1

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY’S

SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General

The Senior Review Panel’s mission was to review the human relations

environment in the Army with particular emphasis on sexual harassment issues. Our

assessment took us to Army locations worldwide. The Panel visited units forward

deployed, in garrison, at training sites, and in classrooms. We saw America’s soldiers

in every conceivable location, performing every type of mission. The Panel delved

deeply into the human relations environment, identified shortcomings, and has

recommended changes. While there are definitely shortcomings that need to be

addressed and are discussed within this report, it is important to state that the Panel

also saw a trained and ready Army--the best Army that the Panel members have seen

in over 200 years collective experience with the Army. Our soldiers are ready to

perform any mission assigned, effectively and efficiently, anywhere in the world.

America’s sons and daughters who are today’s soldiers are better trained and better

equipped than any Army before and they are rightfully proud to be called soldiers.

Purpose

The Secretary of the Army has said, “The Army is based on trust.” In the fall of

1996, the trust between leaders and soldiers was called into question by serious

allegations of sexual impropriety at several Army installations. Investigation indicated

that breakdowns in good order and discipline had occurred and that some leaders had

abused the authority and power vested in them. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army

directed that a Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment be established to

undertake the following missions:

♦ Conduct a systems review of the Army’s policies on sexual harassment and of the

processes currently in place.

♦ Recommend changes needed to improve the human relations environment in which

our soldiers live and work, with the specific goal of eradicating sexual harassment.

♦ Examine how Army leaders throughout the chain of command view and exercise

their responsibility to prevent sexual harassment, specifically addressing behaviors

that fail to acknowledge the dignity and respect to which every soldier is entitled.
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Scope and Methodology

The focus of the Panel’s assessment has been the human relations environment

in which our soldiers live and work, measured in terms of the dignity and respect we

extend to one another as an Army. Panel members, supported by a working group of

over 40 military and civilian personnel, conducted an extensive policy review, collected

data at 59 Army installations worldwide, and completed exhaustive analysis of the data

collected. We used four methods of inquiry to collect the data: surveys, focus groups,

personal interviews, and observation. Before leaving a unit or installation, Panel

members outbriefed senior leaders on their observations. This allowed leaders to

immediately begin addressing issues raised at their installations. This has been a very

positive aspect of the Panel’s efforts--teaching and advising, not just the gathering of

data. In all, the effort took eight months with results based on information provided by

over 30,000 Army respondents.

Findings

Our findings center on four main areas: the Army equal opportunity (EO)

program, the extent of sexual harassment in the Army, leadership, and Initial Entry

Training (IET). We found that:

♦ The Army lacks institutional commitment to the EO program and soldiers distrust the

EO complaint system.

♦ Sexual harassment exists throughout the Army, crossing gender, rank, and racial

lines; sex discrimination is more common than is sexual harassment.

♦ Army leaders are the critical factor in creating, maintaining, and enforcing an

environment of respect and dignity in the Army; too many leaders have failed to gain

the trust of their soldiers.

♦ The overwhelming majority of drill sergeants and instructors perform competently

and well, but respect as an Army core value is not well institutionalized in the IET

process.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Panel concludes that the human relations environment of the Army is not

conducive to engendering dignity and respect among us. We are firmly convinced that

leadership is the fundamental issue. Passive leadership has allowed sexual

harassment to persist; active leadership can bring about change to eradicate it.

Our recommendations are broad based and cover a wide variety of Army

processes, including: leader development, EO policy and procedures, IET
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soldierization, unit and institutional training, command climate, and oversight. Key

recommendations follow:

♦ Assign to one Department of the Army (DA) staff agency the primary responsibility

for leadership, leader development, and human relations for the Army.

♦ Incorporate the human dimension of warfare into Army operational doctrine.

♦ Conduct a critical review of the staffing and organization of the DA elements

responsible for human relations problems and issues and of the resourcing of those

agencies responsible for assisting commanders in implementing and executing

human relations policy.

♦ Embed human relations training in the Army training system as a doctrinal

imperative.

♦ Re-engineer the EO program from top to bottom to make it responsive to leaders

and soldiers, to protect those who use it, and to ensure that those working in it are

not stigmatized.

♦ Mandate the conduct of a command climate assessment down to company-sized

units at least annually; establish a mechanism to hold commanders accountable for

their unit’s command climate.

♦ Publish Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, immediately and

publish interim changes in a timely manner.

♦ Increase the length of IET to allow for more intense, rigorous soldierization and the

inculcation of Army values; design new training to inculcate Army values,

appropriate behavior, and team building in IET.

♦ Improve IET cadre and recruiter training to include tools and techniques for

addressing inappropriate behaviors in units; incorporate ethics and human relations

training in recruiting and IET cadre courses, to include professionally facilitated

sensitivity training.

♦ Implement a renewed Advanced Individual Training (AIT) approach that focuses on

the continuation of the soldierization process begun in Basic Combat Training

(BCT), as well as tactical, technical, and soldier skills and attitudes.

♦ Ensure that professionals and leaders (e.g., commanders, inspectors general,

health care practitioners, criminal investigators, chaplains) who are expected to deal

with soldiers reporting incidents of inappropriate sexual behavior are trained and

qualified.
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The Panel very strongly believes that we must ensure that we maintain a

positive human relations environment in the Army. Personnel readiness relies on a

positive human relations environment. It is the vital base upon which we build our

Army, and the combat effectiveness of our most important weapon system--the soldier.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

Executive Summary 1

Table of Contents 5

Forwarding Letter Report of the Secretary of the Army’s Senior Review

Panel on Sexual Harassment

8

Part I Introduction 11

Part II Recommendations 14

Part III The Senior Review Panel and the Report 33

Part IV Senior Review Panel Assessment

 The Equal Opportunity (EO) Program

 The Extent and Impact of Sexual Harassment

 and Sex Discrimination

 Leadership

 Initial Entry Training

39

39

56

69

78

Epilog 91

Annex A Senior Review Panel Charter A-1

Annex B Panel Member Biographies B-1

Annex C Acronyms / Abbreviations C-1

Annex D Installations and Locations Visited D-1

Annex E Review of Policies E-1

Annex F Events Connected with Equal Opportunity in the

Army Since 1947

F-1
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Section Page

Annex G Contemporary Military Documents Relating to Equal

Opportunity and Sexual Harassment in the

Uniformed Army

G-1

Annex H Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program H-1

Annex I Bibliography I-1
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LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 EOA Staffing as of March 31, 1997 43

2 EOA and EOR Responsibilities 52

3 Were you sexually harassed in the last 12 months? 57

4 Sexual Harassment by Rank and Gender 57

5 Sexual Harassment by Race and Gender 58

6 Experienced Behaviors Described in Sexual Experiences

Questionnaire

58

7 Perceptions of Contribution 64

8 Toleration of Senior-Subordinate Sexual Relationships 67

9 Leaders Set and Enforce Standards 70

10 Leaders Exemplify Standards 71

11 Perceptions of Company Leadership 72

12 Trainee Responses: Experienced Sexual Harassment and

Inappropriate Behaviors in the Different Training Components

81

13 Sources of Harassment 82

14 Trainer Responses: Experienced SEQ Behaviors 83

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1 Percentage Reporting any SEQ Behavior, Sexual

Harassment, or that Sexual Harassment was a Problem in

their Unit

60

2 The Flow from Recruiter to First Duty Assignment 79
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY’S

SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT

This report provides the observations, findings, conclusions, and

recommendations of the Secretary of the Army’s Senior Review Panel on Sexual

Harassment. The Secretary established the Panel on November 21, 1996, in

response to the allegations of sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland. The Secretary directed the Panel to examine the human relations

environment in the United States Army, review policies and procedures that

contribute to that environment, and recommend ways to achieve an Army where all

soldiers and civilians are treated with dignity and respect. Panel members were:

Major General Richard S. Siegfried Senior Review Panel Chair

Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote Senior Review Panel Vice Chair

Mr. John P. McLaurin III Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Military Personnel Management

and Equal Opportunity Policy)

Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Major General Larry R. Ellis Commanding General,

1st Armored Division

Mrs. Ruby B. DeMesme Deputy Assistant Secretary of the

Air Force (Force Management and

Personnel)

Command Sergeant Major Cynthia A. Pritchett Post Command Sergeant Major,

Fort Belvoir, Virginia
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Acknowledgments

The Panel could not have accomplished its mission without the hard work and

assistance of the over 40 officers, noncommissioned officers, and Army civilian

employees who were members of the Panel’s working group. These full-time

members provided support in developing data collection tools, coordinating and

conducting field visits to 59 Army installations and locations worldwide, collecting and

analyzing data, and providing detailed policy research.

The Panel was aided by the following consultants who provided invaluable

contributions to the overall effort:

LTG Robert H. Forman, USA (Ret.) Dr. Laura Miller

COL Karen L. Frey, USA (Ret.) BG Mary Morgan

Dr. Annabel Hagood Dr. Mady Segal

Mr. Dan Lumpkin Dr. Judith Youngman

The Panel also wishes to acknowledge the cooperation of the thousands of

soldiers and Department of the Army civilians who facilitated our visits and

participated in the data collection. Finally, the Panel wishes to recognize the

editorial support provided by the United States Army Center of Military History and

the contributions of the various consultants and outside agencies, both federal and

private, who provided valuable time and expertise to this effort.

Richard S. Siegfried

Major General, United States Army

Senior Review Panel Chair

Evelyn P. Foote

Brigadier General, United States Army

Senior Review Panel Vice Chair

Mr. John P. McLaurin III

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army

Claudia J. Kennedy

Lieutenant General, United States Army
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Larry R. Ellis

Major General, United States Army

Mrs. Ruby B. DeMesme

Deputy Assistant Secretary

of the Air Force

Cynthia A. Pritchett

Command Sergeant Major, United States Army
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Part I

INTRODUCTION

An army is based on trust . . . the trust of the American people that

we will defend them and trust of our soldiers that their leaders will

do what’s best for them. When we violate that trust, we disappoint

our country and betray our soldiers.

Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary of the Army

November 8, 1996

Our Army

The basic purpose of the United States Army is to fight and win our nation’s

wars. In the post cold war era, strategic projection of land power has become the

conceptual framework for decisive victory. Fundamentally, it is accomplished through

the presence of soldiers on the ground in distant places, demonstrating military

capability and commitment. Clearly, our strength as a land power rests with our

soldiers. Indeed, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, has said,

“Our soldiers are our credentials.”

Readiness

What impacts soldiers impacts combat effectiveness. One such factor is the

human relations environment in which our soldiers live and work. The Army subscribes

to a human relations environment based on dignity and respect. Respect is a bedrock

value of both the Army and the Nation. Inherent in American society since the framing

of the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution, the importance

of treating soldiers with dignity and respect is reflected in early military doctrine,

regulations, and codes of conduct as a basic tenet of leadership. In 1789, Frederick

von Steuben wrote in the Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the

United States that a leader’s first priority should be “treating [soldiers] with every

possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and when well

founded, seeing them redressed.”

Trust

Respect encompasses more than the traditional military courtesies that leaders

and soldiers observe in deference to rank and position. It is a deep and abiding sense

of the human worth of our comrades in arms. In peace, it brings us together as a team

and, in war, it holds us together against our enemies. When soldiers are treated with

respect and dignity by their leaders and their peers, a strong bond develops between
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them. This bond is founded on mutual trust and serves to cement unit cohesion and to

build esprit de corps. When this commitment to treating one another with dignity and

respect falters, we risk destroying that which we must hold most precious--the

indomitable, warfighting spirit of our soldiers.

In the fall of 1996, the trust between leaders and soldiers was called into

question by serious allegations of sexual impropriety at several Army installations.

Investigation indicated that breakdowns in good order and discipline had occurred and

that some leaders had abused the authority and power vested in them. Some leaders

had placed their own personal wants above their responsibility to take care of their

soldiers. As a result, soldiers were grievously mistreated.

The Panel’s Charter

Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army directed that a Senior Review Panel on

Sexual Harassment be established to undertake the following missions:

♦ Conduct a systems review of the Army’s policies on sexual harassment and of the

processes currently in place.

♦ Recommend changes needed to improve the human relations environment in which

our soldiers live and work, with the specific goal of eradicating sexual harassment.

♦ Examine how Army leaders throughout the chain of command view and exercise

their responsibility to prevent sexual harassment, specifically addressing behaviors

that fail to acknowledge the dignity and respect to which every soldier is entitled.1

In his personal charge to the Panel, Secretary West stated that both he and the

Army Chief of Staff believed that the views, opinions, and experiences of soldiers

should be considered. To that end, the Senior Review Panel traveled around the world

to gather first-hand information from the grass roots of the Army. In fact, this

assessment provides an unprecedented examination of human relations in the Army,

reflecting the collective voice of over 30,000 Army personnel, including soldiers,

civilians, and leaders.

The Soldiers’ Story

What follows in subsequent sections of this report is the soldiers’ story--what

they told the Senior Review Panel about themselves, their leaders, and their Army. It is

not always a good news story. The Senior Review Panel found disturbing trends of a

declining EO program, a lack of soldier confidence in some of their leaders, and a

human relations environment in which inappropriate behavior is often tolerated and in

 

1

 A copy of the Senior Review Panel Charter signed by the Secretary of the Army is at Annex A,

Volume I.
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which the concept of “respect and dignity for one another” has not always been

practiced.

A Time for Change

Recommendations emanating from this report represent what the Senior Review

Panel believes are those crucial first steps that the Army must take as it moves towards

meeting the challenges of the 21st Century. These recommendations, firmly grounded

in the Panel’s collection and analysis of data, focus on making systemic change in the

Army’s human relations environment.

General Creighton W. Abrams, Army Chief of Staff from October 1972 to

September 1974, had a steadfast belief in the Army’s soldiers. He said:

People are not in the Army, people are the Army.2 . . . By people I

do not mean personnel. . . . I mean living, breathing, serving,

human beings. They have needs and interests and desires. They

have spirit and will, and strength and abilities. They have

weaknesses and faults; and they have means. They are at the

heart of our preparedness . . . and this preparedness--as a nation

and as an Army--depends upon the spirit of our soldiers. It is the

spirit that gives the Army . . . life. Without it we cannot succeed.3

When told on one occasion by a staff member that company grade officers were

idealistic, General Abrams replied, “Yes . . . and our job is to keep them that way.”

If there is an overarching theme to this report, it is this: we must rededicate

ourselves to the fundamental truths so eloquently stated by General Abrams. We must

strengthen the human relations environment in the Army. Personnel readiness relies

on a positive human relations environment. It is the vital base upon which we build the

Army, and the combat effectiveness of the Army’s most important weapon system--the

soldier. In strengthening the bonds of trust among all soldiers, we will ensure that the

United States Army remains our nation’s preeminent fighting force for today, tomorrow,

and into the future.

 

2

 Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 346.

3

 Lieut. Gen. Harris Hollis, “The Heart and Mind of Creighton Abrams,” Military Review, April 1985, p. 63.
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Part II

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army is an institution grounded in seven core values: honor, integrity,

selfless service, courage, loyalty, duty, and respect. When respect for the individual

soldier is not maintained, the Army’s human relations environment suffers. Combat

readiness is directly correlated with a unit’s human relations environment; a “do more

with less” approach and a “zero defects mentality” lead to a diminished human relations

environment that causes soldiers to lose trust and confidence in their leaders. That

loss of faith, in turn, degrades combat readiness.

Our Army is the preeminent military ground force in the history of the United

States, and the world. This status is key both to decisive success in combat and to the

deterrence of would-be aggressors. Should we fail to promote a healthy human

relations environment in a timely and effective fashion, our ability to fight wars and

promote peace will surely suffer. The recommendations that follow are designed to

address the broad scope of issues identified by the Panel, not to solve each and every

shortcoming noted within the body of the report.
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ISSUE 1: Leadership

♦ Leadership is the key to the problem of sexual harassment in the Army and

the key to the solution to that problem.

Leaders set the values compass for the Army; it is from them that respect and

dignity flow. Many leaders are currently seen as practicing a zero defects mentality,

caring only about themselves and their careers. Soldiers do not uniformly have trust

and confidence in their leaders. Unfair treatment, double standards, and a lack of

discipline were raised to Panel representatives time and again during team visits to

various installations and commands. Such a negative view of leaders is

counterproductive to the objectives of EO, unit cohesion, and combat readiness. It is

also indicative of a serious communication problem between leaders and the led. A

leader needs to be sensitive to the possibility that young soldiers’ experiences may be

very different from the leader’s own.

Overarching the leadership issue are systemic problems that need to be

addressed to remedy leadership failures in general, and sexual harassment and other

human relations problems in particular. Both unit and individual leadership and human

relations training have disconnects throughout the Army. Army leadership doctrine

does not effectively address the critical nature of the human relations environment as it

relates to the warfight. There is no DA level proponent for unit leadership or human

relations programs and training. Individually, there is no systemic synchronization at

any of the precommissioning sources (United States Military Academy, Reserve

Officers’ Training Corps, Officer Candidate School) or at U.S. Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) schools for individual training.

According to Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership, Headquarters,

Department of the Army (HQDA) staff responsibility for leadership and leader

development is divided between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). This division of responsibilities

and functions between these two staffs is confusing because of the blurring of the

definitions for leadership and leader development. Leadership doctrine is the

responsibility of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth, a part of

the Combined Arms Center and TRADOC. The Center for Army Leadership was

intended to be the center of gravity for Army leadership, but has been unable to

maintain a strategic viewpoint because of its location within TRADOC. The Center for

Army Leadership is including a chapter on values in the new Field Manual (FM) 22-

100, Military Leadership. This is a step in the right direction, but falls short of ensuring

a fully integrated, concentrated effort, and a central point for all aspects of doctrine

related to leadership in terms of human relations.

Findings indicate that leadership and human relations are not currently

embedded in warfighting doctrine and thus are not considered important. Leaders at

training centers are focused on future concepts and doctrine and do not spend enough
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time on personal leadership tasks. Our training centers do not include leadership or

human relations as a specific battlefield operating system.

ISSUE 1 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Assign to one DA staff agency the primary responsibility for leadership, leader

development, and human relations for the Army.

♦ Designate a center of gravity for leadership and human relations doctrine within the

Army, which reports directly to the DA staff proponent.

♦ Make leadership and human relations readiness part of the monthly Unit Status

Report for all units.

♦ Make the concepts of leadership and human relations a battlefield operating system

at our training centers, and an integral element of Army leader development.

♦ Effectively incorporate the human dimension of warfare into Army operational

doctrine.

♦ Refocus senior leaders on the personal leadership role only they can perform.
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ISSUE 2: Human Relations Environment

While the human relations environment is a force protection and unit cohesion

issue that directly contributes to combat readiness, it has not been viewed as a combat

multiplier by some Army leaders. Over the past several years, DA has reduced the

human resource structure responsible for the human relations environment for DA as a

whole. Consequently the Army’s ability to provide strategic direction, integration, and

oversight of human relations has significantly diminished and the Army’s ability is

limited to reacting to events as they occur. To address the issues surfaced by the

Panel, DA requires a significantly better staffed and organized team of human relations

professionals who are well trained to take steps to address our human relations

problems.

ISSUE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Conduct a critical review of the staffing and organization of the Department of the

Army elements responsible for human relations problems and issues.

