United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking

Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Military Readiness, Committee on

National Security, House of

Representatives

February 1996 MARINE CORPS

Improving Amphibious

Capability Would

Require Larger Share

of Budget Than

Previously Provided

GAO/NSIAD-96-47

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270285 

February 13, 1996

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

This report discusses the current status of the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ capability to

conduct amphibious assaults, improvements being made to that capability, the cost of those

improvements, and how they will affect future budgets. The information in this report should be

useful to your Subcommittee in its deliberations on the readiness of Navy and Marine Corps

forces for amphibious assaults and the funding needed to modernize this capability.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the

Secretaries of Defense and the Navy; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Director,

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose Throughout their history, the Marine Corps and the Navy have conducted

amphibious operations, including complicated major assaults or invasions

of enemy-held territory. Recently, the Marine Corps has adopted a new

concept for performing amphibious operations in the future, and planned

new systems are important to effectively implementing it. In response to a

request from the former Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House

Committee on Armed Services, GAO (1) reviewed the status of the Marine

Corps’ and the Navy’s amphibious fleet, (2) identified the changes the

Marine Corps and the Navy are planning to make to more effectively

conduct amphibious operations, and (3) identified what the planned

changes will cost and how they will affect future defense budgets.

Background Amphibious operations include, but are not limited to, assaults, raids,

noncombatant evacuations, and humanitarian assistance. To effectively

conduct these operations, the Marine Corps must transport Marine

personnel and equipment ashore in a quick, concise manner. The high

complexity of major amphibious assaults necessitates many Navy and

Marine elements working together: amphibious ships from which to

launch an assault; helicopters and landing craft to move troops,

equipment, and supplies ashore; command and control systems to enable

communication; mine countermeasures to clear a path to the shore; and

naval surface fire support to suppress enemy forces.

The Marine Corps has conducted amphibious operations throughout its

history, including numerous assaults throughout the Pacific during World

War II. Since World War II, the Marines have conducted one large-scale

amphibious assault—the landing at Inchon, Korea, during the Korean War.

During the Persian Gulf War, an amphibious task force was embarked on

ships for a large-scale amphibious assault. Although an amphibious assault

was not conducted because of the additional time required to clear mines,

the potential for damage to the Kuwaiti infrastructure, and the risk of

casualties and loss of equipment, the threat of an amphibious assault held

several Iraqi divisions in place, so that they could not be used for inland

operations. In addition, amphibious forces have been used on a smaller

scale on numerous occasions, including during the Cuban missile crisis,

the Vietnam War, the invasion of Grenada, and the peace operations in

Somalia and Haiti.

In concert with naval forces, the Marine Corps also provides (1) forward

presence around the world and (2) the ability to rapidly respond to crises.

The Marines believe that in the next century the Pacific will supplant

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Executive Summary

Europe as the region of the world most important to the United States,

increasing the importance of naval expeditionary forces and their

amphibious capability.

The Secretary of Defense’s 1995 defense planning guidance requires that

the Navy and the Marine Corps have available 2.5 Marine Expeditionary

Brigades of amphibious lift, including lift for vehicles—such as tanks,

amphibious assault vehicles, and artillery—as well as four other categories

of lift.

The Marine Corps is developing a new warfighting concept that

emphasizes speed and maneuverability of its amphibious forces and places

them at less risk than its current doctrine. Under this concept, for an

amphibious assault, ships would be stationed 25 to 50 miles offshore,

allowing them more range to defend against missiles, aircraft, and small

boat attack, and the troops with their equipment would maneuver from

ship to shore. The concept is intended to maximize surprise and give the

Marines better control of a confrontation with the enemy. To most

effectively implement the new concept, the Marine Corps is planning to

procure various types of new equipment.

Results in Brief The Marine Corps and the Navy currently have the capability to conduct

amphibious operations, but the current amphibious fleet has reduced

vehicle lift capability and other equipment has operational limitations that

limit their effectiveness. To modernize their capability and allow them to

effectively implement the new warfighting concept, the Marine Corps and

the Navy plan to buy new amphibious ships, aircraft, and other systems.

However, this modernization has been delayed and costs have increased.

The Marine Corps and the Navy estimate that it will cost about $58 billion

to modernize the amphibious force over the next 25 years. GAO’s analysis

of the Department of Defense’s fiscal years 1996-2001 Future Years

Defense Program showed that the Navy and the Marine Corps plan to

spend a much larger share of their procurement funds to buy upgraded

equipment for amphibious operations than has been the case for most of

the past 40 years. Beyond fiscal year 2001, the Navy and the Marine Corps

will need to continue allocating a large share of available procurement

funds for amphibious equipment to avoid delays. This could be a major

challenge for the Navy because between fiscal years 2002 and 2005 there is

more than a $16-billion gap between the projected shipbuilding budget and

the cost estimate to build all the ships planned for these years.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Executive Summary

Amphibious programs are competing for funding with other major planned

procurements, such as the Navy’s F/A-18E/F combat aircraft, DDG-51

destroyer, additional surface combatants, and a new attack submarine, the

Air Force’s F-22 tactical aircraft, and the Army’s Apache helicopter. If the

Congress determines the amphibious capability requirements to be valid

and wishes to support the planned amphibious programs, three options

seem plausible: increase Navy and Marine Corps procurement funding,

spend less on other Navy or other services’ planned procurements or other

parts of the defense budget, or implement some combination of the first

two options. These are the trade-offs that the Congress and the senior

Department of Defense leadership will have to decide.

Principal Findings

Acquiring New

Equipment Has Taken

Longer Than Planned

and Costs May

Increase

Although the Marine Corps and the Navy currently have the capability

needed to conduct amphibious operations, the services plan to improve

equipment that is key to carrying out the Marines’ new warfighting

concept. The Navy plans to buy 13 new amphibious ships for $10.8 billion,

which would bring vehicle lift capability back to the 2.5 Marine

expeditionary brigade level required by the defense planning guidance.

According to a Navy official, some eventual increases are expected in the

ships’ procurement cost due to inflation. The Navy originally planned to

buy these ships between 1996 and 2003. However, to save money in the

short term, the Navy delayed purchasing the ships until 1998 to 2005. The

Congress funded procurement of two of the amphibious ships in the fiscal

year 1996 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, which is several

years earlier than the Navy planned to procure them. Table 1 shows the

current equipment status and planned improvements.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Executive Summary

Table 1: Current Status of and Planned

Improvements to Amphibious

Equipment

Equipment Current status Planned improvements

Amphibious ships Net reduction of 17

active ships since

fiscal year 1993 has

resulted in reduced

vehicle lift

capability. Planned

construction of most

new ships has

slipped.

The Navy has developed an amphibious

enhancement plan to cover vehicle lift

shortfall and 13 new ships are planned to

be available by 2009.

Amphibious assault

vehicle

Slow water speed

makes vehicle more

vulnerable to enemy

fire and unsuitable

for the Marines’ new

warfighting concept.

A replacement vehicle is being developed

and will be available starting in 2008. In the

interim, the Marines are considering a

major overhaul of the current vehicle.

CH-46E helicopter Speed, range, and

troop-carrying

capacity are limited,

and it needs

intensive

maintenance.

A tiltrotor aircraft (MV-22) is being

developed to replace the CH-46E, and it

will be available starting in 2001. An interim

overhaul to the CH-46E is planned and

others may be needed.

Command and

control systems

Current

communication

equipment has

limitations making it

less than optimal to

support the Marines.

Communication equipment is being

procured to provide improved compatibility

and better communication over the horizon.

Mine

countermeasures

Capability to clear

mines and

obstacles close to

shore and on the

beach is limited.

Research and development is underway to

improve mine countermeasures, but in

some areas, such as detecting mines,

technology is still being developed.

Naval surface fire

support

Current ships have

5-inch guns that

lack the range and

lethality to support

the new warfighting

concept.

The Navy is pursuing improvements to

increase range, accuracy, and lethality

needed for the new warfighting concept.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Executive Summary

Services Plan to

Upgrade and Replace

Much Current

Equipment

Ship-to-shore Equipment The Marines plan to replace their 25-year-old amphibious assault vehicles

and the CH-46E helicopters, which are used to move troops, equipment,

and supplies from ship to shore, because of their age and limited

capabilities. Although the readiness ratings for both pieces of equipment

remain acceptable to high, they can create risks during amphibious

assaults and are not compatible with the Marines’ new warfighting

concept. Both are slow, vulnerable to enemy fire, and limited in their

range. Also, the helicopter can carry only a limited number of troops.

The Marine Corps plans to replace the amphibious assault vehicle with

1,013 advanced amphibious assault vehicles for $6.7 billion, including a

$456-million increase due to a 2-year procurement delay. With a water

speed of 23 to 29 miles per hour, the new vehicle could be launched from

amphibious ships 25 miles or more offshore and reach shore far more

quickly than the current vehicle. This improved mobility would reduce the

risk to Navy ships from missiles, aircraft, boats, and mines. Until the new

vehicle is fielded, beginning in 2008, the Marine Corps anticipates

spending more to maintain the current vehicle. Therefore, the Marines are

considering a service life extension program that they estimate will cost

$473 million, but believe will reduce normal depot-level maintenance,

thereby more than offsetting its cost.

The Marine Corps plans to replace its CH-46E and CH-53D aircraft with

425 MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft over a 25-year period, beginning in 2001, for

$36.5 billion. The CH-46E, the Marines’ primary medium-lift aircraft, has a

cruise airspeed of 110 knots with a mission radius of 75 miles. It can carry

nine troops. The Marine Corps has been using the CH-53D, originally a

heavy-lift aircraft, because of the reduced inventory of CH-46Es due to

attrition. The Marine Corps plans to overhaul the CH-46E for $160 million

and is considering over $1 billion in other overhauls that may be needed to

keep the CH-46E in safe and effective condition until the MV-22 is

available.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Executive Summary

Supporting Capabilities Supporting capabilities play a major role in the success of amphibious

operations, particularly assaults. The Navy and the Marine Corps are

making efforts to improve three of these supporting capabilities:

communication systems, mine countermeasures, and naval surface fire

support. These improvements will be important to fully implement the

Marines’ new warfighting concept.

