THE BASES OF FRENCH PEACE 

OPERATIONS DOCTRINE: 

PROBLEMATICAL SCOPE 

 OF FRANCE’S MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS 

WITHIN THE U.N. OR NATO FRAMEWORK

Joseph Philippe Grégoire

U.S. Foreign Service

U.S. Department of State

September 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-101-6

ii
PREFACE 

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected Army Officers 

and government civilians to reflect and use their career experience to explore a wide range 

of strategic issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is 

available to Army and Department of Defense Leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute 

publishes selected papers in its Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy Series. 

“The Bases of French Peace Operations Doctrine” by Joseph Philippe Grégoire, a Foreign 

Service Officer who was a member of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2002, inaugurates 

this series. In this paper Mr. Grégoire provides a detailed assessment of the French 

approach to peace operations. As the United States adjusts its national security strategy to 

meet the challenges of the global war on terrorism, understanding the capabilities and 

interests of key allies will be particularly important. 

 STEVEN METZ 

 Director of Research 

 Strategic Studies Institute 

iii 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOSEPH PHILIPPE GRÉGOIRE is the Economic Counselor at the U.S. Mission in Nigeria 

and concurrently Chief of the Political-Economic section at the U.S. Consulate General in 

Lagos, Nigeria. 

iv 
ABSTRACT

France believes that external threats to its vital and important interests spring more

from potential instability on the periphery of Europe than from rival European powers.

France has modified its military doctrine to reflect this strategic calculus, and France’s

conception of peace operations reflects this doctrinal change. 

France’s revision of its peacekeeping doctrine has led or lagged its NATO partners’

evolution in thinking, but doctrinal convergence is evident. A meeting of minds has come

about because developments that jeopardize France’s security are likely to affect that of its

key allies as well. France has taken steps to defend its interests within a United Nations or

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework, through the application of force if

necessary. 

NATO political leaders now have cause collectively to play a greater role in North

Atlantic Treaty deliberations than they had during the Cold War. Defending Western

interests in the face of amorphous threats calls for unity of effort and clarity of purpose. If

France’s comparative advantage lies in the use of force for peacekeeping and associated

operations, the Alliance may want to institutionalize this fact via an appropriate

mechanism.

v
France’s security and defense policy

aims to protect the fundamental interests of 

the nation. The French government

categorizes these as vital, strategic, and

force or power interests (intérêts vitaux,

stratégiques, et de puissance). 

• France’s vital interests encompass its

territorial integrity and that of its air and

maritime approaches, free exercise of

France’s sovereignty, and protection of its

nationals.

• France’s strategic interest lies in the

maintenance of peace in Europe and its

periphery, in particular the Mediterranean, 

as well as in areas essential to France’s

economic well-being.

• France’s power interest stems from its

responsibilities as a permanent member of

the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC), armed with nuclear might.1

Developments whose first-order effects

might jeopardize France’s survival as a

sovereign state are of vital interest. France

considers respect of its treaty obligations a

strategic or power interest. Before using

force to protect other important but not vital 

interests, France often seeks United

Nations (U.N.) sanction. For France, the

U.N. remains the arbiter of what constitutes legitimate foreign intervention in

areas of the globe where the vital interests

of its member states are not at stake. 

France has a realistic view of what

constitutes its vital interests and challenges 

to its national security. It defines its

interests in terms of regional stability since

its security is linked inextricably to that of

its regional partners. 2 France believes that

external threats to its interests spring more

from potential instability on the periphery

of Europe than from rival European powers. 

France has modified its military doctrine to

reflect this strategic calculus, and France’s

conception of peace and related operations

reflects this doctrinal change.

The objectives of France’s national

security strategy are assuring defense of

France’s fundamental interests, contributing to its security by preventing or resolving crises, and helping maintain international stability. Execution of this strategy 

presupposes mastery of four strategic functions: deterrence, prevention, projection,

and protection.3 France’s peace and related

operations doctrine centers on these four

roles.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) remains important to France, just

as it was during the Cold War. That

importance stems from NATO’s being a

force enabler and multiplier, especially for

out-of-area deployment of troops, rather

than a guarantor of tranquility in Central

Europe. France has taken steps to defend

its interests within a U.N. or NATO

framework, through the application of force

if necessary. French forces engage in

multilateral operations within the framework of NATO or the European Union (EU)

or in ad hoc groups, mainly in Europe, the

Mediterranean basin, or Europe’s southern

flank. Their mission is ensuring peace and

stability under a U.N. or European mandate or, as a consequence of France’s

defense accords, with African partners.4

Defending Western interests in the face

of amorphous threats calls for unity of effort 

and clarity of purpose. The economic

1

THE BASES OF FRENCH PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE:

PROBLEMATICAL SCOPE OF FRANCE’S MILITARY

ENGAGEMENTS WITHIN THE U.N. OR NATO FRAMEWORK
implications of demographic trends in

Western Europe and the United States, the

technological superiority of U.S. military

forces relative to EU member-state forces,

and the need of both to ensure sustainable

fiscal balances suggest that Western

political leaders should review the roles

their countries play in the maintenance of

stability and peace in the world. If the

comparative advantage of France lies in the

use of force for peacekeeping and related

operations, NATO may want to institutionalize this fact via an appropriate mechanism. 

FRENCH CONCEPTION OF PEACE

AND RELATED OPERATIONS

Conceptual and Doctrinal Sources.

Geography is a good vantage point from

which to consider the origin of France’s

security doctrine, of which peacekeeping

and related operations doctrine is but a

subset. Wedged in between the United

Kingdom on the west and a united Germany 

on the east, France pursues engagement as

a national policy. Having been invaded five

times between 1789 and 1944, France is

“stubbornly realistic, state-centred, selfreliant, and threat-focused.”5

 This fact has

forced French strategic thinkers to

concentrate on the essential. Although

French strategic thinking has been remarkably constant, changes in the national and

international environments have caused

France to adjust its focus. The fall of the

Berlin Wall, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, 

and other transformations in the international environment including economic

and technological progress all provoked

change in French thinking on defense in the

early 1990s. 6

Elements of France’s doctrine with

respect to peacekeeping and associated

operations are nonetheless traceable to

doctrine that justified France’s intervention 

in its former colonies in the early years of

the Fifth Republic. Shortly after General

Charles de Gaulle was elected president in

1958, the French Government sought to

consolidate its relations with France’s

colonies within the framework of a Union

Française. One of the results was a series of

security and defense agreements whereby

France could intervene in the colonies at

their request. Some of these agreements

remain in effect, especially with former

African colonies. They permit France to

maintain bases abroad for the prepositioning of troops and materiel, and in this

respect are relevant to the execution of

France’s peace operations doctrine. 

While France’s relationship with its

former colonies provides a basis for the

projection of forces, the structure through

which this can be done in a major operation

lies in Europe and within NATO. Although

France withdrew from NATO’s integrated

military structure in 1966, France has

signed accords with NATO to deploy French 

forces beyond its national boundaries

within the NATO framework. Practical

interests and shared values account for

France’s willingness to work with NATO

allies. French Defense Minister François

Léotard noted in 1994 that France’s interest 

lay: 

no longer [in] playing off one state against

another, but by achieving . . . a mutualization

of power at the service of Europe’s defence and

of a security shared by the states engaged in

its construction. . . . The defence of our values,

of our ideals . . . and in places far away from

our national territory, will often form the main 

path to our security.7

Many elements of France’s peace

operations and related doctrine stem from a

review of the strategic environment that the 

French Government conducted at the

beginning of the last decade, the findings of

which were published in the 1994 White

2
Paper on Defense. This white paper was only 

the second such paper on defense since the

establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. 