♦ Immediately augment staffing levels with trained professionals to address actions

surfacing during the review and while proposed restructuring and resourcing is

being implemented.
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ISSUE 3: Human Relations Policy and Practices

Although current human relations policy is adequate as written, it has not been

effective in practice. Had existing policy been executed by commanders as intended by

DA, the Panel’s work might well not have been necessary. Commanders are not the

exclusive agents responsible for ensuring compliance with Army policy. Responsibility

for developing packages and tools to support commanders in policy execution is vested

in agencies below HQDA. Unfortunately, many of these agencies are inadequately

resourced to execute their mission. Representative examples are TRADOC

Headquarters and the U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute (SSI). Tasked to develop the

EO training support packages (TSPs) for TRADOC, SSI has but one authorized

position for this critical job. Until the Army applies its resources to solving problems in

the human relations environment, the problems will continue and probably become

more severe.

ISSUE 3 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Make comments on the state of their organizations’ human relations environment

mandatory in leaders’ officer evaluation reports (OERs) and noncommissioned

officer evaluation reports (NCOERs).

♦ Conduct a critical review of the resourcing of those agencies responsible for

assisting commanders in implementing and executing human relations policy.

♦ Immediately augment staffing levels with trained professionals for those agencies to

deal with current requirements until the review is concluded and while its proposed

resourcing is being implemented.
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ISSUE 4: Human Relations Training

Training in the Army is much more than preventive maintenance; it is the critical

way in which Army doctrine is embedded into Army operations and into the hearts and

minds of soldiers. Human relations training, of which EO and the prevention of sexual

harassment (POSH) are important parts, is inadequate and ineffective. Soldiers

uniformly find POSH training is monotonous, viewing it as no more than a compulsory

formation to be endured to satisfy a requirement. When taught, POSH is segregated

from other topics, lecture-based, repetitive, and neither progressive nor sequential.

Leaders are not personally involved in the training and seldom attend. The inadequate

content and ineffective methods of human relations training throughout the Army

diminish the stature and emphasis on human relations issues within the Army.

ISSUE 4 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Embed human relations training in the Army training system as a doctrinal

imperative.

♦ Ensure that leaders and other human relations trainers are adequately trained and

prepared to conduct progressive, sequential, interactive, small group human

relations training, and provided the proper training support packages for the

conduct of this training.

♦ Task TRADOC to conduct a comprehensive review of the programs of instruction of

all leader development training to ensure that human relations training is embedded

in every training program, including all pre-command courses.

♦ Assign proponency for human relations training to the appropriate level within

TRADOC.

♦ Ensure that leaders participate in human relations training with their soldiers.

♦ Hold leaders accountable for preparing and executing human relations action plans

in support of the Army.
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ISSUE 5: Equal Opportunity Policies and Processes

One of the key charges to the Panel was to assess how well EO policies and

processes serve the individual soldier. During the 1980s, staffing for the Army’s EO

program diminished and the military occupational specialty (MOS) for human relations

specialists was deleted from the inventory. Commanders went from being assisted by a

core of trained and seasoned professionals to soldiers rotating in and out of the

program for one tour of duty outside their principal MOS after being trained at the

Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). By rotating equal

opportunity advisors (EOAs) into and out of the EO program, the Army hoped to

reinforce a positive human relations environment throughout the Army; this did not

occur. Commanders were expected to ensure that the EO program emphasis was

maintained. Instead, other responsibilities were allowed to override those of the EO

program and EO resources were among the first to be cut during the current drawdown

of the Army force structure.

Further exacerbating the problem of inadequate EOA resources is the rapid

expansion of the number of tenant activities on Army installations. The installations are

not staffed with sufficient EOAs to handle EO issues. Current policy dictates that

tenant activities must use their own unit’s EO resources. Thus tenant activities must

rely on EOA resources residing at other locations with their parent unit. Parent units

can be hundreds, even thousands, of miles distant.

Equal opportunity in the Army has been marginalized, under-resourced, and

dismissed as a distraction rather than a combat multiplier. The extent to which the

program has worked as well as it has is a tribute to those dedicated, committed EO

personnel working hard to ensure that soldiers’ needs are effectively addressed; as

well as those commanders who, as exceptions to the rule, have actively participated in

and supported human relations as a combat readiness multiplier.

Notwithstanding these laudatory efforts, the failure of the EO program is a

leadership failure from which our soldiers are suffering. Clearly the system suffers from

a lack of credibility and effectiveness. Reconstruction of the program will require a

major effort.

ISSUE 5 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Re-engineer the EO program from top to bottom to make it responsive to leaders

and soldiers, to protect those who use it, and to ensure that those working in it are

not stigmatized. Re-engineering should address the need for a human relations

military occupational specialty and an improved rank structure for all EOAs.
21

♦ While the program is being re-engineered:

--Establish and sufficiently staff a Directorate for Strategic Human Resources

with responsibility for assessing, training, researching, benchmarking, reporting,

and integrating EO program activities.

--Properly resource EOA positions by rank and grade in accordance with current

regulatory guidance.

--Provide adequate host installation EOA resources for tenant activities.

--Monitor training support package development.

--Make EOA utilization and human relations/equal opportunity training a

mandatory item in Quarterly Training Briefs.

--Explore the need for a temporary sexual harassment assistance office at the

installation level until trust and confidence can be reestablished in the EO

complaint system.

--Implement a “Respect for Others” program patterned after the Military District

of Washington’s “Consideration of Others” program for Army Active Component,

Reserve Components, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer

Candidate School (OCS).

--Either properly train and assign equal opportunity representative (EOR) duties

to senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or eliminate EOR positions

altogether and hold the commander personally responsible for EO unit training.

--Ensure commanders understand the EO program and personally participate in

EO training.

--Embed human relations training in all leadership training.
22

ISSUE 6: Climate Assessments

The human relations environment is first and foremost a combat readiness issue.

Anticipating issues and preventing problems is one of the most important steps in

ensuring a positive human relations environment. A climate assessment survey

provides leaders with a baseline appraisal of a unit’s environment and can be key to

promoting a commander’s understanding and awareness of his/her unit’s human

relations environment. Currently, climate assessments are encouraged, not required.

The assessment instruments are neither standardized nor effective, nor are they readily

available to commanders. Periodic command climate assessments must be conducted.

Leaders must be held accountable for this important aspect of combat readiness.

ISSUE 6 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Develop and field a command climate assessment instrument tailored to each type

unit.

♦ Mandate the conduct of a command climate assessment down to company-sized

units at least annually.

♦ Provide standardized guidance from HQDA concerning the use of assessment

results.

♦ Create a mechanism for holding commanders accountable for command climate.
23

ISSUE 7: Army Command Policy

Interim change 4, chapter 6, AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, expired almost

two years ago. Since that time, the proponent has revised, but not published, the

regulation. Many important changes are captured in the revision and would provide

important guidance to the field Army. There are also other Army agencies responsible

for human relations documents (e.g., Department of the Army pamphlets and training

circulars) that depend on the information published in the regulation as the basis for

revising the documents for which they exercise responsibility.

Over the past two years, each time the proponent was prepared to publish the

revised regulation a new issue would surface. In response, the proponent would halt

publication awaiting resolution of the problem and related regulatory changes. Until the

revised AR 600-20 is published, the field Army will fall farther and farther behind in

understanding and applying human relations policy and guidance.

ISSUE 7 RECOMMENDATION:

♦ Publish AR 600-20 immediately and publish interim changes as they develop.
24

ISSUE 8: Support for Training Base

Being a soldier is a learned behavior. If soldiers fail to appreciate that good

order and discipline, Army values, and teamwork are the essence of the Army, the

soldierization process has failed. Our soldiers represent a cross section of the Nation’s

young people who come into the Army with their individual outlooks on life and

individual value systems. It is through the Army’s soldierization process that they

become equal members of the Army team--that they become soldiers. If we expect

soldiers of both genders, all races, and diverse backgrounds to live and work together

as a team, soldierization must teach them how to accomplish this task.

This mission belongs to the training base. The training base is woefully underresourced to accomplish its assigned mission. With the proper resources, the Army

might have avoided many of the breakdowns in discipline that have been so highly

publicized. The command and control structure is inadequate, and the soldierization

process suffers as training cadre are extended beyond their physical, mental, and

emotional limits.

A key to addressing human relations issues, including sexual harassment, is

assigning enough female role models to set the example for all trainees. Twenty

percent of Army accessions are women, but the training base is composed of only ten

percent female drill sergeants. Further, combat arms personnel, who have the least

experience in dealing with sexual harassment issues, comprise the majority of key

command and cadre positions. Most of these leaders, whether combat arms or not,

have not received adequate training in how to deal with sexual harassment issues that

may arise in their units. Added to this void are reorganizations and consolidations,

which over the last several years have created gaps in the command and control

structure, leaving no one to monitor the environment of trainees.

The same facts and almost identical issues apply to recruiters who serve as the

Army’s interface with the American public. Recruiters and drill sergeants hold positions

of similar difficulty and importance, and they set the example not just for new recruits

but for the Nation as a whole.

ISSUE 8 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Task TRADOC to review the command and control structure at each installation

responsible for IET and, where it is inadequate, remedy it.

♦ Increase the length of IET to allow for more intense, more rigorous soldierization

and the inculcation of Army values.

