THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND

CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR

Steven Metz

and

James Kievit

July 25, 1994
ii

******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is

approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

******

For ideas, comments, and background material, the authors would like to

thank Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., Rod Paschall, William W. Mendel, Charles F.

Swett, Jeffrey Cooper, Stefan Antonmattei III, Gary Guertner, Douglas V.

Johnson, and, especially William T. Johnsen.

******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded

to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the

authors by calling commercial (717) 245-3822 or DSN 242-3822, FAX (717) 245-

3820, DSN 242-3820.
iii

FOREWORD

For many experts on U.S. national security, the combination of emerging

technology and innovative ideas seen in the Gulf War seem to herald a genuine

revolution in military affairs. The victory of coalition forces demonstrated

the technology and seemed to suggest that the revolution in military affairs

can solve many of the strategic problems faced by the United States in the

post-Cold War security environment.

In this study, the authors concede that the revolution in military

affairs holds great promise for conventional, combined-arms warfare, but

conclude that its potential value in conflict short of war, whether terrorism,

insurgency, or violence associated with narcotrafficking, is not so clear-cut.

 Given this, national leaders and strategists should proceed cautiously and

only after a full exploration of the ethical, political, and social

implications of their decisions. To illustrate this, the authors develop a

hypothetical future scenario--a "history" of U.S. efforts in conflict short of

war during the first decade of the 21st century. 

It is too early to offer concrete policy prescriptions for adapting many

aspects of the revolution in military affairs to conflict short of war, but

the authors do suggest an array of questions that should be debated. In order

to decide whether to apply new technology and emerging concepts or how to

employ them, the United States must first reach consensus on ultimate

objectives and acceptable costs. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased

to offer this study as a first step in this process.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEVEN METZ is Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs at

the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. His specialties are

transregional security issues and military operations other than war. Dr.

Metz has taught at the Air War College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, and several universities. He holds a B.A. and M.A. in international

studies from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political

science from the Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Metz has published many

monographs and articles on world politics, military strategy, and national

security policy.

JAMES KIEVIT is a Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College. His specialties are operational art,

military engineering, and U.S. Army force structure issues. Commissioned in

the Corps of Engineers, LTC Kievit has served in a variety of troop leading,

command, and staff assignments in the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Engineer

Brigade, and the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized). He has also served as

Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as a force

structure analyst and study director at the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis

Agency. LTC Kievit holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, a M.M.A.S.

from the School of Advanced Military Studies of the U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, and a M.A. in history and M.S.E. in construction

management from the University of Michigan.
v

SUMMARY

Many American strategic thinkers believe that we are in the beginning

stages of a historical revolution in military affairs (RMA). This will not

only change the nature of warfare, but also alter the global geopolitical

balance. 

To date, most attention has fallen on the opportunities provided by the

RMA rather than its risks, costs, and unintended consequences. In the arena

of conflict short of war, these risks, costs, and unintended consequences may

outweigh the potential benefits.

The Strategic Context.

The Cold War notion of conflict short of war is obsolete. Politically

and militarily, the Third World of the future will be full of danger. The

future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed states,

new forms of insurgency and terrorism, and "gray area phenomena." Many if not

most Third World states will fragment into smaller units. Ungovernability and

instability will be the norm with power dispersed among warlords, primal

militias, and well-organized politico-criminal organizations. U.S. policy in

the Third World is likely to be more selective and the U.S. homeland may no

longer provide sanctuary. Renewed external support will restore the lagging

proficiency of insurgents and terrorists.

The Application of Emerging Technology.

Emerging technology will have less impact on conflict short of war than

on conventional, combined-arms warfare. It will, however, have some role. In

noncombatant evacuation operations, new technology can assist with

identification and notification of evacuees. Sensor technology, robotics,

nonlethal weapons, and intelligence meshes will be used in combatting

terrorism, countering narcotrafficking, and peace operations. These

technologies, along with simulator training and unmanned aerial vehicles, will

also be useful in insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Constraints and Countermeasures.

There are a number of constraints on applying the RMA to conflict short

of war. These include the lack of a powerful institutional advocate for this

process, a shortage of money for the development of technology specifically

for conflict short of war, and the possibility that new technology may run

counter to American values.

Enemies may also develop countermeasures to RMA innovations. Rather

than attempt to match the technological prowess of U.S. forces, future enemies

will probably seek asymmetrical countermeasures designed to strike at U.S.

public support for engagement in conflict short of war, at the will of our

friends and allies, or, in some cases, at deployed U.S. forces.

Making Revolution.

Rather than simply graft emerging technology to existing strategy,

doctrine, organization, force structure, objectives, concepts, attitudes, and

norms, the United States could pursue a full revolution in the way we approach

conflict short of war. This is rife with hidden dangers and unintended

consequences. A hypothetical future scenario illustrates some of these.
vi

Conclusions and Recommendations.

In the near future, change will occur in the American approach to

conflict short of war. To understand and control ongoing change, research,

analysis, and debate is needed on a number of topics:

• A comprehensive general theory of military revolutions set within the

context of broader notion of global politics and security;

• The strategy and policy foundation of military revolutions;

• The ethical dimension of RMA;

• The impact of the RMA on the structure of the U.S. national security

organization;

• The impact of RMA on leader development within the military;

• The cultivation of appropriate expertise within the Army; and,

• Technology designed specifically for conflict short of war, especially

psychological, biological, and defensive technology.
1

THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND

CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR

Introduction: Groping for the Future.

In the late 1970s Soviet military analysts, led by Marshal N.V. Ogarkov,

began to write of an emerging revolution in the nature of warfare. 1

 By the

early 1990s, this idea had spread to the United States, leading strategic

thinkers inside and outside the government to conclude that ongoing innovation

represents a true turning point in history.2 If this is true, the strategic

implications are far-reaching. Revolutionary changes in the character of

warfare, according to Andrew F. Krepinevich, "have profound consequences for

global and regional military balances."3 But while it is clear that dramatic

change is underway, its ultimate repercussions remain hidden.

In its purest sense, revolution brings change that is permanent,

fundamental, and rapid. The basic premise of the revolution in military

affairs (RMA) is simple: throughout history, warfare usually developed in an

evolutionary fashion, but occasionally ideas and inventions combined to propel

dramatic and decisive change. This not only affected the application of

military force, but often altered the geopolitical balance in favor of those

who mastered the new form of warfare. The stakes of military revolution are

thus immense. Full of promise, it seems to offer Americans an answer to many

enduring strategic dilemmas, whether intolerance of casualties, impatience, or

the shrinking military manpower base. In a time of shrinking defense budgets,

emerging technology may allow the United States to maintain or even enhance

its global military power.4

 The Gulf War was widely seen as a foretaste of

RMA warfare, offering quick victory with limited casualties. As a result,

most attention has been on the opportunities provided by RMA rather than its

risks, costs, and unintended side effects.

It is ironic that just as Marxism reached final bankruptcy as a

framework for political and economic organization, one of its basic notions

gained new life. Karl Marx, after all, postulated that revolutions can be

deliberate rather than inadvertent; historical change can be created,

engineered, and harnessed by those who understand it. Without direct

attribution to Marx, this idea led many analysts to assume the current RMA can

be the first deliberate one as senior military leaders and strategic thinkers

consciously shape the future.

Whether Marxist or not, revolutionaries must always ask a series of key

questions. First: Do the proper preconditions exist for revolutionary change

or can they be created? In contemporary military affairs, the answer to this

is "yes." Emerging technology; economic, political, and social trends; and,

most importantly, new ideas create the right environment for revolution. Then

revolutionaries must ask: How can I begin, sustain, and control the

revolution? In current military affairs, this question is still under debate.

 Finally, the most difficult and often most critical questions are: Do we

truly want a revolution? and, Will the long-term benefits outweigh the costs

and risks? Advocates of a revolution in military affairs have not begun to

grapple with these issues.
2

The change wrought by some revolutions is deep; others do not reach such

extremes. This also applies to RMAs. The United States now faces a crucial

choice. We can choose to drive the current RMA further and faster than any of

its predecessors. In combined-arms warfare, this may be necessary. But

conflict short of war--whether terrorism, narcotrafficking, peace enforcement,

or insurgency--is different. Even if the RMA does prove applicable to these

problems, there are good reasons for deliberately limiting it. As the United

States faces this dilemma, strategic considerations rather than our

fascination with technology and enthusiasm for change must be paramount .

Cry "Havoc!": The Strategic Context.

