

(5) UPGRADES TO SECURITY PLAN.—Not later than 30 days

after the review of each security plan, the Commission shall ensure that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility revises,

as necessary, its security plan consistent with the findings

under paragraph (4).

(6) UPGRADES TO SECURITY.—The Commission shall ensure

that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility makes any

changes to security required by the security plan according to

the Commission schedule.

(f) EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 150 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission shall review, based on and consistent with the findings
29

and recommendations of the task force, the emergency response

plans for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure that each

emergency response plan provides protection for persons living

in the emergency response planning zones.

(2) ASPECTS OF REVIEW.—The Commission shall ensure

that each emergency response plan provides for—

(A) the protection of public health and safety, including

the ability to implement protective measures;

(B) clear definition and assignment of responsibilities

of emergency response personnel;

(C) notification procedures;

(D) communication and coordination among emergency

response personnel;

(E) dissemination of information to the public, including both pre-emergency education and in the event of a radiological emergency;

(F) adequate emergency facilities and equipment at

and around the sensitive nuclear facility;

(G) the use of methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential impacts of a radiological emergency;

(H) appropriate evacuation and sheltering and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide;

(I) means for controlling radiological exposures;

(J) appropriate medical services;

(K) plans for recovery and reentry; and

(L) radiological emergency response training.

(3) SCHEDULE.—The Commission shall establish a priority

schedule for conducting reviews of emergency response plans for

sensitive nuclear facilities based on the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive nuclear facilities and the proximity of

sensitive nuclear facilities to large population areas.

(4) FINDINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the review of each emergency response plan, the Commission

shall submit to Congress and the licensee of each sensitive

nuclear facility recommendations and findings.

(B) FORM.—The report submitted to Congress under

subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form.

(5) UPGRADES TO EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN.—Not later

than 30 days after completion of the review of each emergency

response plan, the Commission shall ensure that the licensee of

each sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, the emergency response plan for the sensitive nuclear facility consistent

with the findings under paragraph (4).

(g) FEDERAL COORDINATION.—Not later than 90 days after the

task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and consistent with the

findings and recommendations of the task force, establishing the

circumstances under which the Commission shall request the President to—

(1) deploy the Coast Guard to a sensitive nuclear facility;
30

(2) provide for the protection of air space in the vicinity of

a sensitive nuclear facility; or

(3) deploy the antiterrorism team.

(h) NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE ANTITERRORISM TEAM.— (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 1 year after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the President

shall establish, based on and consistent with the findings and

recommendations of the task force, the Nuclear Infrastructure

Antiterrorism Team.

(2) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the antiterrorism team shall

be to provide protection for the perimeter of sensitive nuclear facilities against the threats identified under subsection (c), in coordination with other Federal, State, local, and private entities,

as appropriate, consistent with the security plan for each sensitive nuclear facility.

(i) TRAINING PROGRAM.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4)(B), the President shall establish, based on and consistent with findings and

recommendations of the task force, a program to provide technical assistance and training for the National Guard and State

and local law enforcement agencies in responding to threats

against a sensitive nuclear facility.

(2) GRANTS.—The President may provide grants, consistent

with the findings and recommendations of the task force, to

State and local governments to assist in carrying out this section.

(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out

this subsection.

(j) EMPLOYEE SECURITY.— (1) REVIEW.—Not later than 90 days after the task force

submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission, taking into consideration recommendations of the task force, shall

review and update the hiring and training standards for employees of a sensitive nuclear facility.

(2) DISQUALIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS THAT PRESENT NA- TIONAL SECURITY RISKS.—The Commission, based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task force,

shall establish qualifications and procedures, in addition to any

background check conducted under section 149, to ensure that

no individual that presents a threat to national security is employed at a sensitive nuclear facility.

(k) FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATORS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the task

force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the Commission, based on and consistent with findings and recommendations of the task force, shall promulgate regulations for the hiring and training of Federal security coordinators.

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATORS.— Not later than 60 days after the Commission promulgates regulations under paragraph (1), the Commission shall assign a

Federal security coordinator, under the employment of the Commission, at each sensitive nuclear facility.
31

(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Federal security coordinator

shall be responsible for—

(A) communicating with the Commission and other

Federal, State, and local authorities concerning threats, including threats against the sensitive nuclear facility;

(B) ensuring that the sensitive nuclear facility maintains security consistent with the security plan in accordance with the appropriate threat level; and

(C) ensuring full and active coordination of security

measures among—

(i) the private security force at the sensitive nuclear

facility;

(ii) the antiterrorism team; and

(iii) other Federal, State, and local authorities, as

appropriate.