♦ Better utilize drill sergeants as trainers of Army values.
25

♦ Staff drill sergeant, command and cadre positions, and recruiting positions with a

more appropriate mix of trained men and women professionals.
26

ISSUE 9: Initial Entry Training

New recruits form and hold their most lasting impressions of the Army from the

cadre they encounter during IET. These leaders have more contact with young

trainees than any other leadership segment of the Army. Their preparatory training,

key to their success in this role, is inadequate. Drill sergeant school and instructor

training courses do not provide the essential tactics, techniques, and procedures

required of leaders assigned to the critical tasks of influencing the soldierization

process. Instruction must focus not only on dignity and respect for recruits and their

fellow soldiers, but provide realistic insights into what leaders will face and techniques

for handling inappropriate behaviors by members of their units and for handling the

potential for inappropriate personal behavior. Training must equip leaders with the

tools they will need to conduct continuous evaluations of their units for inappropriate

behaviors and teach them how to recognize and deal with those behaviors when they

occur.

Currently drill sergeants are trained at three different locations. Creating three

quality human relations training programs would be unnecessarily difficult and only add

to the overhead costs associated with running three training sites. More importantly,

one drill sergeant school would ensure uniform quality, maximize use of resources, and

bring greater and more consistent focus and attention to this critical human relations

training shortcoming.

Recruiters are similarly hampered by a lack of training in how to deal with

handling the inappropriate behaviors of prospective enlistees and how to handle their

own potential for inappropriate personal behavior.

In addition to drill sergeants and recruiters, the quality of the other soldiers and

civilians who support training is very important. For example, drivers from the motor

pool, administrative clerks at reception and processing stations and in units, and supply

clerks, require similar training in recognizing and preventing inappropriate personal

behaviors.

ISSUE 9 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Improve IET cadre and recruiter training to include tools and techniques for

addressing inappropriate behaviors in units and for recognizing and interrupting the

potential for inappropriate personal behavior.

♦ Incorporate ethics and human relations training in recruiting and IET cadre courses,

to include professionally facilitated sensitivity training.
27

♦ Combine the three separate drill sergeant schools into one school, properly

resourced and staffed to educate all Army drill sergeants to a given standard of

excellence.
28

ISSUE 10: Drill Sergeant and Instructor Selection

It has already been described that drill sergeants and cadre are key elements in

the formative stages of a soldier’s life in the Army. They are the first and most

important contacts new trainees have with the Army and it is imperative that drill

sergeant selectees are themselves of the highest quality soldiers. This same

philosophy holds true for trainee instructors. It is critical that evaluation criteria and

procedures be used to ensure NCOs and officers selected/nominated for drill sergeant,

instructor, and cadre positions have the requisite qualifications. Although the Army

presently conducts some limited screening of drill sergeant nominees, it does not

screen for cadre and instructors.

ISSUE 10 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Implement and improve screening procedures for drill sergeants, cadre, and

instructors in IET, including psychological screening.

♦ Ensure that failure to complete the Drill Sergeant School does not end or mar a

candidate’s career, unless the failure results from misconduct or failure to meet the

baseline requirements for an NCO.
29

ISSUE 11: Advanced Individual Training

In many locations, AIT has become a “school house” rather than a continuation

of the soldierization process of IET. In part, this attitude may have been caused by the

shortage of personnel in TRADOC schools. Much of the problem, however, has been

caused by the focus on technical skills at the expense of soldier skills and attitudes. In

years past, the duration of IET was reduced significantly on the theory that AIT would

be a continuation of the soldierization process and not separate from it. Advanced

Individual Training has fallen away from that concept, and must be refocused as a

continuation of the soldierization process initiated in BCT. Advanced Individual

Training must be rigorous, satisfying, and challenging. Advanced Individual Training

must not be permitted to adopt a “campus” orientation.

Other detractors also exist at AIT. Service members from other military services

and reclassified soldiers attending AIT are treated in a different, much more collegial

manner than trainees. Trainees view this treatment as a double standard that further

degrades an already troubled environment. Drill sergeants must take on a more

meaningful training role in AIT.

ISSUE 11 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Implement a renewed AIT approach that focuses on the continuation of the

soldierization process begun in BCT as well as tactical, technical, and soldier skills

and attitudes.

♦ Treat all trainees in a like manner, to include other Service attendees and

reclassified soldiers, or place these personnel in separate courses from IET

personnel.

♦ Increase the training responsibilities of drill sergeants in AIT after the current

shortage of drill sergeants is remedied.
30

ISSUE 12: Army Core Values

The Army is a values-based organization with specific core values. These Army

values must be instilled in our soldiers prior to and during IET and must be reinforced

throughout their careers. The bonds of trust between our soldiers are built on these

common values, the traditions of the Army, the shared disciplined life of a soldier, and

the common experiences of working as a team. Initial Entry Training is critical in

calibrating the human relations compass of each soldier and setting appropriate

expectations for them, their peers, and their leaders. In addition to the previously

discussed lack of discipline and rigor in IET, IET trainees lack training in Army values.

ISSUE 12 RECOMMENDATIONS:

♦ Develop and provide literature to new recruits on the Army’s core values, ethics,

and ethos.

♦ Build a new training program into IET to inculcate Army values, appropriate

behavior, and team building.
31

ISSUE 13: Victim Assistance

Throughout the Army, soldiers who have been victims of inappropriate sexual

behavior have reported incidents to professionals and leaders. These same

professionals and leaders have not received sufficient training in working with victims

and are left to rely on rudimentary perceptions of how victims want to be treated. As a

result, victims are reluctant to report inappropriate behaviors for fear of being revictimized by the very system that was put in place to deal with their complaints. This

reluctance contributes to soldiers’ lack of trust and confidence in the chain of command

and in Army leaders in general.

ISSUE 13 RECOMMENDATION:

♦ Ensure that professionals and leaders who are expected to deal with soldiers

reporting incidents of inappropriate sexual behavior are trained and qualified.
32

ISSUE 14: Confidentiality for Victims

One of the best ways in which the Army can assist victims of sexual harassment

is to ensure that adequate counseling services are available, whether through mental

health professionals or chaplains. The real or perceived lack of confidentiality that

exists in military mental health and chaplaincy counseling sessions is a tremendous

impediment to victims’ decisions about whether to avail themselves of these services.

When a victim in need of counseling services is worried that whatever he or she says

may end up as material for the defense of the perpetrator or serve as the basis for

adverse action against the victim, that victim thinks long and hard about seeking help.

The Panel heard mental health professionals and chaplains echo the concern

regarding victims’ confidentiality.

ISSUE 14 RECOMMENDATION:

♦ Pursue relief from current rules that limit confidentiality for victims of sexual

harassment.
33

Part III

THE SENIOR REVIEW PANEL AND THE REPORT

Panel Composition

To serve as Chair of the Senior Review Panel, the Secretary of the Army

recalled to active duty Major General Richard S. Siegfried, a combat arms officer with

extensive experience in Army training policies and practices. Six other members were

selected for Panel duty.4 They were Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote, another

veteran officer who was recalled to active duty by the Secretary to serve as Panel Vice

Chair; Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence;

Major General Larry R. Ellis, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division; Mr. John P.

McLaurin III, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Military Personnel Management

and Equal Opportunity Policy); Mrs. Ruby B. DeMesme, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

the Air Force (Force Management and Personnel); and Command Sergeant Major

Cynthia A. Pritchett, the Post Command Sergeant Major at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.5

Consultants

Secretary West also named three consultants to assist the Panel. They were

Brigadier General Mary Morgan, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Soldier

Support Institute; Judith A. Youngman, Ph.D., Chair of the Defense Advisory Committee

on Women in the Services; and Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D., a professor in the

Department of Sociology at the University of Maryland. They provided advice to the

Panel throughout its deliberations.

In addition to these consultants, the Panel members called upon other

individuals from both the military and civilian sectors whose knowledge and subject

matter expertise were of invaluable assistance throughout the Panel’s deliberations.

These included Lieutenant General Robert H. Forman, USA(Ret.), former Deputy

Commanding General for Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command;

Colonel Karen L. Frey, USA(Ret.), Human Resource Consultant; Dr. Annabel Hagood,

Professor Emerita, University of Alabama; Mr. Dan Lumpkin, Lumpkin and Associates;

Dr. Laura Miller, Harvard University Fellow; and Dr. Naomi Verdugo, Senior

Demographer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER),

HQDA.

 

4

 The Panel originally had nine members. Early in the Panel process, two members’ requests to be

excused were approved by the Secretary.

5

 Biographies of the Panel members are found in Annex B, Volume I.
34

Panel Working Group

To support the Senior Review Panel, a working group of more than 40 soldiers

and civilian employees was assembled. Included in this group were officers and NCOs

from combat, combat support, and combat service support branches. Some members

were former drill sergeants or former recruiters; other members were soldiers trained at

and assigned to DEOMI or within ODCSPER. A DA civilian employee with many years

of experience in the equal employment opportunity (EEO) program was also a member

of the working group. Seven of this group’s members hold Ph.D.s with expertise in

social psychology, anthropology, industrial/organizational psychology, sociology, and

organizational behavior. Legal experts and officers from the Reserve Components

provided additional depth. In all, the working group reflected a diverse array of

backgrounds, races, ranks, and perspectives, bringing a rich mix of professional

experience to bear on the issues being addressed.

Panel Organization

The Panel organized itself into four teams. One team dedicated its main effort to

a review of Army policies and acted as a sustaining body for the other teams which

were organized as field teams for data collection. On the average, each traveling team

had six soldiers and one civilian employee as members. Uniformed members included

an NCO with drill sergeant experience, an officer with human resource management

experience, and an NCO trained at DEOMI. The civilian member of each data

collection team was a scientist assigned to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences. In their travels, each field team was accompanied by

a Senior Review Panel member, who was either the Chair, the Vice Chair, or the

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army. All other Panel members traveled with teams

as often as their other duties permitted.

