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U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

RESEARCH REPORT

Reducing Gun Violence

EVALUATION OF THE

INDIANAPOLIS

POLICE DEPARTMENT’S

DIRECTED PATROL PROJECT
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

John Ashcroft

Attorney General

Deborah J. Daniels

Assistant Attorney General

Sarah V. Hart

Director, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice

World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
Reducing Gun Violence

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police 

Department’s Directed Patrol Project

Edmund F. McGarrell

Steven Chermak

Alexander Weiss

Crime Control Policy Center 

Hudson Institute 

November 2002

NCJ 188740
National Institute of Justice

Sarah V. Hart

Director

Edmund F. McGarrell is director of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan

State University and adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute. Steven Chermak

is associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Indiana

University.Alexander Weiss is executive director of the Center for Public

Safety and professor of management and strategy at the J.L. Kellogg Graduate

School of Management at Northwestern University.

This research was sponsored by grant award number 95–IJ–CX–0019 from

the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view

or opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent the official position of the National Institute of Justice or the U.S. Department of Justice.This document is not intended to create, does not create,

and may not be relied on to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau

of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,

and the Office for Victims of Crime.
iii

Foreword 

This Research Report is part of the National Institute of Justice’s

(NIJ’s) Reducing Gun Violence publication series. Each report in the

series describes the implementation and effects of an individual,

NIJ-funded, local-level program designed to reduce firearm-related violence

in a particular U.S. city. Some studies received cofunding from the U.S.

Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services;

one also received funding from the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention.

Each report in the series describes in detail the problem targeted; the program designed to address it; the problems confronted in designing, implementing, and evaluating the effort; and the strategies adopted in responding

to any obstacles encountered. Both successes and failures are discussed, and

recommendations are made for future programs.

While the series includes impact evaluation components, it primarily highlights implementation problems and issues that arose in designing, conducting, and assessing the respective programs.

The Research Reports should be of particular value to anyone interested in

adopting a strategic, data-driven, problem-solving approach to reducing gun

violence and other crime and disorder problems in communities.

The series reports on firearm violence reduction programs in Boston,

Indianapolis, St. Louis, Los Angeles,Atlanta, and Detroit.

●

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

v

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Putting the Strategies in Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Will the Community Support Aggressive Patrol Strategies? . . . . . . . 13

Implications for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Appendix: Additional Methods and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Introduction

During the mid-1990s, Indianapolis found itself in an unusual situation.The local economy was strong and the city’s downtown was

experiencing a vibrant renewal. But the city also was experiencing

record-setting levels of homicide at a time when homicide was declining in

many comparable cities.

Local officials took several steps to address homicide. For example, they

used data to identify where and when homicides were occurring.To produce the data, the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) created the

Indianapolis Management Accountability Program, or IMAP, an adaptation

of the New York City Police Department’s computer comparison statistics

(CompStat) program.

IPD then applied directed patrol tactics in two areas of the city that had

high concentrations of violent crime. Directed patrol involves assigning officers to a particular area to proactively investigate suspicious activities and

enforce existing gun, drug, traffic, and related laws. Officers assigned to

directed patrol areas are freed from having to respond to calls for service.1

Directed patrol is thought to be most promising as a crime control tool

when it is targeted toward high-crime locations and their hot spots.2

Indianapolis selected the approach because research indicated it had been

successful in Kansas City. (See “Findings From Kansas City.”)

The most common approach in a directed patrol effort is traffic stops.The

strategy generally includes increasing the number of police officers in a

given location and the number of contacts with citizens. In theory, intense

traffic enforcement should have a general deterrent effect because it

increases the threat of detection and punishment of criminal activity.3

To the extent that directed patrol focuses on suspicious individuals in highrisk locations, it moves from a general deterrence strategy to a targeted or

focused deterrence strategy.The Indianapolis study provided the opportunity to compare a general deterrence with a targeted deterrence strategy.

1

●

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project
How Did Indianapolis Reduce Gun Crime? 4

IPD applied directed patrol tactics in two police districts in two different

ways. Put in the simplest terms, the East District followed a general deterrence strategy whereby it assigned many police officers who stopped many

people, issued many citations, and made 1 felony arrest for every 100 traffic

stops.The North District, employing a targeted deterrence strategy, assigned

fewer officers who stopped fewer people and issued fewer citations but

made almost 3 times as many arrests for every 100 stops. Officers in the

North District were more likely to stop and arrest felons because they

focused on specific suspicious behavior and individuals. Homicide went

down in both districts, but the North District also reduced gun crime

overall—and they did so using fewer resources.