RMAs are born, develop, and die in specific strategic contexts, each

composed of an array of social, economic, political, and military factors. 

The strategic context of the current RMA is dominated by the transformation of

the global system from the Cold War to post-Cold War period. This shapes

conflict short of war and influences the utility of U.S. military force.

During the Cold War, the most strategically significant form of conflict

short of war-- then called "low-intensity conflict"--was revolutionary

insurgency in the Third World. Low-intensity conflict outside the Third World

did not require U.S. military force--the British, Italians, Germans, or

Spanish could deal with their own problems--but revolutionary insurgency

targeting our Third World allies often did. Using the strategy of protracted

guerrilla war perfected by Mao and Giap, insurgents, usually supported by the

Soviet Union, China, or their proxies, sought to overthrow fragile, proWestern regimes. Because revolutionary insurgency thwarted political reform

and economic development, often spread to neighboring states, and, when

successful, increased Soviet influence, we considered it a major threat. 

Admittedly no Third World insurgency directly endangered the United States,

but in combination they did. The dominant strategic logic was what French

counterinsurgent theorists called "death by a thousand small cuts." 5

In response, Western strategists developed an elaborate

counterinsurgency doctrine. Codified by Robert Thompson, Roger Trinquier, and

others, this initially emerged from the French and British experience in

Malaya, Algeria, and Indochina.6 Eventually Americans assumed responsibility

for the counterinsurgency paradigm; Vietnam replaced Malaya and Algeria as the

seminal event.7

 The culmination of Cold War-era thinking was the 1990 release

of Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, Military Operations

in Low Intensity Conflict.8

 By defining counterinsurgency as opposition to

Marxist "people's war," this document viewed low-intensity conflict in general

as a subset of the struggle between the superpowers.9 Regime legitimacy was

the central concept. The United States sought to augment this and,

ultimately, ameliorate the underlying causes of conflict. The military

dimension of counterinsurgency simply allowed economic and political reforms

to take root. Counterinsurgents could not win through purely military means,

according to this theory, but they could lose.

Full of well-developed, impressive thinking, FM 100-20 deals with forms

of violence rapidly becoming obsolete. Today, the essential nature of

conflict short of war is changing. Marxist "people's war" represents the

past. The future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed

states, new forms of "spiritual" insurgency designed to radically alter the

ideological structure of regimes, and "commercial" insurgency from quasipolitical "gray area phenomena" such as narcoterrorism.10 Other important

changes are also on the way. During the Cold War, conflict short of war

primarily concerned nation-states. In the post-Cold War era, many if not most

Third World states will fragment into smaller units. Ungovernability and

instability will be the norm. Even those which formally remain intact will

see political and military power dispersed among warlords, primal militias,

and well-organized politico-criminal organizations.11 Most of these will be

characterized by ruthlessness, some also by dangerous sophistication as

terrorists and narcotraffickers master modern technology. Rapid, multilayered

global communications will allow insurgents, terrorists, and narcotraffickers
3

to learn and adapt quickly and even to form alliances and coalitions. While

war or near-war may be no more common than in past decades, general, low-level

violence will be pervasive.

In this environment, the United States will probably concentrate on

containing rather than ameliorating conflict. Our future policy in the Third

World is likely to be more selective with a trend toward disengagement. While

the global conflict with the Soviet Union forced American engagement in Third

World struggles where tangible national interests were minimal, the end of the

Cold War gives us the option of limiting our role in certain types of

conflicts to support of the United Nations or other multinational efforts, or

rejecting involvement all together. While the great powers are currently

cooperating on Third World conflict, they are likely to lose interest over the

long-term. If this happens, U.S. objectives will increasingly be symbolic as

we pursue humanitarian relief or attempt to cultivate a system of world order

but are not willing to bear the costs of the final resolution of complex and

long-standing conflicts.

Most ominously, the U.S. homeland may no longer provide sanctuary as it

did from Cold War-era low intensity conflict. As in Great Britain, insurgents

and terrorists angered by U.S. policy may bring the conflict to our country

using global interdependence and the increased international flow of people. 

Moreover, as Third World dictators assimilate the lessons of the Gulf War,

they will see conflict short of war as a useful but safer form of aggression.

 Renewed external support will restore the lagging proficiency of insurgents

and terrorists including their technological capability. Politically and

militarily, then, the Third World of the future will be full of danger.

Let Slip the Dogs of War: The Application of Emerging Technology.

The emerging RMA in mid- or high-intensity warfare is centered around

the fusion of sophisticated remote sensing systems with extremely lethal,

usually stand-off, precision-strike weapons systems and automation-assisted

command, control, and communications (C3

). Trained with electronic

simulations, virtual reality devices, and field exercises, this fusion is

expected to allow smaller military forces to attain rapid, decisive results

through synchronized, near-simultaneous operations throughout the breadth and

depth of a theater of war.12 The eventual result may be radically new forms

of conventional warfare. With a few exceptions, however, the impact of the

RMA on conflict short of war is far less clear.

Attacks or raids--which are doctrinal missions for the U.S. Army--are an

exception. The military objective of attacks or raids in a conflict short of

war is to damage or destroy high value targets of an adversary in order to

seize and maintain the political or military initiative, and to demonstrate

U.S. capability and resolve.13 Although sometimes such operations are covert

and executed by unconventional or special operations forces, in most cases a

successful operation and its effects should be clearly visible to both the

target and the international community. Emerging RMA technologies should

improve the U.S. military's capability in these types of operations. 

Terrestrial, aerial, and space-based, autonomous, wide-ranging, high-speed

collecting devices capable of on-board processing will identify precise

targets and provide near-real-time information about the adversary's

dispositions. Distributed interactive simulations and virtual reality devices

will train the forces and be used to rehearse the strikes. And automationassisted C3

 systems will synchronize and control lethal, stand-off, precisionguided weapons systems in near-simultaneous attacks.14 Information technology

could be used to both conceal the intent to strike and, later, provide

evidence of a successful strike.15 Attacks and raids during conflict short of

war are, in effect, mid- to high-intensity operations writ small.16 RMA

therefore can have a significant effect. By contrast, the potential impact of

emerging technology on more "traditional" operations in conflict short of war

such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), counterterrorism,

counternarcotrafficking, peace enforcement, and counterinsurgency is more

ambiguous.
4

In the increasingly global economy, large numbers of Americans may find

themselves in areas of instability and conflict. Voluntary and involuntary

noncombatant evacuation operations will therefore be more frequent. The

strategic objective of a NEO is the removal of U.S. (and occasionally allied)

citizens from danger. The presence of Americans in areas of conflict reduces

the flexibility of decision makers not only because U.S. citizens might be

taken hostage or endangered, but also because their injury or death can rally

public support in the United States for more militant action than policymakers

might otherwise favor. But the open declaration of a NEO and its execution

also restricts options since it signals the seriousness of a crisis by

"clearing the decks" for further action. For decision makers this creates a

tension between a desire to remove citizens from danger early and a fear of

intensifying a crisis or precipitating undesirable adversary reaction. 

While advances in robotics and information technologies may make it

possible to perform many commercial activities with fewer employees in

dangerous regions, those Americans who are overseas will be more isolated and

dispersed. This complicates the main problems of NEOs: identification and

notification of the individuals to be evacuated, identification of safe

evacuation routes, and assessment of threats to the evacuation. Technology

could diminish these problems. In the near future every American at risk

could be equipped with an electronic individual position locator device

(IPLD). The device, derived from the electronic bracelet used to control some

criminal offenders or parolees, would continuously inform a central data bank

of the individuals' locations. Eventually such a device could be permanently

implanted under the skin, with automatic remote activation either upon

departure from U.S. territory (while passing through the security screening

system at the airport, for example) or by transmission of a NEO alert code to

areas of conflict. Implantation would help preclude removal of the device

(although, of course, some terrorists might be willing to remove a portion of

the hostage's body if they knew where the device was implanted). The IPLD

could also act as a form of IFFN (identification friend, foe, or neutral) if

U.S. military personnel were equipped with appropriate challenge/response

devices. Finally, such a device might eventually serve, like Dick Tracey's

wrist radio, as a two-way communication channel permitting the NEO

notification to be done covertly.