The Navy and the Marine Corps are buying improved communication

systems to better support amphibious operations. The radios the Marines

now use ashore are not compatible with the Navy’s shipboard radios, and

they cannot communicate over the horizon because of their short range.

Department of Defense officials said they have been able to work around

these limitations.

The Navy has begun several programs to improve its limited shallow-water

mine countermeasures. Some of its programs are using existing

technology to develop countermeasures that will be ready before 2000.

Other longer term programs depend on advanced technologies that are

still being developed. With its current capabilities, amphibious assaults

against a heavily mined area appear to place troops and equipment at

serious risk.

The Navy plans to upgrade its 5-inch gun and develop a longer range

precision-guided munition to improve fire support for amphibious forces.

Until the 5-inch guns are upgraded, the Navy plans to use more tactical air

support.

Funding Amphibious

Programs Will Require

a Larger Share of the

Procurement Budget

The remaining cost to develop and buy the new amphibious ships,

advanced amphibious assault vehicle, and MV-22 is $58 billion over 

25 years. (See table 2.)

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Executive Summary

Table 2: Cost to Complete Selection of

Amphibious Programs Then-year dollars in billions

Program

Quantity

planned

Development

cost

Procurement

cost

Total

cost

Amphibious ship 13 $ 0.1 $10.8 $10.9

Advanced amphibious

assault vehicle

1,013 0.9 6.7

7.6

MV-22 425 2.5 36.5 39.0

Total $3.5 $54.0 $57.5

Source: Developed by GAO from December 1994 selected acquisition reports and other

information provided by the Department of Defense.

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the military services as a

whole face a potential shortfall of $11 billion to $25 billion per year

between 2000 and 2010, compared with the funding projected for the 1999

budget year in the fiscal years 1995-99 Future Years Defense Program. For

the Navy and the Marine Corps, the estimated shortfall was $4 billion to

$13 billion per year from 2000 to 2010. Although the administration has

since increased projected funding by several billion dollars per year

through fiscal year 2001, the increase appears insufficient to overcome

these shortfalls.

The amphibious ships’ portion of Navy shipbuilding procurement for fiscal

year 2001 will consume one of the highest percentages of funding for such

ships in the 40-year period beginning in 1962 and will probably continue to

require substantial shares of Navy shipbuilding procurement funding

through fiscal year 2005. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2005, there is more

than a $16-billion gap between the Department of Defense’s projected

shipbuilding budget and the Navy’s estimate for building all the ships

planned for those years.

The MV-22’s share of the Navy’s aircraft procurement budget is projected

to be about 10 percent each fiscal year from 1997 to 2001 and is likely to

require a substantial share for many years after 2001. Since fiscal year

1962, the proportion of the budget spent for aircraft for amphibious

operations exceeded 7.5 percent in only 2 years and was below 5 percent

in most years. The Marine Corps procurement budget for fiscal year 1996,

$459 million, is far less than would be required to procure the advanced

amphibious assault vehicle. While that budget is projected to double by

fiscal year 2001, GAO estimates that it would have to almost triple over the

present level to fund the advanced amphibious assault vehicle when

procurement begins late in the next decade.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Executive Summary

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation

The Department of Defense concurred with a draft of this report. The

Department’s comments appear in appendix I.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

Marine Corps Functions 14

Amphibious Operations Are Complex Because a Variety of

Equipment Is Needed

15

Marine Corps Has Developed New Amphibious Warfighting

Concept

19

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 21

Chapter 2 

Replenishing

Amphibious Ship

Inventory Will Be

Expensive and Take

Longer Than Planned

23

Amphibious Fleet Has Been Significantly Reduced 23

Navy Had Delayed Procurement of 13 Amphibious Ships 28

Maritime Prepositioning Force Is Available to Support

Amphibious Operations

29

Conclusions 30

Chapter 3 

Navy and Marine

Corps Plan to

Modernize Equipment

to Improve

Amphibious

Capability and More

Effectively Implement

OMFTS

31

Marine Corps Plans to Replace the AAV With the AAAV 31

MV-22 Aircraft Planned to Replace Existing Medium-Lift

Helicopters

33

Navy and Marine Corps Efforts to Improve Supporting

Equipment

37

Conclusions 40

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Contents

Chapter 4 

Amphibious Programs

Will Require a Larger

Share of Procurement

Budgets for Many

Years

41

Three Major Systems Estimated to Cost 

$58 Billion

41

Congressional Budget Office Reports on Budget Shortfalls 42

Amphibious Programs Will Require Larger Proportion of

Procurement Funds

42

Amphibious Programs Will Compete for Funding With Other

Major DOD Programs

48

Conclusions 50

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 50

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 52

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 53

Tables Table 1: Current Status of and Planned Improvements to

Amphibious Equipment

5

Table 2: Cost to Complete Selection of Amphibious Programs 8

Table 2.1: Procurement Schedules for LPD-17 and LHD-7 Ships

Prior to Passage of the Fiscal Year 1996 DOD Appropriations Act

28

Table 3.1: Comparison of Selected AAAV Requirements With

AAV’s Current Capabilities

31

Table 3.2: Comparison of Selected MV-22 Operational

Requirements With CH-46E Current Capabilities

34

Table 3.3: CH-46E Upgrade Programs 36

Table 4.1: Cost to Complete Acquisition of Major Amphibious

Systems

41

Table 4.2: Procurement Costs and Years to Complete for Selected

Major Programs

49

Figures Figure 2.1: Projected Vehicle Lift Under Accelerated

Decommissioning Plan

25

Figure 2.2: Vehicle Lift Under Amphibious Enhancement Plan

With and Without Maintenance Category B Ships

27

Figure 3.1: Comparison of Mission Radius With Internal Payload

of the MV-22 and the CH-46E Launched From 50 Nautical Miles at

Sea

35

Figure 4.1: Proportion of Navy Shipbuilding Procurement Funds

Spent for Amphibious Programs

43

Figure 4.2: Comparison of Long-Range Estimates for Shipbuilding

Procurement Funding and Estimated Shipbuilding Costs

45

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Contents

Figure 4.3: Proportion of Navy Aircraft Procurement Funds Spent

for Amphibious Programs

46

Figure 4.4: Proportion of Marine Corps Procurement Funds Spent

for Amphibious Programs

48

Abbreviations

AAV Amphibious assault vehicle

AAAV Advanced amphibious assault vehicle

DOD Department of Defense

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

LCAC landing craft, air cushion

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

OMFTS operational maneuver from the sea

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The Marine Corps provides expeditionary forces to project combat power

ashore in support of naval campaigns or in advance of Army and Air Force

units. Power can be projected ashore through amphibious operations as

well as by flying in the Marines to join equipment offloaded from its

maritime prepositioning ships. In concert with naval forces, the Marine

Corps also provides (1) forward presence around the world and (2) the

ability to rapidly respond to crises. The current amphibious fleet can

deploy about one-third of fleet Marine forces at any one time; the other

two-thirds deploy by air and other ships.

Marine Corps

Functions

Title 10 of the United States Code directs that the Marine Corps, among

other things, be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine

forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for

service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases

and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the

prosecution of a naval campaign. As such, together with the Navy, the

Marine Corps is statutorily charged with functions that demand that it

preserve and perfect the national amphibious capability.

Amphibious Operations

Are an Important Marine

Corps Function

Conducting amphibious assaults is a primary function of the Marine Corps.

Amphibious operations include, but are not limited to, assaults, raids,

noncombatant evacuations, and humanitarian assistance. An amphibious

assault is a principal type of amphibious operation that involves

establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. It involves

projecting force from the sea to displace shore defenders, take and hold

the beachhead, and mount offensive action further inland toward an

ultimate objective. A major assault stresses resources the most because it

is against a defended beach and generally involves a large number of

troops and equipment. Major amphibious assaults are among the most

complex military operations. They require the coordinated use of diverse

capabilities, including amphibious ships from which to launch an assault,

helicopters and landing craft to move troops, equipment, and supplies

ashore, naval surface fire support to suppress enemy forces, mine

countermeasures to clear a path to the shore, and integrated command

and control systems.

The Marine Corps has conducted amphibious operations throughout its

history, including numerous assaults throughout the Pacific during World

War II. Since World War II, the Marines have conducted one large-scale

amphibious assault—the landing at Inchon, Korea, during the Korean War.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

During the Persian Gulf War, an amphibious task force was embarked on

ships for a large-scale amphibious assault. The force conducted feints and

raids when the ground offensive began and was ready to execute a major

amphibious assault. However, according to the Department of Defense’s

(DOD) Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, an

amphibious assault was not conducted because of the additional time

required to clear mines, the potential for damage to the Kuwaiti

infrastructure, and the risk of casualties and loss of equipment. However,

according to the report, the threat of an amphibious assault held several

Iraqi divisions in place so that they could not be used for inland

operations.1

 In addition, amphibious forces have been used on a smaller

scale on numerous occasions, including during the Cuban missile crisis,

the Vietnam War, the invasion of Grenada, and the peace operations in

Somalia and Haiti.

Since the Persian Gulf War, the Navy and the Marine Corps have shifted

their strategy from focusing on a global threat to influencing events in the

world’s littoral regions—areas next to oceans and seas that are within

direct control of, and vulnerable to, the striking power of sea-based forces.