Directed patrol in the North target area reduced gun crime, homicide, aggravated assault with a gun, and armed robbery. In contrast, in the East target

area it had no effect on gun-related crime, except for a possible effect on

homicide.Why? The North District’s targeted deterrence approach most likely sent a message of increased surveillance to those individuals most likely

to commit violent gun-related crimes.5

2

Reducing Gun Violence

Findings From Kansas City

One of the most promising studies on the use of directed patrol to reduce violent

crime is the Kansas City gun experiment conducted by Lawrence W. Sherman and

his colleagues in the early 1990s.* Kansas City police officers, trained to search for

illegal guns, increased traffic enforcement in a police beat with high levels of violent crime. Their efforts led to increased seizures of illegal firearms, which in turn

were associated with a significant decrease in gun-related crime in the targeted

area. The researchers found that the target beat experienced a 65-percent increase

in firearm seizures and an approximately 50-percent decrease in the incidence of

gun-related crime. A control beat experienced a slight decline in gun seizures and

a small increase in gun-related crime.

* Sherman, L.W., J.W. Shaw, and D.P. Rogan, The Kansas City Gun Experiment, Research

in Brief, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1995,

NCJ 150855; and Sherman, L.W., and D.P. Rogan, “The Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun

Violence: ‘Hot Spots’ Patrol in Kansas City,” Justice Quarterly 12 (1995): 673–693.
The results of the Indianapolis directed patrol program are consistent with

a growing body of research that shows that when police identify a specific

problem and focus their attention on it, they can reduce crime and violence.

As in the Kansas City gun intervention project, directed police patrol led to

sizable reductions in gun crime.Additionally, it did not shift crime to surrounding areas or harm police-community relations.

The finding that the community generally accepted the program supports

the idea that crime control benefits need not generate police-citizen conflict. However, the lack of impact in Indianapolis’s East target area, which

used a more general rather than a targeted deterrence model, and the

potential strain that these types of police initiatives could have on policecommunity relations suggest the need for continued research on both the

benefits and the potential costs of such strategies.

About This Report

The evaluation of the Indianapolis directed patrol program examined several

questions:

● Can directed police patrol reduce violent gun crime?

● Do different directed patrol strategies have different effects?

● Will the community support this type of aggressive traffic enforcement?

● Which aspects of the Indianapolis experiment work and what still

remains unknown?

The following sections address these questions.

3

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

5

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Putting the Strategies in Place

The Indianapolis directed patrol experiment was a 90-day project initiated on July 15, 1997, in two districts:

● The North District’s beats A51 and A52.

● The East District’s beats B61 and B62.

Data from IPD’s Indianapolis Management Accountability Program revealed

that these four beats were consistently among those that exhibited the highest levels of violent crime, drug distribution, and property crime in the city.

(See “Selecting the Target and Comparison Areas.”)

The choice of strategies employed to implement directed patrol was left to

the command staff of each district. Consequently, each district employed a

slightly different strategy.

The East District used a broader general deterrence strategy that maximized

the number of police vehicle stops, thereby creating a sense of significantly

increased police presence.The strategy was based on the theory that offenders would be deterred by the increased patrols.Additionally, the police

anticipated that the large number of vehicles would yield seizures of illegal

weapons and drugs.

Selecting the Target and Comparison Areas

To determine the extent to which directed patrol in the North and East target areas

had an impact, researchers needed to select a comparison area that did not experience directed patrol.

Selecting comparison areas for evaluations can be problematic. No two areas are

alike, and they are influenced by myriad demographic, economic, neighborhood,

and police processes. In an ideal situation, the police beats with crime patterns

most like those in the target areas would be selected. This process was impossible

in Indianapolis, however, because the beats most like the target areas were contiguous to them. Researchers did not want to use contiguous beats as comparisons because they intended to examine crime effects in those surrounding areas.

Demographics

Consequently, two beats in the East District were selected as the most similar

available choices (beats B41 and B42). The comparison area, however, is more

Continued on page 6
6

Reducing Gun Violence

populous than both of the target areas and covers a significantly larger land area.

The comparison area houses primarily black residents (86 percent) and thus is

more comparable to the North target area, where most residents live in predominately black, low-income neighborhoods. The low-income neighborhoods in the

East target area consist principally of white residents; 14 percent are black and a

small but growing number are Latino. 

Exhibit 1 presents basic data for the target and the comparison areas, and exhibit 2

presents Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program Index offenses (1996) for the

three areas as well as citywide.*

Crime Rate Comparisons

The evaluation compared crime trends in the target areas with crime trends in the

comparison area and citywide (minus crime in the target areas). The evaluators

assumed that the citywide crime trend would provide the best estimate of what

was likely to occur in the target areas absent the directed patrol project.

