1 The IJ’s decision constitutes the final agency determination for purposes of judicial review, seeKimumwe v. Gonzales , 431 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 2005); and we lack jurisdiction to consider De Zelaya’s arguments that her case was not proper for an affirmance without opinion, see Ngure v. Ashcroft , 367 F.3d 975, 981-88 (8th Cir. 2004). 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-1767

___________ Claudia Marisol Orellana De Zelaya, * * Petitioner, * * Petition for Review v. * of an Order of the * Board of Immigration Appeals. Alberto Gonzales, United States * Attorney General, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Respondent. *

___________ Submitted: September 13, 2006 Filed: November 7, 2006

___________ Before SMITH, MAGILL, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Claudia Marisol Orellana De Zelaya (D e Zelaya), a citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) which summarily affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of relief from deportation. 1-2- In March 1994 the former Immigrati on and Naturalization Service (INS) charged De Zelaya with being deportable for entering the United States without inspection. De Zelaya conceded deportab ility and after a political-asylum hearing, she was ordered deported to El Salvador.
In July 1998 De Zelaya moved to reopen to apply for “suspension of deportation/special cancellation of removal” under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Ac t (NACARA). The IJ granted the motion and, following a merits hearing in February 2003, denied the application. The IJ analyzed De Zelaya’s case applying the NACARA suspension-of-deportation requirements, see 8 C.F.R. § 240.65 (2005) (NAC ARA suspension-of-deportation regulation), and concluded that De Ze laya did not satisfy section 240.65’s goodmoral-character requirement because she had testified falsely at the 2003 hearing regarding her date of entry into the Unite d States. De Zelaya and the government agree that she applied for NACARA special-rule cancellati on of removal derivatively through her husband--who had applied for and received NACARA special-rule cancellation of removal--and that the IJ s hould have applied the requirements listed at 8 C.F.R. § 240.66 (2005) (NACARA cance llation-of-removal regulation). The IJ did not discuss why he applied s ection 240.65 instead of section 240.66.
Although NACARA suspension of de portation and NACARA special-rule cancellation of removal both provide the same benefit to the alien applicant, that is, adjustment of status to that of a lawful pe rmanent resident, there are differences in the requirements for establishing eligibility for these two forms of relief, including the relevant period for which good moral char acter must be established. SeeCuadra v. Gonzales , 417 F.3d 947, 950-52 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting difference between § 240.65 “was and is” requirement and § 240.66 “has been” requirement; finding § 240.66 requires alien to demonstrate good moral char acter during 7-year period before filing of application and does not require alien to demonstrate good moral character after that period).-3- Accordingly, we grant the petition a nd remand this case to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ to co nduct a further analysis of De Zelaya’s application for NACARA special -rule cancellation of removal.

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