In addition, the Marine Corps has undertaken an effort called Vision 2015

to predict future requirements 20 years hence. Vision 2015 predicts that

the Pacific will supplant Europe as the region of the world most important

to the United States for economic reasons. With the Pacific’s vast

distances and resulting long transit times, Vision 2015 asserts that strong

naval forces will be needed in the region.

Amphibious

Operations Are

Complex Because a

Variety of Equipment

Is Needed

Several types of equipment are needed to conduct amphibious operations.

Amphibious ships transport troops and equipment throughout the world.

Once amphibious ships reach the area of operations, amphibious vehicles,

landing craft, and aircraft move troops and equipment ashore. Maritime

prepositioning ships, stationed in three locations throughout the world,

carry equipment that could be used to support an amphibious task force.

However, the ships are used primarily to support troops that are flown

into a benign airfield to be married up with the equipment from the ships.

Various types of supporting equipment for command and control, mine

countermeasures, and naval surface fire support are also essential to the

success of an amphibious operation.

1

Although the amphibious assault was not conducted, the troops and equipment in some of the

amphibious ships were offloaded in Saudi Arabia and used in the ground campaign. The remaining

Marines on amphibious ships could have been offloaded if additional combat forces were required.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Amphibious Ships Amphibious ships carry Marine Corps troops and equipment throughout

the world for two primary purposes: forward presence and crisis response.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requires the Navy to provide forward

presence in three areas of responsibility—the Mediterranean Sea, Indian

Ocean, and Western Pacific. The Navy and the Marines require 

12 amphibious ready groups to meet part of this requirement. Each group

consists of either three or four ships and carries a Marine expeditionary

unit of about 2,800 Marines and sailors and their equipment. Amphibious

ships also transport troops and equipment for crisis response, such as to

major regional conflicts, as well as smaller operations. In crisis response,

these ships carry the assault echelon of the Marine expeditionary force.2

The lift capability—that is, the space available on a ship and the weight

that can be carried—of amphibious ships consists of five components:

troops, vehicles, cargo, helicopters, and landing craft.

• Troop space is defined as the accommodations available to carry

embarked troops.

• Vehicle space is defined as the quantity of square feet available to carry

vehicles such as tanks, amphibious assault vehicles (AAV), and trucks.

• Cargo space is defined as the quantity of cubic feet available to carry cargo

such as food, water, and ammunition.

• Helicopter space is defined as the number of landing spots on the flight

deck or in the hangar deck.

• Landing craft space is defined as the number of craft—such as landing

craft, air cushion (LCAC)—that can be carried in the ship’s well deck.

The Navy currently operates five different types of amphibious ships. One

type is the amphibious assault ship, also known as a big deck ship,

because it serves as a floating airfield for helicopters and AV-8B Harrier

jets. There are three classes of this type of ship—Amphibious Assault Ship

(helicopter), known as the LPH; Amphibious Assault Ship (general

purpose), known as the LHA; and Amphibious Assault Ship

(multipurpose), known as the LHD.

A second type of ship is the amphibious transport dock, known as the

LPD-4, that has secondary aviation support and carries vehicles, cargo,

and troops. There is one class of this type. A third type of ship is the dock

landing ship, known as the LSD, which performs functions similar to the

amphibious transport dock ships. There are three classes of this type—the

2

A Marine expeditionary force consists of approximately 50,000 troops and the equipment and supplies

to sustain it for up to 60 days.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

LSD-36, LSD-41, and LSD-49. A fourth type of ship is the tank landing ship,

known as the LST, which is designed to allow vehicles to roll directly off

the ship onto the beach. There is one class of this type. A fifth type of ship

is the amphibious cargo ship, known as the LKA, which carries heavy

equipment and supplies. There is one class of this type. The Navy plans to

place a new ship in the fleet—the LPD-17—that would replace three types

of ships—the LPD-4, LST, and LKA—and the LSD-36 class of ship.

Maritime Prepositioning

and Amphibious Forces

While some Marine expeditionary forces deploy on amphibious ships,

other Marines are transported by air and assemble with equipment and

supplies carried by maritime prepositioning force ships.3

 A maritime

prepositioning force can perform many of the same missions as an

amphibious force, such as reinforcing an amphibious assault after the

initial landing, or occupying or reinforcing an advanced naval base.

Marines using this equipment and these supplies are not in the initial

amphibious assault waves because a secure environment is required to

unload the maritime prepositioning ships. Therefore, maritime

prepositioning forces can be used as follow-on forces and are not a

substitute for amphibious assault forces.

The maritime prepositioning force consists of a total of 13 commercial

charter ships in three squadrons located in the Mediterranean Sea 

(4 ships), Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (5 ships), and Guam in the

Pacific Ocean (4 ships). Each squadron’s ships provide enough ground

combat equipment, combat support equipment, and sustainment supplies

to support a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB).4

 The equipment and

supplies are prepositioned on the ships for 30 months at a time. Then, on a

rotational basis, one ship at a time unloads all its equipment and supplies

for maintenance at Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, Florida. The

equipment and supplies are reloaded, and the ship sails back to its original

location for another 30-month deployment.

Ship-to-Shore Movement The landing force—troops and equipment—is transported to shore by

amphibious vehicles, landing craft, and aircraft. The Marine Corps’

primary means of transporting troops on water is the AAV, which converts

3

Maritime prepositioning was developed in the 1980s, in part, because of the Navy’s limited amphibious

lift capability.

4

An MEB consists of approximately 17,000 troops and the equipment and supplies to sustain it for up

to 30 days.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

from a water to a land vehicle. The AAV provides mobility, firepower, and

armor protection for troops. The Marine Corps currently has 1,322 AAVs.

The Navy and the Marine Corps use two different types of landing

craft—the LCAC and the landing craft, utility—to transport heavy

equipment such as tanks and artillery from ship to shore during an assault.

These landing craft are also used to transport supplies and troops. LCACs

are the primary heavy equipment craft used for the surface assault. They

are high-speed (over 40 knots) amphibious landing craft that use a cushion

of air under their hulls to glide over water, beach, land, and obstacles up to

4 feet in height. The LCACs can land on 70 percent of the world’s beaches,

whereas the landing craft, utility can only land on 17 percent. The Navy

has 81 LCACs, with another 10 to be delivered by 1998, which will bring the

total to 91. The Navy and the Marine Corps continue to use the landing

craft, utility, which is a World War II-type of flat-bottomed craft. These

craft carry troops and equipment to the shore where they beach, unload

the payload, and retract off the beach. Their maximum speed is about 

12 knots. The Navy has 35 landing craft, utility.

Troops and equipment are also transported from ship to shore by aircraft.

The Marine Corps’ current medium-lift helicopters—the CH-46E and the

CH-53D—are the primary troop transport aircraft. The CH-46E entered

Marine Corps service in 1964 and has been out of production since 1971.

The Navy procured 624 CH-46s for the Marine Corps, but 382 have been

lost, primarily in Vietnam, resulting in an inventory of 242 CH-46s as of the

start of fiscal year 1995. To make up for the reduced inventory of CH-46s,

the Marines now use their inventory of 52 CH-53D helicopters, even

though they were originally designed as heavy lift helicopters to primarily

transport supplies and equipment. According to a Marine Corps official,

the CH-53D helicopters were first delivered to the Marine Corps in 1966

and have been out of production since about 1971. The Marines plan to

replace it with the MV-22 by 2015.

In 1981, the Marine Corps replaced the CH-53D as the heavy lift helicopter

with the CH-53E. At the end of fiscal year 1995, the Marines had 146

CH-53Es to transport heavy equipment, such as artillery, trucks, and light

armored vehicles, from ship to shore and retrieve crash-damaged aircraft,

such as the AV-8B Harrier jet and the CH-46E helicopter. The CH-53E can

also transport 55 troops per helicopter.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Supporting Capabilities

Are Critical to Amphibious

Assaults

In order for the Marine Corps and the Navy to conduct successful

amphibious operations, particularly amphibious assaults, certain

supporting capabilities are essential. These include command and control

systems, mine countermeasures, and naval surface fire support.

An amphibious operation requires reliable command and control systems

that can operate in a hostile environment and provide communication

between all elements of the amphibious task force. These communication

systems include those used by amphibious ships, helicopters, and ground

forces to control ship-to-shore movement, assault vehicles and landing

craft, naval surface fire support, and tactical air operations.

Naval mines can pose a significant threat in littoral environments. In an

amphibious assault, mines must be cleared—particularly in water less than

40 feet deep and on the beach—to bring troops and equipment from ship

to shore. Mine countermeasures involve preventing or reducing damage

from mines, including hunting for and clearing mines with various types of

equipment.

Navy surface combatant ships provide fire support for amphibious

operations. They provide supporting firepower for amphibious operations,

including suppressing and destroying enemy air defenses and artillery,

delaying and disrupting enemy movement to oppose a landing, and

responding to calls by troops under attack during an operation.

Marine Corps Has

Developed New

Amphibious

Warfighting Concept

The Marine Corps plans to augment its current doctrine for amphibious

assaults with a new warfighting concept, called operational maneuver

from the sea (OMFTS). Although the current doctrine includes elements of

maneuver warfare, amphibious assaults today would consist of more

attrition-style warfare5

 than the Marines would like to use because its

current equipment does not facilitate maneuver warfare. Because the

planned new equipment and aircraft will increase capabilities, the Marines

can better incorporate maneuver warfare concepts, which will allow them

to exploit weaknesses or gaps in the enemy’s defenses and surprise the

enemy.