Panel Preparation

Prior to traveling, the Panel and working group members received a series of

briefings, as well as extensive training from agencies within DA or the Department of

Defense (DoD). Representatives from DEOMI briefed on EO programs. Officers of the

Office of The Judge Advocate General briefed the legal aspects of sexual harassment,

and Department of the Army Inspectors General covered the status of sexual

harassment investigations ongoing within their agency. The U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command and one of its major subordinate commands, the U.S. Army Soldier

Support Institute, provided personnel to present information concerning EO training

programs and initiatives. The policy dimension of EO was discussed by

representatives from ODCSPER. The status of sexual harassment investigations was

briefed by members of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.
35

Methodology

Four methods were used by the Panel to assess the human relations

environment of the Army. The data collection entailed sampling from Army leaders,

soldiers, and civilians.6

Individual Interviews. First, Panel members and field teams conducted individual

interviews with the Army’s military and civilian leaders, mental health professionals,

equal opportunity (military) and equal employment opportunity (civilian) personnel,

chaplains, and judge advocates. Using carefully developed interview protocols, these

key individuals were asked their perceptions and recommendations concerning the

human relations environment in their commands. Their comments were then entered

into a computer program for categorization, coding, and analysis.

Focus Groups. Focus group sessions were the second method of data collection.

The sessions consisted of single-gender groups of eight to twelve people stratified into

distinct categories (i.e., junior enlisted soldiers, junior NCOs, senior NCOs, company

grade officers, field grade officers, civilian employees, drill sergeants, instructors, and

trainees). Each focus group was restricted to one of these categories. Participants

were randomly selected by the last digit of their social security number. Focus group

facilitators and note takers, also the same gender as the group, conducted their

sessions by using protocols which contained standardized questions about the human

relations environment. As with the interview data, the focus group data were entered

into a program for subsequent analysis.

Surveys. The third data collection method was a written survey which addressed the

subjects of leadership, cohesion, and sexual harassment. In order to accommodate

different types of groups (i.e., company-level units, military students, and the training

base) several survey versions were used. They were administered by working group

members to entire randomly-selected company-sized units. Subsequently, the data

gathered were analyzed by using a standard statistical software package.

Observation. The Panel’s fourth method of data collection was by observation. Panel

members spoke with soldiers, leaders, civilians, family members, and others who

provided their perspective concerning the human relations environment in which they

worked and/or lived. Panel members spent many hours visiting barracks, dining

facilities, recreation centers, gymnasiums, and other soldier facilities. Wherever they

traveled, they took a measure of whether soldiers lived and worked in an atmosphere

characterized by respect and dignity. Insights gathered worldwide proved to be

invaluable complements to the voluminous amount of scientific data. In addition, a

detailed outbrief to the senior leaders at each location visited allowed them to

immediately begin taking corrective actions.

 

6

 Detailed methodological discussions are found in Volume II of this report.
36

Scope

The Panel conducted an extensive policy review, collected data at 59 Army

installations throughout the world, 7 and completed exhaustive analysis of the data

collected. After more than seven months of intensive study, 808 Army leaders had

been interviewed, 7,401 soldiers and 1,007 civilian employees had participated in focus

groups, and 22,952 soldiers had completed surveys.

The Report

The report reflects the results of the effort described above. It must be noted

that the Panel could not have completed its work without the willing cooperation of the

soldiers, leaders, and civilians with whom we met. In many cases, their input was

provided with personally painful recollection of incidents of mistreatment. We

acknowledge how difficult it was for them to air emotionally charged feelings and we

appreciate everyone’s frank participation in the data collection.

Non-attribution. Throughout our study we observed strict rules of confidentiality, and

the data contained in this report adheres to that same standard of non-attribution.

Where we have used direct quotations, we have kept them anonymous. These

quotations have been carefully selected to be illustrative of what we heard overall.

They are not idiosyncratic and are not intended to single out any one individual as

unique or distinct in their comments.

Definition of Terms. There are terms used throughout this report for which a common

understanding is essential. The following definitions establish this frame of reference

for future discussion within the report:

♦ Commanders. The term “commanders” refers to officers holding command

positions.

♦ Equal opportunity. Equal opportunity is a principle fixed in law that recognizes the

right of an individual to consideration and treatment based on merit, fitness, and

capability without regard to race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. In any

discussion of equal opportunity as an Army policy or program it is important to

distinguish between equal opportunity (EO) and equal employment opportunity

(EEO). Equal opportunity covers military members and EEO covers civilian

employees.8

 

7

 The list of installations visited is at Annex D, Volume I.

8

 The Panel collected limited data from the civilian work force in the course of its examination of the

Active Component. The statistical sample was small and the data inconclusive in terms of assessing

sexual harassment in the civilian work force. However, some potential issues and conclusions related to

the civilian work force were identified and are discussed in Annex H, Volume 1. The results of the data

collection are provided in Volume II.
37

♦ Human relations. Human relations are the interactions between people, one with

another. Human relations is an overarching term encompassing many dimensions

of human interaction including equal opportunity, sex discrimination, and sexual

harassment.

♦ Inappropriate behavior. The term “inappropriate behavior” is derived from the

Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (Fitzgerald, 1988), which categorizes sexual

harassment behaviors (e.g., crude or offensive language such as sexual jokes;

sexist behavior such as displaying pinup calendars; unwanted sexual attention such

as touching; sexual coercion; and sexual assault).

♦ Leaders. “Leaders” include the most junior noncommissioned officer to the most

senior commissioned officer.

♦ Sex Discrimination. Sex discrimination, sometimes referred to as gender

discrimination, is discrimination based solely on an individual being male or female.

Discrimination based on one’s sex is often linked to a set of assumptions based on

sex role stereotypes concerning the abilities, competence, status, and roles of the

particular group, resulting in a disparate treatment of or impact on that group.

♦ Sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that

involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal

or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:

a. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or

condition of a person’s job, pay, or career, or

b. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for

career or employment decisions affecting that person, or

c. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an

individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

working environment.

This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be actionable as “abusive

work environment” harassment, need not result in concrete psychological harm to

the victim, but rather need only be so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person

would perceive, and the victim does perceive, the work environment as hostile or

offensive. (“Workplace” is an expansive term for military members and may include

conduct on or off duty, 24 hours a day.) Any person in a supervisory or command

position who uses or condones any form of sexual behavior to control, influence, or

affect the career, pay, or job of a military member or civilian employee is engaging

in sexual harassment. Similarly, any military member or civilian employee who

makes deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or physical

contact of a sexual nature is engaging in sexual harassment. 9

 

9

 The source of this definition is Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense

Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, August 1995. Annex E, Volume I, provides further

discussion of sexual harassment.
38

♦ Soldiers. Except as otherwise noted, the discussions pertain to active duty soldiers

and not to the Reserve Components or to Department of the Army civilian

employees.

♦ Trainees. Those soldiers attending Basic Combat Training (BCT), Advanced

Individual Training (AIT), or One Station Unit Training (OSUT).

♦ Trainers. “Trainers” are defined as drill sergeants and instructors.

Report Organization. Our report is divided into two volumes. Each volume begins

with the same executive summary and forwarding letter.

Volume I. Volume I consists of four parts. Part I is our introduction. Part II

summarizes our conclusions and provides our recommendations. Part III has

background information on the Panel and the report. Part IV reports the results of our

assessment in four subsections. We first review the Army EO Program and then, in

turn, examine the Extent of Sexual Harassment and Sex Discrimination in the Army,

Leadership, and Initial Entry Training in successive sections.

Volume II. Volume II contains a complete explanation of our study scope and

methodology and fully details our data analysis. This analysis covers all the data we

collected from surveys, focus groups, and interviews. Copies of the instruments and

protocols we used are also contained in Volume II.
39

Part IV

SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ASSESSMENT10

THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (EO) PROGRAM

Historical Context

The EO program policy provides the foundation and sets the framework for the

Panel’s review. In 1964, the Army established its EO program to ensure equal

opportunity and just treatment for soldiers and their families on and off post.11 That

same year, per DoD guidance, the Army implemented its first regulation concerning

equal opportunity, AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel.

Since then, the Army’s efforts to achieve equal opportunity have centered around three

issues: improving race relations, eliminating gender discrimination, and eliminating

sexual harassment.

Race Relations

During the late 1960s and early to mid 1970s, the Army concentrated on the

problem of race relations. The Civil Rights movement, the accompanying unrest of the

1960s, the institutional turmoil caused by the Vietnam War, the end of the draft, and the

need to establish a volunteer Army all exacerbated tensions and heightened racial

polarization in the Army. Concerned that these problems were affecting unit readiness,

the Army directed its efforts toward educating soldiers and leaders, and placing trained

EO experts into the field. By 1972, more than 2000 school-trained EO officers and

NCOs were on hand, filling formally established positions in Army unit organizational

manning tables, to assist commanders in eliminating racism and discrimination in the

Army.

The objective of the Army’s race relations education program was “to maintain

the highest degree of organizational and combat readiness by fostering harmonious

relations among all military personnel under Army control.”12 Army policy mandated a

yearly 18-hour block of race relations and equal opportunity (RR/EO) instruction for all

soldiers, taught by instructors trained at the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI).

 

10 Percentages used in this assessment are based on survey analysis. Focus groups and individual

interviews were used to give dimension to the quantitative data. The Panel uses the terms “few,”

“some,” “many,” and “most” to report the number of responses from focus group and individual interview

analyses. “Few” means 25% and below, “some” means 26% - 50%, “many” means 51% - 75%, and

“most” means 76% and above.

11 A more detailed discussion of the history of the Army’s EO program is at Annex E, Volume I, “Review

of Policies,” and Annex F, “Events Connected With Equal Opportunity in the Army Since 1947.”

12 Dep’t of Army, Regulation 600-42, Race Relations Education for the Army, para. 2 (December 11,

1973).
40

Unit commanders, however, had no responsibility for EO training. In 1973, AR 600-21,

newly titled as Race Relations and Equal Opportunity, placed the responsibility for

conducting the unit RR/EO program squarely on the chain of command. Surveys

showed this directed focus increased soldiers’ trust that the Army was serious in

solving the most pressing EO problems.

