TRENDS IN GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY:

THE DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES AND THE CENTRALIZATION

OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Thomas-Durell Young

June 14, 1994
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work was prepared in association with

The Royal Institute of International Affairs

Chatham House

10 St James's Square

London, SW1Y 4LE

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessary reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an

independent body which promotes the rigorous study of

international questions and does not express opinions of its own.

The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility

of the author.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be

conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717)

245-4058 or DSN 242-4058.

*******

The author would like to express his sincere appreciation to

the following individuals for their insightful comments on

earlier drafts of this paper: Professor Sir Laurence W. Martin,

Professor Trevor Taylor, LTC William T. Johnsen, Dr Wolfgang

Schlör, Dr Beatrice Heuser, and Herr Jürgen Schwarz. Ms Emma

Matanle, of the International Security Programme of the Royal

Institute of International Affairs, provided key support

throughout the development of this work. The Strategic Outreach

Initiative of the U.S. Army War College provided financial

support to this endeavor. Professor Donald Abenheim and LTC Jack

Hoschouer provided encouragement and considerable assistance.

Numerous BMVg officials and serving Bundeswehr officers, who the

author interviewed over the years, provided essential

information.

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Thomas-Durell Young is a Research Professor, National

Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College.

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TRENDS IN GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY:

THE DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES AND THE CENTRALIZATION

OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Introduction

Like most of its NATO allies, the Federal Republic of

Germany has undertaken a massive restructuring of its armed

forces.1

 The end of the Cold War, the need for unified Germany to

assume responsibility for its security, and the current economic

recession have made German defense planning extremely difficult.

Bonn is also under pressure to reorient the Bundeswehr (Federal

Armed Forces) from a defense force organized to deter war in the

Central Region to one with deployment capabilities similar to

those of other comparable powers. However, countervailing

domestic and external political pressures have impeded this

reorganizing effort.

Internally, even a clear political consensus regarding the

use of the Bundeswehr has yet to emerge in Bonn. German

participation in peace operations and international humanitarian

missions has yet to gain wide political support, let alone

participating in military campaigns in support of national

interests outside of the immediate defense of German territory.2

 Notwithstanding defense planning efforts undertaken to date by

the current Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social

Union/Free Democratic Party coalition government, the resolution

of this debate is essential before definitive planning can be

undertaken. In the sagacious words of Clay Clemens,

The major consistency in German political life for at

least three decades has been the tendency of all the

mainstream parties to shape policy together in an

incremental, consensus-building process.3

Thus, until the time when an all party accord is reached in

Bonn, Germany's defense structure will remain provisional.

Externally, the rest of Europe continues to cast a wary eye

over this new iteration of "ein Deutschland." As the largest

member of the European Union and possessing an enormous economic

potential, the Federal Republic may increasingly come to dominate

European affairs. Moreover, if Bonn were to maintain the

Bundeswehr at a peacetime ceiling of 370,000, as referred to in

Article 3 of the "Two Plus Four" Treaty, Germany would be likely

to possess the largest standing military force in Western Europe.

In view of recent history, it will be some years before other

European countries are fully comfortable with a united Germany.

Indeed, in Germany itself, anxiety over "normalizing" defense

structures has resulted in charges by some that the current

coalition government is militarizing German foreign policy.4

Given these numerous factors influencing German defense

policy formulation, coherent defense planning has become all but
impossible. While this situation is not unique, it is

particularly important for Germany because of its significance in

the regional balance of power. Moreover, Germany's allies also

expect Bonn to be able to participate to a greater degree in

military operations outside of the Central Region. However, in

spite of this planning uncertainty, there have been littlenoticed developments in two key areas which presage the ruling

coalition's and defense bureaucracy's reoriented concept of the

Bundeswehr: the publication of the Verteidigungspolitische

Richtlinien”--VPR (Defense Policy Guidelines) in November 1992;5

and efforts on the part of the Bundesministerium der

Verteidigung--BMVg (Federal Ministry of Defense) to establish,

for the first time, a centralized operational control structure.

While perhaps inconspicuous, the VPR and operational control

restructuring will fundamentally affect the future planning of

the Bundeswehr and how its deployments in less-than-war

operations will be commanded. Yet neither this document nor this

restructuring should cause undue concern. As will be argued in

this paper, German national strategy, force planning and

operational control structures will remain firmly tied to NATO

and the emerging European defense identity.

Defense Policy

Planning Confusion That the Bundeswehr is in upheaval is an

understatement.6

 The initial planning confusion following

unification in October 1990 was expected to be remedied in

December 1992 with the release of Bundeswehrplanung 94 (Federal

Armed Forces Planning Document). It was anticipated that this key

planning document would provide defense planners with stable

financial and structural assumptions.7 This expectation was

shattered in February 1993 when Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl

suggested at the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich that

financial restrictions would necessitate a smaller Bundeswehr

than was announced in December (i.e., 370,000).8

Since Kohl's remarks, defense planning has become all but

meaningless, at least for the medium term.9 Probably what has

complicated planning most has been the lack of consistent

financial guidance. Although the budget has diminished from DM

52.13 billion in 1992 to DM 50.80 billion in 1993, this does not

fully explain the depth of the problem facing defense planners.10

 First, recent decisions by the government further to reduce

public expenditures (in the case of defense, an additional DM

1.25 billion reduction, which has resulted in a DM 47.50 billion

budget for 1994) have greatly complicated efforts on the part of

the BMVg to program needed new capabilities for the Bundeswehr.11

 For instance, the Bundeswehr deployment to Somalia demonstrated

the army, in particular, requires substantial upgrading of its

combat service support capabilities if it is to participate in

these types of operations in future.12 Second, the BMVg must

also expend ever diminishing resources for requirements

associated with unification. The costs incurred by the immediate
requirement to clean up, upgrade and close eastern military

facilities, quite apart from disposing of the immense munition

holdings of the Nationale Volksarmee (East German Army), have

come out of the defense budget, and largely at the expense of

operational readiness.13 As a result of these problems, the

well-respected defense correspondent Lothar Rühl can state

incontrovertibly that the current Bundeswehr exists only as a

transitional structure.14

Moreover, difficult decisions related to the Bundeswehr's

force structure have been deferred because of the 1994 elections.