5

Attrition-style warfare involves direct confrontation with the enemy where one force wears down the

other and eventually defeats it.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Current Warfighting

Doctrine

Under the Marine Corps’ current warfighting doctrine, the mission

objective for amphibious operations is accomplished in stages. The first

stage involves maneuvering the ships. The second stage is moving the

landing force from the assembly area to the shore, known as the

ship-to-shore movement. The third stage is to maneuver ashore, including

establishing a lodgement—a secured area of land where combat power

can be built up. The lodgement is used as maneuver space to conduct

combat operations toward inland objectives, as well as a base for building

up combat power and sustainment capability ashore. Examples of mission

objectives on land are to free a city from enemy control, secure an airfield,

or destroy a communication facility held by the enemy.

The current doctrine is, in large part, based on the capabilities of the

current equipment—such as the AAV and the CH-46E—responsible for

moving troops from ship to shore. For example, due to the AAV’s

slow-water speed (8 miles per hour), the current doctrine states that AAVs

should be launched from about 3 to 9 miles from shore to land within 1

hour to (1) build up combat power ashore and (2) prevent the troops’

fighting capability from diminishing during travel time. Likewise, due to

the CH-46E helicopter’s constrained speed and range, only relatively

shallow insertions into enemy territory can be made during the initial

assault waves. As a result of these capabilities, amphibious ships are

usually stationed no more than 25 miles from shore, putting them at

increased danger from antiship missiles, according to Marine Corps

officials.

New Warfighting Concept Unlike the current doctrine for amphibious assaults, OMFTS is designed to

conduct an assault as a single, seamless maneuver from the ships directly

to the assigned objective. OMFTS emphasizes maneuver warfare more than

current doctrine because new equipment and aircraft—such as the

advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) and the MV-22—that the

Marines and the Navy plan to procure and the LCAC that the Navy is

procuring will provide greater speed and maneuverability and force the

enemy to defend significantly more shoreline. Also, under OMFTS,

amphibious ships would be stationed approximately 25 to 50 miles

offshore, or over the horizon, thereby allowing the ships to stay out of

some missiles’ range and provide more time to react to missiles that have a

range of 25 miles or more. According to a Marine Corps official, OMFTS will

become doctrine as the Marines field the new equipment and aircraft

needed to fully implement it.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The former Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on

Armed Services, asked us to (1) review the status of the Marine Corps’ and

the Navy’s amphibious forces, (2) identify the changes the Marine Corps

and the Navy are planning to make to more effectively conduct

amphibious operations, and (3) identify what the planned changes will

cost and how they will affect future defense budgets.

To review the status of the Marine Corps’ and the Navy’s amphibious

capability and related improvements, we interviewed knowledgeable

officials about amphibious capability at the Office of the Secretary of

Defense; the Joint Staff; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,

Development, and Acquisition; the Chief of Naval Operations; Navy,

Atlantic Fleet; Navy, Pacific Fleet; Naval Air Station, Patuxent River,

Maryland; Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Amphibious Base, Little

Creek, Virginia; Naval Station, San Diego, California; Marine Corps

Headquarters; Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Marine

Corps Systems Command; Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic; Marine Corps

Forces, Pacific; Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Marine

Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California; Blount Island Command,

Jacksonville, Florida; and Military Sealift Command.

We reviewed relevant documentation on the cost, schedule, and

capabilities of the current and planned ships, equipment, aircraft, and

systems. We did not evaluate the cost estimates of the new programs;

instead, we reported the official estimates from the services. We also

reviewed documents, such as the bottom-up review; defense planning

guidance; the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ Forward From the Sea,

Operational Maneuver From the Sea, and amphibious shipping plans; and

cost and operational effectiveness analysis reports.

To determine the resources projected to be available in future defense

budgets, we interviewed officials and obtained funding estimates from the

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Marine Corps Headquarters.

We also determined the proportion of Navy and Marine Corps budgets

allocated to amphibious operations by analyzing DOD’s 1996-2001 Future

Years Defense Program (FYDP)—a database providing DOD planning

assumptions for those years. To determine funding trends for amphibious

operations, we analyzed FYDP data from 1962 through 2001, which we

converted to constant dollars to adjust for inflation. We focused on the

development and procurement costs for major amphibious capabilities,

such as ships, medium-lift aircraft, and amphibious vehicles.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 1 

Introduction

We also interviewed officials at three warfighting commands—Atlantic,

Pacific, and Central—to obtain their views on whether they have sufficient

amphibious capability to carry out their assigned responsibilities.

We conducted our review from February 1994 to September 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

As a result of the military downsizing and a Navy and Marine Corps plan to

accelerate the decommissioning of amphibious ships, the amphibious fleet

has been significantly reduced. Carrying out this plan would have resulted

in retaining fewer amphibious ships than needed to meet the 2.5 MEBs of

amphibious lift required by the defense planning guidance. To restore lift

to the required level, the Navy and the Marine Corps developed a revised

plan that includes relying on seven ships in an inactive status. However,

Navy officials believe that they may not be able to reactivate the ships

quickly.

The Navy plans to procure 13 new amphibious ships at a cost of

$10.8 billion. The Navy’s schedule for completing procurement of the ships

has slipped by 2 years. The Congress, however, advanced the procurement

of 2 of the 13 new ships in the fiscal year 1996 DOD Appropriations Act. As

the 13 new ships are phased in and older ships are phased out, vehicle lift

will reach 2.5 MEBs by 2009, meeting the level directed by the defense

planning guidance.

Amphibious Fleet Has

Been Significantly

Reduced

According to a Navy official, at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the

amphibious fleet had 62 ships, but declined to 54 by 1993 as part of the

military downsizing. In August 1993, the Navy and the Marine Corps

agreed to accelerate the fleet downsizing to save money and accelerated

the decommissioning of 21 ships from fiscal years 1993 to 1995.1

 At the

same time, the Navy took delivery of 4 new ships it had ordered before

1993, changing the fleet’s size from 54 to 37 ships during this period. The

Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps

agreed in 1993 that temporarily reducing amphibious lift was a prudent

risk to provide funds for modernizing the fleet by procuring the 12 LPD-17

amphibious ships. The Commandant said the plan was acceptable only if

the LPD-17 procurement remained on schedule, and the Chief of Naval

Operations agreed.

In 1990, the Navy and the Marine Corps established an amphibious lift

requirement of three MEBs to meet their forward presence and crisis

response missions. In fiscal year 1992, due to fiscal constraints, the FYDP

established a goal of 2.5 MEBs. The Secretary of Defense’s 1995 defense

planning guidance affirmed this fiscally constrained 2.5-MEB goal.

1

Navy officials said they could not tell us how much money would have been saved by accelerating the

decommissioning of 21 ships because the Navy did not retain the data.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

As discussed in chapter 1, amphibious lift consists of five components:

troops, vehicles, cargo, helicopters, and landing craft. Vehicle lift is

important to transport tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and trucks, all of

which are essential to establish combat power ashore in an assault.

Vehicle lift is the only one of the five components that fell short of 2.5 MEBs

from fiscal years 1993 to 1995. Vehicle lift which, according to a Navy

official, stood at 2.90 MEBs at the end of the Persian Gulf War, declined to

2.56 MEBs as the size of the amphibious fleet fell from 62 to 54 ships from

the end of the Gulf War to 1993. As a result of the accelerated

decommissioning plan, vehicle lift declined further—to 1.88 MEBs—in

fiscal year 1995. As discussed in the next section of the report, the Navy

developed a revised plan in August 1994, called the amphibious

enhancement plan, to rectify this decline.

If the accelerated decommissioning plan had continued, vehicle lift was

scheduled to reach 2.48 MEBs by fiscal year 2009, virtually meeting the

defense planning guidance level of 2.5 MEBs. (See fig. 2.1.) The planned

vehicle lift shortage between 1994 and 2009 would have meant that the

Navy and the Marines would not have had sufficient lift to deploy all the

equipment needed to fully support 2.5 MEBs.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

Figure 2.1: Projected Vehicle Lift Under Accelerated Decommissioning Plan

1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

1.6

1.8

2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3

3.2

Fiscal year

MEBs

Vehicle 

lift

DPG 

goal

Before the accelerated decommissioning plan, vehicle lift would have

remained at or above the 2.5-MEB level through 2007, then fallen slightly

below 2.5 MEBs, to 2.45 MEBs, in 2008 and 2009.

Navy Developed

Amphibious Enhancement

Plan to Address Vehicle

Lift Shortage

The Congress has been concerned about the reduction in amphibious lift.

The Senate report on the fiscal year 1995 National Defense Authorization

Act expressed concern about the reduction in amphibious lift capability

due to the retirement of amphibious ships. Subsequently, the Congress

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

authorized the transfer of nine amphibious ships to various foreign

countries, and it made the transfers conditional on maintaining

amphibious lift capability for at least 2.5 MEBs. As an interim measure to

ensure this minimum lift capability, the Navy developed the amphibious

enhancement plan in August 1994.

The plan called for increasing vehicle lift from 1.88 MEBs at the beginning

of fiscal year 1995 to 2.62 MEBs by the end of fiscal year 1995. The plan

increases the number of ships in the amphibious fleet by placing two

previously decommissioned LKA ships in a reduced operating status with

the Military Sealift Command (which are planned to be available within 

5 days) and retaining seven ships—four LSTs and three LKAs—in an

inactive status, called maintenance category B, which are planned to be

available within 180 days of the order to reactivate them. The two ships

scheduled to be with the Military Sealift Command are in the process of

being reactivated. There has, however, been a delay in implementing the

plan. The first ship is now scheduled to complete reactivation in

September 1996 and the second ship in December 1996. The other seven

ships have been placed in maintenance category B.

Without the seven ships in the inactive status, vehicle lift would stand at

only 2.13 MEBs as of the end of fiscal year 1995 and the highest level

reached through 2008 would be 2.39 MEBs. Figure 2.2 compares vehicle lift

under the amphibious enhancement plan with and without these seven

ships. According to a Navy official, it may be difficult to reactivate the

ships within 180 days because the Navy has not reactivated ships in this

category before. In addition, Navy officials indicated that the longer a ship

remains inactive, the longer it takes to reactivate, often because more

extensive environmental work has to be done and older systems need to

be replaced with newer systems. In addition, officials said that the 

180 days excludes the time needed to tow the ship to the shipyard (up to 

14 days).