The first white paper was published in 1972

to clarify “the principles of the defence

policy that had been defined by General de

Gaulle.”8

The 1994 White Paper described a

strategic environment in which France

perceives no major direct threat to its vital

interests near France’s frontiers, an

interdependent relationship among the

world’s major powers, and a world in which

the threats to France’s important interests

are asymmetric. 

Contrary to its centuries-old experience,

France finds itself in the unfamiliar situation

in which its frontiers no longer seem immediately or directly threatened.9

The main security risk [France concluded]

now lies in regional conflicts [that can]

jeopardize the quest for international stability 

and more just and balanced growth in the

world. 10

The defence of France . . . depends on

preservation of international stability and on

prevention of crises, within and [beyond]

Europe, which, by degenerating, [can] imperil

our interests and our security.11

Asymmetric threats to France’s national 

interests circumscribe the domain within

which it has adapted its ways and means to

pursue its ends and defend its interests. The 

1994 White Paper described a model or

framework for intervention that corresponds with France’s objectives and capabilities, a model premised on France’s

defense of its vital interests and confirmation of its European option and international calling. The model postulates that

France must be able to defend its interests

“without claiming a capacity for global

action,” a significant conclusion with

respect to ways and means for France to

achieve its ends. This model reflects

France’s view that:

• the prevention and management of

crises of varying intensity are now its

prevailing concerns;

• crises take place at great distances

from its national territory more often than

not;

• most do not appear, at least initially,

to call into question France’s vital interests

although the risk of dangerous second- and

third-order effects cannot be neglected; and,

• France will generally use its forces

and facilities in concert with its partners or

allies, in multinational operations.12

Because these assumptions underpin

France’s strategic thinking, the capability

of its conventional forces to participate in

the settlement of regional crises is of

greater practical relevance than is its

nuclear deterrent. In the 1994 White Paper,

France’s prime minister, Edouard Balladur, 

underscored their continuing relevance.

“Our classical forces,” he said, “have a new

task and a new dimension.”13 France’s

conventional forces must be able to

contribute, “if necessary by force, to the

prevention, limitation, or settlement of

regional crises or conflicts that that do not

involve risks of extreme escalation.”14

France’s conventional forces must be able to 

deter or dissuade, prevent, project, and

protect, as conditions warrant.15

A New Defence: 1997-2015, which was

published in 1996, supplemented the 1994

White Paper.

16 The former introduced new

elements into the equation like the end of

military conscription, an innovation that Le

Monde characterized as ‘une véritable

révolution’ (a true revolution).

17 This

center-left newspaper was right, given the

long-term implications of these changes.

The two most noteworthy are that (1)

France’s armed forces, although fewer as a

result of the end of the draft, can be more

easily deployed outside France (since there

are no statutory impediments to such use of

3
volunteer forces) and (2) France’s professional armed forces can more easily collaborate with NATO-dedicated forces, among

other reasons because of the ethos they have 

in common. 

Four years later, writing on the doctrinal 

bases and orientation of the French army,

the commandant of the Research and

Documentation Center of the French

Army’s Doctrine and Training Command

noted that armed intervention now takes

place under novel circumstances. Continuous fronts no longer characterize areas of

operations (AORs); spatial discontinuity of

conflict is more likely. Fewer forces are

engaged in increasingly fragmented AORs.

An equally significant feature of the new

environment is that French forces no longer

have a singular end, destroying enemy

forces.1 8 The last observation is doctrinally

important for reasons described below. 

In 1995, France’s Armed Forces Chief of

Staff Jacques Lanxade characterized the

types of peace operations in which France’s

forces can be involved as first, second, and

third generation operations:

• peacekeeping (I): traditional operations conducted under Chapter VI of the

U.N. Charter and premised on the consent

of the parties and the existence of a ceasefire;

• peace restoration (II): operations

conducted under Chapter VII premised on

the absence of both a cease-fire and consent

and in which the United Nations intends to

restore peace without identifying a particular aggressor; and

• peace imposition (III): operations

conducted under Chapter VII in which the

United Nations intends to impose peace by

the threat or use of force against an

identified aggressor.19

A robust interpretation of what constitutes threats to peace under Chapter VI of

the U.N. Charter has led to operations that

U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold 

designated Chapter VI-and-a-half operations. Peace restoration operations are

sometimes called Chapter VI-and-a-half

interventions. Such operations include

humanitarian intervention accompanied by 

use of force.20

Lanxade had filled a doctrinal void in

March 1995 when he expounded his views

on the conditions under which force could be 

used in the gray area existing between

peace and war. In what became known as

the Lanxade Directive, the admiral “articulated the new concept of ‘peace restoration,’

situated between the well-known missions

of ‘maintaining’ (Chapter VI, U.N. Charter)

and ‘imposing’ peace (Chapter VII, U.N.

Charter).”21 The directive:

argued that ‘peace restoration’ necessitated

active use of military force and that strict

neutrality was not a policy option. Rather, use

of force should be ‘impartial’ in the sense that

it should not aim to affect the local balance,

but serve to protect and create respect around

French forces. 22

The Lanxade Directive was first

executed when a Franco-British-Dutch

rapid reaction force deployed as part of

NATO’s Operation DELIBERATE FORCE

in the fall of 1995.23 This was a decisive

development since it led to political

recognition in France that a gap had to be

bridged between war and peace operations.24 France’s experience in Bosnia had

provoked realization that conflicts occur

along a spectrum, and that operations to

restore peace fall within the ambiguous

middle of such a spectrum.25 France’s

experience had also shed light on the

possibility of escalation from one operation

to another, or from one of the White Paper

scenarios to another.26 The situation in

Kosovo in late 1999 exemplified the new

setting. Testifying at a French Senate

hearing in March 2000, General Bernard

4
Thorette noted that French forces

encountered three types of situations there:

combat, periods of truce, and activity in

between the first two. France, he said, had

the troop structure to respond to all three

situations. While its armed forces were

prepared for combat, its gendarmes helped

reestablish public order.27

From its experience in the mid 1990s,

France concluded that its forces might often 

engage in peace operations in environments 

characterized by limited consent, in operations known as gray operations.28 Gray

operations involve low-to-medium intensity

conflict “half way between open warfare and 

a state of peace, in environments that are

often urban and complex.”29 This concept is

akin to France’s concept of peace restoration, which France places midway between

peacekeeping and peace imposition or

enforcement on the spectrum of conflict.30 In 

the conduct of gray operations, France

regards “a credible coercive capacity as a

prerequisite for success.”31

After reflecting on the ineffectiveness of

peace operations in Bosnia in the early

1990s, French doctrinal writers concluded

that the problems with the traditional

approach were caused by military weakness, misunderstanding of impartiality, and 

restrictive rules of engagement that prevented troops from using force to protect

civilians and implement their mandate.

France’s solution is to equip and organize

its: 

forces deployed on peace missions with ‘real

self-defence and even combat assets . . .

whatever their initial mission’s environment

may be.’ The key to success in French eyes [is]

to equip forces from the outset so that they can 

deal effectively with a deterioration of the

mission environment. This [is] also seen as the 

best way to deter noncompliance.32

According to General Philippe Morillon,

the acceptance of that lesson by the international community was a watershed in

doctrinal thinking. 