(l) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Nothing in this section shall be

construed to supersede any existing law (including a regulation)

governing the disclosure of classified information or safeguards information.

SEC. 170D. CARRYING OF WEAPONS.

(a) AUTHORITY TO MAKE ARREST.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A person authorized under section 161k.

to carry a firearm, other weapon, device, or ammunition may,

while in the performance of, and in connection with, official duties, detain or arrest an individual without a warrant for any

offense against the United States committed in the presence of

the person or for any felony under the laws of the United States

if the person has a reasonable ground to believe that the individual has committed or is committing such a felony.

(2) LIMITATION.—An employee of a contractor or subcontractor or of a Commission licensee or certificate holder (or a

contractor of a licensee or certificate holder) authorized to make

an arrest under paragraph (1) may make an arrest only after

the Commission, licensee, or certificate holder has applied for

and been granted authorization from the Commission—

(A) when the individual is within, or is in flight directly from, the area in which the offense was committed;

and

(B) in the enforcement of—

(i) a law regarding the property of the United

States in the custody of the Department of Energy, the

Commission, or a contractor of the Department of Energy or Commission or a licensee or certificate holder

of the Commission;

(ii) a law applicable to facilities owned or operated

by a Commission licensee or certificate holder that are

designated by the Commission under section 161k.;

(iii) a law applicable to property of significance to

the common defense and security that is in the custody

of a licensee or certificate holder or a contractor of a

licensee or certificate holder of the Commission; or

(iv) any provision of this Act that subjects an offender to a fine, imprisonment, or both.
32

(3) OTHER AUTHORITY.—The arrest authority conferred by

this section is in addition to any arrest authority under other

law.

(4) GUIDELINES— (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary and the Commission,

with the approval of the Attorney General, shall issue

guidelines to implement section 161k. and this subsection.

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The authority to carry and use

weapons, devices, or ammunition provided to employees described in section 161k.(2) and the authority provided to

those employees under this subsection shall not be effective

until the date on which guidelines issued under subparagraph (A) become effective.

SEC. 170E. SENSITIVE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SECURITY.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) SENSITIVE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘sensitive radioactive material’ means— (i) a material— (I) that is a source material, byproduct material, or special nuclear material; and

(II) that is any other radioactive material (regardless of whether the material is or has been licensed or otherwise regulated under this Act) produced or made radioactive before or after the date

of enactment of this section; and

(ii) that is in such a form or quantity or concentration that the Commission determines, based on and

consistent with the recommendations of the task force,

should be classified as ‘sensitive radioactive material’ that warrants improved security and protection against

loss, theft, or sabotage.

(B) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘sensitive radioactive material’ does not include nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel.

(2) SECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘security threat’ means— (A) a threat of sabotage or theft of sensitive radioactive

material;

(B) a threat of use of sensitive radioactive material in

a radiological dispersal device; and

(C) any other threat of terrorist or other criminal activity involving sensitive radioactive material that could harm

the health or safety of the public due primarily to radiological properties of the sensitive radioactive material, as

determined by the Commission based on and consistent

with the recommendations of the task force.

(3) TASK FORCE.—The term ‘task force’ has the meaning

given the term in section 170C(a).

(b) DUTIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall—

(A) evaluate the security of sensitive radioactive material against security threats; and

(B) recommend administrative and legislative actions

to be taken to provide the maximum practicable degree of

security against security threats.
33

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the

task force shall make recommendations to—

(A) determine the radioactive materials that should be

classified as sensitive radioactive materials;

(B) develop a classification system for sensitive radioactive materials that—

(i) is based on the potential for use by terrorists of

sensitive radioactive material and the extent of the

threat to public health and safety posed by that potential; and

(ii) takes into account—

(I) radioactivity levels of sensitive radioactive

material;

(II) the dispersibility of sensitive radioactive

material;

(III) the chemical and material form of sensitive radioactive material; and

(IV) other appropriate factors;

(C) develop a national system for recovery of sensitive

radioactive material that is lost or stolen, taking into account the classification system established under subparagraph (B);