The homicide rate in the North target area was three times that of the city. Its robbery and aggravated assault rates were almost twice those of the city. Its property

crime rate, however, was slightly lower than the city’s rate.

The East target area’s homicide rate was between the rates of the North target area

and the city. It had a particularly high rate of robbery, and its rate of aggravated

assault was nearly twice that of the city. Its rate of property crime was higher than

the rates in the city and the North target area.

The North and East target areas are quite dense, which reduces their populationbased rates of crime. Both areas, however, have extremely high rates of violent

crime for their size. Although the comparison area had a higher violent crime rate

than the city, its rate was considerably lower than those of the target areas.

* Indianapolis is part of a consolidated city-county governmental structure. The police

department’s jurisdiction consists of the center city. The population in 1990 was 377,723.

The crime data and the population base refer to the police department’s jurisdiction. The

figures differ from those reported in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, which include

the consolidated city-county jurisdiction (population approximately 760,000).

Exhibit 1 Characteristics of Target and Comparison Areas 

Characteristic North Target Area East Target Area Comparison Area

Population 16,612 14,645 19,305

Square miles 2.79 1.69 4.74

Person-weeks 215,956 190,385 250,965

Square mile-weeks 36.27 21.97 61.62

Gun crimes (July 15 to

October 15, 1996) 75 42 49

Note: Person-weeks are calculated by population ✕ weeks. Square mile-weeks are calculated by

square miles ✕ weeks.
7

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Exhibit 2 Level of Crime for Uniform Crime Reporting Program Index Offenses, 1996

Number of Offenses

Activity Citywide North Target East Target Comparison Area

Murder 114 15 7 9

Robbery 2,600 194 229 122

Aggravated assault 4,280 330 301 281

Rape 424 23 25 23

Total violent 7,418 562 562 435

Burglary 7,797 303 564 337

Larceny 16,842 633 796 469

Motor vehicle theft 5,860 295 269 350

Total property 30,499 1,231 1,629 1,156

Total Index 37,917 1,793 2,191 1,591

Rate per 1,000 Residents

Citywide North Target East Target Comparison Area

Murder 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.5

Robbery 6.8 11.7 15.6 6.3

Aggravated assault 11.3 19.9 20.6 14.5

Rape 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.2

Total violent 19.6 33.8 38.4 22.5

Burglary 20.6 18.2 38.5 17.5

Larceny 44.6 38.1 54.4 24.3

Motor vehicle theft 15.5 17.8 18.4 18.1

Total property 80.7 74.1 111.2 59.9

Total Index 100.4 107.9 149.6 82.4

Rate per Square Mile

Citywide North Target East Target Comparison Area

Murder 1.2 5.4 4.1 1.9

Robbery 27.6 69.5 135.5 25.7

Aggravated assault 45.4 118.3 178.1 59.3

Rape 4.5 8.2 14.8 4.8

Total violent 78.6 201.4 332.5 91.8

Burglary 82.6 108.6 333.7 71.1

Larceny 178.5 226.9 471.0 98.9

Motor vehicle theft 62.1 105.7 159.2 73.8

Total property 323.2 441.2 963.9 243.9

Total Index 401.9 642.6 1,296.4 335.6

Note: Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Exhibit 3 Directed Patrol Activity Data

Total Activities

Activity Total North Target Area East Target Area

Officer hours 4,879.8 1,975 2,904.8

Traffic citations 1,638 698 940

Warning tickets 2,837 510 2,327

Combined tickets 4,475 1,208 3,267

Vehicle stops 5,253 1,417 3,836

Total arrests 992 434 558

Drug seizures 61 18 43

Illegal gun seizures 25 12 13

Legal guns discovered 81 43 38

Total guns 106 55 51

8

Reducing Gun Violence

The North District followed a more targeted deterrence approach.This

selective approach to vehicle and pedestrian stops sought to maximize

seizures of illegal weapons and drugs through more thorough, focused

investigation. Resources were targeted toward individuals suspected of

being involved in illegal activities.

Activity Data

In their effort to increase the visibility of the police and thus deter crime,

the East target area used nearly 1,000 more officer hours than the North 

target area (see exhibit 3). East District police officers made more arrests,

issued more warning tickets and traffic citations,6 and seized more drugs.

But the North District’s more selective, focused approach resulted in the

detection of more serious criminal activity during each stop.As a result,

North District officers made twice as many total arrests per vehicle stop.

They were three times as likely to uncover an illegal firearm during a traffic

stop and discovered three times as many total guns per stop.7 (See exhibit

4.) As part of the strategy to target offenders and investigate suspicious

behavior, North District officers also made 126 probation checks during

proactive checks of probationers at their residences.
9

Illegal Firearms Seized

Although the North District officers found more guns per vehicle stop, the

total number of illegal firearms seized in the two target areas was similar.As

exhibit 5 shows, 42 firearms were seized in the North target area and 45

were seized in the East target area during the 90-day directed patrol period

in 1997.This compared with 39 and 30, respectively, during the same 90-day

period in 1996.This represented a modest increase (7.7 percent) over 1996

levels in the North District and a sizable increase (50 percent) in the East

District. In the comparison area, the number of seizures declined 40 percent

from 1996 to 1997.

Observational Data

Trained observers rode with participating officers for 100 hours and

observed 104 contacts between officers and citizens.According to the

observers, East District officers were more likely to base their contact on a

traffic law violation. In the North District, officers concentrated their efforts

and contacts on suspicious persons or situations.Yet, when North District

officers did make a traffic stop, they were more likely to issue a citation. In

the North District, 26 percent of contacts resulted in traffic citations; in the

East District, 9 percent of contacts resulted in citations. Contacts in both

target areas lasted about 15 minutes.

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Exhibit 4 Comparison of Activity for Vehicle Stops

Activity North Target per 100 Stops East Target per 100 Stops

Total vehicle stops 1,417 3,836

Felony arrests 2.9 1.1

Total arrests 30.6 14.5

Illegal gun seizures 0.9 0.3

Total guns 3.9 1.3

Warning tickets 36.0 60.7

Citations 49.2 24.5

Probation contacts* 8.9 0.0

* Probation checks were based on addresses of probationers residing in the target beats rather than on

routine vehicle stops.
10

Reducing Gun Violence

Exhibit 5 Firearms Seized in Target and Comparison Areas During 90-Day Period in

1996 and 1997

Guns Seized* North Target East Target Comparison Area

1996 (before directed patrol) 39 30 45

1997 (during directed patrol) 42 45 27

% change +7.7 +50.0 –40.0

Note: Data are for the period from July 15 through October 15.

* Includes guns seized by directed patrol officers and regular duty officers.

Differences in Firearm-Related Crimes 8

Although homicide declined in both North and East target areas (and the

declines were significant when contrasted with the citywide trend), other

gun-related offenses declined in the North target area but increased in the

East target area (see exhibit 6). For example, aggravated assaults with a gun

and armed robberies declined 40 percent in the North target area.These

were statistically significant decreases compared with both the comparison

area and the citywide trend. Similarly, total gun crimes declined 29 percent

in the North target area. In contrast, aggravated assaults with a gun increased 58 percent and armed robberies increased 16 percent in the East

target area.Although the increases in the East District were smaller than the

increases observed in the comparison area, they contrast significantly with

the decreases in the North target area.

Thus, other than for homicide, it appears that the positive effects on

firearm-related crimes were confined to the North target area, where officers were more selective in who they stopped. Furthermore, decreases in

robbery and aggravated assault rates in the North District were primarily

due to the decline in firearm-related assaults and robberies.
Exhibit 6 Change in Firearm-Related Crime for 90-Day Period in 1996 and 1997

Total Target Comparison

North Target East Target Area Area Citywide

Homicide

1996 (before

directed patrol) 7 4 11 3 17

1997 (during

directed patrol) 1 0 1 3 26

% change NA*† NA*‡ NA*† NA* +52.9

Aggravated assault—gun

1996 (before

directed patrol) 40 19 59 22 333

1997 (during

directed patrol) 24 30 54 48 402

% change –40.0≠ +57.9 –8.5∫ +118.2 +20.7

Armed robbery

1996 (before

directed patrol) 31 31 62 13 356

1997 (during

directed patrol) 19 36 55 21 338

% change –38.7# +16.1 –11.3 +61.5 –5.0

Gun crimes

1996 (before

directed patrol) 75 42 117 49 NA

1997 (during

directed patrol) 53 57 110 53 NA

% change –29.3 +35.7 –6.0 +8.2 NA

Note: Data are for the period from July 15 to October 15.The homicide and armed robbery categories

include some incidents that involved a weapon that was not a firearm.

* Percent change not calculated due to small total study population.

† Comparison to citywide trend significant at ≤ .05.

‡ Comparison to citywide trend significant at ≤ .10.

∫ Comparison to citywide trend significant at ≤ .05; to comparison beats significant at ≤ .10.

≠ Comparison to both citywide trend and comparison beats significant at ≤ .05.

# Comparison to comparison beats significant at ≤ .10.

11

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

13

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Will the Community Support Aggressive

Patrol Strategies? 

I

ncreasing the number of police officers on patrol, especially in a city’s

most disenfranchised neighborhoods, may increase citizens’ feelings of

safety and communication between the police and the community. But

police managers also need to consider the possible adverse consequences of

implementing aggressive patrol strategies. If citizens criticize the police and

view the frequent stops as harassment, then any reduction in crime will be

accomplished only with significant costs. Citizen support for the police may

decrease, public criticism may increase, and racial tensions may intensify.

These consequences, if they occur, would adversely affect any department’s

community policing program.

To learn how citizens perceive aggressive patrol strategies and investigate

how an intense police presence affects citizens’ opinions, researchers examined whether citizen perceptions of crime, fear, and disorder changed after

the directed patrol program was implemented. Researchers also explored

the community’s awareness and acceptance of the program. Did the community support the aggressive effort, or did directed patrol increase the

community’s concerns about racial profiling and disparity in how the police

treat people? Surveys were administered in both the target and comparison

areas before and after directed patrol was conducted.9 The findings:The

community was aware of the program and supported it.

Awareness of and Support for Directed Patrol

Approximately two-thirds of citizens were aware of IPD’s patrol strategies

to remove guns and drugs from the streets (see note 9). Little change was

found in the levels of awareness in the test and comparison samples.This

suggests a general awareness of the strategies rather than an increased

awareness as a result of the directed patrol experiment.

Before the directed patrol intervention, approximately 71 percent of the citizens in the sample supported “intense patrol” and increased police visibility.

This figure increased to 76 percent following the program. Residents of the
14

Reducing Gun Violence

East target area accounted for most of the increase. No change in support

was found among North target or comparison area residents.

In the North District, the level of support from blacks was almost unchanged (from a mean score of 4.58 before the program to 4.62 after the

program).10 Whites in the North District were slightly less supportive, but

their support increased more from the preprogram to the postprogram

survey (4.09 to 4.25). In the East District, whites were slightly more supportive than blacks.

Whites in the North target area prior to directed patrol were the least supportive.Women were more supportive of directed patrol than were men,

although the differences were not pronounced. No statistically significant

changes in opinion by race or gender followed the directed patrol experiment.Thus, the effort neither built nor harmed public support.

Attitudes Toward the Police

Citizens also were asked about their general support for the police department.The high level of support for IPD prior to directed patrol did not

change after the experiment ended.Whites expressed slightly more positive

attitudes toward the police, although no statistically significant changes

were found by race or sex in the postintervention survey.11

Minimizing Police-Citizen Conflict

Despite the large number of contacts between police and citizens, citations

issued, and arrests made, IPD officials said that no reported citizen complaints were tied to the directed patrol initiative. IPD took several steps to

prevent conflict from this aggressive police strategy. First, the deputy chief

of each district attended community meetings and spoke with neighborhood leaders before directed patrol was implemented.The deputy chiefs

explained the project and its goals and stated that the department would

not implement the project if the community objected.Assured of neighborhood leaders’ support, the deputy chiefs asked them to explain the project

to residents and to solicit community support.
15

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Second, the department provided adequate supervision for the project.A

captain in each district was assigned to the project.A team of sergeants

directly supervised the officers, often arriving on the scene of traffic stops

and investigations. Furthermore, the captains and sergeants emphasized that

the project had to be implemented in a way that was respectful of the citizens with whom officers had contact.

The citizen survey results suggest that IPD was successful in implementing

the project in a fashion that did not generate police-citizen conflict.12 The

survey approach is unlikely, however, to tap into the perceptions of the

most disenfranchised members of the community because they are unlikely

to participate in a telephone survey. No evidence of such criticism exists,

but it remains a possible effect of directed patrol efforts.

Impact on Perceptions of Crime,

Quality of Life, and Fear 

Although the changes were not dramatic, declines were seen in both the

North and East target areas in the percentage of respondents indicating that

neighborhood crime had increased.At the same time, a slight, although not

significant, increase was seen in the comparison area. Drug and gun crimes

were the highest rated crime problems in the target neighborhoods. Statistically significant declines were noted in the percentage of citizens in both

target areas who labeled drugs as a “major problem” following directed

patrol. Modest, although not statistically significant, declines also were

observed for gun crime. No changes were observed in the comparison area.

North target area residents were less likely to rate their neighborhood negatively following directed patrol. Both North and East target area residents

were less likely to claim that the neighborhood was a “worse place.” Beyond

this, however, no significant changes in perceptions of the neighborhood or

fear of crime were noted.

17

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Implications for Further Research

The results of this study indicate that directed patrol, using a targeted

rather than a broad general deterrence strategy, can have a significant effect on violent crime.This finding is supported by the overall

effect on homicide, the effect on firearm-related crime in the North target

area (which used a targeted deterrence strategy), and the consistency with

earlier findings in the Kansas City project.The less positive results on crime

in the East target area, which used a broader general deterrence strategy,

illustrate the greater effectiveness of a more focused deterrence approach.

Consequently, more needs to be learned about the effects of directed 

patrol strategies on crime.The Kansas City results show that removing

illegal weapons from a high-crime neighborhood may be a key strategy in

reducing firearm-related crime.The contrast between the North and East

Districts, however, suggests that merely removing illegal firearms may not 

be the primary causal agent. Rather, a targeted deterrence approach that

increases surveillance of suspicious individuals in high-risk neighborhoods

may be the key ingredient to reducing gun crime and violence. More research

is needed on the crime reduction effects of targeted versus more general

deterrence approaches. Multiple-site, multiple-method tests of directed

patrol interventions could be helpful in understanding the impact on different types of crime.13

Further Research on Directed Patrol and 

Police-Minority Community Relations

More needs to be learned about how to implement directed patrol projects

while maintaining positive relationships with the community. Consistent

findings emerge from Kansas City and Indianapolis about the impact these

projects had on citizen perceptions of the police. Both the Kansas City target area and the North target area in Indianapolis were in predominantly

black neighborhoods, involved aggressive patrol strategies, and received support from residents.The effort also was supported in the predominantly

white neighborhoods in the East target area. Given the history of policecitizen relationships in the black community, it is striking to find high levels

of support by blacks for an aggressive police strategy that can lead to significantly higher levels of vehicle stops by the police.
In their 1988 article, Sampson and Cohen quoted Lawrence W. Sherman:14

Done properly, proactive strategies need not abuse minority rights or

constitutional due process nor hinder community relations. But the

difficulties of implementing such strategies are substantial, and great

care is required at implementation. (Sherman, 1986: 379)

IPD district chiefs took the time to meet with neighborhood leaders and

community groups to explain the initiative and secure their support before

implementation. In addition, directed patrol supervisors emphasized the

need to treat citizens with respect and explain to citizens why they were

being stopped. Observations by trained observers suggested that officers’

actions were consistent with these instructions. Beyond these points, however, more needs to be learned about the training and tactics that can be

used to ensure that this type of aggressive strategy is positively received by

the community.This point is given weight in the recent research reported

by Paternoster and colleagues.15 Although they looked specifically at arrests

in spouse assault cases, researchers found that suspects’ perception of the

fairness of police treatment had long-term impacts on subsequent violence.

Turning Research Into Practice

Indianapolis’s experience with directed patrol establishes the value of using

research methods and data analysis to help solve crime problems.The study

demonstrates the need to distinguish between two similar but distinct

strategies that had very different levels of effectiveness in addressing gunrelated violence.

The directed patrol experience helped Indianapolis officials understand

the importance of linking research and practice.After the directed patrol

experiment, it became more commonplace for officials to use research to

enhance the success of strategic initiatives. One such initiative is a broad,

multiagency problem-solving effort aimed at addressing homicide and gun

violence.The initiative, known as the Indianapolis Violence Reduction

Partnership (IVRP), includes local, State, and Federal criminal justice agencies; community leaders; service providers; and a research team. Researchers

help IVRP pinpoint problems, develop a strategy, monitor how the strategy

is working, interpret new data, and continually adjust the strategy as needed.

18

Reducing Gun Violence
19

Analyses to date indicate that the IVRP approach resulted in significant

reductions in homicide in Indianapolis during 1999.16

The link between research and practice also has produced promising results

elsewhere. Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, a communitywide collaboration,

reduced youth homicide by more than 60 percent.17 Other cities, including

Indianapolis through IVRP, are adopting Boston’s problem-solving model in

the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative sponsored by the

National Institute of Justice.The Boston and Indianapolis experiences, coupled with other promising interventions, suggest that serious crime problems can be productively addressed through these partnerships between

criminal justice practitioners and researchers.18

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

21

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Notes

1. Cordner, G.W.,“The Effects of Directed Patrol:A National Quasi-Experiment

in Pontiac,” in Contemporary Issues in Law Enforcement, ed. J. Fyfe, Beverly

Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981.

2. Sherman, L.W., D. Gottfredson, D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S.

Bushway, Preventing Crime:What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice,

1997, NCJ 165366.

3. Support for the deterrent effect of increasing the number of police and

the contacts between police and citizens in high-crime areas is provided by

Marvel,T.B., and C.E. Moody,“Specification Problems, Police Levels and

Crime Rates,”Criminology 34 (1996): 609–646;Wilson, J.Q., and B. Boland,

“The Effect of the Police on Crime,” Law and Society Review 12 (1978):

367–390; Sampson, R.J., and J. Cohen,“Deterrent Effects of the Police on

Crime:A Replication and Theoretical Extension,” Law and Society Review 22

(1988): 163–189; Press, S.J., Some Effects of an Increase in Police Manpower

in the 20th Precinct of New York City, New York: New York City Rand

Institute, 1971; and Schnelle, J.F., R.E. Kirchner, Jr., J.D. Casey, P.H. Uselton, Jr.,

and M.P. McNees,“Patrol Evaluation Research:A Multiple-Baseline Analysis of

Saturation Police Patrolling During Day and Night Hours,” Journal of Applied

Behavior Analysis 10 (1977): 33–40.

4.The full technical report, including the time-series analysis discussed in

the appendix,“Additional Methods and Findings,” was submitted to the

National Institute of Justice in 2000: McGarrell, E.F., S. Chermak, and A.Weiss,

“Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol: Final Report

on the Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol

Project.” See also McGarrell, E.F., S. Chermak,A.Weiss, and J.Wilson,“Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol,”Criminology &

Public Policy 1 (1) (November 2001): 119–148.

5.The targeted deterrence strategy was also evident in the Kansas City gun

experiment. (Sherman, L.W., J.W. Shaw, and D.P. Rogan, The Kansas City Gun

Experiment, Research in Brief,Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,

National Institute of Justice, 1995, NCJ 150855; and Sherman, L.W., and D.P.

Rogan,“The Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence:‘Hot Spots’ Patrol in

Kansas City,” Justice Quarterly 12 (1995): 673–693.)
22

Reducing Gun Violence

Similar targeted deterrence strategies were successful in San Diego and

Boston.The San Diego field interrogation was intended to send a deterrence

message to high-risk individuals in high-risk locations (Boydstun, J., San

Diego Field Interrogation: Final Report, Washington, DC: Police Foundation,

1975). In Boston’s Operation Ceasefire meetings, the threat of punishment

was directly communicated to individuals believed to be at greatest risk for

involvement in firearm-related violence (Kennedy, D.M.,“Pulling Levers:

Getting Deterrence Right,”National Institute of Justice Journal 236 (July

1998): 2–8). See also Sherman, L.W.,“Policing for Crime Prevention,” in

Preventing Crime, by Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, and

Bushway (see note 2).

6. North and East District officers issued 1,638 traffic citations and 2,837

warning tickets. Officers said that warning tickets often were issued for

minor infractions because issuing expensive tickets to low-income residents

frustrates their efforts to cultivate positive community relations. Citations

were issued for more serious infractions and repeat violations.The directed

patrol experiment in Indianapolis resulted in 84 felony arrests, 654 misdemeanor arrests, and 254 warrant arrests, for a total of 992 arrests.

7. Directed patrol officers seized 25 illegal firearms; an additional 81 legally

possessed weapons were discovered. (Additional firearms were seized in the

target areas by officers on routine patrol. Exhibits 4 and 5 reflect the total

firearms seized.) Thus, officers uncovered more than three legally possessed

weapons for every one illegally possessed weapon. Some officers joked that

people who were stopped were more likely to have a gun permit than a driver’s license.

8. Exhibit 6 reports the results of statistical significance tests conducted

using the general linear model analysis of variance approach.The variance is

partitioned into period effects, area effects, and effects due to the interaction of area and period.The interaction effect is of interest because it allows

the study to contrast the trend in the target areas with the trend in the comparison area and in the city as a whole.When the target areas experience a

decline in crime, the method tests whether the decline is greater than

would be expected by chance given the trend in the comparison area.
23

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Similarly, when the target areas experience no change or an increase, the

method allows the study to test whether it is significantly different from

the trend in the comparison area.

9.The surveys were conducted using a randomly selected panel design.The

sample size of the preintervention panel was 420.The net response rate was

58.2 percent (302 of the 722 people approached refused to participate).The

response rates in the North (59.7 percent) and East (66.5 percent) target

areas were higher than in the comparison area (49.6 percent).The sample

size of the panel following the directed patrol experiment was 282 (67 percent of the original sample).Attrition was evenly distributed throughout

the two target areas and the comparison area and the demographic patterns were consistent in both the presamples and postsamples.Additional

information on the survey is available in Chermak, S., and E.F. McGarrell,

“Citizens’ Perceptions of Aggressive Traffic Enforcement Strategies,” Justice

Quarterly 18 (2001): 365–391.

10. Support for the program was measured on a five-point Likert scale from

“no support” to “strongly support.”

11.A small decline occurred in the number of North District residents who

strongly agreed that police were professional and courteous.This was not

found in the East District, but it was observed in the comparison area.Thus,

it does not seem to be the product of directed patrol.The decline most likely is the result of the highly publicized trial of four IPD officers who were

involved in a confrontation with two citizens while the officers were off

duty.The trial occurred during the directed patrol experiment.This appeared to affect attitudes of black citizens, who are the majority of citizens

in the North District and comparison area.

12. See also Shaw, J.W.,“Community Policing Against Guns: Public Opinion of

the Kansas City Gun Experiment,” Justice Quarterly 12 (1995): 695–710.

13. Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, and Bushway, Preventing

Crime (see note 2); and Sherman, L.W.,“Cooling the Hot Spots of Homicide:

A Plan for Action,” in What Can the Federal Government Do to Decrease

Crime and Revitalize Communities? Research Forum,Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice and Executive Office for

Weed and Seed, 1998, NCJ 172210.
24

Reducing Gun Violence

14.Sampson and Cohen,“Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime”(see note 3).

15. Paternoster, R., R. Bachman, R. Brame, and L.W. Sherman,“Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault,” Law

and Society Review 31 (1997): 163–204.

16. Coleman,V.,W.C. Holton, Jr., K. Olson, S.C. Robinson, and J. Stewart,“Using

Knowledge and Teamwork To Reduce Crime,”National Institute of Justice

Journal 241 (October 1999): 16–23; and McGarrell, E.F., and S. Chermak,

“Problem Solving to Reduce Gang and Drug-Related Violence in Indianapolis,” in Gangs, Youth Violence, and Community Policing, edited by S.

Decker, Belmont, CA:Wadsworth, forthcoming.

17. See Kennedy, D.M.,A.A. Braga,A.M. Piehl, and E.J.Waring, The Boston

Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire, Reducing Gun Violence Series,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice,

2001, NCJ 188741.

18.The data-driven problem-solving model is a key component of the U.S.

Department of Justice’s Project Safe Neighborhoods (visit the Project Safe

Neighborhoods Web site at http://www.psn.gov).
25

Evaluation of the Indianapolis Police Department’s Directed Patrol Project

●

Appendix: Additional Methods

and Findings

To further test the potential impact on violent crime, three ARIMA

(auto-regressive integrated moving average) models were used to

compare the North and East target areas, the comparison area, and

the city (minus the target areas).The outcome measure was the number of

homicides, aggravated assaults with a gun, and armed robberies.The data

were compiled from the first week in 1995 through January 12, 1998—a

132-week preintervention period, a 13-week intervention period, and a 

13-week postintervention period.

The first model compared the three periods.A significant effect was found

for the North target area, which had approximately two fewer violent

crimes on average during the intervention.The comparison area witnessed

an increase of slightly more than one violent crime per week on average

during the intervention period. Neither the East target area nor the net citywide trend showed significant changes during the intervention period.

The second model compared the intervention period with the preintervention period.An effect of reduced violent crimes was found in the North target area during the intervention period.The comparison area witnessed an

increase, whereas neither the East target area nor the city trend saw a

change.

The third model compared the intervention period with the postintervention period.This tested the effect of removing the intervention. No significant changes were found when the intervention was removed.This suggests

that the intervention effect in the North target area remained even after the

directed patrol project ended.This model should be interpreted cautiously,

however, because of the small number of observations (26 weeks).

It appears unlikely that the findings from the East target area were due

either to a long-term suppression effect or a rebound from unusually low

levels of violent crime.

To determine whether evidence of a residual deterrence effect existed,

researchers compared the trend in crime for the 90-day period following the

termination of directed patrol (October 16, 1997, to January 15, 1998) with
26

Reducing Gun Violence

the same period in the previous year.The findings from this analysis are

mixed.Although homicides continued to decline in the North target area,

they increased in the East target area.Aggravated assault with a gun declined

30 and 49 percent in the North and East target areas, respectively; declines

also occurred in the comparison area and citywide, although they were of a

smaller magnitude than in the target areas.The differences between the target areas and the comparison area were not statistically significant.Armed

robberies declined 15 percent in the North target area, similar to the citywide trend. Both the East target area and the comparison area witnessed

increases in armed robbery.Thus, the most promising results are for aggravated assault with a gun. Both target areas experienced fairly large decreases,

although the lack of statistical significance when contrasted with the comparison area suggests that these results reflect the citywide trend rather

than the residual deterrent effect of directed patrol.The findings for other

offenses did not reveal any consistent evidence of residual deterrence.
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