CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

A

STUDY

OCTOBER 2006

Recruiting,

Retention, and

Future Levels of

Military Personnel

CBO
Pub. No. 2777
The Congress of the United States O Congressional Budget Office

CBO

Recruiting, Retention, and 

Future Levels of Military Personnel

October 2006

A

STUDY
Notes

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.

The years referred to in this study are fiscal years. The data presented in tables and figures are 

through fiscal year 2005. The text includes updates into fiscal year 2006 as available, including data on recruiting for the first 11 months of the fiscal year. The Department of Defense’s 

Directorate for Accession Policy and Office of Reserve Affairs are due to release year-end data 

on recruiting later this month.

The main cover photo (showing a formation of marines and sailors aboard the amphibious 

assault ship Kearsarge) was taken by Airman Finley Williams; it is used courtesy of the Navy. 

The inset photo (showing recruits being sworn in at Fort Lee, Virginia) is used courtesy of the 

Army.
Preface

The U.S. military’s ability to maintain the force levels required for operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan rests on recruiting and retaining service members. Several of the military components did not achieve their recruiting goals during fiscal year 2005. In particular, all of the 

Army components missed their recruiting goals at the same time that the overall Army was 

attempting to increase its personnel levels and its number of combat brigades. In 2006, some 

military components have had a turnaround, approaching or meeting their quantity goals, but 

in some cases have done so at the expense of their goals for recruits’ qualifications.

Prepared at the request of the Ranking Member of the House Committee on Armed Services, 

this study projects potential levels of personnel for all of the active, national guard, and reserve 

military components through 2010 and examines the components’ ability to overcome any 

adverse trends in recruiting or retention through the use of incentives and other tools. In 

keeping with the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this study makes no recommendations.

Heidi Golding and Adebayo Adedeji prepared the analysis under the supervision of 

Matthew S. Goldberg and J. Michael Gilmore. Daniel Frisk, along with Victoria Liu and 

Joshua Lee, contributed to the analysis. Nabeel Alsalam, David Moore, Matthew Schmit, and 

Roberton Williams provided comments. Stanley A. Horowitz of the Institute for Defense 

Analyses reviewed the study. (The assistance of an external reviewer implies no responsibility 

for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)

John Skeen edited the manuscript, and Christine Bogusz and Loretta Lettner proofread it. 

Cindy Cleveland produced drafts of the manuscript and prepared the tables. Maureen 

Costantino, with assistance from Christian Howlett and Allan Keaton, prepared the report for 

publication and designed the cover. Lenny Skutnik printed the initial copies. This publication, along with others by CBO, appears on the agency’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).

Donald B. Marron

Acting Director

October 2006 

Contents

Summary xi

1 Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength in the Army 1

Recruiting Trends 4

Retention Trends 10

The Effectiveness of Recruiting and Retention 

Incentives and Resources 15

Ongoing Operations and Future Recruiting and Retention 25

Implications of Recruiting and Retention Trends for 

End Strength 29

2 Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength in the Marine Corps 41

Recruiting Trends 42

Retention Trends 44

Implications of Recruiting and Retention Trends for 

End Strength 46

3 Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength in the Navy 53

Recruiting Trends 54

Retention Trends 57

Implications of Recruiting and Retention Trends for 

End Strength 58

4 Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength in the Air Force 67

Recruiting Trends 67

Retention Trends 70

Implications of Recruiting and Retention Trends for 

End Strength 71
VI RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

A References on Enlistment and the Productivity of 

Recruiting Resources 85

B Research Studies on the Effectiveness of Recruiting Resources 87
CONTENTS VII

Tables

1-1. The Army’s End Strength 2

1-2. The Army’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel 5

1-3. The Quality of the Army’s Recruits Without Prior Service 6

1-4. The Army’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Bonuses 8

1-5. The Army’s Recruiting Resources 9

1-6. The Active Army’s Retention of Enlisted Personnel 11

1-7. The Army Reserve Components’ Attrition Rates 12

1-8. The Effectiveness of Recruiting Tools for the Active Army 18

1-9. Costs for the Active Army to Obtain an Additional 6,600 Enlistments Using 

Various Recruiting Tools 20

1-10. The Effectiveness of Recruiters and Related Costs for the Army National

Guard and the Army Reserve to Attain Their 2006 Accession Goals 21

2-1. The Marine Corps’s End Strength 42

2-2. The Marine Corps’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel 43

2-3. The Quality of the Marine Corps’s Recruits Without Prior Service 44

2-4. The Marine Corps’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Incentives 45

2-5. The Marine Corps’s Recruiting Resources 46

2-6. The Marine Corps’s Retention of Active-Duty Enlisted Personnel 47

2-7. The Marine Corps Reserve’s Attrition Rates 48

3-1. The Navy’s End Strength 54

3-2. Plans for the Active Navy’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years

Defense Program 55

3-3. Plans for the Navy Reserve’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program 56

3-4. The Navy’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel 57

3-5. The Quality of the Navy’s Recruits Without Prior Service 58

3-6. The Navy’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Bonuses 59

3-7. The Navy’s Recruiting Resources 60

3-8. The Active Navy’s Retention of Enlisted Personnel 61

3-9. The Navy Reserve’s Attrition Rates 62
VIII RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

4-1. The Air Force’s End Strength 68

4-2. Plans for the Active Air Force’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program 70

4-3. Plans for the Air National Guard’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program 71

4-4. Plans for the Air Force Reserve’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program 72

4-5. The Air Force’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel 73

4-6. The Quality of the Air Force’s Recruits Without Prior Service 74

4-7. The Air Force’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Bonuses 75

4-8. The Air Force’s Recruiting Resources 76

4-9. The Active Air Force’s Retention of Enlisted Personnel 77

4-10. The Air National Guard’s and Air Force Reserve’s Attrition Rates 78

B-1. Elasticities for the Active Army Reported in Research Studies That CBO 

Used to Compare the Effectiveness of Recruiting Resources 88

Figures

1-1. The Army’s Annual Continuation Rates 14

1-2. Trends in Manning Compared with Selective Reenlistment Bonuses for 

Selected Army Occupations, September 1999 to June 2006 24

1-3. Percentage of Youths Who Say They Will Probably or Definitely Join the Military 

in the Next Few Years 26

1-4. Percentage of Adults Who Would Be Likely or Very Likely to Recommend 

Military Service to Youths 27

1-5. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Active Army Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 32

1-6. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active Army’s 

End Strength 33

1-7. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Army National Guard Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 36

1-8. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Army National Guard’s 

End Strength 37

1-9. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Army Reserve Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 38
CONTENTS IX

1-10. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Army Reserve’s 

End Strength 39

2-1. The Marine Corps’s AnnualContinuation Rates 48

2-2. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Active Marine Corps Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 49

2-3. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active Marine Corps’s 

End Strength 50

2-4. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Marine Corps Reserves Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 51

2-5. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Marine Corps Reserve’s 

End Strength 52

3-1. The Navy’s Annual Continuation Rates 62

3-2. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Active Navy Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 63

3-3. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active Navy’s

End Strength 64

3-4. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Navy Reserve Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 65

3-5. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Navy Reserve’s

End Strength 66

4-1. The Air Force’s Annual Continuation Rates 79

4-2. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Active Air Force Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 79

4-3. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active Air Force’s 

End Strength 80

4-4. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Air National Guard Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 81

4-5. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Air National Guard’s 

End Strength 82

4-6. Annual Accessions and Length of Service in the Air Force Reserve Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios 83

4-7. Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Air Force Reserve’s 

End Strength 84
X RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Box

1-1. Calculating the Marginal Costs of Increasing Enlistments 16
Summary

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

ongoing military operations—including Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation 

Noble Eagle—have required substantial increases in the 

number of military personnel deployed.1

 As of July 31, 

2006, about 180,000 active-duty service members and 

another 60,000 national guard and reserve members were 

deployed in support of those operations. The Army, supplying the bulk of the personnel, had about 110,000 

active-duty troops and 50,000 Army National Guard and 

Army Reserve members deployed to the Iraq and 

Afghanistan theaters at that time. 

The military’s ability to maintain the force levels required 

to continue conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan rests on its ability to recruit and retain service 

members. Some military analysts and policymakers have 

expressed concern that the ongoing operations could detrimentally affect both recruiting and retention. The proportion of youth who say that they may join the military 

increased after September 11, 2001, but according to the 

Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) surveys of parents and 

other adults who influence youths’ decisions, a majority 

in 2005 said that they were less likely to recommend military service because of the war in Iraq. In addition, some 

military services, including all of the Army components, 

faced recruiting shortfalls in 2005, although some components, including all of the Army ones, have had a turnaround in 2006, approaching or meeting their quantity 

goals, albeit sometimes at the expense of their goals for 

recruits’ qualifications. Furthermore, recent studies indicate that the current combat operations could negatively 

affect retention in some segments of the active-duty 

military.

In this analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 

examines the recruiting and retention rates for enlisted 

personnel within each of the military components, the 

factors that may influence enlistment and reenlistment, 

and the implications of changes in each component’s success in recruiting and retaining service members. CBO 

presents a more in-depth discussion for the Army components—the active Army, the Army National Guard, and 

the Army Reserve—than it does for the other military 

components—the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Air 

Force—because the Army components are deploying the 

largest numbers of personnel to the military operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan and they have also all faced difficulties either maintaining or increasing their end strength 

(the number of service members in a component’s force 

at the end of the fiscal year) in accordance with the Congress’s authorization.2

This study focuses on attaining end-strength goals as a 

measure of the military’s ability to sustain operations.3

In turn, there are two key determinants of future end1. Operation Iraqi Freedom consists of military operations in Iraq 

and neighboring states; Operation Enduring Freedom consists of 

military operations in and around Afghanistan and other overseas 

counterterrorism activities. Operation Noble Eagle refers to 

domestic homeland security missions, such as combat air patrols 

over major metropolitan areas, undertaken by the Department of 

Defense in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001.

2. Authorized end strength represents a goal set by the Congress in 

the National Defense Authorization Act for a fiscal year.

3. A number of factors besides end strength also affect the military’s 

ability to sustain operations overseas, for instance, the redeployment of units to the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters from elsewhere 

in the world (outside the United States). See Congressional 

Budget Office, An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain 

an Occupation in Iraq: An Update (October 5, 2005). 
XII RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

strength levels: yearly accessions and continuation rates.4

(CBO’s analysis focuses on enlisted personnel.) Accessions and continuation rates are related in a complex way. 

A trained service member who separates from the military 

must be replaced by more than one accession to account 

for recruits who separate during training or during their 

first few years of service.

On the basis of 2005 end strength, 2005 continuation 

rates for personnel in each year of service, and 2006 

accession goals, CBO estimated the future end strength 

of each military component separately, compared those 

results to the levels authorized by the Congress, and 

calculated the effect of changes in end strength on the 

number of troops available for deployment. CBO also 

modeled other scenarios for end strength, varying 

assumptions about accessions and continuation rates.

Active Army

The active Army was the only active component that did 

not achieve its recruiting goal in 2005, falling short of 

80,000 accessions by 6,600, or 8 percent. In addition, it 

drew from the participants in its Delayed Entry Program 

(DEP)—in effect, borrowing from future end strength—

to reach the accession level that it did. In response to its 

recruiting difficulties, the Army substantially increased its 

recruiting resources during the year. In addition, lawmakers increased the educational benefits provided to service members under the Montgomery GI Bill, among 

other things. For 2006, the Army again set its goal at 

80,000 recruits. 

CBO examined the effectiveness of various recruiting 

resources (the number of recruiters, advertising, enlistment bonuses, and educational benefits) to determine 

which of the Army’s options would be most effective in 

increasing enlistments and whether the Army’s actions to 

date should be sufficient for meeting its recruiting goals. 

According to CBO’s review of relevant analyses, placing 

more recruiters in the field has the largest effect on the 

number of enlistments. A 10 percent increase in the 

number of recruiters would boost enlistments by between 

4 percent and 6 percent, while a 10 percent increase in 

the expenditures on advertising, enlistment bonuses, or 

educational benefits would increase enlistments by up to 

1 percent.

By CBO’s calculations, a force of 6,400 experienced 

recruiters—reflecting an increase of between 800 and 

1,100 over the average number in 2005—could eliminate 

the shortfall of 6,600 recruits that the active Army experienced in 2005; such a force would cost between $98 million and $147 million, CBO estimates. Alternatively, 

eliminating that shortfall using only advertising or only 

enlistment bonuses would cost between $137 million and 

$195 million and between $161 million and $429 million, respectively. 

By the end of 2005, the active Army had increased its 

total number of recruiters to almost 6,500, which should 

have enabled it to meet its goal for 2006 if the recruiting 

environment did not deteriorate. Indeed, through August 

2006, it had recruited 73,000 soldiers, or 88 percent of 

its annual goal. However, to meet that goal, the quality 

of the recruits (defined in terms of the percentage who 

were high school graduates and the percentage scoring 

above the median on a qualification test) declined substantially, potentially posing difficulties for retention and 

performance in the future.

In addition to recruiting problems, continuation rates in 

the active Army in 2004 and 2005 were at historical lows. 

In response to concerns about retention, in 2005 the 

Army began allowing individuals to reenlist up to two 

years early (increasing reenlistments temporarily, for 2005 

and 2006), and it increased its expenditures on reenlistment bonuses almost fourfold, to $505 million. According to data from the Army, expenditures in 2006 may 

exceed $650 million.

4. In the active military components, accessions typically are new 

recruits who undergo basic training and begin their military service (that is, they “ship” to initial training). A related concept is 

the number of contracts, or agreements between recruits and the 

military that they will do so (after they graduate from high school, 

for example). Such recruits enter the Delayed Entry Program and 

are not counted toward end strength. In the reserve components, 

accessions typically are individuals who have signed contracts to 

participate in the Selected Reserves; those individuals are counted 

toward end strength. In the Army Reserve, however, recruits with 

prior service are deemed accessions (and counted toward end 

strength), but those without prior service are not deemed accessions (and are not counted toward end strength) until they attend 

initial training.

Continuation rates convey the proportion of service members that 

remain in the military for a specific time period. CBO typically 

considers the 12-month continuation rate—that is, the proportion of service members from the beginning of a fiscal year who 

remain in the military through at least the end of the fiscal year. 

For its modeling, CBO considered the 12-month rate for service 

members at each experience level.
SUMMARY XIII

Under the assumption that the Army will attain its 2006 

recruiting goal (the data are due to be released later this 

month), along with the assumption that the Army will 

maintain its continuation rates at the 2005 levels for the 

next several years, the Army’s end strength would drop 

from about 492,700 soldiers in 2005 to 481,600 by 

2010—implying that the 2005 continuation rates are 

insufficient to sustain the force.5

 If the ratio of deployable 

to nondeployable troops remained at its current levels, 

the number of troops in deployable units would drop by 

between 6,800 and 7,400 soldiers. However, the Congress increased the Army’s authorized end strength to 

512,400 active soldiers for 2006 and granted the Secretary of Defense the discretion to increase it to as many as 

532,400 soldiers for the period 2007 through 2009.6

For the Army to increase its force to about 500,000 in 

2006 and to surpass its authorized end strength of 

512,000 troops by 2008 and reach 524,000 personnel by 

2010 would require sustained accession levels and continuation rates that have not been sustained for extended 

periods. But under that scenario, in 2010 the force would 

have 31,500 more personnel than it did in 2005 and 

between 19,500 and 21,100 more deployable troops. 

According to CBO’s estimates, as a rule of thumb, each 

increase of 1,000 annual accessions (maintained over a 

five-year period) would accumulate to boost end strength 

by more than 3,000 additional personnel by the end of 

the fifth year.

Army National Guard

The Army National Guard missed its recruiting goal each 

year from 2003 to 2005 by at least 13 percent.7 In 2005, 

with a somewhat higher-than-average goal of 63,000 

recruits, it had its largest shortfall—of almost 13,000 

recruits, or 20 percent. Consequently, the component’s 

end strength fell from over 350,000 troops in 2003 to 

333,000 in 2005. 

To partially compensate, the Army National Guard set a 

goal of 70,000 recruits in 2006, the highest level in this 

decade. By CBO’s calculations, the Guard’s increase in 

the number of full-time recruiters (from 3,915 at the end 

of 2004 to 4,955 by the end of 2005, or an average of 

4,400 for those two years) alone would not have enabled 

it to meet the 2006 goal.8

 However, more recruiters in 

combination with increases in other resources and 

incentives, increases in recruiters’ productivity, or 

improvements in the recruiting environment could have 

permitted the National Guard to attain that goal. 

Through August 2006, the National Guard recruited 

63,000 soldiers, or 90 percent of its annual goal.

If the Guard achieved its 2006 accession goal and maintained continuation rates at the 2005 levels, it would 

reach an end strength of over 346,000 personnel in 2006, 

CBO estimates—fewer than 4,000 personnel short of its 

authorized end strength of 350,000. In that scenario, 

accessions of 63,500 for 2007 would enable it to reach its 

authorized end strength of 350,000 that year. Accessions 

of 61,000 thereafter would maintain end strength at that 

level through 2010. By CBO’s estimates, each increase of 

1,000 in annual accessions would translate to a boost in 

end strength of almost 3,200 personnel. Under a different 

scenario, accessions of 70,000 for 2006 combined with a 

0.9 percentage-point improvement over the 2005 continuation rates (which would be similar to those experienced 

in the first half of 2006) would allow the Guard to come 

within 1,000 personnel of its authorized end strength in 

2006.

Army Reserve

For the Army Reserve, end strength dropped from 

204,000 troops in 2004 to 189,000 in 2005, or 16,000 

below its authorized level. End strength fell as recruiting 

difficulties materialized and continuation rates declined. 

Despite having set the lowest recruiting goal of the 

decade—28,485 accessions—the Reserve fell short by 

nearly 5,000 individuals, or 16 percent. A DEP that the 

Reserve started in 2004 and a related change in how it 

5. The latest 12-month continuation rate through February 2006 

shows an improvement; if that pattern continues, it may help 

ameliorate such a decline in end strength.

6. By comparison, authorized end strength averaged 480,000 troops 

from 2000 through 2003. For more details on current authorized 

end strength, see the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163, sections 401 and 403). 

7. Some components make a distinction between their accession 

mission and recruiting mission. In that case, the accession mission 

includes all gains—both individuals without prior service and 

those with prior service—and the recruiting mission refers to 

enlistments by individuals without prior service. In this study, 

CBO uses the phrases interchangeably, referring to gaining personnel of both types.

8. According to CBO’s calculations, the number of recruiters would 

need to be further increased to between 6,400 and 7,400 on average to meet that goal.
XIV RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

counts end strength account for another portion of the 

shortfall. Under those policy changes, about 3,500 

recruits who had signed contracts but who did not have 

prior service were not deemed accessions and were not 

due to be counted toward end strength until they 

attended initial training.9

In an effort to meet its goals for end strength, the Army 

Reserve has increased its recruiting resources by shifting 

its full-time recruiting support personnel into direct 

recruiting and by increasing enlistment and reenlistment 

bonuses, among other initiatives. By CBO’s calculations, 

the increase in the number of direct recruiters by year-end 

2005 alone might not have been enough for the component to reach its goal of 36,000 recruits for 2006.10

Through August 2006, the Army Reserve recruited substantially more individuals, 31,300, than in did in 2005 

but was still short (at 94 percent) of its year-to-date goal. 

And even if the Army Reserve was able to attain 36,000 

recruits each year for the next several years, by CBO’s 

projections the size of the force in 2010 would be about 

the same as it was in 2005 (if continuation rates were held 

at their 2005 levels). To attain an end strength of 

200,000 by 2010 (as outlined in DoD’s Future Years 

Defense Program, or FYDP), the Army Reserve would 

need to recruit 40,000 individuals each year, which is 

above the average numbers attained early in the decade.11

Each change of 1,000 in the number of annual accessions, CBO estimates, would accumulate to a change in 

end strength of 2,800 personnel by the end of five years.

Active Marine Corps

The active Marine Corps has met its recruiting and retention goals, and it has slightly exceeded its authorized levels of end strength every year this decade, even as those 

levels increased from 172,500 troops in 2000 to 178,000 

in 2005. However, the recruiting environment in 2005 

showed some contradictory signs. On the one hand, to 

meet its recruiting goal, the Marine Corps allowed its 

DEP pool at the end of 2005 to drop to 43 percent of its 

original 2006 goal for accessions, marking the first time 

in at least 10 years that that figure dropped below its target of 50 percent.12 On the other hand, in 2005, the 

Marine Corps was able to keep the number of recruiters 

stable, while its expenditures for enlistment bonuses were 

at their lowest levels this decade. 

The Marine Corps began the year with a goal of 32,880 

recruits for 2006, a level just 200 above the average for 

2000 through 2004. Having recruited 101 percent of its 

cumulative goal through August, the Marine Corps was 

on pace to meet its 2006 goal. If, for the next several 

years, the Corps could recruit at about that level while 

maintaining continuation rates at the 2005 levels (which 

were about 1 percentage point higher than the rates that 

existed before September 11, 2001), end strength would 

grow to 184,000 by 2010. That figure corresponds to the 

increased level that the Congress authorized, at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, in the 2006 National 

Defense Authorization Act for the period spanning 2007 

through 2009. If, instead, the Marine Corps recruited 

31,700 soldiers annually, end strength would remain stable over the period at 180,000 Marines, the 2006 authorized level. 

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corps Reserve—the smallest component, 

with an end strength of 40,000 personnel in 2005—met 

its recruiting and retention goals for each year from 2000 

through 2005. In that time span, the size of the force varied only slightly, from 39,600 to 41,100 (while authorized end strength was stipulated at about 39,600 for each 

of those years). 

Continuation rates have increased substantially over this 

decade; to compensate, the Reserve dropped annual 

accession levels in recent years to about 8,000 recruits. 

(Despite lower accession goals, expenditures for enlistment bonuses are considerably higher than they were 

early in the decade.) If the Marine Corps Reserve maintained its continuation rates from 2005 and attained its 

2006 recruiting goal (which was the lowest that it has 

been this decade), end strength would be 41,100 by 

2010. That level corresponds closely to the one outlined 

in DoD’s 2007 FYDP. If, however, the number of recruits 

9. However, the operational strength of the Army Reserve (the 

trained-and-ready force) is unaffected by the institution of the 

DEP.

10. The number of fully productive recruiters would need to increase 

from the 2005 average of about 1,500 to between 2,300 and 

2,500, according to CBO’s calculations.

11. The average accession level for 2000 through 2004 was 41,300, 

but if accessions were defined as they currently are, the average for 

that period would have been roughly 35,300. 

12. Despite the drop, the Marine Corps’s DEP level for 2005 was 

higher than what the other active components typically maintain.
SUMMARY XV

fell short of the 2006 goal by 500 each year, the size of the 

force would total about 39,400 personnel in 2010.

Active Navy

The Navy—both active and reserve components—is 

in the midst of a reduction in force. Authorized endstrength levels for the active Navy dropped from 372,000 

personnel in 2000 to 352,700 in 2006. Further reductions to 331,300 by 2010 (as outlined in the FYDP) are 

planned. Consequently, the Navy has reduced its recruiting and retention goals considerably. At the beginning of 

the decade, the number of accessions was 55,100; in 

2005, it was 37,700. Although some shortfalls for particular occupational specialties may have existed, the Navy 

does not appear to have had broad difficulties recruiting. 

It was able to meet its goals while decreasing the number 

of active-force recruiters and lowering the expenditures 

on enlistment bonuses. As of August 2006, the Navy 

looked as if it would meet is annual goal of 36,000 

recruits.

The active Navy is facing the challenge of retaining the 

skilled personnel it needs while encouraging others to 

leave voluntarily. In 2005, the Navy did not meet its 

(lowered) retention goal. Presumably in response to that 

difficulty, the Navy increased its expenditures on Selective 

Recruitment Bonuses (SRBs) during the year. It also has 

crafted programs such as “Perform to Serve,” in which 

sailors are screened at their reenlistment point for their 

eligibility to reenlist. In that program, the Navy offers 

some sailors in overmanned occupations who might otherwise be separated a chance to retrain and reenlist in 

undermanned occupations.

By CBO’s estimates, if the Navy recruited 37,500 sailors 

(the 2006 goal) each year and maintained continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels (which were similar to the preSeptember 11, 2001, levels), the Navy would reduce its 

end strength to 333,800 sailors by 2010—a number 

slightly higher than planned. A 1 percentage-point 

decline in continuation rates from their overall 2005 level 

of 86.2 percent (yielding a level similar to that in 2000) 

would reduce the force by 12,000 more sailors, to 

321,700, by 2010. A force of that size would be almost 

10,000 below the goal.

Navy Reserve

The Navy Reserve plans to cut its end strength from 

76,500 personnel in 2005 to 68,100 by 2010. (The level 

had already dropped by about 6,000 personnel in 2004 

and again by about that amount in 2005.) Although the 

Navy Reserve successfully achieved a declining goal for 

accessions from 2001 to 2004, it fell short of its goal by 

1,700 in 2005, when it had only 9,800 recruits. Despite 

spending more on reenlistment bonuses in 2005, the 

continuation rates in that year followed a declining trend 

that had begun three years previously. For 2006, the Navy 

Reserve planned to recruit 11,200 sailors, an increase of 

1,400 over the actual number in 2005.13 With 8,800 

recruits through August 2006, or 86 percent of its cumulative goal, the service may not have attained its annual 

goal.

The Navy Reserve has embarked on several new initiatives in its attempt to reverse its decline in accessions. 

Those initiatives include increases in recruiting resources 

and tapping new segments of the recruiting market. In 

addition, the Navy Reserve anticipates that about 1,700 

individuals who participate in the active Navy through 

the National Call to Service (NCS) will transfer to the 

Reserve in 2007 and that similar or larger numbers will 

do so thereafter.14 Those sailors represent an additional 

boost to the Navy Reserve if they would not have served 

in the Reserve in the absence of the program. If, however, 

some of them would have joined the Reserve without the 

program, accession goals above the 2006 level might be 

difficult to attain without additional resources.15

13. The reserve components typically fill their requirements for Active 

Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel, also termed full-time support 

(FTS) personnel, with existing reserve personnel. However, the 

Navy Reserve also maintains separate accession goals for those personnel. To match DoD’s reporting elsewhere, CBO reports only 

the accessions and goals for drilling reservists (those who train on 

weekends) and not those for AGR or FTS personnel.

14. In the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress 

authorized the National Call to Service initiative. Participants 

agree to serve a shortened enlistment of 15 months of active duty 

following their initial training. After that period, they are required 

to complete their obligation either in the active or reserve components or in a designated national service program, as specified in 

the agreement.

15. Again, accessions include all permanent gains to strength (both 

individuals without prior service and those with prior service). 

Individuals who transfer under the NCS program would count as 

accessions under this definition.
XVI RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

According to CBO’s estimates, even if the Navy attained 

its 2006 accession goal and maintained the continuation 

rates that existed in 2005, the Reserve’s end strength 

would fall below planned levels, to 65,900 personnel, 

by 2010—a shortfall of 3 percent. If the Navy Reserve 

recruited at the 2005 level—almost 9,800 sailors—each 

year over the next five, end strength would fall to 62,300 

by 2010, a shortfall of 9 percent. To reach the planned 

end-strength levels outlined in the FYDP, the Navy 

Reserve would require accessions of 8,750 for 2006, rising to 13,000 by 2010, while maintaining continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels. If the Reserve’s NCS program 

succeeds in tapping a new segment of the recruiting 

market and if enhanced bonuses are effective, the Navy 

Reserve may be able to achieve those accession and endstrength targets.

Active Air Force

The active and reserve components of the Air Force are 

also undergoing reductions. The Air Force’s end strength 

exceeded authorized levels from 2002 to 2004. Accordingly, accessions were reduced; for instance, between 

2004 and 2005, they were almost halved, to only 19,000 

recruits. After decreasing from 376,600 personnel in 

2004 to 353,700 in 2005, or by 6 percent, to meet its 

authorized level of end strength, the active Air Force will 

further reduce its end strength to 316,500 by 2011, or by 

about 10.5 percent cumulatively. The accession goal for 

2006 (about 31,000 recruits), while larger than the previous year’s, was lower than the average annual accession 

level for the decade; as of August 2006, the Air Force was 

on track to meet that goal. Reductions in recruiting 

resources like advertising and enlistment bonuses have 

accompanied the lower accession and end-strength levels. 

Continuation rates, too, have fallen during the past few 

years, possibly to reduce end strength to authorized levels. 

According to CBO’s projections, if, in conjunction with 

its 2006 accession goal, the active Air Force maintained 

its continuation rates at the 2005 levels (which were 

among the lowest in the past 15 years), by 2010 its end 

strength would fall 11,300 below the level outlined in the 

FYDP, to 308,900 personnel. The Air Force could attain 

its planned end strength by that year by recruiting up to 

32,500 new personnel annually combined with achieving 

substantially higher continuation rates for 2006 (similar 

to those for 2004) and continuation rates 1 percentage 

point higher than those, for 2007 and beyond (similar to 

those before September 11, 2001).

Air National Guard and 

Air Force Reserve

The Air National Guard plans to reduce its end strength 

by about 11 percent between 2005 and 2010 (from 

106,400 to 94,200 personnel), while the Air Force 

Reserve plans to reduce its force size by about 9 percent 

during the same period (from 75,800 to 68,700). The 

reserve components have generally met their recruiting 

goals. The Air Force Reserve met its goals every year but 

2000. However, the Air National Guard fell short in 

2001, 2004, and 2005. As of August 2006, the Reserve 

was meeting its year-to-date goal, but the Guard was at 

94 percent of its goal. After being interrupted by somewhat sharp drops in 2003, continuation rates in 2005 for 

the two components nearly returned to their levels before 

September 11, 2001. By CBO’s projections, if the Air 

National Guard attained its 2006 accession goal (which 

was low by historical standards) and maintained its continuation rates at the 2005 levels through 2010, its end 

strength would exceed the planned level by about 9,000 

in 2010. However, if the Air Force Reserve did the same, 

its end strength would fall to the levels outlined in its 

plan. 
CHAPTER

1

Recruiting, Retention, and 

End Strength in the Army

The U.S. Army consists of three components: the 

active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army 

Reserve. The components are often discussed together 

because the Army has drawn from all three to provide 

ground forces during the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In addition, the Army’s Modularity Initiative, as recently reinforced by the Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR), attempts to rebalance the numbers of 

combat brigades and the end-strength levels among the 

three components.

The integration of the three Army components reflects 

the Abrams Doctrine. After the Vietnam War, General 

Creighton W. Abrams, then-Chief of Staff of the Army, 

advocated placing key wartime support functions in the 

guard and reserve components of the military. Under that 

doctrine, it is difficult for the Army to engage in largescale military conflicts without mobilizing guard and 

reserve personnel.1

The active Army contains combat divisions and regiments, and the National Guard contains both combat 

divisions and separate combat brigades. All 15 of the 

National Guard’s separate brigades have been mobilized 

since 2003 (supplementing active Army troops): 11 to 

Iraq, three to Afghanistan, and one (218th Infantry Brigade, South Carolina Army National Guard) to Bosnia.2

In a July 9, 2003, memorandum, Secretary of Defense 

Donald H. Rumsfeld stated that the Department of 

Defense (DoD) should “limit involuntary mobilization 

to reasonable and sustainable rates, using not more than 

one year in every six as the planning metric.”3

 If DoD 

adheres to that pronouncement, deploying the separate 

brigades again in the near term will be difficult because 

the six-year period will not have elapsed for some of the 

more senior personnel in those units. 

Logistics support for combat forces is provided by a portion of the Army’s force structure known as Combat Service Support (CSS). About one-third of the Army’s CSS 

personnel are located in the Army Reserve, and another 

one-third are located in the Army National Guard.4 The 

Army Reserve does not contain any combat units, but 

many of its logistics units have been deployed to Iraq or 

Afghanistan in a supporting role. As of May 2005, a total 

of about 45,000 Army CSS soldiers, from all three components, were deployed to the Iraq theater (including 

Kuwait).5

1. For more on the Abrams doctrine and the current use of the Army 

Reserve, see John R. Groves, Crossroads in U.S. Military Capability: The 21st Century U.S. Army and the Abrams Doctrine, Land 

Warfare Paper No. 37 (Arlington, Va.: Association of the United 

States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, August 2001); and Gary 

C. Howard, Reinventing the Army Reserve Again, Landpower Essay 

No. 04-4 (Arlington, Va.: Association of the United States Army, 

Institute of Land Warfare, November 2004).

2. The Army National Guard also has the mission of providing disaster relief and other services at the request of state authorities.

3. Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of 

Defense, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretaries 

of Defense, “Rebalancing Forces,” July 9, 2003, as quoted in 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 

Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization), Rebalancing 

Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve (January 15, 

2004), available at www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/

rebalancingforcesfinalfinald1.pdf.

4. See Congressional Budget Office, Logistics Support for Deployed 

Military Forces (October 2005), Table 1-4, p. 17.

5. Ibid., Table 1-2, p. 5. In addition to CSS units, combat support 

units (providing other support such as combat engineering) in the 

reserves have also been deployed.
2 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 1-1.

The Army’s End Strength

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Army, the National Defense Authorization Act (various years) and Department 

of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Statistical Information Analysis Division, “Military Personnel Statistics,” available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm; and, for the reserve components, the National 

Defense Authorization Act (various years) and Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and Reserve 

Manpower Strengths and Statistics (various years).

Note: n.a. = not available.

a. The active Army’s total end strength includes about 4,000 cadets not otherwise classified.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter 

Schoomaker, announced the Army’s Modularity Initiative 

in January 2004. As initially conceived, the active Army’s 

33 maneuver brigades would be restructured into 

between 43 and 48 brigade combat teams. The active 

Army’s end strength would be temporarily increased by 

30,000 troops to fill the added brigades.6 The Army 

National Guard’s divisional and separate brigades would 

be converted into 34 brigade combat teams.7

 As of 

March 2006, however, the Army’s plans had changed to 

include 42 brigade combat teams in the active component and 28 in the National Guard.8

To facilitate the Army’s transformation to a modular brigade structure and to support operational missions, the 

Congress authorized several increases in the active Army’s 

end strength. Starting from a level of 480,000 in 2003, 

the Congress raised the Army’s end-strength goal to 

482,400 in 2004, 502,400 in 2005, and 512,400 in 2006 

(see Table 1-1). The 2005 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) also granted the Secretary of Defense 

the discretion to increase end strength as high as 512,400 

for the period spanning 2005 through 2009. The 2005 

NDAA stipulated that DoD’s 2005 budget would contain only enough funding for military personnel to pay 

482,400 active soldiers. Any additional end strength up 

to a total of 512,400 soldiers would have to be funded 

through supplemental appropriations. If the Secretary of 

Defense chose to exercise his discretion to increase end 

strength above 482,400 active soldiers in 2006, DoD’s 

budget submission would have to specify the estimated 

funding that would come from regular appropriations, as 

well as the estimated amounts paid from emergency 

reserve funds or supplemental appropriations.9

The 2006 NDAA increased the authorization to 512,400 

active soldiers and expanded the Secretary of Defense’s 

discretion, allowing end-strength levels as high as 

532,400 through 2009. End strength above 482,400 

Fiscal

Year

2000 480,000 401,414 76,667 482,170 350,000 315,645 37,400 353,045

2001 480,000 400,461 76,179 480,801 350,526 315,250 36,579 351,829

2002 480,000 404,304 78,158 486,542 350,000 314,629 36,449 351,078

2003 480,000 414,769 80,325 499,301 350,000 314,246 36,843 351,089

2004 482,400 414,438 80,968 499,543 350,000 306,234 36,684 342,918

2005 502,400 406,923 81,656 492,728 350,000 296,623 36,554 333,177

2006 512,400 n.a. n.a. n.a. 350,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Officers Total

Army National Guard

Enlisted

Authorized

Active Army

Actual

Authorized

Enlisted

Actual

Personnel Officers Totala Personnel

6. Gary Sheftick, “Army to Reset into Modular Brigade-Centric 

Force,” Army News Service, February 24, 2004, available at 

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/02/

mil-040224-usa01.htm.

7. Jim Garamone, “Army to Restructure, Will Grow by 30,000,” 

Armed Forces Press Service, January 29, 2004, available at 

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/01/

mil-040129-afps04.htm.

8. See Congressional Budget Office, The Army’s Future Combat System and Alternatives (August 2006), Table 2-1, p. 18.

9. See the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375, sections 401 and 403; 

118 Stat. 1863).
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 3

during 2006 would have to be funded through supplemental appropriations. For 2007 through 2009, funding 

for the entire force of up to 532,400 active soldiers would 

have to be included in the annual budget submission.10

However, the Army’s 2007 budget justification document 

explicitly states: “Like the FY 2006 budget the 2007 estimate (excluding contingency operations) is based on a 

482,400 man-years program for FY 2007. The permanent minimum level end-strength is 502,400. Funding 

for end strength above the baseline level of 482,400 will 

be requested through FY 2007 Supplemental Appropriations.”11

The Quadrennial Defense Review offers limited additional guidance on the Army’s end strength. It expresses 

the goal to “Stabilize the Army’s end strength at 482,400 

Active and 533,000 reserve component personnel by Fiscal Year 2011.”12 The QDR does not provide subtotals 

for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, 

which constitute the Army’s reserve component. However, DoD’s 2007 Future Years Defense Program 

(FYDP)—which presents the department’s plan for 2007 

through 2011, was released after the QDR report was 

published and reflects the QDR’s priorities—does provide such subtotals. The 2007 FYDP separates the Army’s 

533,000 reserve component personnel into 333,000 

members of the Army National Guard and 200,000 

members of the Army Reserve. Those levels are smaller 

than the levels of end strength authorized for recent years: 

350,000 for the Army National Guard and 205,000 for 

the Army Reserve. In particular, the decline of 17,000 for 

the Army National Guard has been questioned by the 

Congress. On February 2, 2006, a bipartisan group of 

75 Senators sent a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld to register 

their concern with that decline. In response to the Senators’ letter, General Schoomaker has pledged to support a 

National Guard of 350,000 personnel if recruiting is adequate to allow the force to grow to that level.13

Whether the Army components will be able to increase 

their forces to authorized end-strength levels is an open 

question. Realized end strength for the active Army over 

this decade grew from 482,200 in 2000 to a peak of 

499,500 in 2004 and then dropped to 492,700 in 2005 

(see Table 1-1). The drop occurred in part because of the 

recruiting difficulties that the Army was experiencing. 

Similarly, the Army National Guard’s and the Army 

Reserve’s end strength dropped in 2005, falling below 

authorized levels by about 17,000 personnel (5 percent) 

and 16,000 personnel (8 percent), respectively. Recruiting shortfalls in both components contributed to the 

declines. In addition, the Army Reserve began implementing a Delayed Entry Program (DEP) in 2004 that 

also affected its accounting for end strength. Under that 

program, about 3,500 recruits who had signed contracts 

but who did not have prior service were not deemed 

accessions and were not counted toward end strength 

until they attended initial training. Under the previous 

practice, those 3,500 recruits would have immediately 

counted toward end strength. However, the operational 

strength of the Army Reserve (the trained-and-ready 

force) is unaffected by the institution of the DEP. Also, 

even with the decreases in end strength, the Army’s shift 

toward a modular brigade structure continued in 2005.

10. See the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 

(Public Law 109-163, sections 401 and 403; 119 Stat. 3218).

11. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Active Forces, 

vol. I of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Estimates: Military Personnel, 

Army Justification Book (February 2006), p. 2-1.

12. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 6, 2006), p. 43.

205,000 165,053 41,839 206,892

205,300 164,760 40,868 205,628

205,000 166,258 40,424 206,682

205,000 171,593 40,297 211,890

205,000 165,781 38,350 204,131

205,000 152,070 36,935 189,005

205,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Enlisted

Total

Army Reserve

Authorized

Actual

Personnel Officers

13. Ann Scott Tyson, “Army Pledges No Cutbacks in National Guard: 

Recruiting Shortfalls Led to Proposed Reduction,” Washington 

Post, February 3, 2006, p. A-8.
4 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Although the Army’s end strength rose in 2006, the components were not able to reach authorized levels. The 

active Army's end strength as of July 31, 2006, was 

499,400, or 3.5 percent below the now higher 2006 

authorized level of 512,400. The Army National Guard’s 

and Army Reserve’s strength equaled, respectively, 

341,700 (2.4 percent below the authorized level) and 

190,400 (7.1 percent below the authorized level).

Recruiting Trends

All three Army components—the active Army, the Army 

National Guard, and the Army Reserve—fell short of 

their recruiting goals in 2005. That year, they were all 

also shy of DoD’s benchmark specifying that 90 percent 

of recruits hold a high school diploma. By another measure—the portion of recruits scoring above the median 

on a qualification test—the active Army and the Army 

Reserve were above DoD’s standard of 60 percent, but 

the Guard was not. By August 2006, all three components had recruited almost as many or more individuals 

as they had for 2005. Both the active Army and the Army 

National Guard were on pace to meet their goals, 

although the Army Reserve was short of its cumulative 

goal. However, the extent to which active Army recruits’ 

qualifications were meeting DoD’s standards had fallen. 

Although the reserve components had shown improvements, they were still short of some of those standards.

Quantity of Recruits

The Army has several mechanisms available to help 

achieve its end-strength goals. One strategy is to boost 

accessions, by, for instance, increasing the number of 

recruiters, raising enlistment bonuses, or easing enlistment restrictions.14

The active Army’s accession goal in 2003 was 73,800 

enlisted personnel (see Table 1-2). The Army began 2004 

with an accession goal of 72,500 but later in that year 

increased it to 77,000. Exceeding the latter goal by nearly 

1 percent, the Army recruited 77,586 soldiers that year. 

However, the Army surpassed its goal in part by drawing 

from its DEP. The Army normally prefers to have about 

one-third of the coming year’s accession goal “banked” in 

the DEP to improve the likelihood of meeting the accession goal as well as to balance its training requirements.15

However, the Army drew down its DEP pool to about 

14,750 individuals, or 18.5 percent of its recruiting goal 

set at the beginning of 2005.16

The active Army set an accession goal of 80,000 for 

2005. Although that goal was higher than the ones of 

previous years, that level of accessions is not without precedent in recent history. The Army recruited almost that 

many soldiers as recently as 2002 and slightly more than 

80,000 soldiers in 2000. Those precedents notwithstanding, the Army was able to recruit only 73,373 soldiers 

(92 percent of its goal) in 2005. Moreover, by the end of 

2005, the Army had depleted its DEP pool to 12.4 percent of its initial accession goal for 2006, or fewer than 

10,000 individuals, which is about the number of recruits 

who were expected to start initial training in a single 

month during the summer of 2006. By the Congressional 

Budget Office’s (CBO’s) estimates, if the Army had held 

the size of its DEP constant, it would have achieved just 

68,600 accessions in 2005.

Both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve 

have faced challenges meeting their recruiting goals in 

recent years. The National Guard exceeded its recruiting 

goals in 2000 through 2002, averaging about 62,000 soldiers each year but did not do so from 2003 to 2005 (see 

Table 1-2). In 2003, it recruited only 54,202 soldiers, 

compared with a recruiting target of 62,000, attaining 

just 87 percent of its goal. In 2004, despite a lower goal of 

56,002 recruits, the Guard was able to sign up just

14. The components have increased the pool of potential enlistees in 

recent years by changing eligibility requirements. For example, in 

January 2006, the active Army raised the maximum age for enlisting from 35 to 40. The reserves had already raised the age ceiling 

from 35 to 40 the previous year. In June 2006, both again raised 

the age limitation to 42. In another example, as of February 2006, 

the Army began accepting individuals with visible tattoos 

(although certain restrictions apply). The Army has also increased 

the number of recruits it accepts through its special exemptions 

program, which provides waivers. Recruits who would otherwise 

not be permitted to join the military (for example, individuals 

having certain medical conditions, misdemeanor convictions, or 

other disqualifying incidents) may petition DoD for special consideration. The active Army granted waivers to about 11,000 

recruits in 2005, compared with 9,300 the previous year. 

15. The Army has not typically maintained year-end DEP levels of 

over 30 percent since the mid-1990s. For year-end 1998 through 

2001, the DEP pool ranged from 19 percent to 25 percent of the 

beginning goal for the next year. Only for 2002 and 2003 was the 

figure over 40 percent. 

16. See Lawrence Kapp, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY 

2004 and FY 2005 Results for Active and Reserve Component 

Enlisted Personnel, CRS Report for Congress RL32965 (Congressional Research Service, June 30, 2005).
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 5

Table 1-2.

The Army’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Army, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy; 

and, for the reserve components, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs and Office of the Chief, Army 

Reserve.

Note: n.a. = not available or not applicable.

48,793 individuals, or 87 percent of its goal. In 2005, it 

set a goal of 63,002 and recruited 50,219 individuals, or 

80 percent of its goal. From 2003 through 2005, the 

Guard had an average goal of more than 60,000 recruits 

(a level higher than that earlier in the decade), yet it averaged about 51,000 recruits (a level 18 percent lower than 

that experienced earlier in the decade). 

The Army Reserve set an accession goal of 40,900 

recruits in 2003 (which was similar to the numbers in the 

previous two years), and it surpassed that goal by 2 percent. The following year, it lowered its goal to 32,275 soldiers, partly to reduce end strength, as actual end strength 

was higher than authorized end strength by almost 7,000 

in 2003. The Army Reserve then exceeded its reduced 

recruiting goal by 1 percent in 2004. Although end 

strength dropped to the authorized level, the Army 

Reserve decreased its recruiting goal further for 2005, to 

28,485 soldiers. The lower recruiting goals in 2004 and 

2005 may also be attributed, in part, to the change in the 

Army Reserve’s definition of an accession. With the institution of the Army Reserve’s DEP in 2004, recruits without prior service are not counted as accessions into the 

Selected Reserves until they begin initial training. (If 

prior years’ accessions were counted in the same way as 

they are currently, the Army Reserve would have had 

roughly 6,000 fewer recruits each year between 2000 and 

2003.) In 2005, the component was not able to meet its 

goal, recruiting a total of 23,859 soldiers, or 84 percent of 

the goal.

All of the Army components had higher-than-average 

accession goals for 2006. The active Army again set a goal 

of 80,000 for 2006. From October 2005 through August 

2006, it met its monthly goals and to that point had 

recruited 72,973 individuals, compared with its goal of 

70,200. Thus, the Army had achieved 104 percent of the 

cumulative goal (whereas as of the same time last year, 

August 2005, the figure was 90 percent).

The Army National Guard increased its accession goal to 

70,000 recruits for 2006, a level that it has not attained 

this decade. Through August, it had recruited 63,025 soldiers, or 100 percent of its year-to-date goal. By that time 

last year, it had recruited just 44,171 soldiers, or 78 percent of its year-to-date goal. 

The Army Reserve increased its recruiting goal by over 

7,500, to 36,032 soldiers for 2006; that level is roughly 

equivalent to a goal of 42,000 as it would have been tallied in previous years, before the change to the DEP. For 

the first 11 months of fiscal year 2006, the Army Reserve 

had recruited 31,301 individuals (94 percent of its 

year-to-date goal). By contrast, for the same time period 

in 2005, the Army Reserve had recruited 21,651 individuals, or 82 percent of its cumulative goal.

Fiscal

Year

2000 80,000 80,000 80,113 100 54,034 61,260 113 48,461 48,596 100

2001 78,950 75,800 75,855 100 60,252 61,956 103 41,191 42,097 102

2002 76,800 79,500 79,585 100 60,504 63,251 105 38,251 41,385 108

2003 73,389 73,800 74,132 100 62,000 54,202 87 40,900 41,851 102

2004 72,500 77,000 77,586 101 56,002 48,793 87 32,275 32,710 101

2005 80,000 80,000 73,373 92 63,002 50,219 80 28,485 23,859 84

2006 80,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 70,000 n.a. n.a. 36,032 n.a. n.a.

Average, 

2000–2004 76,328 77,220 77,454 n.a. 58,558 57,892 n.a. 40,216 41,328 n.a.

Initial

Objective Accessions

Final Actual Percentage

Objective

Army National Guard Army Reserve

Objective Objective

Active Army

of Objective Accessions of Objective of Objective

Percentage

Accessions

Actual Actual Percentage
6 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 1-3.

The Quality of the Army’s Recruits Without Prior Service

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Army, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy 

(partly available at www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/recqual04.pdf); and, for the reserve components, data from the Department of 

Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs.

Notes: AFQT = Armed Forces Qualification Test. 

The Department of Defense divides the scores on the AFQT into five ranges, or categories. Scores at or above the 50th percentile fall 

into categories I through IIIA.

a. Figures exclude up to 4,000 participants in the GED+ (General Educational Development Plus) pilot program for 2000 to 2004 and about 

2,100 participants in the Tier Two Attrition Study (a pilot program in which some individuals without high school diplomas are recruited) 

for 2005.

Quality of Recruits

End strength and the ability of the force to meet its missions are also influenced by new recruits’ capabilities. 

Recruits who are better educated or who score higher on 

aptitude tests are more likely to complete their initial 

training and stay in the Army. They also perform better 

in the military.17 DoD has to compete for young people 

with those characteristics because many such youth are 

inclined to pursue higher education or to seek jobs in the 

private sector.

DoD sets two major goals for the quality of its recruits. 

First, at least 90 percent of the recruits without prior service should be high school graduates. Second, at least 60 

percent of recruits without prior service should score at or 

above the 50th percentile (relative to the general population) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). 

The ability of the service branches to meet those quality 

goals depends on labor-market conditions as well as the 

adequacy and effectiveness of recruiting resources.

During 2005, 87 percent of the Army’s non-prior-service 

recruits were high school graduates (see Table 1-3).18

Among the four active service branches, from 2000 to 

2005, only the Army missed the stated goal, in 2005. The 

percentage of Army recruits with AFQT scores at or 

above the median—in AFQT categories I through IIIA—

increased from 65 percent in 2000 to 73 percent in 2003. 

That metric was stable at 72 percent in 2004 but declined 

to 67 percent in 2005. 

Even though the Army was meeting its quantity goals for 

2006, the quality of those recruits declined. Through 

August 2006, high school graduates and recruits in 

AFQT categories I through IIIA made up 82 percent and 

61 percent, respectively, of the recruits without prior serFiscal

Year

2000 91 65 87 61 88 63

2001 91 65 86 60 90 66

2002 91 70 86 60 92 69

2003 92 73 84 60 93 68

2004 92 72 84 57 91 70

2005 87 67 83 57 88 67

Graduatea Categories I-IIIA Graduate Categories I-IIIA Graduate Categories I-IIIA

Active Army Army Reserve Army National Guard

High School High School AFQT AFQT AFQT High School

17. See David J. Armor and Paul R. Sackett, “Manpower Quality in 

the All-Volunteer Force,” in Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, 

and John T. Warner, eds., The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of 

Service (Dulles, Va.: Brassey’s Inc., 2004), pp. 90-108; and 

Jennifer Kavanagh, Determinants of Productivity for Military Personnel: A Review of the Findings on the Contributions of Experience, 

Training, and Aptitude on Military Performance, TR-193-OSD 

(Arlington, Va.: RAND, 2005).

18. Following the Army’s convention, that calculation for 2005 

excludes approximately 2,100 participants in the Tier Two Attrition Study, a pilot program in which selected individuals without 

high school diplomas (such as some individuals earning GED 

(general educational development) certificates or home-schooled 

students) are recruited. 
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 7

vice. A year earlier, through August 2005, the quality of 

non-prior-service recruits was higher: about 89 percent 

were high school graduates while 69 percent were in 

AFQT categories I through IIIA.19 Additionally, the proportion of recruits with low AFQT scores (between the 

10th and 30th percentiles) for the first 11 months of 

2006 increased to 3.9 percent (from 3.1 percent for the 

comparable period last year). Those changes may raise 

concern about the Army’s retention in the future.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have also 

experienced declines in the quality of their recruits. In 

2000, the Guard missed the goal for 90 percent of nonprior-service recruits to have high school diplomas and 

experienced a downward trend through 2005. The portion of recruits with high school diplomas declined from 

87 percent in 2000 to a low of 83 percent in 2005. The 

portion of recruits with AFQT scores at or above the 

median also slipped, from 61 percent in 2000 to 57 percent in both 2004 and 2005. Through August 2006, the 

percentage of recruits with high school degrees (89 percent) increased substantially over the figure a year earlier, 

through August 2005, while the portion with AFQT 

scores at or above the median (58 percent) improved 

slightly.

The Army Reserve experienced increases in the quality of 

its recruits early in the decade followed by a more recent 

decline. The share of non-prior-service recruits with high 

school diplomas increased from 88 percent in 2000 to a 

high of 93 percent in 2003 and afterward dropped back 

to the 2000 level. Recruits in AFQT categories I through 

IIIA increased from 63 percent at the beginning of the 

decade to 70 percent in 2004; in 2005, that group constituted 67 percent of accessions. Through August 2006, 

new recruits with high school diplomas made up 90 percent of accessions, compared with 87 percent at the same 

time last year, while those with AFQT scores above the 

median constituted 59 percent versus 67 percent at the 

same time last year. Additionally, through August 2006, 

the Army Reserve was recruiting relatively more individuals with low AFQT scores (between the 10th and 30th 

percentiles) than it had through August of the previous 

year. 

Recruiting Resources

CBO examined three of the most important resources 

available to the Army to influence accession levels—

enlistment bonuses, the number of recruiters, and advertising expenditures. Enlistment bonuses, paid in a lump 

sum or in installments, provide incentives for new

recruits to join the military. The service branches may 

offer greater incentives when they require larger numbers 

of recruits to build a growing force or when they encounter an unusual degree of competition with the private sector. They also offer enlistment bonuses to some recruits 

even when they are not facing general difficulties in 

recruiting—to encourage recruits to join selected occupations with manning shortfalls and to smooth the flow of 

recruits into initial training.

The active Army has increased its incentives to join by 

instituting, in January 2005, an enlistment bonus of up 

to $10,000 for recruits with prior service. Also in 2005, 

the Army expanded its bonus eligibility for non-priorservice recruits. For example, the Army began offering 

those recruits with college credits additional cash enlistment incentives (the “HiGrad” program). Previously, 

only high-quality non-prior-service recruits in certain 

occupations were eligible for bonuses. In addition, the 

maximum enlistment bonus amount was increased from 

$20,000 to $40,000 for selected occupations in 2006. 

Other enlistment incentives besides bonuses have also 

been strengthened. For example, in 2005, the maximum 

payout from the Army College Fund was increased from 

$50,000 to $70,000, and the maximum benefit in the 

Student Loan Repayment Program was increased to 

$65,000 for personnel in selected occupations.20

Between 2000 and 2005, the active Army spent between 

$95 million and $201 million annually on enlistment 

bonuses (see Table 1-4). Although the expenditures of 

$166 million in 2005 represented a decrease from the

19. Those numbers have deteriorated since midyear. Typically, the 

percentages improve through the year as students who have completed high school are disproportionately recruited through the 

remainder of the year.

20. The Army College Fund (ACF) is an educational benefit that provides funds for higher education to qualified non-prior-service 

recruits who enroll in the program at the time of enlistment. The 

ACF supplements the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) and must be 

used in conjunction with it. Under MGIB, an eligible member 

receives monthly educational assistance for 36 months. The ACF 

supplements the basic MGIB benefit, and the combined benefit, 

paid monthly for 36 months, cannot exceed the maximum ACF 

amount. Further information on the program is available at 

www.hrc.army.mil/site/education/acf.html. Under the Student 

Loan Repayment Program, the military will repay a portion of eligible college loans for non-prior-service enlistees.
8 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 1-4.

The Army’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Bonuses

(Millions of current dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Army, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy 

and Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management; and, for the reserve components, data from the Department of 

Defense’s personnel budget books, available at www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html.

a. Selective reenlistment bonuses for the active Army include Critical Skills Retention Bonuses, which were also authorized for the reserve 

forces in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act.

previous year, $238 million and $200 million are budgeted for 2006 and 2007, respectively.21 The higher 

amounts are necessary to fund the new enlistment bonus 

programs.22

The number of active Army recruiters varied substantially 

between 2000 and 2005, more than the variation in 

recruiting goals might suggest; some of the difference 

presumably reflects changes in the recruiting climate (see 

Table 1-5). The active Army reduced its recruiting force 

from an average of about 6,400 recruiters during 2002 to 

an average of 5,100 during 2004, a decline of almost 21 

percent (compared with the decline in initial accession 

goals of 5.6 percent). It then increased the number of 

recruiters from 5,200 at the beginning of 2005 to 6,500 

by year’s end (averaging just under 6,000 for the entire 

fiscal year). The number of recruiters averaged about 

6,500 through the first 11 months of 2006. The additional recruiters should be or will shortly be fully productive. Research has shown that recruiters typically produce 

few recruits in their first six months on the job; it is not 

until 18 months of recruiting duty that they reach the 

height of their productivity.23 An Army-wide referral 

program newly instituted this year, in which service 

members who help sign up new recruits receive a $1,000 

bonus, could also boost recruiting.24

The active Army has also devoted more funding for support resources—for such things as the use of rental cars 

by recruiters—and advertising (see Table 1-5). The cost 

of the support resources increased from $182 million in 

2003 to $226 million in 2004 and $258 million in 2005. 

Advertising expenditures totaled $126 million in 2000 

and grew to $216 million in 2005, averaging a 12 percent 

annual rate of growth during that period. The greatest 

increase, of almost $40 million, came in 2005, presumably to counter the difficulties that recruiters were having 

meeting their goals.

Fiscal Year

2000 105.4 94.9 23.8 20.8 5.5 18.7

2001 112.6 166.2 27.9 60.4 7.8 27.2

2002 127.8 200.7 25.0 81.5 9.9 28.9

2003 102.6 150.3 25.1 63.0 11.9 41.9

2004 142.9 188.1 27.2 77.6 2.7 35.6

2005 505.6 165.9 235.1 138.6 56.9 61.0

Selective

Incentive

Bonusesa Bonuses Program Bonuses

Enlistment

Reenlistment

Army National Guard

Enlistment Incentive

Army Reserve

Selective

Program Bonuses

Enlistment

Active Army

Selective Reenlistment

Reenlistment 

21. Budgeted levels do not reflect any spending on enlistment bonuses 

that may be funded from supplemental appropriations for the war 

in Iraq.

22. As is sometimes the case, it is possible that the figures for expenditures, including those for enlistment bonuses, will be revised 

upward after any adjustments occur as the spending accounts are 

finalized. For example, data that DoD provided to CBO showed a 

revision of the 2004 amount from $125 million to $188 million.

23. See Paul R. Sackett and Anne S. Mavor, eds., Evaluating Military 

Advertising and Recruiting: Theory and Methodology, National 

Research Council of the National Academies (Washington, D.C.: 

The National Academies Press, 2004), p. 108, available at 

www.nap.edu.

24. The program generated 168 contracts for the active Army and 

122 contracts for the Army Reserve through early May 2006 and 

another 225 accessions for the Army National Guard through 

mid-April 2006.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 9

Table 1-5.

The Army’s Recruiting Resources

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Army, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy; 

and, for the reserve components, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs, and selected Department of 

Defense budget books and related justification materials.

Note: n.a. = not available.

a. For the active Army, statistics reflect the average number of recruiters for each year. For the reserve components, they reflect the number 

of full-time reservists filling positions as recruiters or recruiter support personnel as of the end of the year.

b. For the reserve components, support resources also fund activities to retain soldiers.

c. For 2002, the National Guard’s reporting consolidated information on support for recruiters and advertising.

To meet their recruiting missions, the Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve have also increased their 

recruiting incentives and the resources allocated to 

recruiting. The reserve components operate three bonus 

programs: an enlistment bonus for individuals with prior 

service but with no military service obligation, a bonus 

for those without prior service, and an affiliation bonus, 

which may be offered to individuals with a military service obligation. The Congress enhanced the enlistment 

bonus program for 2005 by raising the maximum bonus 

for non-prior-service recruits from $8,000 to $10,000 

and then again, for 2006, to $20,000.25 The Army 

National Guard, as of June 2006, was offering $20,000 

bonuses for its 10 most critical occupations, while the 

Army Reserve was using bonuses up to that amount to 

attract recruits into five selected occupations. The Congress also increased the maximum affiliation bonus from 

$10,000 for 2005 to $20,000 for 2006. Even so, as of 

March 2006, the Army National Guard was paying up to 

$15,000 and the Army Reserve up to $10,000. (Previously, the services typically paid $50 per month for each 

month of remaining obligation.) Both Army components 

also offer the statutory maximum of $15,000 to selected 

prior-service recruits enlisting for a six-year obligation 

into certain occupations.

Between 2000 and 2002, the Army National Guard spent 

between $21 million and $82 million annually on enlistment bonuses (see Table 1-4). In 2003, the first year it 

did not meet its recruiting goal, expenditures for enlistment bonuses totaled $63 million, a decline of $18 million from the amount the previous year. In 2004, the 

Guard increased spending to the level of previous years. 

Then, in 2005, enlistment bonuses almost doubled—

exceeding $138 million. For 2006, the budgeted amount 

was $147 million; for 2007, it is $132 million.26

The Army Reserve spent between $19 million and $42 

million on enlistment bonuses in 2000 through 2004 (see 

Table 1-4). In 2005, when the Army Reserve experienced 

recruiting shortfalls, it increased its expenditures to $61 

million. It has budgeted $103 million for 2006 and $53 

million for 2007.

Fiscal

Year Recruitersa

2000 6,188 188.6 125.4 3,584 24.7 37.4 1,738 32.2 48.2

2001 5,156 199.4 139.8 3,608 38.2 48.9 1,724 48.2 31.3

2002 6,367 242.1 131.2 3,549 n.a. 82.7 c 40.6 46.3 1,438

2003 6,078 181.7 171.2 3,312 43.8 62.5 1,284 43.1 50.3

2004 5,109 226.4 177.1 3,915 45.5 114.4 1,265 39.9 62.2

2005 5,953 258.1 215.9 4,955 45.9 175.2 1,399 42.5 67.9

Active Army Army National Guard Army Reserve

Recruiter

Advertising

Recruiter

Advertising Supportb

Recruitersa

Supportb

Recruiter

(Millions

of dollars)

(Millions

of dollars)

(Millions

of dollars)

(Millions (Millions

of dollars)

(Millions

Recruiters of dollars) a

Support Advertising

of dollars)

25. Those levels are applicable to all national guard and reserve components, not just for the Army National Guard and Reserve.

26. Again, budgeted levels do not reflect any spending on enlistment 

bonuses that may be funded from supplemental appropriations 

for the war in Iraq.
10 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

In terms of other resources, the Army National Guard 

funded the fewest (3,312) full-time recruiters/recruiting 

support personnel this decade in 2003, the first year it 

experienced recruiting shortfalls (see Table 1-5).27 However, in the face of continued problems in recruiting the 

required personnel, it increased its recruiting force to 

3,915 in 2004 and 4,955 in 2005. As is true with the 

active Army, those new recruiters should now or shortly 

be fully productive. In addition to its full-time force, the 

Army National Guard also created the Guard Recruiting 

Assistance Program, or G-RAP, a pilot program in which 

individual reservists receive training in recruiting and 

then become “recruiting assistants.” For every recruit who 

signs up and “ships” to basic training, the recruiting assistant earns $2,000. The Army expanded the program in 

February 2006, allowing National Guard members 

nationwide to enroll. From January 1 through mid-April 

2006, assistants recruited almost 4,000 soldiers. To the 

extent that those individuals would not have signed up or 

would have required substantial efforts under the traditional recruiting system, the program has been a significant boost to recruiting.

The Army National Guard also almost doubled its spending on support for recruiting between 2000 and 2005, to 

$45 million, but the largest increases occurred early in the 

decade. In addition, advertising expenditures grew almost 

fivefold over the same period. Expenditures were boosted 

the most in 2004 and 2005 in an attempt to reverse 

recruiting problems—rising from $62 million in 2003 to 

$114 million in 2004 and $175 million in 2005.

The Army Reserve has also increased its recruiting 

resources recently. While the number of full-time recruiters or recruiting support personnel in the Army Reserve 

(at year-end) declined from 1,738 in 2000 to 1,265 in 

2004, it increased 11 percent in 2005, to 1,399 (see 

Table 1-5). According to the Army Reserve, the number 

of individuals assigned as recruiters (not recruiting support personnel) declined from 1,259 in 2000 to 841 in 

2004 and then jumped to 1,374 in 2005. That number 

has increased further to 1,794 by late August 2006, 

according to Army Reserve officials. Spending on recruiting support has been uneven over the period, ranging 

from a low of $32 million to a high of $48 million. 

Expenditures in 2005 were increased by 7 percent over 

the level the previous year, to $43 million. The Army 

Reserve boosted advertising expenditures more than 40 

percent from 2000 through 2005, with the largest 

upsurge occurring in recent years.

Retention Trends

Boosting the number of troops the Army keeps in the service is another way to maintain or increase end strength, 

particularly when difficulties develop in recruiting. 

Improvements in pay and allowances may be expected to 

raise continuation rates in the future. However, some 

analysts have voiced concerns that higher sustained 

deployment rates than experienced in the past several 

decades will contribute to depressed continuation rates. 

Although none of the Army components achieved its 

recruiting goals in 2005, the active Army and the Army 

Reserve met their retention or continuation goals for 

enlisted personnel.28

Quantity

The active Army states its retention goals in terms of the 

number, not the percentage, of soldiers retained. CBO 

examined retention separately among soldiers serving in 

their initial enlistment, those in midcareer, and careerists 

(see Table 1-6).29 For all three seniority ranges, the Army 

met its retention goals for every year between 2000 and 

2005. Year-to-year comparisons among those data are difficult to make, however. For example, in January 2005, 

the Army changed the eligibility window for deployed 

soldiers to reenlist from 12 months to 24 months before 

the expiration of their contract; the Army extended that 

policy change to all soldiers in April 2005. Consequently, 

the pool of possible reenlistees potentially nearly doubled 

between 2004 and 2005. Thus, the counts for 2005 and

27. The statistics on the reserve components’ recruiters do not include 

reservists who support recruiting on an intermittent basis (by, for 

example, attending job fairs or escorting recruits to military processing stations) or any civilian personnel or related contracts the 

components might use. 

28. Retention refers to the number of personnel who remain in the 

military after their contractual term of service expires; retention 

rates are often measured separately by military occupation and by 

seniority. Generally, retention rates are computed on a base of 

only those soldiers whose term of service will expire within a given 

fiscal year. Continuation refers to the proportion of service members who remain in the military for a specific period of time 

regardless of the expiration of their contract.

29. Initial enlistment refers to soldiers under their first enlistment 

contract regardless of their length of service. Service members who 

are on their second or subsequent enlistment with up to 10 years 

of service are categorized as being in midcareer, whereas service 

members with more than 10 years of service are called careerists.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 11

Table 1-6.

The Active Army’s Retention of Enlisted Personnel

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel

Management.

Note: Soldiers under their first enlistment contract regardless of their length of service are considered to be in their initial enlistment. Service members who are on their second or subsequent enlistment with up to 10 years of service are categorized as being in midcareer, 

whereas service members with more than 10 years of service are called careerists.

a. In 2005, the Army changed the eligibility window for soldiers to reenlist from 12 months to 24 months before the expiration of their contract. Consequently, the pool of possible reenlistees potentially nearly doubled between 2004 and 2005.

2006 include soldiers who would have reenlisted in the 

original reenlistment window and those individuals who 

would have reenlisted in later years.30 Future years may 

have lower numbers than 2005 and 2006; fewer people 

will be available in the original window, as some will 

reenlist early.

Unlike the active component, the reserve components 

focus on the number of losses regardless of whether personnel have a military service obligation remaining on 

their contract. DoD computes attrition rates as the number of losses from a component in a period compared 

with the component’s average end strength for the same 

period. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

stated ceilings for attrition rates of 19.5 percent and 28.6 

percent, respectively, for 2000 through 2005. While the 

Army Reserve has been under its ceiling since 2000, the 

Army National Guard exceeded its ceiling in 2001, 2002, 

and again in 2005 (see Table 1-7). 

However, as with the active Army’s retention statistics, it 

is difficult to make accurate year-to-year comparisons. 

For example, the Army Reserve’s change in the definition 

of accession means that recruits who had not begun initial training were included in attrition statistics early 

in the decade but not in the more recent calculations. 

Because recruits have higher-than-average attrition rates 

prior to initial training, attrition rates early in the decade 

were higher than if the definitions had been comparable 

over the time period. More generally, however, declines 

in end strength (whether resulting from higher-thanexpected losses or lower-than-expected accessions) will 

inflate attrition rates. For example, suppose end strength 

declined from 350,000 to 300,000 personnel in a fiscal 

year while the corresponding losses equaled 60,000. The 

attrition rate, as calculated by DoD, would be 18.5 percent. Instead, if end strength were stable at 350,000, the 

attrition rate would be 17.1 percent.31

Because yearly comparisons of DoD’s official retention 

and attrition measures are difficult to make, CBO also 

examined trends in continuation rates as measured by the 

proportion of soldiers at the beginning of a fiscal year 

that remain in the same component and status one year 

later. The rates were computed for all personnel in the

Fiscal

Year

2000 21,402 20,000 107 24,118 23,700 102 25,791 24,300 106

2001 20,000 19,750 101 23,727 23,350 102 21,255 20,900 102

2002 19,433 19,100 102 23,074 22,700 102 15,700 15,000 105

2003 21,838 19,821 110 19,509 18,422 106 12,804 12,757 100

2004 24,903 23,000 108 21,120 20,292 104 13,987 12,808 109

2005a 27,818 26,935 103 24,407 23,773 103 17,287 13,454 128

Percentage Percentage

of Goal

Careerists

Percentage

Initial Enlistments Midcareer Personnel

Goal Goal

of Goal of Goal

Actual Goal Attained Attained Actual Actual Attained

30. Some individuals may decide to reenlist earlier to take advantage 

of bonuses. For example, soldiers deployed in a war zone 12 to 24 

months before their obligation is fulfilled may decide to reenlist at 

that time to receive special tax-exempt reenlistment bonuses.

31. Other conditions may also distort attrition rates as calculated. For 

example, if individuals are temporarily dropped from the endstrength rolls—for a disciplinary reason, for instance—and then 

reinstated, attrition rates will be higher than they otherwise would 

be. 
12 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 1-7.

The Army Reserve Components’ Attrition Rates

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

component at the start of the fiscal year, including those 

whose term of service would not expire until some future 

fiscal year.32

CBO found that the active Army’s overall continuation 

rates were lower in 2004 and 2005 than they had been 

since 1996 (see Figure 1-1 on page 14). In addition, continuation rates for initial enlistees in their fourth year of 

service (the point at which many face their first reenlistment decision) were more than 3 percentage points lower 

in 2005 than they had been in either 2000 or 2001 and 

lower than they had been since the mid-1990s. Despite 

increases in pay and the enforcement of stop-loss policies, 

continuation rates dropped to levels not observed in over 

a decade.33 The more-recent 12-month continuation 

rates through February 2006 (82.8 percent overall) were 

slightly higher than the 2005 levels (82.4 percent overall), 

suggesting that the situation may improve.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve, too, have 

had their continuation rates decline since 2003. However, 

the reserve components’ rates are still at or above the levels early in the decade. The Guard’s rates (at 82.2 percent 

overall in 2005) were just 0.3 percentage points higher 

than those in 2001, while the Army Reserve’s (at 79.2 

percent overall in 2005) were about 1.5 percentage points 

higher (with the difference adjusted for the change in the 

definition of accession).34 More recent 12-month continuation rates through February 2006 suggest that the 

Army National Guard’s and the Army Reserve’s continuation rates are on an upswing: they were 83.1 percent for 

the Guard and 79.6 percent for the Reserve.

Pay and Reenlistment Bonuses

Active-duty military pay includes basic pay, allowances 

for food and housing, and other incentive pay and pay for 

special duty. Reservists who drill (that is, train on the 

weekends) are paid at twice the rate as active-duty service 

members’ basic pay for the duration of the drill.35 Reservists who are activated to continuous active duty are paid 

at the normal active-duty rate. 

Military pay has risen substantially over the decade for 

both active-duty service members and reservists. In 2000, 

the Congress authorized that annual increases in basic 

pay be 0.5 percent more than the increase in wages in the 

Fiscal

Year

2000 18.0 92.2 29.4 102.9

2001 20.0 102.6 27.4 95.7

2002 20.6 105.7 24.6 86.0

2003 18.1 92.9 22.2 77.4

2004 18.6 95.5 22.7 79.2

2005 20.2 103.6 23.5 82.1

Memorandum:

Attrition Ceiling 19.5 n.a. 28.6 n.a. 12.0 36.0

Percentage to Ceiling Percentage to Ceiling

Percentage Relative

Army National Guard Army Reserve

Actual Percentage Relative Actual

32. One failing of that measure is that changes in early attrition (when 

individuals enter and then leave within the same fiscal year, for 

example) are not reflected.

33. Stop-loss policies enable the military services to retain members 

beyond the length of their obligation.

34. The Army Reserve’s continuation rates are not wholly comparable 

across years because statistics for earlier years included individuals 

before they attended initial training and later statistics do not. 

Adjusting for the changed definition requires a relatively small 

upward revision of about 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points in the continuation rates before 2004. 

35. Traditionally, one weekend of drills (four drills) is compensated by 

four days of active-duty basic pay. Pay for drilling is expressed in 

relation to active-duty basic pay, and both increase at the same 

rate.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 13

civilian sector, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s employment cost index.36 The Congress has also 

increased housing allowances and other pay significantly. 

To examine military compensation, a broader measure 

than basic pay, termed regular military compensation 

(RMC), is typically used. RMC is a construct that 

includes basic pay, allowances for food and housing, and 

the tax advantage that arises because those allowances are 

not taxable. Between 2001 and 2005, average RMC for 

the entire active-duty enlisted force showed a cumulative 

increase of almost 14 percent, adjusted for inflation. 

However, some of that increase took the form of targeted 

pay raises for senior enlisted service members (noncommissioned officers). For soldiers facing their first 

reenlistment decision, RMC rose by a smaller amount—

about 10 percent, adjusted for inflation. That rate was 

about 13.5 percent higher than that for comparable 

civilians.37 Similarly, the average pay for enlisted reserve 

personnel who drill (basic pay) increased by about 10 percent more than the pay of comparable civilians.

In the absence of any other changes, that increase in relative military pay would be expected to increase the 

retention of first-term active-duty personnel by about 

25 percent and add more than 1 percentage point to 

overall continuation rates, CBO estimates.38 The 

observed decline in the active Army’s continuation rates 

represents the combined effects of other factors that outweighed the increase in military pay.

In addition to regular military compensation, the service 

components offer reenlistment bonuses to enlisted members as a way of retaining sufficient numbers in the military. The active components offer Selective Reenlistment 

Bonuses (SRBs), and the reserve components have the 

Selective Reenlistment Incentive Program (SRIP).39 The 

bonuses are typically offered for specific skills or occupations, although in recent years, the Guard has offered an 

SRIP bonus to all soldiers reenlisting into a position that 

matches their occupational qualifications. In the 2006 

NDAA, the Congress authorized individual reenlistment 

bonuses of up to $90,000 for the active-duty personnel 

(up from the previous year’s maximum of $60,000) and 

up to $15,000 for reserve personnel.40 That legislation 

also increased the maximum Critical Skills Retention 

Bonus (CSRB), another type of reenlistment bonus, from 

$150,000 to $200,000 for the active components and 

authorized the bonus (to a maximum of $100,000) for 

the reserve forces. The active Army is paying CSRBs up 

to the maximum for some soldiers in the Special Forces, 

while the reserves too have begun using the bonus 

authority selectively. 

In September 2003, the active Army introduced a $5,000 

reenlistment bonus known as the Temporary Selective 

Reenlistment Bonus, which was later renamed the 

Deployed SRB. That bonus, payable to active-duty soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait, is exempt from

36. The 2004 NDAA stipulated that the military pay raise revert to 

the percentage increase in the employment cost index after 2006.

37. Using data from the Current Population Survey by the Bureau of 

Labor Statistics, CBO calculated the 70th percentile of civilian 

wages for full-time male workers in nonagricultural industries 

with some college education and four years of experience. DoD 

uses the 70th percentile as a benchmark for pay for enlisted personnel. See Beth Asch and others, “An Analysis of Pay for Enlisted 

Personnel,” Report of the Ninth Quadrennial Review of Military 

Compensation, Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2002. 

38. CBO applied a pay elasticity of 1.75. The pay elasticity expresses 

the change in retention associated with a change in relative military pay. An increase in relative military pay of 14 percent induces 

an increase in the reenlistment rate of 25 percent (1.75 × 14 percent) for soldiers at their first reenlistment point. CBO applied 

that increase to only those soldiers whose initial term of service 

would expire within a given fiscal year. The effect on overall continuation rates (for all soldiers) is smaller—increasing overall rates 

by more than 1 percentage point. The elasticity of 1.75 was the 

midpoint of elasticities reported in Matthew Goldberg, “A Survey 

of Enlisted Retention: Models and Findings,” Report of the Ninth 

Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Department of 

Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 

Readiness), 2002. CBO made similar calculations to adjust 

careerists’ retention rates. CBO was unable to calculate the effect 

of pay changes for reservists because data on the relationship 

between pay and retention of reservists are not available. 

A 1 percentage-point increase in the overall continuation rate 

above the 2005 level for the active Army translates into a rise in 

end strength of more than 29,000 troops in a steady state (that is, 

with the force structure that evolves stabilized over 20 years or 

more) and more than 15,500 by the end of CBO’s five-year projection period. Equivalent increases in the Army National Guard’s 

continuation rate boosts its end strength by more than 17,500 

troops in a steady state and more than 11,000 by 2010, and such 

increases in the Army Reserve’s rate boosts its figures by more than 

7,500 and 5,000.

39. The discussion here applies only to reenlistment bonuses for 

reservists who are drilling. Full-time reservists may be eligible for 

other reenlistment incentives.

40. See 37 U.S.C. 308. Those statutory maximum levels apply to all 

military components, not only to the Army components.
14 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 1-1.

The Army’s Annual Continuation Rates

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 

Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Data on the Army National Guard’s and Army Reserve’s continuation rates before 2000 are not available.

federal income taxes. In January 2005, the Army 

increased the payment up to $15,000. Although soldiers 

are not entitled to both an occupation- or skill-based 

SRB and the Deployed SRB, they are entitled to the 

bonus of the higher amount.41 According to the Army, 

6,700 active-duty soldiers reenlisted and took the 

Deployed SRB in 2004; and 22,000 did so in 2005, at a 

cost to the Army of approximately $227 million. As of 

September 21, 2006, the number of such soldiers was 

23,200, at a cost of roughly $320 million. Unlike the regular SRB, which encourages soldiers in targeted (usually 

undermanned) occupations to reenlist, the Deployed 

SRB is available to a broader group of soldiers and thus 

provides an incentive to soldiers in a wider spectrum of 

occupations to reenlist.

The Army Reserve began a similar program in January 

2005. Reservists receive $15,000 for a six-year reenlistment and smaller amounts for shorter reenlistments (the 

same rates as occupation-specific bonuses). In 2005, 

about 2,050 reservists who were in-theater reenlisted and 

claimed a bonus, at a cost of $28 million. The National 

Guard also extended its reenlistment bonus program to 

allow individuals in-theater who were filling positions 

without the normal occupational qualifications to also 

receive a bonus of up to $15,000.

In 2005 alone, the active Army spent more on SRBs 

(including Critical Skills Retention Bonuses and SRBs for 

deployed personnel) than it spent in the four previous 

years combined (see Table 1-4). Although the Army’s 

SRB expenditures averaged less than $120 million annually between 2000 and 2004, they grew to $506 million 

in 2005.42 That increase, the largest among the active 

components between 2000 and 2005, may have derived 

from concerns that the current rate of deployment could 

lower retention.43 A large number of active and reserve 

soldiers have been deployed to the Iraq theater, and many 

have been deployed more than once since the onset of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consequently, the deployment 

rate of Army troops is considerably higher now than it 

was during the previous decade. Without the substantial 

increase in SRBs during 2005, retention rates would have 

been still lower. In 2006, according to data from the 

Army, expenditures on SRBs (including CSRBs and 

SRBs for deployed personnel) may exceed $650 million.

The Army National Guard’s expenditures on reenlistment 

bonuses had been stable at $24 million to $28 million per 

year between 2000 and 2004. However, in 2005, spending on its SRIP increased 10-fold, to $235 million. In the 

first six months of 2006, it spent $185 million on the 

program. Similarly, the Army Reserve had spent between 

$3 million and $12 million annually on reenlistment 

bonuses to its forces between 2000 and 2004. In 2005, 

expenditures increased to $57 million. Continuation 

41. Either bonus is exempt from federal income taxes if the soldier 

reenlists while in a wartime theater; see Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Armed Forces’ Tax Guide, Publication 3 (2005).

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

0

70

75

80

85

90

Active Army

Army

National Guard

Army Reserve

42. CSRB expenditures totaled $41 million in 2005.

43. SRB expenditures (excluding those for Critical Skills Retention 

Bonuses) by the other services did not grow nearly as rapidly. The 

Navy’s annual SRB expenditures ranged between $233 million 

and $344 million over the years 2000 through 2005. The Marine 

Corps’s and the Air Force’s ranged, respectively, between $36 million and $64 million and between $126 million and $263 million 

during those years. The Army included about $420 million in its 

2006 budget for SRBs. In its 2007 budget submission, the Army 

reduced that amount to $104 million.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 15

rates were declining for both components even in light of 

the additional expenditures. 

Stop-Loss Policies

A member of the military is obligated to serve through a 

date that is set in his or her initial enlistment contract, 

as modified by subsequent extensions, reenlistments, or 

“payback” periods after training. However, stop-loss policies enable the military to retain service members beyond 

the length of their obligation. 

Until November 2003, the active Army typically invoked 

a stop-loss policy within certain occupational specialties. 

Since then, the policy has been applied instead at the unit 

level, affecting all members of a unit. Regardless of the 

separation date in their contract, active-duty soldiers 

under a stop-loss policy are required to remain in the 

Army for a period beginning 90 days prior to their unit’s 

deployment and extending until 90 days after their unit 

has returned from its deployment.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve also 

applied stop-loss policies to some specialities between 

December 2001 and July 2003. In addition, both components have applied the policy on a unit basis since 

November 2002. Individuals are under the policy from 

the date the unit is alerted for mobilization to 90 days 

after demobilization.

The number of soldiers potentially affected by stop-loss 

policies (those soldiers whose obligation expires while 

they are deployed or preparing for or returning from 

deployment) varies from month to month as some 

soldiers’ contracts expire and various units either are 

deployed or return from deployment. Soldiers may reenlist when under a stop-loss policy, and many do so to take 

advantage of the tax-exempt reenlistment bonuses. Such 

reenlistments typically occur before a service member’s 

contract expires, although some soldiers reenlist under a 

stop-loss policy after their original contract has expired. 

The Army considers soldiers who are subject to a stoploss policy and are kept in the service past their obligation 

as “involuntarily retained.” At any point during 2005, the 

active Army retained an average of about 7,000 enlisted 

soldiers who were involuntarily kept in the service past 

their contracted separation date. That number has since 

increased. For the 12 months that ended in March 2006, 

an average of 7,900 enlisted soldiers were involuntarily 

retained at any given time. Almost all such soldiers separate from the Army once they are no longer under stoploss orders. The National Guard involuntarily retained 

an average of 2,650 individuals for the 12 months that 

ended in February 2006, and the Army Reserve involuntarily retained an average of 3,260 for the 12 months that 

ended in January 2006. 

According to CBO’s estimates, continuation rates for the 

active Army without the stop-loss policy would have been 

0.3 percentage points lower than the 2005 rate. Similarly, 

for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, 

continuation rates without stop-loss policies would have 

been, respectively, 0.1 percentage points and 0.3 percentage points lower than the 2005 rates.

The Effectiveness of Recruiting and 

Retention Incentives and Resources

As stated, there are two ways Army components could 

maintain or increase their end strength should they 

decide to do so. One way is to increase the number of 

individuals they bring in (accessions). The other way is to 

retain more of their existing personnel. Those two 

approaches have different costs and different implications 

for the level of seniority of the force. Increasing accessions 

largely involves the costs to recruit and train new personnel. Increasing retention primarily involves the cost of 

extra incentives (for example, reenlistment bonuses or 

other pay increases) needed to encourage more personnel 

to stay in the military. If the Army were to emphasize 

retaining additional personnel, the force would become 

older and more experienced than it would be if the Army 

increased end strength through recruiting additional 

personnel instead. Moreover, because more-experienced 

personnel are more productive than recruits, the Army 

would not need to increase end strength as much as otherwise. However, since the trade-off between using new 

recruits compared with experienced personnel to accomplish a given mission is not well quantified, CBO did not 

consider any potential differences in the costs and productivity of those two types of personnel. 

Recruiting Resources and Incentives 

To obtain additional enlistments, the Army could either 

increase its recruiting resources (adding recruiters, for 

instance) or it could improve incentives to enlist (boosting compensation, for instance). CBO examined the 

change in enlistments that results from raising total 

expenditures on recruiting. Specifically, CBO presents 

ranges of estimates of the effectiveness of the number of 

recruiters, advertising levels, enlistment bonuses, and
16 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

educational benefits (largely, the services’ college 

funds)—the levers for recruiting that the Army could 

more easily adjust and target toward new recruits. CBO 

did not consider an increase in basic pay, because, 

although it may have a beneficial effect on recruiting, it 

affects the entire force and is not targeted to new recruits. 

More-targeted enlistment incentives such as enlistment 

bonuses are more effective in increasing the number of 

recruits. 

CBO’s analysis is based on a review of previous research, 

most of which focuses on active-duty personnel.44 All 

except two of those studies were conducted prior to the 

current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While it is 

possible that recent changes in the recruiting environment could alter the effectiveness of individual recruiting 

tools, the results of the most recent studies are consistent 

with those of earlier ones.

Of course, additional factors besides the Army’s recruiting 

resources and incentives affect recruiting success. For 

example, the effect of the war in Iraq on youths’ propensity to join the military is one such factor that defines 

the recruiting environment, probably quite significantly. 

Although statistical data on the effect of the war on 

recruiting are scanty, survey evidence (which is discussed 

in the next section of this study) does exist. Another factor, the state of the economy, is also important to recruiting success. A low unemployment rate in the civilian 

economy makes signing up new recruits harder because 

they have relatively more opportunities in the private sector. However, because the state of the economy is beyond 

the military’s control, it is not considered in this discussion of recruiting tools. 

Box 1-1.

Calculating the Marginal Costs of Increasing Enlistments

Marginal costs describe the expense of increasing one 

resource to obtain one additional unit of product 

while holding other resources constant. For example, 

in the context of recruiting personnel for military service, an estimate of the increase in advertising expenditures needed to obtain one additional enlistment 

captures marginal costs. Elasticities of the recruiting 

resources relate percentage changes in those resources 

to percentage changes in enlistments. 

The active Army’s expenditures on advertising averaged about $160 million per year between 2000 and 

2005. The marginal costs for advertising can be estimated as follows:

1. Calculate the change in enlistments. Mathematically, this can be expressed as:

The change in enlistments = elasticity × % change 

in advertising × base number of enlistments.

As shown in Table 1-8, the elasticity values are 

0.7 percent to 1.0 percent for a 10 percent increase, or 0.07 percent to 0.1 percent for each

percentage-point increase in advertising, and the 

base number of enlistments is 77,000, or the average number of accessions in the active Army between 2000 and 2005. 

The change in enlistments from a 10 percent 

increase in advertising expenditures (or $16 million) could yield between 540 additional enlistments (0.07 × 0.1 × 77,000) and 770 additional 

enlistments (0.1 × 0.1 × 77,000).

2. Divide the change in costs by the additional enlistments to derive the marginal costs:

$16 million ÷ 540 = $30,000 and

$16 million ÷ 770 = $21,000.

In general, marginal costs are relevant only for relatively small changes in resources. Consequently, they 

are sensitive to wide fluctuations in expenditures and 

may not be valid if expenditures are outside the range 

over which the underlying elasticities were calculated. 

Because the Congressional Budget Office calculated 

marginal costs from average expenditures on recruiting resources from 2000 to 2005, the marginal costs 

should be interpreted as the increase in costs that the 

Army could expect from relatively small changes in 

enlistments from the 2000-2005 levels. 

44. See the list of studies in Appendix A.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 17

In estimating the effectiveness of selected recruiting 

resources for the active Army, CBO obtained from past 

studies estimates of the percentage increase in enlistments 

that could be expected from a 1 percent increase in each 

recruiting resource, the so-called elasticity of each 

resource, and used that information to calculate the cost 

of increasing enlistments through a given means by one 

recruit, that is, the marginal cost.45 The elasticity relates 

percentage changes in enlistments to percentage changes 

in a recruiting resource, while the marginal cost concept 

expresses those changes in terms of the cost per additional 

person enlisting. Thus, marginal costs provide a way to 

evaluate cost-effectiveness and inform decisions about 

how much of each recruiting resource should be used to 

obtain additional enlistments when faced with budgetary 

constraints.

Marginal costs are calculated using historical expenditures and the elasticities obtained from previous studies. 

However, marginal costs are sensitive to fluctuations in 

spending and may not be valid if expenditures are outside 

the range over which the elasticities were calculated. 

CBO calculated marginal costs on the basis of the average 

expenditures on each recruiting resource between 2000 

and 2005. For that reason, the marginal costs (and elasticities) reflect the increase in costs that the Army could 

expect in order to achieve relatively small changes 

(increases or decreases) in enlistments from their 2000-

2005 levels. (See Box 1-1 for further discussion of how 

CBO calculated the marginal costs.)

In calculating the marginal cost of recruiters, CBO 

included the pay and allowances of the recruiters as well 

as recruiting support costs. The former include basic pay, 

allowances, special pay and bonuses, permanent-changeof-station costs, DoD’s contributions to Social Security, 

health care costs for recruiters and their dependents, and 

DoD’s contributions to the trust funds for military retirement and retirees’ health care (which are funded on an 

accrual basis). Recruiting support costs include those for 

office supples, motor vehicles, other travel, utilities, and 

civilian support personnel.

One might consider the inclusion of recruiters’ pay and 

allowances unnecessary because additional recruiters are 

generally reassigned from other enlisted occupations, 

rather than being specifically recruited and added to end 

strength. Then, because new recruiters were already on 

the payroll, the incremental personnel costs would be 

zero. However, when personnel are shifted from other 

duties to recruiting, their previous functions are often 

backfilled by civilians or contractors, or in some cases left 

undone. In the former case, the recruiters’ pay and allowances approximate DoD’s costs to replace military personnel with civilians or contractors. If, instead, the work 

in or from the previous jobs is left undone, the recruiters’ 

pay and allowances can be considered to roughly approximate the productivity lost.

According to the studies reviewed, placing more recruiters in the field has the largest effect on enlistments (see 

Table 1-8).46 Although a 10 percent increase in expenditures on advertising, enlistment bonuses, or educational 

benefits would increase enlistments by up to 1 percent, a 

10 percent increase in the number of recruiters would 

boost enlistments by between 4 percent and 6 percent.47

45. Much of the literature concentrates on enlistment contracts rather 

than accessions of “high-quality” recruits. Some individuals who 

sign enlistment contracts do not follow through and actually 

report for boot camp (and thereby become accessions). Because 

such cases are relatively few and the difference between contracts 

and accessions would not change the calculations on the relative 

effectiveness of recruiting resources, CBO uses the two terms 

interchangeably. Researchers generally define individuals who 

score at or above the median in the AFQT as “high quality.” Lowquality recruits are often assumed to be in excess supply, so their 

numbers could be increased at negligible cost.

46. For the other services, the elasticities for the effectiveness of 

recruiters, also obtained from previous research, are similar to that 

for the Army. However, the other services’ elasticities for advertising, enlistment bonuses, and educational benefits are smaller than 

those estimated for the Army.

47. Some researchers have pointed out that many of the published 

elasticities for recruiters could be imprecise because they do not 

fully reflect certain practices by the services’ recruiting offices. 

First, the services often place a greater number of recruiters in 

areas with more youths predisposed toward enlisting in the military. The observed productivity of recruiters in those areas could 

partially be a result of that propensity. Second, the services sometimes expand their recruiting effort by opening new offices in 

areas where the target population was formerly hard to reach. 

Expanding the recruiting infrastructure into new areas could produce larger increases in enlistments than simply adding recruiters 

to existing stations, and it could increase enlistments independently of the number of recruiters. The services have followed 

both approaches in the past, and both are reflected in the elasticities for recruiters reported in the studies that CBO reviewed. 

Statistical analyses, it is argued, should take those factors into consideration separately. However, the existing elasticities remain useful, particularly for projection purposes if the Army’s future 

expansion of the number of recruiters and recruiting stations followed the same proportions observed in the data from which the 

elasticities were estimated.
18 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 1-8.

The Effectiveness of Recruiting Tools 

for the Active Army

Sources: Congressional Budget Office and various research studies 

(see Appendix A).

a. Ranges for elasticity convey the percentage change in enlistments effected by a 10 percent change in the various recruiting 

tools (for recruiters, a change in their number; for the other 

resources, a change in expenditures).

b. Ranges for marginal costs convey the expenditure required of 

the various recruiting tools to obtain an additional enlistment. 

Marginal costs for each recruiting tool are calculated from both 

the elasticities reported in this table and the average levels of 

each recruiting tool in the Army’s budget from 2000 to 2005. 

Marginal costs do not include any costs or receipts to the federal, state, or local governments outside of the costs incurred by 

the Department of Defense—for example, receipts from 

income taxes that recruits pay on enlistment bonuses.

c. Marginal costs for recruiters include support costs such as those 

for office supplies, civilian personnel support, vehicles, travel, 

utilities, and so forth. Marginal costs for recruiters without 

those support costs would be in the range of $11,000 to 

$16,000.

However, enlistments do not increase very much immediately after an increase in the number of recruiters. New 

recruiters tend to have little or no experience; they generally sign up few recruits during their first six months on 

the job and do not reach full productivity until one year 

or more after their assignment begins.48

Educational benefits also entice some qualified youths to 

join the military. The result is not surprising, as an 

increasing proportion of youths attend postsecondary 

education.49 The military often targets educational benefits to specific occupations in high demand to help channel personnel into those areas.

According to the literature that CBO reviewed, marginal 

costs for recruiters and educational benefits are lower 

than for advertising and enlistment bonuses. But because 

the elasticities for educational benefits, advertising, and 

enlistment bonuses are similar, their relative costeffectiveness is sensitive to the historical expenditure 

levels used to calculate the marginal costs.50

On the basis of the elasticities obtained from previous 

research, CBO also calculated the resources that would be 

necessary to increase accessions by 6,600, the shortfall 

that the active Army experienced in 2005. The additional 

enlistments should have been enough to enable the active 

Army to achieve its 2006 goal of 80,000 recruits. Even 

though that magnitude of increase in enlistments might 

be considered large (as opposed to the small changes 

embodied in the concept of marginal costs), CBO 

includes it here to provide a general sense of how much 

the Army might need to spend to meet its goals.

In examining the effectiveness of recruiting resources, 

CBO has assumed that all other potential influences on 

the propensity to enlist, such as the state of the economy, 

are held constant. However, as previously discussed, other 

factors besides recruiting resources can change the services’ recruiting success significantly. For instance, an 

increase in the civilian unemployment rate from its 2006 

year-to-date average of 4.7 percent to 5.7 percent (a 

48. Although increasing the number of recruiters would help the 

Army, research also shows that increasing the Army’s recruiters 

could harm other services’ recruiting. For example, one study 

found that a 10 percent increase in the Army’s recruiting effort 

would reduce enlistments in the Navy by 1.3 percent and in the 

Marine Corps by the same amount (the finding for the Air Force 

was not statistically significant); see John T. Warner, Curtis J. 

Simon, and Deborah M. Payne, “The Military Recruiting Productivity Slowdown: The Roles of Resources, Opportunity Cost, and 

the Tastes of Youth,” Defense and Peace Economics, vol. 14, no. 5 

(October 2003), pp. 329-342. 

Recruiters 4.0–6.0 15,000–22,000 c

Advertising 0.7–1.0 21,000–30,000

Enlistment Bonuses 0.3–0.8 24,000–65,000

Educational Benefits 0.7–1.0 8,000–11,000

(Percentage 

change in 

Elasticitya 

(Dollars)

Marginal Costsb

enlistments)

49. A CBO paper documented the education of enlisted personnel 

and the effect on retention; see Congressional Budget Office, Educational Attainment and Compensation of Enlisted Personnel (February 2004).

50. The relatively high marginal cost of advertising may indicate a saturation effect. The cost was calculated from the average advertising budget between 2000 and 2005, which was higher than 

budgeted levels for enlistment bonuses and educational benefits. 

Thus, a fixed percentage change in the advertising budget implies 

a comparatively high expenditure to induce a given percentage 

increase in enlistments. The marginal cost of enlistment bonuses 

is also relatively high because the 2005 budget levels already capture the fact that when a bonus is offered, it must be paid to all 

those who are eligible even though many of them would have 

enlisted anyway.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 19

21 percent increase) could increase enlistments by about 

8,000 without any increase in recruiting resources.51

CBO considered various combinations of increases in 

recruiting resources that the Army could use to obtain the 

necessary number of enlistments. For example, only the 

number of recruiters might be increased, or only advertising might be increased, to generate the additional 6,600 

enlistments. Alternatively, an increase in one resource 

could be combined with increases in other resources. 

As illustrative examples, CBO considered the following 

increases in recruiting resources from their 2005 levels to 

achieve the 6,600 additional enlistments:

B An increase in only the number of recruiters,

B An increase in only the expenditures on advertising, 

B A 20 percent increase in advertising in combination 

with an increase in the number of recruiters,

B A boost in enlistment bonuses only,

B A 20 percent increase in enlistment bonuses in combination with an increase in the number of recruiters,

B A 20 percent increase in both advertising and enlistment bonuses, in combination with an increase in the 

number of recruiters, and

B Increases in advertising and enlistment bonuses to 

produce equal gains in enlistments, with no change in 

the number of recruiters. 

The costs of those alternatives to DoD may differ from 

the total cost to the federal government. For instance, 

enlistment bonuses are taxable, making the total cost to 

the federal government less than the bonus amount. 

CBO did not include such considerations in this analysis. 

Also, the costs of the alternatives could be higher if the 

increases in the recruiting resources reached a saturation 

point (implying diminished productivity) that was not 

reflected in the elasticities.

By CBO’s calculations, the Army would need an additional 800 to 1,100 recruiters to achieve its goal of 

80,000 accessions (see Table 1-9). Adding that many 

recruiters to the average number of fully productive 

recruiters from 2005 would yield a total number of up to 

6,400.52 The Army has increased its recruiting resources 

substantially since 2004, including adding more than 

1,500 recruiters for a total recruiting force of almost 

6,500 by September 2005. Because of the on-the-job 

learning that occurs, those additional recruiters would 

have been productive for only a portion of 2005 but 

would have contributed more fully to the 2006 recruiting 

goal. The 2005 increases in recruiters alone should have 

enabled the Army to achieve its 2006 goal, CBO estimates (assuming that the recruiting environment did not 

deteriorate).53

Consistent with the relative marginal cost of each recruiting resource, increasing the number of recruiters to 

obtain the additional 6,600 enlistments is less costly than 

increasing only advertising expenditures or enlistment 

bonuses. The additional recruiters would cost between 

$98 million and $147 million to achieve 6,600 additional 

enlistments, whereas the alternatives that would increase 

advertising and enlistment bonuses separately would cost 

$137 million to $195 million and $161 million to $429 

million, respectively. However, a combination of increases 

in advertising or enlistment bonuses with a higher number of recruiters would cost only slightly more than using 

recruiters alone. For example, a 20 percent increase in 

advertising expenditures in combination with increasing 

the number of recruiters (by between 600 and 900) 

would cost between $115 million and $153 million, 

while a similar combination of boosts in enlistment 

bonuses and the number of recruiters (providing an additional 700 to 1,000 recruiters) would cost between $118 

million and $160 million. Combining all three resources 

(a 20 percent increase in advertising and enlistment 

bonuses and an additional 500 to 700 recruiters) would 

cost between $135 million and $166 million. Finally, 

increasing both advertising and enlistment bonuses (to

51. That estimate is based on an unemployment elasticity of about 

0.5, obtained from the research studies examined.

52. On the basis of discussions with DoD officials, CBO estimates 

that it takes newly assigned recruiters about six months to be productive. Thus, with that lag, only the recruiters assigned between 

April 2004 and March 2005 would have contributed fully to 

recruiting in fiscal year 2005, which ran from October 2004 to 

September 2005.

53. It is possible that an increase in the number of recruiters by one 

service may reach a point at which the services compete with one 

another for the same potential recruits. In such a situation, 

recruiters’ productivity would probably decline. CBO did not 

include that effect in its analysis.
20 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 1-9.

Costs for the Active Army to Obtain an Additional 6,600 Enlistments Using 

Various Recruiting Tools

(Millions of 2007 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

produce equal gains in enlistments) without increasing 

the number of recruiters would cost between $149 million and $313 million.

The analytic result that increasing the number of recruiters is the least costly alternative does not suggest that the 

other alternatives do not also play important roles. First, 

as a practical matter, it might not be possible to achieve a 

timely increase in the number of recruiters. Selecting and 

assigning hundreds of recruiters to the various geographic 

locations where they might be needed takes time. Moreover, the recruiters will require training and will not be 

fully productive early in their assignments. And, as mentioned, a resource (such as recruiters) might reach a saturation point if there are large-scale increases in it.

Although educational benefits appear cost-effective, that 

appearance may be misleading. For instance, some educational benefits have been criticized as a recruiting tool 

because they are of value to service members only after 

they leave the military. Thus, educational benefits may 

encourage enlistments but discourage reenlistments. In 

addition, the financing mechanism for educational benefits makes estimating an elasticity that measures their 

effectiveness difficult. The Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA) pays the base benefit under the Montgomery 

GI Bill, but the individual military services may pay 

“kickers” that enhance the DoD-wide benefit. Increases 

in the GI Bill’s base benefit have enabled the Army to 

reduce its payments for kickers by over one-half between 

2000 and 2005.54

Scenario

800–1,100 98–147 n.a. n.a. 98–147

n.a. n.a. 137–195 n.a. 137–195

600–900 76–113 40 n.a. 115–153

with the Remainder Achieved 

Through Additional Recruiters

n.a. n.a. n.a. 161–429 161–429

700–1,000 85–127 n.a. 33 118–160

Bonuses, with the Remainder 

Achieved Through Additional 

Recruiters

500–700 62–93 40 33 135–166

and Enlistment Bonuses,

with the Remainder Achieved

Through Additional Recruiters

n.a. n.a. 68–98 81–215 149–313

Enlistment Bonuses

20 Percent Increase in Enlistment 

20 Percent Increase in Advertising

Increase in Advertising and 

20 Percent Increase in Advertising, 

Increase in Enlistment Bonuses Only

Recruiters

Number Advertising Bonuses Cost Total Cost

Enlistment

Increase in Recruiters Only

Increase in Advertising Only

54. For example, the basic benefit under the GI Bill for veterans who 

have completed three or more years of service and are engaged in 

full-time institutional training increased from $650 per month (or 

$23,400 for 36 months) in 2000 to $1,034 per month (or 

$37,224 for 36 months) in 2005. Conversely, Army College Fund 

expenditures in the Army’s budget decreased from $117 million to 

$46 million in the same period. Army officials indicated that the 

drop in the Army College Fund expenditures was mostly due to 

the increase in the GI Bill’s basic benefit.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 21

Table 1-10.

The Effectiveness of Recruiters and Related Costs for the Army National

Guard and the Army Reserve to Attain Their 2006 Accession Goals

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

a. Ranges for elasticity convey the percentage change in enlistments effected by a 10 percent change in the number of recruiters.

b. Ranges for marginal costs convey the expenditure for recruiters (including recruiter support costs) required to obtain an additional 

enlistment.

c. Computed as the 2006 goal minus the actual enlistments in 2005.

Soldiers are presumably indifferent to the financing 

source and respond only to their total potential educational benefits, whether paid by VA or by the Army. A 

pitfall in estimating the behavioral elasticity from the 

Army’s spending on the benefits is that the number of 

enlistments may be increasing in response to a rise in the 

total educational benefits, even when the Army-financed 

share is decreasing. A statistical relationship between the 

Army’s share and the number of enlistments will yield an 

elasticity that is too small or even negative, masking the 

true (positive) relationship. For those reasons, the published elasticities for educational benefits are somewhat 

suspect. Although CBO presents those elasticities (in 

Table 1-8) for the sake of completeness, it has avoided 

using them in the policy options it considers.

Research evidence on the effectiveness of recruiting 

resources for the Army National Guard and the Army 

Reserve is scanty, although one study from 1991 presented evidence on recruiters’ effectiveness. That research 

indicated that if the Guard boosted its reserve recruiting 

force by 10 percent, enlistments might increase by 

between 6 percent and 9 percent, and that if the Army 

Reserve did the same, enlistments might go up by 

between 7 percent and 8 percent.55 Those estimates suggest that recruiters are at least as effective in the reserve 

components as they are in the active Army. 

Accessions in the National Guard totaled about 50,000 in 

2005, but its recruiting goal for 2006 was about 20,000 

higher, at 70,000 recruits. The Guard increased its number of recruiters from 3,915 at the end of 2004 to 4,955 

by the end of 2005. The number of recruiters who were 

fully productive at the end of 2005 would be somewhere 

in between, perhaps about 4,400 (the average of the two 

numbers). According to CBO’s estimates, to meet its goal 

with solely an increase in the number of recruiters, the 

Guard would have needed 2,000 to 3,000 more than 

that, at a cost of between $275 million and $412 million 

(including support costs) (see Table 1-10).

Similarly, the 2006 recruiting goal for the Army Reserve, 

about 36,000 recruits, represented an increase of about 

12,000 above the number of recruits in 2005. The Army 

Reserve increased its number of recruiters (including support personnel) from 1,265 at the end of 2004 to 1,399 

by the end of 2005. The number who were fully productive in 2005 would be about 1,300. By CBO’s estimates, 

the Army Reserve would have needed an additional 800 

to 1,000 recruiters at a cost of $120 million to $137 million to achieve its goal in 2006. 

In addition to boosting recruiting resources, the Army 

could consider changing or revising some of its policies 

on enlistment. The Army could consider more aggresElasticitya (Percentage change in enlistments) 6.0–9.0 7.0–8.0

Marginal Costsb

 (Dollars) 14,000–21,000 10,000–11,000

Additional Enlistments Needed to Achieve 2006 Goalc 20,000 12,000

Increase in Number of Recruiters Needed to Obtain Additional Enlistments 2,000–3,000 800–1,000

Cost of Additional Recruiters (Millions of dollars) 275–412 120–137

Army National Guard Army Reserve

55. See Hong W. Tan, Non-Prior Service Reserve Enlistments, R-3786-

FMP/RA (Arlington, Va.: RAND, 1991). That study and others 

CBO reviewed did not cover recruiting resources such as advertising, bonuses, and educational benefits.
22 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

sively targeting certain individuals who, although they 

have alternative high school credentials like GED (general educational development) certificates, have been 

shown to perform well in the military. For example, GED 

certificate holders who score high on the qualification test 

(in category I or II) have attrition rates that are similar to 

that of individuals with regular high school diplomas 

(in categories I to IIIB). However, the number of new 

recruits generated by such targeting may not be large, and 

new methods to accurately identify such individuals may 

be needed. 

Retention Incentives

Some of the factors that affect recruiting success also 

influence service members’ decisions to stay in or leave 

the military, such as the state of the economy and overall 

military compensation. Other factors include promotion 

opportunities, job conditions, and time away from home 

or deployed. 

Increases in basic pay are usually applied across the whole 

force, not specifically targeted to individuals at their 

reenlistment point. Because it is paid to everyone in the 

force, a basic-pay increase is a relatively expensive way to 

increase the number of soldiers reenlisting. Reenlistment 

bonuses, in contrast, can be increased or decreased 

quickly at a service’s discretion, targeted to individuals 

facing a reenlistment decision, and further targeted to 

selected occupations. 

Because bonuses are the primary reenlistment incentive, 

CBO examined their effectiveness in increasing the size of 

the active Army.56 According to CBO’s analysis, based on 

a review of previous research, if the Army increased its 

Selective Reenlistment Bonuses by one level to all personnel at their first reenlistment point, the number of 

reenlistments might increase by between 1 and 3 percentage points.57 At the midpoint of that range, the increase 

in bonuses would generate about 1,200 new reenlistments per year for the Army.58 The cost would be 

roughly $200 million per year, or about $170,000 per 

additional reenlistment.59 The cost would include not 

only the amount spent on new reenlistments but also the 

amount spent on individuals who would have reenlisted 

even without the additional incentive but who would 

receive the SRB nonetheless.

Typically, the services use SRBs not as an across-theboard retention tool, but instead as a targeted incentive 

to service members in occupational specialties with high 

training costs or demonstrated shortfalls in retention. 

CBO considered several occupations that may be experiencing difficulties from increased civilian competition. 

Some commentators have expressed concern that the military services, and particularly the Army, are losing personnel to defense contractors who offer much higher pay 

to perform similar jobs within a wartime theater. Indeed, 

the combination of military training and possession of a 

security clearance makes many military personnel attractive to potential civilian employers.60 CBO examined 

whether civilian competition for selected enlisted occupations in the active Army has increased in recent years and 

whether the Army has effectively used bonuses to mitigate any problems. To do so, CBO compared fill rates 

(the number of personnel divided by the authorized 

number of billets) with the level of bonuses provided.

In consultation with Army staff, CBO identified eight 

occupations for enlisted personnel (military occupational 

specialties, or MOSs) that may have been subject to 

increasing civilian competition associated with the 

ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan:

56. CBO found only one paper that studied the reserve forces’ use of 

reenlistment bonuses, which focused on the Navy Reserve exclusively. See Diana Lien, “The Effect of Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses on Participation in the Navy Selected Reserve,” 

CRM D0013385.A2 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, 2006).

57. See Goldberg, “A Survey of Enlisted Retention: Models and Findings.” SRBs are typically paid in increments, or levels, with each 

level equal to one month of basic pay. The total bonus amount is 

equal to the SRB level multiplied by the number of years for 

which the service member reenlists. 

58. That estimate assumes a “steady state” for the incentive. In the 

first two years that a bonus is added, the number of reenlistments 

could be substantially more than in a steady state. Initially, all 

individuals who are in their reenlistment window (up to 24 

months before the end of their obligation) are offered the bonus 

to reenlist, but after the initial offering, only the behavior of people newly entering that period is affected. 

59. CBO assumed an average bonus of $7,750 per reenlistment. That 

amount is based on the monthly basic pay of an E-4 with four 

years of service in 2006 (or $1,936 per month) and a period of 

reenlistment of four years on average. 

60. David Rennie and Michael Smith, “Afghanistan/Iraq: Weary 

Special Forces Quit for Security Jobs,” Daily Telegraph (London), 

March 31, 2004; and Walter Pincus, “Increase in Contracting 

Intelligence Jobs Raises Concerns,” Washington Post, March 20, 

2006.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 23

B 18B, Special Forces Weapon Sergeant,

B 18C, Special Forces Engineer Sergeant,

B 18D, Special Forces Medical Sergeant,

B 18E, Special Forces Communications Sergeant,

B 25B, Information Technology Specialist, 

B 25S, Satellite Communication Systems Operator/

Maintainer,

B 31B, Military Police, and

B 74D, Chemical Operations Specialist.

Personnel in those occupations have skills that are valuable in security and protective services, an industry that 

has grown in importance since the September 11 attacks.

For a control group, CBO also identified two enlisted 

occupations that have been heavily utilized in the current 

conflicts but that have not necessarily faced unusual civilian competition:

B 11B, Infantryman, and

B 91W, Health Care Specialist.

CBO first compared fill rates with eligibility for an 

SRB.61 CBO overlaid the past seven years of fill rates in 

those Army occupations against the SRB multiples 

offered to Staff Sergeants (at pay grade E-6) in zone B 

(those soldiers with a length of service of between six and 

10 years).62 CBO used the aggregate fill rates in pay 

grades E-5 through E-9 for the selected occupations 

because those rates were based on larger numbers of soldiers and therefore were more stable than the fill rates for 

E-6s alone. In addition, the Army often fills a given billet 

(coded by MOS and pay grade) with soldiers from an 

adjacent pay grade. CBO did not examine soldiers in 

zone A (those with a length of service of two to six years) 

because soldiers cannot enter the Special Forces until they 

reach at least pay grade E-5, at which point they may 

apply to transfer from other MOSs. Nor did CBO examine soldiers in zone C (those with a length of service of 

between 11 and 14 years), because the lure of retirement 

pay (available after 20 years of service) makes reenlistment bonuses largely moot. The overlays indicate fill 

rates as well as the reenlistment bonuses that might have 

been necessary to achieve them. Even if fill rates at or 

near 100 percent have been achieved, a pattern of rising 

SRBs could signal a period of increasing competition 

from the civilian sector.

The first two occupations—18B, Special Forces Weapon 

Sergeant, and 18C, Special Forces Engineer Sergeant—

show similar patterns of fill rates (see Figure 1-2). The fill 

rates for pay grades E-5 through E-9 had been falling in 

the early part of the decade but reversed direction and 

climbed to 100 percent by September 2004 or September 

2005, remaining above that level through June 2006.63 If 

there was increased civilian competition for those particular skills, it was apparently overcome by the increased 

SRB levels. The tripling of SRB awards in those two 

occupations—from one month to three months of basic 

pay per additional year of service commitment, or an 

SRB multiple that increased from a “level 1” to a “level 

3”—was consistent with the Army’s overall quadrupling 

of its SRB budget between 2004 and 2005.64 The two 

control occupations—11B, Infantryman, and 91W, 

Health Care Specialist—experienced steady manning 

at about 100 percent of authorizations, yet they too 

required increases from zero SRBs to level 1.5 or 2.0 

(see Figure 1-2). The SRB increases for the control 

occupations may have been necessary to counteract any 

improvements in the general state of the economy or the 

negative effects of increases in the frequency and duration 

of wartime deployments. The somewhat larger SRB 

increases for Special Forces MOSs 18B and 18C could

61. The fill rates, particularly those for later years, may include some 

personnel who are being held beyond their obligated term of service under the Army’s stop-loss policy. While it is, therefore, possible that the fill rates would be lower in the absence of stop loss, 

the general pattern of the data would probably not differ much 

from that reported here.

62. Within a MOS, the Army may offer higher bonuses to individuals 

with particular skills or who are willing to move to certain locations. CBO considered the SRB multiple that any soldier within 

the occupation might receive. 

63. Increases in manning in 2003 for those occupations are consistent 

with the high overall continuation rates the Army experienced in 

that year.

64. A level-3 bonus for personnel at pay grade E-5 with eight years of 

service would be almost $30,000 for a four-year reenlistment.
24 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 1-2.

Trends in Manning Compared with Selective Reenlistment Bonuses for 

Selected Army Occupations, September 1999 to June 2006

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army.

Note: For the percentage of billets manned, the Congressional Budget Office used the aggregate manning rates for pay grades E-5 through

E-9 for the selected occupations.

Billets Manned (Right scale)

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

4

80

90

100

110

120

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

4

80

90

100

110

120

18B, Special Forces Weapon Sergeant

18C, Special Forces Engineer Sergeant

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

70

80

90

100

110

120

Level of Bonus Percentage of Billets Manned

18D, Special Forces Medical Sergeant

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

4

5

80

90

100

110

18E, Special Forces Communications Sergeant

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

90

100

110

120

25B, Information Technology Specialist

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

90

100

110

120

25S, Satellite Communication Systems

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

90

100

110

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

80

90

100

110

31B, Military Police

74D, Chemical Operations Specialist

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

3

80

100

120

140

160

180

11B, Infantryman

Sept.

1999

Sept.

2000

Sept.

2001

Sept.

2002

Sept.

2003

Sept.

2004

Sept.

2005

0

1

2

90

100

110

91W, Health Care Specialist

Level of Bonus Percentage of Billets Manned

Selective Reenlistment Bonus (Left scale) 
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 25

reflect competition from the civilian sector for the particular training and skills possessed by those personnel.65

The patterns are a bit more varied for the other six occupations that may have been subject to increased competition (see Figure 1-2). For example, the fill rate for Special 

Forces Medical Sergeants (MOS 18D) has fluctuated 

between about 80 percent and 85 percent since 1999. It 

has not approached 100 percent. However, losses from 

that occupation actually declined over the period, so the 

Army’s inability to fill the positions reflected a shortage of 

assignments into that MOS rather than an outflow of 

personnel who decided not to reenlist. The remaining 

occupations under study had fill rates at or above 100 

percent for much of the seven-year period (MOSs 25B, 

25S, and 31B) or at least achieved 100 percent by the end 

of the period (MOSs 18E and 74D). Thus, the Army’s 

application of SRBs appears to have successfully managed 

the competition that it has faced from the private sector 

for those particular occupations.

CBO also compared the number of losses through retirement with the levels of Critical Skills Retention Bonuses. 

The CSRB was first awarded to soldiers in Special Forces 

occupations in 2003 and then expanded to a small number of other occupations and skills in 2005. To receive 

the CSRB, soldiers must be near to or eligible for retirement and must be willing to extend their service by a 

minimum of at least two years. The top award (for an 

additional six-year commitment) for the Special Forces 

occupations or a special skills designation of “T” is 

$150,000; other eligible soldiers may receive up to 

$50,000 (depending on the soldier’s occupation and 

extension of service). 

According to CBO’s analysis, the number of retirements 

has increased in all of the occupations studied. For Special Forces occupations, annual losses through retirement 

declined from an average of 230 soldiers in 2000 and 

2001 to an average of 125 soldiers in 2002 and 2003. 

However, in 2005, losses increased to more than 300 soldiers. That variation occurred despite the fact that the 

number of personnel in those occupations did not change 

substantially during the period. However, the net increase 

in losses from the 2000-2001 average to the 2005 level 

was just 80 soldiers (under 2 percent of the personnel in 

those occupations). Increases in CSRBs—the average 

award in 2005 for Special Forces occupations was 

$72,200—were not sufficient to completely offset the 

lure of retirement pay and potentially high civilian pay 

for soldiers in the Special Forces occupations.66

Ongoing Operations and Future 

Recruiting and Retention

The U.S. military is now about five years into the war on 

terrorism and more than three years into Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. Youths joining the military today will probably 

be deployed at least once and possibly twice during their 

first term of enlistment. The combination of the duration 

of the conflict, the tempo of operations (length and 

frequency of deployments), and the generally difficult 

nature of deployments has led to some concerns about 

the continuing effects on recruiting and retaining the 

force. However, feelings of patriotism and a desire to 

serve may have increased many youths’ propensity for 

military service. For the first time, the military is recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force during a drawnout war.

Potential Effect of the War on Terrorism on 

Attitudes Toward Military Service

The relevant opinions about military service are not only 

those held by potential recruits but also those of their 

parents, other family members, teachers, coaches, and 

members of the clergy—who may influence youths’ decisions. Because there is little historical information for 

estimating the effect of the ongoing operations on the 

success of recruiting, CBO analyzed several surveys to 

assess what public perceptions might portend for 

recruiting.67

The surveys show changing attitudes toward military 

service. While one indicator of the recruiting climate 

improved since September 11, 2001, another worsened 

in recent years. 

65. Within the Special Forces, some “skill groups” had increases one 

level higher than the rest.

66. Of the remaining occupations that CBO examined, only the Satellite Communication Systems Operator/Maintainer (MOS 25S) 

position is eligible for the CSRB. Retirement losses for that occupation, although higher more recently, are small: 23 personnel in 

2005 compared with 19 in 2000.

67. Through the program for joint advertising, market research, and 

studies, known as JAMRS, DoD regularly surveys youths to gauge 

their perception of and propensity to enlist in the military.
26 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 1-3.

Percentage of Youths Who Say They Will Probably or Definitely Join the Military 

in the Next Few Years

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense, Joint Advertising, Market Research, and Studies Program, 

Department of Defense Youth Polls 1 Through 10, April 2001 to December 2005.

One survey includes a random sample of roughly 3,000 

youths ages 16 through 21. The sample is weighted to 

reflect the general population in age (within that range), 

sex, race/ethnicity, and educational level. Another survey 

includes about 1,300 people ages 22 to 85 who have a 

relationship with and report a direct influence on youths 

who are 12 to 21 years old. CBO obtained the results of 

10 “waves” of the survey of youths conducted from April 

2001 through December 2005 and four waves of the survey of adults conducted from August 2003 through June 

2005.68

Compared with their counterparts in a survey conducted 

before September 11, 2001, more youths in a November 

2001 survey reported that they would “probably” or “definitely” be serving in the military in the next few years. 

That percentage of youths increased slightly from April 

2001 (when it was 12 percent) to December 2005 (when 

it was 15 percent).69 However, that propensity fluctuated 

over those years. It increased in the months immediately 

after the September 11 attacks. It peaked in November 

2003 but decreased after that, coinciding with the war in 

Iraq. The propensity differed by sex—with males more 

favorably inclined than females—but exhibited the same 

temporal pattern. By 2004 and 2005, that propensity 

remained somewhat greater than what existed before the 

start of the war on terrorism (see Figure 1-3).

Adults’ likelihood to recommend military service has 

declined in the aftermath of the Iraq war (see Figure 1-4). 

Throughout the period surveyed, fewer than half of the 

adults surveyed said that they were “likely” or “very 

likely” to recommend military service among post-high 

school options including higher education and work. 

Among the military components, the active Air Force, 

the reserve components, and the National Guard components garnered more such recommendations—around 40 

percent, on average.70 Of the active-duty components, 

the Army and Marine Corps—the services most likely to 

deploy personnel to Iraq or Afghanistan—had the fewest 

recommendations, averaging less than 35 percent. The 

corollary finding is that a majority of adults surveyed 

were more likely to recommend nonmilitary career paths

Apr. 2001 Aug. 2001 Nov. 2001 Nov. 2002 June 2003 Nov. 2003 May 2004 Nov. 2004 June 2005 Dec. 2005

0

5

10

15

20

25

Male

Female

Total

68. That period for the survey of adults lies entirely after the start of 

the war on terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom, thereby precluding the possibility of comparing the attitudes held before and 

after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

69. Given the available data, the extent to which those who indicated 

that likelihood actually joined the military is unclear.

70. Although fewer than a half would recommend military service, 

about 68 percent responded that they would at least somewhat 

support a youth’s decision to join.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 27

Figure 1-4.

Percentage of Adults Who Would Be Likely or Very Likely to

Recommend Military Service to Youths

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense, Joint Advertising, Market Research, and Studies Program, 

Department of Defense Influencer Polls 1 Through 4, August 2003 to June 2005.

Note: The adults surveyed have a relationship with and report a direct influence on youths who are 12 to 21 years old.

a. Includes all of the services’ reserve components.

b. Includes the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard.

(for example, higher education). In each case, adults’ likelihood to recommend military service initially declined 

(from the August 2003 level) but edged back up by June 

2005. In addition, when asked directly in June 2005, a 

majority of youths and adults reported that the war on 

terrorism had negatively affected their likelihood to join 

or recommend military service.71

Effect of Deployments on Retention

Since the United States launched Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, hundreds of 

thousands of U.S. active-duty and reserve personnel have 

been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of them 

have been deployed more than once. The length and pace 

of deployments today are greater than U.S. forces have 

seen during the previous decade. Furthermore, the conflicts in the two countries—though different—both 

provide a hostile and challenging environment for U.S. 

personnel. The demands of the deployments have led 

DoD to activate segments of its personnel that it would 

not ordinarily tap. For instance, since the beginning of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and Marine Corps—

the services supplying the bulk of ground troops—have 

had to involuntarily call up inactive reservists in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).72 The latest call-up was 

announced in August 2006 for up to 2,500 Marines in 

the IRR.73 The Marine Corps previously involuntarily 

called up about 2,000 Marines in the early days of the 

war in Iraq. The Army has also used its IRR since September 11, 2001, calling up about 5,600 soldiers in July 

2004 to help in Iraq.74

U.S. Military Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Reservesa National Guardb

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Aug. 2003 May 2004 Nov. 2004 June 2005

71. About 62 percent of the youths surveyed reported that they were 

less likely to join the military and 52 percent of the adults said 

that they were less likely to recommend military service because of 

the war on terrorism.

72. The IRR includes personnel who have completed their initial 

active-duty enlistment but are within their mandatory eight-year 

military service obligation. Although service members typically 

transition to civilian life after serving on active duty, they are liable 

to be called up when needed to fulfill the remainder of their obligation. As of September 2005, there were more than 59,000 

former Marines and more than 111,000 soldiers in the IRR.

73. See U.S. Marine Corps, Public Affairs Office, “Marines May 

Recall Some Recent Veterans to Active Duty” (press release no. 

0825-06-1238, August 23, 2006). Those affected Marines would 

be activated for 12 to 18 months of duty.

74. See U.S. Army, Army Public Affairs,“IRR Soldiers to Be Mobilized” (news release, Washington, D.C., June 30, 2004).
28 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

CBO examined available research evidence from preSeptember 11 and post-September 11 deployments. The 

earlier deployments were generally shorter, and those 

involving hostilities ended relatively quickly (including 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm). The current deployments in Iraq (and, to some extent, Afghanistan) are characterized by the drawn-out insurgency with 

no obvious signs that deployments will end anytime 

soon. 

According to the studies that CBO examined, deployments in the pre-September 11 era did not typically 

depress retention or reenlistments—if anything, deployments tended to boost retention. For the post-September 

11 era, the findings are mixed, but a notable theme 

emerging from the studies is that how deployments are 

carried out plays an important role in determining how 

they affect retention. The results of past and more-recent 

studies may not reflect the future, however. If the war was 

to be perceived more positively or negatively than it was 

earlier in the conflict, the effects of deployments on 

retention might become less or more pronounced. 

Pre-September 11. According to the research examined 

by CBO, the effect of deployments occurring before the 

September 11 attacks on retention was generally positive. 

A RAND study of the active components found that 

first-term personnel who were deployed had higher 

reenlistment rates than first-term personnel who were 

not.75 The study also found that reenlistment rates 

tended to increase with the number of hostile deployments and changed little with deployments that were not 

hostile. Although longer deployments reduced the probability of reenlistment, the effect was small, so deployments still had a net positive effect on reenlistment.76 For 

second-term personnel, the findings were similar. 

A study on the reserves found that being mobilized during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm had little 

effect on retention.77 However, the study found a modest 

positive effect on retention among reservists who perceived their own chances of being called up as “high.”

Navy ships are routinely deployed to various parts of the 

world as part of their mission. Those routine deployments may sometimes be associated with lower retention, 

according to one study.78 However, Navy deployments to 

crises (in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for 

instance), another study found, had no effect on reenlistment rates, but quick turnarounds (that is, little time 

between deployments) tended to lower reenlistments.79

In addition, attrition decreased during those crises but 

then increased afterward.80

Post-September 11. Researchers are just beginning to 

analyze the effects of post-September 11 deployments on 

retention. The studies examined by CBO analyzed 

individual-level reenlistment data as well as responses of 

service members during focus groups and surveys. On 

the effect of a deployment itself on retention, the findings 

are mixed: in some cases, deployments had no effect on 

retention, while in other cases, they were associated with 

lower retention. Collectively, those studies point to the 

factors that service members cite as negatively affecting 

their intention to stay in the military: stress associated 

with high workload and long work hours while deployed, 

uncertainties surrounding deployment dates, short-notice 

deployments, and insufficient downtime between 

deployments. 

To find out how the changed nature of military service 

affects reenlistment intentions, one study by RAND analyzed data from a focus group and from surveys of military personnel in each service conducted by the Defense 

Manpower Data Center.81 The study’s findings suggest 

75. James Hosek and Mark E. Totten, How Deployments Influence 

Reenlistment, MR-1594-OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 

2002).

76. For the Army, longer deployments actually increased the probability of reenlistment by first-term personnel.

77. Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Scott Naftel, The Effect of Mobilization 

on Retention of Enlisted Reservists After Operation Desert Shield/

Storm, MR 943-OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998).

78. Timothy Cooke, Alan Marcus, and Aline Quester, “Personnel 

Tempo of Operations and Navy Enlisted Retention,” Research 

Memorandum 91-150 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, 

1992).

79. Heidi L.W. Golding and Henry S. Griffis, How Has 

PERSTEMPO’s Effect on Reenlistments Changed Since the 1086 

Navy Policy? CAB D0008863.A2 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, 2004).

80. Heidi L.W. Golding and Henry S. Griffis, Increased 

PERSTEMPO, Retention, and Navy Policy, CAB D0008040.A2 

(Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, 2003).

81. James Hosek, Jennifer Kavanagh, and Laura Miller, How Deployments Affect Service Members, MG 432-RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 2006).
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 29

that long work hours in preparing for a deployment and 

while deployed, uncertainties surrounding deployments, 

and family separation are among the main factors that 

negatively affect intentions to stay in the military. Both 

deployed and nondeployed service members who experienced more workdays that were longer than their usual 

workday were more likely to report lesser intention to 

stay. The result was more pronounced for service members who were away from their home base because they 

had a greater incidence of longer-than-usual workdays. 

Being deployed in itself did not seem to have any impact 

on service members’ intention about reenlisting. But 

being away from home base longer than expected was 

related to lesser intention to stay in the military.

Involvement in combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan 

decreased the intention to stay in the military only for 

officers and enlisted personnel in the Army. (The majority of combat forces in those theaters have been Army 

ground troops.) Since the time period covered by the 

survey, from mid-2002 to mid-2003, more service members have been deployed to Iraq multiple times, and the 

deployments have become more difficult, with more 

insurgency attacks and more casualties. Consequently, 

the negative effect of deployment on the intention to stay 

in the military may now be more pronounced than indicated in the data from several years ago.

Another study, on active-duty Marines, found that 

deployment tempo did not have a negative effect on 

reenlistment rates for career Marines or officers but did 

for first-term Marines, particularly those without dependents.82 Marines who were not deployed at all in 2005, 

the study found, had lower reenlistment rates than those 

who were deployed. However, longer deployments were 

associated with lower reenlistment rates among firstterm Marines (except for those deployed for more than 

500 days). That negative effect was stronger for single 

Marines than for those who were married or had dependents at the date of the reenlistment decision. For 

Marines in their second term, deployment length had 

no effect on reenlistment rates in 2004, but in 2005, the 

number and length of deployments were positively 

related to reenlistment rates.

The main concerns raised by Marines in focus group discussions included short-notice deployments,83 uneven 

distribution of deployment duty84 (some Marines who 

were not deployed wanted to be, whereas others who 

were deployed for longer spells wished for a break), 

uncertainties about deployment dates, and insufficient 

downtime between deployments.

For active-duty Navy personnel, loss rates decreased 

between September 11, 2001, and June 2003, particularly for those assigned to ships deployed in Operation 

Enduring Freedom.85 However, attrition rose after the 

crisis was over. 

Evidence on Selected Reserve members indicates that 

although loss rates were higher from October 2001 

through July 2004 than in 2000, there was no significant 

difference between the rates for activated and neveractivated reservists.86 Nor did loss rates vary with the 

number of activations: reservists with multiple completed 

activations had loss rates similar to those with only one 

activation.87 However, loss rates for reservists who were 

activated but not deployed were higher than the rates of 

both those activated and deployed and those never 

activated. 

Implications of Recruiting and 

Retention Trends for End Strength

To examine the military’s ability to sustain its operations, 

CBO considered how goals for end strength could be 

met, focusing on the enlisted forces. For each Army component, CBO modeled several scenarios, each shaped by 

future accession levels and continuation rates for the 

82. Aline O. Quester and others, Marine Corps Deployment Tempo and 

Retention in FY05, CRMD00 13786.A2 (Alexandria, Va.: CNA 

Corporation, 2006).

83. Single Marines cited short-notice deployments as a concern. 

Requests to fill holes in a unit’s manning prior to deployment are 

often made on short notice, according to the study; such requests 

are often answered with single Marines. 

84. For instance, more than a quarter were deployed for fewer than 

100 days during the period analyzed, and a quarter were deployed 

for more than 400 days.

85. See Golding and Griffis, Increased PERSTEMPO, Retention, and 

Navy Policy.

86. See Michelle A. Dolfini-Reed and others, Determining Patterns of 

Reserve Attrition Since September 11, 2001, CAB D0011483.A2 

(Alexandria, Va.: CNA Corporation, 2005).

87. Conversely, loss rates tended to increase with the length of the 

activation period, except for members of the Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve, for whom loss rates tended to decrease.
30 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

enlisted forces. Changes in end strength in a given year 

equal the additions to end strength (or accessions) minus 

the losses from end strength (derived from continuation 

rates).

Under most scenarios (except where noted), CBO 

adopted the assumptions that the new accession levels 

and continuation rates take effect in 2006 and continue 

indefinitely and that there are no phased-in changes. 

CBO incorporated various continuation rates in a given 

year for service members at different levels of experience. 

The end strength in the scenarios and, more particularly, 

the number of enlisted soldiers in each year of service will 

evolve over time, as past years’ accession cohorts and new 

accessions are subjected to the new (assumed) continuation rates. Eventually, a “steady state” is reached, wherein 

all of the past years’ accession cohorts have served a full 

career and separated from the military, and only the 

cohorts from 2006 and beyond remain in the force (at 

the assumed accession levels). Because military careers 

can span 30 years, the steady state is not reached until 

30 years into the future, or 2035; as a practical matter, 

though, the steady-state end strength is reached 10 years 

earlier because relatively few soldiers continue beyond 20 

years of service. But because even a 20-year horizon is too 

distant to inform the current policy debate, CBO reports 

instead the change in military personnel levels under each 

scenario for the five years 2006 through 2010.

The actual accession levels and continuation rates that 

the Army achieves will reflect a complex interplay 

between environmental changes (including, for example, 

changes in unemployment rates and deployment tempo) 

and the Army’s reallocation of recruiting or retention 

resources in response to those changes. CBO’s scenarios 

do not generally assume any particular environmental 

change or the Army’s response.

On the basis of the forecast changes in end strength and 

historical data on the percentage of the force that is available for deployment, CBO also calculated changes in the 

number of troops available for deployment.88 By CBO’s 

estimates, for every 10,000 personnel, between 6,200 and 

6,700 of them are assigned to deployable units—either a 

combat unit or a deployable support unit. Admittedly, 

those calculated levels are rough approximations and do 

not incorporate other factors that may influence the 

number of deployable forces. For example, if the Army 

encounters difficulties recruiting or retaining individuals 

within certain occupational specialties, an apparently sufficient total number of deployable troops might still be 

inadequate because of the shortfalls in those specific 

occupations. Additionally, changes in the experience level 

of the deployable force partly determine its ability to 

accomplish its mission. If, for example, the Army relies 

more heavily on junior personnel (whose productivity is 

lower than that of more experienced personnel), a mission may require more troops than planned.

Active Army

According to CBO’s estimates, even if the Army met its 

2006 recruiting goal and achieved the (relatively low) 

continuation rates that it experienced in 2005 for the 

next several years, its end strength would drop from 

about 493,000 troops in 2005 to 482,000 by 2010.89

That result implies that the Army’s continuation rates in 

2005 would be insufficient to sustain the force. Indeed (if 

the ratio of deployable to nondeployable troops remained 

steady), the number of troops in deployable units would 

drop by between 6,800 and 7,400 soldiers.

Although, by CBO’s estimates, the levels of the Army’s 

recruiting resources during the past year were sufficient to 

have enabled it to reach or exceed the 2006 goal for accessions, CBO also calculated what end strength would be if 

the lower accession level and continuation rates from 

2005 continued for five years. In that case, CBO estimates, the Army’s end strength would decline by an additional 20,000 soldiers over the next five years compared 

with what it would be if the Army attained 80,000 accessions each year. That decline translates into an additional 

reduction in deployable troops of between 12,400 and 

13,400. 

For the Army to increase its force to about 500,000 in 

2006 and to surpass its authorized end strength of 

512,400 troops by 2008 and reach 524,000 personnel by 

2010 (thus increasing its deployable forces) would require 

sustained accession levels and continuation rates that 

have not been sustained during the past 20 years 

88. For example, about 20 percent to 25 percent of personnel in the 

Army are assigned to units that typically are not deployed, while 

another 13 percent are primarily trainees, students, or personnel 

moving between assignments.

89. Higher continuation rates are among the factors that might help 

reverse that trend. The 12-month continuation rate through February 2006 showed an improvement and, if it continues, may 

ameliorate or reverse the predicted decline in end strength.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 31

(although they have occurred during one- or two-year 

periods). But under that scenario, in 2010 the force 

would have 31,500 more personnel than it did in 2005 

and between 19,500 and 21,100 more deployable troops. 

According to CBO’s estimates, as a rule of thumb, each 

increase of 1,000 in annual accessions (maintained over a 

five-year period) would accumulate to boost end strength 

by more than 3,000 additional personnel by the end of 

the fifth year.

To derive its conclusions, CBO modeled six scenarios in 

which the active Army’s enlisted end strength varies, via 

different possible future accession levels and continuation 

rates (starting in 2006). All six scenarios begin with the 

Army’s end-strength levels on September 30, 2005: 

406,900 enlisted personnel, 81,700 officers, and 4,100 

cadets, for a total of 492,700 active personnel. Because 

future years’ end-strength goals for officers and cadets are 

not available, CBO’s scenarios assume that their numbers 

are maintained at 2005 levels.90

The scenarios are characterized as follows:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions of 80,000 

per year (the 2006 goal) and continuation rates at the 

levels that existed from September 2004 through 

September 2005 for the next five years (82.4 percent 

overall). The Army has not consistently added that 

many recruits since before the drawdown in the 

1990s, nor did it achieve its accession goal of 80,000 

in 2005. However, as discussed earlier, the Army has 

increased its recruiting resources substantially since 

2004, including adding more than 1,500 recruiters. 

That increase alone should have allowed the Army to 

meet its accession goal of 80,000 (if the recruiting 

environment did not deteriorate). 

B Scenario 2: accessions of 75,900 per year and continuation rates at the 2001 levels. Such figures represent 

typical recruiting and retention prior to September 11, 

2001. For example, between 1997 and 2001, the 

Army recruited about that number of soldiers annually, on average, and achieved an average continuation 

rate of about 82.9 percent (just lower than the 2001 

level) to attain end-strength levels averaging 484,000 

service members. While accessions in 2001 were lower 

than the current year’s goal, the overall continuation 

rate was 0.7 percentage points higher than that 

recorded in 2005.

B Scenario 3: accessions totaling 73,400 per year, the 

same level as achieved in 2005; continuation rates at 

the 2005 levels. This is the most pessimistic case that 

CBO considered. Although the Army had recruited 

nearly that number through August 2006, this case 

illustrates what might happen if the recruiting environment deteriorated in 2007. 

B Scenario 4: accessions totaling 80,000 per year; continuation rates at every experience level 1 percentage 

point higher than the 2005 rates. This case illustrates 

the effect of improving continuation rates over the 

2005 levels and, as such, is a more optimistic case than 

the base case.

B Scenario 5: accessions and continuation rates like 

those in Scenario 1 but with the effects of the stop-loss 

policy removed. This case is more pessimistic than the 

base case because the stop-loss policy enabled the 

Army to involuntarily retain an average of about 7,900 

enlisted soldiers at any point over the 12-month 

period that ended in March 2006. In this scenario, 

CBO assumes that the policy is rescinded late in 2006, 

resulting in an immediate onetime drop in the size of 

the enlisted portion of the Army. The scenario incorporates CBO’s estimate of the lower continuation 

rates that would have prevailed if the stop-loss policy 

had not been in effect.

B Scenario 6: accessions totaling 80,000 per year; continuation rates at the simple average of the 2002 and 

2003 levels. This case is the most optimistic because 

the Army’s continuation rates during 2002 and 2003 

were at the highest levels observed in recent history. 

The scenario was designed to determine whether the 

Army could achieve an end strength of 532,400 personnel for the years 2006 through 2010 on the basis of 

the most favorable continuation rates and accession 

levels that have been experienced in more than a 

decade.

90. Although the Army’s submission to the 2007 Future Years Defense 

Program does include end-strength goals of 4,000 cadets and 

about 79,000 officers, those goals are stated relative to a total end 

strength of about 482,000, which is the force level funded 

through the Army’s annual budget submission. The Army’s authorized end strength—at 502,400 for 2005—was higher. The Army 

achieved an end strength of 492,700 that year, with the overage 

above 482,000 funded by supplemental appropriations. The 

FYDP offers no guidance on the planned composition of the difference for 2006 through 2011. 
32 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 1-5.

Annual Accessions and Length of 

Service in the Active Army Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (80,000 

recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels 

(82.4 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2001 level (75,900 recruits) 

each year and continuation rates at the 2001 levels (which 

were higher than those in Scenario 1).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2005 level (73,400 recruits) 

each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and 

continuation rates 1 percentage point higher than the 2005 

levels.

Scenario 5 = Accessions and continuation rates like those in 

Scenario 1 but with the effects of the stop-loss policy 

removed.

Scenario 6 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and 

continuation rates at the simple average of the 2002 and 

2003 levels (which were significantly higher than those in 

Scenario 1).

Under any scenario, the average length of service will 

evolve as cohorts pass through the system, converging to 

a steady-state value.91 The average length of service in a 

steady state is determined solely by the continuation 

rates; the accession levels in a steady state do not matter. 

Therefore, differences in the average length of service in a 

steady state among scenarios indicate differences in experience levels and, consequently, the productivity of the 

force. Higher continuation rates imply that soldiers 

remain in the Army longer and are reflected in a higher 

average length of service. In 2005, the average length of 

service in the Army was 6.34 years. All of the scenarios 

considered by CBO except the sixth would eventually 

lead to a more junior force, including the base scenario, 

whose continuation rates imply a thinning of the seniority of the current force and a possibly less productive 

force (see Figure 1-5).

In most of CBO’s scenarios, the Army’s end strength 

would drop to less than its level in 2005 (see Figure 1-6). 

In the base scenario, end strength would fall to 482,000 

in 2010, a decline of about 11,000 soldiers from the 

2005 level. Under the assumption that between 62 percent and 67 percent of troops are deployable, their numbers would drop by between 6,800 and 7,400 soldiers 

from the 2005 level.92 Additionally, under this scenario, 

end strength in 2010 would be about 31,000 soldiers 

lower than the 2006 authorized end strength of 512,400 

(with up to 20,000 fewer deployable troops) and more 

than 50,000 lower than the 2009 level of 532,000 that is 

authorized at the Secretary of Defense’s discretion (with 

up to 34,000 fewer deployable troops). 

123456

70,000

72,000

74,000

76,000

78,000

80,000

82,000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a Steady State

(Right scale)

Scenarios

91. Yearly fluctuations in the force’s overall continuation rates and 

average length of service may occur as different sized year-ofservice cohorts occur. Consequently, the steady-state values are a 

better summary of underlying results than are the yearly values. 

92. For a given change in accessions or continuation rates, end 

strength may vary considerably in the short run depending on the 

size of past accession cohorts and the pattern of continuation rates 

by year of service. For example, if continuation rates increased for 

a group of soldiers at a given experience level but the number of 

soldiers entering that group was relatively small, end strength 

would increase very little or barely at all. In a steady state, as all 

soldiers advance through the years-of-service profile, continuation 

rates change end strength in a predictable way.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 33

Figure 1-6.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active Army’s 

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (80,000 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (82.4 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2001 level (75,900 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2001 levels (which were higher 

than those in Scenario 1).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2005 level (73,400 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and continuation rates 1 percentage point higher than the 2005 levels.

Scenario 5 = Accessions and continuation rates like those in Scenario 1 but with the effects of the stop-loss policy removed.

Scenario 6 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and continuation rates at the simple average of the 2002 and 2003 levels (which 

were significantly higher than those in Scenario 1).

Under the second scenario—which illustrates what end 

strength would be if accessions and continuation rates 

returned to pre-September 11, 2001, levels—although 

continuation rates are higher than those observed in 

2005, the lower assumed accession levels would bring 

about a steeper decline in end strength than in the base 

case; by 2010, end strength would fall to 475,000 soldiers. 

As shown by the third scenario—which models end 

strength assuming the recruiting and retention environments of 2005 are maintained—each decrease of 1,000 

in annual accessions in each of the five years would 

accumulate to cut end strength by almost 3,100 additional personnel by 2010. Under this scenario, CBO estimates, the Army’s end strength would drop from the 

2005 level by more than 30,000, to 461,000 personnel. 

That outcome implies 20,000 fewer personnel, or 

between 12,500 and 13,600 fewer deployable troops, 

than CBO estimates the Army would have in the base 

case. In this scenario, the size of the Army would be more 

than 50,000 below the 2006 authorized end strength of 

512,400. 

Under the fourth scenario—assuming that the Army will 

meet its current accession goal of 80,000 and have continuation rates 1 percentage point higher than the 2005 

levels—the active Army’s end strength would total 

492,400 in 2006 and 498,500 by 2010, higher than the 

Army had in 2005 by about 5,700 personnel and higher 

than the level in the base case by more than 15,500 by 

2010. End strength would be somewhat higher than the 

size of the Army earlier in this decade but considerably 

below the current authorized end strength of 512,400. 

There is some indication that continuation rates for 2006 

were higher than they were in the two previous years; the 

overall continuation rate for February 2005 through February 2006 increased above the 2005 level by 0.4 percent2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

440,000

460,000

480,000

500,000

520,000

540,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Scenario 5

Scenario 6
34 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

age points, to 83.1 percent. With SRB expenditures in 

2005 up by an additional $365 million (more than a 

threefold increase) since 2004, soldiers’ increased willingness to stay in the Army may be attributed, in part, to the 

aggressive reenlistment bonus programs. However, 

Scenario 4 implies that larger improvements in retention 

would be needed to maintain the force size at the 2005 

level or increase it to authorized levels. 

In the fifth scenario, although CBO assumes that the 

Army attains its 2006 accession goal of 80,000, the 

agency also assumes that the Army ends its stop-loss program. A drop in end strength would occur because most 

soldiers who were involuntarily retained would immediately separate from the Army and because lower continuation rates would prevail once the stop-loss policy was 

terminated, as estimated by CBO.93 The Army’s end 

strength in 2006 would fall the furthest under this scenario. After the first year, however, end strength would 

decline less precipitously and the size of the force by 2010 

would be about 8,000 smaller relative to that in the basecase scenario.

Under the final scenario—the most optimistic CBO 

considered—the size of the force in 2006 would equal 

499,600; the Army would exceed the 2006 authorized 

end strength by 2008 and by 2010 would reach 524,200 

active-duty personnel, 8,000 fewer than the number 

authorized at the Secretary’s discretion. Under this scenario, the force in 2010 would have 31,500 more personnel than it did in 2005 and, therefore, between 19,500 

and 21,100 more deployable troops. Those results hinge 

on the Army’s attaining 80,000 accessions annually, plus 

continuation rates as high as those observed during 2002 

and 2003. Continuation rates for those two years averaged about 85 percent (when computed as a weighted 

average based on the 2005 force profile). The last time 

continuation rates reached those levels in the Army was 

in 1991 under Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm. The rates in 1991 were not sustained; in fact, 

overall continuation rates averaged 80.2 percent in the 

subsequent five years.94 However, continuation rates of 

85 percent are needed—in conjunction with 80,000 

annual accessions—if the Army chooses to expand to 

more than 512,400 active-duty troops.

The 2002 and 2003 continuation rates used in the final 

scenario imply an increase in the average length of service 

from its current level of 6.34 years to 6.64 years in a 

steady state. By contrast, freezing the continuation rates 

at 2005 levels (as was done in Scenarios 1 and 3) implies 

a decline to 5.34 years. The continuation rates under the 

final scenario are so much higher than those under the 

other scenarios that they imply an increase of 1.3 years in 

the average length of service.

Army National Guard

According to CBO’s analysis, if the National Guard 

achieved its 2006 accession goal and maintained continuation rates at the 2005 level, end strength would equal 

almost 347,000 personnel in 2006 (or just more than 

3,000 personnel short of its authorized level of 350,000). 

In that scenario, accession levels of between 61,600 and 

63,500 through 2010 would enable the Guard to reach 

its authorized end strength of 350,000 by 2007 and 

remain at that level through 2010. Accessions of 70,000 

for 2006 combined with an improvement of 0.9 percentage points in continuation rates over the levels in 2005 

(similar to those experienced in the first half of 2006) 

would allow the Guard to come within 1,000 personnel 

of its authorized end strength in 2006.

As discussed earlier, DoD had offered a plan to reduce the 

National Guard’s end strength from 350,000 soldiers to 

333,000, but the Congress objected to that plan. CBO 

has examined the feasibility of both goals under several 

scenarios. In all scenarios, CBO assumes that the number 

of officers in the National Guard is maintained at the 

September 30, 2005, level of 36,600. The enlisted force 

on that date numbered 296,600. 

The scenarios are characterized as follows:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions of 70,000 in 

2006 (the goal for that year) and lower amounts thereafter to sustain the force at the Congressionally authorized level of 350,000 personnel; continuation rates at 

the levels that existed from September 2004 through 

September 2005, 82.2 percent overall. According to 93. On the basis of data obtained from DoD, CBO estimated that 

about 90 percent of those soldiers kept in the Army past their contract expiration date would not reenlist when their stop-loss orders 

were lifted; instead, they would separate at the earliest possible 

opportunity.

94. The lower continuation rates may be partly attributed to the 

planned decreases in force size that occurred in the early to mid1990s.
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 35

CBO’s calculations, the Guard’s increase in the number of full-time recruiters (from 3,915 at the end of 

2004 to 4,955 by the end of 2005) alone would not 

have enabled it to meet the 2006 goal, the highest this 

decade.95 However, more recruiters in combination 

with increases in other resources and incentives or 

improvements in the recruiting environment could 

have permitted the Guard to recruit that number.

B Scenario 2: accessions and continuation rates at the 

average of the 2000 and 2001 levels. Accession levels 

are extrapolated at that average, 61,600, through 

2010, and continuation rates are 0.6 percentage points 

lower than the 2005 level (for all experience levels). 

This scenario, which is more pessimistic than the base 

case, shows what might happen to the size of the Army 

National Guard if it achieved the average levels of 

accessions and retention that existed in the years just 

prior to the start of operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq.

B Scenario 3: accessions totaling 50,200 per year 

through 2010, the same level as achieved in 2005; 

continuation rates at the 2005 levels. Because of 

increases in the number of recruiters and other 

resources, the Guard has exceeded that number of 

accessions for 2006. This scenario—the most pessimistic that CBO modeled—illustrates what might 

occur if the recruiting and retention environment 

worsened. 

B Scenario 4: accessions similar to those in the base 

case; continuation rates based on the 2005 levels but 

adjusted downward for a recision of the stop-loss policy. This case is more pessimistic than the base case 

because the stop-loss policy enabled the Guard to 

involuntarily retain an average of about 2,650 enlisted 

soldiers at any point over the 12-month period that 

ended in February 2006. In this scenario, CBO 

assumes that the policy is lifted late in 2006, resulting 

in an immediate onetime drop in end strength.96

B Scenario 5: accessions totaling 62,200 per year; continuation rates at the 2005 levels. This case keeps 

annual accessions within historical norms (62,200 

accessions are the average for 2000 through 2002) 

while allowing the Guard to increase to its authorized 

end strength, although more gradually than under the 

base case. 

B Scenario 6: accessions similar to those in the base case; 

continuation rates 0.9 percentage points higher than 

the 2005 levels. That improvement in continuation 

rates reflects the experience from February 2005 

through February 2006. This scenario shows how 

quickly the Army National Guard could reach, and 

exceed, its authorized end strength under an assumption that it attains its 2006 accession goal and maintains the current (relatively high) continuation rates 

over the next several years. This scenario is the most 

optimistic of those modeled.

In 2005, the average length of service in the Army 

National Guard was 9.48 years. All of the scenarios considered by CBO would lead to a more junior force. Even 

under Scenario 6, in which continuation rates are higher 

than under the base case, the average length of service 

would be 8.51 years in a steady state (see Figure 1-7).

In terms of end strength, under CBO’s base-case scenario, 

the Guard would have 346,600 personnel by the close of 

2006, just short of the authorized level of 350,000 (see 

Figure 1-8). By 2007, it would reach its authorized level. 

Thereafter, the assumed accession levels would be sufficient to maintain the force at 350,000 personnel.

Under Scenario 2, the Guard’s end strength would 

increase above the 2005 level by 8,300 personnel, reaching 341,500 by 2010. However, it would be about 8,500 

fewer personnel than the authorized level and 9,500 

fewer than the amount under the base-case scenario. 

Under Scenario 3, the Guard’s end strength would drop 

from the 2005 level by more than 22,000 personnel, to 

310,000, or about 40,000 below the authorized level.

In Scenario 4, end strength would fall about 2,400 personnel below the level in the base case in the first year and 

then level off and almost parallel the base-case level. By 

2010, end strength would be just 2,500 fewer than the 

level under the base case. The stop-loss policy keeps soldiers in the military longer than would otherwise be the

95. According to CBO’s calculations, the number of recruiters would 

need to have been further increased to between 6,400 and 7,400 

to meet the accession goal.

96. On the basis of data on the active Army, CBO assumed that 90 

percent of involuntarily retained Guardsmen would not reenlist 

when their stop-loss orders were lifted.
36 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 1-7.

Annual Accessions and Length of Service 

in the Army National Guard Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = Varying accession levels (70,000 

recruits in 2006, the goal for that year, and lower amounts 

thereafter) and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (82.2 

percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the average of the 2000 and 

2001 levels (61,600 recruits) each year and continuation 

rates at their average for the same period (which was lower 

than the rates in Scenario 1).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2005 level (50,200 recruits) 

each year and continuation rates at their 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions and continuation rates like those in 

Scenario 1 but with the effects of the stop-loss policy 

removed.

Scenario 5 = Accessions at their average for 2000 through 

2002 (62,200 recruits) each year and continuation rates at 

the 2005 levels.

Scenario 6 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and 

continuation rates 0.9 percentage points higher than the 

2005 levels.

case and consequently inflates continuation rates. The 

recision of that policy in this scenario would cause continuation rates to decline by 0.1 percentage points, CBO 

calculates, reflecting the shortening tenure of soldiers in 

the force. The recision would also cause a onetime drop 

in the number of personnel.

Under Scenario 5, with accessions at historical norms, the 

Guard would meet its end-strength goal of 350,000 personnel by 2010. By that year, each increase of 1,000 in 

annual accessions would boost end strength by more than 

3,000 personnel. For example, if accessions rose from 

62,200 to 63,200 in 2006 and were maintained at that 

level for the next five years, end strength by 2010 would 

be more than 3,000 higher than it would otherwise have 

been. 

In Scenario 6, which extends the recent rise in continuation rates through 2010, end strength would surpass 

349,000 personnel by 2006 and continue climbing 

through 2010, reaching 361,000 at that time. A 

percentage-point increase in continuation rates for all 

experience levels would translate into more than 11,000 

additional personnel by 2010 than in the base case.

Army Reserve

To attain an end strength of 200,000 by 2010 (the Army’s 

plan as outlined in DoD’s Future Years Defense Program), the Army Reserve would need to recruit 40,000 

individuals each year, slightly more than the average 

number between 2000 and 2005. If it attained 36,000 

recruits, its 2006 goal, each year for the next several years, 

the size of the force in 2010 would be 188,800, about the 

same as in 2005. If, instead, the Reserve focused its policies on improving retention, by CBO’s estimates every 

1 percentage-point increase in continuation rates would 

add more than 5,000 service members to end strength in 

2010.

CBO modeled six scenarios of the Army Reserve’s end 

strength, allowing enlisted end strength to vary on the 

basis of different accession levels and continuation rates. 

The starting point was the 2005 end-strength levels: 

36,900 officers and 152,100 enlisted personnel. Unlike 

the case for the other Army components, in this instance, 

CBO used the FYDP as guidance for the number of 

123456

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

7.8

8

8.2

8.4

8.6

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a Steady State

(Right scale)

Scenarios
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 37

Figure 1-8.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Army National Guard’s 

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = Varying accession levels (70,000 recruits in 2006, the goal for that year, and lower amounts thereafter) and 

continuation rates at the 2005 levels (82.2 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the average of the 2000 and 2001 levels (61,600 recruits) each year and continuation rates at their average 

for the same period (which was lower than the rates in Scenario 1).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2005 level (50,200 recruits) each year and continuation rates at their 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions and continuation rates like those in Scenario 1 but with the effects of the stop-loss policy removed.

Scenario 5 = Accessions at their average for 2000 through 2002 (62,200 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 6 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and continuation rates 0.9 percentage points higher than the 2005 levels.

officers.97 According to the FYDP, the number of officers 

is projected to increase to 41,400 in 2006 and then 

decline and stabilize at 38,900 the following year.

The scenarios are characterized as follows:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions of 36,000 (the 

2006 goal) and continuation rates at the levels that 

existed from September 2004 through September 

2005, 79.2 percent overall. The Army Reserve did not 

achieve that level of accessions in 2005; it recruited 

24,000 new soldiers, falling short of its goal of 28,500. 

CBO estimates that the Army Reserve’s full-time 

reserve recruiting force would have needed to reach 

between 2,100 and 2,400 personnel to attain the 

2006 accession goal. Instead, the recruiting force, 

which numbered 1,400 at the end of 2005, was 

probably not be sufficient to meet that higher level of 

accessions. Recruiting resources above 2005 levels or 

an improvement in the recruiting environment might, 

however, have allowed the Army Reserve to meet its 

2006 accession goal.

B Scenario 2: accessions and continuation rates similar 

to those experienced just prior to the operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan (at the average of the 2000 and 

2001 levels). CBO assumes accession levels of 39,200 

each year through 2010 and continuation rates for all 

experience levels 1.25 percentage points lower than 

the 2005 levels.98

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

300,000

320,000

340,000

360,000

380,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Scenario 5

Scenario 6

97. Both the House and Senate versions of the 2007 NDAA authorize 

an end strength of 200,000 personnel for the Army Reserve (see 

H.R. 5122, passed on May 11, 2006, and S. 2766, passed on June 

22, 2006). The total is consistent with all of the out-years in 

DoD’s 2007 FYDP. However, the FYDP provides additional yearby-year detail on the split between officers and enlisted personnel.

98. Both accession levels and continuation rates before September 11, 

2001, were adjusted downward to account for the Army Reserve's 

changed definition of an accession.
38 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

B Scenario 3: accessions totaling 24,000 per year 

through 2010, the same level as achieved in 2005; 

continuation rates remaining at the 2005 levels. This 

is the most pessimistic case that CBO modeled. 

Although the Reserve surpassed that level of accessions 

in the summer of 2006, this scenario illustrates the 

effect that a deteriorating environment might have on 

the size of the force.

B Scenario 4: accessions of 36,000 per year; continuation rates at the 2005 levels but adjusted (downward) 

for a lifting of the stop-loss policy. The Army Reserve 

involuntarily retained an average of about 3,260 

enlisted soldiers at any point over the 12-month 

period that ended in January 2006. In this scenario, 

CBO assumes that the policy is lifted late in 2006, 

resulting in an immediate onetime drop in end 

strength. The scenario also incorporates the lower 

continuation rates that would prevail if the stop-loss 

policy was not in effect, as estimated by CBO. This 

case is more pessimistic than the base case. 

B Scenario 5: accessions totaling 40,000 per year; continuation rates at the 2005 levels. Although accessions 

are higher than under the base case, they are still 

within historical norms.99 The scenario illustrates the 

accession levels that the Army Reserve would have to 

achieve (and budget for) to increase the force from the 

2005 level of 189,000 to 200,000 service members, 

the end strength planned in the 2007 FYDP.

B Scenario 6: accessions of 40,000 per year through 

2010; continuation rates 0.4 percentage points higher 

than the 2005 levels. This scenario reflects recent 

experience in that the overall continuation rate from 

February 2005 through February 2006 showed a 0.4 

percentage-point improvement from the 2005 level.

In 2005, the average length of service in the Army 

Reserve was 10.0 years. All of the scenarios considered by 

CBO would lead to a less experienced force, with the 

average length of service varying between 8.2 and 8.6 

years in a steady state (see Figure 1-9).

Under the base case, end strength would grow by 4,600 

personnel in 2006, but only 200 of those additions would 

be enlisted personnel. The overall increase would be 

almost wholly due to an increase of 4,400 in officers, 

Figure 1-9.

Annual Accessions and Length of 

Service in the Army Reserve Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (36,000 

recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels 

(79.2 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the average of the 2000 and 

2001 levels (39,200 recruits) each year and continuation 

rates at their average for the same period (which was lower 

than the rates in Scenario 1).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2005 level (24,000 recruits) 

each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions and continuation rates like those in 

Scenario 1 but with the effects of the stop-loss policy 

removed.

Scenario 5 = Accessions of 40,000 each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 6 = Accessions totaling 40,000 each year and continuation rates 0.4 percentage points higher than the 2005 

levels.

which is planned in the FYDP and which CBO assumes 

will be achieved (see Figure 1-10). Under this scenario, 

if the Army Reserve recruited 36,000 personnel each 

year, end strength over the five years would be stable, but 

the mix would change, with 2,000 more officers and 

99. Again, adjusted for the new definition of an accession. 2,000 fewer enlisted soldiers by 2010. The Army Reserve

123456

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

8.0

8.1

8.2

8.3

8.4

8.5

8.6

8.7 Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a Steady State

(Right scale)

Scenarios
CHAPTER ONE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE ARMY 39

Figure 1-10.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Army Reserve’s 

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (36,000 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (79.2 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the average of the 2000 and 2001 levels (39,200 recruits) each year and continuation rates at their average 

for the same period (which was lower than the rates in Scenario 1).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2005 level (24,000 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions and continuation rates like those in Scenario 1 but with the effects of the stop-loss policy removed.

Scenario 5 = Accessions of 40,000 each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 6 = Accessions totaling 40,000 each year and continuation rates 0.4 percentage points higher than the 2005 levels.

would not achieve its planned end strength of 200,000 by 

2010.

Under Scenario 2, end strength would grow by 2,800 

above the level achieved in the base case, with the increase 

in accessions of more than 3,000 each year more than 

offsetting continuation rates that are lower by more than 

1 percentage point. However, the Army Reserve still 

would not reach its goal of 200,000 personnel by 2010.

Under Scenario 3, the Army Reserve’s end strength, CBO 

estimates, would drop from the 2005 level by almost 

35,000, to 154,000 service members, or more than 

45,000 below the planned end strength of 200,000. Each 

decrease of 1,000 in annual accessions would accumulate 

to a drop in end strength of over 2,800 personnel by 

2010, compared with the result in the base case.

In Scenario 4, enlisted end strength would drop immediately upon the lifting of the stop-loss policy. In addition, 

in the years following the recision, continuation rates 

would decline by about 0.3 percentage points, CBO calculates.100 While total end strength would increase in the 

first year because of gains in the number of officers, 

enlisted end strength would fall by about 2,800. By 2010, 

the enlisted force would have almost 5,000 fewer personnel than in 2005, and total end strength would be almost 

3,000 lower.

Under Scenario 5, staying within historical accession levels and with no increase in continuation rates, the Army 

Reserve would reach its planned end strength by 2010, 

CBO estimates.

In Scenario 6—which has the Army Reserve staying 

within historic accession levels and maintaining its cur2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

150,000

175,000

200,000

225,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Scenario 5

Scenario 6

100. On the basis of data obtained from DoD, CBO assumed that 

about 90 percent of those soldiers kept in the Army Reserve past 

their contract expiration date would not reenlist when their 

stop-loss orders were lifted.
40 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

rent (relatively high) continuation rates over the next 

several years (through offering higher bonuses or other 

means)—the component would quickly reach, and 

shortly thereafter exceed, its authorized end strength. 

Each 1 percentage-point increase in continuation rates 

would accumulate to an increase in force size of about 

5,100 soldiers by 2010. In this scenario, the size of the 

force would reach 200,000 by 2008 and 202,000 by 

2010. 
CHAPTER

2

Recruiting, Retention, and 

End Strength in the Marine Corps

Between 2000 and 2004, the authorized end 

strength for the active Marine Corps did not exceed 

175,000 personnel. To support operational missions, the 

Congress authorized increases to 178,000 in 2005. The 

2005 National Defense Authorization Act also granted 

the Secretary of Defense the discretion to increase the end 

strength to as high as 184,000 for the period spanning 

2005 through 2009. The law stipulated that the Department of Defense’s 2005 budget would contain only 

enough funding to pay for 175,000 active Marines; any 

additional personnel would have to be funded through 

supplemental appropriations. If the Secretary of Defense 

chose to exercise his discretion to increase end strength 

above 175,000 active Marines in 2006, DoD’s budget 

submission would have to specify the estimated necessary 

funding that would be paid out of the annual budget as 

well as the estimated amount paid from emergency 

reserve funds or supplemental appropriations.1

The 2006 NDAA increased the authorized level to 

179,000 active Marines and reiterated the Secretary of 

Defense’s discretion to increase end strength as high as 

184,000 through 2009. End strength above 175,000 during 2006 would have to be funded through supplemental 

appropriations. For 2007 through 2009, funding for the 

entire force up to 184,000 active Marines would have to 

be included in the annual budget submission.2

The Quadrennial Defense Review offers additional guidance. Its expressed goal is to “Stabilize the Marine Corps’ 

end strength at 175,000 Active and 39,000 Reserve 

Component personnel by Fiscal Year 2011.”3

As of September 30, 2005, the active Marine Corps’s 

end strength was 18,900 officers plus 161,100 enlisted 

Marines, for a total of 180,000. DoD’s 2007 Future Years 

Defense Program calls for 19,400 officers plus 161,300 

enlisted Marines from 2008 through 2011, implying a 

total of 180,700, which exceeds the 175,000 goal specified in the QDR. Similarly, for the reserve component, 

the 2007 FYDP calls for 4,100 officers and 37,400 

enlisted Marines, for a total of 41,500. That total exceeds 

the QDR’s goal of 39,000 personnel.

From 2000 to 2002, the Marine Corps exceeded its 

authorized end strength for active-duty personnel by 

about 1,100 or fewer (see Table 2-1). Since 2003, the 

Marine Corps’s actual end strength exceeded the authorized levels by between 2,000 and 3,000 active-duty 

members. Contributing to that phenomenon was an 

increase in continuation rates and stop-loss policies.4

For the Marine Corps Reserve, the authorized end 

strength was relatively unchanged from 2000 to 2005, at 

about 39,600 personnel (see Table 2-1). Except in 2003, 

when it exceeded the authorized level by about 1,500 personnel, actual end strength remained close to the set limits, exceeding them by no more than 350 personnel.

1. See the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375, sections 401 and 403; 

118 Stat. 1863).

2. See the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 

(Public Law 109-163, sections 401 and 403; 119 Stat. 3218).

3. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 43.

4. From 2000 to 2005, the overall continuation rates for the entire 

force were 81.5 percent, 81.7 percent, 82.0 percent, 82.5 percent, 

82.2 percent, and 82.7 percent, respectively.
42 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 2-1.

The Marine Corps’s End Strength

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Marine Corps, the National Defense Authorization Act (various years) and data 

from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (available at web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/

military/miltop.htm); and, for the Marine Corps Reserve, the National Defense Authorization Act (various years) and Department of 

Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics (various years). 

Note: n.a. = not available.

Recruiting Trends

Both the active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps 

Reserve met or exceeded their recruiting goals in terms of 

quantity and quality every year this decade.

Quantity of Recruits

With its authorized end strength for the active force stable or increasing minimally since 2000, the Marine 

Corps’s had accession goals for enlisted personnel that did 

fluctuate substantially between 2000 and 2006 (see 

Table 2-2). Initial goals at the beginning of fiscal years 

ranged from 30,600 to 34,100—a variation of about 10 

percent, similar to that experienced by the active Army.5

The Marine Corps met its accession goal for enlisted personnel every year during the 2000-2005 period, including those years following the invasion of Iraq. In fact, it 

exceeded its goal by 5 percent for 2004. 

For 2005, the Marine Corps had 32,961 individuals start 

initial training. However, the Marine Corps allowed the 

pool of recruits in its Delayed Entry Program to drop to 

43 percent of its original 2006 annual accession goal, 

which was the first time in at least 10 years that its DEP 

level dropped below its target of 50 percent. 

For 2006, the initial goal of 32,880 accessions was just 

slightly higher than the average of the goals set at the 

beginning of each fiscal year this decade. Through the 

first 11 months of fiscal year 2006 (as of August 2006), 

the Marine Corps had so far met its accession objective—

it sent about 28,620 recruits to initial training, compared 

with the year-to-date goal of about 28,400, or 101 percent of the goal.

The Marine Corps Reserve’s accessions equaled or slightly 

exceeded the goals set every year from 2000 to 2005. The 

2002 goal of 9,800 was the peak for the decade (up about 

11 percent from 2001), but the Reserve was able to surpass it by 3 percent (with 10,090 new enlistments).6 The 

following year, the Marine Corps Reserve set a significantly lower goal of 8,200 enlistments, which it exceeded 

by 1 percent. Since then, the goal has hovered between 

8,000 and 8,200 recruits. End strength, in turn, has been 

very stable, ranging from 39,600 to 39,900 in every year 

but 2002, when it peaked at 41,000. The goal of about 

Fiscal

Year

2000 172,518 155,383 17,938 173,321 39,624 35,699 3,968 39,667

2001 172,600 154,872 18,062 172,934 39,558 35,881 3,929 39,810

2002 172,600 155,445 18,228 173,733 39,558 36,144 3,761 39,905

2003 175,000 159,033 18,746 177,779 39,558 37,386 3,660 41,046

2004 175,000 158,641 18,839 177,480 39,600 36,178 3,466 39,644

2005 178,000 161,144 18,885 180,029 39,600 36,539 3,399 39,938

2006 179,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 39,600 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Personnel Personnel Officers Total

Actual

Marine Corps Reserve

Authorized

Active Marine Corps

Actual

Authorized

Enlisted

Officers Total

Enlisted

5. For the active Army, accession goals ranged from 72,500 to 

80,000 recruits, or by 9 percent.

6. Many manpower planners consider 2002 a relatively easy recruiting environment, and several of the military components exceeded 

their recruiting goals by a considerable margin that year. 
CHAPTER TWO RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE MARINE CORPS 43

Table 2-2.

The Marine Corps’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Marine Corps, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession 

Policy; and, for the Marine Corps Reserve, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

8,000 accessions for 2006 was the lowest yet for the 

decade. Having sent 7,886 recruits to initial training as of 

August 2006, the Marine Corps Reserve had met its 

year-to-date goal of 7,799 recruits.

Quality of Recruits

From 2000 through 2005, the active Marine Corps met 

DoD’s goal that at least 90 percent of recruits without 

prior service be high school graduates. That percentage 

rose from 95 percent in 2000 to peak at 98 percent in 

2003 and then settled at 96 percent in 2005 (see 

Table 2-3). Similarly, the percentage of non-prior-service 

recruits in categories I through IIIA of the Armed Forces 

Qualification Test (or “high-quality” recruits) ranged 

from 64 percent to 69 percent between 2000 and 2005, 

exceeding DoD’s goal of 60 percent. As of August 2006, 

for the fiscal year to date, about 70 percent of the recruits 

sent to initial training were high quality, and 99 percent 

were high school graduates.

For the Marine Corps Reserve, the quality of accessions 

also exceeded DoD’s goals between 2000 and 2005. The 

percentage of accessions with high school degrees averaged 97 percent, while the percentage who were high 

quality averaged 78 percent—figures that are higher than 

those for the active Marine Corps and are among the 

highest for all of the military components. During the 

first 11 months of the current fiscal year, the portion of 

high-quality recruits fell slightly for the Marine Corps 

Reserve but still exceeded DoD’s benchmarks—as of 

August 2006, 74 percent of the year-to-date accessions 

were high quality, compared with 76 percent for the same 

period in 2005.

Recruiting Resources

As is the case with the other services, there has been a 

general upward trend in the Marine Corps’s use of enlistment incentives since 2000. That trend is more pronounced in the Marine Corps Reserve, where expenditures for enlistment bonuses increased severalfold 

between 2000 and 2005.

Instead of using enlistment bonuses to boost recruiting 

in general, the active Marine Corps uses them primarily 

as a tool to steer recruits into particular occupations or 

to influence their starting dates to meet its needs. The 

Corps’s expenditures for enlistment bonuses showed 

some variation between 2000 and 2005: increasing from 

$6.7 million in 2000, peaking at $9.4 million in 2004, 

and falling to $5.4 million in 2005 (see Table 2-4 on 

page 45). Perhaps reflecting some concern about recruiting, higher amounts are budgeted for 2006 and 2007—

$7.9 million and $8.0 million, respectively. 

The number of active-duty recruiters in the Marine 

Corps remained stable at 2,650 between 2000 and 2005 

Fiscal

Year

2000 33,367 32,417 32,440 100 9,341 9,465 101

2001 32,903 31,404 31,429 100 8,945 9,117 102

2002 32,422 32,593 32,767 101 9,835 10,090 103

2003 34,143 32,501 32,530 100 8,173 8,222 101

2004 30,608 29,659 31,006 105 8,087 8,248 102

2005 32,273 32,917 32,961 100 8,180 8,350 102

2006 32,880 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8,035 n.a. n.a.

Average, 

2000–2004 32,689 31,715 32,034 n.a. 8,876 9,028 n.a.

Active Marine Corps

Actual

of Objective

Percentage

Marine Corps Reserve

of Objective

Actual

Objective

Initial

Objective

Final

Objective Accessions

Percentage

Accessions
44 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 2-3.

The Quality of the Marine Corps’s Recruits Without Prior Service

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Marine Corps, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession 

Policy (partly available at www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/recqual04.pdf); and, for the Marine Corps Reserve, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs.

Notes: AFQT = Armed Forces Qualification Test. 

The Department of Defense divides the scores on the AFQT into five ranges, or categories. Scores at or above the 50th percentile fall 

into AFQT categories I through IIIA.

(see Table 2-5 on page 46). However, recruiting operations for the active-duty Marine Corps and its Reserve 

have been consolidated. Consequently, active-duty 

recruiters and Active Guard/Reserve recruiters are responsible for enlisting both active-duty and reserve personnel. 

Recruiters may shift their efforts toward one component 

or the other as conditions warrant. 

The active Marine Corps’s expenditures to support 

recruiters were also stable from 2000 to 2004 and then 

rose almost 20 percent in 2005. Advertising expenditures 

rose from $33 million in 2000 to $43 million in 2004; in 

2005, they jumped by $25 million, to about $69 million.

Expenditures for enlistment bonuses in the Marine Corps 

Reserve are small relative to those for the other components. Nevertheless, the growth in those expenditures in 

the Marine Corps Reserve is noteworthy. Total enlistment bonuses grew from $426,000 in 2000 to $1.6 million in 2005, with that change occurring as early as 2001 

(see Table 2-4). Of the 2005 amount, the Corps spent 

$1.2 million on bonuses for prior-service and non-priorservice personnel and $374,000 on affiliation bonuses 

(which are paid to individuals who have a military service 

obligation but are not in the Selected Reserve). Those 

expenditures are more than triple the amounts in 2000.

By contrast, other recruiting resources devoted to the 

Marine Corps Reserve appear to have declined somewhat. 

The number of reservist recruiters (including support 

personnel) decreased from 170 in 2000 to 160 in 2004 

and further to 149 in 2005 (see Table 2-5 on page 46).7

Advertising expenditures targeting potential reservists 

dropped from $5 million for 2000 to $3 million for 

2005.

Retention Trends

As with recruiting, both the active Marine Corps and the 

Marine Corps Reserve met their respective goals for 

retention and attrition every year this decade. 

Quantity

A higher proportion of active enlisted Marines are in their 

first term of service than is the case for their counterparts 

in the other active services. Thus, there is a relatively 

larger pool of eligible Marines at the end of their first 

term who are available to enter the career force. Because 

the number of first-term Marines who leave before the 

end of their obligated service has declined in recent years, 

the pool of eligible Marines has only gotten larger. The 

Fiscal Year

2000 95 64 98 77

2001 96 65 96 76

2002 97 67 98 79

2003 98 69 97 80

2004 97 69 97 78

2005 96 68 96 76 96 68 96% 76%

Categories I-IIIA

High School

Active Marine Corps Marine Corps Reserve

AFQT

Graduate Graduate Categories I-IIIA

High School AFQT

7. The total level of effort cannot be known precisely, as active-duty 

and reserve recruiters may have shifted their work to or from 

enlisting reservists. 
CHAPTER TWO RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE MARINE CORPS 45

Table 2-4.

The Marine Corps’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Incentives

(Millions of current dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Marine Corps, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession 

Policy and Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management; and, for the Marine Corps Reserve, data from the Department of Defense’s personnel budget books, available at www.dod/mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html.

Marine Corps has typically selected about 25 percent of 

eligible Marines at the end of their first term to advance 

to the career force—a situation that provides managers 

some discretion in shaping that force. Should the Corps 

develop problems in recruiting or decide to increase its 

end strength, it could relax the constraints it places on 

reenlistments of first-term soldiers.

The Corps met its retention goals for first-term personnel 

and careerists each year from 2000 to 2005 (see Table 2-6 

on page 47).8 For example, it met 103 percent of its goal 

for first-term personnel in 2005 and 138 percent of its 

goal for careerists. 

As discussed above, the reserve components in general 

focus on losses, or attrition rates, for managing the size of 

the force. Personnel who leave regardless of whether they 

have a military obligation remaining on their contract are 

counted as losses and expressed as the percentage of the 

average strength for that year. The Marine Corps Reserve 

uses an attrition rate ceiling of 30 percent as a benchmark. During the 2000-2005 period, it did not exceed 

that limit (see Table 2-7 on page 48). 

Because changes in end strength affect attrition rates as 

they are currently calculated and because year-to-year 

comparisons of (numerical) retention and attrition measures may be misleading, the Congressional Budget 

Office also examined trends in continuation rates as measured by the proportion of personnel at the beginning of 

the fiscal year that remain in the same component and 

status one year later. For the active Marine Corps, the 

overall continuation rate fell to 80.4 percent in 1999, 

about a 3 percentage-point drop from the level in the 

mid-1990s (see Figure 2-1 on page 48). Since 2000, the 

rates have headed up, almost returning to their mid1990s level, reaching about 83 percent in 2005. Such elevated continuation rates persist despite the higher-thannormal deployment schedule associated with current 

operations. Part of the improvement has occurred because 

losses among personnel who have not reached the end of 

their obligation have not materialized to the same extent 

as in the past. According to Marine Corps officials, such 

losses are lower partly because it is more difficult for 

deployed soldiers to leave the service before the end of 

their obligation. The stop-loss policy might also have 

contributed to the higher continuation rates in 2002 and 

2003, but that policy was rescinded in 2003 and did not 

significantly affect the 2004 and 2005 rates.9 The 12-

month continuation data through February 2006 show a 

break in the upward trend, with the overall rate dropping 

to 82 percent. 

Fiscal Year

2000 35.8 6.7 0.5 0.4

2001 64.1 6.7 1.1 1.7

2002 58.2 7.0 0.9 1.5

2003 57.3 8.5 0.8 1.6

2004 51.8 9.4 0.8 1.2

2005 51.1 5.4 0.9 1.6

Active Marine Corps Marine Corps Reserve

Reenlistment Bonuses Incentive Program Bonuses Bonuses

Selective Enlistment Selective Reenlistment Enlistment

8. The active Marine Corps states its goal in terms of the number 

(rather than the percentage) of first-term and career Marines that 

it needs to retain.

9. The Marine Corps instituted the stop-loss policy in December 

2001 for selected occupations and expanded it to the total force in 

January 2003. 
46 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 2-5.

The Marine Corps’s Recruiting Resources

(Millions of current dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Marine Corps, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession 

Policy; and, for the Marine Corps Reserve, data from the Department of Defense's personnel budget books, available at www.dod. 

mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html.

c. For the active Army, statistics reflect the average number of recruiters for each year. For the reserve components, they reflect the number 

of full-time reservists filling positions as recruiters or recruiter support personnel as of the end of the year.

In the Marine Corps Reserve, overall continuation rates 

from 2000 to 2005 ranged from about 78 percent to 83 

per-cent and also showed a general upward trend, 

although there was a noticeable drop in 2004 (see Figure 

2-1 on page 48). The rate in 2005, 82 percent, was 

almost 3 percentage points higher than that in 2001 and 

more than 4 percentage points higher than in 2000. The 

more-recent rate spanning February 2005 through February 2006, 81 percent, remained higher than the rates earlier in the decade. 

Reenlistment Bonuses

Like the other services, the Marine Corps uses reenlistment bonuses to retain qualified personnel with needed 

skills.10 During 2005, active Marines in 90 to 95 different occupations received Selective Reenlistment Bonuses. 

That number of occupations was expected to increase to 

150 in 2006. The increase should have helped the Marine 

Corps meet its retention goal and improve its continuation rate.

The active Marine Corps’s expenditures for SRBs peaked 

at $64.1 million in 2001 and have declined since then 

(see Table 2-4 on page 45). By 2005, the expenditures 

were $51.1 million. According to Marine Corps officials, 

an additional $7.5 million for SRBs in 2005 had been 

requested but later found to be unnecessary. For 2006 

and 2007, the Marine Corps’s budget includes $53.1 million and $55.4 million for SRBs, respectively.

As a small military component, the Marine Corps 

Reserve’s spending on reenlistment bonuses is low relative 

to that by the other services. Between 2000 and 2005, its 

expenditures for reenlistment bonuses grew by $388,000 

(or 71 percent), to $936,000 (see Table 2-4). 

Implications of Recruiting and 

Retention Trends for End Strength

In a manner similar to that used for the Army components, CBO examined how the Marine Corps could meet 

its planned end strength. CBO modeled several scenarios 

for both the active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps 

Reserve, taking September 30, 2005, as the starting point 

Fiscal

Year

2000 2,650 46.5 33.0 170 5.0 5.1

2001 2,650 42.9 38.1 166 4.9 4.9

2002 2,650 43.9 44.2 166 5.3 2.8

2003 2,650 47.0 41.8 168 5.3 3.0

2004 2,650 46.3 43.4 160 4.7 3.1

2005 2,650 55.1 68.5 149 4.9 3.0

Support

Recruitersa

Advertising Advertising Support

(Millions

of dollars)

Active Marine Corps Marine Corps Reserve

Recruiter Recruiter

(Millions

of dollars)

(Millions

of dollars)

(Millions

Recruiters of dollars) a

10. Changes in military pay relative to pay in the civilian sector can 

also motivate a Marine to stay or leave the service. Because basic 

pay and allowances are set by the Congress regardless of the service, enlisted Marines have experienced increases in pay equal to 

those for their counterparts in the Army. Therefore, the earlier discussion of pay in the Army provides information on trends in military pay generally.
CHAPTER TWO RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE MARINE CORPS 47

Table 2-6.

The Marine Corps’s Retention of Active-Duty Enlisted Personnel

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management; and data from the Marine Corps, Office of Enlisted Plans.

Note: n.a. = not available.

a. Service members under their first enlistment contract, regardless of their length of service, are considered to be in their initial enlistment. 

Service members who are on their second or subsequent enlistment are classified as careerists.

b. In 2000, the Marine Corps calculated careerist retention as the percentage of eligible careerists retained, which was 63 percent. The following year, the Corps changed its metric to the number of individuals retained. 

and projecting end strength forward from 2006 through 

2010. 

Active Marine Corps

If the Marine Corps could attain 32,700 accessions (its 

revised 2006 goal) and maintain continuation rates at 

the2005 levels (or slightly higher than the rates before 

September 11, 2001) annually for the next several years, 

its end strength would grow to 184,000 personnel by 

2010. That level corresponds to the discretionary amount 

for the 2005-2009 period that the Congress granted the 

Secretary of Defense. If, instead, the Marine Corps maintained lower annual accessions of 31,700, end strength 

would remain stable over the period at 180,000. 

To derive those results, CBO modeled four scenarios in 

which enlisted end strength varies. In its modeling, CBO 

assumed that the number of officers would equal the 

number proposed in the FYDP, or 19,400 each year for 

five years. As of September 30, 2005, the number of 

officers was 18,900; and the number of enlisted personnel, 161,100.

The characteristics of the scenarios are as follows:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions of 32,700 (the 

2006 goal) and continuation rates at the levels that 

existed from September 2004 through September 

2005, which were 82.7 percent overall. The Marine 

Corps’s accession goal was revised downward slightly 

from 32,880 in October 2005 to 32,700 by December 

2005). That revised goal is just 3 percent higher than 

the average attained from 2000 through 2004. Continuation rates in 2005 were at their highest levels 

since 1996, although the variation over the period was 

relatively small (the peak in 2005 was just 2.3 percentage points higher than the trough of 80.4 percent 

overall experienced in 1999).11 This scenario might be 

realistic if the recruiting or retention environment 

weakened. In that case, the Marine Corps might be 

able to alleviate any difficulties by offering additional 

incentives.

B Scenario 2: accessions and continuation rates representative of pre-September 11, 2001, levels (set at 

2001 levels). The Marine Corps had 31,400 accessions and had an overall continuation rate of 81.7 percent for that year. The 2001 accession level was 

somewhat lower than the average for the 1997-2001 

period. The continuation rates in the scenario are on 

average about 0.6 percentage points higher than the 

Fiscal

Year

2000 5,846 5,791 101 63% b n.a. n.a.

2001 6,144 6,144 100 5,900 n.a. n.a.

2002 6,050 5,900 103 7,258 5,784 125

2003 6,001 6,025 100 7,161 6,172 116

2004 6,011 5,974 101 7,729 5,628 137

2005 6,152 5,949 103 6,987 5,079 138

Percentage of

Actual Actual

Initial Enlistmentsa Careerists

Percentage of

Goal Goal Attained Goal Goal Attained

11. By contrast, continuation rates for the active Army ranged 

between 81.9 percent and 86.7 percent for the same period. 
48 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 2-7.

The Marine Corps Reserve’s

Attrition Rates

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 

Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

rates attained between 1997 and 2001 and reflect 

some of the improvements (in basic pay and allowances) that the Congress authorized and provided appropriations for beginning in 2000. Both accessions 

and continuation rates were lower in 2001 than those 

experienced in 2005, by 1,500 and 1 percentage 

point, respectively. Consequently, the scenario is 

more pessimistic than the base case. 

B Scenario 3: accessions at the 2006 goal; continuation 

rates at the 2001 levels. This case illustrates the effect 

that a decline in retention of about 1 percentage 

point—to pre-September 11, 2001, levels—and no 

corresponding increase in accession levels would have 

on end strength. Because soldiers’ continuation behavior is assumed to worsen from the 2005 levels, this scenario is more pessimistic than the base case.

B Scenario 4: accessions totaling 31,700 per year; continuation rates at the 2005 levels. This case assumes 

that, each year, the Marine Corps recruits 1,000 fewer 

individuals than the 2006 goal. CBO chose this case 

to illustrate the level of accessions necessary to keep 

end strength stable and within the authorized level if 

continuation rates remained at the 2005 levels. 

In 2005, the average length of service in the Marine 

Corps was 4.83 years. Because continuation rates have 

been somewhat higher in recent years, the average length 

of service in a steady state in the base case would grow 

slightly, to 5.11 years (see Figure 2-2). A drop to 2001 

continuation rates would still increase the average length 

of service slightly, to 4.95 years.

Under CBO’s base-case scenario—in which the Marine 

Corps attains its 2006 accession goal and continuation 

rates stay constant—its end strength would grow from 

180,000 personnel in 2005 to the discretionary authorized end strength of 184,000 by 2010 (see Figure 2-3 on 

page 50). 

In the second scenario—with accessions and continuation rates at 2001 levels—the Marine Corps’s end 

strength would drop 3 percent from the 2005 level, to 

175,000 soldiers (the level authorized in 2003 and 2004). 

The force would have 4,000 fewer soldiers than the 2006 

authorization and 9,000 fewer than the discretionary 

maximum. 

Figure 2-1.

The Marine Corps’s Annual

Continuation Rates

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 

Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Data for the Marine Corps Reserve before 2000 are not 

available.

Fiscal

Year

2000 28.5 94.9

2001 26.4 88.0

2002 26.0 86.5

2003 21.5 71.6

2004 26.3 87.8

2005 22.0 73.3

Memorandum:

Attrition Ceiling 30.0 n.a. 12.0

Percentage to Ceiling

Actual Percentage Relative

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

0

75

80

85

90

Active Marine Corps

Active Marine Reserve
CHAPTER TWO RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE MARINE CORPS 49

Figure 2-2.

Annual Accessions and Length of Service 

in the Active Marine Corps Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 = 2006 accession goal (32,700 recruits) each 

year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (82.7 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2001 level (31,400 recruits) 

each year and continuation rates at the 2001 levels (which 

were lower than those in Scenario 1, or 81.7 percent 

overall).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and 

continuation rates at the 2001 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions of 31,700 each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Under the third scenario, if the overall continuation rate 

declined 1 percentage point from the 2005 level, by 2010 

the Marine Corps would have almost 5,000 fewer personnel than in the base case and 1,000 fewer than in 2005. 

Even with the lower continuation rates, end strength 

would still be higher than it was early in the decade and 

would still be at the current authorized level. A decline in 

continuation rates (albeit smaller than the one in this scenario) may be materializing. As of February 2006, the 

Marine Corps’s overall continuation rate had dropped by 

0.7 percentage points. 

According to CBO’s calculations for the fourth scenario, 

the Marine Corps could drop its accession levels by 1,000 

each year from its 2005 goal and still maintain the size of 

the force at 180,000 in 2010. As shown in this scenario, 

each change of 1,000 in annual accessions would accumulate to a change of about 3,500 personnel in end 

strength by 2010 (compared with end strength in the 

base case).12

Marine Corps Reserve

If the Marine Corps Reserve maintained its continuation 

rates from the levels in 2005 and attained its 2006 

recruiting goal (the lowest this decade), its end strength 

would be 41,100 personnel by 2010. That level corresponds closely to that outlined in DoD’s 2007 Future 

Years Defense Program. If, however, annual accessions 

were to fall 500 recruits short of the 2006 goal each year 

in the future, the size of the force would total about 

39,400 personnel. 

To derive those results, CBO modeled three scenarios of 

end strength allowing the accession levels and continuation rates for enlisted personnel to change. CBO assumed 

that the Marine Corps Reserve would achieve the officer 

end strength as given in the FYDP, or 4,100 annually over 

five years. The total numbers of enlisted personnel and 

officers were 36,500 and 3,400, respectively, as of September 30, 2005. 

The scenarios have these characteristics:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions of 8,035, the 

goal for 2006, and continuation rates at the levels that 

existed from September 2004 through September 

2005, which were 82.1 percent overall, one of the 

highest levels this decade. Only in 2003 was the rate—

at 83.0 percent—higher, and earlier, it was at least 2.6 

percentage points lower. The accession goal is the lowest in recent history (the average for 1998 through 

2005 was 9,200) and is presumably in response to 

relatively high continuation rates.

1234

30,800

31,000

31,200

31,400

31,600

31,800

32,000

32,200

32,400

32,600

32,800

4.85

4.90

4.95

5.00

5.05

5.10

5.15

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of

Service

in a Steady

State

(Right scale)

Scenarios

12. For example, if accessions rose from 32,000 to 33,000 in 2006 

and stayed at that level for four more years, end strength by 2010 

would be more than 3,500 higher than it would otherwise have 

been.
50 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 2-3.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active

Marine Corps’s End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 = 2006 accession goal (32,700 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (82.7 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2001 level (31,400 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2001 levels (which were lower 

than those in Scenario 1, or 81.7 percent overall).

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and continuation rates at the 2001 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions of 31,700 each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

B Scenario 2: accession levels at 7,500 per year through 

2010; continuation rates at the 2005 levels. This case 

was modeled to illustrate what might happen to the 

size of the force if the recruiting environment worsened.

B Scenario 3: accessions similar to those in the base case; 

continuation rates reverting to levels last seen in 2000 

(the lowest levels of the decade and 4.6 percentage 

points lower than the 2005 levels).

In 2005, the average length of service equaled 4.8 years. 

Because the Marine Corps Reserve recruits non-priorservice individuals relatively more intensively than the 

other reserve components do (in a manner more like the 

active Marine Corps’s approach), its average length of service is closer to that in the active Marine Corps. In the 

base case, the Marine Corps Reserve’s average length of 

service would increase to 5.1 years (see Figure 2-4). And 

even with lower continuation rates, as in Scenario 3, it 

would be 4.6 years.

Under CBO’s base-case scenario, the Marine Corps 

Reserve would increase enlisted end strength by 500 personnel, or 1.3 percent, above the 2005 level. The component is assumed to increase the number of officers from 

3,400 to the FYDP target of 4,100 in all five years. In 

combination, total personnel would increase by 1,200, or 

2.9 percent, to 41,100, and exceed authorized end 

strength by 1,500 individuals, or almost 4 percent (see 

Figure 2-5 on page 52). 

Under Scenario 2, with about 500 fewer accessions each 

year, enlisted end strength would drop from the 2005 

level by 1,300 soldiers, or 3.4 percent, to 35,300 by 

2010. Total end strength would decrease by 600 personnel, or 1.4 percent, to 39,400, just under the authorized 

level.

Under Scenario 3, the drop in continuation rates would 

translate, between 2005 and 2010, into a decline in 

enlisted end strength of more than 4,000 personnel and 

in total end strength of 3,600. While that decline may 

appear relatively small in absolute numbers, end strength 

in 2010 would be 36,300 personnel, or just 91.8 percent 

of the authorized level.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

170,000

175,000

180,000

185,000

190,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4
CHAPTER TWO RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE MARINE CORPS 51

Figure 2-4.

Annual Accessions and Length of Service 

in the Marine Corps Reserves Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 = 2006 accession goal (8,035 recruits) each 

year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (82.1 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions of 7,500 recruits and continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and 

continuation rates (at 79.4 percent overall) similar to the 

2000 levels (which were substantially lower than those in 

2005).

123

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a

Steady State (Right scale)

Scenarios
52 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 2-5.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the

Marine Corps Reserve’s End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 = 2006 accession goal (8,035 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (82.1 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions of 7,500 recruits and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and continuation rates (at 79.4 percent overall) similar to the 2000 levels (which 

were substantially lower than those in 2005).

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

36,000

37,000

38,000

39,000

40,000

41,000

42,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3
CHAPTER

3

Recruiting, Retention, and 

End Strength in the Navy

U nlike the Army, the Navy and Air Force are 

undergoing planned reductions in end strength. As they 

proceed, they may have to encourage some personnel to 

separate from the service while at the same time providing incentives to retain other needed personnel.

Authorized end strength for the active Navy was largely 

stable from 2000 to 2004—the level was 372,000 personnel in 2000 and 373,800 in 2004—but then dropped to 

352,700 by 2006, or by more than 21,000 personnel. 

From 2000 to 2003, actual end strength was greater than 

the authorized levels; end strength declined to the authorized level in 2004.1 Planned reductions in line with 

declines in authorized end strength began in 2004. 

Between 2003 and 2005, the number of enlisted personnel decreased by over 17,200 personnel, or 5 percent, and 

the number of officers dropped by almost 2,200, or 4 

percent (see Table 3-1). According to the Navy, reasons 

for the reductions included the decommissioning of older 

manpower-intensive ships and technology-related efficiencies in newer ships.2

The situation could put the active Navy in a better position than the active Army to meet its recruiting goals 

because the Navy will require fewer accessions as it downsizes the force. However, the active Navy faces the challenge of managing the reductions in a way that retains the 

skilled personnel it needs while encouraging others to 

leave voluntarily, without creating morale problems that 

could harm recruiting and retention in the future. 

According to Navy officials, the transition will be managed by policies such as shifting personnel from overmanned to undermanned occupations and by encouraging transfers of personnel from the active Navy to the 

reserve component or to other services (through, for 

example, the Army’s Blueto-Green program).

Authorized end strength for the Navy Reserve has been 

declining for most of this decade. The Navy Reserve’s 

authorized end strength decreased by between 2 percent 

and 3 percent per year between 2000 and 2005 and averaged 87,000 personnel during that period. Reductions in 

actual end strength were concentrated in 2004 and 2005, 

when the Navy Reserve dropped by 6 percent to 7 percent, or about 6,000 personnel, in each of those years. 

Lower recruiting goals in those years as well as difficulties 

meeting those goals helped cause end strength to fall 

3,300 and 6,900 sailors below authorized levels in 2004 

and 2005, respectively.

The Future Years Defense Program outlines plans to 

reduce the size of the active Navy force over the next several years. Starting from an end strength of 362,900 for 

2005, the Navy is expected to decline by almost 10 percent by 2008, to a force of 331,200, and then to stabilize 

at about that level (see Table 3-2). Over the period from 

2005 through 2011, the enlisted force is expected to

1. The Navy implemented a stop-loss program in September 2001 

for some specialties. In August 2002, the program was terminated, 

and affected personnel were permitted to leave the service through 

December 2002. However, with the onset of the war, the stop-loss 

policy was imposed on certain health professionals in April 2003. 

The policy was rescinded in May 2003, and a total of about 2,600 

sailors who reached the end of their military service obligation 

(including members of both the active Navy and the Navy 

Reserve) were permitted to leave the Navy from June through 

December 2003.

2. Statement of Vice Admiral Gerald L. Hoewing before the Military 

Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2005.
54 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 3-1.

The Navy’s End Strength

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Navy, the National Defense Authorization Act (various years) and Department 

of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Statistical and Analysis Division, “Military Personnel Statistics,” 

available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm; and, for the Navy Reserve, the National Defense Authorization Act (various years) and Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower 

Strengths and Statistics (various years). 

Note: n.a.= not available.

a. The active Navy’s total end strength each year includes about 4,000 midshipmen not otherwise classified.

decline at a greater rate, 9.3 percent, than the officer force 

(including midshipmen), at 8.5 percent. The FYDP also 

shows cuts in the Navy Reserve of almost 8,000 reservists, 

or about 8 percent, by 2008 (see Table 3-3 on page 56). 

As of July 31, 2006, the active Navy’s end strength was 

351,591 personnel; the Navy Reserve’s, 70,051 (more 

than 3,000 sailors, or 4.2 percent, below authorized end 

strength). 

Recruiting Trends

Commensurate with the active Navy’s overall reduction 

in end strength and higher retention, its accessions have 

been decreasing. 

Quantity of Recruits

Although the active Navy began the decade with 55,000 

accessions, by 2005 the number of new sailors was about 

38,000—a decrease of over 30 percent (see Table 3-4 on 

page 57). The Navy successfully recruited 100 percent of 

its decreasing recruiting requirement each year from 2000 

through 2005. That trend continued into 2006, as the 

Navy attained 100 percent of its cumulative objective 

through August 2006 (about 32,600 accessions). Notwithstanding that situation, the Navy will probably need 

to employ incentives to help it recruit and retain highquality personnel.

As the Navy Reserve executes planned cuts in end 

strength, the goals for accessions and the number realized 

have been declining. The goals have dropped from over 

18,000 in 2000 to 11,180 in 2006 (although 2004 did 

have a lower goal of about 10,000).3

 The number of 

recruits entering the Navy Reserve began to decline in 

2003, at a rate of over 10 percent per year (see Table 3-4). 

In 2005, the Navy Reserve fell short of its goal of 11,500 

by about 1,700 recruits, or 15 percent. Shortfalls continued in 2006, as the component had 8,811 accessions, or 

86 percent, of its cumulative objective of about 10,276 as 

of August 2006. Several factors might have contributed 

to the shortfalls. Although fewer Navy reservists have 

Fiscal

Year

2000 372,037 315,471 53,550 373,193 90,288 67,999 18,934 86,933

2001 372,642 319,601 53,908 377,810 88,900 68,872 19,041 87,913

2002 376,000 324,351 54,476 383,108 87,000 69,692 18,266 87,958

2003 375,700 322,915 55,022 382,235 87,800 69,370 18,786 88,156

2004 373,800 314,681 54,208 373,197 85,900 64,359 18,199 82,558

2005 365,900 305,735 52,826 362,941 83,400 59,471 16,995 76,466

2006 352,700 n.a. n.a. n.a. 73,100 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Enlisted

Actual

Navy Reserve

Authorized

Active Navy

Actual

Authorized

Enlisted

Personnel Officers Total Personnel Officers Total a

3. The reserve components typically fill their requirements for Active 

Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel, also termed full-time support 

(FTS) personnel, with existing reserve personnel. However, the 

Navy Reserve also maintains separate accession goals for those personnel. To match DoD’s reporting elsewhere, the Congressional 

Budget Office reports only the accessions and goals for drilling 

reservists (those who train on weekends) and not those for AGR 

or FTS personnel.
CHAPTER THREE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE NAVY 55

Table 3-2.

Plans for the Active Navy’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years

Defense Program

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Future Years Defense Program, and Department of 

Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Statistical and Analysis Division, “Military Personnel Statistics,” available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm.

been called up for the current missions than their Army 

counterparts, call-ups have nonetheless been more frequent than in the past. Additionally, according to some 

Navy recruiters, individuals with technical training (one 

of its targeted groups for recruiting) have had relatively 

attractive civilian opportunities. Finally, the Navy consolidated its reserve and active recruiting commands in 

recent years, and effects are apparently still being felt, as 

recruiters continue to learn new areas of responsibility.4

However, the Navy may have some new opportunities to 

attract individuals into the Reserve. The drawdown in the 

active Navy may provide a recruiting opportunity for the 

Navy Reserve over the next few years, as additional experienced personnel become available for reserve service. 

For instance, the Reserve has created the Recruiting 

Selective Conversion Reenlistment-Reserve, or 

RESCORE-R, program. In it, selected military personnel 

in overmanned occupations who would otherwise be 

ineligible to enter the Reserve may do so if they undertake training in a critical skill. Additionally, sailors who 

entered the active Navy under the National Call to Service (NCS)—a Congressionally mandated program—are 

beginning to transition to the Reserve. Sailors in that program serve a shortened enlistment of 15 months of active 

duty following their initial training and then shift to the 

reserve component. About 1,700 such sailors will enter 

the Navy Reserve in 2007, representing an additional 

boost to the component if they would not have served in 

the Reserve in the absence of the program. 

Quality of Recruits

The quality of the active Navy’s recruits has been increasing steadily and is above the Department of Defense’s 

standards for scores on the Armed Forces Qualification 

Test and for the percentage of high school graduates in 

2005 (see Table 3-5 on page 58). The percentage of Navy 

recruits who were high school graduates increased from 

90 percent in 2000 to 97 percent in 2005, while the percentage in AFQT categories I to IIIA increased from 64 

percent to 71 percent in the same period. As of August 

2006, 95 percent of the recruits were high school graduates, and 75 percent scored at or above the median in the 

AFQT.

The Navy Reserve, by contrast, appears to have experienced difficulties maintaining the percentage of nonprior-service recruits who have high school diplomas.5

That percentage has fallen below DoD’s 90 percent 

benchmark every year this decade except for 2000 (see 

Table 3-5 on page 58). Indeed, in 2005, only 69 percent 

of the Navy Reserve’s recruits were high school graduates, 

the lowest proportion among all 10 military components.6 The Navy Reserve was able to meet and exceed 

DoD’s benchmark specifying that 60 percent of recruits 

have AFQT scores at or above the median between 2000 

and 2004 but fell to below that level (to 59 percent) in 

2005. As discussed above, the Navy Reserve also missed 

Enlisted Personnel 305,735 296,475 280,862 277,272 277,172 277,373 277,363

Officers 52,826 51,520 50,057 49,910 49,910 49,909 49,919

Cadets 4,380 4,100 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

Total 362,941 352,095 334,919 331,182 331,082 331,282 331,282

2005 2009 2011

Actual

2006 2007 2008 2010

4. For instance, reserve recruiters are now responsible for recruiting 

active-duty personnel and vice versa.

5. DoD is auditing the Navy Reserve’s data prior to 2005 on the 

quality of recruits. 

6. Eighty-seven percent of the Air Force Reserve’s recruits—the component with the next lowest proportion in 2005—had earned 

high school diplomas. 
56 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 3-3.

Plans for the Navy Reserve’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Future Years Defense Program, and Department of 

Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics: Fiscal Year 2005 Summary.

its accession goal that year. For 2006, as of August, there 

appears to be a turnaround, as 85 percent of recruits were 

high school graduates, and 72 percent were scoring at or 

above the median in the AFQT. 

Recruiting Resources

Incentive packages contained in existing statutory authorities are available for the Navy for shaping its force, particularly to recruit and retain personnel with specific 

skills. The active Navy’s expenditures on enlistment 

bonuses were $74 million in 2000, peaked at $100 million in 2002, and thereafter declined to $81 million in 

2005 (see Table 3-6 on page 59). The Navy’s budget 

includes $81 million and $74 million for enlistment 

bonuses for 2006 and 2007, respectively.

The planned reductions in the active Navy’s accession 

goals are also reflected in decreases in some recruiting 

resources (see Table 3-7 on page 60). For instance, the 

average number of Navy recruiters decreased from about 

4,900 in 2000 to about 3,400 in 2005. As of August 

2006, the number remained at approximately the same 

level that it was last year. Recruiting support expenditures 

averaged $72 million between 2000 and 2005. Advertising expenditures fluctuated during that period. From 

2004 to 2005, they jumped from $78 million to $112 

million (an increase of over 40 percent), but the figure for 

2005 incorporates spending by the Navy Reserve because 

the active and reserve recruiting commands merged. 

Although the data on the previous years’ advertising 

expenditures by the Navy Reserve are not precise, that 

component may have spent up to $8 million per year on 

advertising. Under that assumption, the Navy’s total 

spending on advertising increased roughly 30 percent 

between 2004 and 2005. 

Over the 2000-2005 period, spending by the Navy 

Reserve on enlistment bonuses fluctuated between $4.2 

million and $5.0 million, except for 2002, in which the 

component spent $6.2 million on enlistment bonuses 

(including affiliation bonuses) (see Table 3-6 on page 59). 

In 2005, the year it missed its recruiting goal by 15 percent, the Navy Reserve spent a total of $4.5 million, an 

increase of less than 6 percent from the previous year. 

While expenditures on enlistment bonuses for recruits 

without prior service increased by $1 million (or 42 percent), the Navy Reserve’s spending on other enlistment 

bonuses decreased a total of $700,000. That shift in 

spending is explained in part by the Navy Reserve’s higher 

reliance on non-prior-service recruits. To encourage individuals to enlist, the Navy Reserve budgeted $10.4 million for 2006 and $9.5 million for 2007 (more than double the amount it spent in 2005) on enlistment bonuses, 

anticipating that most of the increase would be spent on 

non-prior-service individuals and RESCORE participants. 

The number of full-time Navy Reserve recruiters and 

recruiting support personnel was stable between 2000 

and 2005, averaging about 1,100 (see Table 3-7 on 

page 60). However, since the two Navy components 

began merging their recruiting commands in 2003, both 

active and reserve service members recruit for both components. Therefore, even though the Navy has fewer 

recruiters in total, it may be devoting additional resources 

to recruiting reservists.

Enlisted Personnel 59,471 54,927 53,592 53,012 52,663 52,788 52,760

Officers 16,995 16,317 15,778 15,558 15,407 15,282 15,310 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Total 76,466 71,244 69,370 68,570 68,070 68,070 68,070

2005 2009 2011

Actual

2006 2007 2008 2010
CHAPTER THREE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE NAVY 57

Table 3-4.

The Navy’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Navy, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy; 

and, for the Navy Reserve, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs.

Note: n.a. = not available or not applicable.

Retention Trends

The Navy states its retention goals in terms of the percentage of eligible sailors in various experience levels who 

choose to reenlist. Although the active Navy’s plan to 

reduce end strength may imply the ability to be more 

selective in retaining high-quality personnel, the component has not always met its retention goals in the past few 

years (see Table 3-8 on page 61). The Navy’s retention 

improved from 2001 to 2003 such that the component 

met its goals for personnel in their initial enlistment (who 

had up to six years of service), termed zone A, and for 

personnel in midcareer (who had at least six years of service but less than 10 years), termed zone B. In 2003, it 

also met its goal for careerists (who had 10 to 14 years of 

service), termed zone C. In 2004, the Navy met retention 

goals for zones B and C but slightly missed the goal for 

zone A. In 2005, the Navy did not meet the retention 

goal for any of the experience categories, with the biggest 

shortfall being almost 6 percentage points for zone B. 

The Navy Reserve manages its force largely by monitoring attrition, which averaged 28 percent between 2000 

and 2005. Attrition remained below the 36 percent ceiling throughout that entire period (see Table 3-9 on 

page 62).

Continuation rates (which provide an alternative way of 

comparing the combined retention of and attrition by 

service members over time) for the active Navy hovered 

around 86 percent in 2004 and 2005 (see Figure 3-1 on 

page 62). But during the past 15 years, there has been 

some fluctuation. In the early 1990s (with the militarywide drawdown), the rates declined, and later in that 

decade, they reversed. Early in the current decade, rising 

levels of expenditures on Selective Reenlistment Bonuses 

probably helped continuation rates increase substantially 

(from 84 percent overall in 1999 to a peak of 89 percent 

in 2002). After peaking in 2002 and 2003, they returned 

to pre-September 11, 2001, levels. Through February 

2006, the overall continuation rate for the active Navy for 

the preceding 12 months was 86 percent, indicating no 

significant departure from the trend.

The active Navy’s expenditures on SRBs increased from 

$232 million in 2000 to $344 million in 2005 (see Table 

3-6 on page 59). Budgeted amounts for 2006 and 2007 

are $342 million and $340 million, respectively. Stable 

SRB expenditures in the context of falling end strength 

may reflect force-shaping initiatives in which sailors in 

undermanned occupations are encouraged to stay in the 

Navy. 

Fiscal

Year

2000 57,370 55,000 55,147 100 18,410 14,911 81

2001 56,348 53,520 53,690 100 15,250 15,344 101

2002 53,000 46,150 46,155 100 15,000 15,355 102

2003 46,137 41,065 41,076 100 11,893 12,772 107

2004 39,672 39,834 39,677 100 10,101 11,246 111

2005 41,556 37,635 37,703 100 11,491 9,788 85

2006 37,456 n.a. n.a. n.a. 11,180 n.a. n.a.

Average,

2000–2004 50,505 47,114 47,149 n.a. 14,131 13,926 n.a.

Navy Reserve

Objective

Final

Objective

Actual Percentage Actual

Active Navy

Accessions of Objective Accessions of Objective

Initial Percentage

Objective
58 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 3-5.

The Quality of the Navy’s Recruits Without Prior Service

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Navy, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy 

(partly available at www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/recqual04.pdf); and, for the Navy Reserve, data from the Department of Defense, 

Office of Reserve Affairs.

Notes: AFQT = Armed Forces Qualification Test. 

The Department of Defense divides the scores on the AFQT into five ranges, or categories. Scores at or above the 50th percentile fall 

into categories I through IIIA.

a. Data for the Navy Reserve prior to 2005 are being audited by the Department of Defense and are subject to change.

In addition to SRBs, the Navy uses other tools to help 

shape its force as it downsizes. Such tools include the 

Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) and the Perform to Serve 

(PTS) programs. Those programs are designed to steer 

sailors to particular jobs and skill areas needed by the 

Navy. The AIP program offers monetary incentives to 

encourage sailors to volunteer for hard-to-fill locations 

and jobs.7

 The PTS program screens first-term sailors for 

reenlistment. It offers some sailors in overmanned occupations who might otherwise be separated from the service a chance to retrain and reenlist in undermanned 

occupations.

From 2000 to 2005, the pattern for the Navy Reserve’s 

continuation rates mimicked that for the active Navy. 

The rates peaked in 2002, at 80.9 percent overall, and 

declined thereafter (see Figure 3-1 on page 62). However, 

the continuation rates in the Navy Reserve were between 

6 and 8 percentage points lower than the rates for the 

active Navy in that 2000-2005 period. In comparison to 

the other reserve components, the Navy Reserve had the 

lowest levels of continuation in 2005, at 78.8 percent 

overall, and has been among the lowest performers for the 

past several years. The low continuation rates occurred 

despite an increase in reenlistment bonuses from $3.2 

million in 2004 to $4.9 million in 2005 (see Table 3-6). 

Moreover, the situation may be worsening, as the morerecent 12-month continuation rate through February 

2006 showed a further decrease, to 77.5 percent. Those 

continuation rates for the Navy Reserve are more than 

2 percentage points lower than those for the Army 

Reserve (the reserve component experiencing the next 

lowest continuation levels). To mitigate the problems, the 

Navy Reserve budgeted large increases for reenlistment 

bonuses for 2006 and 2007, with expenditures reaching 

$7.0 million and $7.7 million, respectively.

Implications of Recruiting and 

Retention Trends for End Strength

As with the other military components, the Congressional Budget Office examined how the Navy could meet 

its planned end strength. CBO modeled several scenarios 

for both the active Navy and the Navy Reserve, taking 

September 30, 2005, as its starting point and projecting 

end strength forward from 2006 through 2010. 

Fiscal Year

2000 90 64 93 76

2001 90 63 89 73

2002 92 65 86 69

2003 94 66 84 70

2004 96 70 78 71

2005 97 71 69 59 96 68 96% 76%

High School High School

Categories I-IIIA

Active Navy Navy Reservea

AFQT

Graduate Graduate Categories I-IIIA

AFQT

7. Sailors may “bid” for assignments offering AIP, stating an amount 

of pay that would induce them to accept the assignment. The 

Navy then fills the vacancy on the basis of the bids, the applying 

sailors’ qualifications, and other criteria.
CHAPTER THREE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE NAVY 59

Table 3-6.

The Navy’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Bonuses

(Millions of current dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Navy, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy 

and Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management; and, for the Navy Reserve, data from the Department of Defense’s

personnel budget books, available at www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html.

Active Navy

Even if accessions dropped slightly below their current 

historical lows (by 500) for each year through 2010, the 

Navy would be able to sustain its force at its planned 

(lower) levels. However, a decrease in continuation rates 

of 1 percentage point combined with accessions of 

37,500 (the 2006 goal) would decrease end strength substantially below the planned levels. Lower continuation 

rates could be used as the primary lever to reduce end 

strength to planned levels, but a drop of 2 percentage 

points, for instance, would require about 44,000 accessions per year (higher than the active Navy’s objective for 

2006 but still lower than the more than 50,000 that 

occurred each year prior to 2002). 

In the four scenarios modeled, CBO assumes the decline 

in officer end strength (including midshipmen) that is 

planned in the FYDP, from 57,200 in 2005 to 53,900 in 

2011. Otherwise, the accession levels and continuation 

rates in the scenarios are as follows: 

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions of 37,500, the 

2006 goal, for each year through 2010 and continuation rates for all experience levels remaining at the 

2005 levels, 86.2 percent overall. That level 

for recruiting would be the lowest this decade and a 

historic low—even in the downsizing efforts of the 

1990s, accessions did not fall below 48,000. The continuation rates, by contrast, would be relatively high—

slightly higher than the 2001 rates but 2 percentage 

points higher than the simple average from 1997 

through 2000. (Recruiting and retention both were 

hampered by a booming national economy in the late 

1990s.)

B Scenario 2: varying accession levels, but continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels. In this scenario, CBO assumes 

36,500 accessions for 2006 (which is lower than the 

Navy’s goal), dropping to 27,000 in 2007 (the year 

that the Navy plans to decrease the size of the force 

by 17,000 personnel) and then rising to 40,500 in 

2009. Accessions stabilize thereafter at levels between 

37,700 and 38,500. This case illustrates the number 

of recruits necessary to decrease the size of the Navy to 

its end-strength targets, assuming that it maintains 

continuation rates at their 2005 levels.

B Scenario 3: accessions of 36,500 per year; continuation rates at the 2005 levels. This case assumes that the 

Navy recruits 1,000 fewer individuals than the 2006 

goal.

B Scenario 4: accessions totaling 37,500 each year; continuation rates at all experience levels 1 percentage 

point lower than the 2005 levels. According to DoD’s 

data, the 12-month continuation rate as of February 

2006 had dropped slightly, to 86.0 percent.

The average length of service for enlisted personnel in the 

Navy was 7.34 years at the end of 2005. Under the base 

Fiscal Year

2000 232.9 73.8 2.3 4.2

2001 335.8 90.8 3.0 4.8

2002 320.4 100.0 4.2 6.2

2003 339.3 80.1 3.7 4.9

2004 310.7 83.3 3.2 4.3

2005 344.2 80.8 4.9 4.5

Selective Selective Reenlistment Enlistment

Active Navy Navy Reserve

Reenlistment Bonuses

Enlistment

Bonuses Incentive Program Bonuses
60 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 3-7.

The Navy’s Recruiting Resources

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Navy, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy; 

and, for the Navy Reserve, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs, and selected Department of Defense 

budget books and related justification materials.

Note: n.a.= not available.

a. For 2000 to 2004, CBO was unable to separate the expenditures for recruiter support and advertising from other budgetary items in the 

operation and maintenance accounts.

b. For the active Navy, statistics reflect the average number of recruiters for each year. For the Navy Reserve, they reflect the number of fulltime reservists filling positions as recruiters or recruiter support personnel as of the end of the year.

c. The active Navy and the Navy Reserve had a consolidated recruiting command. Resources for both components are reflected in the statistics for the active Navy.

case, even with accession levels declining, the average 

length of service in a steady state would be 6.82 years (see 

Figure 3-2 on page 63). The lower continuation rates 

associated with Scenario 4 would push the average length 

of service lower, to 6.41 years.

End strength under CBO’s base case—which entails low 

levels of recruiting but relatively high continuation 

rates—would drop to 333,800 personnel by 2010, a 

reduction from 2005 of about 29,200: 25,900 fewer 

enlisted personnel and an assumed reduction of 3,300 

officers (see Figure 3-3 on page 64). A force of that number would be just 1 percent higher than the planned end 

strength of 331,300. Because planned end strength drops 

sharply in 2007 compared with the slow decline in 

CBO’s model, end strength that year would be over 

10,000 more than planned, and in 2008 it would be 

almost 9,000 more than planned.

Under the second scenario, which varies accessions only, 

the Navy would reach yearly planned end-strength targets. Its end strength would drop by 31,700 personnel 

between 2005 and 2010, yielding a force of 331,300. The 

Navy would probably not choose to decrease its force in 

this way, however. By relying solely on lower accession 

levels, the Navy would create gaps in the experience profile of the future force that could affect readiness. 

In the third scenario, accessions drop below the 2006 goal 

by 1,000 per year. Lowering the number of accessions by 

that amount each year would translate into a further drop 

in end strength of about 3,600 personnel by 2010 compared with the result in the base case. At 330,100 personnel, the Navy would differ from its end-strength target by 

just 1,000 personnel by 2010. 

Under the final scenario—which includes no change in 

accessions from the 2006 goal but a decline in retention—the Navy would have 37,900 fewer sailors and 

41,200 fewer personnel in total by 2010. The enlisted 

force would have 267,800 sailors, and the total force, 

321,700. As shown by this scenario, each 1 percentagepoint decline in continuation rates would accumulate to 

a drop in end strength of over 12,000 sailors from what it 

would have been. This is the only scenario of the four in

Fiscal

Year

2000 4,863 70.9 63.7 1,014 n.a. n.a.

2001 4,934 71.6 71.5 1,104 n.a. n.a.

2002 4,714 68.1 78.1 1,162 n.a. n.a.

2003 4,617 75.4 90.9 1,120 n.a. n.a.

2004 3,767 67.1 78.4 1,122 n.a. n.a.

2005c 3,365 75.9 112.3 1,124 n.a. n.a.

Active Navy Navy Reservea

Recruiter Recruiter

of dollars)

Advertising

Recruitersb

(Millions (Millions

Support Support Advertising

(Millions (Millions

Recruiters of dollars) of dollars) b of dollars)
CHAPTER THREE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE NAVY 61

Table 3-8.

The Active Navy’s Retention of Enlisted Personnel

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, and data from the Navy Personnel Command, Center for Career Development.

Note: Initial enlistments (termed zone A) covers sailors with less than six years of service. Midcareer personnel (zone B) have at least six 

years of service but less than 10. Careerists (zone C) have 10 to 14 years of service.

which end strength by 2010 would be substantially lower 

than planned.

Lowering retention could be the Navy’s primary means of 

reducing the force, although the average length of service 

and, consequently, the productivity of the force would 

decline. If the Navy chose that method, it could adjust its 

SRB levels, make further use of the Perform to Serve program, and adopt other policies. If the Navy dropped continuation rates 2 percentage points further than the 2005 

levels starting in 2007 and had accessions of 44,000 (one 

of the lowest levels in the last 20 years), the Navy could 

still attain its 2010 end-strength target.

Navy Reserve

As outlined in the FYDP, the Navy Reserve plans to 

reduce its force by 8,400 personnel (1,700 officers and 

6,700 sailors), reaching an end strength of 68,100 by 

2010. The Navy Reserve would not be able to meet its 

(lower) end-strength goal for 2010, CBO estimates, if it 

could both increase the number of accessions to its 2006 

goal and maintain continuation rates at the 2005 levels. 

The Navy Reserve’s force size would decrease from 

76,500 personnel in 2005 to 65,900 in 2010—which 

would be 2,100, or 3.1 percent, below the planned number. If accessions were to reach the (lower) levels attained 

in 2005, end strength in 2010 would be still lower, 

62,300 personnel—a shortfall of 8.5 percent. Reaching 

the planned end strength (without changes in continuation rates) would require accessions of up to 13,000 per 

year. 

In the four scenarios that CBO modeled, it assumes the 

decline in officer end strength that is planned in the 

FYDP, from 17,000 in 2005 to 15,300 in 2010. Otherwise, the accession levels and continuation rates in the 

scenarios are as follows: 

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions totaling 

11,180 each year (the 2006 goal); continuation rates 

at the 2005 levels, 78.3 percent overall.8

 That number 

of accessions would be one of the lowest goals this 

decade but substantially more than the number the 

Navy Reserve had in 2005. The recruiting difficulties 

suggest that achieving a higher accession goal consistently may be difficult. But the Navy Reserve may be 

able to do so if the recruiting environment improves 

or if the added recruiting resources and incentives are 

sufficient. The continuation rates assumed in this sceFiscal

Year

2000 47.1 62.0 82.9

2001 56.9 57.0 No 68.2 69.0 No 85.0 89.0 No

2002 58.7 56.0 Yes 74.5 73.0 Yes 87.4 90.0 No

2003 61.8 56.0 Yes 76.7 73.0 Yes 87.9 86.0 Yes

2004 54.1 56.0 No 70.2 70.0 Yes 86.9 85.0 Yes

2005 51.8 53.0 No 63.2 69.0 No 84.8 85.0 No

Attainment Attainment Attainment

Actual Goal of Goal of Goal

Initial Enlistments Midcareer Personnel Careerists

Actual Goal Goal of Goal Actual

8. To match DoD’s reporting, any counts of the Navy’s accessions 

that CBO reports do not include individuals recruited for fulltime Active Guard or Reserve, or full-time support, positions. 

According to DoD’s Defense Manpower Data Center, such accessions totaled an additional 1,230 individuals in 2005. For all four 

scenarios, CBO assumed that the Navy Reserve would recruit that 

same number of personnel in Active Guard or Reserve positions 

each year in the future. 
62 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

nario would also extend the lowest rate that the component has experienced this decade.

B Scenario 2: accessions of 9,788 (the same level as the 

Navy Reserve attained in 2005); continuation rates at 

the 2005 levels. The Navy Reserve missed its accession 

goal in 2005 by 15 percent, and the number of 

recruits was the lowest of the decade. This case is more 

pessimistic than the base case and assumes that either 

the recruiting environment deteriorates or that the 

added bonuses are not sufficient.

B Scenario 3: accessions totaling 11,180 each year; continuation rates for all experience groups falling 1 percentage point from the 2005 levels, to an overall rate 

of 77.3 percent. For the 12 months that ended in February 2006, the overall rate had deteriorated to 77.5 

percent, close to the assumed level.

B Scenario 4: accessions of 8,750 for 2006, rising to 

13,000 by 2010; continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

The average length of service in the Navy Reserve in 

2005 was 11.1 years. Under the scenarios that assume an 

extension of the 2005 continuation rates, the average 

length of service would decline to 9.1 years in a steady 

state (see Figure 3-4 on page 65). In Scenario 3, which 

models a decline in continuation rates, the force would 

continue to lose experience, and the average experience 

level of the force would decline further. 

Table 3-9.

The Navy Reserve’s Attrition Rates

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 

Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

Figure 3-1.

The Navy’s Annual Continuation Rates

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 

Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Data on the Navy Reserve’s continuation rates before 2000 

are not available.

In the base case, the Reserve would exceed its planned 

end strength in 2006 but fall below the planned level in 

2007. By 2010, enlisted end strength would fall by 8,800 

personnel (or 14.8 percent), to 50,700; total end strength 

would fall by 10,500 (or 13.8 percent), to 65,900 (see 

Figure 3-5 on page 66). That level of total end strength 

would be 2,100 (or 3.1 percent) lower than the planned 

level.

As shown by the second scenario, every drop in accessions 

of 1,000 would accumulate to a decrease in enlisted end 

strength of 2,600 by 2010. If the Navy Reserve signed up 

as many recruits as it did in 2005, enlisted end strength 

would drop from the 2005 levels by 12,500 sailors, to 

47,000, and total end strength by 14,200, to 62,300 

reservists. That level would represent a force more than 

3,600 sailors smaller than that of the base case. In 2010, 

the Navy Reserve’s end strength would be 5,800, or 8.5 

percent, below the planned level. 

Under the third scenario—which examines the effect of a 

1 percentage-point drop in continuation rates—enlisted 

Fiscal Year

2000 27.1 75.3

2001 27.7 76.9

2002 26.5 73.6

2003 26.5 73.7

2004 28.3 78.5

2005 31.2 86.8

Memorandum:

Attrition Ceiling 36.0 n.a. 18.0

Percentage Relative

Percentage to Ceiling

Actual

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

0

75

80

85

90

95

100

Active Navy

Navy Reserve
CHAPTER THREE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE NAVY 63

end strength would drop 1,700 more than it would in the 

base case. The size of the force would be 3,800 personnel 

(or 5.6 percent) less than the planned end strength.9

Under the final scenario—which illustrates the accession 

levels necessary to achieve the Navy’s planned end 

strength, holding continuation rates constant at the 2005 

levels—only 8,750 accessions would be required in 2006 

to maintain a force of 71,200 (the target stated in the 

FYDP). Accession levels in future years, however, would 

have to rise to achieve the desired end strength. By CBO’s 

calculations, for the Navy Reserve to achieve an end 

strength of 68,100 personnel for 2010 and beyond, the 

number of accessions would have to climb to 11,250 in 

2007, 12,100 in 2008, and 12,500 in 2009 and then 

stabilize at just over 13,000 by 2010. If the Reserve’s 

NCS program succeeds in tapping a new segment of the 

recruiting market and if enhanced enlistment bonuses are 

effective, the Navy Reserve may be able to achieve those 

accession and end-strength targets.

Figure 3-2.

Annual Accessions and Length of 

Service in the Active Navy Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (37,500 

recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels 

(86.2 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Varying accession levels (36,500 recruits in 

2006 and, thereafter, the numbers necessary to decrease the 

Navy's end strength to targeted levels) and continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions of 36,500 each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and 

continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 

levels.

9. Alternatively, if the higher reenlistment bonuses are effective, continuation rates may improve. A 1 percentage-point increase in 

continuation rates for all experience levels from the 2005 levels 

would, by 2010, increase end strength by about 1,700 personnel 

above the number in the base case. End strength would be just 

400 under the planned level.

1234

33,000

33,500

34,000

34,500

35,000

35,500

36,000

36,500

37,000

37,500

38,000

6.2

6.3

6.4

6.5

6.6

6.7

6.8

6.9

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a

Steady State (Right scale)

Scenarios
64 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 3-3.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active Navy’s

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (37,500 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (86.2 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Varying accession levels (36,500 recruits in 2006 and, thereafter, the numbers necessary to decrease the Navy's end 

strength to targeted levels) and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions of 36,500 each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

300,000

320,000

340,000

360,000

380,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4
CHAPTER THREE RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE NAVY 65

Figure 3-4.

Annual Accessions and Length of 

Service in the Navy Reserve Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (11,180 

recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels 

(78.3 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2005 level (9,788 recruits) 

each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and 

continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 

levels.

Scenario 4 = Varying accession levels (8,750 recruits in 

2006, rising to 13,000 recruits by 2009) and continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels.

1234

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

8.8

8.9

9.0

9.1

9.2

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a

Steady State (Right scale)

Scenarios
66 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 3-5.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Navy Reserve’s

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (11,180 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (78.3 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2005 level (9,788 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal each year and continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Varying accession levels (8,750 recruits in 2006, rising to 13,000 recruits by 2009) and continuation rates at the 2005 

levels.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

60,000

65,000

70,000

75,000

80,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4
CHAPTER

4

Recruiting, Retention, and

End Strength in the Air Force

B etween 2000 and 2005, the active Air Force’s 

authorized end strength was relatively flat, declining from 

360,900 personnel to 359, 700. Actual end strength, 

however, varied, increasing from 355,700 personnel in 

2000 to 368,200 in 2002 and peaking at 376,600 in 

2004. At that point, actual end strength was almost 

5 percent over the authorized level. In 2005, the Air 

Force had 353,700 personnel—which was about 23,000, 

or 6 percent, fewer than the level of the previous year (see 

Table 4-1). 

Like the Navy, the Air Force is implementing planned 

reductions in its end strength. The Future Years Defense 

Program outlines a force size of 351,800 personnel for 

2006 and of 334,200 for 2007, reflecting planned reductions of about 1,900 and 17,600 personnel, respectively 

(see Table 4-2 on page 70). For 2011, the planned end 

strength is 316,500 service members. According to the 

Air Force, a reorganization of the force, including phased 

retirements of some older aircraft systems, is among the 

reasons for the reductions.1

Fluctuating within 1 percent to 2 percent from year to 

year, the authorized end-strength levels for the Air 

National Guard and the Air Force Reserve were relatively 

stable between 2000 and 2005 (see Table 4-1). Over that 

period, the Air National Guard’s authorized level averaged about 107,000 personnel; and the Air Force 

Reserve’s, about 75,000. Their actual end strength averaged about 108,000 and 75,000, respectively. In both 

instances, the components exceeded their authorized end 

strength during the early part of the war on terrorism 

(2001 to 2003 for the Guard and 2001 and 2002 for the 

Reserve) but by less than 3 percent.2

The Future Years Defense Program outlines plans for the 

Air National Guard to have a force of 92,400 personnel 

by 2011 (a cut of 14,000, or 13.2 percent, from the 2005 

level) and Air Force Reserve, of 67,800 by then (a cut of 

8,000, or 10.6 percent, from the 2005 level) (see Table 4-

3 on page 71 and Table 4-4 on page 72). The reductions 

for the reserve components begin in 2008. 

The Quadrennial Defense Review calls for “reducing Air 

Force end strength by approximately 40,000 full-time 

equivalent personnel with balanced cuts across the total 

force.”3

 The total drop among the three Air Force components between 2007 and 2011, as programmed in the 

2007 FYDP, matches that objective.

Recruiting Trends

Undergoing reductions, the active and reserve components of the Air Force usually met their recruiting goals 

from 2000 to 2005: the active Air Force did so every 

year; the Reserve, every year but 2000; and the Guard, 

three of the years—falling short in 2001, 2004, and 

2005. Through August 2006, those trends were continuing. Also, the active Air Force has had the highest-quality 

recruits among the active services, and the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve have generally exceeded the 

Department of Defense’s benchmarks.

1. See Frank Faykes, Director, Air Force Budget, “FY2007 Air Force 

Budget” (briefing prepared for Congressional staff, February 

2006).

2. Stop-loss orders probably contributed to that situation.

3. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

February 6, 2006, p. 417.
68 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 4-1.

The Air Force’s End Strength

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Air Force, the National Defense Authorization Act (various years) and Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Statistical Information Analysis Division, “Military Personnel 

Statistics,” available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm; and, for the reserve components, the 

National Defense Authorization Act (various years) and Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and 

Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics (various years).

Note: n.a. = not available.

a. The active Air Force’s total end strength each year includes about 4,000 cadets not otherwise classified.

Quantity of Recruits

The active Air Force met its recruiting goal each year 

between 2000 and 2005 and is adjusting its recruiting 

mission in line with the planned reductions in end 

strength. The number of accessions in 2005 reflected a 

sharp downsizing: the 19,000 that year represents almost 

a halving of the amount in 2004 (see Table 4-5 on 

page 73). Year-end levels in the service’s Delayed Entry 

Program, expressed as a percentage of the coming year’s 

goal, have increased to 43 percent or higher in recent 

years, as compared with levels closer to one-third in the 

late 1990s and early in the decade. Although the accession goal for 2006 increased to 30,750, that level represented about 5,250 fewer recruits than the average number that the Air Force had annually from 2000 through 

2004. For 2006, as of August, the Air Force had recruited 

about 28,256 personnel—100 percent of its cumulative 

year-to-date goal and 92 percent of the total year’s goal.

For the Air National Guard, accession goals fluctuated 

between 2000 and 2005, with a low of 5,700 in 2003 and 

a high of 11,800 in 2001 (see Table 4-5 on page 73). 

Actual accessions varied less—totaling 10,000 to 11,000 

annually between 2000 and 2002 and decreasing to 

between 8,000 and 9,000 annually between 2003 and 

2005. While the Air National Guard exceeded its lowest 

accession goal of the decade in 2003 (by 48 percent), it 

did not meet its goals in 2001, 2004, or 2005, falling 

short by 13 percent, 6 percent, and 14 percent, respectively. Because the next planned cuts in force size take 

effect in 2008, the goal of 9,380 recruits for 2006 is 

higher than the number attained in the past three years. 

As of August 2006, the Air National Guard was again 

falling short of its goal; it had recruited 8,207 personnel 

of the year-to-date goal of 8,518 (or 96 percent).

Recruiting an average of 8,300 personnel between 2000 

and 2005, the Air Force Reserve met its recruiting goals, 

except in 2000, when it fell short by 20 percent (see Table 

4-5 on page 73). As of August 2006, it had recruited 

about 6,803 personnel, compared with its cumulative 

year-to-date accession goal of about 6,606 (or 103 percent of its goal). 

The drawdown in the active Air Force should provide a 

recruiting opportunity for the Air National Guard and 

the Air Force Reserve because of the greater availability of 

personnel with prior service that it provides. The extent 

to which the skills of those personnel match the reserve

Fiscal

Year

2000 360,877 282,356 69,023 355,654 106,678 93,019 13,346 106,365

2001 357,000 280,410 68,862 353,571 108,022 95,060 13,425 108,485

2002 358,800 292,061 72,032 368,251 108,400 98,141 13,930 112,071

2003 359,000 297,219 73,758 375,062 106,600 94,435 13,702 108,137

2004 359,300 298,314 74,109 376,616 107,030 93,188 13,634 106,822

2005 359,700 276,117 73,252 353,696 106,800 92,758 13,672 106,430

2006 357,400 n.a. n.a. n.a. 106,800 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Officers Total

Air National Guard

Enlisted

Active Air Force

Actual

Authorized

Enlisted

Actual

Personnel Officers Totala Authorized Personnel
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 69

components’ needs is, of course, a factor that will help 

define the opportunity. 

Quality of Recruits

Among the active services, the Air Force had the highestquality recruits from 2000 to 2005. In each of those 

years, 99 percent of Air Force recruits were high school 

graduates, which was well above the Department of 

Defense’s benchmark of 90 percent (see Table 4-6 on 

page 74). Between 73 percent and 82 percent of the 

recruits scored at or above the median for the Armed 

Forces Qualification Test (or in categories I to IIIA). Similarly, in 2006, through August, 99 percent of the recruits 

held high school diplomas, and 78 percent were in AFQT 

categories I-IIIA.

For the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, 

the quality of recruits is generally within DoD’s acceptable levels, although it has fallen below DoD’s benchmarks in some years: the proportion of Air National 

Guard recruits with high school degrees fell from 96 percent in 2000 to 85 percent in 2003 and then increased to 

91 percent in 2005; the proportion of Air Force Reserve 

recruits with high school degrees dropped from 93 percent in 2000 to 87 percent in 2005 (see Table 4-6 on 

page 74). Also, for both components, recruits’ scores on 

the AFQT have generally declined since the beginning of 

the decade. 

Lower accession goals in 2006 and future years may allow 

the components to recruit higher-quality individuals. 

Indeed, data through August 2006 show improvements 

in all categories (compared with annual data from 2005). 

As of August 2006, 95 percent of the Air National 

Guard’s accessions were high school graduates, and 96 

percent of the Air Force Reserve’s were. Similarly, 77 percent of the Guard’s accessions scored at or above the 50th 

percentile on the AFQT, and 78 percent of the Reserve’s 

did so (compared with 72 percent and 69 percent for the 

components in 2005, respectively).

Recruiting Resources

The Air Force’s expenditures on enlistment bonuses 

declined from a peak of $124 million in 2001 to roughly 

one-half as much in 2004 (see Table 4-7 on page 75). A 

steeper drop occurred in 2005, when the expenditures 

were only $21 million, reflecting the plunge in the 

accession goal associated with the planned reduction in 

end strength.4 For 2006, the Air Force’s budget devoted 

$8 million to enlistment bonuses; and for 2007, it 

devotes $17 million.

The number of recruiters in the active Air Force increased 

from about 1,200 in 2000 to peak at about 1,600 in 

2002 and then decreased to roughly 1,450 in 2005 (see 

Table 4-8 on page 76). The active Air Force’s advertising 

expenditures exhibited the same pattern: they increased 

from $49 million in 2000, peaked at $72 million in 

2002, and decreased to $43 million in 2005. Expenditures on recruiter support averaged about $37 million 

during the period. Presumably, the Air Force decreased 

the number of recruiters and advertising expenditures to 

meet its end-strength targets, particularly in 2005. 

Like the other reserve components, the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve offer enlistment bonuses to 

their prior-service and non-prior-service recruits (and 

affiliation bonuses to the former). Although expenditures 

on those incentives have been increasing since 2000, 

there was a sharp increase (of over 50 percent) in 2005 for 

the Guard, presumably reflecting its difficulties recruiting 

73,708 55,676 16,664 72,340

74,358 57,660 17,209 74,869

74,700 59,330 17,302 76,632

75,600 57,949 16,805 74,754

75,800 58,598 16,724 75,322

76,100 59,126 16,676 75,802

74,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Authorized Personnel Officers

Air Force Reserve

Actual

Enlisted

Total

4. Accessions in the Air Force dropped from about 34,000 activeduty personnel in 2004 to about 19,000 in 2005.
70 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 4-2.

Plans for the Active Air Force’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense’s Future Years Defense Program, and Department of 

Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Statistical Information Analysis Division, “Military Personnel Statistics,” available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm.

(see Table 4-7 on page 75). Expenditures for enlistment 

bonuses for recruits with prior service almost tripled, to 

$1.7 million; expenditures for affiliation bonuses almost 

doubled, to $135,000; and those for enlistment bonuses 

for recruits without prior service increased by 44 percent, 

to $12.6 million. The Air Force Reserve also increased its 

expenditures on those incentives in 2005 but by more 

modest amounts (19 percent overall). Instead, the Air 

Force Reserve increased expenditures on those incentives 

more substantially, by almost 75 percent, to $8 million, 

in 2004.

The number of full-time Selected Reserve recruiters (or 

personnel supporting recruiting) for the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve has not fluctuated widely 

this decade—averaging 547 and 385, respectively (see 

Table 4-8 on page 76). After a high of more than $23 

million spent on advertising and recruiting support in 

2003, the Guard has spent progressively less on those 

resources over the decade. By 2005, its second consecutive year of recruiting shortfalls, it spent about $19 million for that purpose. It also changed the mix of expenditures in recent years, boosting its expenditures supporting 

recruiters while reducing advertising spending. The Air 

Force Reserve spent about $12 million on advertising in 

2005, reflecting a stable pattern of spending on advertising (except in 2003, when the amount climbed to $21 

million). The component increased spending on recruiter 

support from $5.9 million in 2000 to $9.1 million in 

2005. 

Retention Trends

The Air Force also states its retention goals in terms of 

the percentage of personnel in certain experience categories who choose to reenlist. The component appears to 

face the greatest challenge in meeting its retention goal 

for midcareer active-duty personnel: between 2000 and 

2005, it met its goals for such personnel only once, in 

2002 (see Table 4-9 on page 77). In the same time 

period, it met its retention goals for first-term personnel 

most of the time and for career personnel, half of the 

time. In 2005, in particular, the Air Force did not meet 

its retention goals for first-term or midcareer personnel, 

but it did meet the retention goal for career personnel. 

Because many of its personnel are trained in aircraft and 

aviation skills that are directly transferable, the Air Force 

probably faces greater competition from the private sector 

for larger segments of its personnel than do some of the 

other services. Retention incentives such as Selective 

Reenlistment Bonuses, Aviator Continuation Pay, and 

other pay for special occupations are among the retention 

tools available to the component. Like the Navy, the Air 

Force may still use retention incentives during endstrength reductions as a means of retaining personnel 

with special skills in high demand even while it releases 

other personnel. Between 2000 and 2005, the Air Force’s 

SRB budget was at its highest levels in 2002 ($232 million), 2003 ($247 million), and 2004 ($263 million) (see 

Table 4-7 on page 75); in those years, it met its retention 

goals in more of the experience categories than during the 

other years of the period. The decrease in SRB expenditures to $238 million in 2005 coincided with the Air 

Force’s not meeting its retention goals in two of the three 

Enlisted Personnel 276,117 277,222 264,424 261,557 257,279 254,162 251,154

Officers 73,252 70,578 65,776 64,643 62,821 62,038 61,346

Cadets 4,327 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

Total 353,696 351,800 334,200 330,200 324,100 320,200 316,500

2005 2009 2011

Actual

2006 2007 2008 2010
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 71

Table 4-3.

Plans for the Air National Guard’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense’s Future Years Defense Program, and Department of 

Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics: Fiscal Year 2005 Summary.

experience categories. For 2006 and 2007, the Air Force 

budgeted lower amounts—about $214 million and $195 

million, respectively—presumably because of its planned 

reductions. 

Overall year-to-year continuation rates of enlisted Air 

Force personnel have followed a general upward trend 

since the 1990s (see Figure 4-1 on page 79), similar to 

that for enlisted personnel in the Navy. The more pronounced increase in recent years (from 2000 through 

2004) roughly coincided with the boost in SRB expenditures. However, the continuation rates dropped substantially, from an overall rate of 89.7 percent in 2004 to 

about 86.4 percent in 2005, coinciding with the decrease 

in SRB expenditures. As of February 2006, the overall 

continuation rate for the preceding 12 months was 

87.5 percent.

Unlike the active Air Force, the reserve components focus 

on attrition (calculated, within a period, as the number of 

losses—regardless of service members’ contractual end of 

obligation—divided by end strength) as a primary tool 

for managing the size and composition of the force. Attrition in the Air National Guard has remained below its 

12 percent ceiling, except in 2003, when the rate reached 

12.7 percent (see Table 4-10 on page 78). Attrition in the 

Air Force Reserve averaged less than 14 percent in the 

2000-2005 period, below the 18 percent ceiling. 

Continuation rates, as discussed previously, better facilitate year-to-year comparisons than do the retention and 

attrition numbers (see Figure 4-1 on page 79). For both 

the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, since 

2000 continuation rates peaked in 2002 and hit their 

lowest point in 2003—when most of the other service 

components were experiencing their highest rates. In the 

Guard, the overall rate went from 93 percent in 2002 to 

88 percent in 2003; in the Reserve, it went from 92 percent to 85 percent. The Air Force’s stop-loss policy, which 

went into effect shortly after September 11, 2001, was 

partly responsible for the pattern. By late in 2002, the Air 

Force required service members who were mobilized or 

deployed to remain in the service regardless of the original date marking the end of their obligation. The policy 

was expanded in the spring of 2003 and then rescinded in 

late 2003.5 Continuation rates for both reserve components have since rebounded and are similar to those 

experienced in 2000 and 2001. In 2005, the overall rate 

for the Guard was 90 percent, and the 12-month rate 

through February 2006 remained about the same. The 

corresponding rates for the Reserve were both 87 percent. 

The reserve components offer reenlistment bonuses to 

incumbent personnel. Expenditures for those incentives 

have been going up since 2000; for the Air National 

Guard, they tripled in 2005, to $13 million. 

Implications of Recruiting and 

Retention Trends for End Strength

To examine how the Air Force could meet its planned 

end strength, the Congressional Budget Office modeled 

several scenarios for the active Air Force, the Air National 

Guard, and the Air Force Reserve, taking September 30, 

2005, as the starting point and projecting end strength 

forward from 2006 through 2010. 

Enlisted Personnel 92,758 92,500 92,669 84,825 83,262 81,599 80,035

Officers 13,672 14,297 14,331 13,075 12,838 12,601 12,365 ________ ________ ________ _______ _______ _______ _______

Total 106,430 106,797 107,000 97,900 96,100 94,200 92,400

2005 2009 2011

Actual

2006 2007 2008 2010

5. A small number of individuals no longer subject to the policy, 

however, may still have been processed out of the service through 

December 2003.
72 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 4-4.

Plans for the Air Force Reserve’s End Strength, as Specified in the Future Years 

Defense Program

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense’s Future Years Defense Program, and Department of 

Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics: Fiscal Year 2005 Summary.

Active Air Force

If the Air Force maintained accessions and continuation 

rates at historically low levels over the next several years 

(the 2006 accession goal and the 2005 continuation 

rates), the size of the force would fall 11,300 below the 

level outlined in the FYDP by 2010, to 308,900 personnel, CBO estimates. The Air Force plans to reduce the 

number of officers (including cadets) from 77,600 in 

2005 to 66,000 in 2010, or by 15 percent, and the number of enlisted personnel from 276,100 to 254,200, or by 

8 percent. One way for the Air Force to attain its planned 

end strength by 2010 would be to recruit up to 32,500 

personnel annually combined with substantially higher 

continuation rates for 2006 (similar to those in 2004) 

and, for 2007 and beyond, rates 1 percentage point 

higher than that (similar to those before September 11, 

2001).

Again, in the four scenarios modeled for the active Air 

Force, CBO focused on enlisted end strength and 

assumed the same reduction in the number of officers as 

presented in the FYDP. The accession levels and continuation rates associated with the scenarios are as follows:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions totaling 

30,750 each year, the recruiting goal for 2006; continuation rates for airmen in all experience categories at 

the 2005 levels (the overall rate was 86.4 percent). 

Except in 2005—when the Air Force exceeded its goal 

and recruited 19,200 airmen—the recruiting goal for 

2006 represented the lowest level of accessions in 

recent history and a decline of about 5,000 since the 

beginning of the decade. Continuation rates in 2005 

were the lowest since the mid-1990s, when the service 

was reducing its force size significantly. Those low levels may have derived, in part, from the Air Force’s 

lower spending on enlistment and reenlistment 

bonuses to downsize the force.

B Scenario 2: accession levels at 29,750 annually; continuation rates at the 2005 levels. This case illustrates 

the cumulative effect that every cut of 1,000 accessions annually would have on end strength. A further 

decline in accessions could happen if the Air Force 

decided to cut end strength more quickly than outlined in the FYDP, if the Air Force offset higher 

retention (should retention improve) or if recruiting 

difficulties developed.

B Scenario 3: accessions of 30,750 (as in the base case); 

continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 

2005 levels. This case shows the effect that an acrossthe-board decrease in continuation could have on end 

strength, with no offsetting increase in accessions. 

Because of its plans to draw down its force, the Air 

Force has adopted some policies (such as cutting 

reenlistment bonuses) to achieve lower continuation 

rates. 

B Scenario 4: varying accessions of up to 32,500 annually; continuation rates up to 3.3 percentage points 

above the 2005 levels. In this scenario, CBO assumes 

32,000 accessions for 2006 (which is higher than the 

2006 goal), dropping to 25,000 in 2007 (the year that 

the Air Force plans its largest decrease in the size of the 

force), and then rising to 32,500 in 2008. Accessions 

Enlisted Personnel 59,126 57,061 57,662 53,790 53,117 52,912 52,245

Officers 16,676 17,017 17,238 16,110 15,883 15,788 15,555 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______

Total 75,802 74,078 74,900 69,900 69,000 68,700 67,800

2005 2009 2011

Actual

2006 2007 2008 2010
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 73

Table 4-5.

The Air Force’s Total Accessions of Enlisted Personnel

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Air Force, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession 

Policy; and, for the reserve components, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs.

Note: n.a. = not available or not applicable.

stabilize thereafter at 30,000. CBO also assumes that 

continuation rates for 2006 improve above 2005 levels by 

3.3 percentage points (similar to those experienced in 

2004) and thereafter are 1 percentage point higher than 

2005 (similar to 2001 overall rates). This case illustrates 

the number of recruits necessary to decrease the size of 

the Air Force to its annual end-strength targets. 

The Air Force has the most senior force among the active 

components, with the average length of service in 2005 at 

8.61 years. Under the base case, the figure would fall to 

7.30 years in a steady state (see Figure 4-2 on page 79). 

Should continuation rates fall a further 1 percentage 

point, the average length of service in a steady state would 

decline to 6.83 years. Should the Air Force attain its endstrength targets by recruiting fewer personnel than it had 

early in the decade and by returning to 2001 continuation rates, the average experience level would increase to 

7.78 years.

Under the base-case scenario—with accessions and continuation rates at relatively low levels—end strength 

would drop steadily (see Figure 4-3 on page 80). By contrast, the FYDP shows the largest drops in planned end 

strength occurring in 2006 and 2007. According to 

CBO’s modeling for this scenario, end strength would fall 

to 326,900 personnel for 2007, below the planned end 

strength of 334,200 for that year, and end strength would 

remain below FYDP levels thereafter. By 2010, enlisted 

end strength in CBO’s model would drop by 33,200, to 

242,900, or by 12 percent. Total end strength would 

equal 308,900 personnel, a decline of 12.7 percent, 

and 11,300 personnel below its planned level. 

The second scenario shows that each 1,000 decrease in 

annual accessions would result in an end-strength reduction of about 3,500 by 2010 from what it would have 

been otherwise. Under this scenario, the Air Force would 

be 14,800 personnel under planned end strength by 

2010.

Under the third scenario, if continuation rates fell 1 percentage point from the 2005 levels, the size of the enlisted 

force would decrease to 232,200 by 2010, a decline of 

15.9 percent from 2005; total end strength would be 

298,200, or about 22,000 under planned end strength.

Recent data from DoD indicate that continuation rates 

(based on the enlisted personnel who were in the Air 

Force as of February 2005 and who remained in the service 12 months later) may have increased 1 percentage 

point above the 2005 level. Such an increase would accumulate to boost enlisted end strength by more than 

11,000 personnel above the base case by 2010, CBO

Fiscal Percentage

Year Accessions

2000 34,600 34,600 35,217 102 10,080 10,730 106 9,624 7,740 80

2001 34,600 34,600 35,381 102 11,808 10,258 87 8,051 8,826 110

2002 36,000 37,283 37,967 102 9,570 10,122 106 6,080 6,926 114

2003 32,078 37,000 37,141 100 5,712 8,471 148 7,512 7,557 101

2004 34,080 34,361 34,362 100 8,842 8,276 94 7,997 8,904 111

2005 24,465 18,900 19,222 100 10,272 8,859 86 8,801 9,942 113

2006 30,750 n.a. n.a. n.a. 9,380 n.a. n.a. 6,780 n.a. n.a.

Average,

2000–

2004 34,272 35,569 36,014 n.a. 9,202 9,571 n.a. 7,853 7,991 n.a.

Initial

Objective

Initial

Accessions Objective

Initial

Accessions of Objective

Percentage

Active Air Force Air National Guard Air Force Reserve

Actual Actual Actual

Objective Objective of Objective

Final

of Objective

Percentage
74 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 4-6.

The Quality of the Air Force’s Recruits Without Prior Service

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Air Force, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession 

Policy (partly available at www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/recqual04.pdf); and, for the reserve components, data from the Department 

of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs.

Notes: AFQT = Armed Forces Qualification Test; n.a. = not available.

The Department of Defense divides the scores on the AFQT into five ranges, or categories. Scores at or above the 50th percentile fall 

into AFQT categories I through IIIA.

estimates, resulting in enlisted end strength of 254,100 

and total end strength of 320,100. The Air Force would 

just meet its planned end strength.

Under the final scenario—which increases both accessions and continuation rates above the 2005 levels—the 

Air Force would reach yearly planned end-strength targets. In this scenario, the Air Force’s end strength would 

drop by less than 2,000 personnel from 2005 to 2006, 

with the largest reduction (17,600) occurring in 2007. 

By 2010, the size of the force would be just 320,150. 

Air National Guard

If the Air National Guard attained its 2006 accession goal 

and adopted policies that kept continuation rates constant at the 2005 level for the next several years, the size 

of the force would drop from 106,400 personnel in 2005 

to 103,000 in 2010, CBO estimates. That number would 

be significantly higher than the end-strength level of 

94,200 planned for in the FYDP. Furthermore, if the Air 

National Guard maintained the number of accessions at 

the 2004 level (the lowest level in recent history), the size 

of the force would drop to 98,700 personnel in 2010—

still exceeding the planned level by 4,500 personnel, or 

4.7 percent. 

In the three scenarios modeled, CBO assumes that officer 

end strength declines as presented in the FYDP, from 

13,700 in 2005 to 12,600 in 2010. As of September 30, 

2005, the beginning point for the scenarios, actual end 

strength was 106,400 personnel. The continuation rates 

and accession levels associated with the scenarios are as 

follows:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accessions of 9,380 (the 

2006 goal) for each year through 2010; continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels, 90.4 percent overall. That 

level of accessions is just higher than the average of 

9,200 from 1998 to 2005. Those continuation rates 

are similar to those experienced in 2001 but are a 

percentage point higher than those in 2000.

B Scenario 2: accessions of 8,276 (the number of 

recruits attained in 2004) for each year through 2010; 

continuation rates at the 2005 levels. This case illustrates what would happen to end strength if the Guard 

experienced recruiting difficulties similar to those in 

2004. Fiscal year 2004 marked the fewest recruits the 

Air National Guard had signed up since at least 1998. 

(The following year, the Guard obtained almost 600 

more recruits, although it still did not meet its goal.)

B Scenario 3: accessions at the same level as in the base 

case; continuation rates for all experience levels 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

Fiscal

Year

2000 99 73 96 78 93 73

2001 99 75 98 79 93 73

2002 99 76 n.a. 85 92 73

2003 99 81 85 70 93 73

2004 99 82 n.a. n.a. 91 73

2005 99 80 91 72 87 69

Active Air Force Air Force Reserve Air National Guard

AFQT AFQT High School AFQT High School

Graduate Categories I-IIIA

High School

Categories I-IIIA Graduate Graduate Categories I-IIIA
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 75

Table 4-7.

The Air Force’s Spending on Reenlistment and Enlistment Bonuses

(Millions of current dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Air Force, data from the Department f Defense, Directorate for Accession 

Policy and Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management; and, for the reserve components, data from the Department

of Defense’s personnel budget books, available at www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/index.html.

Compared with that in most of the other components, 

the average length of service in the Air National Guard in 

2005 was relatively high, at 12.9 years. In the base case, 

the average length of service in a steady state would fall to 

12.2 years (see Figure 4-4 on page 81). Should continuation rates fall a further 1 percentage point, that figure 

would decline to 11.7 years.

In the base case—with accessions at the 2006 goal and 

continuation rates at the 2005 levels—enlisted end 

strength would fall by 2,300 personnel, or 2.5 percent, to 

90,400 in 2010; total end strength, by 3,400, or 3.2 percent, to 103,000 (see Figure 4-5 on page 82). That overall decline would be largely as planned through 2007 but 

slower than planned thereafter. By 2010, end strength 

would be 8,800, or 9.4 percent, more personnel than 

planned.

Under the second scenario—which continues the recruiting difficulties that the Air National Guard had in 2004 

and 2005—the overall size of the force would drop an 

additional 4,400 personnel below that of the base case, 

but it would still exceed the planned number by 4,500 

personnel, or 4.7 percent, in 2010.

The final scenario—which illustrates the effect if the Air 

Force chose policies to lower continuation rates to reduce 

its end strength—yields a decline of 5,900 enlisted airmen over five years. Enlisted and total end strength under 

this scenario would drop 3,600 further than the levels 

presented in the base case, but total end strength would 

still exceed the planned level by 5,200 personnel, or 5.6 

percent, in 2010. Continuation rates spanning the 12 

months that ended in February 2006 dropped slightly (by 

0.2 percentage points), to 90.2 percent overall.

Air Force Reserve

If the Air Force Reserve maintained accessions at the 

2006 goal (the lowest this decade) and continuation rates 

at the 2005 levels, the size of the force would drop from 

75,800 personnel in 2005 to about 68,800 in 2010, 

essentially the level outlined in the FYDP. The Air Force 

plans a reduction in the number of officers of 5.3 percent, 

from 16,700 in 2005 to 15,800 in 2010, and a reduction 

in the number of enlisted personnel of 10.5 percent, from 

59,100 to 52,900. 

For its three scenarios, CBO assumed the same decline in 

officer end strength as presented in the FYDP. The continuation rates and accession levels associated with the 

scenarios are as follows:

B Scenario 1, CBO’s base case: accession levels at 6,800 

each year (the 2006 goal) through 2010; continuation 

rates at the 2005 levels (overall, at 87.3 percent). That 

level of accessions would represent the lowest in at 

least the past eight years (average accessions between 

1998 and 2005 were 8,300). Continuation rates in 

2005 were similar to those experienced in 2000 but 

almost a percentage point lower than those in 2001. 

Fiscal

Year

2000 125.7 83.3 1.9 1.5 2.3 3.0

2001 168.7 123.8 3.1 2.9 4.1 3.5

2002 232.1 89.3 4.6 7.3 2.3 3.7

2003 246.7 95.5 5.7 10.7 2.5 4.7

2004 262.6 63.1 4.0 9.4 3.5 8.0

2005 237.9 21.0 13.4 14.4 3.5 9.6

Selective

Bonuses Bonuses Bonuses Incentive Program Bonuses

Reenlistment

Active Air Force Air National Guard

Air Force Reserve

Enlistment Enlistment Enlistment Reenlistment

Reenlistment Bonuses

Selective 
76 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 4-8.

The Air Force’s Recruiting Resources

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on, for the active Air Force, data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Accession Policy; and, for the reserve components, data from the Department of Defense, Office of Reserve Affairs, and selected Department of 

Defense budget books and related justification materials.

Note: For the active Air Force, statistics reflect the average number of recruiters for the year. For the reserve components, they reflect the 

number of full-time reservists filling positions as recruiters or recruiter support personnel as of the end of the year.

a. Expenditures for advertising and recruiter support were consolidated from 2000 to 2002.

B Scenario 2: accession levels of 6,300 (a reduction of 

500 from the 2006 goal); continuation rates at the 

2005 levels.

B Scenario 3: accessions similar to those in the base case; 

continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 

2005 levels.

Because the Air Force Reserve draws heavily on experienced individuals from the active Air Force, the average 

length of service in 2005 was relatively high, at 13.7 

years. Under the base case, in a steady state, that level 

would fall to 12.3 years (see Figure 4-6 on page 83). 

Should continuation rates fall 1 percentage point further, 

the average experience level in a steady state would 

decline to 11.9 years.

In the base case—with accession levels at the 2006 goal 

and continuation rates at the 2005 levels—enlisted end 

strength in the Air Force Reserve would, except in 2007, 

be somewhat higher than the planned level through 

2010. It would fall by 6,100 personnel, to 53,000 by 

2010; total end strength, by 7,000 personnel, to 68,800 

(see Figure 4-7 on page 84). End strength would be just 

100 personnel higher than the level planned for by 2010.

CBO’s second scenario shows that a decrease of 500 

recruits would translate into a drop of about 1,800 

enlisted airmen by 2010. At 67,000 personnel, total end 

strength would be 1,700, or 2.4 percent, below the 

planned level. 

Under the final scenario, with a 1 percentage-point drop 

in continuation rates (either because the Reserve adopted 

additional policies to reduce personnel or because the 

retention environment deteriorated)—enlisted end 

strength would drop by 2,100 more personnel than it 

would in the base case. Continuation rates spanning the 

12 months that ended in February 2006 dropped slightly 

(0.2 percentage points), to 87.1 percent overall.

Fiscal

Year

2000 1,215 31.1 49.0 506 a 12.3 355 5.9 12.2

2001 1,325 35.5 58.7 556 a 19.5 372 6.1 9.5

2002 1,574 39.8 72.0 536 a 15.5 394 6.5 12.0

2003 1,494 36.2 57.3 556 4.5 18.8 398 7.3 21.0

2004 1,460 36.2 54.7 573 4.1 16.2 394 7.3 12.5

2005 1,453 41.3 42.8 552 6.3 12.8 398 9.1 12.1

Recruiters

Advertising

(Millions

Recruiters of dollars) of dollars) of dollars)

(Millions

Support

Active Air Force Air National Guard Air Force Reserve

Recruiter Recruiter Recruiter

(Millions (Millions

of dollars) of dollars)

(Millions (Millions

of dollars) Recruiters

Support Advertising Support Advertising
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 77

Table 4-9.

The Active Air Force’s Retention of Enlisted Personnel

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Officer and Enlisted Personnel

Management.

Note: Initial enlistments (termed zone A) covers airmen with less than six years of service. Midcareer personnel (zone B) have at least six 

years of service but less than 10. Careerists (zone C) have 10 to 14 years of service.

a. The Air Force introduced a new metric—average career length—in July 2005, so rates for that year cannot be compared with earlier 

ones.

Fiscal

Year

2000 53.1 55.0 No 69.7 75.0 No 90.8 95.0 No

2001 56.1 55.0 Yes 68.9 75.0 No 90.2 95.0 No

2002 72.1 55.0 Yes 78.3 75.0 Yes 94.6 95.0 No

2003 60.5 55.0 Yes 72.9 79.0 No 95.2 95.0 Yes

2004 63.0 55.0 Yes 70.0 75.0 No 97.0 95.0 Yes

2005a 39.0 52.0 No 67.0 69.0 No 85.0 85.0 Yes

Attainment

of Goal Goal Goal

Attainment

of Goal

Initial Enlistments Midcareer Personnel Careerists

Actual Goal Actual of Goal Actual

Attainment
78 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table 4-10.

The Air National Guard’s and Air Force Reserve’s Attrition Rates

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

Fiscal Year

2000 11.0 91.7 13.9 77.3

2001 9.6 80.3 13.4 74.6

2002 7.3 60.4 8.7 48.3

2003 12.7 105.8 17.0 94.3

2004 11.5 96.0 13.6 75.7

2005 10.2 85.2 14.7 81.5

Memorandum:

Attrition Ceiling 12.0 n.a. 18.0 n.a. 12.0 18.0

to Ceiling to Ceiling

Actual

Percentage Percentage

Air National Guard

Percentage Relative

Air Force Reserve

Actual Percentage Relative
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 79

Figure 4-1.

The Air Force’s Annual 

Continuation Rates

(Percent)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 

Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center.

Note: Data on the Air National Guard’s and Air Force Reserve’s 

continuation rates before 2000 are not available.

Figure 4-2.

Annual Accessions and Length of 

Service in the Active Air Force Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (30,750 

recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 2 = Accessions of 29,750 recruits each year and 

continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal and continuation 

rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions of 32,000 in 2006 and varying 

thereafter and continuation rates up to 3.3 percentage 

points higher than the 2005 levels.

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

0

80

85

90

95

Active Air Force

Air

National

Guard

Air Force

Reserve

1234

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a

Steady State (Right scale)

Scenarios
80 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 4-3.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Active Air Force’s 

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (30,750 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 2 = Accessions of 29,750 recruits each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal and continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

Scenario 4 = Accessions of 32,000 in 2006 and varying thereafter and continuation rates up to 3.3 percentage points higher than the 

2005 levels.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

280,000

300,000

320,000

340,000

360,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 81

Figure 4-4.

Annual Accessions and Length of Service 

in the Air National Guard Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case)= 2006 accession goal (9,380 

recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels 

(90.4 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2004 level (8,276 recruits) 

each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal and continuation 

rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

123

7,600

7,800

8,000

8,200

8,400

8,600

8,800

9,000

9,200

9,400

9,600

9,800

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a

Steady State (Right scale)

Scenarios

11.5

11.6

11.7

11.8

11.9

12.0

12.1

12.2

12.3
82 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 4-5.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Air National Guard’s 

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case)= 2006 accession goal (9,380 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (90.4 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions at the 2004 level (8,276 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal and continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

95,000

100,000

105,000

110,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3
CHAPTER FOUR RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND END STRENGTH IN THE AIR FORCE 83

Figure 4-6.

Annual Accessions and Length of Service 

in the Air Force Reserve Under 

Recruiting and Retention Scenarios

(Accessions) (Years)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (6,800 

recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels 

(87.3 percent overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions of 6,300 recruits each year and 

continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal and continuation 

rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

123

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

Accessions

(Left scale)

Length of Service in a

Steady State (Right scale)

Scenarios

11.7

11.8

11.9

12.0

12.1

12.2

12.3

12.4
84 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Figure 4-7.

Effects of Recruiting and Retention Scenarios on the Air Force Reserve’s 

End Strength

(Number of personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Scenario 1 (Base case) = 2006 accession goal (6,800 recruits) each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels (87.3 percent 

overall).

Scenario 2 = Accessions of 6,300 recruits each year and continuation rates at the 2005 levels.

Scenario 3 = Accessions at the 2006 goal and continuation rates 1 percentage point lower than the 2005 levels.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

0

66,000

68,000

70,000

72,000

74,000

76,000

78,000

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3
APPENDIX

A

References on Enlistment and the 

Productivity of Recruiting Resources

Arkes, Jeremy, and Rebecca Kilburn, Modeling Reserve 

Recruiting, MG-202 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 

2005).

Berner, K., and T. Daula, “Recruiting Goal, Regime 

Shifts, and the Supply of Labor to the Army,” Defense 

Economics, vol. 4, no. 4 (1993), pp. 315-328.

Daula, T., and D. Smith, “Estimating Enlistment Supply 

Models for the U.S. Army,” in R. Ehrenberg, ed., 

Research in Labor Economics, vol. 7 (Greenwich, 

Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 261-309.

Goldberg, L., Recent Estimates of Enlistment Supply Models

(Reston, Va.: Economic Research Laboratory, 1991).

Hogan, Paul F., Timothy M. Dall, and Pat Mackie, An 

Econometric Analysis of Navy Television Advertising 

Effectiveness (draft, The Lewin Group and SAG 

Corporation, 1996).

Kearl, E., D. Horne, and C. Gilroy, “Army Recruiting in 

a Changing Environment,” Contemporary Policy 

Issues, vol. 8, no. 4 (1990), pp. 68-78.

Murray, Michael, and Laurie McDonald, Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications for Models of Enlistment Supply, MR-847-OSD/A (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 1999).

Polich, M., J. Dertouzos, and J. Press, The Enlistment 

Bonus Experiment, R-3353-FMP (Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND, 1986). 

Sackett, Paul R., and Anne S. Mavor, eds., Evaluating 

Military Advertising and Recruiting: Theory and Methodology, Committee on the Youth Population and 

Military Recruitment—Phase II, Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences, Division of 

Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, 

National Research Council of the National Academies (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 

2004).

Tan, Hong W., Non-Prior Service Reserve Enlistments,

R-3786-FMP/RA (Arlington, Va.: RAND, 1991). 

Warner, John T., and Beth J. Asch, “The Economics of 

Military Manpower,” in K. Heartley and T. Sandler, 

eds., Handbook of Defense Economics, vol. 1 (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science, 1995), 

pp. 347-401. 

Warner, John T., and Curtis J. Simon, “Estimates of 

Army Enlistment Supply, 1988-2005” (briefing 

slides, November 2005).

Warner, John T., and Curtis J. Simon, Updated Estimates 

of U.S. Military Enlistment Supply (prepared for 

Accession Policy Directorate, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

October 2004).

Warner, John T., Curtis J. Simon, and Deborah M. 

Payne, Enlistment Supply in the 1990s: A Study of the 

Navy College Fund and Other Enlistment Incentive 

Programs, Defense Manpower Data Center, Report 

No. 2000-015 (April 2001).

Warner, John T., Curtis J. Simon, and Deborah M. 

Payne, “The Military Recruiting Productivity Slowdown: The Roles of Resources, Opportunity Cost, 

and the Tastes of Youth,” Defense and Peace Economics, vol. 14, no. 5 (October 2003), pp. 329-342.

APPENDIX

B

Research Studies on the 

Effectiveness of Recruiting Resources 

I n order to better understand the effectiveness of 

recruiting resources, the Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO) reviewed the published research on enlistment. 

In general, the studies analyze the relationship between 

the number of high-quality recruits and the resources 

devoted to recruiting (such as recruiters, advertising, 

bonuses, and so forth). CBO’s summary of the studies (in 

Table B-1) focuses on the better-known studies and those 

that employ well-established analytical techniques.

The studies typically account for many of the factors that 

influence youths to join the military in addition to the 

recruiting resources and practices employed by the services. The factors controlled for include economic factors 

(for example, civilian pay, military pay, and civilian 

unemployment rates), demographic factors (the percentage of the population who are of military age, the percentage of youth attending college, the percentage of the 

local population who are veterans, and so on), recruiting 

resources (the number of recruiters, advertising, enlistment bonuses, and educational benefits), and the possible 

cross-effect of one service’s recruiting activities on the 

others’. Unlike the previous generation of enlistment 

analyses, these more recent studies also control for 

recruiters’ effort in addition to the number of recruiters 

themselves. The effort that recruiters devote to different 

categories of recruits (for example, high-quality versus 

low-quality recruits or ones for active components versus 

reserve components) can vary depending on the incentives they have.

The studies’ estimates of elasticities for recruiters, 

advertising, enlistment bonuses, and educational benefits 

are listed in Table B-1 and condensed in Table 1-8 on 

page 18. Appendix A contains the full citations for the 

studies as well as other related reports.
88 RECRUITING, RETENTION, AND FUTURE LEVELS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Table B-1.

Elasticities for the Active Army Reported in Research Studies That CBO Used to 

Compare the Effectiveness of Recruiting Resources

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on the research reports listed in Appendix A.

Notes: Elasticities reflect changes in the number of enlistments resulting from a 10 percent change in each recruiting resource.

n.a. = not applicable.

a. Advertising measured in dollar expenditures, unless otherwise noted.

b. Educational benefits measured as the discounted present value of benefits from the Army College Fund.

c. Enlistment bonuses measured as the discounted present value of bonus amounts.

d. Measured in terms of the number of times people are exposed to the advertisements, not expenditures.

Study

Warner and Simon (2005) 1988–2005 4.0–6.0 0.5–0.9 0.3 0.3

Warner and Simon (2004) 1989–2003 5.5–7.1 0.5–0.7 n.a. n.a.

Warner, Simon, and Payne (2001) 1990s 5.0 1.6 3.3 1.2

Murray and McDonald (1999) 1983–1987 5.1 n.a. 0.7 0.8

1990–1993 6.0 n.a. 0.1 0.03

Berner and Daula (1993) 1980–1990 2.7 2.1 -0.4 4.6

Goldberg (1991) 1980–1988 1.5 0.5 1.4 -2.9

Polich, Dertouzos, and Press (1986) 1981–1984 6.0 0.6 n.a. n.a.

Daula and Smith (1985) 1980–1984 5.9–1.1 0.7–1.3 d n.a. n.a.

Benefitsb Advertisinga

Educational Enlistment

Bonusesc Time Period Recruiters