For instance, the Federal Defense Minister, Volker Rühe, argued

until December 199315 that the Bundeswehr would not fall below

370,000. Because of the existing financial environment, however,

maintaining a force structure at this figure has long been

assumed to be extremely unlikely.16 Yet for Rühe not to argue

for 370,000 would have raised the politically sensitive issues of

conscription and of which military bases will be closed.17 As a

result of these developments, longer-term planning will only

start after the Bundestag (Lower House) elections have been held

in October 1994. Since in the past it has taken approximately one

year to develop a new Bundeswehrplanung, one can expect to see

drafts of the 1997 edition by late 1995.

The VPR Given this rapidly changing planning environment,

it is difficult to predict how the Bundeswehr will look in even a

few years' time. As a guide to defining the aim of the overall

concept of military defense for a period of 15 years,18 the VPR

were prepared by the Planungsstab (Planning Staff) of the BMVg

and endorsed by Federal Defense Minister Rühe in November 1992.

Perhaps most revealing about the importance of this document is

that its publication predated the recent release of the

government's Defense White Book, which (not surprisingly) closely

follows the VPR.19 The new VPR are the first guidelines to be

issued since 1979 and, significantly, they are unclassified.20

These guidelines are important because they address unified

German security and define national interests in the post-Cold

War world. Moreover, in the German defense planning system, the

VPR constitutes the primary document for all subsequent planning.

Thus, from the VPR, the Militärpolitische Zielsetzung (Military

Policy Objective), the Bundeswehr Konzeption 21 (Federal Armed

Forces Concept) and, finally, Bundeswehrplanung are eventually

developed. As such, the VPR establish a binding basis for future

Bundeswehr planning and force development.22

The fact that the VPR are little known outside Germany can

be explained by the lack of a complete official, or even

unofficial, translation into English.23 Perhaps the relative

obscurity of the VPR inside Germany is due in large part to a

decision by Rühe to avoid publicizing them widely after what

happened to his unfortunate predecessor, Dr Gerhard Stoltenberg.

When Stoltenberg attempted to obtain government support for a

draft version of new guidelines in February 1992,24 the paper was
leaked to the press. Its explicitness concerning the future

military missions of the Bundeswehr outside the NATO area

provoked a storm of protest in the press.25 While these protests

were arguably unjustified, they provide an example of how Germans

are only slowly becoming comfortable about thinking of their

country as one with global interests. Consequently, the VPR have

been softened in tone, but not significantly in terms of content.

What follows is a précis of the more salient aspects of the

document, and an analysis of the principal points.

Defining National Interests In keeping with the earlier

Stoltenberg draft document, the guidelines acknowledge the

importance of existing integrated defense arrangements and

outline the Federal Republic's national interests and objectives.

According to the VPR, German defense policy will be guided by the

following vital security interests:

1) The protection of Germany and its citizens from outside

dangers and political blackmail;

2) The prevention, containment, and termination of crises

and conflicts which are likely to affect Germany's integrity and

stability;

3) Maintaining alliance ties to the nuclear and naval

powers within NATO, because Germany, as a non-nuclear and

continental power with global interests, cannot act alone;

4) Deepening and widening of the European integration

process, including the development of a European defense

identity;

5) "Partnership among equals" between Europe and US/Canada,

as expressed in North America's sharing of European interests and

a significant US military presence in Europe;

6) Consolidation and expansion in effective global and

regional security structures among complementary organizations;

7) Advancing the democratization process and economic and

social advancement in Europe and globally;

8) Maintenance of free-world trade and access to markets

and raw materials throughout the world within the framework of an

equitable world economic order;

9) Continuation of a stability-oriented arms control policy

process in and for Europe; and,

10) Influencing international institutions and processes in

the interests of Germany on the basis of its national economic

power, its military contribution, and, above all, its credibility

as a stable, functioning democracy.26
Note that these national interests are not unique to the

Federal Republic. What makes them unusual for Germans is to hear

"national" interests so clearly (indeed, painstakingly) defined.

As a state whose international position has been defined since

its birth in 1949 strictly in the context of the Western

Alliance, Germany experiences such official statements as a

novelty. Perhaps most important from an external perspective is

the recognition in the VPR of the Federal Republic's political

and military limitations, and the continued need for NATO and

greater European integration. This acknowledgment of the

importance of remaining in NATO and increasing the depth of

European integration underscores another important political

factor: only through such associations can German national power

continue to be accepted as legitimate by its European neighbors.

Risks and Threats The VPR next address the issue of future

challenges to German security. The guidelines recognize that

there are four areas of risk against which the Federal Republic

must prudently plan:

1) Continuing uncertainties regarding democratic processes

in a Russia which remains a nuclear, military and naval power;

2) Domestic and regional European conflicts which might

escalate (e.g., a Yugoslav-type civil war);

3) The military potential of states lining Europe's

periphery (i.e., North Africa and the Middle East); and,

4) Attacks on German citizens abroad.27

To prepare for these risks, traditional and non-traditional

approaches are needed. As to the latter, the guidelines argue

that the European Union must take a more active role in promoting

political stability and economic growth. To enable this to occur,

the European integration process must continue to widen (i.e.,

increase in membership) and deepen (i.e., become more

comprehensive in its activities). At the same time, to underwrite

the continued security and stability of Europe, the transatlantic

relationship remains crucial. However, for this relationship to

stand the test of time, it must evolve into a more equal

association.

In spite of this definition of new risks and challenges to

German security, the VPR assess Germany's overall security

environment as relatively favorable. To quote defense

correspondent Lothar Rühl once again, "For the first time since

the Eighteenth Century, Germany is no longer exposed to a direct

military threat involving an offensive war in Europe."28 On the

basis of these positive developments, the VPR assume that future

military planning can be premised upon a one-year period of

warning. The important implications of this assumption for the
operational readiness of the Bundeswehr will be dealt with

below.29

Defense Policy Principles Five principles are established

to guide the formulation of defense policy in the post-Cold War

era:

1) A broad security concept will serve as the basis for

policy, requiring close cooperation among all political sectors;

2) "Common security" is adopted with its ensuing regional,

supra-regional and global interdependence;

3) There is an acceptance of "stability orientation," which

recognizes the importance of non-military aspects of security;

4) Cooperation with allies (viz. NATO and the WEU) will

remain fundamental to the resolution of future security

challenges; and,

5) Collective defense, within multinational structures, is

still essential in order to forestall the renationalization of

defense policies in Europe.30

From these principles one can conclude that NATO remains the

basis for the Federal Republic's security. At the same time, the

principles intimate the need further to develop the European

Pillar of the Alliance, in the form of the Western European

Union. The guidelines acknowledge the growing importance that

other international organizations (including the United Nations

and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) will

play in the security area.31

Force Structure Guidance The guidelines state that the

Bundeswehr will be structured to protect national interests,

within the overall force structure guidelines established by

NATO's new strategy for future missions, i.e., rapid reaction,

main defense and augmentation. The VPR also acknowledge

significant limits to planning. In a financial sense, the VPR

explicitly state that future monies will be largely programmed

for:

1) Capabilities to support rapid reaction forces;

2) Training to support these new missions; and,

3) Improving the substandard living, training and service

conditions in the new eastern Länder.32

Planning itself will also be limited to, and influenced by:

1) The Two-Plus-Four-Treaty, which refers to Bonn's

declaration that the Bundeswehr is to be reduced to 370,000
during peacetime, of which there is a sub-limit of 345,000 for

the army (Heer) and air force (Luftwaffe);

2) Political guidance as to the length of military service

and the amount of financial resources made available to defense;

and,

3) Commitments to collective defense and collective

security to which the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed.33

VPR: An Assessment As stated, the VPR establish the basis

for the future orientation and structure of the Bundeswehr. The

implications of this document are that the Bundeswehr will be

restructured primarily for crisis management at the expense of

funding the standing main defense forces, and that a centralized

operational control structure will be created to command these

forces.34 As a number of potential problems and issues relate to

the structural planning of the Bundeswehr, they will be dealt

with individually to avoid confusion.

From an Alliance perspective, it is difficult to find

significant fault with the stated principles and structural plans

outlined in the guidelines. They implement the NATO force

structure concept and recognize that an integrative approach to

German security remains a sine qua non. While the structural

issues are in line with Alliance guidelines, a related issue,

readiness, is troublesome. Because the VPR assumed a one-year

period of warning of a developing threat, the main defense forces

will probably be kept at a one-year operational readiness level.

Of course, there is a distinct difference between "warning" and

"mobilization" time and there are no assurances that future

political leaders will act appropriately to meet Alliance

commitments. Although it is true that reaction forces will

receive priority in finances, the result could produce a

significant gap in the ability of the government to

support/augment reaction forces, once deployed, should the need

arise. This lack of depth in force structure is a growing problem

in the Central Region as standing forces are reduced. This

development has resulted in an Alliance effort to control

unilateral force reductions.35 Yet, given the prevailing

regional security environment and Bonn's determination not to be

in a position where it is incapable of responding militarily to

events outside the Central Region, the concentration of scarce

resources in rapid reaction formations is inevitable.

This situation is not without potential domestic political

ramifications. By making rapid reaction the priority for

financial resources, at the expense of main defense formations,

it is difficult to see how the concept "eine Bundeswehr" can

continue. A perhaps unintended implication of the VPR is that the

largely reserve Field Army will become a very different force

from the standing reaction forces. One can expect long-serving

professionals and financial resources to be funnelled to reaction
forces. Conversely, the Field Army will be largely made up of

conscripts, provided with aging equipment suited for conventional

warfare in the Central Region, while being partially manned and

maintained at low-readiness levels. While this is not an issue of

concern in many other Alliance countries, it is a very sensitive

political matter in the Federal Republic, where the Bundeswehr

has been structured with a large (and in principle, politically

aware) conscript cohort to guard against the emergence of a

professional military which could become a "state within a

state."

VPR: Criticisms Despite their relative obscurity, the VPR

have not completely escaped public criticism. A regular critic of

the BMVg, RADM Elmar Schmähling (Ret), claimed in Der Spiegel

that generals were making policy and that the guidelines were

developed without public scrutiny and with no formal approval

from the government.36 Moreover, Wolfram Wette and Susanne

Peters have argued that the VPR and other developments are

leading to a militarization of German foreign policy.37 Both of

these pronouncements are inaccurate: the former because Rühe

approved the VPR in his legal capacity as Federal Minister of

Defense;38 the latter because the concepts articulated in the VPR

mirror the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, which, of course,

the government has approved.

Leaving aside the question of whether any government in Bonn

would deploy forces outside Germany for whatever mission, it is

difficult to see where fault can be found in the structural

principles of the guidelines. The threat analysis and assumptions

employed in the VPR are similar to those of the opposition Social

Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).39 Thus, should the SPD assume

power following fall 1994 general elections, the current version

of the VPR should not suffer major revisions. Indeed, the SPD has

limited its criticism of the government's defense structural

planning to the projected size of Bundeswehr rapid reaction

forces.40

Finally, even assuming there will be sufficient financial

resources to implement the VPR, which is not at all certain,41

there has yet to emerge a political consensus to support

operations for the employment of these envisaged military

capabilities. This indicates the larger issue of what type of

Bundeswehr unified Germany will eventually create. Both Rühe and

the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr (Chief of Staff of the

Federal Armed Forces), General Klaus Naumann, fully understand

that the Bundeswehr must be restructured. If it is not, then Bonn

opens itself to the charge that it is not a serious Alliance

partner. Furthermore, from a domestic political and financial

perspective, it is equally foolhardy to keep a Cold War force

structure that is no longer relevant to contemporary security

conditions.

The course set by Rühe and Naumann, however, is not without
its potential for failure. By appearing to pre-empt the domestic

political debate, Rühe and Naumann run the risk, should political

dissent to the plans develop, of discrediting their program in

the eyes of the already skeptical political opposition.42 Yet

not to continue their restructuring program will leave the

Bundeswehr ill-prepared to react to future security challenges.

Only time will tell whether framing these new Bundeswehr missions

in the context of NATO and European responsibilities will stand

the test of a future government which includes the SPD. 

Centralizing Operational Control

In her seminal analysis of the BMVg, Catherine Kelleher

wrote that the Federal Republic had probably the "least to offer

in terms of lessons that can be generalized for the organization

of a central defense establishment," largely because it was

specifically organized with the aim of not providing operational

control over its standing national forces.43 Germany does not

have the command and control arrangements needed to undertake

joint operations on any scale. This unusual condition persists

because of the anxieties of a suspicious German population about

the historical tendency toward a militaristic culture in German

armies and because of the apprehensions of Germany's NATO allies.

The consensus between German politicians and Western officials in

1954 was that there would be never again be a "Generalstab"

(General Staff). Consequently, the Bundeswehr was structured so

that wartime operational control would not be exercised by a

German Central Staff, but through NATO command structures.

As a result, the Führungsstab der Streitkräfte--Fü S

("Joint" or "Central Staff" of the Armed Forces)--does not have

the capability of exercising operational control over all

Bundeswehr services and individual units. Thus, at the crux of

the operational control deficiency in the BMVg and the Bundeswehr

lies the sensitive issue of German civil-military relations. And,

as a consequence, any effort to reorganize operational control

structures will be a sensitive political matter, and subject to

uninformed and emotional charges.

The Constitution and Command and Control Because

misunderstanding surrounds the very concepts of "national

command" and "operational control," let alone as they relate to

Germany, there is a need for the definition of nomenclature and

an analysis of legal parameters. First, there is no question in

the Federal Republic, as in any democratic country, that ultimate

"national command" over armed forces is exercised by the senior

political leadership and delegated to military officials within

constitutional bounds. Second, "operational control" is the

authority invested in military commanders to direct military

operations for the achievement of political objectives. The

Grundgesetz (Basic Law, or constitution of the Federal Republic)

establishes this principle so as to ensure civil control over the

military. Indeed, so strongly did the Germans who framed the
Grundgesetz feel about the need to limit the independence of

future politicians and military leaders that they included a

provision (Article 26) defining the disturbance of peaceful

relations between states and wars of aggression as criminal acts.

Given the fact that the basis for civil-military relations

in Germany is explicitly stated in the Grundgesetz, an

understanding of its relevant provisions is essential. Article

65(a) invests the power of national command (Befehls-und

Kommandogewalt) in the Federal Minister of Defense. Article 115

defines how a "state of defense" is to be enacted by the

Bundestag and Bundesrat (Upper House), and establishes the legal

parameters for the defense of the Federal Republic. Article

115(b) stipulates that upon the declaration of a state of

defense, national command of the Bundeswehr is transferred from

the Federal Minister of Defense to the Federal Chancellor. <T>As

regards operational control of the Bundeswehr, the Grundgesetz is

rather vague. Article 24 states that the Federal Republic may

enter into a system of collective security and transfer sovereign

powers to intergovernmental institutions (e.g., to participate in

the NATO integrated command structure). This particular article

is often cited by some informed commentators44 and some in the

SPD45 to claim that the creation of a national centralized

operational control capability is constitutionally proscribed.

This position is not entirely correct. Nowhere does the

Grundgesetz proscribe the creation of a national military

operational control structure. Where there are constitutional

proscriptions on military structures, they refer to the civilian

oversight of military organizations. Often overlooked is Article

87(b) which states that, in effect, the BMVg shall be a civilian

ministry, thereby ensuring civil control over the military.

The Need for Change These constitutional provisions

establishing the parameters for national command and operational

control are actually neither onerous nor unusual. Civilian

control over the military in a democracy presupposes national

command being invested with civilian authorities, whereas

responsibility for the operational control of forces is delegated

to military authorities, with requisite political oversight. In

the case of the Federal Republic prior to unification in 1989,

the Bundeswehr was established almost exclusively for the purpose

of the defense of German territory and could be employed only in

wartime. In such a situation, following the declaration of a

state of defense, operational control over the Bundeswehr, with

some exceptions (e.g., the Territorial Army), would be

transferred to NATO commanders who would implement their

respective General Defense Plans for the defense of Alliance

territory.46

For the purpose of the defense of Germany, this wartime

operational control arrangement was, and arguably remains,

adequate. Since it remains a key assumption that NATO is

essential to German security, there is no pressing military
requirement to create a centralized wartime national operational

control structure. However, as regards any military operations

short of declared war, the BMVg is singularly ill-structured to

exercise operational control. This was made patently clear, for

instance, during the conduct of Bundeswehr humanitarian relief

operations carried out in Iran, Iraq and Turkey in spring 1991.47

 According to one German press report, during this deployment of

500 Bundeswehr personnel, the command channels of the commanding

officer, Major General Georg Bernhardt, had to be routed through

23 offices in the BMVg and other ministries. Even within the BMVg

there was confusion. For instance, Fü S III 6 (political-military

affairs) was responsible for operations in Turkey and Iran, while

Fü L III 3 (operational matters of the Air Force Staff) was in

charge of Luftwaffe missions in Iraq, within the framework of the

United Nations.48 As the VPR envisage restructuring the

Bundeswehr to undertake these types of operations, national

operational control structures need to be expanded, clarified and

centralized. Hence, from the previous situation where the

Bundeswehr was structured almost exclusively for wartime

operations, the BMVg must now have the capability to exercise

operational control within what the VPR terms Frieden, Krise und

Krieg (peace, crisis and war).49

Impediments to Change To remedy the lack of an adequate

centralized operational control structure, two major

organizational and political challenges need to be overcome.

First, and probably most important, is the need to effect change

in the sensitive area of the nexus between the civilian national

command authority and senior military officials invested with

responsibility for exercising overall operational control. In

other words, the relationship between the Federal Minister of

Defense and the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr needs to be

changed. Second, and closely related, the existing operational

control structures of the three services, as well as the

operational control responsibilities exercised by the three

service Inspekteure (Chiefs of Staff), also require alteration.

The Generalinspekteur is the senior military advisor to the

Federal Minister of Defense and the Federal Chancellor and is a

non-voting member of the Cabinet's Bundessicherheitsrat (Federal

Security Council). Until 1993, he had neither national command

nor even operational control authority over Bundeswehr forces.

However, he did have the independent right of inspecting all

units of the Bundeswehr. Thus, his position was largely confined

to advising the government on military matters, particularly in

the important area of force planning. Additionally, he chairs the

Militärische Führungsrat (Federal Armed Forces Defense Council),

where he exercises "executive authority." This consists of the

Stellvertreter des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr (Deputy

Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces) and the three service

Inspekteure.50

Peacetime operational control over Bundeswehr forces was
previously invested in the service Inspekteure. Until 1993, the

three Inspekteure reported directly to the Federal Minister of

Defense. They continue to be responsible for the operational

readiness of, and exercise discipline over, their individual

services.51 Interestingly, for many years following the

establishment of the Bundeswehr, the issue of exactly who

(military or civilian) was ultimately responsible for the

discipline and operational readiness of the armed forces went

unresolved. It was only settled on March 21, 1970, following the

promulgation of the important Blankeneser Erlass (ministerial

decree) by the then Federal Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt,

who acted solely upon his own authority. The decree established

"the formal specification of interacting responsibilities of the

political and military leadership in ministerial and governmental

affairs."52 In effect, this ruling established the pre-eminence

of the Inspekteure in the areas of exercising discipline and

ensuring the combat readiness of their services.

Finding a solution to this civil-military and organizational

problem has not been a simple task. First, the BMVg itself must

be reorganized to enable it to support a centralized operational

control capacity. The Federal Minister currently has

approximately nine difficult options from which to choose.

Overriding most considerations is the objective Rühe has

established to reduce the ministry from its current unwieldy

5,000 military and civilian personnel to a more manageable

2,000.53 While it is relatively simple to reduce military

offices and personnel by transfers to organizations outside the

BMVg, effecting redundancies of civil servants is an extremely

difficult, if not impossible, task in the Federal Republic, given

its labor laws.

This has, therefore, concentrated efforts on removing

service components from the BMVg. One such proposal is

bureaucratically and physically to relocate the service

headquarters, i.e., Army Staff (Fü H), Air Staff (Fü L) and Navy

Staff (Fü M), and their Inspekteure to their respective

operational command headquarters. It has even been suggested that

the Inspekteure and operational commanders of the three services

be merged into one position.54 This is a very unpopular proposal

within the services, yet it demonstrates the possible degree of

change the BMVg is likely to undergo in the near future as

efforts are made to turn it into a more effective bureaucracy.

Second, efforts to centralize operational control

capabilities in the BMVg, or alter the responsibilities of the

Generalinspekteur in this area, could result in charges that a

new "Generalstab" is being created. Given the emotional character

of this issue, a misunderstanding of the intentions of the BMVg

could present difficulties, without proposals being judged upon

their merits. Indeed, the mere terminology "Generalstab"55 has

come to have pejorative connotations to Germans.56 To quote a

leading expert on German military institutions, Donald Abenheim,
The men in their Prussian blue or field-gray uniforms

with the crimson facings have earned such epithets as

'brilliant militarists,' 'the brains of armies,'

'geniuses of war,' 'criminals against peace,' 'foes of

democracy,' and 'technocrats of organized violence.'57

While it appears to be a minor semantic matter, in essence the

problem of terminology only serves to complicate finding a

politically acceptable solution.

Third, just as there is domestic political sensitivity

surrounding this issue, so too must German defense officials be

careful not to send signals to their NATO allies that Bonn is no

longer interested in maintaining existing integrated military

command structures. As the VPR establish, NATO remains central to

German security. The integrated military command structure

therefore remains essential in German eyes. Thus, as will be seen

below, the efforts of the BMVg to centralize operational control

capabilities are modest and fall well short of a wartime command

structure, let alone a new "Generalstab."

Solution Part 1: The services As a result of these

numerous political obstacles, the approach taken by the BMVg has

been an incremental one, and an "interim solution" has been put

in place (see Chart 1, Appendix).58 This has been effected at

the level of the services and the BMVg. The operational command

headquarters of the individual services have been expanded to

provide improved national operational control over Bundeswehr

deployments. Both the Luftwaffe (see Chart 2, Appendix) and the

Bundesmarine (Federal Navy--see Chart 3, Appendix), have long

possessed service operational control headquarters of varying

degrees of independence. They are currently being modestly

expanded: Luftwaffenführungskommando in Köln-Wahn and

Flottenkommando in Glücksburg, respectively.

Since the creation of the Bundeswehr, however, there has

been no army operational command headquarters above the corps

level. In wartime, it was planned that the three corps commanders

would implement NATO General Defense Plans at the direction of

their respective Army Group headquarters (NORTHAG and CENTAG).

Given Bonn's interest in participating in less-than-war

operations, an Army operational headquarters, similar to those of

its sister services, is required. As a result, the

Heeresführungskommando (Army Operations Command) is in the

process of being established at the previous home of III Korps in

Koblenz (see Chart 4, Appendix). This headquarters will consist

of approximately 100 personnel and will be commanded by a

three-star general.59 It has three important tasks:

1) Exercise command and control over the three Army Corps,

on behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

2) Ensure operational readiness of the major combined arms
units of the Army.

3) Plan for and control the employment of army forces in

national and multinational formations.60

The creation of this headquarters will have a significant

impact on the future operation of the Germany Army. For instance,

as its units increasingly are deployed in multinational

formations, this command will assume an important role in

providing the national input into the operation of German Army

divisions and brigades. Moreover, contrary to the initial

planning for the headquarters as expressed in Heeresstruktur 5

(Army Structure Plan 5), the Territorial Army headquarters will

not be fused to the three Army corps, but rather will fall under

the responsibility of the Heeresführungskommando.61 Finally,

under the Heeresführungskommando a new mobile subcommand is being

established, Kommando Luftbeweglische Kräfte (Air Mobile Forces

Command--KLK). The KLK headquarters is being established in

Regensburg to act as a national command and represent German

interests in the deployment of airmobile/airmechanized reaction

forces.62

All three service headquarters were activated on April 1,

1994 and assume full command authority over all German forces and

territory on September 1, 1994, the day following the final

withdrawal of Russian forces in eastern Germany. These service

headquarters will be increasingly important as they are intended

not only to improve operational control over their service

formations, but also to support the exercise of national command

by the Federal Minister of Defense. As such, all three are being

developed to be mobile.

Given that the reorganization of the BMVg and the final

redefinition of the role of the Generalinspekteur may not be

resolved in the near term, the BMVg envisages employing the

service headquarters to provide an operation control linkage

between the BMVg and deployed Bundeswehr task forces operating

outside the Central Region. To ensure an adequate degree of

"jointness," liaison officers will be exchanged among the

headquarters. The choice of which of the three headquarters will

be used to command and control German forces will be dictated by

the type of mission. Hence, the embryonic Heeresführungskommando

has provided, not without some difficulties,63 an operational

control linkage to Bundeswehr forces, including Luftwaffe units

deployed to Somalia.64 The Flottenkommando has provided command

over Bundesmarine participation in enforcing sanctions against

Serbia and Montenegro in the Adriatic, and the

Luftwaffenführungskommando has exercised command over Luftwaffe

humanitarian flights in the former Yugoslavia.

Solution Part 2: The BMVg Leaving aside for a moment the

question of the responsibilities of the Generalinspekteur, the

BMVg has itself required reorganization to exercise centralized
operational control over Bundeswehr forces in cases of

less-than-war. Notwithstanding the existence of three service

operational commands, there remains a distinct need for a central

office within the BMVg to coordinate national command

responsibilities in less-than-war operations, provide options to

the Federal Defense Minister and ensure that the Minister's

intentions are being carried out. For reasons already recounted

above, it is not feasible to create a large standing office to

support the Minister.

Consequently, within the Central/Joint Staff, Fü S IV

(Organization) was directed to create a small operational staff

on April 1, 1993.65 Formally named Einsatzführung Bundeswehr

(Operational Command of the Federal Armed Forces), and

organizationally referred to as Fü S IV 4, this office has become

the operations center of the BMVg for less-than-war missions.

Although it is very small (approximately 10 officers), a planning

cell and supporting personnel taken from the Streitkräfteamt

(Armed Forces Office) and the Bundesamt für Wehrverwaltung

(Federal Office for Defense Administration) support the office.

The fact that this support staff is located organizationally

outside the BMVg reflects Rühe's directive to reduce the manning

level of the ministry.

One of the significant implications of this organizational

development is that while the services have increased their

ability to exercise operational control over their forces,

national command over these operations is being exercised through

Fü S IV 4. This is the first time Fü S has possessed such a

capability. In effect, this new office has enhanced the power of

Fü S, at the expense of the three services and their Inspekteure.

As part of this new responsibility, Fü S IV has the

important task of coordinating the activities of the military and

civilian departments of the BMVg which support military

deployments short of war. A BMVg internal directive of February

1993 created the Koordinierungsstab für Einsatzaufgaben

(Coordination Staff for Operational Tasks).66 This staff falls

under the direction of the departmental staff chief of Fü S IV.67

 When directed to support a "deployment," this staff:

1). Prepares a chain of command;

2). Coordinates all BMVg activities supporting the

deployment;

3). Develops the position of the BMVg for interaction with

efforts of other ministries;

4). Briefs senior BMVg leadership on the results of

decisions; and,

5). Oversees the conduct of the mission.
The directive of February 9, 1993 creating the above

structures in Fü S has also had a defining influence upon the

responsibilities of the Generalinspekteur. First, within the

context of less-than-war situations, the Generalinspekteur has

been delegated the following new powers:

The Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces assumes,

on the basis of his command authority and in

conjunction with the Inspekteure, responsibility for

all requisite measures for the preparation, culmination

and control of deployments. He also assumes, on the

presentation of an appropriate decree (Erlass), the

central administration of humanitarian aid-work of the

Bundeswehr overseas.

Second, the Koordinierungsstab is subordinated to the

Generalinspekteur. The implication of this directive is to make

the Generalinspekteur the military authority for coordinating

less-than-war operations, as well as making him (as opposed to

the individual service Inspekteure) the key military official

interface with the Federal Minister of Defense.

This is a significant development. For the first time the

Generalinspekteur has been placed in the direct line of

responsibility for operational control over forces between the

Federal Minister of Defense and the service operational commands.

This, in effect, excludes the Inspekteure from their operational

control responsibilities when their services deploy units in

less-than-war operations.68 As the civilian Abteilungen

(departments) continue to report administratively to their

respective State Secretaries, while participating in the

operation of the Koordinierungsstab, the principle of civilian

control over military activities remains intact. Thus, the

responsibilities of the Generalinspekteur have been significantly

increased, without rupturing the delicate civil-military

relationship at the level of national command.

In essence, the position of Federal Minister of Defense Rühe

and the defense bureaucracy is that a modest centralized

operational control organization was required. That this

restructuring has been modest is primarily due to domestic

political rationales. It must be understood, however, that the

current structure just described is provisional. The reason for

this is that any final structure will have to await the eventual

reorganization of the BMVg. It remains an open issue whether the

final organization of the BMVg will include an expanded joint

operations directorate. However, at least in the interim, these

arrangements will be limited to support only less-than-war

missions.

Whether this interim structure will be sufficient for the

tasks envisaged, however, is uncertain. The mere fact that great

pains have been made to "invent" new nomenclature (e.g.,

Koordinierungsstab für Einsatzaufgaben), instead of simply using
"Generalstab," is a manifestation of the extreme domestic

political sensitivity surrounding the issue. Although this may be

a premature observation, one could reasonably predict in which

areas efforts to validate this structure through exercises and

simulations will be circumscribed for fear of causing

misperceptions of its mission on the part of the media and

public. Thus, whereas this interim structure might be appropriate

for command and control of a Bundeswehr deployment similar to the

Somalia peace support mission, commanding operations at a higher

level of intensity and scope could well be beyond its

capabilities. Given political realities in the Federal Republic,

this is a predicament that the BMVg and Bundeswehr have no choice

but to face in their efforts to ensure that government policy is

efficiently executed.

Implications

This paper has argued that the Bundeswehr is in the process

of undergoing a fundamental restructuring and reorientation.

Owing to the planning uncertainties caused by the impending

Bundestag elections and the inability on the part of the ruling

coalition to provide consistent budgetary guidelines, assessing

the numerical parameters of the Bundeswehr is meaningless. It is

simply not possible to estimate accurately how large the

peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr will be, let alone whether

it will consist of conscripts to the degree that is has until

now. Yet, in view of this uncertainty, and the political

importance of Germany in Europe, as well as lingering anxiety

over "ein Deutschland," it is essential that trends in that

country's defense policy be ascertained and assessed. The VPR and

operational control restructuring qualify as critical indicators

of national intention.

In assessing the design and scope of this document and the

reorganization effort, two general observations can be drawn.

First, it is clear that the policies outlined in the VPR and

operational control restructuring are evolutionary in their

objectives. Germany's political and security interests and

objectives are explicitly outlined in the VPR and are defined

strictly within the context of the Western Alliance and European

integration. Centralized national operational control structures

are undergoing a painstakingly slow maturing process whose

completion is nowhere in sight. If there is anything

"revolutionary" in German defense policy and operational control

structures, it is the lack of concern on the part of senior

leaders of all political parties about the need to develop an

independent power capacity, commensurate with Germany's new

status. Indeed, where there is agreement on external policy

between the principal political parties in the Federal Republic,

it is with regard to their contentment with this state of

affairs.

Second, and related to the above, given this envisaged

defense policy and centralized operational control structure, it
is difficult to find merit in the argument that these

developments presage a militarization of German foreign policy.

To be sure, the ruling coalition has decided that it requires new

capabilities to support its foreign policies, i.e., peace

operations and humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, this new

vision and supporting military structures can hardly be

considered as militarizing Bonn's foreign policy. Quite apart

from the fact that peace support and humanitarian operations do

not seem to constitute a "militarized" foreign policy, the

policies outlined by the VPR and operational control planning are

clearly envisaged to be supportive of allied/coalitional, rather

than national efforts.

Yet, as the Federal Republic wishes to participate in these

new military missions, a reorganized and restructured Bundeswehr

is needed. In fact, what is truly needed is for the very basis of

the Bundeswehr to be revisited. A conscript-based force, raised

almost exclusively for the territorial defense of the Federal

Republic, and lacking in key areas of combat capabilities, is no

longer an appropriate structure for Bonn's security requirements.

However, to effect such an enormous change in German defense

structures will require a political debate of a magnitude perhaps

surpassing the current controversy surrounding the use of the

Bundeswehr in peace operations. Although it is never framed as

such, the latter debate reflects the larger question of the need

to remodel the Bundeswehr. Considering the passions in Germany

surrounding this politically sensitive subject, one can be fairly

certain that the debate on restructuring the Bundeswehr is some

years away. But in the interim, the effort to evolve a more

capable Bundeswehr will continue, "politics," of course,

allowing.

ENDNOTES

1. Assessing contemporary German defense policy is no easy

task, given rapid changes in the security environment, policy and

financial resources. For background on the immediate implications

of unification on German defense structures see the excellent

essay by Geoffrey Van Orden, "The Bundeswehr in Transition,"

Survival, Volume 33, No. 4, July-August 1991, pp. 352-370. For

long-term implications and the effect of unified Germany on

regional security, the following monograph should survive the

test of time: Wolfgang F. Schlör, "German Security Policy: An

Examination of the Trends in German Security Policy in a New

European and Global Context," Adelphi Paper, No. 277, London: The

International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1993.

2. For background on this contentious political debate see

Kurt A. Kissinger, "Bundeswehr Deployments 'out-of-area': An

Examination of the Current Debate over German Armed Forces'

Participation in International Peace Operations," Ridgway

Viewpoints, No. 93-10, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh,

1993.
3. See, Clay Clemens, "A Special Kind of Superpower? 

Germany and the Demilitarization of Post-Cold War International

Security" in, Germany in a New Era, ed. by Gary L. Geipel,

Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1993, p. 200.

4. See Die Zeit (Hamburg), July 30, 1993. Cf., the response

by General Gerd Schmückle (Ret) in Die Zeit (Hamburg), August 6,

1993. See as well, Susanne Peters, "Germany After the End of the

Cold War: Arriving at a New Staatsräson?", n.d., p. 24.

5. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung,

Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, Bonn, November 26, 1992.

6. Oberst i.G. Rolf Baumgärtel, "Die Bundeswehr im Umbruch,"

Bonn, BMVg, Planungsstab, December 23, 1992, draft m/s.

7. See Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 16, 1992.

8. See The Washington Post, February 6, 1993.

9. The BMVg has acknowledged that "reliable and

future-oriented planning for the Bundeswehr [is] impossible." 

See, Die Welt (Hamburg), December 17, 1993 in, Foreign Broadcast

Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-93-242, December 20, 1993, pp.

26-27.

10. See The Military Balance, 1993-1994, London: The

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 45.

11. See the interview by Michael Inacker with General

Naumann in, Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), February 6, 1994.

12. See Süddeutsche Zeitung (München), March 8, 1994.

13. For more details on the problems associated with

unification see my essay, "The 'Normalization' of the Federal

Republic of Germany's Defense Structures," Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1992, pp. 9-11.

14. See Die Welt (Hamburg), February 6, 1993.

15. Rühe finally acknowledged publicly what was already well

known: financial conditions will not allow the Bundeswehr to

remain at 370,000 in 1994. Current planning envisages a force of

350,000. Rühe claims that this lower figure is valid until

financial conditions improve. See DDP (Berlin), December 16, 1993

in, FBIS-WEU-93-240, December 16, 1993, p. 28.

16. The Bundeswehr is finding it increasingly difficult to

argue for the continuation of conscription as conscientious

objectors increase and sheer demographic factors work against it.

Following unification and the end of the cold war, those claiming

objector status have reached a record high. See Süddeutscher

Zeitung (München), July 17-18, 1993. Even a conservative
newspaper like Rheinischer Merkur has questioned the wisdom of

continuing the draft. See the newspaper's August 20, 1993

editorial in, FBIS-WEU-93-180, September 20, 1993, p. 26.

17. See Frankfurter Allgemeine, October 26, 1993.

18. Information provided by the BMVg.

19. For an analysis of the Defense White Book see Michael

Inacker's essay in, Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), March 20, 1994.

20. Cf., Der Spiegel (Hamburg), May 3, 1993 where the claim

is made by RADM Schmähling that the VPR are "secret." This is

nonsense; they are not even restricted in their distribution

(i.e., VS-NUR FüR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH).

21. A draft of the new concept has been leaked to the press.

According to the reliable Michael Inacker, it is said to include

a cut in military service from 12 to 10 months and a reduction in

the size of the Bundeswehr to 320,000-340,000. See, Welt am

Sonntag (Hamburg), April 10, 1994.

22. See Dieter Mahnke, "Wandel im Wandel: Bundeswehr und

europäische Sicherheit," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Bonn),

April 9, 1993, pp. 40-46.

23. A translated précis is available in Welt am Sonntag

(Hamburg), December 6, 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-236, December 8,

1992, pp. 25-27.

24. See Dr Gerhard Stoltenberg, Bundesminister der

Verteidigung, Militärpolitische und militärstrategische

Grundlagen und konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der

Bundeswehr, n.d.

25. See Der Spiegel (Hamburg), January 20, 1992, pp. 33-35.

26. See Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, point 8, pp.

4-5.

27. Ibid., points 19, 20, 21, and 22, pages 12-14.

28. Die Welt (Hamburg), February 6, 1993.

29. Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, point 19, pp.

12-13.

30. Ibid., point 28, pp. 17-18.

31. Ibid., points 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, pp. 19-24.

32. Ibid., point 51, p. 32.

33. Ibid., point 52, p. 33.
34. Ibid., points 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, pp. 29-31.

35. For an analysis of the precipitous drop in Central

Region force structure and the ensuing SHAPE Force Structure

Review, see William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, Preparing

for the NATO Summit: What are the Pivotal Issues?, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 8, 1993, pp.

7-14.

36. See Der Spiegel (Hamburg), May 3, 1993, pp. 24-25.

37. See Die Zeit (Hamburg), July 30, 1993; and, Peters,

"Germany After the End of the Cold War," n.d., p. 24.

38. See Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Defense Organization in

Germany: A Twice Told Tale", in Reorganizing America's Defense:

 Leadership in War and Peace, ed. by Robert J. Art, et al., Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense

Publishers, 1985, p. 94.

39. See Florian Gerster's article in, Frankfurter Rundschau, April 6, 1994.

40. See Die Welt (Hamburg), November 19, 1993 in, FBIS-WEU93-223, November 22, 1993, p. 20.

41. See Die Welt (Berlin), November 26, 1993; and,

Frankfurter Allgemeine, November 29, 1993 in, FBIS-WEU-93-228,

November 30, 1993, pp. 23-24.

42. Note that as late as the recent Wiesbaden Congress, the

SPD continues to reject even United Nations' sanctioned combat

missions. See, Die Welt (Hamburg), November 19, 1993 in,

FBIS-WEU-93-223, November 22, 1993, pp. 19-20.

43. Kelleher, p. 82.

44. See Peters, p. 11.

45. See, for example, one SPD parliamentarian's view on

Article 24 and command difficulties posed by the creation of the

Franco-German Brigade. Hermann Scheer, "Ein grundgesetzwidriges

Vorhaben," Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, November 20, 1987,

cited in Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," Survival, Volume 30, No. 6, November- December 1988, p. 522. Note, however,

that Dr Egon Bahr, with his impeccable SPD credentials, has gone

on record arguing for the creation of a new "Generalstab" in

order to support humanitarian and peace operations. Egon Bahr,

"Ein Generalstab kein Tabu mehr", Europäische Sicherheit, Vol.

41, No. 3, 1992, p. 127.

46. Note, however, that it has been claimed that in the

past, owing to the lack of an adequate operational department
within the BMVg, senior defense officials and Bundeswehr officers

have not been well-prepared in assessing NATO war plans. See Welt

am Sonntag (Hamburg), August 29, 1993.

47. The Bundeswehr's deployment to the Middle East was

criticized by its Ombudsman for poor planning and execution. See,

Kölner Stadt- Anzeiger, March 13, 1992.

48. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), March 1, 1992.

49. See Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, point 49, p.

32.

50. See Kelleher, p. 97.

51. "The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are directly

responsible also to the Minister, as the authority vested with

the power of command, for the operational readiness of their

force components. Thus, the Service Chiefs of Staff have dual

functions: in respect of the task of the Chief of Staff, Federal

Armed Forces, to develop and implement an overall concept of

military defence, they are as ministerial heads of division

subordinated to him in the hierarchy of the Federal Ministry of

Defence. With regard to their responsibility of assuring the

operational readiness of their Services, they are immediately

subordinate to the Minister, without any intermediate authority

in between. Accordingly, their respective staffs accomplish the

functions of both a ministerial division and a Service command."

 Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1985: The Situation

and Development of the Federal Armed Forces, Bonn: Federal

Ministry of Defence, 1985, point 376, p. 168.

52. Kelleher, p. 94.

53. One possible option may include the creation of a

Gemeinsamer Führungsstab der Streitkräfte ("Joint Command Staff

of the Armed Forces") "...to achieve tighter decision making

structures of the BMVg." Exactly how this staff would be

constituted and how it would differ from Fü S remains to be

explained. See, Süddeutsche Zeitung (München), July 2, 1993.

54. See, ibid.; and, Der Spiegel (Hamburg), August 2, 1993,

p. 16.

55. Cf.: "...the working method of the Prussian-German

General Staff has been adopted in the German language as an

idiom. A very accurately prepared and successfully executed

project is frequently rated 'general staff-like'

(generalstabsmässig)." See, Christian O. E. Millotat,

Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 20, 1992, p. 7.

56. This, in itself, is but a manifestation of Germans'

misunderstanding of their own history. Kelleher makes the
persuasive argument that German civil-military relations since

1870s are terribly misunderstood by Germans. A comparison of

civil-military relations with, say France, shows that the

influence of the Generalstab was not all that different from its

continental counterparts. Indeed, during the Nazi era, it was the

government's principal aim to ensure "civilian" control over the

Wehrmacht. And it should not be forgotten that it was principally

General Staff Officers in 1938 and 1944 who attempted to

assassinate the dictator, Adolf Hitler. See Kelleher, pp. 85-86.

57. Donald Abenheim, "Foreword," in Understanding the

Prussian- German General Staff System, p. vii.

58. "kleine Lösung," according to the well-informed defense

correspondent Michael Inacker. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg),

August 29, 1993.

59. For general background on the Heeresführungskommando see

Erhard Drews, et al., "Das neue deutsche Heer: Zielsetzung,

Konzeption, und Elemente der Heeresstruktur 5," Truppenpraxis, Vol. 35, No. 4, July-August 1991, pp. 362-365.

60. Fü H-IV-1, Führungsebene des deutschen Heeres (Vortrag

f. GE/US Heeresgeneralstabsgespräche, 1992), October 12, 1992.

61. See Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 16, 1992.

62. Vortragskonzept, StAL Fü H VI am 05.08.1993 in DA,

Washington, Part I, point 9; Part II, point 7.

63. See Frankfurter Allgemeine, July 17, 1993.

64. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), January 10, 1993.

65. See Sts/Org 1 - Az 10-02-01 vom 9.02.1993, Koordinierung

des Einsatzes der Bundeswehr für Unterstützungsaufgaben.

66. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), August 28, 1993.

67. The Koordinierungsstab consists of one-star general

officer representatives from Fü S staff divisions I (Personnel),

II (Military Intelligence), III (Political-Military Affairs), V

(Logistics), and VII (Communications/Electronics), staff

departmental directors from the three service staffs (Fü H, Fü L

and Fü M), the deputy director of medical services, the staff

departmental heads from the civilian Abteilungen to include

administration and law, armament, finance, social services, and

the deputy head of the powerful Planungsstab (Planning Staff).

Other section and department representatives shall be consulted

as required.

68. While there has not been, as reported in the press, a

reformulation of the important Blankeneser Erlass, the

relationship between the Generalinspektur and the Inspekture has
been fundamentally altered de facto by the promulgation of this

directive. See Süddeutsche Zeitung (München), July 2, 1993.