Army Proponency

In 1971, the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs (OEOP) was established as a

division in ODCSPER to carry out the development, management, and execution of the

EO program. The OEOP was originally under the direction of a general officer and

senior colonels. By 1985 the OEOP was just a small branch within the Leader Policy

Division of the Human Resources Directorate (HRD), ODCSPER, under the direction of

a major. In 1986, the HRD was disestablished with its remaining functions going to

other directorates. In 1990, the HRD was reestablished to more centrally manage

human resources programs. Today’s OEOP, now authorized a lieutenant colonel and

sergeant major, is located within the Leadership Division of HRD, ODCSPER. The

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Military Personnel Management and Equal

Opportunity Policy has the responsibility for monitoring the Army’s EO program. The

DCSPER, a member of the Army General Staff, is responsible for the development,

management, and execution of the EO program.

Women in the Army

While women’s issues were evident during the years of the Women’s Army

Corps (WAC), the WAC chain of command typically ensured the resolution of problems

when and where they occurred. Change began in 1973 with the end of the draft and

the beginning of the all-volunteer Army. A policy decision was made to expand the

number of Army women and to integrate them more widely into Army career fields. This

decision was made in part to sustain a quality force in the post-draft era and to ensure

the viability of the all-volunteer Army. Also, in 1973, the Army implemented a policy

change to provide for equal opportunity and treatment for uniformed members withhold

regard to not only race, color, religion, or national origin, but also gender.

Organizationally, the years 1972 to 1978 were years of change: women entered

the Army ROTC program in 1972, began integrating into Table of Organization and

Equipment (TOE) units in 1975, and enrolled at the United States Military Academy

(USMA) in 1976. By 1977, women started training alongside men in basic training, and

female officers served in all branches of the Army except combat arms. In 1978, the

Women’s Army Corps was disestablished and women were integrated into the Army.

By 1990, women could serve in 90% of the Army enlisted MOSs, and in January 1994,

the Secretary of Defense directed that all positions be opened to women except those

in units below brigade level that had a primary mission of engaging in direct ground

combat.
41

Command Responsibility

In 1977, the Army changed the name of its basic EO regulation to Equal

Opportunity Program in the Army. This regulation affirmed that the EO program was a

single, integrated program that concerned all military members of the Army.

Commanders at all levels were responsible for the development and implementation of

EO programs for their organization. The major commands (MACOMs) specified

minimum unit EO training requirements for subordinate organizations consistent with

command needs and local conditions. It was left to individual commanders to

determine the content and development of local programs.

In 1988, the Army incorporated AR 600-21 into AR 600-20, Army Command

Policy, sending an even stronger signal that EO was intended to be a command

program. Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, which establishes the current Army EO program, is

explicit in affixing responsibility on the chain of command. Chapter 6 also establishes

EO hotlines at all installations, prescribes EO policies, defines sexual harassment, lists

the staffing requirements and duties of EOAs, explains the complaint process,

addresses mandatory unit training requirements, and outlines the parameters for

professional military education course training requirements.

DoD Sexual Harassment Definition

The Army last updated Chapter 6 of AR 600-20 in September 1993, with Interim

Change 4. Change 4 expired in September 1995. A new AR 600-20 has been drafted

and is pending publication.13 The existing regulation does not incorporate verbatim the

1995 DoD definition of sexual harassment, as required by DoD Directive 1350.2,

Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, August 18, 1995.14

Under the provisions of AR 600-20, commanders must develop an affirmative action

plan and review it at least annually. Guidance to the field in this area also is outdated

in that the DA Affirmative Action Plan, found in Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA

Pam) 600-26, was last published in May 1990.

Complaint System

In 1993, the Army restructured the complaint system described in AR 600-20 in

response to a reported lack of confidence in the old system. Although the primary and

preferred channel for identifying and correcting discriminatory practices is the chain of

command, the new system gives a soldier a number of alternative channels for filing

complaints if the complainant feels uncomfortable in filing a complaint with the chain of

command, or if the complaint is against a member of the chain of command. Other

channels available to soldiers include the EO advisor, inspector general (IG), chaplain,

 

13 ODCSPER is currently revising and updating AR 600-20 pending the recommendations from this

Panel’s report.

14 The Army’s definition of sexual harassment is found in Dep’t of Army, Regulation 600-20, Army

Command Policy, para. 6-4 (March 30, 1988) (IO4, September 17, 1993).
42

provost marshal/criminal investigation command, medical agencies, staff judge

advocate, and housing referral office. Ultimately, the chain of command is responsible

for ensuring that human relations issues are taken seriously and acted upon as

necessary.

Command Authorities

Commanders have the authority under current law, rule, and regulation to deal

with cases of unlawful discrimination or sexual harassment. Army Regulation 600-20,

paragraph 4-4, “Soldier Conduct,” provides that “[e]nsuring the proper conduct of

soldiers is a function of command. Commanders rely upon all leaders in the Army . . .

to . . . [t]ake action against military personnel in any case where the soldier’s conduct

violates good order and discipline.” Although chapter 6 of AR 600-20 is not punitive,

the commander’s inherent authority to impose administrative sanctions and the

nonjudicial punishment and punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ) provide commanders with sufficient authority to enforce Army policy in matters

of discrimination and harassment.

Commanders have the full range of administrative actions available to them to

deal with violators of Army policy on equal opportunity, including sexual harassment. A

commander can initiate administrative action against a soldier who committed an

offense, as a single action or in conjunction with action under the UCMJ.

Administrative action is meant to be corrective and rehabilitative. These actions range

from counseling to involuntary separation.

When administrative measures are inadequate due to the nature of the offense

or the record of the soldier, nonjudicial punishment and trial by court-martial are

available for use by a commander depending on the severity of the offense. If a

commander decides, after investigation, that an offense is too serious for nonjudicial

punishment, authorized by Article 15, UCMJ, then the commander may seek to have

charges referred for trial by court-martial. A commander may also forward charges for

disposition by a superior commander.

Panel Assessment of the EO Program

The Panel’s review of the Army’s EO program began with a review of the

purposes served by specific policies and procedures and concluded with an

assessment of how well these policies and procedures serve the individual soldier in

practice. Four main concerns emerged from the review: institutional commitment to the

EO program; trust on the part of soldiers in the EO complaint system, which, if absent,

inhibits effective communications between soldiers and their leaders; EO training; and

EO resourcing.
43

Lack of Institutional Commitment

♦ Many commanders have not demonstrated commitment to the EO program.

Thirty-three years after implementing its EO program, the Army continues its

attempts to eradicate discrimination. It has long been a leader in this effort, but is now

in danger of failing to meet its own standards. The experience of the Army in dealing

with race relations, gender discrimination, and sexual harassment has been that a

successful program depends in large measure on unit leaders’ perceptions of how

these problems affect combat readiness--the greater the perceived effect on combat

readiness, the higher the level of command emphasis and the better the EO program.

The current EO program is a command responsibility, therefore command emphasis is

critical to successful implementation.

Unfortunately, many commanders fail in their responsibility to develop and

implement the EO program within their organizations. In failing to accept the EO

program as their personal responsibility, these commanders delegate its operations to

a subordinate (e.g., the executive officer, adjutant, command sergeant major, or the EO

advisor). Viewed another way, many commanders are not committed to the EO

program because they do not see the value added. While the value of the EO program

to the human element, the individual soldier, should be self-evident, it is not.

Correcting this misperception will require a solution driven by senior leaders.

♦ The number of equal opportunity advisors (EOAs) assigned is unacceptably

low.

Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 6-6a(2), states that one enlisted soldier

(sergeant first class or higher) with primary duty as an EOA will be available full-time as

the advisor for each brigade-level or equivalent and higher unit commander.15 As

evidenced by Table 1, however, neither EOA authorizations nor the assigned strength

comply with the prescribed policy.

Table 1--EOA Staffing as of March 31, 1997

Regulatory Requirement Authorizations EOAs Assigned

Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted

36 547 16 324 16 277

Of the 547 enlisted positions required by regulation, only 324 (59%) are

authorized as positions to be filled. Of those positions authorized for fill, only 277

(51%) have EOAs assigned. Manning documents that establish positions and actions

needed to fill these positions are normally established and initiated by the individual

 

15 A brigade is comprised of approximately 2,000 soldiers.
44

commands. As the Army has drawn down its force, some of the first positions cut have

been EOA positions. The fundamental reason for these cuts was that other positions

were seen as more directly tied to unit readiness and thus more important. This failure

to comply with established policy indicates that the EO program is not seen as a priority

in many commands. The EOA positions were simply shifted to meet other needs in a

downsizing, “do-more-with-less” environment.

Officers face a unique situation regarding EOA coverage. With only sixteen

officer EOAs in the Army, officers must consult with enlisted EOAs or use other less

skilled alternatives. According to focus group comments, this situation contributes to a

general reluctance on the part of officers to seek help if sexually harassed.

♦ Current EOA demographics give the appearance of a minority or woman’s

program.

The current demographic make-up of EOAs does not parallel the demographic

make-up of the Army. Enlisted EOAs are currently 56% black, as compared to the

Army's enlisted composition of 27% black. Women comprise 32% of enlisted EOAs,

while 14% of the Army’s enlisted force are women. This finding gives unintended

support to the common perception held by many leaders and soldiers that the Army's

EO program is irrelevant--a peripheral program designed for and comprised of only

minorities and women.

The Commanding General, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM),

is charged to select officers and NCOs for training and duty as EOAs. Most officers

assigned to EO positions are graduates of the two-week Equal Opportunity Program

Manager course taught by DEOMI (formerly DRRI). Noncommissioned officers

assigned to EOA positions must be graduates of the 16-week DEOMI resident course.