The second emerging technology with direct application in NEOs is the

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). UAVs will be able to conduct rapid

reconnaissance of possible evacuation routes and identify threats during the

evacuation. Their small size will make them less conspicuous than either

ground vehicles or manned air platforms. Large numbers of fast UAVs could

cover multiple exit routes, thus complicating any attempt to interfere with

the NEO. In combination with "wrist-radios," High Altitude Long Endurance

(HALE) UAVs could provide NEO notification capability via scrambled TV/radio

to Americans on the ground.17 When a NEO required combat action, stand-off,

precision-strike weapons systems could allow small military teams to

accomplish missions which today require companies or even battalions.18

Equipping these small units with adaptive camouflage could also reduce the

visibility of NEOs.19 The less visible an operation, the less provocative; the

less visible military teams are, the harder to interfere with them. 

Finally, developing military C3I systems could help avoid dangerous,

last minute evacuation of Americans all together. Currently, businessmen and

diplomats facing crises tend to linger until the last possible moment, often

ignoring official warnings. If the U.S. military could gain nondestructive

access to (and perhaps even control of ) the communications of an area from

remote locations and made this available to Americans, businessmen and

diplomats might voluntarily depart early in a crisis knowing they could carry

on their activities even though not physically present. By encouraging

voluntary departure prior to a crisis, reducing the need for a public

disclosure of a NEO, and reducing the political visibility of evacuations,

emerging technology increases options available to decision makers and reduces

the degree to which NEOs act as barometers of U.S. resolve. When evacuees are
5

actually threatened, the ability to strike quickly, precisely, and from a

distance will provide a margin of safety.

Providing safety is also the primary U.S. objective when combatting

terrorism. Currently, the State Department deals with terrorism overseas and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation has domestic jurisdiction. The military

supports both. Efforts to combat terrorism fall into two categories:

defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property

(antiterrorism), and offensive actions to prevent, deter, and punish

(counterterrorism).20 Emerging technologies are a two-edged sword. Some--

like bio-technical weapons--can be tools of terrorism. Others--like

precision, stand-off weapons or intrusive information technologies--may be

used either for or against terrorism.

If technology allows a reduced American presence overseas, antiterrorism

will be easier. Improved sensors and robotic guard systems may make

installations, both military and commercial, more difficult to penetrate. In

counterterrorism, according to Count de Marenches, former chief of French

Intelligence, "Precision personal intelligence can be more critical than

precision-guided munitions."21 Advances in electronics and sensors and, even

more importantly, the ability to fuse data through automation and improved

organizations may provide that most critical commodity. New computer

software, according to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, could "quickly discover and

expose critical associations that would otherwise go undetected."22 As

demonstrated by Israel, UAVs can also play a significant role: "... a

remotely piloted plane followed a car carrying fleeing terrorists back to

their base, so that it could subsequently be demolished by air attack."23 If

the Army develops the aerial capability to broadcast and alter television

signals, it could remove a key and essential weapon from the terrorist

arsenal--media coverage.24 Finally, some authors have speculated that

advances in nonlethal weapons may make it possible to disable and capture

terrorists or "glue" incoming car bombs to the street. 

At least one analyst has suggested using "soft kill" weapons such as

high energy radio frequency (HERF) guns and electromagnetic pulse transformer

(EMP/T) bombs, to interdict narcotrafficking flights by damaging or destroying

their avionics.25 Like combatting terrorism, counternarcotrafficking

operations are primarily a law enforcement function, with the military

providing support.26 Because narcotraffickers operate like terrorists, much

counterterrorism technology can be used against them. In fact,

narcotraffickers are even more likely than terrorists to rely on radios,

cellular telephones, fax machines, and computers. This greatly increases

their vulnerability to electronic intelligence gathering and disruption. For

example, remote intrusive monitoring of the financial computer networks of

offshore banks could identify the deposits associated with money laundering. 

If desired, such accounts could be electronically emptied.

Because interdicting narcotrafficking is similar to locating a military

opponent's reconnaissance platforms, a military capable, in Martin Libicki's

words, of collecting "more and more data about a battlefield, knitting a finer

and finer mesh which can catch smaller and stealthier objects" could pinpoint

intruders into U.S. territory.27 Existing radar nets can identify aircraft

attempting low altitude entry into the United States, so a favored technique

of drug smugglers is to transfer the contraband from planes to speedboats

offshore. Tracking and stopping high-speed small craft in coastal waters is

difficult today. With projected advances in sensors and directed-energy or

stand-off precision conventional munitions it could become routine. Drugs

smuggled in commercial carriers might be interdicted by hosts of miniaturized,

remote controlled, robotic detectors capable of rapid stem to stern searches

of ships and airliners.28 Interdiction of narcotics at the source, currently

a resource-intensive activity involving search and destroy operations or large

scale spraying of ecologically damaging herbicides, might be done in the

future by miniature, self-mobile, bio-mechanical "bugs" delivered by aerial

dispenser to seek out and kill or modify narcotic producing plants.29

Alternatively, information warfare systems might influence the behavior of
6

populations by convincing citizens to turn in traffickers or not buy drugs.

Behavior modification is a key component of peace enforcement. The

primary objective of these operations is to prevent violence and facilitate

diplomatic resolution of a conflict.30 "Soft kill" systems can play a key

role. Examples include not only information warfare but also biotechnical

antimaterial agents which "could disable propulsion systems (attacking fuel

and lubricants or clogging airways and critical passages); change the

characteristics of soil or vegetation (to deny terrain to vehicles and

troops); or degrade warfighting material (particularly those with organic

components)."31 Advances in electronics and robotics could also prove useful

in peace operations, allowing commanders to separate forces with a "no man's

land" populated by remote sensing devices or robotic patrols and enforced with

stand-off precision strike weapons, thus reducing peacekeeper casualties and

improving the chances that the peacekeeping force will remain long enough for

a political resolution of the conflict. 

The final area of consideration for application of emerging technologies

to conflict short of war are insurgency and counterinsurgency. The military

objectives of insurgency and counterinsurgency are diametrically opposed. In

insurgency the United States assists an armed political organization

attempting to seize power or extract political concessions from a regime

opposed to U.S. interests. Counterinsurgency seeks to contain or defeat an

insurgency attempting the overthrow of a friendly regime.32 How then, might

the RMA affect these operations? According to FM 100-20 the U.S. armed

forces, when directed to do so, can assist insurgent efforts to:

• Recruit, organize, train, and equip forces;

• Develop institutions and infrastructure;

• Gather intelligence; and

• Perform psychological operations, surreptitious insertions, linkups,

evasion, escape, subversion, sabotage, and resupply.33

Emerging technology can augment U.S. capabilities in a number of these areas.

 Simulator training devices can help force development and partially

compensate for the difficulties insurgents face in performing actual field

training. UAVs can be used for psychological operations aimed at mobilizing

support and enhancing the legitimacy of the insurgents. Stealth vehicles can

be used for insertions, biotechnological antimaterial agents for sabotage, and

the U.S.'s extensive sensor and collector network can provide intelligence

support. 

Counterinsurgency is similar. Success hinges on obtaining accurate

intelligence about the insurgents, and developing or maintaining government

legitimacy. Greatly improved intelligence gathering and fusion is a primary

component of the RMA, and proposed information warfare capabilities might be

ideally suited for helping develop desired emotions, attitudes, or

behavior.34 Stand-off weapons could interdict outside support to the

insurgents without requiring a U.S. presence. This could help a beleaguered

regime maintain legitimacy. Improved training of security forces using

simulators would improve their effectiveness, thus increasing the public's

trust in the regime's ability to provide security.

Potholes in the Information Superhighway: Constraints and Countermeasures.

Emerging technology may improve the application of force in conflict

short of war, but there is probably no imminent RMA in this arena. The

changes in conflict short of war will be considerably less dramatic than in

those projected for mid- to high-intensity combat, particularly when possible

constraints or countermeasures are considered.

These constraints begin at the highest level as the basic nature of our

national security organization generates obstacles to innovation. As Stephen

Peter Rosen points out, large bureaucracies are not only difficult to change,

they are explicitly designed not to change--"the absence of innovation is the

rule, the natural state."35 Ironically, the successful end of the Cold War,
7

even though it dramatically increased the need for innovation, complicates the

process. In all human endeavors, success tends to stifle innovation. The

natural attitude is "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The fact that the

United States has not faced a recent military or national security disaster

has hindered the development and application of new technology to conflict

short of war. To many Americans, the absence of disaster shows that our

national security strategy "ain't broke." Moreover, conflict short of war

lacks a powerful institutional advocate able to transcend this attitude. Both

civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense fear that effort,

time, and, most importantly, money spent on conflict short of war will be

subtracted from that available for conventional combined-arms warfare. And it

is not clear that the American public and the Congress consider improving our

capabilities in conflict short of war important.

