1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

MARKEY VALDEZ CRUSE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:20-cv-466-AW-MAF

ERIC PAYNE,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

FINAL ORDER

In this § 1983 case, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Eric Payne violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by (i) stopping him without probable cause; (ii) arresting him on 

a parole violation without probable cause; and (iii) searching his car after the arrest. 

The defendant officer has moved for summary judgment, and the magistrate judge 

recommends granting that motion. ECF Nos. 10, 20. I have considered the magistrate

judge’s Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 20. And I have considered de novo 

Plaintiff’s objections. ECF No. 24. I have now determined that Defendant is entitled 

to summary judgment. 

First, it is Plaintiff’s burden to show the absence of probable cause. See Rankin 

v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1356 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not presented any 

evidence to meet this burden. As to the stop, the gist of his claim is that the stop sign 

Case 4:20-cv-00466-AW-MAF Document 25 Filed 09/29/21 Page 1 of 4
2

was missing, so he did not violate the law when he did not stop.1 But he has not 

shown that the officer knew the stop sign was down. The probable-cause analysis 

asks whether “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . would 

cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect 

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Von Stein v. 

Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Without any 

evidence of the officer’s knowledge, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden. Therefore, the 

magistrate judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim as to 

the initial stop.2

As to the arrest, the magistrate judge correctly concludes that there was 

probable cause. Plaintiff contends he did not actually violate his parole because his 

parole officer permitted him to be out at that hour (which his parole officer denied, 

1 Even if the downed stop sign actually did excuse Cruse from needing to stop 

at the intersection as a matter of Florida law—and I do not hold that it did—an officer 

still has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop if he is reasonably mistaken about 

what state law requires. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014). And Cruse 

has offered no evidence to show that the officer’s mistake, if there was one, was 

unreasonable.

2

I do not adopt or address the magistrate judge’s alternative conclusion that 

the stop was lawful because Plaintiff violated Florida Statute § 316.125(2)—that is, 

that even if the officer knew there was no stop sign, there was still probable cause 

for the stop because the road from which Plaintiff turned was a private road. This 

alternative holding is unnecessary, and there is no evidence in the record that the 

road was, indeed, a private road—or that a reasonable officer would have known 

that.

Case 4:20-cv-00466-AW-MAF Document 25 Filed 09/29/21 Page 2 of 4
3

ECF No. 9-5). But that is not the standard. As the magistrate judge noted, “a police 

officer is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of 

innocence before making an arrest.” ECF No. 20 at 17 (quoting Ricciuti v. NYC 

Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, Plaintiff was 

convicted of the parole violation (the subject of the contested arrest), so Heck v. 

Humphrey precludes his claim. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

Last, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that the inventory search was 

not a constitutional violation. To succeed on his unreasonable search claim, Plaintiff

had to show either (i) that the officer had no authority to impound his vehicle or (ii) 

that the search was not done pursuant to department policy. See United States v. 

Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts 

supporting either of these conditions. In his objection, he argues that his wife was 

present to take control of the vehicle, meaning the officer lacked authority to 

impound it. ECF No. 24 at 6. But Plaintiff never alleged that his wife was present 

before the search, cf. ECF No. 9-1 at 32, and the police report indicates that she 

arrived after the search was over. See ECF No. 9-2; ECF No. 20 at 20-21. Thus, there 

is no dispute over a material fact as to the officer’s authority to impound the car after 

arresting Plaintiff. Cf. Williams, 936 F.2d at 1259 (no Fourth Amendment violation 

when officer immediately impounded a car without a proper license plate, then 

conducted an inventory search before it was towed away). Nor has Plaintiff alleged 

Case 4:20-cv-00466-AW-MAF Document 25 Filed 09/29/21 Page 3 of 4
4

anything that would indicate the officer acted outside of official department policy; 

he simply asserts that the officer searched the car looking for incriminating material. 

See ECF No. 24 at 6. Thus, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff

failed to show that the inventory search was unreasonable.

The Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 20) is adopted in part and 

incorporated into this order (except as stated otherwise above). Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. The clerk will enter a judgment 

that says, “This case is resolved on summary judgment. Plaintiff’s claims are 

dismissed on the merits, and Plaintiff shall take nothing from this action.” The clerk 

will then close the file.

SO ORDERED on September 29, 2021. 

s/ Allen Winsor

United States District Judge

Case 4:20-cv-00466-AW-MAF Document 25 Filed 09/29/21 Page 4 of 4