(D) provide for the storage of sensitive radioactive material that is not currently in use in a safe and secure manner;

(E) develop a national tracking system for sensitive radioactive material, taking into account the classification

system established under subparagraph (B);

(F) develop methods to ensure the return or proper disposal of sensitive radioactive material;

(G) modify current export controls on sensitive radioactive materials so that, to the extent feasible, exports from

the United States of sensitive radioactive materials are

made only to foreign recipients that are willing and able to

control the sensitive radioactive materials in the same manner as recipients in the United States; and

(H) establish procedures to improve the security of sensitive radioactive material in use, transportation, and storage.

(3) PROCEDURES TO IMPROVE SECURITY.—The procedures to

improve the security of sensitive radioactive material under

paragraph (2)(H) may include—

(A) periodic audits or inspections by the Commission to

ensure that sensitive radioactive material is properly secured and can be fully accounted for;

(B) evaluation by the Commission of security measures

taken by persons that possess sensitive radioactive material;

(C) imposition of increased fines for violations of regulations relating to security and safety measures applicable

to licensees that possess sensitive radioactive material;

(D) conduct of background checks on individuals with

access to sensitive radioactive material;
34

(E) measures to ensure the physical security of facilities

in which sensitive radioactive material is stored; and

(F) screening of shipments of sensitive radioactive material to facilities that are particularly at risk for sabotage

to ensure that the shipments do not contain explosives.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment

of this section, and not less frequently than once every 3 years thereafter, the task force shall submit to the President and Congress a

report in unclassified form (with a classified annex, if necessary) describing the administrative and legislative actions recommended

under subsection (b)(1).

(d) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.—Not later than 60 days after the

date of submission of the report under subsection (b), the Commission shall, based on and consistent with the recommendations of the

task force, take such actions as are appropriate to— (1) revise the system for licensing sensitive radioactive materials based on and consistent with the recommendations of the

task force; and

(2) ensure that States that have entered into an agreement

under section 274b. establish compatible programs in a timely

manner.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 229. TRESPASS UPON COMMISSION INSTALLATIONS.— a. The Commission is authorized to issue regulations relating to the entry upon or carrying, transporting, or otherwise

introducing or causing to be introduced any dangerous weapons, explosive, or other dangerous instrument or material likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or property, into or upon any facility, installation, or real property

subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or in the custody of

the Commission. Every such regulation of the Commission

shall be posted conspicuously at the location involved or subject

to the licensing authority of the Commission or to certification

by the Commission under this Act or any other Act.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 236. SABOTAGE OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES OR FUEL.—

a. Any person who intentionally and willfully destroys or

causes physical damage to, or øwho intentionally and willfully attempts¿ or who attempts or conspires to destroy or cause physical

damage to—

(1) any production facility or utilization facility licensed

under this Act;

(2) any nuclear waste østorage facility¿ storage, treatment,

or disposal facility licensed under this Act;

(3) any nuclear fuel for such a utilization facility, or any

spent nuclear fuel from such a facility; øor¿

(4) any uranium enrichment øfacility licensed¿ a utilization facility licensed under this Act by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commissionø.¿ ; or

(5) any production, utilization, waste storage, waste treatment, waste disposal, uranium enrichment, or nuclear fuel fabrication facility subject to licensing or certification under this

Act during construction of the facility, if the destruction or
35

damage caused or attempted to be caused could adversely affect

public health and safety during the operation of the facility; shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more

than ten years, or both.

b. Any person who intentionally and willfully causes or attempts to cause an interruption of normal operation of any such facility through the unauthorized use of or tampering with the machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, shall be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than ten years,

or both.

* * * * * * *

ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974

[Public Law 93–438]

* * * * * * *

SEC 203. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

(a) ESTABLISHMENT; APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR.—There is

hereby established in the Commission an Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards under the direction of a Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, who shall be appointed by

the Commission, who may report directly to the Commission as

provided in section 5849 of this title, and who shall serve at the

pleasure of and be removable by the Commission.

(b) FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTOR.—Subject to the provisions of this

chapter, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

shall perform such functions as the Commission shall delegate including:

(1) Principal ølicensing and regulation involving¿ licensing,

regulation, and, except as otherwise provided under section 212,

carrying out safety reviews, safeguards, and physical security of

all facilities and materials, licensed under the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), associated

with the processing, transport, and handling of nuclear materials, øincluding¿ not including the provision and maintenance

of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sabotage of such licensed facilities, øand materials¿ and materials, to the extent

that the safeguards and security functions are delegated to the

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response under section

212.

(2) Review safety øand safeguards¿ of all such facilities and

materials licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, øas

amended, and such review shall include, but not be limited

to—

ø(A) monitoring, testing, and recommending upgrading

of internal accounting systems for special nuclear and

other nuclear materials licensed under the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended;

ø(B) developing, in consultation and coordination with

the Administration, contingency plans for dealing with

threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear

materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facili-
36

ties resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

ø(C) assessing the need for, and the feasibility of, establishing a security agency within the office for the performance of the safeguards functions, and a report with recommendations on this matter shall be prepared within one

year of the effective date of this chapter and promptly

transmitted to the Congress by the Commission¿ (42

U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).

(3) Recommending research to enable the Commission to

more effectively perform its functions.

(c) Responsibility for safeguarding special nuclear materials;

high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities Nothing in this

section shall be construed to limit in any way the functions of the

Administration relating to the safeguarding of special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting

from all activities within the jurisdiction of the Administration pursuant to this chapter.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 211. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION

(a) Discrimination against employee

(1) No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise

discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request

of the employee) -

(A) notified his employer of an alleged violation of this

chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011

et seq.);

(B) refused to engage in any practice made unlawful by

this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if the employee has identified the alleged illegality to the employer;

(C) testified before Congress or at any Federal or State

proceeding regarding any provision (or proposed provision)

of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;

(D) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to

commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under

this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement

of any requirement imposed under this chapter or the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;

(E) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding

or;

(F) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any

other manner in such a proceeding or in any other action

to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

(2) For purposes of this section, the term ’’employer’’ includes

-

(A) a licensee of the Commission or of an agreement

State under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

(42 U.S.C. 2021);
37

(B) an applicant for a license from the Commission or

such an agreement State;

(C) a contractor or subcontractor of such a licensee or

applicant; øand¿

(D) a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of

Energy that is indemnified by the Department under section 170 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.

2210(d)), but such term shall not include any contractor or

subcontractor covered by Executive Order No. 12344ø.¿ ;

and

(E) a contractor or subcontractor of the Commission.

* * * * * * *

SEC. 212. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ANTITERRORISM TEAM.—The term ‘antiterrorism team’

has the meaning given the term in section 170C(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(2) ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.—The term ‘Assistant Director’

means the Assistant Director for Security Response.

(3) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘Director’ means the Director of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response appointed under subsection (c).

(4) MOCK TERRORIST TEAM.—The term ‘mock terrorist team’

means the mock terrorist team described in subsection (d)(3).

(5) OFFICE.—The term ‘Office’ means the Office of Nuclear

Security and Incident Response established by subsection (b).

(6) SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITY.—The term ‘sensitive nuclear facility’ has the meaning given the term in section 11 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014).

(7) THREAT.—The term ‘threat’ has the meaning given the

term in section 170C(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(8) UNIT.—The term ‘Unit’ means the Security Response

Unit established under subsection (d)(1).

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE.—There is established in the

Commission the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

(c) DIRECTOR.—

(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Commission may appoint and terminate a Director of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to

head the Office.

(2) DUTIES.—The Director shall perform any duties delegated by the Commission to the Director, including—

(A) carrying out security, safeguards, and incident responses relating to—

(i) any facility owned or operated by a Commission

licensee or certificate holder;

(ii) any property owned or in the possession of a

Commission licensee or certificate holder that—

(I) is significant to the common defense and

security; or

(II) is being transported to or from a facility

described in clause (i); and
38

(iii) performing any other activity of a Commission

licensee or certificate holder that is significant to the

common defense and security;

(B) for a facility or material licensed or certified under

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)— (i) developing contingency plans for dealing with

threats, thefts, and sabotage; and

(ii) monitoring, reviewing, and evaluating security

and safeguards;

(C) recommending upgrades to internal accounting systems for special nuclear and other materials licensed or certified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011

et seq.);

(D) developing and recommending standards and

amendments to the standards of the Commission relating

to the duties described in subparagraphs (A) through (C);

and

(E) carrying out any other safeguards and physical security functions that the Commission determines to be appropriate.