The U.N. has understood that [others were]

strong only to the extent that the U.N. was

weak. By finally giving its soldiers the

authority and means to retaliate not only

when their own lives [are] in danger but also

whenever their freedom of movement [is]

obstructed, the U.N. has understood that, to

limit violence, its military forces must be able

to implement their mandate whilst throwing

down the challenge, ‘shoot at us, if you dare.’33

The emerging consensus on gray area operational doctrine, reflected in recent British,

French, NATO and U.S. thinking, provides a

straightforward answer to the problem

created by uncertain consent: when in doubt

deploy a force capable of using both carrots

and sticks to promote consent, deter noncompliance and, if necessary, enforce compliance.34

French troops may engage in peace

restoration without obtaining consent from

the parties to a conflict although no party is

designated the enemy prior to France’s

engaging in such operations.3 5 In a semipermissive environment, lack of consent is

of secondary importance. George A. Bloch, a

defense analyst writing on this “new

departure in French doctrinal thought,”

explained that French Army leaders posit

that “violence itself, rather than an

identifiable opponent, will likely be the

primary future enemy of French and allied

soldiers.”36 France’s peace operations doctrine cautions commanders, however, that

while the parties to a conflict may not be

considered enemies, they still “cannot be

regarded as neutral elements.”3 7 The

distinction, as France understands it,

between impartiality and neutrality is an

important doctrinal point. Impartiality

means not having preconceptions about the

warring parties, keeping the option of

taking sides open if necessary. Neutrality

requires not taking sides in any circumstances.38

5
With respect to impartiality, France

subordinates a hostile party’s appreciation

of a situation to that of a larger community,

the view of which underpins the mandate of

France’s engagement. 

“Active impartiality” allows peacekeepers to

use force in defence of the mandate and of

civilians in all types of peace operations. This

is not expected to result in a loss of

impartiality provided that force is employed in 

a controlled manner against parties who

prevent the peace contingent from performing

its duties. To make this concept workable,

French doctrine recommends the deployment

of combat troops that “enjoy, to the extent

possible, undisputed military superiority.” If

there is a risk that consent will be withdrawn,

they must deploy a force capable of imposing

compliance of U.N. resolutions on the

parties.39

France’s interpretation of impartiality

was novel in the mid-1990s and contrasted

with the “traditionalist” doctrine that

placed emphasis: 

on managing and preserving consent in [gray]

operations and on avoiding inadvertent

escalation to peace enforcement. Traditional

and wider peacekeeping operations, the

doctrine held, shared the same “intrinsic

nature” and should consequently honour the

same principles: consent, impartiality and

non-use of force except in self-defense. Use of

force had to be minimal and was only allowed

at the tactical level against “maverick,

unrepresentative opposition.” Use of force

against a major party meant crossing the

consent divide that separated wider peacekeeping from peace enforcement. Crossing the

consent divide had to be avoided because . . . to

cross the consent divide [might] be to cross a

Rubicon.40

Unlike the traditionalist doctrine that

was designed to prevent loss of consent from 

excessive use of force, France’s doctrine

reflects the view that inability to use

minimum force necessary to protect

civilians and to implement the mandate of

an operation results in loss of credibility

and prevents restoration of peace. The

priority must be maximizing deterrence in

order to avoid placing troops in a situation

where they cannot protect themselves or

take effective action to protect the civilian

population and fulfill their mandate.

Peacemakers “must be capable and

prepared to use force . . . to ‘stop violent

actions that threaten the population or that

stop [French] troops from fulfilling their

mission.’”41 They must use all available

means in their attempt to end conflict.

Likely use of force leads France to base its

intervention on a U.N. Chapter VII

mandate, whenever possible.42

In the conduct of peace operations,

French commanders must distinguish

between actual hostility and generalized

unrest in order “to determine the nature

and degree of force required to ‘control,

dominate, and eliminate’ the threat.”43

Since the intent of military action is

achieving this end-state, commanders must

impartially employ force, if necessary, to

suppress the freedom of action of belligerents without escalating their opposition, if

possible.44 In addition, since peace operations take place along a continuum, peacekeeping forces must be able to adapt

themselves immediately to possible

changes in mandate or operational framework.45

France’s peacekeepers need to be

prepared to engage in joint multinational

operations to be effective. The authors of the 

French Army’s doctrinal manual Instruction 1000: Doctrine interarmées d’emploi des 

forces en operation (Training 1000: Joint

Forces Operational Employment Doctrine),

acknowledging conceptual borrowings from

NATO’s Allied Joint Publication AJP.01(A), 

the 1994 White Paper on Defense, and the

Concept d’emploi des forces 1997 (Force

Employment Concept), state that:

the principal role of our conventional forces is

to contribute actively to the prevention,

6
limitation, or, if necessary, resolution of crises

or regional conflicts by force, within the

framework of the Alliance, the WEU, a

coalition, or ourselves as the case may be.46

Reflecting the French army’s experience

in multinational operations, doctrine highlights the importance of the army’s interoperability within an alliance framework,

whether with respect to command and

control, communications, or the composition 

and projection of forces.47

To ensure proper execution of orders and 

procedures in the multinational environment, the French Army encourages its

peacekeepers to master English.48 “Knowledge of English, the language most

probably to be used in joint allied operations, is an imperative of interoperability,

the guarantor of a unit’s integrity.”4 9 In this

spirit, the authors of Doctrine interarmées

d’emploi des forces en operation (Joint

Forces Operational Employment Doctrine): 

used NATO Military Committee manuals—

referring to the integrated command of which

France is not a part—to adapt the planning

scenarios that would make French and NATO

documents immediately compatible. The

authors of the manual literally used the NATO 

vocabulary, which is as specific as any

ordinary dictionary and perhaps even more

precise, given the requirements of coordinating planning among the allies, to write the

French document.50

Doctrinal Afterthoughts.

The French Army categorizes conflicts

as symmetric, dissymmetric, and asymmetric.51 Its definitions of the first and last

concepts are not unlike those of the U.S.

armed forces, but the second concept needs

expansion.

Dissymmetry is a major imbalance between

two opponents in either the stakes or the

performance of assets, but hardly ever (or not

at all) the nature of these assets. However, the

nature of the stakes is different in that the

party for whom they are the smaller is

disadvantaged, insofar as it will not engage in

the same outbidding in the search for its

objectives.52

A footnote associated with the sentence

above indicates that:

from this point of view, the concept of “zero

casualties,” when openly announced before

the beginning of a conflict, is a signal to the

opponent, giving him the fundamental

advantage of dominating the escalation

process. 53

The French Army has drawn two

conclusions from the conceptual distinction

mentioned above. First, when: 

a conflict initially appears to be symmetrical

or dissymmetrical, [the Army tries] to prevent

it from slipping into asymmetry, because it is,

for [the Army], the most unfavourable

configuration. Moreover, in a situation of

imbalance and weakness, it should be feared

that the opponent may change his ends and

means in order to overcome what he believes is 

the source of [the French armed forces’]

operational superiority. This slippage is

especially likely where the conflict represents

an essential stake to the opponent and when

his collective morality is very permissive (use

of human shields by Iraq during the Gulf

War).54

[Secondly, while French forces] were used to

producing physical effects on their opponents

first, hoping that a psychological impact would 

follow (collapse of will), asymmetrical conflicts 

most often place [French forces] in situations

in which the psychological effects come first

and [the physical impact] normally [has] to be

found [later], without any armed and

generalized show of strength.55

Cautioning against underestimating

enemy capabilities, the authors of Future

Engagements identified two factors that

tend to inhibit military action. The first is

the difference in the nature of the stakes

involved, a difference that will often lead to

refusal to accept a level of risk that would

place the armed forces in a position to

preempt escalation. 

7
The more limited the conflict, the more the

political authorities make sure that it is kept

within a circumscribed framework, as no

commitment of forces should produce the

opposite effect. . . . This constraint is a new

element that reduces the operational

superiority of armies whose sophistication

requires that effectiveness be based on higher

control of the time-space relationship.56

[However], to dominate escalation, it is

necessary to be ready to outmatch an

opponent in order to achieve operational

superiority and create favourable dissymmetry. As soon as one of the protagonists

believes that the stakes are limited, he is

logically no longer ready to do this and loses

control of the situation.57

The second factor that tends to inhibit

military action is a collective morality that

forbids immoderate use of superior firepower.

58 For this reason, French forces

apply a “lightning principle”: they have to

be quicker than their opponents and impose

their own tempo.59 Execution of this principle does not aim at destroying everything,

but at breaking the tempo of an opponent to

prevent him from recovering and thus keep

him permanently behind the curve.60

Rejection of escalation as a principle of military action is the logic underpinning this

principle. 61 With respect to crowd control in

hostile environments, the manual warns

that some crowds “will not follow a code of

behavior tacitly imposing some limitation

on violence. Confrontations may suddenly

degenerate.”62 To prevent this outcome,

French armed forces need to have their

weapons visible “and it will be wise to be

able to use them without prior notice.” 63

U.N. Frame of Reference.

France attaches strategic importance to

its permanent membership on the UNSC.

There, France has a role that is more than

just nominally equal to that of the great

powers; in fact, within the UNSC, France’s

voice counts just as much as theirs does.64

Like the United States, France has a say

when the Council invokes Chapter VII of

the U.N. Charter, which authorizes

recourse to armed force, failing the

application of Chapter VI provisions aiming 

at the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Through the UNSC, France maintains its

rang or rank as a major player, a privilege

that France is loath to abandon and one

that conditions its peace operations

doctrine. 

As a permanent member of the Security

Council, France has to contribute actively, no

doubt more than others do, to the maintenance 

of world peace and the respect of international

law. . . . Assuming these international responsibilities, [and] promoting democracy and law

are aims connected with the defence of

France’s world rank. . . .65

France’s participation in the Gulf War

illustrates how France advances its power

interests through UNSC action. France

committed itself to the Gulf War coalition

for reasons that had “remarkably little to do 

directly with the Middle East, and rather

more to do with France’s national interests

and future role in the post-Cold War

world.”6 6 President François Mitterrand

stated in December 1991 that: 

assuming “the rank, the role and the

responsibilities which [are] hers, and declaring her solidarity with the camp of law against

the politics of aggression,” France would

participate in military action against Iraq in

fulfillment of the resolutions of the Security

Council.67

In the face of challenges to France’s

international rank, cooperative action, preferably through the U.N. or Europe, [offers

France] the prospect of deliberative equality

and associated credit when operations [are]

successfully fulfilled. 68

France’s high profile in U.N. deliberaations and operations supports French

norms and values, some of which seem to

have little to do with realpolitik. France was 

8
the lead nation in the U.N. adoption of

Resolution 43/131 in December 1988 that

laid the foundation for a U.N. droit (right) or 

devoir (duty) d’ingérence (to intervene) by

mandating humanitarian assistance in

cases of natural disasters and “emergency

situations of the same order.”69 In a speech

before the U.N. General Assembly in

October 1988, President Mitterrand had

said: 

the humanitarian situation constitutes a

reason that may justify an exception to the

rule—the UNSC’s primacy in establishing the

legitimacy of a mandate to act in a crisis—

however strong and solid it be. If it appeared

that a situation required it, France would not

hesitate to join others who would want to

assist those in danger.70

Four years later, in 1992, Prime

Minister Pierre Bérégovoy affirmed that

“France intends to be present, always under 

U.N. auspices, wherever the law must be

respected or human lives preserved.”71

In the early 1990s, developments in

Somalia focused attention anew on the

possibility of humanitarian intervention in

times in crises. “The humanitarian motivation for action in Somalia . . . precipitated

within France a wide-ranging debate about

the devoir d’ingérence [the duty to

intervene] and the droit d’ingérence [the

right to intervene].”72 Jean-Bernard

Raimond, a deputy in the National

Assembly, addressed this issue in La

Politique d’intervention dans les conflits:

éléments de doctrine pour la France (Policy

of Intervention in Conflicts: Doctrinal

Elements for France) published in February

1995. Raimond argued for incorporation of

the principle of humanitarian intervention

in France’s peace operations doctrine and

for a better interface between humanitarian 

and other forms of peace operations.73

France’s readiness for military-backed

humanitarian intervention is predicated on

a principle of limited intervention. This

principle “allows states to use armed force

in other states for humanitarian reasons

and for the very purposes declared in the

U.N. Charter, i.e., to maintain international 

peace and security.”74 Under this principle,

individual states may engage on their own

initiative in an operation prior to collective

endorsement of their engagement. In recent 

interventions, in Kosovo in particular, 

NATO countries acted to avert a

humanitarian catastrophe and to restore

peace and stability in the region. Both reasons

were always cited simultaneously; NATO

never claimed to act to maintain peace and

stability exclusively, and this illustrates an

important aspect of the new principle.75

Taken together, the two concepts confer

legality via the UNSC and legitimacy via

the broader community.7 6

Although France endorsed NATO’s

action in Kosovo because NATO is the

collective defense organization upon which

rests the fundamental stability of Europe,

this was not the only reason it did so.

NATO’s Strategic Concept of April 1999

generally satisfied France’s concerns.77

Paragraph 10 of Article 7 of the Washington 

Treaty reaffirms that the U.N. Security

Council is primarily responsible for

maintenance of peace and international

security.78 And paragraph 31 recalls the

Alliance’s offer to support peace and other

operations under the authority of the

Security Council or the responsibility of the

Organization for Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE) on a case-by-case basis.7 9

France believes that its interest can be

served by strengthening the U.N. peace

operations planning cells, assigning experienced personnel to U.N. offices, and by

drawing upon resources existing within the

EU and NATO structures.80

The responsibilities and competences of the

Secretary General’s military advisors have to

9
be expanded, as well as the means of

communications and monitoring of crises and

even facilities for making emergency plans. . . . 

[Military concerns] connected with the

implementation of Security Council mandates

have to be dealt with more carefully and

integrated more promptly and continuously

into the Council’s tasks.81

Since France favors reinforcing the

U.N.’s capability for peace operations,

France responded quickly to U.N. Secretary

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda

for Peace that was published in June 1992.

In its wake, France proposed various

measures to strengthen the United Nations. 

These included organizational changes to

enhance its military competence, the

suggestion that the U.N. have a 5,000-

strong standing military force, and the offer

of up to 1,000 French troops to be put at the

disposition of the U.N. on 48-hours’ notice.82

France’s efforts to beef up U.N. military

capability are not disinterested; they help

assure France’s permanent seat on the

Security Council and confer additional

influence upon France within that forum.

As of July 2001, France had about 9,000

troops engaged in peace operations under a

Chapter VIII mandate (U.N. delegation of

responsibility to a regional organization),

about 8,800 of which were in the Balkans.83

By contrast, it had only 400 troops in

operations led directly by the United

Nations.8 4 With respect to the doctrinal

aspect of France’s involvement in U.N.

operations, in general France now takes

part only in operations in which its presence 

can affect its national interest.8 5 Including

troops deployed pursuant to bilateral

accords (Article 51 of the Charter), France

had about 10,000 in the field in July 2001.86

PEACE OPERATIONS WITHIN U.N.

OR NATO FRAMEWORK

EU and NATO Structures.

France has been in the forefront of the

Western European states’ pursuit of

European integration for 50 years.

Throughout this period, France has directed 

its efforts toward a single purpose: ensuring 

peace and tranquility in a Europe in which

it can remain a dominant player. France’s

actions within what was first called the

European Economic Community, then the

European Communities, and now the

European Union (EU) reflected and continue to reflect this constant of French

policy.

France’s maintenance of its world rank will

largely depend on its aptitude to influence the

European structure and Europe’s future

evolution. If France proves strong on the

continent, it will speak with a firm voice

everywhere else. Its success or failure in this

venture may determine the role it will play in

the community of nations.87

France’s ratification of the Treaty on

European Union, signed in Maastricht,

Belgium, in February 1992, was a step

forward. The treaty provides for the

establishment of an EU common foreign

and security policy and for “creation of a

true European defence identity, followed by

a joint defence and security policy that can

lead to common defence when the time

comes.”88 The Treaty stipulated in article J

4.2 that the Western European Union

(WEU) was an integral part of the European 

Union. For its part, the WEU, in a

declaration attached to the Treaty, affirmed 

its intention “to develop WEU as the

defence component of the EU and as a

means to strengthen the European pillar of

the Alliance.”89 Article J 7.3 provided for EU 

recourse to the WEU to formulate and

implement EU decisions having defense

implications.9 0

10
The EU’s assimilation of the WEU by

mutual agreement in 2001 represented a

victory of French diplomacy. The EU may

play a significant role in Europe’s defense

and security, given that the WEU’s raison

d’être (reason for being) was mutual defense 

of member states. Assured of the solid

foundation of Franco-German defense and

security cooperation, France is firming up

its political and military cooperation with

the United Kingdom. Both agreed in

December 1998 in St. Malo, France, that the 

EU “must have the capacity for autonomous 

action, backed up by credible military

forces, [as well as] the means to decide to

use them and a readiness to do so in order to 

respond to international crises.”91 In this

context, “European autonomy” refers to the

capability of NATO’s EU member states to

act together without U.S. participation.

France envisages European autonomy

primarily in relation to NATO’s non-Article

5 missions since Article 5 missions implicate the United States.

The EU member states have since taken

steps to create practical arrangements to

cooperate in crisis management and

military operations. They have established

an EU military committee (EU summit in

Cologne, June 1999); are implementing

proposals for a European rapid deployment

force for humanitarian and peacekeeping

duties, incorporating multinational planning cells and cooperation in military

transportation (Anglo-French summit in

London, November 1999); and are pursuing

proposals for enhanced naval cooperation

between Britain and France.92 France is

unlikely to disengage itself from this

process since it promotes European integration and strengthens the European

pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This dynamic

is compatible with France’s European

ambitions and with the post-Cold War role

that it seeks. 

The Amsterdam summit of April 1997,

which endorsed the EU-WEU merger,

included the WEU Petersberg tasks in the

treaty. Article 17.2 of the Amsterdam

Treaty on European Union defines these

Petersberg tasks as follows: “Questions

referred to in this Article shall include

humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 

management, including peacemaking.”93

The 15 members of the EU “chose [in 1997]

to retain the language adopted by the nine

WEU states at Petersberg in 1992 rather

than work out a new description, as there

was consensus on a text that allowed for

various interpretations (constructive ambiguity).”94

The three types of missions envisaged at

Petersberg cover measures that range from

the most modest to the most robust.

Keeping in mind the context in 1992,

peacekeeping tasks refer to the interposition missions and second-generation peace

operations—the Chapter VI-and-a-half

missions that Admiral Lanxade designated

as peace restoration—that were being

conducted in the early 1990s. Article 17.2 of

the Amsterdam Treaty is broad enough to

encompass France’s concept of peace

restoration under the category of “tasks of

combat forces in crisis management.” The

best example of “tasks of combat forces in

crisis management” during that time was

the allied action against Iraq.95 The last

Petersberg task, peacemaking, includes

coercive measures, and can be interpreted

as peace enforcement.96

The presidential conclusions of the

Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, and Nice

European Councils all indicate that the EU

is standing up a force that will have “the

ability to carry out all the Petersberg

missions, including the most demanding of

them.”97 “In 1999, the Cologne and Helsinki

European Councils decided to create a rapid 

11
reaction force for crisis management, and

much work has been done to implement

that decision, as was noted at the Nice

Council in December 2000.”98 The rapid

reaction force’s projection capability, interoperability, and flexibility are to be such as

to meet the operational requirements for

these types of operation.99

The 1992 Petersberg formulation

implicitly subordinated WEU use of force to

the Security Council, a relationship not

echoed in the Treaty on European Union

(TEU). While the treaty deliberately

omitted any link between the Petersberg

missions and a Security Council mandate,

the TEU includes reference of the principles 

of the U.N. Charter in Article 11.1.100 The

logic of this omission was no different from

that which had guided the British

representative at the 1945 San Francisco

conference that created the U.N. Charter: 

The purposes and the principles . . . seem . . . of

the highest importance. . . . Instead of trying to 

govern the actions of the members and the

organs of the U.N. by precise and intricate

codes of procedure, we have preferred to lay

down purposes and principles under which

they have to act. And by that means, we hope

to insure that they are in conformity with the

express desires of the nationals assembled

here, while, at the same time, we give them

freedom to accommodate their actions to

circumstances that today no man can

foresee. 101

Use and Scope of French Forces.

Senator François Trucy’s report on

Participation de la France aux opérations de 

maintien de la paix (France’s participation

in peace operations) helped refine French

thinking on peace operations.102 In his

February 1994 report to the Prime

Minister, Trucy had called for a definition of 

the types of missions in which French forces

might participate and the conditions under

which they might do so. The 1994 White

Paper established the boundaries of

France’s likely intervention. New Defence:

1997-2015 specified how and where France

is apt to use its forces in the decades ahead. 

The types of missions that French forces

are likely to be engaged in are asymmetrical 

crises and conflicts short of all-out war.

Performing them calls for forces that

possess joint and multinational operational

capabilities, conventional technological

advantages, and an ability to participate in

operations ranging from major theater

engagements to peacekeeping, peacemaking, and other limited interventions.103

These missions require action that can:

• Preempt, contain, and control escalation of violence, thus giving scope for

possible resolution of conflict through political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and media

action;

• Impose the international community’s 

will by force if necessary and thus compel an 

adversary to renounce his objectives, by

engaging forces adapted to the political and

military objectives pursued;

• Offer an adversary material and

psychological incentives to disengage in

certain situations; and, 

• Lead to crisis resolution and participation in post-conflict peace consolidation

efforts.104

The 1994 White Paper mentions the

conditions under which France’s armed

forces may participate in an operation,

individually or in a coalition or alliance:

• The principle of the operation and the

expected scope of France’s commitment

must correspond with its strategic priorities 

and interests. 

• The general and specific political

objectives of the operation must be

determined at the outset and must form an

unequivocal framework of reference for the

states that will participate in the operation.

• The constraints on the operation,

especially the rules of engagement, must be

12
approved at the national and multinational

political levels prior to its initiation, and the 

prospect of success must be clear. 

• The division of responsibilities

between the operation’s political representative and the commander of the forces to be 

employed must reflect rules underscoring

the preeminence of the senior civilian

authority as regards the general application 

of the mandate, and the military commander’s operational responsibility as

regards the conduct of the military aspects

of the operation.

• France retains the right to limit its

participation or to withdraw from an operation if the conditions prevailing at the time

of the initial decision are no longer being

met.

105

The effectiveness with which French

forces carry out peace operations depends

on the clarity of the military directives

resulting from the political mandate. The

desired end state must be explicit. France

must provide input for the concepts of

operations, input based on thorough review

of military needs as well as lessons learned,

as called for in the U.N. Agenda for Peace. In 

U.N.-mandated operations, French forces

must not be placed in untenable situations

that would condemn them to witness

violence against civilians without being

able to react before the end of hostilities.106

To avoid such situations, the first rule to be

respected always is knowing the intended

end state of an operation. 

The second and third points mentioned

above—clear objectives and robust rules of

engagement that permit necessary use of

force—aim to avoid the ineffectualness of

French soldiers on the ground. The French

military forces’ experience in Bosnia has led 

them to adopt a simple maxim with respect

to peacekeeping or enforcement operations:

“on tire ou on se retire” (we fire or we pull

back).107 Doctrinally, the meaning is clear:

French forces must have the capacity and

freedom to defend themselves and pursue

their mandate or they have no business

being in a conflict theatre.108 Given the

possibility that operations may deteriorate

from peacekeeping to peace restoration,

French forces must be equipped to engage in 

combat notwithstanding the U.N. Operational framework in which they may be

committed.109

In 1996, President Jacques Chirac

observed in New Defence: 1997-2015 that

France must be able to project large enough

forces anywhere and quickly for its opinions 

and interests to be considered with respect

to how crises are handled and what goes

into their settlement.110 Since readily

deployable forces assist in preventing or

resolving crises and conflicts, sustaining

their capability to employ important means

far from the homeland is the priority of

France’s conventional forces.111 The extent

to which French forces may be used depends 

on the role that France intends to play in an

operation. 

If France’s contribution is [to be] based on the

concern to simply manifest its presence . . . the

specific nature and quality of the assets is

emphasized; [if] it intends to take a significant 

place in the plan of action . . . the criterion of

volume comes into play; [and if] it is . . . to play

a crucial role . . . France can indeed be made to

supply the central element of a European

action, jointly with one of its principal

partners.112

To reconcile its international commitments and limited means, France is adapting its conventional forces to exercise

influence outside Europe at the lower level

of conflict. Underlying France’s approach to

use of military power is its desire to deal

with threats to French interests and to

international stability at the lowest level of

military force possible. Four elements of

doctrine and policy help interpret the trend: 

the roles of prevention and projection; the

13
interplay of French forces deployed in

French territories outside metropolitan

France or in peace operations; and the

establishment of four 15,000-strong combat

projection forces with the requisite air,

naval, logistic and command and control

support, about which we have more to say

below.

France’s concept of prevention makes

clear that France prefers to address

situations or conflicts before they escalate,

on the premise that timely involvement

obviates riskier commitments later.

France’s inclination to act before escalation

of a crisis is also premised on its capability

and willingness to act promptly, if

necessary in advance of broader international consensus.113 France’s concept of

prevention entails advantages and risks.

The advantages flow from a better match

between French capabilities and situational 

requirements if France acts early in a crisis. 

In the 1990s, France repeatedly deployed

troops at levels below 5,000 troops and its

willingness and ability to act in relation to

low-level threats enhanced France’s

influence at little cost. The risk arises from

France’s predisposition for action, which

can generate perceptions of French adventurism.

Prevention, according to New Defence:

1997-2015, aims to: 

avoid the return or emergence of threats to

[France’s] interests and [its] security, the

outbreak of conflicts, or even the development

of situations, which may in the long run give

rise to the reappearance of major threats.114

“To ensure such an outcome, projection of

power becomes the priority mission for

[French] forces.”115 Projection presupposes

availability of forces deployable far from

permanent bases, and long-range lift capability. The time it takes to deploy ground

troops to an operational theatre is a

distinguishing characteristic of France’s

projection of force or projection of power.116

Force projection presupposes deployment of

troops with command and combat means,

and support elements adapted to the force

deployed.117 Power projection refers to

employment of superior force or special

forces in a briefer period and can be

complementary to force projection.118 Only

to the extent that military force can be

projected in zones of crises or conflicts is

credibility of prevention assured.119

France does not expect to act alone

whatever the nature of the operations. In

June 2001, multinational participants at a

forum at the Ecole Militaire (Military

Academy) discussed doctrinal issues

including the multinational component of

peace operations. The participants shared

the view that France’s participation in

multinational forces endows French forces

with an indispensable political and moral

legitimacy, the advantages of which

outweigh the disadvantages. French Army

Chief of Staff Yves Crene asserted that

France’s doctrinal thinking about the

employment of its ground forces must

reflect operations conducted in common

with its allies. The establishment and

application of a body of common doctrine

applied by allied forces can but enhance

their effectiveness, he said.120

The participants at the forum also

agreed that multinational operations never

constitute an insurmountable obstacle

when a clearly defined mission remains the

objective. Besides interoperability, success

requires training that reflects common

principles, acceptance of subordinate structures, a willingness to integrate and contribute to group cohesion, and confidence

among national contingents. The execution

of common doctrine reflects not only a

shared philosophy but also permits political

commitment. The stronger the commitment, the less likely it is that differences in

14
language, in secondary interests, and in

rules of engagement will hinder the

mission’s execution.121

New Defence: 1997-2015 had foreshadowed the reorganization of France’s defense

forces for multilateral and out-of-area

operations in ways that look remarkably

like those necessary to shape French forces

“to slot smoothly into, or at least closely

beside, NATO.”122 France played a major

role in leading several European states in

multinational deployments in Bosnia as

part of the U.N. Protection Force between

1992 and 1995. France worked with the

British and Dutch to deploy a Rapid

Reaction Force to Bosnia in June 1995 to

firm up the U.N. contingent. France

persuaded Germany to deploy combat

troops from the Franco-German brigade to

man the Stabilization Force in January

1997. France took the lead with Italy in the

all-European Operation ALBA in Albania in 

1997. France played a key role in the

initially all-European Macedonian Extraction Force supporting the OSCE in Kosovo

at the end of 1998.123 France also participated in NATO air strikes against Serbia

and Serbian targets in Kosovo in early 1999. 

One striking feature of France’s participation in these operations was its early

commitment to the Alliance war aims, notwithstanding the absence of an explicit U.N. 

mandate for the bombing.124

With respect to force projection, France

is standing up four division-like entities

distinct from the Eurocorps, which are

European forces answerable to the EU. The

objectives for the year 2015 call for a

capability to deploy the following forces

with their equipment and logistical and

support elements:

• With respect to the Army, up to 60,000 

personnel, 50,000 of whom will be combat

troops to take part in a major engagement

within the framework of the Alliance or

30,000 men in one theater, for a year, with

relief forces (which implies a total of 35,000

men) and another 5,000 men engaged in a

secondary theater who can be rotated

(which corresponds to about 15,000 men);

• With respect to the Navy, one naval

aviation group with its support element, as

well as attack submarines; and, 

• With respect to the Air Force,

transport aircraft equal to the actual fleet

and some 100 combat aircraft and

associated air tankers, as well as air control

and detection systems.125

France’s capability to project more than

5,000 troops quickly is problematic. Rapidly 

projecting more, with hundreds of pieces of

heavy equipment, is beyond France’s actual

capabilities. France lacks lift capability and

France is not accompanying its expansion of 

projection forces with parallel expansion of

airlift or sealift, refueling, and logistics

support capabilities. France’s vessels are

deployed around the globe servicing

France’s overseas territories. Even if

France could allocate all of them to a single

time-sensitive operation, their combined

carrying capacity could accommodate only a 

quarter of the troops and hardware of a

single heavy armored group.126 Budget constraints may prevent France from bridging

the gap in the medium term; that is, within

7-10 years. France may be able to buy or

lease adequate lift to deploy up to 5,000

troops during this decade, but capacity to

project much greater force will be inadequate at least until 2015.127

France’s maintenance of a forward

presence in former colonies is a way

partially to overcome lift limitations. The

African states from which France can

project forces—Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory

Coast, Senegal—and the French overseas

territories ensure France a global reach.

Without them, France’s claim to global

reach would be greatly diminished. 128 The

15
simultaneous stationing of troops in

Francophone Africa in accord with bilateral

defense agreements, deployment of projection forces in the French overseas territories, and use of increasingly robust rules

of engagement of French forces on U.N.

deployments generate a synergy that partly

compensates for France’s inadequate lift

capacity.129

The contours of French policy with

respect to foreseeable peace operations can

thus be characterized as follows:

• France is moving along a multilateral

trajectory oriented toward pan-African,

European, or international responses to

regional crises.

• France supports multinational peace

operations if the underlying mandates are

specific and the rules of engagement robust.

• The number of troops that France can

project into regional theatres is a function of 

its logistical capability and its desire to

maintain global reach and relevance. 

• France’s military forces are especially

useful at lower levels of conflict and enable

France to “‘punch above its weight’ by [its]

being able and willing to act where others

[dare] not.”130

IMPLICATIONS OF DOCTRINAL

CONVERGENCE

NATO’s January 1994 summit represented the point at which NATO’s evolution

and France’s security ambitions for Europe

became intertwined through the Combined

Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, given

U.S. willingness to entertain a larger

European role in NATO. 131 Potential use of

the CJTF in non-Article 5 missions implies

evolution away from NATO’s Cold War

integration of member state armed forces

under a single command.132 For France,

these decisions are significant since they 

[hold] out the prospect that military

integration, the bête noire (pet aversion) of

France’s relations with NATO, [will] be

abandoned because, as Frédéric Bozo

observed, in the new context what [matters is]

“not the integration of forces but [the

flexibility] for each country . . . to act

together—or not—when the time comes.”133

France participates in NATO both to

exert influence and to ensure that a

European Security and Defense Identity

evolves in ways that advance France’s

interests. France concluded from its need to

work with NATO that France’s willingness

to cooperate matters. France was drawn

into NATO deliberations by the war in

Yugoslavia; once engaged, France found

itself influential because NATO itself was

being shaped by events in Yugoslavia.134

This was proof that a state’s influence rests

on its capacity to be heard “in situations

where ‘political, military, and regional

dimensions mingle from the strategic point

of view, while multinational and inter-army 

(joint) dimensions mix in the military

domain.’”135

The path that France has mapped out

suggests a NATO Article 5 and EU nonArticle 5 division of labor. The United

States should be reassured that France

wants the European Union to take on

Petersberg tasks. These tasks do not cover

national defense in the traditional sense of

ensuring, by military means, the territorial

integrity and political independence of a

state in the face of a military threat. Nor do

Petersberg tasks cover collective defense

commitments. Since these operations do not 

encompass collective security as NATO has

defined the concept, the EU’s taking the

lead in Petersberg tasks should not

threaten the integrity of the Alliance. 

If France should find itself involved in

regional conflicts not implicating France’s

vital interests, conflicts that involve

conventional war among regional powers,

French forces will “act under international

16
mandate within the framework of the

Atlantic Alliance . . . and eventually the

European Union or a coalition.”136 France’s

military capabilities dictate that it pursue

coalition operations in the advancement of

its national interest. France’s economic

requirements compel it to do so whenever

possible. France lacks funding for lift

capacity to deploy military forces in

external theaters using national means

exclusively. Since France must use whatever means it has at its disposition to

maintain its rank, the EU, NATO, and the

U.N. provide the framework for such action.

The prospects of France’s participation

in coalition operations are therefore buoyant. France has demonstrated to the United 

States that it is a “mover and shaker . . .

perhaps the only state [with the possible

exception of Great Britain] capable of

mobilizing other EU states around collective action.”137 France has a decisive contribution to make, having shown itself to be

one of the United States’ most reliable

partners in post-Cold War world order roles

(Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo).138

If the comparative advantage of France lies

in the use of force for peacekeeping and

related operations, NATO may want to

institutionalize this fact via an appropriate

mechanism.

ENDNOTES

1. Etat-major des Armées, “La Politique de

sécurité et de défense de la France,” Concept

d’emploi des forces (Joint Staff, “France’s Security

and Defense Policy,” Force Employment Concept),

Paris: Etat-major des Armées, Division Emploi, 8

octobre 1997.

2. Rachel Utley, “The Case for Coalition:

Motivation and Prospects. French Military

Intervention in the 1990s,” The Occasional, No. 41,

January 2001, Camberly, Surrey, UK: The Strategic

and Combat Studies Institute, p. 41.

3. Etat-major des Armées, “Stratégie générale

militaire,” Concept d’emploi des forces (Joint Staff,

“General Military Strategy,” Force Employment

Concept).

4. Shaun Gregory, French Defence Policy into the

Twenty-First Century, London: Macmillan Press

Ltd., 2000, p. 95.

5.Ibid., p. 8.

6. Ibid.

7. Ministère de la Défense, “Preface,” 1994 White

Paper on Defense, Paris: Ministère de la Défense,

Service d’Information et de Relations publiques des

Armées, 1994, translation of Livre blanc sur la

défense; hereinafter cited as 1994 White Paper (iii-iv

italicized page numbers inserted by author of this

paper). 

8. Ibid., p. I.

9. Ibid., p. 4.

10. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

11. Ibid., p. I.

12. Ibid., pp. 45-47.

13. Ibid., p. I.

14. Ibid., p. 52.

15. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

16. Ministère de la Défense, A New Defence:

1997-2015, Paris: Ministère de la Défense, Service

d’Information et de Relations Publiques, translation

of Une Nouvelle Défense: 1997-2015, 1996; hereinafter cited as A New Defence.

17. Gregory, p. 91.

18. Colonel Gillet, “Bases et orientations de la

doctrine de l’armée de terre” (Army Doctrinal Bases

and Guidelines), Paris: Commandement de la

Doctrine et de l’Enseignement militaire Supérieur,

2000; from http://www.cdes.terre. defense.gouv.fr/

sitefr/Grdlignes/default.htm; accessed March 3,

2002, p. 1.

19. Gregory, p. 178.

20. Etat-major des Armées, “Annex,” Orientations pour la conception, la préparation, la planification, le commandement et l’emploi des forces

françaises dans les opérations militaires fondées sur

une résolution du conseil de sécurité de l’ONU,

N°_0165__/DEF/EMA/ EMP/E.1 (Joint Staff,

Guidelines for the Conception, Preparation,

Planning, Command, and Use of French Forces in

Military Operations Based on UNSC Resolutions),

Paris: Etat-major des Armées, Division Emploi, 6

17
mars 1995; hereinafter cited as Orientations pour la

conception.

21. Sten Rynning, “French Military Doctrine in

the 1990s,” working paper from chapter 5 in

Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military 

Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958-2000,

Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, p. 37.

22. Ibid., p. 51; citing “Directive Lanxade”:

Orientations pour la conception.

23. Ibid., p. 38.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Sénat, “Politique étrangère et de sécurité

commune,” Les réunions de la délégation du Sénat

pour l’Union européenne du 2 mars 2000 (French

senate, “Foreign and Common Security Policy,”

Meetings of March 2, 2000 of the Senate’s European

Union Delegation), testimony of General Bernard

Thorette, Paris: Sénat; from http://www.senat.fr/

Extense/bin/nph-cgi_view.cgi?file=%2Fappl1%2

Fusers%2 Fmcweb%2FD; accessed February 7, 2002, 

p. 4.

28. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Emerging

Consensus on Grey Area Peace Operations Doctrine:

Will It Last and Enhance Operational Effectiveness?” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 3,

Autumn 2000, p. 36.

29. Ministère de la Défense, 1994 White Paper , p. 

54.

30. Ibid., p. 38.

31. Gregory, p. 37.

32. Jakobsen, pp. 38-39.

33. Gregory, p. 176.

34. Jakobsen, p. 51.

35. Jakobsen, p. 37.

36. George A. Bloch, “French Military Reform:

Lessons for America’s Army?” Parameters, Vol. XXX,

No. 2, Summer 2000, from http://carlisle-www.

army.mil/usawc/ parameters/ 00summer/bloch. htm,

p. 9; accessed September 14, 2001.

37. Ibid.

38. Gregory, p. 179.

39. Jakobsen, p. 39.

40. Ibid. p. 37.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Bloch, p. 9.

44. Ibid.

45. General Philippe Mercier, “Armies in an Era

of Change: France,” Military Technology, Vol. 22,

issue 6, June 1998: p. 18 [database on-line]; from

UMI ProQuest, Bell & Howell; accessed September

14, 2001.

46. Etat-major des Armées; Instruction 1000:

Doctrine interarmées d’emploi des forces en

opération , 01-06 (Joint Staff, Training 1000: Joint

Forces Operational Employment Doctrine), Paris:

Etat-major des Armées, 28 juin 1999; hereinafter

cited as Instruction 1000.

47. Etat-major des Armées; “Prologue,” Concept

d’emploi des forces (Joint Staff, “Prologue,” Force

Employment Concept).

48. Sénat, Politique étrangère et de sécurité

commune, Les réunions de la délégation du Sénat

pour l’Union européenne du 2 mars 2000 (French

Senate, “Foreign and Common Security Policy,”

Meetings of the Senate’s European Union Delegation

of March 2, 2000), testimony of General Bruno

Cuche, Paris: Sénat; from http://www.senat.fr/

Extense / bin / nph-cgi _ view.cgi?file = %2Fappl1%2 

Fusers%Fmcweb%2FD ; accessed February 7, 2002,

p. 6.

49. Etat-major des Armées; Instruction 1000,

05-24(Joint Staff, Training 1000).

50. Rynning, pp. 39-40.

51. Colonel Ballarin, ed., Future Engagements by 

Ground Forces, Paris: Army General Staff, Doctrine

and Combat Development Command, 2000;

hereinafter cited as Future Engagements, p. 26.

52. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

53. Ibid., p. 27.

54. Ibid., p. 28.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

57. Ibid., p. 43.

58. Ibid., p. 44.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

18
62. Ibid., p. 48.

63. Ibid.

64. Gregory, p. 61.

65. Ministère de la Défense, 1994 White Paper,

pp. 23-24.

66. Utley, p. 19.

67. Ibid. p. 17.

68. Ibid. p. 26.

69. Gregory, p. 174.

70. Sénat, L’OTAN: Une réalité opérationnelle

entre la légitimité de l’ONU et la nécessité d’une

Europe de la défense, L’OTAN et l’ONU (French

Senate, NATO: Operational Reality in Relation to

U.N. Legitimacy and the Necessity of European

Defense, NATO and the U.N .), Paris: Sénat; from

http://www.senat.fr/rap/r98-464/r98 - 4645.html;

accessed February 7, 2002, p. 1.

71. Gregory, p. 174.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 178

74. Martin Ortega, Military Intervention and the

European Union , Chaillot Papers, no. 45, March

2001, Paris: Western European Union, Institute for

Security Studies, p. 8.

75. Ibid. p. 80.

76. Ibid., p. 78, p. 100.

77. Avis présenté au nom de la commission de la

défense nationale et des forces armées, sur le projet de

loi de finances pour 2002, n° 3323 (Opinion on the

2002 Budget Law by the National Defense and Armed 

Forces Committee of the National Assembly), by

Bernard Cazeneuve, deputy, Paris: Assemblée

Nationale, 11 octobre 2001; hereinafter cited as Avis

(Opinion), p. 33.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Etat-major des Armées, Orientations pour la

conception (Joint Staff, Guidelines for the Conception ), section 2.1.

81. Ibid., p. 38.

82. Gregory, p. 177.

83. Avis (Opinion), section I.A.2.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ministère de la Défense, 1994 White Paper, p. 

24.

88. Ibid., p. 30.

89. Gregory, p. 55.

90. Etat-major des Armées, Instruction 1000

(Joint Staff, Instruction 1000), section 02-49.

91. Utley, p. 42.

92. Ibid.

93. Ortega, p. 105.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., pp. 105-106.

96. Ibid., p. 106.

97. Ibid., p. 107.

98. Ibid., p. 101.

99. Ibid., pp. 107-108.

100. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

101. Ibid., p. 103.

102. Gregory, p. 177.

103. Gregory, p. 82.

104. Etat-major des Armées, “L’engagement des

forces conventionnelles,” Concept d’emploi des forces

(Joint Staff, “Engagement of Conventional Forces,”

Force Employment Concept).

105. Ministère de la Défense, 1994 White Paper,

pp. 38-39.

106. Etat-major des Armées, Orientations pour

la conception (Joint Staff, Guidelines for the

Conception), section I.

107. Gregory, p. 178.

108. Ibid.

109. Etat-major des Armées, “L’Opération de

“maintien de la paix,” Orientations pour la

conception (Joint Staff, “Peace Maintenance

Operations,” Guidelines for the Conception).

110. Ministère de la Défense, A New Defence , p.

7.

111. Etat-major des Armées, “Le Déploiement

des forces conventionnelles,” Concept d’emploi des

forces (Joint Staff, “Deployment of Conventional

Forces,” Force Employment Concept).

19
112. Ministère de la Défense, 1994 White Paper,

p. 65.

113. Gregory, pp. 179-180.

114. A New Defence, p. 29.

115. Ibid. p. 26.

116. Etat-major des Armées, “La projection,”

Concept d’emploi des forces (Joint Staff, “Projection,”

Force Employment Concept).

117.Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Etat-major des Armées, “La combinaison

des grandes functions stratégiques,” Concept

d’emploi des forces (Joint Staff, “Combination of

Grand Strategic Functions,” Force Employment

Concept).

120. Commandement de la Doctrine et de

l’Enseignement militaire Supérieur, Objectif

Doctrine: La Multinationalité, no. 27, 07/2001, p. 8

(Senior Military Training and Doctrine Command,

Objective Doctrine: Multinationality); from www.

cdes.terre.gouv.ft/doctrine; accessed December 10,

2001.

121.Ibid., p. 6.

122. Gregory, p. 110.

123. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

124. Gregory, p. 123.

125. Etat-major des Armées, “Scénarios d’emploi 

et hypothèse d’engagement,” Concept d’emploi des

forces (Joint Staff, “Hypothetical Force Engagement

Scenarios,” Force Employment Concept).

126. Gregory, pp. 181-183.

127. Ibid., p. 183.

128. Ibid., pp. 161-162.

129. Ibid., p. 180.

130. Ibid., p. 64.

131.Ibid., p. 104.

132. Ibid., p. 107.

133. Ibid., p. 54.

134. Ibid., p. 72.

135. Bloch, p. 3.

136. Ministère de la Défense, 1994 White Paper,

p. 57.

137. Gregory, p. 72.

138. Ibid., p. 126. 

20

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

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