Strategie Forum 77

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STRATEGIC FORUM

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Number 77, June 1996

Sustaining Success in Haiti...

by Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic

Conclusions

• The objectives sought in UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 940 have been achieved-but

are not irreversible. The next several months are critical.

• Sustaining the success ofOperation Uphold Democracy requires Haiti-and the international

community-to confront, simultaneously, crucial transitions in political leadership, law and order,

economic assistance, and the international military presence.

• Freezing humanitarian aid and long-term financial support to force reforms is counterproductive.

Such international pressure weakens the Haitian government's ability to improve living

conditions-undermining domestic support for democracy, increasing the risk of

lawlessness-which decrease the likelihood ofrefrom and increase the likelihood of yet another

boatlift.

• Due to delays in recrutiment and training, Haitian police forces lack most ofthe supervisors and

much ofthe experience needed to successfully maintain order ifthe last UN forces leave as

scheduled by July 1996. A follow-on international force will likely be needed while the Haitian

National Police (HNP) become capable of autonomous action.

Background

The next several months will be crucial as Haiti confronts four fundamental transitions:

• Political Leadership: Relations between the business class and the new political elite; between the

executive and an increasingly independent Parliament; and between Jean Bertrand Aristide and his

successor, President Rene Preval, all remain in flux.

• Law and Order: Responsibility for public security has shifted from an Interim Public Security

Force with 900 UN civilian police (Civ-Pol) monitors working closely with a highly visible

Multinational Force (MNF) and United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) military forces to the

inexperienced HNP with few trained supervisors, only 300 Civ-Pol, and no visible UNMIH

military liaison.

• Economic Assistance: Instead ofreadily available humanitarian aid and balance ofpayments

support, much assistance is frozen pending enactment ofseveral controversial reforms. Without

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external funding, the Government of Haiti (GOH) will be unable to function beyond mid-summer,

yet severe unemployment, balance ofpayment deficits, and other macro- economic problems

persist after years of exploitation by the country's despotic leadership and the devastating impact

ofthe embargo.

• International Military Presence: UNMIH has been reduced from a 6,500-member,

U.S.-dominated, highly mobile force to a much smaller, less mobile contingent with no U.S.

participation; unless there is an extension to the mandate, UN presence will end July 1,1996.

Will Success Endure?

The last U.S. soldier serving as part ofthe UNMIH departed Port-au-Prince April 17,1996. The

remaining force of 1,900 Canadian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi troops is led by a Canadian general. The

U.S. military "exit strategy" has been executed as planned, in a three-phased transition that began with

the replacement ofthe U.S.-led 22,000 member MNF by a contingent of 6,000 UNMIH troops in March

1995.

The objectives established in UNSC Resolution 940 have been achieved. The credible threat ofU.S.

military action, combined with the 1 lth-hour diplomacy ofthe Carter-Nunn-Powell mission, peacefully

dislodged the Cedras regime where all else had failed. A secure and stable environment was established,

allowing open and orderly elections to be held for local and national level officials. This was followed

by an even more historic event: Haiti's first peaceful transfer ofpower from one democratically-elected

president to another. Remarka-bly, the entire process of controlling and ultimately dissolving the Haitian

Armed Forces was accomplished with only one U.S. service member killed in action. An entirely new

police force of 5,200 was recruited, given four months training, and deployed by February 1996.

Large-scale relief efforts and temporary work projects helped alleviate the misery ofthe masses.

Progress was made in restoring basic infrastructure such as electricity, roads, and water, and a few

private sector enterprises also resumed operations. A crucial factor undergirding these achievements was

the exceptional cooperation among key players: the Special Representative ofthe UN Secretary General

Lakhdar Brahimi, the U.S. (and UN) force commander Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer, the U.S. Ambassador

William Lacey Swing, and Haitian authorities.

In the process, U.S. interests in Haiti-stopping atrocities, securing our borders against illegal

immigration, promoting democracy in the hemisphere, upholding our international commitments, and

restoring national credibility tarnished by the abortive deployment ofthe USS Harlan County-were also

furthered.

Although the MNF and the UNMIH successfully accomplished their assigned tasks, some ofthese

achievements are fragile and subject to reversal. Much remains to be done by the extended UNMIH

mission, by the United States, the international community, and principally by the Haitian people

themselves. Ifsuccess is to be sustained in Haiti, each ofthese actors will need to take appropriate

measures.

Political Leadership: Haiti's democratic roots are shallow, and the ability ofthe government to respond

to citizen needs is severely constrained. A genuine commitment to resolve future political disputes

through peaceful, democratic means has yet to be forged. The conduct ofthe French-speaking oligarchy

and of hard-core Aristide supporters within the Lavalas movement will be particularly crucial. The

possibility also exists that essential economic reforms could be thwarted by opposition from within

Lavalas. Ifpolitical gridlock immobilizes the Preval government, eroding its legitimacy and prolonging

economic stagnation, domestic stability could give way to serious disorder, with all the attendant

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consequences.

Also vital to the consolidation of democracy is governmental performance. Given that Haitian

government has traditionally been little more than a mechanism ofself-enrichment, a major role reversal

is obviously required ifit is to respond effectively to the basic needs ofthe people. Dire shortages of

both material resources and administrative-technical expertise at all levels immensely compound this

challenge.

Law and Order: In spite of Herculean efforts to create a police force de novo, serious voids remain:

• Recruitment and training ofafull cadre ofsupervisors for Haiti's rookie police force. When

Preval took office, only 35 of 257 supervisory billets had been filled. (This deficiency is being

addressed by Preval's new public security team. However, it is constrained by an extremely limited

pool oftalent and by the need to purge some questionable Aristide appointees.)

• Intensive on-the-job training, to include programs for crowd control and community relations

(delayed by holds on U.S. funding) and long-term mentoring for HNP cadres by UN Civ-Pol

monitors.

• Development ofa competent and objective investigative capability (delayed initially by Aristide

and subsequently by holds on U.S. funding.)

• Acquisition and maintenance ofessential equipment, particularly for transportation and

communication (also delayed by holds on U.S. funding.)

Owing to these major but resolvable shortcomings, the HNP will not be capable of autonomously

maintaining a secure and stable environment until long after the scheduled July 1, 1996, departure ofthe

extended UNMIH mission.

To have any lasting impact, improvements in law enforcement must be accompanied by similar

developments in the courts and prisons, particularly given the structure ofHaitian jurisprudence which

requires judicial direction before the police may conduct investigations or make arrests. In the absence of

a functional judicial system, the HNP could eventually be inclined to take justice into its own hands, and

organized crime, especially drug traffickers, could become a severe threat to democratic governance.

Economic Assistance: Regime stability in the near term will largely depend on the perceived likelihood

of economic growth and the government's ability to begin responding to basic citizen needs.

Well-publicized pledges of assistance by the United States and the international community have led to

expectations that living conditions should already have begun to improve. Bloody encounters between

the HNP and street gangs in the slums of Cite Soliel in early March accentuated the need to focus

assistance expeditiously on potential trouble spots. Resources already pledged (Approximately $950

million from 1996-99) should be adequate, ifproperly targeted. An inability to bring about tangible

improvements could be destabilizing for the Preval government and produce a new wave ofmigration.

Addressing these rising expectations necessarily involves both long-term structural reform (e.g.,

privatization and civil service reform) and near-term improvement in living conditions. Paradoxically,

the reforms, although essential for sustainable growth and for the release ofmost long-term international

assistance, could nevertheless exacerbate economic distress in the short run. This is an especially

contentious issue within the Haitian Parliament. Preval must patch together a coalition in support of

reforms that Aristide had refused to address. Haitian authorities also confront serious resource

constraints, limited bureaucratic and organizational capabilities, and growing public impatience.

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U.S. policy makers and international financial institutions need to strike a prudent balance between

withholding economic assistance as an inducement to reform, versus the injection offunds essential for

economic revitalization and political performance. Denial of assistance could undermine domestic

confidence in the Preval government to such an extent that it becomes too feeble to adopt or implement

the very reforms being sought by the international community. At the moment, the benefits of bolstering

the Preval government by carefully calibrated assistance are perhaps at a premium. The damaging

consequences of a prolonged suspension of aid would be compounded by uncertainty over the country's

stability after UNMIH's ultimate withdrawal (now set for July 1st) since the HNP is not yet able to

maintain law and order on its own.

Immediate Measures to Sustain Success in Haiti

With the departure ofU.S. troops in mid-April, responsibility for preserving democratic practices and

resurrecting the economy shifted onto Haitian shoulders. This transition is fraught with uncertainty, and

the continuing engagement ofthe international community, led by the United States, will be vital to

assure that the successes ofthe MNF and UNMIH missions are sustained. The next several months will

be crucial. The linchpin will be to bolster positive public perceptions in Haiti regarding Preval's political

stature, the country's economic prospects, and the competence ofthe HNP. This does not necessarily

require additional funding, but rather judicious targeting of existing resources to have an immediate

impact on vital areas.

Political Leadership: A critical need, at present, is to galvanize the GOH's capacity to convert

assistance into tangible projects having a direct impact at the grassroots level. One measure that could be

taken would be to assign U.S. Army Civil Affairs officers, on temporary duty, to work directly in key

ministries~as was done during the fall of 1994 to help Aristide resurrect the governmental apparatus and

jump-start the economy. Special priority should be given to eliminating dysfunctional government

practices that impede delivery ofservices, to supporting the judiciary, and to bolstering the public

information function.

Law and Order: The need to provide additional mentoring for the HNP rank and file, train specialized

units, and develop a cadre ofsupervisors is clearly understood. The United States has the lead-through

the International Criminal Investigation and Training Assistance Program-with support from Canada

and France. Programs have been developed to address these needs. However, U.S. funding has been

delayed because of various Congressional concerns, including the perceived inadequacy ofinvestigations

into alleged political killings. (Approximately $1 million was released on March 22, 1996, allowing the

resumption of certain law enforcement training. Other funds and key programs remained on hold.)

Avoiding similar U.S. executive- legislative impasses in the future will be crucial to the viability of an

autonomous HNP and Preval's prospects as president.

The 300 UN Civ-Pol monitors will be pivotal in providing oversight for Haiti's rookie police force.

Current strength (100 Canadians, 100 French, and 100 others) has been reduced by two-thirds from its

previous level, but it will still need to play a very active, hands-on mentoring role for an extended

period. This should include encouraging the HNP to conduct expanded and highly visible patrolling.

UNMIH will also need to maintain a highly visible profile and remain poised to assist the HNP as

needed with its Quick Reaction Force.

Economic Assistance: Especially during the next several months, a share ofresources should be

dedicated to marginalized urban populations where the greatest potential for destabilizing unrest exists.

The HNP and, ifnecessary, UNMIH should afford security, as required, for aid providers in restive

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areas. U.S. Agency for International Development "quick impact projects" can be used for immediate

action, with responsibility for implementation assigned to Haitian non-governmental organizations

(NGOs), supported by U.S. counterparts. Other international donors should undertake similar accelerated

action. Longer term plans have been developed-and international assistance pledged--for economic

development in both the public and private sectors, with emphasis upon the latter. These should be

expedited.

International Military Presence: With the HNP still in its infancy, departure of UNMIH on July 1st

would clearly be premature; however, any further UNMIH extension would assuredly encounter staunch

resistance from Russia and China. It is prudent, therefore, to consider other alternatives for maintaining a

residual international military presence to assure public order until the HNP has acquired the experience

and resources to take full responsibility.

Without a mandate extension, the options are another coalition force blessed but not funded by the UN

(such as the MNF), or several purely bilateral accords. In either case, it is likely that Canada, having

made the political commitment and borne the sunk cost of deploying its military units, would be willing

to remain. The Canadian government has not only taken on a major responsibility in Haiti, they have

done so largely at their own expense. They would be reluctant, however, to assume the entire task

unilaterally, and a multinational presence would also be much more acceptable to the GOH. Ifthe UN

does not authorize a further extension, potential contributors to an alternative follow-on force (e.g.,

Pakistan, Argentina, Venezuela, and the Caribbean states) would almost certainly require funding from

some other source.

The United States retains a 275-450 member Support Group in Haiti, including engineering units

temporarily assigned to perform training activities. The contribution their presence makes to public

security would need to be reevaluated in light of changing circumstances. To permit a smooth transfer to

any follow-on force by early July, and to avoid the unsettling perception of a lapse in public security,

action to extend UNMIH's mandate or to create a separate follow-on force must be taken promptly.

The destiny ofHaiti is now in the hands ofits people and their democratically elected leadership. By

remaining engaged, the international community can maximize prospects that the developmental process

remains on course and does not falter for simply technical reasons. Just as vital, perhaps, is the

psychological signal this sends to the Haitian people ofsupport for the Preval regime as it grapples with

some very nettlesome decisions.

Recommendations

As Haiti copes with fundamental transitions in the character ofit political and economic systems, public

security apparatus, and international military presence, the following short-term actions would maximize

prospects for success:

• Release sufficient humanitarian aid and balance of payments support to promote GOH readiness

for reforms and provide urgent grassroots socio-economic assistance.

• Reinforce positive public perceptions in Haiti regarding Preval's political stature, and boost the

government's capacity to convert outside assistance into tangible projects at the grassroots level.

• Target a share ofresources immediately to marginalized urban populations where the greatest

potential for destabilizing unrest exists.

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• Provide additional mentoring for the HNP rank and file, prepare specialized units, and train a

professional cadre ofsupervisors.

• Act promptly to extend UNMIH's mandate or create a separate follow-on force.

INSS held a simulation on March 28th examining future prospects for Haiti. Specialists from Canada,

U.S. State and Defense Department organizations, the Haitian NGO umbrella organization Inter-Action,

and several distinguished academic experts participated. This paper is taken from the simulation's

conclusions and recommendations, as well as from judgments formed during INSS research in Haiti. For

more information contact Ambassador Oakley at (202) 685-3837, ext. 510, or Col. Michael Dziedzic at

ext. 548. NOTE

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