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

Figure 2.2: Vehicle Lift Under Amphibious Enhancement Plan With and Without Maintenance Category B Ships

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

1.6

1.8

2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3

Fiscal year

MEBs

Vehicle lift 

with 7 ships 

DPG 

Goal 

Vehicle lift

without 7 ships

The Congress, in enacting the fiscal year 1996 DOD Appropriations Act,

funded two amphibious ships in fiscal year 1996 that the Navy had

postponed to later years. A Navy official said that, by March 1996, the Navy

will determine the impact of this change on the ships that make up the

amphibious enhancement plan and the Navy’s ability to meet the required

2.5 MEBs of amphibious lift.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

Navy Had Delayed

Procurement of 13

Amphibious Ships

To recapitalize (i.e., modernize) the amphibious fleet, the Navy currently

plans to buy 13 new ships—12 LPD-17s and 1 LHD-class big deck ship, the

LHD-7. Because of budget constraints, and after the accelerated

decommissioning plan was agreed to, the Navy delayed each ship’s

procurement date. (See table 2.1.) According to a Navy official, the Navy

did not reassess the risk of delaying the LPD-17 production schedule.

Table 2.1: Procurement Schedules for

LPD-17 and LHD-7 Ships Prior to

Passage of the Fiscal Year 1996 DOD

Appropriations Act

LPD-17 ship schedule LHD-7 ship schedule

Fiscal year Originala Current Originala Current

1996 1 1

1997

1998 2 1

1999 2

2000 2 2

2001 2 2 1

2002 2 2

2003 1 2

2004 2

2005 1

Total 12 12 1 1

aProcurement schedule at time of accelerated decommissioning plan.

As previously mentioned, as part of the fiscal year 1996 DOD

Appropriations Act, the Congress provided funding for the first LPD-17

ship and for the LHD-7 ship, 2 and 5 years earlier, respectively, than the

Navy’s current procurement plan. The lead ship is now expected to be

delivered in fiscal year 2002. The 1996 DOD Appropriations Act did not

affect the balance of the LPD-17 procurement schedule. Each of the other

11 LPD-17s will be delivered about 4 years after their respective

procurement contract award dates. The last of the 12 LPD-17s is scheduled

for delivery in 2009.

According to a Navy official, the estimated cost to procure the 12 LPD-17

ships, starting in fiscal year 1996, is approximately $9.4 billion, with some

eventual increase expected due to inflation. By March 1996, the Navy

expects to know by how much the $9.4 billion will increase. The estimated

cost to procure the LHD-7 is $1.4 billion. The total cost of procuring the 13

ships is now estimated at $10.8 billion (then-year dollars).

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

As the 12 LPD-17 ships and the LHD-7 are phased into the fleet, the Navy

plans to phase out the 9 ships in the amphibious enhancement plan. As

this process takes place, vehicle lift will fall slightly below 2.5 MEBs in

fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and then increase to 2.5 MEBs by fiscal year

2009, after all 13 new ships have entered the fleet.

The Navy is required to provide 12 amphibious ready groups for forward

presence, allowing one to be present in the western Pacific Ocean, Indian

Ocean, and Mediterranean Sea at all times. According to the Navy, 

12 amphibious ready groups are needed to allow the Navy and the Marine

Corps to maintain their established personnel and operating tempo

targets. At present, there are only 11 amphibious ready groups, which

creates a 19-day gap in coverage for the Central Command’s area of

responsibility (South West Asia and West Africa), during which the ability

to respond to an emerging crisis would be limited.

In addition to providing vehicle lift, the 12 LPD-17s and the LHD-7 will

contribute to having 12 amphibious ready groups. The LHD-7 is

particularly important because there will only be enough big deck ships

for 11 amphibious ready groups until it enters the fleet as scheduled in

2001.

Maritime

Prepositioning Force

Is Available to

Support Amphibious

Operations

The equipment and supplies on the maritime prepositioning ships are used

for several purposes, including supporting responses to crises and

reinforcing an amphibious assault. For example, in responding to the crisis

in Somalia, after the Marine expeditionary unit had landed, ships from the

prepositioning squadron in Diego Garcia were sent to provide equipment

and supplies.

The Marine Corps considers maintaining the equipment prepositioned on

the ships to be a high priority. As of July 1995, 97.8 to 100 percent of major

items on the 13 ships, such as weapons and vehicles, were considered

ready for use. Also, 91.1 to 100 percent of the required equipment and

supplies were available on the 13 ships. The availability of equipment and

supplies is measured against the list of items that the Marine Corps

determines are most needed on the ships.

The size of the 13 ships limits the quantities of equipment and supplies

prepositioned to less than the Marine Corps believes it needs. This is

because (1) some of the equipment has increased in size, (2) the required

quantities for some equipment have increased, and (3) the Marine Corps

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 2 

Replenishing Amphibious Ship Inventory

Will Be Expensive and Take Longer Than

Planned

believes it needs additional prepositioned capabilities—such as an

expeditionary airfield, a Navy mobile construction battalion, a command

element augment package, and a fleet hospital. The Marine Corps already

has these equipment items, so procurement funds will not be needed for

them. To preposition these items, the Marine Corps said it needs three

additional ships, one for each squadron. The Congress authorized up to

three additional ships and appropriated $110 million in fiscal year 1995 to

acquire and convert one ship.

Conclusions The Navy and the Marine Corps agreed to accept increased risk over the

next decade by reducing the amphibious fleet in the short term to provide

funds for long-term amphibious ship needs. Reducing the number of

amphibious ships has reduced vehicle lift, a critical component in total

amphibious lift, to levels below what is called for in the defense planning

guidance. The risk associated with this temporary reduction was judged to

be acceptable as long as LPD-17 procurement remained on schedule.

However, the Navy has delayed procuring new amphibious ships because

of budget constraints, which has prolonged the period of risk.

To address the decline in amphibious lift, the Navy and the Marine Corps

developed an amphibious enhancement plan. Achieving the goals of this

plan depends, in large part, on reactivating seven amphibious ships in a

maintenance category requiring reactivation within 180 days. Navy

officials said that it may be difficult to meet this time frame. Therefore, the

Navy and the Marine Corps may, for all practical purposes, not be able to

achieve the plan’s goals.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 3 

Navy and Marine Corps Plan to Modernize

Equipment to Improve Amphibious

Capability and More Effectively Implement

OMFTS

To improve amphibious capability and more effectively implement the

new warfighting concept, OMFTS, the Navy and the Marine Corps plan to

modernize ship-to-shore and supporting equipment. The modernization

includes procuring the AAAV and the MV-22 Osprey aircraft, as well as

improving supporting equipment for mine countermeasures, command

and control systems, and naval surface fire support.

Marine Corps Plans to

Replace the AAV With

the AAAV

The Marine Corps is developing the AAAV to replace the AAV as its primary

combat vehicle for transporting troops on land and from ship to shore. The

AAAV must satisfy many operational requirements, which will provide

increased capabilities compared to the AAV and improve the ship-to-shore

movement, thus allowing the Marine Corps and the Navy to more

effectively implement OMFTS. Table 3.1 compares selected AAAV

requirements with the AAV’s current capabilities.

Table 3.1: Comparison of Selected

AAAV Requirements With AAV’s

Current Capabilities

Function AAAV requirementa AAV capability

Water speed 23-29 miles per hour 6-8 miles per hour

Cross-country land speed Keep up with main battle

tank, which travels at about

30 miles per hour

15-20 miles per hour

Range on water 65 miles 45 miles

Range on land 300 miles 300 miles

Troop-carrying capacity 18 combat-equipped troops 18 combat-equipped troops

Survivability (armor

protection)

Survive 14.5mm bullets

without attaching enhanced

armor plating to vehicle’s

hull

Can only survive 14.5mm

bullets if enhanced armor

plating has been attached

to vehicle’s hull

Lethality (main armament) Defeat light armored

combat vehicles of

2005-2025 time frame

during day and night while

moving

40mm and .50 caliber

machine guns, which

cannot defeat light armored

combat vehicles of today

aBecause the AAAV is in an early development stage, we were not able to assess whether its

requirements will be met.

The AAAV’s required maximum water speed (23 to 29 miles per hour) will

make it much easier to implement OMFTS because AAAVs will be able to

transport troops the 25 miles from ship to shore in an hour. Marine Corps

officials said the current AAV’s 8-mile-per-hour water speed makes

implementing OMFTS extremely difficult and risky because AAVs need 3 or

more hours to travel 25 miles from ship to shore. Taking this long to reach

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 3 

Navy and Marine Corps Plan to Modernize

Equipment to Improve Amphibious

Capability and More Effectively Implement

OMFTS

shore would delay the buildup of combat power ashore, increase the AAV’s

exposure to enemy fire, and degrade the troops’ combat effectiveness

because of the adverse conditions in the AAV’s troop-carrying

compartment.

According to a Marine Corps official, to overcome the AAV’s limited water

speed, the Marines have two primary options for transporting troops in

AAVs from ship to shore during an amphibious assault: (1) bring the

amphibious ships carrying the AAVs within several miles of the shore and

let them swim in from there or (2) station ships 25 to 50 miles out to sea

and bring AAVs in from there on LCACs. Both alternatives have drawbacks.

Bringing the ships close to shore places them at greater risk from

precision-guided missiles, aircraft, boats, and mines. Therefore, when a

high enemy threat is present, the Navy and the Marines plan to use LCACs

to transport AAVs to shore. However, this diverts LCACs from their primary

mission of transporting heavy equipment, such as tanks and artillery, thus

decreasing the Marines’ ability to build combat power ashore quickly and

counter enemy forces. Because of the AAAV’s 25-mile-per-hour water speed,

LCACs would not be needed to carry the AAAVs to shore.

The Marine Corps has a requirement to procure 1,013 AAAVs. Prior to

December 1994, the cost to develop and procure AAAVs was estimated at

$7.2 billion (then-year dollars). Due to budget constraints, DOD reduced

AAAV funding in the FYDP by $189 million in December 1994. As a result, the

Marine Corps extended the demonstration and validation phase 22 months

and delayed procurement by 2 years, which increased the program’s cost

by $456 million, to $7.6 billion. As a result, low-rate initial production has

been delayed from fiscal year 2003 to 2005; initial operational capability

from fiscal year 2006 to 2008; and full operational capability—fielding all

required AAAVs to the active assault amphibian battalions and the maritime

prepositioning squadrons—from fiscal year 2012 to 2014.

Due to the AAAV schedule delays, the Marines must use the AAV longer than

planned. Although the AAV’s readiness ratings are acceptable, according to

a Marine Corps official, the AAV’s maintenance costs are increasing. For

example, depot-level maintenance is now needed every 4 years, 400 hours,

or 4,000 miles, whereas, it used to be every 6 years, 600 hours, or 6,000

miles. Therefore, to ensure that the AAV can continue to operate safely and

effectively until the AAAV is delivered, the Marine Corps is considering

upgrading the AAV with a service life extension program. If the extension

program is not implemented, depot-level maintenance is projected to be

needed even more often—every 3 years, 300 hours, or 3,000 miles.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 3 

Navy and Marine Corps Plan to Modernize

Equipment to Improve Amphibious

Capability and More Effectively Implement

OMFTS

If approved, the service life extension program, which would start in fiscal

year 1998 and end by fiscal year 2001, would include replacing the engine

and suspension and rebuilding other parts to improve reliability,

maintainability, and readiness. The program is estimated to cost

$473 million—$243 million to procure the engine and suspension and

$230 million in labor to rebuild the vehicle and procure other parts. The

Marines believe the program will allow depot-level maintenance to return

to once every 6 years, 600 hours, or 6,000 miles, which would result in

spending $933 million less than currently estimated for operations and

maintenance in fiscal years 1998 through 2010. Therefore, the Marine

Corps believes the program would result in net savings of $460 million

from fiscal years 1998 to 2010. Despite the substantial savings, the Marines

are not sure that they will implement the program because it requires

spending $473 million by fiscal year 2001, a 4-year period, whereas, the

$933 million for depot-level maintenance is spread out over a 13-year

period.

MV-22 Aircraft

Planned to Replace

Existing Medium-Lift

Helicopters

The Marine Corps plans to replace its CH-46E and CH-53D medium-lift

helicopters with the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. According to the

Marine Corps, the MV-22’s improved capabilities will allow the Marines to

implement OMFTS more effectively and with less risk. Table 3.2 compares

selected MV-22 requirements with the CH-46E’s current capabilities. The

Navy and the Marine Corps plan to procure 425 MV-22s at an estimated

cost of $36.5 billion (fiscal year 1996 to completion in then-year dollars).

The Navy plans to procure the aircraft over a 25-year period, primarily due

to the $1 billion per year funding cap that DOD placed on the program.

Production of the MV-22 is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 1997. The

Marine Corps plans to have initial operational capability in fiscal year

2001. Full operational capability is planned for fiscal year 2018.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Chapter 3 

Navy and Marine Corps Plan to Modernize

Equipment to Improve Amphibious

Capability and More Effectively Implement

OMFTS

Table 3.2: Comparison of Selected

MV-22 Operational Requirements With

CH-46E Current Capabilities Function

Marine Corps minimum

requirements (MV-22)

CH-46E current

capabilitiesa

Cruise airspeed 240 knots 110 knots

Internal payload capacity 24 troops or 8,000 lbs. of

cargo

9 troops or 1,700 lbs. of

cargo

External payload capacity 10,000 lbs. 4,000 lbs.b

Mission radius

with internal payload

200 nautical miles 75 nautical miles

Mission radius with external

payload

50 nautical miles 75 nautical miles

Refueling Capable of being refueled

in flight

Cannot be refueled in flight

Self-deployability 2,100 nautical miles with

one refueling in flight

None

Range 1,200 nautical miles 236 nautical milesc

aThe current capabilities are less than the original capabilities because of the weight restriction

imposed on the helicopter.

bThe maximum average external payload that can be carried depends on factors such as the

outside ambient temperature, altitude, humidity, and wind speed and direction.

cSome aircraft have external fuel tanks that extend the range to 411 nautical miles, but reduce the

payload that can be carried.

The MV-22 is a tilt-rotor, multimission aircraft, currently being developed,

which is designed to take off and land vertically like a helicopter and fly

like a fixed-wing aircraft. The MV-22’s missions include transporting

Marines in the initial and follow-on stages of an amphibious operation,

transporting supplies and equipment, evacuating casualties, and tactical

recovery of aircraft and personnel.

The MV-22’s greater speed will provide more maneuverability; build up

combat power ashore more quickly because it carries more Marines per

aircraft; and allow amphibious ships to be stationed further out to sea,

such as 50 miles, because of its longer mission radius. For example, the

MV-22’s required mission radius is 200 nautical miles versus the CH-46E’s

capability of 75 nautical miles. If aircraft were launched from 50 miles out

to sea, the enemy would have to defend a significantly greater land area

against the MV-22 because of its greater mission radius and about three

times the length of coastline than it would if the Marines used the

CH-46Es. Figure 3.1 illustrates how much more area the enemy would

have to defend if the Marines were to use the MV-22 versus the CH-46E.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of Mission Radius With Internal Payload of the MV-22 and the CH-46E Launched From 50 Nautical

Miles at Sea

Coastline

50NM


Ship to Shore

200NM


MV-22

75NM

387NM of Coastline


(43,000 sq mi)

112NM of Coastline


(981 sq mi)

CH-46

NM = nautical miles

To ensure that the CH-46E continues to fly safely and effectively until it is

replaced by the MV-22, the Marine Corps plans to institute an upgrade

program and may institute up to two others, which could cost up to

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OMFTS

$1.2 billion. The CH-46E has been out of production for over 20 years and

requires additional effort to keep it flying safely. Nevertheless, the

CH-46E’s readiness ratings remain high.

According to a Marine Corps official, if all three upgrade programs are

implemented, they are expected to restore the aircraft to its original

capability, increase its service life, and keep it safe for flying until 2018,

when the MV-22 is fully operational. None of the planned programs will

increase the helicopter’s capability beyond what it was originally.

According to the Marine Corps, without at least the planned upgrade and

one of the other two upgrades under consideration, the helicopters will

begin to be taken out of service starting in 2010, because they will no

longer be safe to fly. Although the CH-53D helicopters are almost as old as

the CH-46Es, the Marine Corps has no plans to upgrade them.

The three programs that may be necessary to keep the CH-46E flying

safely and effectively are the dynamic component upgrade,

super-scheduled depot-level maintenance, and service life extension. The

Marine Corps has decided to implement the dynamic component upgrade.

It is conducting a service life assessment of the CH-46E to determine if it

needs to do the super-scheduled depot-level maintenance and/or the

service life extension program. The cost of the assessment is $3 million

and is scheduled to be completed by July 1996. Table 3.3 describes the

three upgrade programs.

Table 3.3: CH-46E Upgrade Programs

Then-year dollars in millions

Program Costa Start Complete Description

Dynamic

component

upgrade

$160.2 12/95 9/99 Replace rotor head, drive

system, transmission and

rotor controls

Superscheduled

depot-level

maintenance

145.2 Undecided Undecided Extend service life of

fuselage by 3.5 years

Service life

extension

895.4 Undecided Undecided Extend service life of

fuselage by 20 to 25 years

Total $1,200.8

aBased on 242 CH-46E aircraft.

From 1989 to 1994, the average CH-46E maintenance hours per flight hour

increased by about 50 percent. Also, because of problems with the shafts

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OMFTS

in the drive systems, the Navy now requires a mandatory maintenance

inspection every 10 hours in peacetime and wartime and restrictions on

the weight that a CH-46E can carry. The dynamic component upgrade

program will replace the rotor heads, drive systems, and other related

parts on each helicopter, which will eliminate the 10-hour maintenance

inspection and weight restriction. The program is fully funded and is

scheduled for fiscal years 1996 through 1999. At a cost of $662,000 per

aircraft, the total cost for 242 aircraft is $160.2 million.

The Marine Corps will decide whether the super-scheduled depot-level

maintenance program and/or service life extension program are needed,

based on the service life assessment, as well as the MV-22’s delivery

schedule. The sooner the MV-22 is delivered to the squadrons, the fewer

CH-46Es that will need to undergo either of these two upgrade programs.

The super-scheduled depot-level maintenance program may be needed to

extend the service life of the aircraft’s fuselage by 3.5 years. At a cost of

about $600,000 per aircraft, the program’s total cost would be

$145.2 million. The service life extension program may be needed to

extend the life of the aircraft’s fuselage by 20 to 25 years. The estimated

cost of the program is $3.7 million per CH-46E. If all 242 helicopters

undergo a service life extension, the total estimated cost would be

$895.4 million.

Navy and Marine

Corps Efforts to

Improve Supporting

Equipment

The Navy and the Marine Corps are taking actions to improve the

supporting equipment needed for amphibious assaults—including mine

countermeasures, command and control systems, and naval surface fire

support. Because mines can be a significant problem for an assault, the

Navy has initiated efforts to improve its mine countermeasures capability

since the Persian Gulf War. The Navy and the Marine Corps are procuring

improved communication systems to support amphibious operations

because current systems lack some of the needed capabilities. The Navy

plans to upgrade its 5-inch gun and develop a precision-guided munition to

provide much greater range than the current gun.

Navy Is Developing

Shallow-Water Mine

Countermeasures

Mines can be a significant deterrent to amphibious assaults because they

are hazardous to amphibious ships and landing craft and could prevent

ships from getting close enough to shore to launch the assault force and

fire their guns to support the assault. Studies done for the Navy indicated

that shallow-water mine countermeasures need significant improvement

and identified this as a high priority. Available capabilities for use in water

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less than 30 feet deep include Navy special forces swimmers and explosive

ordnance disposal. According to Marine Corps officials, until additional

mine countermeasures capabilities are provided, conducting amphibious

assaults in a heavily mined area would place troops and equipment at risk.

During the Persian Gulf War, the mine threat contributed to the decision

not to conduct an amphibious assault. Mine countermeasures were

principally needed to clear a path to the Kuwaiti coast for naval gunfire

support and a possible amphibious assault. The amphibious task force was

deployed and prepared to conduct an amphibious assault. However,

clearing the Iraqi mines to prepare for an assault was estimated to take 

10 to 14 days. This was one of the reasons that the U.S. Central Command

decided not to conduct the assault.

After the Persian Gulf War, the Navy emphasized improving shallow-water

mine countermeasures and issued a mine warfare plan that identified

providing efficient, effective, and speedy mine countermeasures in shallow

water and on the beach to support amphibious assaults as having great

urgency. Also, the Marine Corps and the Navy are working on a concept

paper that will stress mine detection and avoidance, while efforts are

continuing to develop improved capability to clear mines.

In 1991, the Navy began a program for clearing shallow-water mines and

beach obstacles. The program’s projected funding from fiscal years 1996

through 2001 is $179 million for research and development and $85 million

for procurement. Several projects are planned to start procurement by

2000, including line demolition charges and distributive explosive

technology (i.e., nets) to clear mines and light and medium obstacles.

Others are currently in development, and procurement is not planned to

begin until after 2000. Examples include an advanced, lightweight mine

sweeping system and a system to breach heavy obstacles in the surf and

on the beach. These projects will take additional time to complete because

more development work is needed to obtain the best approaches and

technologies. The Navy is also considering buying modularized kits that

can be mounted on LCACs to allow them to carry the new shallow-water

equipment and is focusing its development projects toward using this

equipment from LCACs.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
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Improved Communication

Systems for Command and

Control Are Being

Procured

The Navy and the Marine Corps are procuring improved communication

systems to support amphibious operations because current systems lack

some of the needed capabilities. These capabilities include systems that

are compatible with each other and that can communicate over the

horizon. However, DOD officials said they have been able to work around

these limitations. Since the Persian Gulf War, some improvements have

been fielded. Because an amphibious assault is complex and requires

significant coordination and OMFTS requires over-the-horizon capability,

current communication systems would increase the risk of an assault to

troops and equipment.

The Navy is upgrading communication capabilities on surface ships,

including amphibious ships. The Navy is

• providing satellite communication to ensure reliable global

communication to and from flagships, including LHAs and LHDs;

• procuring improved high-frequency radios that allow over-the-horizon

communication, as well as provide a backup to satellite communication;

• acquiring a shipboard single channel ground and airborne radio system

(SINCGARS), which is the same radio the Marines use, to provide

ship-to-shore communication; and

• buying a relay to be flown on helicopters that will allow communication

over the horizon using SINCGARS.

The planned procurement costs for these systems is about $101 million

from fiscal years 1996 to 2001.

From 1996 to 2001, the Marine Corps plans to spend about $269 million to

procure SINCGARS, microcomputers for tactical combat, position location

reporting systems, and advanced field artillery tactical data systems.

SINCGARS will be the Marines’ primary equipment for battlefield

communication for command and control and fire support because it

(1) improves voice and data communication capability on the ground,

(2) allows the Marines to communicate between ship and shore with the

Navy’s SINCGARS equipment, and (3) is compatibile with Army and Air

Force equipment.

Navy Plans to Improve

Surface Fire Support

The Navy has 5-inch guns on its destroyers and cruisers that can provide

fire support for amphibious assaults. In 1992, the Navy decommissioned

the last of its battleships, which had 16-inch guns, providing a 26-mile

maximum range. Because the current 5-inch guns have a 13-mile maximum

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range, the Navy has to bring its surface combatant ships closer to shore in

order to reach the targets. However, bringing the ships closer to shore

increases their exposure to missiles, aircraft, boats, and mines. In addition,

because the 5-inch gun fires about a 70-pound shell, whereas, the 16-inch

gun fired shells up to 2,700 pounds, the 5-inch gun shell does not have the

explosive power of the 16-inch gun shell. Due to the limitations of the

5-inch gun, the Navy plans to use tactical aircraft to provide fire support

for amphibious assaults.

We recently reported on the Navy’s surface fire support program.1

 The

Navy plans to upgrade its 5-inch gun and develop a precision-guided

munition with an effective range of 41 to 63 nautical miles, which will

allow the ships to remain further out to sea. The Navy plans to field the

upgraded gun from fiscal years 2001 to 2006 on 18 new destroyers built

during that time and one other destroyer or cruiser. The 5-inch guns on

existing destroyers and cruisers may also be upgraded. The Navy included

$270 million in the FYDP for fiscal years 1996-2001 for research and

development for the upgraded 5-inch gun and precision-guided munition.

Conclusions The Marine Corps has the amphibious assault vehicles, aircraft, and

supporting equipment necessary to conduct amphibious assaults and other

operations. Because of the equipment’s operational limitations, the Navy

and the Marine Corps are modernizing it to reduce the risk of conducting

such operations. Although the planned modernization will require large

capital investments, without the entire amphibious package, which is

greater than the sum of the individual components, the risk of an assault

would not be reduced as much as it could be.

1

Naval Surface Fire Support: Navy’s Near-Term Plan Is Not Based on Sufficient Analysis

(GAO/NSIAD-95-160, May 19, 1995).

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The projected costs for major amphibious programs will be $58 billion

over the next 25 years and will require increased proportions of Navy and

Marine Corps procurement budgets. Amphibious programs are competing

with other Navy and the Marine Corps procurement programs, as well as

other services’ programs. We found that the funding projected to acquire

amphibious ships, aircraft, and vehicles will take a much larger proportion

of procurement funding than has been the case for most of the last 

40 years.

Acquiring amphibious ships is projected to require substantial shares of

the shipbuilding budget until 2005. There is more than a $16-billion gap

between the projected budget and the estimated cost of all ships planned

to be built from 2002 to 2005. Procuring the MV-22 is projected to require

about 10 percent of the Navy’s aircraft procurement budget for fiscal years

1997 to 2001 and is likely to require substantial shares of the budget for

many years after 2001. We estimate that the Marine Corps procurement

account would have to almost triple over the present level to fund the AAAV

when procurement begins late in the next decade.

Three Major Systems

Estimated to Cost 

$58 Billion

The remaining projected cost to develop and buy the new amphibious

ships, AAAV, and MV-22 is $58 billion. (See table 4.1.) This investment is

planned to occur over the next 25 years, which means that the cost per

year averages $2.3 billion. The Marine Corps believes this is a modest

annual investment to maintain this capability because it represents less

than 1 percent of the current annual defense budget.

Table 4.1: Cost to Complete

Acquisition of Major Amphibious

Systems

Then-year dollars in billions

Program

Quantity

planned

Development

cost

Procurement

cost

Total

cost

Amphibious ship 13 $ 0.1 $10.8 $10.9

AAAV 1,013 0.9 6.7 7.6

MV-22 425 2.5 36.5 39.0

Total $3.5 $54.0 $57.5

Source: Developed by GAO from December 1994 selected acquisition reports and other

information provided by DOD.

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Congressional Budget

Office Reports on

Budget Shortfalls

In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office analyzed each of the military

services’ budget plans through 2010. Using the 1999 budget year in the

fiscal years 1995-1999 FYDP as a benchmark, it projected a total shortfall for

all the services of $11 billion to $25 billion per year from 2000 to 2010.

Since this analysis, DOD has issued the 1996 FYDP, covering fiscal years 1996

through 2001, which increased projected funding levels. For example, for

fiscal year 1999, the projected budget increased from $253.8 billion in the

1995 FYDP to $257.3 billion in the 1996 FYDP. However, the Navy faces large

procurement requirements in the future because of low procurement

budgets in recent years, according to a Congressional Budget Office

official.

In its November 1994 report on the Navy,1

 the Congressional Budget Office

observed that three key factors influence the Navy’s long-term costs: the

number of forces (ships and aircraft); plans for modernizing the forces

with new weapons; and the expected cost of those weapon systems.

Although the size of the fleet is declining, the Navy is still developing

expensive new ships and aircraft that it will begin purchasing in the late

1990s and the next decade. This has resulted in a gap between the

projected Navy budget and the amount that the Congressional Budget

Office estimated would be needed for the 330-ship Navy. Using the 1999

fiscal year in the 1995 FYDP, it projected a shortfall of $4 billion to

$13 billion per year from 2000 through 2010—5 to 15 percent of the Navy’s

budget.

Amphibious Programs

Will Require Larger

Proportion of

Procurement Funds

The major amphibious programs will require a larger proportion of the

Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ projected procurement budgets than has

been the case for most of the last 40 years. The percentage of funding

needed for amphibious programs will increase greatly toward the end of

the 1996-2001 FYDP period, requiring more than 10 percent of the fiscal

years 2000 and 2001 budgets for the first time since 1966.2

Amphibious Share of Navy

Shipbuilding Will Increase

Significantly

As discussed in chapter 2, the Navy plans to procure two amphibious ships

in fiscal year 1996, two in fiscal year 2000, and two in fiscal year 2001.

