**Railroad Accident Brief**[PDFversion]

**LAX 96 FR 014****REAR-END COLLISION****SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY****BEAUMONT, CALIFORNIA****AUGUST 30, 1996**

**Accident Description**

About 8:10 a.m., Pacific daylight time, on August 30, 1996, a SouthernPacific Lines (SP) freight train SP 7405 East collided with the rear endof standing SP freight train 1 LBBPX-29, near Beaumont, California. SP7405 East was moving at about 20 mph at the time of the collision. Thelead locomotive unit from the striking train and the rear car on the standingtrain were derailed. Fuel oil was released from the derailed locomotivewhen the fuel tank ruptured in the collision; however, the spill was containedto the immediate accident site. There were no injuries. Monetary damagewas estimated to be $176,000. 

Upon departing Loma Linda, California, by signal indication, both crewmembersof the SP 7405 East stated they were aware that they were following SPfreight train 1 LBBPX-29. At Hinda, milepost (MP) 559, the train dispatcherlined the route for SP 7405 East to cross over from track No. 2 to trackNo. 1. The crew said they received a red over yellow aspect at the crossoverindicating the movement from track No. 2 to track No. 1. Once occupyingtrack No. 1, the crew reported that they proceeded, but were prepared tostop at the next signal as required by the red over yellow aspect at thecrossover. When reaching the signal at MP 560, the engineer stated shestopped approximately 500 feet prior to the signal because the early morningsun made it difficult for the conductor to see the signal. The crew relatedthat at this point the conductor walked to the end of the locomotive andreported to the engineer by radio that the signal displayed a green aspect.The crew testified that the engineer was unable to see the signal fromthe engineer's seat because the locomotive was operating with the longhood forward. Furthermore, the engineer stated that while stopped she steppedout of the locomotive cab on to the side walkway and leaned over the handrailsto see the signal. The engineer said she could see a red aspect on thelower signal unit; however, she felt that there was some indication onthe upper signal unit, but it was difficult to be certain because she waslooking directly into the sun. This signal was not equipped with an uppersignal unit, applicable to the movement of the SP 7405. The upper signalunit on this mast was facing in the opposite direction. 

In a later interview, the engineer said she realized that this signalwas only equipped with one signal head. The engineer confirmed that shehad seen the red aspect and had erroneously read into the situation a nonexistentaspect in the upper unit that was actually the back side of the signalfor the opposite direction. 

The engineer and conductor related that they assumedthe reason they had crossed over was to pass the preceding train. Bothemployees stated that they had discussed this scenario and that it wasa logical assumption for them to make. If this assumption had been true,the signal at MP 560 would most likely have displayed a green aspect.

The engineer stated later that she had concluded the signal displayeda clear indication. As shown by the data from the event recorder, the engineeraccelerated from a stop to 35 mph into the section of track beyond thesignal. The conductor related that after passing the signal he saw a trainstanding on the track ahead of their movement. The standing train was inthe middle of a 4-degree curve to the right. Once discerning that the trainwas not on the adjacent track, the conductor said he instructed the engineerto slow down, which the engineer did as confirmed by the data from theevent recorder. When the conductor realized that the deceleration was notadequate, he stated later that he requested the engineer to stop immediately.The data from the event recorder recorded that the engineer applied thebrakes with an emergency application and the locomotive consist slowedto 20 mph before abruptly falling to 0 mph when striking the standing trainat MP 560.5. 

**Probable Cause**

The National Transportation Safety Board determinesthat the probable cause of this accident was the engineer and the conductorof the striking train mistakenly interpreted the restricted signal indicationto be clear because of sunglare.

**Adopted: August 18, 1998**

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