In this era of shrinking defense budgets, little money is available for

technology designed specifically for conflict short of war. Fortunately, much

of the technology developed for conventional mid- and high-intensity conflict

can be extrapolated to conflict short of war, but insurgency, terrorism, and

narcotrafficking also demand some unique capabilities. Like a business'

investment in new plant, military technology increases effectiveness and

efficiency in the long-term, but has major short-term costs. If we choose to

engage in conflict short of war, two things could inspire efforts to develop

and apply cutting-edge technology. One is the emergence of an active and

powerful coterie of visionaries within the national security community,

including both senior military and civilian leaders. The other is defeat or

disaster. Yet even if the United States did make a concerted effort to apply

emerging technology to conflict short of war, our opponents would quickly

develop countermeasures, thus posing new problems and forcing further

innovation by U.S. forces. Because U.S. engagement in conflict short of war

will continue to be have weak domestic support, opponents will not have to

match us innovation for innovation, but only increase the cost of American

engagement beyond the low limits of public and congressional tolerance. How,

then, might future opponents attempt to counter high-tech U.S. forces?

First, they will strike at domestic support for U.S. engagement. One

way to do this is to kill Americans or damage U.S. property. Off-duty and

rear-area U.S. forces in country will--as always--be targets. But in the

increasingly mobile and interdependent world, the United States itself may

also be vulnerable. At times, immigrant or resident alien communities within

the United States may provide a base of support. New alliances among groups

unhappy with our policy will coalesce, share information and, occasionally,

conduct cooperative operations. Electronic terrorism--the sabotage of

communications and computer systems in retaliation for official policy--will

also be a tool of our enemies. Cyberspace will supplement international

airports as the point-of-entry for terrorists. As a National Security

Decision Directive signed by President Bush noted, "Telecommunications and

information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception,

unauthorized access, and related forms of technical exploitation...The

technology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is used

extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as well, by terrorist

groups..."36 Opponents will also undercut domestic support for U.S.

engagement through traditional political mobilization using immigrant and

resident alien communities as well as sympathetic indigenous political groups-

-time-tested tactics honed during Vietnam and the 1980s. Advertising and

public relations firms will be hired to construct sophisticated

"consciousness-raising" campaigns. Often these will attack American public

opinion indirectly by creating international opposition to our policy.

Opponents will also counter American military prowess by targeting our

friends and allies. Reliance on allies has long been an American

vulnerability in conflict short of war. In Vietnam, for example, even our

hard-won understanding of revolutionary "people's war" could not bring victory

to the incompetent and repressive Saigon elite. For American doctrine and

strategy to work, we must have a local ally with some base of legitimacy. 
8

Given this, future opponents may not even attempt to confront high-tech

American forces, but instead steal a flank march by undercutting our allies. 

In conventional, combined-arms warfare, backward or weak contingents of

coalitions can be assigned peripheral duties--figuratively holding the horses-

-and thus not erode the overall military effectiveness of the alliance. With

the exception of operations in failed states or certain types of raids and

attacks, a host nation must be the centerpiece of efforts to confront

insurgency, terrorism, or narcotrafficking. The United States can be no more

effective than its allies, a coalition no stronger than its weakest element. 

Terrorists, insurgents, and narcotraffickers will quickly recognize this.

In some cases, though, our opponents will attempt to directly counter

deployed American forces. Since new technology will improve the ability of

U.S. forces to locate and track enemies and to collect, analyze, and

disseminate intelligence, the most useful countermeasures will be tactical,

operational, and strategic camouflage and deception. Some opponents,

especially those with an external sponsor, may deploy limited but high-tech

methods of camouflage and deception. External sponsors may also provide just

enough technology to their clients to foil our forces as Stingers did for the

Afghan mujahedeen. Some narcotraffickers, insurgents, or terrorists will take

a purely low-tech approach including things as simple as abandoning electronic

communications in favor of written or voice messages, and relying on timetested cellular organization to foil intelligence efforts.37 Organizational

decentralization may not totally destroy the effectiveness of RMA technology,

but certainly erodes it. Saddam Hussein's Iraq or the other Third World

caricatures of the Soviet Union are perfect opponents for a RMA-type military.

 Driven by the well-earned paranoia of tyrants, they have highly centralized

military forces. This prevents coups d'etat, but also limits the chance of

military victory against determined advanced states. Future insurgents,

terrorists, and narcotraffickers will not be so stupid.

The use of new technology may also run counter to basic American values.

 Information age--and in particular information warfare--technologies cause

concerns about privacy.38 For example, the individual position locator raises

several thorny issues: Would Americans overseas be forced to wear (or worse

have implanted) such a device or would its use be voluntary? If forced, would

it apply equally to those employed overseas and tourists? Will Americans

accept the fact that the government might, by access to the NEO locator data

base, know every move they make? If a locator device could be remotely

activated, how could Americans be sure that activation was only effective

outside the United States? How would they know that "wrist radios" were not

used to monitor personal conversations? Similarly, military use of

television against foreign adversaries raises the specter of domestic

applications. Even if domestic use was never contemplated, its possibility

might cause greater public skepticism regarding television appearances,

reducing the impact of one of the American politician's greatest communication

tools. Deception, while frequently of great military or political value, is

thought of as somehow "un-American."

American values also make the use of directed energy weapons against

suspected narcotrafficking aircraft technologically feasible but morally

difficult, perhaps unacceptable. The advantage of directed energy weapons

over conventional ones is deniability. Against whom is such deniability

aimed? Certainly not the narcotraffickers, who will quickly recognize that

interception by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or military planes leads to

loss of their aircraft.39 Instead, deniability must be aimed at the American

people, who do not sanction the imprisonment, much less execution, of

individuals without a trial (and execution is how they will perceive it--the

argument "we only disabled the aircraft, it was the crash which killed the

pilot" will carry little weight). Deniability will not last long, since

narcotraffickers can choose any number of ways to make such interceptions

public such as landing and then challenging the intercept technique in court,

or arranging to relay communications with their aircraft to a ground station

which could broadcast the "nonlethal" downing (ideally of a plane carrying no
9

drugs). The American public may perceive the DEA or military involved in such

actions to be as bad or worse than the narcotraffickers.

Certain biotechnical weapons--considered by some to violate the

biological warfare convention to which the United States is a signatory--also

may transgress American values regarding appropriate means.40 Most Americans

would not support the use of a weapon designed to target only a specific

racial or ethnic group in anything less than a war for survival of the

nation.41 Could the government and military of this multi-ethnic republic

face charges that it was developing or using a weapon targeting Africans,

Jews, Koreans, Hispanics, etc.? Would defense against such a charge occupy

the attention of policymakers to the detriment of other essential business? 

And even accidental injuries or deaths caused by "nonlethal" antimaterial

substances could be politically damaging. 

American values and attitudes thus form significant constraints on full

use of emerging technology, at least in anything short of a perceived war for

national survival. Overcoming these constraints to make a RMA in conflict

short of war would require fundamental changes in the United States--an

ethical and political revolution may be necessary to make a military

revolution.

The Silicon Icarus: Making Revolution.

Even with all the constraints and countermeasures, there is some value

in applying emerging technology using existing strategy, doctrine,

organization, force structure, objectives, concepts, attitudes, and norms. 

But there is another alternative: we could deliberately engineer a

comprehensive revolution, seeking utter transformation rather than simply an

expeditious use of new technology. However alluring, such a program is rife

with hidden dangers and unintended consequences. Unlike the architects of the

Manhattan Project, we are not forced to pursue revolution without considering

the implications. In conflict short of war, RMA is a Pandora's box

desperately in need of careful scrutiny before opening. 

But how to do so? Because it transcends the comfortable familiarity of

both the past and present, revolution is never easy. It is, above all, a

challenge to the imagination. Even the greatest revolutionaries have only

hazy images of the future, their lives driven more by shadowy vision than

concrete plans. But for decision makers contemplating revolution, visualizing

long-term implications--however difficult--is the only way to gauge whether or

not they truly want the kind of fundamental and irrevocable change revolution

brings. To decide how far we want to push RMA in the arena of conflict short

of war, Americans must speculate on where it might ultimately lead. One way

to do this is by constructing hypothetical future scenarios. There are any

number of feasible scenarios. The probability of any one is less important

than the interconnections it uncovers. What follows, then, is such a

hypothetical future scenario--a "history" of the application of RMA to

conflict short of war written in the year 2010. It is not a prediction and

certainly not a preference, but is a possibility.

The first question is: What led American leaders and national

security professionals to apply the revolution in military affairs to

conflict short of war? Most often, a revolution in military affairs

occurs in response to defeat or a perception of rising threat. Napoleon

led an undrilled army stripped of most veteran officers against a host

of enemies; the architects of blitzkrieg all had first-hand experience

with bitter military defeat. Likewise, the RMA of the 2000s was sparked

by a series of fiascos in the mid-1990s. First was the emergence of

what became known as "third wave terrorism." Recognizing the strategic

bankruptcy of old-fashioned hijacking, kidnapping, assassination, and

bombing, terrorists rapidly adopted state-of-the art technology to their

sinister ends. Within Third World countries, they developed the means

to identify and kill American businessmen, diplomats and military

advisors at will, and to disrupt international air traffic and
10

electronic communications in and out of their countries. Even more

damaging was their ability to "carry the war to its source" in the

United States. Biotechnology and information warfare, especially

sabotage of communications and computer networks using mobile high power

microwave sources, replaced AK-47s and SEMTEX as the preferred tools of

terrorism. The new post-Mafia generation of silicon criminals provided

models and even mentors for third wave terrorists.

About the same time, the U.S. military became embroiled in several

horrific ethnic struggles. Our involvement usually began as part of a

multinational peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, but rapidly

turned violent when American forces were killed or held hostage. The

usual response to the first few attacks on Americans was to send

reinforcements, thus placing U.S. prestige on the line. Since our

strategy was contingent on global leadership, we were aware of the

political damage which would result from being forcibly expelled from a

Third World country, and thus doggedly "stayed the course" until

domestic pressure forced withdrawal. On the ground, enemies would not

directly fight our magnificent military forces, but relied instead on

mines, assassination, and terror bombings. 

The costs of these imbroglios were immense. A bitter dispute

broke out in the United States between supporters of multinational peace

operations and isolationists. And domestic political acrimony was not

the only long-term cost of these operations: many of our troops assigned

to operations in tropical areas brought back new resilient diseases

which then gained a foothold in the United States. Debate was fierce

over the new law requiring long-term quarantine of troops returning from

Third World operations.

American efforts at counterinsurgency during the mid-1990s were no

more successful. Whether facing commercial insurgents such as

narcotraffickers or spiritual insurgents attempting to forge new systems

of identity and personal meaning in their nations, we found that our

allies were penetrated with enemy agents, corrupt, and unable to

ameliorate the severe political, economic, and social problems that had

given rise to insurgency. When a number of these allied governments

collapsed, we were privately relieved but publicly aware of the

precipitous decline in our prestige. At times, the United States

tottered dangerously close to being the "poor, pitiful giant" Richard

Nixon warned against. 

In areas where the United States was not militarily involved, the

major trends of the 1990s were the disintegration of nations,

ungovernability, ecological decay, and persistent conflict. Much of

this had a direct impact on the United States whether by generating

waves of desperate immigrants, inspiring terrorists frustrated by our

failure to solve their nations' problems, creating health and ecological

problems which infiltrated the continental United States, or increasing

divisiveness in the robustly multicultural American polity.

This series of fiascos led a small number of American political

leaders, senior military officers, and national security experts to

conclude that a revolution was needed in the way we approached conflict

short of war. They held the Vietnam-inspired doctrine of the 1980s and

1990s directly responsible for these disasters. Only radical

innovation, they concluded, could renew U.S. strategy and avoid a slide

into the global irrelevance. Nearly everyone agreed the old strategic

framework which coalesced in the 1960s was bankrupt. This thinking,

derived from the Marshall Plan, sought to use American aid and advice to

ameliorate the "root causes" of conflict in the Third World and build

effective, legitimate governments. By the 1990s this was impossible or,

at least, not worth the costs. Few, if any, Third World governments had

the inherent capability of becoming stable and legitimate even with

outside assistance.

The revolutionaries'first task was to recruit proselytes
11

throughout the government and national security community. Initially

the revolutionaries, who called their new strategic concept "Dynamic

Defense," were opposed by isolationists who felt that new technology

should be used simply to build an impenetrable electronic and physical

barrier around the United States. Eventually the revolutionaries

convinced the president-elect following the campaign of 2000 that

Dynamic Defense was both feasible and effective--a task made easier by

his background as a pioneering entrepreneur in the computer-generated

and controlled "perception-molding" systems developed by the advertising

industry. The President was thus amenable to the use of the sort of

psychotechnology which formed the core of the RMA in conflict short of

war.

The first step in implementing Dynamic Defense was reshaping the

national security organization and its underlying attitudes and values.

 Technology provided opportunity; only intellectual change could

consolidate it. With the full and active support of the President, the

revolutionaries reorganized the American national security system to

make maximum use of emerging technology and new ideas. This loosely

reflected the earlier revolution in the world of business, and sought to

make the U.S. national security organization more flexible and quicker

to react to shifts in the global security environment. The old Cold War

structures--the Department of Defense, Department of State, Central

Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and others--were

replaced by two organizations. One controlled all U.S. actions designed

to prevent conflict, including economic assistance programs and

peacetime diplomacy. The second was responsible for containing conflict

by orchestrating sanctions, quarantines, embargoes, the building of

multinational coalitions, and conflict short of war. This integrated

the military, civilian law enforcement, the diplomatic corps, and

organizations responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence. 

Since so many of the conflicts faced by the United States were "gray

area" threats falling somewhere in between traditional military problems

and traditional law enforcement problems, the organizational division

between the two was abolished. Moreover, many aspects of national

security were civilianized or sub-contracted to save costs.42

One of the most difficult dimensions of the reorganization was

altering the dominant ethos of the armed forces. As technology changed

the way force was applied, things such as personal courage, face-to-face

leadership, and the "warfighter" mentality became irrelevant. 

Technological proficiency became the prime criterion for advancement

within the military while the officer corps came to consider research

universities such as Cal Tech and MIT its breeding ground rather than

increasingly archaic institutions like West Point and Annapolis. For

the military, the most common career track alternated assignments in

national security with ones in business and science. Since physical

endurance was not particularly important, military careers no longer

ended after 20 or 30 years. In fact, soldiers and officers were given

few responsibilities until the twentieth year of their careers. As

proposed by Carl Builder, the Army was organized into highly specialized

units permanently associated with a territorial franchise.43 Careers

were within one of these units, thus allowing all soldiers and officers

to develop the sort of language and cultural abilities previously

limited to Special Forces and Foreign Area Officers.

One of the turning points of the revolution came when its leaders

convinced the President and key members of Congress that traditional

American ethics were a major hinderance to the RMA. This was crucial:

the revolutionaries and their allies then crafted the appropriate

attitudinal vessel for the RMA. Through persistent efforts and very

sophisticated domestic "consciousness-raising," old-fashioned notions of

personal privacy and national sovereignty changed. This was relatively
12

easy since frustration with domestic crime had already begun to alter

attitudes and values. In fact, the RMA in conflict short of war was, in

many ways, a spin-off of the domestic "war on drugs and crime" of the

late 1990s when the military, as predicted by William Mendel in 1994,

became heavily involved in support to domestic law enforcement.44 The

changes in American values that accompanied that struggle were easily

translated to the national security arena. Once the norms concerning

personal privacy changed, law soon followed.

Old-fashioned ideas about information control and scientific

inquiry also changed. Preventing enemies (or potential enemies) from

responding to our technological advantages became a prime objective of

U.S. national security strategy. The government closely controlled and

monitored foreign students attending American universities and exchanges

of information within the global scientific and business communities. 

When necessary, the government protected valuable information through

outright deception. And the national security community cooperated

closely with business on counterespionage, providing training, advice,

and equipment.

With values changed, technology then opened the door to profound

innovation. Vast improvements in surveillance systems and information

processing made it possible to monitor a large number of enemies (and

potential enemies). In the pre-RMA days, psychological operations and

psychological warfare were primitive. As they advanced into the

electronic and bioelectronic era, it was necessary to rethink our

ethical prohibitions on manipulating the minds of enemies (and potential

enemies) both international and domestic. Cutting-edge pharmaceutical

technology also provided tools for national security strategists. 

Sometimes the revolutionaries found it necessary to stoke the

development of technology designed specifically for conflict short of

war. Whenever possible, profitability was used to encourage private and

quasi-private enterprises to develop appropriate technology. For

example, much of the lucrative technology of surveillance, intelligence

collection, and attitude manipulation used to solve the domestic crime

problem was easily adapted to conflict short of war. The same held for

new weapons, especially nonlethal biological ones and advanced

psychotechnology. Only when there was absolutely no expectation of

profit did the government directly sponsor research of cutting-edge

technology, often with funds freed by disbanding what were seen as

increasingly irrelevant conventional military forces.

All of this reorganization and technological development was

simply preface for the full flowering of the revolution in military

affairs. American leaders popularized a new, more inclusive concept of

national security. No distinction--legal or otherwise--was drawn

between internal and external threats. In the interdependent 21st

century world, such a differentiation was dangerously nostalgic. The

new concept of security also included ecological, public health,

electronic, psychological, and economic threats. Illegal immigrants

carrying resistant strains of disease were considered every bit as

dangerous as enemy soldiers. Actions which damaged the global ecology,

even if they occurred outside the nominal borders of the United States,

were seen as security threats which should be stopped by force if

necessary. Computer hackers were enemies. Finally, external

manipulation of the American public psychology was defined as a security

threat.

The actual strategy built on the RMA was divided into three

tracks. The first sought to perpetuate the revolution. Its internal

dimension institutionalized the organizational and attitudinal changes

that made the revolution possible, and pursued future breakthroughs in

close conjunction with business, the scientific community, and local law

enforcement agencies--the core troika of 21st century security. The

external dimension actively sought to delay or prevent counterresponses
13

by controlling information and through well-orchestrated deception. 

The second track consisted of offensive action. Our preference

was preemption. In a dangerous world, it was preferable to kill

terrorists before they could damage the ecology or strike at the United

States. While Americans had long supported this in theory, the RMA

allowed us to actually do it with minimal risk just as the Industrial

Revolution allowed 19th century strategists to build the massive

militaries they had long desired. If regional conflicts--whether

ethnic, racial, religious, or economic--did not damage the global

ecology or appear likely to bring disease or violence to the United

States, they were ignored. When conflicts seemed likely to generate

direct challenges, the United States did not attempt ultimate

resolution, but only to preempt and disrupt whatever aspect of the

conflict seemed likely to endanger us. In the quest for strategic

economy, preemption was the byword. Since the RMA made preemption

quick, covert, usually successful, and politically acceptable, the

United States gradually abandoned collective efforts. Nearly all

allies, with their old-fashioned, pre-RMA militaries, proved more an

encumbrance than a help. When preemption failed, the United States

sought either passive containment which included isolation and

quarantines, or active containment where strikes (electronic,

psychological, or physical) were used to limit the spread of the

deleterious effects of a conflict. For opponents with the ability to

harm the United States, the military preemptively destroyed their

capabilities. 

The third track of the strategy was defensive, and included

missile defense, cyberspace defense, and rigid immigration control.

By 2010, the RMA accomplished its desired objectives. Most of the

time, we prevented Third World conflict from directly touching our

shores. Probably the finest hour of the new warriors was the Cuba

preemption of 2005--Operation Ceberus. This was so smooth, so effective

that it warrants explanation. Following the overthrow of Fidel Castro

in 1995 by a popular revolt, an elected government of national unity

quickly proved unable to engineer massive economic and ecological

reconstruction of the country or build a stable democracy. Frequent

seizures of emergency powers and fraudulent elections were the rule. 

Within a few years, nostalgia for the stability of the old regime gave

rise to an armed insurgency; most of the front-line rebels were former

members of Castro's security forces and military. The United States

refused to directly support the corrupt and inept regime, but recognized

that the conflict required our attention.

The operation officially began when the President transferred the

Cuban portfolio from the Conflict Preemption Agency to the Conflict

Containment Agency. An existing contingency plan with implementing

software provided the framework for quick action. Immediately, all

electronic communication in and out of Cuba was surreptitiously

transferred to the national security filter at Fort Meade. This allowed

full monitoring, control, and, when necessary, manipulation of private,

commercial, and government signals. Potential or possible supporters of

the insurgency around the world were identified using the Comprehensive

Interagency Integrated Database. These were categorized as "potential"

or "active," with sophisticated computerized personality simulations

used to develop, tailor, and focus psychological campaigns for each. 

Individuals and organizations with active predilections to support

the insurgency were targets of an elaborate global ruse using computer

communications networks and appeals by a computer-generated insurgent

leader. Real insurgent leaders who were identified were left in place

so that sophisticated computer analysis of their contacts could be

developed. Internecine conflict within the insurgent elite was

engineered using psychotechnology. Psychological operations included

traditional propaganda as well as more aggressive steps such as drug-
14

assisted subliminal conditioning. At the same time, Cubans within the

United States and around the world were assigned maximum surveillance

status to monitor their physical presence and communications webs. This

thwarted several attempts to establish terrorist cells in the United

States.

Within Cuba itself, fighting was widespread. Several acts of

industrial and ecological terrorism led to the outbreak of disease. 

U.S. forces under the command of the Conflict Containment Agency helped

control these while limiting the chance of their own infection by

"stand-off" and robotic medical and humanitarian relief. Naturally all

food supplies contained a super long-lasting sedative. This calmed

local passions and led to an immediate decline in anti-regime activity.

 Where there were no direct U.S. relief efforts, sedatives were

dispersed using cruise missiles. In areas thought to have high areas of

insurgent activity, the dosage was increased.

Since all Americans in Cuba had been bioelectrically tagged and

monitored during the initial stages of the conflict, the NEO went

smoothly, including the mandatory health screening of all those

returning to the United States. Coast Guard aircraft and hovercraft

stanched illegal refugees. The attitude-shaping campaigns aimed at the

American public, the global public, and the Cuban people went quite

well, including those parts using computer-generated broadcasts by

insurgent leaders--"morphing"-- in which they were shown as disoriented

and psychotic. Subliminal messages surreptitiously integrated with

Cuban television transmissions were also helpful.45 In fact, all of

this was so successful that there were only a few instances of covert,

stand-off military strikes when insurgent targets arose and government

forces seemed on the verge of defeat. U.S. strike forces also attacked

neutral targets to support the psychological campaign as

computer-generated insurgent leaders claimed credit for the raids. At

times, even the raids themselves were computer-invented "recreations." 

(These were a specialty of the Army's elite Sun Tzu Battalion.) 

Eventually it all worked: the insurgents were discredited and

their war faded to simmering conflict unlikely to directly threaten the

United States. Even the relatively unimportant criticism from domestic

political groups was stilled when the President temporarily raised the

quota of Cuban orphans eligible for adoption in the United States.

Unfortunately, there are growing signs in 2010 that the great

advantages brought by the RMA might be eroding. With a decade to adapt,

many opponents of the United States–both state and non-state actors–are

themselves bending technology to their ends. While none can match the

prowess of American forces across the board, indications are that by

concentrating on one potential weakness of U.S. forces, enemies might be

able to increase the human costs of intervention and, if not defeat the

United States, at least deny us success. The RMA has amplified our

distaste for death, a liability our enemies initially disdained and are

now learning to manipulate in simple, low-tech ways.

In 2010, a decade of constant success in counterterrorism was

marred by several dramatic failures. The post-attack environmental

clean-up and reconstruction of St. Louis will take decades. Many of the

difficult-to-detect drugs and psychotechnology developed for use in

conflict short of war have appeared on the domestic black market and,

increasingly, in American schools and workplaces. Perhaps most

important, Americans are beginning to question the economic, human, and

ethical costs of our new strategy. A political movement called the "New

Humanitarianism" is growing, especially among Americans of non-European

descent, and seems likely to play a major role in the presidential

election of 2012. There are even rumblings of discontent within the

national security community as the full meaning of the revolution

becomes clear. Since the distinction between the military and

non-military components of our national security community has eroded,
15

many of those notionally in the military service have to come to feel

unbound by traditional notions of civil-military relations. This group

has founded a new political party–The Eagle Movement–which is beginning

to exert great pressure on the traditional political parties for

inclusion in national policymaking. The traditional parties are, to put

it lightly, intimidated by the Eagle Movement, and seem likely to accept

its demands.

In the end, only historians and philosophers of the future can

ultimately assess the consequences of applying the RMA to conflict short

of war.

Defining the Agenda: Conclusions and Recommendations.

The impact of purely military innovation, whether revolutionary or

evolutionary, is nearly always less in conflict short of war than in

warfare. The military dimension of conflict short of war is smaller, a

less decisive proportion of the total struggle. Political, diplomatic,

cultural, psychological, and economic factors matter in all conflicts,

but are preeminent in conflict short of war. Military superiority–

however measured–nearly always brings battlefield victory, but as

Vietnam, Algeria, and a hundred other steamy struggles showed, it is not

always strategically decisive in conflict short of war.

Still, there is some value in applying emerging technology and

innovative concepts to conflict short of war. If the United States wants

marginal improvements of effectiveness and efficiency, emerging

technology and new concepts offer it. The bigger question is whether to

seek true revolution rather than simply marginal improvements. To do so

will demand fundamental changes in attitudes and values as well as

organization, force structure, doctrine, and techniques. After serious

debate, the people and leaders of the United States may decide the costs

and risks of applying RMA to conflict short of war are not worth the

expected benefits.

Even without such debate, undesirable change may come through

accretion. By applying new technology here and new concepts there, by

making apparently limited and benign modifications in the way we

approach conflict short of war, by serendipity, we may eventually

stumble into change as ultimately profound as deliberate revolution.

Equally, revolutionary change in our approach to conflict short of war

may come about indirectly as we grapple with domestic problems such as

crime and drugs. If our traditional notions of privacy and public

security are altered to fight these battles, it is an easy step to

change our attitudes toward intervention in the affairs and psyches of

foreign foes. Again, the focus on short-term considerations may lead to

an undesirable future.

Whether we opt for revolution or evolution, change will occur. Our

current approach to conflict short of war is a child of the Cold War.

New threats demand new ideas; old assumptions no longer hold. To

understand and control ongoing change, research, analysis, and debate is

needed. Adaptation of military force structure, doctrine, and procedures

must follow rather than precede this. The agenda for research, analysis,

and debate, at least, is fairly clear.

For starters, we must develop a comprehensive general theory of

military revolutions set within the context of broader notion of global

politics and security. Currently, there is no accepted definition of

RMAs or even agreement on which historical transformations constituted

revolutions. It is not clear whether military revolutions are

independent variables created by military leaders, or dependent

variables that occur as spin-offs of wider social, political, and

economic changes. We do not know conclusively whether military

revolutions can be deliberately created, or whether rapid change is only

seen as revolutionary after the fact. If the latter is true, then

perhaps military revolutions are gist only for historians and not

strategists. The concept of the "life-span" of a revolution–the period
16

during which the enemy deliberately or inadvertently allows asymmetry to

persist–also demands attention. What determines the "life-span"? Does

military innovation increase the chances of conflict or diminish it? 

Finally, what is the relationship between the nature of future armed

conflict and RMAs? Most of what are considered RMAs occurred in the

Westphalian state system. Can they also occur in some different type of

political system not based on nation-states and traditional inter-state

war?

The strategy and policy foundation of military revolutions also

warrants further study. Again, the direction of influence is central:

Can military revolutions cause strategy to change, do strategic changes

somehow generate military revolutions, or must they always occur

simultaneously? Can an incomplete or partial military revolution occur

in the absence of fundamental strategic change? Once these questions

are answered, the architects of RMA must, if they are to gauge the

potential for a military revolution, discern the future of U.S. strategy

and policy in the Third World. American decision makers and strategists

must then decide whether institutionalizing military revolution should

be an integral part of our national security strategy in the absence of

an equally innovative opponent like the Soviet Union.

Perhaps more importantly, analysis of the ethical dimension of RMA

is needed. Military strategists often overlook the fact that the

employment of force occurs within and is structured by an elaborate

normative framework. This has a historical foundation based on just war

theory, the Judeo- Christian ethical tradition, and international law as

well as a superstructure constantly modified by specific military and

political developments. In the 20th century total war, strategic

bombing, nuclear weapons, limited war, and revolutionary people's war

forced adaptation of the normative framework Americans use when

employing force. The RMA will require a new assessment. We must decide

whether innovative military capabilities are, in fact, acceptable and

desirable. That can only happen through open debate. The military must

be a vital participant, but not the sole one. But as the institution

most intensely aware of both the opportunities and dangers offered by

emerging technology and concepts, the military must–as our notion of

civil-military relations evolves to meet changing conditions–serve as a

catalyst of this debate.

We must also examine the impact of the revolution in military

affairs on the structure of the U.S. national security organization

including both the policymaking apparatus and the military services.

Reflecting the Cold War strategic environment, the military services are

each organized around a key warfighting competency defined by geographic

medium–landpower dominance, air superiority, control of the seas, power

projection on the oceanic littoral. If writers like Alvin Toffler and

Winn Schwartau are correct and the key to future conflict is

information, organization of the military by geographic medium may be

obsolete.46 At a minimum, the growing importance of information suggests

the need for an integrated, interservice C4

I force.47 The same logic

holds for conflict short of war: since it must be confronted with a

cohesive blend of military, political, economic, and intelligence

assets, organizational integration makes sense. This notion bears

careful analysis in the context of changes in the global security

environment and emerging technology. Organizational change which was

politically impossible or undesirable in the past should be considered

anew.

The military services must also assess the impact of RMA on leader

development. Since the Army plays the largest role of any service in

conflict short of war, it must take the lead in this assessment. Based

on a careful analysis of recent history, Stephen Rosen concludes that

neither money nor outside encouragement determines the ability of a
17

military to innovate. The key is acceptance by senior leaders that the

nature of conflict is undergoing fundamental change. Then, Rosen argues,

if "military leaders...attract talented young officers with great

potential for promotion to a new way of war, and then...protect and

promote them, they [can] produce new, usable military capabilities."48

This suggests that the ultimate fate of the current revolution in

military affairs will not be decided in the laboratories of the great

universities, the board rooms of the major defense contractors, or even

the offices of the Pentagon, but at Fort Leavenworth, in the classrooms

of the Combined Arms Services and Staff School and the Command and

General Staff College, and at PERSCOM.

The cultivation of expertise is related to leader development, but

is not the same. Technological expertise should be of particular concern

to the Army. Because of their roles and functions, the Air Force and

Navy have traditionally emphasized technological expertise. For the

Army, successful officers need branch-specific competence, interpersonal

leadership and management ability, proficiency at staff functions, and,

later in their careers, expertise at the operational and strategic

levels of war. Technological acumen is relegated to a very few Army

officers. But if an RMA is, in fact, underway, whether in conventional

warfare or conflict short of war, and the Army intends to play a major

role, it must develop a long-term program for cultivating technological

expertise among all its officers rather than simply a tiny cadre. The

same holds for nontechnological skills. If the Army is to pursue a RMA

in conflict short of war, it must decide which nonmilitary skills from

the worlds of law enforcement, science, intelligence, and psychology are

necessary and then cultivate them throughout an officer's career.

Research and analysis is also needed on technology designed specifically

for conflict short of war. Currently, the primary advances of the RMA

are in integrated, stand-off strike systems–the ability to find and

destroy or disable targets by synchronized strike forces. Such

capabilities form the heart of conventional, combined-arms warfare, but

play only a very limited role in conflict short of war. Advances in

sensors and other elements of information technology may bring great

benefits to conventional, combined-arms warfare, but will have less

impact in conflict short of war, which is most often won or lost through

the manipulation of images, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions.49 These

things rather than troop concentrations, command and control nodes, and

transportation infrastructure are the key military targets in conflict

short of war. This makes psychological technology much more important

than strike technology. Ways must be found to use emerging technology,

including advanced artificial intelligence and information dissemination

systems, to help military strategists develop, implement, and

continually improve methods of influencing opinion, mobilizing public

support, and sometimes demobilizing it. There is also the potential for

defensive pyschotechnology such as "strategic personality simulations"

to aid national security decision makers.50 To date, most analysts feel

that the RMA has not generated adequate advances in such "soft war"

capabilities or even the promise of such gains. But ultimate success in

applying the RMA to conflict short of war hinges on the development of

psychotechnology. As this emerges, it could be tested for political

acceptability by using it first in non-lethal operations other than war

like humanitarian relief and nation assistance.

Additional research is also needed on defensive technology for

conflict short of war. Most current attention to defensive technology

concerns protection against missiles. This is appropriate: ballistic

missile proliferation poses a real and present danger to American

national security. But in the arena of conflict short of war, different

forms of strategic defense apply. For example, research is needed on the

defense of cyberspace against politically-motivated terrorists.51 As

Winn Schwartau argues, the United States needs a national information
18

policy to integrate the efforts of the national security community,

business, and the criminal justice system.52 And, as public health

increasingly becomes a national security issue, strategic medical

defense, including buffering the effects of ecological decay and

preventing the import of new resilient diseases, demands study.