A lack of rigor in the selection process has prompted PERSCOM to change its selection

procedure for EOAs to one that will be nominative, with centralized management.

PERSCOM will also take action to realign EOA demographics with those of the Army by

May 1999.

It is imperative that these initiatives, as well as others described later in this

section, be implemented and institutionalized. Currently, EO assignments are not

considered to be career enhancing for either officers or NCOs. Some officers and

NCOs have gone to great lengths to ensure their official records do not reflect the fact

that they served in EO positions or attended EO training. Others have been counseled

by PERSCOM career managers that EO assignments are not career enhancing. While

adequate staffing and education are the central pillars needed to support an effective

EO program, until the Army, as an institution, places value on EO duty, it will always be

viewed as a less than career enhancing assignment and the EO program itself will be

characterized similarly.
45

♦ The EO program policy is adequate but has failed in practice.

Equal opportunity policy, as defined in AR 600-20,16 has long been viewed by

commanders, EOAs, and by Congress as a success story. “The system is in place”

was a common statement from leaders interviewed by the Panel. The 1993 revamping

of EO complaint procedures was viewed as yet another positive step by both

commanders and the EO community at large. In the Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 National

Defense Authorization Act, Congress recommended that the other military services

adopt the Army’s EO policy and procedures.17 On paper, the policy is clear and

unequivocal; commanders have authority sufficient to enforce the policy, and the

complaint procedures are well defined.

Unfortunately, paper policy has not translated into reality in the field. Although

many senior leaders in the field actively voiced their support for EO, the actual level of

support usually diminished at each successively lower level of the chain of command.

Lower level commanders perceive that other missions take precedence; and, as a

result, many commanders are not making the EO program a priority, nor taking the

necessary steps to implement and institutionalize it.

As has been noted earlier, the EO program is a commander’s program. In 1984,

the Army removed the Military Occupational Specialty, “00U” (full time, school-trained

EO specialist) for EOAs. With this action, the Army reinforced the fact that the EO

program is a commander’s program, but diminished the likelihood of properly trained

specialists. Rather than having a corps of trained career professionals assist him/her

in operating the EO program, the commander now runs the program with the aid of

soldiers from other specialties, who have received training for what is usually one tour

of duty as an EOA. The theory behind this shift in approach was a vision that more EO

trained soldiers would move into leadership positions over time and, thus, more

effectively institutionalize EO Army-wide. That vision, however, has not been achieved.

Equal opportunity duty is viewed as something less than beneficial to a soldier’s career.

As a consequence, the EO program has suffered.

Views on the EO program itself are quite divergent. Most commanders view the

system as functioning properly. Almost all commanders interviewed reported that they

can freely investigate and resolve EO complaints. “There is an open climate here, I am

encouraged to pursue [investigations],” was the type of comment often heard from

commanders. Most EOAs agreed that they are free to make inquiries into

discrimination complaints. Many EOAs, however, do not believe they receive enough

command support. They cited both a lack of EO support and of commanders’

 

16 “The U.S. Army will provide equal opportunity and treatment for soldiers, civilian employees, and their

families without regard to race, color, religion, gender, or national origin and provide an environment free

of sexual harassment.” Dep’t of Army, Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 6-3a (March 30,

1988) (IO4, September 17, 1993).

17 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. 103-337, § 532, 108 Stat. 2663, 2759

(1994).
46

understanding of the EO system as frustrating aspects of the job. One EOA remarked,

“I have considered asking to be taken out of the EOA position because of the

frustration with the command, and four other EOAs that I know feel the same way.”

Soldiers, on the other hand, often view the system as irrelevant and not working for

them; representing the interests of the chain of command rather than the interests of

the soldier. Further, some soldiers reported that they do not trust their EOAs or EORs

because both work for the commander and not for the soldier. Although the vast

majority of EOAs are dedicated, hard-working soldiers, the perceived lack of leadership

commitment to the EO program, in general, promotes parallel distrust of EOAs. Policy,

no matter how well conceived and written, cannot adequately substitute for commitment

on the part of the chain of command.

Lack of Trust in the EO Complaint System

♦ Soldiers do not use the established reporting system for EO or sexual

harassment complaints.

Soldiers are reluctant to use the EO reporting system because they see no

positive benefits for reporting EO violations or sexual harassment. Said another way,

the negative consequences of reporting sexual harassment operate to discourage use

of the EO complaint procedures.

In effect, the system stigmatizes an individual for reporting. Frequently,

complainants find that their working conditions worsen once a complaint is surfaced.

Soldiers who complain are often ostracized by other soldiers in their unit and/or by their

chain of command, or find themselves being transferred to another unit. In effect,

victims are re-victimized by the system. The individual soldier, as a result, often

chooses to simply put up with the harassment.

One company grade officer’s story illustrates this point: “I was grabbed in a bar

by a soldier. I confronted the situation with a witness [reported the violation], but I was

made to feel like I had done something wrong. The whole experience was so awful that

it might have dissuaded me to ever challenge a situation again.” An EOA explained,

“The procedures are in place but there is tremendous reluctance to report for fear of

bringing unwanted attention or being isolated by others.”

In order for the reporting system to operate effectively in achieving the goal of

zero tolerance for sexual harassment, positive inducements must come from the entire

unit: peers, NCOs, and officers. Unit leaders must take charge, set the example, and

lead the way. Unfortunately, in some instances, soldiers who reported sexually

inappropriate behavior to their chain of command or other agencies have been

mistreated. Most prominently, such mistreatment included insensitive questioning of

the soldier victim, together with the implication that, somehow, the victim, not the

perpetrator, created the problem.
47

In the survey administered by the Panel, soldiers were asked, if they had been

sexually harassed, how they chose to resolve the sexual harassment. Of the soldiers

who indicated that they were sexually harassed in the last twelve months, 12% used

the formal complaint system, while 33% resolved their sexual harassment complaint

informally. The other 55% apparently chose either to ignore the sexual harassment, or

to handle it in a way that they did not consider “formal” or “informal”--handling incidents

of sexual harassment themselves or putting up with the sexual harassment rather than

using the reporting system. The reasons offered by soldiers for not reporting fall into

five basic categories:

Fear of reprisals from the chain of command and other soldiers.

18 This was

the most often stated reason given by soldiers. One soldier remarked, “You can

report it, but they get you sooner or later.” A senior NCO stated, “Various

reprisals will result if you report. Reporting can affect favorable actions such as

assignment considerations, adverse NCOER/OER,19 etc.” Another soldier

stated, “Experience has been that every woman that filed a complaint was out in

two years for one reason or another.” A junior NCO said, “I’d report it, but after

you’ll have to go through hell and high water.” One soldier stated, “You get

labeled as a troublemaker, get bad mouthed if you file any kind of claim, it goes

into your permanent file.” Another said, “You become a problem and

whistleblower stuff does not work.” Other soldiers responded that they could

endure the harassment until it stopped or they left the unit, so as “not to hurt my

career.” In the training base, trainees feared being kept in a holdover20 status

and thus were reluctant to report sexual harassment.

Distrust of the system. Often, the EO reporting system is seen as an

extension of the chain of command, there to protect the chain of command as

opposed to assisting soldiers. A soldier stated, “The good old boy system works

here. A buddy is not going to call another buddy on sexual harassment.” A field

grade officer stated, “I don’t believe that the leadership at this installation would

do the right thing in solving problems.”

A belief that nothing will be done if they do report. Many soldiers believe

that the chain of command will not act on a complaint. One soldier stated, “I’m

not afraid of something happening, I’m afraid of nothing happening.” “Nothing

happens and they treat you bad,” said another. “You have to get really toughskinned around here. Some things you just have to suck up and take. Learn to

deal with it.”

 

18 Another aspect that the Panel considered was the issue of labeling female soldiers as homosexuals if

they report sexual harassment. The Panel heard this issue in a few female focus groups, but further data

to support it were limited.

19 An NCOER is a noncommissioned officer evaluation report; an OER is an officer evaluation report.

20 Trainees in a holdover status are held at their current location.
48

A belief that problems can be resolved at the individual level. Some

soldiers believe they can resolve sexual harassment or inappropriate behavior at

their personal level, as recommended by prevention of sexual harassment

(POSH) training. One soldier reported that, “I first address the person who’s

giving me the problem.” Another said, “I’ve always been able to deal with these

types of cases.”

A belief that some inappropriate behaviors are “normal.” Finally, a few

soldiers stated that they grew up in an environment where some inappropriate

behaviors were considered “normal.” These behaviors, while fitting the definition

of sexual harassment, were not viewed as a big deal “back in high school or

college.” Despite POSH training to the contrary, these soldiers continue to apply

their own definitions of sexual harassment in determining what behaviors they

will or will not tolerate.

Zero Defects

Closely tied to these reasons for not using the EO complaint procedures is the

often referenced “zero defects mentality” that affects and concerns leaders at all levels;

that is, one mistake and your career is ruined. The Panel found that, in most cases,

when sexual harassment was reported to the battalion or higher level, the chain of

command took action. Many incidents, however, do not reach the battalion level.

Lower level leaders often perceive that an EO complaint is an adverse reflection on

their leadership and a “defect” from which they can never recover if it becomes known

higher up the chain of command. This “defect” view can result in problems being

improperly “contained” within the unit as well as the negative consequences of

reporting sexual harassment previously discussed, e.g., reluctance to use the EO

complaint system and re-victimizing the victim. With this “zero defects mentality” in

place, trust in already suspect complaint procedures erodes even further.

The true barometer for the effectiveness of the EO complaint reporting system

lies in the trust and confidence that individual soldiers have in the system. As noted,

many soldiers lack this requisite trust and confidence, do not report harassment, and

do not use the established system. But, in addition to the chain of command, there

exist multiple avenues for soldiers to report EO complaints. With the core EO

complaint system suspect, however, even the IG and other support elements (e.g.,

chaplain, mental health office, staff judge advocate, criminal investigation command)

are painted with the same brush and considered by some to be too aligned with the

chain of command. One soldier reported that, “The chaplain is just another man in

uniform.”

Because soldiers do not use the established complaint procedures, senior

leaders quickly delude themselves into thinking they do not have problems.

Unfortunately, there is often a huge gap between what senior leaders and junior

enlisted soldiers think.
49

Ineffective EO Training

♦ Current Army EO training is often ineffective and does not adequately train

soldiers.

Equal opportunity training received by soldiers rarely facilitates understanding

and dialogue either among peers or between soldiers and their leaders. Too often, EO

training is dismissed as unimportant. Many leaders do not attend or participate in the

training. The absence of leader involvement speaks volumes about the lack of

commitment and represents a missed opportunity for leaders to dialogue with their

soldiers.

In the early 1970s, EO training was a mandatory 18-hour standardized program

taught annually by DRRI-trained instructors. Today, EO training is required at least

twice a year, with commander discretion in determining some of the program content,

duration of training, the attendees, and the instructor.

When Army-wide training on sexual harassment was mandated in 1982,

TRADOC developed standardized training plans for use in all service schools and

ROTC courses. In 1986, HQDA mandated an intensification of unit EO and POSH

training in response to survey and anecdotal evidence that female soldiers were not

receiving proper treatment. In addition, DoD Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense

Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, requires that all military personnel, from

trainee to general officer, receive training in EO, human relations, and POSH on a

recurring basis, and at all levels of professional military education. Training is to

include comprehensive material on leadership roles and responsibilities for EO

programs, complaints processing, legal implications, reprisal prevention and detection,

climate assessment methodologies, and managing civilian EEO systems. Army training

policy meets the mandatory training requirements of DoD Directive 1350.2.

Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, mandates the conduct of unit

EO training at least twice a year. This guidance differs from AR 350-1, Army Training,

and AR 350-41, Training in Units, which require commanders to conduct refresher

training on EO and POSH, but leave the frequency of training up to the commander.

Refresher training is used when periodic or recurring emphasis is required. This type

of training depends on the local situation and the commander’s assessment of need.

Training materials, such as DA Pamphlet 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity

Training Guide, and Training Circular (TC) 26-6, Commander’s Equal Opportunity

Handbook, provide the commander with a limited array of off-the-shelf training

programs. Unfortunately, some commanders with whom the Panel spoke were

unaware of the existence of such training aids.
50

The extent and quality of human relations training21 that future officers receive

varies greatly depending upon their source of commission. The United States Military

Academy employs a comprehensive program entitled Bedrock II: Consideration of

Others. This program provides 58 hours of human relations training over a cadet’s

four-year term, of which 25 hours deal with EO and gender issues. The Military District

of Washington has adapted USMA’s program for its Army installations. Reserve

Officers’ Training Corps human relations training is not standardized. The U.S. Army

Cadet Command has directed local ROTC commanders to evaluate and devise their

own programs based upon training needs. Soldiers at OCS receive a two-hour block of

instruction in the area of human relations.

The Army is providing relatively little emphasis on human relations training in its

service schools. For example, the Command and General Staff College teaches only

3.2 hours of EO out of 1,616 contact hours, and only 20 minutes of POSH.22 The

Sergeants Major Academy currently has 4.7 hours of EO training, of which 30 minutes

are devoted to POSH. The Army War College has no POSH training, but will add a

block of instruction for academic year 1997-98. The Panel’s analysis shows that

institutional EO training is neither sequential, progressive, nor integrated across

schools.

Within the last two years, however, TRADOC has developed a common core

concept that has reduced the number of TSPs required for EO and POSH from fifteen

to four and standardized training on these subjects at the following levels: the basic

leader level (platoon leaders and squad leaders) through the senior leader level

(sergeants major, warrant officers, and majors). Upon implementation of these TSPs,

all soldiers from accession through separation will receive discussion-based, nonrepetitive, progressive, and sequential training. The EO TSPs for IET and drill

sergeant school are not included as part of the common core, but are separate training

requirements. Updated TSPs are being implemented in IET and drill sergeant school

training. Changes are occurring, but slowly. This is due in large measure to the

inadequate resourcing of the Adjutant General’s School, U.S. Army Soldier Support

Institute, which is responsible for EO TSPs for all Army schools. The School is staffed

with only one authorized person to accomplish this mission. Inadequate resourcing of

agencies responsible for supporting and implementing EO policy reflects a poor level of

institutional commitment to the EO program.

Most EOAs reported that, except for the Chief of Staff of the Army's chain

teaching package,23 unit leaders do not usually participate in EO training. Soldiers

described unit EO training as “boring,” “bland,” “unrealistic,” and “repetitive.” Equal

opportunity advisors reported that junior enlisted and junior NCOs attend EO training

 

21 Human relations training encompasses not only EO training, but also topics such as leadership, ethics,

counseling, communication, drug abuse prevention, and suicide prevention.

22 The figures used in this paragraph were current at the time of the Panel review. The Army is in the

process of revising the period of time devoted to human relations training.

23 Chain teaching is the dissemination of standardized information by the chain of command.
51

while senior leaders of the company, to include field grade officers, are absent. One

EOA commented, “Rarely is the senior leadership attending training. They ensure

soldiers attend, but do not make an appearance themselves.” Training is often done in

large assemblies and is not interactive. Many soldiers also said training should be

relevant to their current job level. They called for changes in most of the teaching

methods now used, stating that methods need to include small discussion groups and

other “uncanned” programs. Many soldiers said EO training tends to be trendy and

reactive. For example, the latest round of EO training usually included extremist

organization training, which was viewed by soldiers as a reaction to the 1996 Secretary

of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities. Some soldiers reported that the

vignette-based sexual harassment videotape distributed by DA in 1996 was having a

positive impact on awareness. Soldiers would also like current “real-world” case

studies to use in their training, but these type summaries are not currently available.

While plans are underway to improve the quality of EO and POSH training,

existing tools have been largely ineffective. Although TSPs and other training tools

undergoing development and fielding are significantly better than those available in the

past, they are simply tools; their effectiveness is only as good as the instructors using

them and the leaders who stand behind them. Leader and instructor training has yet to

be effectively addressed. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute trains

EOAs to be instructors to some degree during the 16-week course. But EOAs can

conduct only a small percentage of the necessary training. Normally unit personnel

and/or junior leaders are tasked with the responsibility. With the advent of newer,

interactive, discussion-based training methodologies, instructors will require school

training in these techniques to present effective training.

Inadequate EO Resources

♦ Soldiers lack understanding about the roles, missions, and functions of the

EOA and EOR.

The Panel found evidence of ineffective EOA utilization in the field. Equal

opportunity is intended to be a commander’s program, yet many EOAs are forced to go

through a “gatekeeper,” e.g., the executive officer, adjutant, or command sergeant

major, to gain access to the commander. Many EOAs are buried in the staff sections

making access to commanders difficult. Although most EOAs attend weekly staff

meetings, few have a “speaking part” and only about one-third of EOAs stated that they

met with their commander weekly. The access problem is further exacerbated by the

rank differential presented when a sergeant first class EOA is expected to interface

routinely with a brigade commander. Some EOAs commented that their main

responsibility is focusing on ethnic celebrations or unrelated work, not on

recommending strategies to prevent and eliminate discrimination and sexual

harassment. The following table depicts the typical profile of EOA and EOR duties and

training levels.
52

Table 2--EOA and EOR Responsibilities

Rank24 Assigned as Supports Training Typical Role/Duty

EOA SFC at brigade

level, MSG-SGM at

division and higher

Primary Duty Brigade and

higher

DEOMI trained

for 16 weeks

Process individual

complaints

EOR SSG-SFC at

company and

battalion levels

Additional

duty

Battalion and

below

Locally trained

for 2 weeks

Refer individual

complaints to

appropriate agency

Overwhelmingly, the Panel found that most soldiers and commanders are

confused about the different roles of an EOR and an EOA. As noted earlier, the EOA is

in a full-time position assigned to brigade level and is a graduate of the 16-week

DEOMI course. Equal opportunity representatives assist commanders at battalion-level

and below in carrying out the EO program within their units. Unlike EOAs, EORs do not

attend the 16-week DEOMI program of instruction and are not utilized in special duty

assignments. Equal opportunity representative duties are a part-time, secondary

responsibility.

Equal opportunity representative training is a command/installation

responsibility. There is, however, no uniform training of EORs. Commands and

installations have developed their own training materials. DEOMI-trained EOAs train

EORs with a local 80-hour course, but the course is often erratic: training aids are

limited and some EOAs do not have all the necessary skills to conduct the training

adequately. The EO proponent for the development of TSPs for Army schools is the

Adjutant General’s School, U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute. In order to better

support commanders, the Adjutant General’s School is developing a program of

instruction (POI) for EOR training. Implementation of the POI is scheduled for October

1998. Equal opportunity advisors believe that training inconsistencies and lack of

command emphasis are limiting the positive contributions EORs could have on unit

cohesion.

Unlike EOAs, EORs are not trained to process individual complaints of

discrimination or sexual harassment. Despite this lack of training, they often are used

to handle informal complaints at the company and battalion levels.

Equal opportunity advisors are not authorized to receive sworn statements from

soldiers or to conduct formal investigations when they receive a complaint. According

to AR 600-20, EOAs are expected to provide advisory assistance to commanders and

comment on investigation reports for compliance with DoD and DA policy. