Present: All the Justices 

CRAIG RICHARDSON 

v. Record No. 980324 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 January 8, 1999 

VALERIE BRAXTON-BAILEY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Theodore J. Markow, Judge 

 Valerie Braxton-Bailey filed a motion for judgment 

against Craig Richardson seeking $60,000 for injuries that she 

allegedly sustained in an automobile accident caused by 

Richardson's negligence. Following a jury trial, the trial 

court set aside a $3,265 verdict in favor of Braxton-Bailey, 

finding it "inconsistent with the law and the evidence," and 

the case was retried on the issue of damages only. The second 

trial resulted in a jury verdict of $1,270, which the trial 

court also set aside as "contrary to the evidence and law" and 

"inadequate as a matter of law." Following a third trial on 

damages alone, the trial court entered judgment on a jury 

verdict in the amount of $35,000. Richardson appealed, 

asserting that the first two verdicts were not inadequate as a 

matter of law and that the third verdict was excessive as a 

matter of law. We will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court because we conclude that the trial court erred in 

setting aside the first verdict. 
In reviewing the trial court's action in setting aside 

the jury verdict of $3,265, we apply the following familiar 

principles: (1) the amount of a verdict is within the jury's 

discretion, and when arrived at upon competent and proper 

instructions, is inviolate, Taylor v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 

224 Va. 562, 567, 299 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1983); (2) when 

evaluating the amount of the jury verdict, all reasonable 

inferences must be drawn in favor of the verdict rendered, 

Hall v. Hall, 240 Va. 360, 363, 397 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1990); 

and (3) if, based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to 

believe that only a portion of the damages claimed were 

reasonably related to the accident, then the verdict cannot be 

set aside by the trial court as inadequate as a matter of law, 

Brown v. Huddleston, 213 Va. 146, 147, 191 S.E.2d 234, 235 

(1972). 

 Braxton-Bailey was injured when Richardson failed to stop 

at a red traffic signal, and his vehicle hit the rear 

passenger side of Braxton-Bailey's vehicle. The impact spun 

her vehicle around, causing a flat rear tire. There was no 

other damage to her vehicle. 

The day after the accident, Braxton-Bailey, complaining 

of soreness in her neck, shoulder blades, right wrist, and 

right arm, went to see Dr. Leon J. Brown, Jr., a doctor 

recommended by her attorney. Dr. Brown testified that 

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Braxton-Bailey's injuries were caused by the accident. He also 

testified that there were no objective symptoms of her 

injuries and that his diagnosis was based solely on what 

Braxton-Bailey told him. The injuries were muscular in 

nature, did not involve nerve damage, and were not permanent. 

Dr. Brown treated Braxton-Bailey with prescribed exercises, 

heat packs, anti-inflammatory medication and electric 

stimulation over the course of six weeks. Braxton-Bailey 

introduced medical bills of $1,225 for Dr. Brown's services 

and $45.59 for prescription medications. 

Dr. Brown testified that he initially anticipated that 

Braxton-Bailey could return to her work as a teacher 

approximately two weeks after the accident, but that 

"additional problems" prevented her from doing so. He 

testified that "on several occasions we tried to get her back 

to work," but that she did not finally return to work until 

five weeks after the accident. Braxton-Bailey asserted that 

she incurred $5,905.20 in lost wages. 

 The jury's verdict of $3,265 was clearly less than the 

approximately $7,200 in special damages claimed by BraxtonBailey.* In setting aside the verdict on the basis that it was 

 *

 Counsel for Richardson stipulated that the amounts 

claimed by Braxton-Bailey were incurred subsequent to the 

accident; however, the record does not support the conclusion, 

asserted by Braxton-Bailey, that Richardson's counsel agreed 

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"inconsistent with the evidence and law," the trial court did 

not disagree with the jury's obvious conclusion that only a 

portion of Braxton-Bailey's damages were reasonably related to 

the accident. The trial court's action was based on its 

belief that the amount awarded reflected "an award of the 

medical expenses and two of the five weeks claimed for lost 

wages" and that the jury thus made "[n]o allowance" for the 

other damage elements such as pain, suffering, and 

inconvenience which were contained in the jury instructions. 

The trial court erred in setting aside the verdict based on 

this assumption. 

 When the evidence permits a jury to conclude that only 

some of the damages claimed resulted from the accident, a 

verdict in an amount less than or approximating a portion of 

the special damages does not justify the conclusion that the 

jury failed to consider other damage elements such as pain, 

suffering, and inconvenience. Walker v. Mason, 257 Va. ___, 

___ S.E.2d ___ (1999)(this day decided); Doe v. West, 222 Va. 

440, 446, 281 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1981). The quality of the 

evidence is dispositive, not a comparison between the amount 

of the verdict and the special damages claimed. See Doe v. 

West, 222 Va. at 446, 281 S.E.2d at 852-53. Based on this 

 

or stipulated that those damages were proximately caused by 

the accident. 

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record, we conclude that the jury was permitted to conclude 

that not all the damages claimed by Braxton-Bailey were 

incurred as a result of the accident. The verdict was not 

based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence; 

therefore, the trial court erred in setting it aside. 

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court, reinstate the jury verdict of $3,265 in favor of 

Braxton-Bailey, and enter final judgment here on that verdict. 

Reversed and final judgment.

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