(3) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out the duties under paragraph (2), the Director shall, to the maximum extent practicable, consult and coordinate with— (A) other officers of the Commission; and

(B) other Federal agencies.

(d) SECURITY RESPONSE UNIT.— (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Office the

Security Response Unit.

(2) HEAD OF UNIT.—The Unit shall be headed by an Assistant Director for Security Response.

(3) MOCK TERRORIST TEAM.—The personnel of the Unit

shall include a mock terrorist team comprised of— (A) a number of individuals, consistent with the threat,

who have advanced knowledge of special weapons and tactics comparable to special operations forces of the Armed

Forces;

(B) nuclear engineers, as appropriate;

(C) individuals with knowledge of the operations of the

sensitive nuclear facility who are capable of actively disrupting the normal operations of the sensitive nuclear facility; and

(D) any other individual that the Commission determines should be a member of the mock terrorist team.

(4) SECURITY RESPONSE EVALUATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date

of enactment of this section, the Commission shall establish

a security response evaluation program to assess the ability

of each sensitive nuclear facility to defend against the

threats in accordance with the security plan for the sensitive nuclear facility.

(B) FREQUENCY OF EVALUATIONS.—Not less than once

every 3 years, the Commission shall conduct and document

security response evaluations at each sensitive nuclear facility to assess the ability of the private security force, in co-
39

operation with the antiterrorism team, at the sensitive nuclear facility to defend against the threat.

(C) SECURITY EXEMPTION.—The Commission may suspend activities under this section if the Commission determines that the security response evaluations would compromise security at any sensitive nuclear facility in accordance with a heightened threat level.

(D) ACTIVITIES.—The security response evaluation shall

include force-on-force exercises by the mock terrorist team

against the sensitive nuclear facility that simulate air,

water, and land assaults, as appropriate.

(E) PERFORMANCE CRITERIA.—The Commission shall

establish performance criteria for judging the security response evaluations.

(F) CORRECTIVE ACTION.— (i) IN GENERAL.—When any of the performance criteria established under subparagraph (E) are not

satisfied—

(I) the licensee shall promptly correct any defects in performance identified by the Commission

in the security response evaluation; and

(II) the Commission shall conduct an additional security response evaluation within 6

months to confirm that the licensee satisfies the

performance criteria established under subparagraph (E).

(ii) 2 CONSECUTIVE FAILURES TO SATISFY ALL PER- FORMANCE CRITERIA.— (I) IN GENERAL.—If a sensitive nuclear facility

fails to satisfy all of the performance criteria established under subparagraph (E) in 2 consecutive security response evaluations, the Commission shall

issue an order specifying the corrective actions that

must be taken by the licensee of the sensitive nuclear facility.

(II) FAILURE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION.—If

the licensee of a sensitive nuclear facility does not

take the corrective action specified by the Commission within 30 days after the date of issuance of an

order under subclause (I), the Commission shall

assess a civil penalty under section 234.

(G) REPORTS.—Not less often than once every year, the

Commission shall submit to Congress and the President a

report, in classified form and unclassified form, that describes the results of each security response evaluation

under this paragraph for the previous year.

(e) EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less than once every 2 years, the

Commission, in coordination with the Director of the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, shall conduct emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability of Federal, State, and

local emergency response personnel to respond to a radiological

emergency at the sensitive nuclear facility in accordance with

the emergency response plans.
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(2) ACTIVITIES.—The emergency response exercises shall

evaluate—

(A) the response capabilities, response times, and coordination and communication capabilities of the response

personnel;

(B) the effectiveness and adequacy of emergency response and evacuation plans; and

(C) the availability of potassium iodide or other prophylactic medicines.

(3) REVISION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS.—The Commission shall ensure that the emergency response plan for a

sensitive nuclear facility is revised to correct for any deficiencies

identified by an evaluation under this subsection.

(4) REPORTS.—Not less than once every year, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a report, in

classified form and unclassified form, that describes— (A) the results of each emergency response exercise

under this subsection conducted in the previous year; and

(B) each revision of an emergency response plan made

under paragraph (3) for the previous year.

(f) EFFECT.—Nothing in this section limits any authority of the

Department of Energy relating to the safe operation of facilities

under the jurisdiction of the Department.

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