These ships are funded from the shipbuilding and conversion portion of

Navy procurement funds. For fiscal year 1996, the proportion of the Navy

1

The Costs of the Administration’s Plan for the Navy Through the Year 2010, Congressional Budget

Office (Nov. 1994).

2

We examined the period from fiscal year 1962 to 2001, using 1962 as the starting point because the

FYDP database that DOD provided us covers the period from 1962 through 2001.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
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shipbuilding procurement account that is used to buy amphibious ships

would be the highest percentage since at least fiscal year 1962.

Procurement funds budgeted for amphibious ships through fiscal year

2001 are projected to reach 24 percent of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget in

2001. (See fig. 4.1.)

Figure 4.1: Proportion of Navy Shipbuilding Procurement Funds Spent for Amphibious Programs

1970 1980 1990 2000

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: Developed by GAO from historical FYDP data beginning in fiscal year 1962, the fiscal

years 1996-2001 FYDP, and the fiscal year 1996 DOD Appropriations Act.

The funding budgeted through fiscal year 2001 includes 6 of the 13

amphibious ships the Navy plans to procure from fiscal years 1996 to 2005.

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The Navy plans to procure two additional amphibious ships in each of

fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, and one amphibious ship in fiscal year

2005. Navy shipbuilding procurement funding is projected to increase from

fiscal year 2001 to 2002, primarily to fund the acquisition of an aircraft

carrier, and then decline to lower levels. However, the Navy estimates that

the building costs planned in these years will be substantially higher than

its projected shipbuilding budget. (See fig. 4.2) The gap between the two

for fiscal years 2002 through 2005 totals $16.5 billion. This suggests that

funding for the ships between these years will continue to require

substantial shares of the Navy shipbuilding budget and will pose a

challenge because of other competing ship procurements.

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Figure 4.2: Comparison of Long-Range Estimates for Shipbuilding Procurement Funding and Estimated Shipbuilding Costs

(Fiscal Years 2002-2005)

2002 2003 2004 2005

0

5

10

15

20

Fiscal years

Dollars in billions

Plan Budget

Source: Navy Programming and Surface Warfare Offices.

MV-22 Share of Navy

Aircraft Funding Will Also

Increase Significantly

The MV-22 is funded from the aircraft portion of Navy procurement funds.

Since fiscal year 1962, the portion of the Navy procurement budget spent

on amphibious aircraft has exceeded 7.5 percent only twice and was

below 5 percent in most years. (See fig. 4.3.) Beginning in fiscal year 1997,

funding for the MV-22 is projected to be about 10 percent of the Navy’s

aircraft procurement budget through 2001.

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Figure 4.3: Proportion of Navy Aircraft Procurement Funds Spent for Amphibious Programs

1970 1980 1990 2000

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: Developed by GAO from historical FYDP data beginning in fiscal year 1962 and the fiscal

years 1996-2001 FYDP.

As discussed earlier, the Navy plans to procure the MV-22 aircraft over a

25-year period. Navy aircraft procurement funding is projected to decline

after fiscal year 2000 and not reach fiscal year 2000 levels again until fiscal

year 2007. This suggests that funding the MV-22 will continue to require

substantial shares of Navy aircraft procurement for many years in addition

to funding other aircraft procurements, including the F/A-18E/F aircraft.

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Marine Corps Needs to

Almost Triple Procurement

Funding for the AAAV

The two largest categories in the Marine Corps procurement appropriation

are currently (1) communication and electronics equipment and

(2) ammunition. From fiscal years 1996 through 2001, less than 3 percent

of the Marines Corps’ procurement budget each year is planned for major

amphibious programs because amphibious vehicles are not now being

procured. (See fig. 4.4.)

The Marine Corps procurement budget is projected to double from

$459 million in fiscal year 1996 to $918 million in fiscal year 2001.

However, more procurement funding will be needed when AAAV acquisition

begins late in the next decade. Cost estimates show that $874 million

(constant dollars) will be required in 2008 and over $700 million will be

required in each of the three following years. We estimate that the

procurement budget would have to almost triple over the present

level—from $459 million to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2008 and to

$1.2 billion in fiscal years 2009 to 2011—to allow the Marines to procure

the AAAV, while continuing to procure other required items, such as

ammunition. The Marines believe they need $1.1 billion to $1.5 billion per

year (in constant dollars) to recapitalize the force, based on projected

force structure and equipment needs.

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Figure 4.4: Proportion of Marine Corps Procurement Funds Spent for Amphibious Programs

1970 1980 1990 2000

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Fiscal year

Percent

Source: Developed by GAO from historical FYDP data beginning in fiscal year 1962 and the fiscal

years 1996-2001 FYDP.

Amphibious Programs

Will Compete for

Funding With Other

Major DOD Programs

Navy and Marine Corps amphibious programs will compete with many

other major defense programs for procurement funding. For example,

major procurements include the Air Force’s F-22 advanced tactical fighter

and C-17 cargo aircraft; the Army’s Apache Longbow helicopter and

Javelin missile system; and the Navy’s new attack submarine and F/A-18

E/F Hornet combat aircraft. Table 4.2 shows the estimated procurement

costs for some of DOD’s major programs and years to complete from 1996.

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Table 4.2: Procurement Costs and

Years to Complete for Selected Major

Programs

Then-year dollars in millions

Program Completion costs Years to complete

Longbow Apache Helicopter $8,278 16

F/A-18 E/F Aircraft 83,351 19

DDG-51 Destroyer 29,575 13

F-22 Aircraft 53,807 18

Source: Developed by GAO from December 1994 selected acquisition reports.

To increase funding for amphibious programs, three choices seem

plausible: (1) increase Navy and Marine Corps procurement funding,

(2) spend less on other Navy or defense planned procurements or other

parts of the defense budget, or (3) implement some combination of the

first two choices.

Both the administration and the Congress plan to increase future defense

funding. The administration plans to increase overall defense funding by

$12.6 billion between fiscal years 1996 and 1999, but plans to reduce

procurement funding by $27 billion by eliminating, reducing, or deferring

to 2000 and beyond planned weapon systems modernization. In fiscal

years 2000 and 2001, the administration plans to increase procurement

funding above the 1999 level.

In the fiscal year 1996 concurrent budget resolution approved by the

Senate and House in June 1995, the Congress plans to increase defense

funding by $35.6 billion above the administration’s plan between fiscal

years 1996 and 1999, in part, for the procurement of weapons. The budget

resolution then envisions reducing defense spending $11.4 billion below

the administration’s plan in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Since the planned

amphibious programs’ procurement spans more than 20 years, we believe

that increases in the next few years may benefit the planned procurement

of some amphibious ships whose procurement had been deferred, but

reduced defense funding could adversely affect planned procurement of

the MV-22 aircraft and the AAAV, as well as some of the amphibious ships

whose procurement had always been planned after fiscal year 2001.

Within procurement funding, the administration examines its priorities as

it prepares each new defense budget. As discussed earlier in this report,

planned procurement of amphibious ships and the AAAV have been delayed

as a result of budget decisions. Other decisions could have been made,

however. For example, we reported that because the Air Force does not

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urgently need the F-22 aircraft and the concurrency between development

and production is high, the Congress could choose to restrict production

planned in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.3

 This would save $2.5 billion in

those 2 fiscal years. We also reported that due to a variety of factors, the

Congress might consider canceling plans to buy the third Seawolf

submarine and defer acquisition of a new generation submarine to 2003.

This would save $8.6 billion between fiscal years 1996 and 2000. These

savings could be made available to fund other programs or be taken out of

the budget and so not add to the deficit.

Conclusions The Marine Corps and the Navy estimate that it will now cost about

$58 billion to modernize the amphibious force. DOD’s current FYDP indicates

that through fiscal year 2001, the Navy and the Marine Corps plan to

allocate a higher percentage of their procurement funds for amphibious

equipment than has been the case for most of the past 40 years. Beyond

fiscal year 2001, the Navy and the Marine Corps will need to continue to

allocate a large share of available procurement funds for amphibious

equipment to avoid delays. This could pose a challenge for the services

because of the many programs that will compete for procurement funds.

If the Congress determines the amphibious capability requirements to be

valid and wishes to support the planned amphibious programs, three

options seem plausible: increase Navy and Marine Corps procurement

funding; spend less on other Navy or other services’ planned procurements

or other parts of the defense budget; or implement some combination of

the first two options. These are the trade-offs that the Congress and the

senior DOD leadership will have to decide.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with our draft report. It suggested that because of the

dynamics of the planning, programming, and budgeting system and

congressional action, the charts in the report should clearly state the

source and date of data. We agree and have added this information.

Regarding our discussion of the competition for funds, DOD stated that

programs we cite, such as the Navy’s F/A-18E/F and the Air Force’s F-22,

are not directly linked to the amphibious mission area capabilities. It also

stated that major funding trade-offs across service programs are made at

the highest levels within DOD and that DOD sees no basis for us to cite what

3

Addressing the Deficit: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 1996

(GAO/OCG-95-2, Mar. 15, 1995).

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it describes as apparently arbitrary potential sources of funds. We stated in

this chapter that the administration examines its priorities as it prepares

each new defense budget. Our discussion regarding this matter is intended

to illustrate the choices available to DOD and the Congress and draws from

our past reports in identifying different decisions that could be made.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Steven Sternlieb, Assistant Director

Alan M. Byroade, Senior Evaluator

Los Angeles Office Joseph E. Dewechter, Evaluator-in-Charge

Lorene Sarne, Evaluator

James Nolan, Evaluator

(701031) Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-96-47 Marine Corps
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