Finally, research is needed on the application of biotechnology to

conflict short of war. It is possible that some of the conceptual

confusion concerning the current RMA may have to do with the compression

of time which is such an integral characteristic of the modern era. In

the past, RMAs took years, often decades to develop. Today, two RMAs may

be underway simultaneously. The first (and more mature) is electronic.

Its manifestations are improved C4I and precision strike systems. The

second (and potentially more profound) RMA is biotechnological,

including genetic engineering and advanced behavior-altering drugs.

Because of the compression of time and the shortening of historical

patterns, the biotechnical revolution is totally enmeshed with the

electronic. It may ultimately be the combination of the two that proves

truly revolutionary.

******* Distilled to their essence, revolutions are acts of supreme

creativity. The U.S. military is not inherently hostile to creativity,

but is cautious. If the nation–our political and intellectual leaders

and the public–decide that improving American capabilities in conflict

short of war is necessary and desirable, the preeminent task for the

military is to continue to build and enlarge a culture of creativity and

strategic entrepreneurship among the officer corps. To some extent, this

has begun. The changes leading to AirLand Battle, victory in the Gulf

War, and the current RMA were supremely creative. Still, these were only

first steps. To make a revolution in conflict short of war will be more

difficult. But to allow technology to develop without concomitant

creativity would, in the end, endanger the Nation's security.
19

ENDNOTES.

 1. Jeffrey R. Cooper, "Another View of the Revolution in Military

Affairs," a paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Strategy,

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 27, 1994, pp. 42-43.

 2. See, for example, reports of the roundtables on the revolution in

military affairs held for the Army, Air Force, and Navy by Science

Applications International Corporation of McLean, VA, and Michael J.

Mazarr, et. al., The Military Technical Revolution, Final Report of a

CSIS Study, Washington, DC: CSIS, March 1993. Another important early

work was Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "The Military-Technical Revolution:

A Preliminary Assessment," a report prepared for the Office of the

Secretary Defense/Net Assessment (OSD/NA), July 1992.

 3. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "The Coming Revolution in the Nature of

Conflict: An American Perspective," in The US Air Force Roundtable on

the Revolution in Military Affairs, a report prepared by Science

Applications International Corporation, January 1994, p. 2.

 4. Dan Gouré, "Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in America's

Future?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 1993, p. 175.

 5. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Peter Paret,

ed., Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 852.

 6. See Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, New York:

Praeger, 1966; and Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of

Counterinsurgency, New York: Praeger, 1967.

 7. On the development of American counterinsurgency doctrine, see

especially Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, New York:

Free Press, 1977; Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of

American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War, New York: New

York University Press, 1986; and, D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms:

The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1988.

 8. FM (Field Manual) 100-20/AFP (Air Force Pamphlet) 3-20, Military

Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Washington, DC: Headquarters,

Departments of the Army and the Air Force, December 5, 1990.

 9. Ibid., pp. 2-7 through 2-14.

 10. On the concepts of commercial and spiritual insurgency, see Steven

Metz, The Future of Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.

 11. For detailed analysis, see Steven Metz, America and the Third

World: Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994,

pp. 12-24.

 12. See, for example, Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, Land

Warfare in the 21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993. Also the reports of the

roundtables on the revolution in military affairs held for the Army, Air

Force, and Navy by Science Applications International Corporation of

McClean, VA.

 13. FM (Field Manual) 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters,

Department of the Army, 1993, p. 13-8.

 14. These are the capabilities identified as essential to future

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) technologies

in the Army's final draft Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

Pamphlet 525-xx, Concept for Information Operations, Ft. Monroe, VA:

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, May 5, 1994, p. 4-7.

 15. Although the Army's most recent proposed doctrine in regard to

Information Operations merely states: "The Army supports the timely and

accurate release of information to the media as well as open and

independent reporting as the principal means of coverage of U.S.

military operations." TRADOC Pamphlet 525-xx, p. 2-9.
20

 16. FM 100-20, pp. 5-5 to 5-7.

 17. National Research Council, STAR 21 (Strategic Technologies for the

Army of the Twenty-first Century), Airborne Systems, Washington DC:

National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 49-55. Also Chuck de Caro, "Sats,

Lies, and Video-Rape: The Soft War Handbook," unpublished paper,

Aerobureau Corporation, 1994.

 18. See for example the discussion in National Research Council, STAR

21, Airborne Systems, p. 19.

 19. "Chameleon" camouflage is based on commercially available heat- and

light-sensitive colorants that adapt to the surrounding environment, as

well as electrically stimulated colorants that change color according to

the surrounding landscape. See "Living Camouflage," Soldiers' Magazine, Volume 49, No. 3, March 1994, p. 9. Also National Research Council, 

STAR 21, Special Technologies and Systems, Washington DC: National

Academy Press, 1993, pp. 23-24.

 20. FM 100-5, pp. 13-6 and 13-7.

 21. Quoted in Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at

the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993, p. 157.

 22. Ibid., p. 157.

 23. Ibid., p. 113.

 24. de Caro, "Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape," pp. 32-34.

 25. Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic

Superhighway, New York: Thunder's Mouth, 1994, pp. 171-176. Note that de

Caro defines "soft war" as the hostile utilization of global television.

 "Soft kill" is used here in a more generic sense of any system designed

to achieve its effect without causing harm to human beings. See National

Research Council, STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessments, p. 314.

 26. FM 100-5, p. 13-6 .

 27. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, DC: National Defense

University Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1994, p. 24.

The utility of Libicki's very interesting analysis is limited by his

failure to provide supporting references.

 28. For a brief description of very small autonomous systems, see

Richard O. Hundley and Eugene C. Gritton, Future Technology-Driven

Revolutions in Military Operations: Results of a Workshop, Santa Monica,

CA: RAND Corporation, November 1993, pp. 12-37.

 29. Possible advances in biotechnology are outlined in STAR 21,

Technology Forecast Assessments, Washington DC: National Academy

Press, 1993, pp. 314-346.

 30. FM 100-5, p. 13-7.

 31. National Research Council, STAR 21, Technology Forecast

Assessments, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1993, p. 346.

 32. FM 100-20, p. 2-0 and pp. 2-7 to 2-9.

 33. Ibid., pp. 2-17 to 2-18.

 34. Ibid., p. 2-22.

 35. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the

Modern Military, Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 5.

 36. Quoted in Schwartau, Information Warfare, p. 127.

 37. A classic explanation of cellular organization by insurgents is

Andrew R. Molnar, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in

Insurgencies, Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in

Social Systems, 1966, pp. 3-22.

 38. See, as an example, Stephen Sloan, "Technology and Terrorism:

Privatizing Public Violence," Technology and Society, Vol. 10, No. 2,

Summer 1991, pp. 8-14.

 39. Narcotraffickers may, in fact, respond by arming their own aircraft

with conventional air-to-air weaponry. Imagine the surprise of the first

DEA crew who sees, as they pass ahead of a suspected drug laden aircraft

to aim their HERF gun at its vulnerable avionics, a Sidewinder exiting a
21

concealed cargo compartment.

 40. The Army contends that its research falls within the limitations of

the chemical and biological conventions. See National Research Council,

STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessments, pp. 314-315.

 41. Tofflers, War and Anti-War, p. 122.

 42. Michael Mazarr, an early analyst of the revolution in military

affairs, considered "civilianization of war" one of the principles of

the RMA. See The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense

Planning, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic

Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 22-27.

 43. Carl Builder, "Information Technologies and the Future of

Conflict," Briefing to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASDSOLIC), March 23,

1994.

 44. William W. Mendel, "The Cold War Returns," Military Review, Vol.

74, No. 5, May 1994, pp. 69-71.

 45. This is described in Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations and

Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century, Washington: Brassey's, 1990,

pp. 56-57.

 46. Tofflers, War and Anti-War; Schwartau, Information Warfare.

 47. For a detailed discussion, see Libicki, The Mesh and the Net, pp.

52-69.

 48. Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 252.

 49. By contrast, a seminal study by the Center for Strategic and

International Studies suggests that emerging sensor technologies (at

least) will have equal benefits for conventional and unconventional

military operations. (Mazarr, et. al., The Military Technical

Revolution, p. 44.)

 50. See Norman D. Livergood and Stephen D. Williams, "Strategic

Personality Simulation: A New Strategic Concept," unpublished draft

paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1994.

 51. For thinking on this topic, see Hundley and Gritton, Future

Technology-Driven Revolutions in Military Operations, pp. 60-73.

 52. Schwartau, Information Warfare, pp. 316-353.
22

 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Steven Metz

Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

*****

Cover Design

Mr. James E. Kistler

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett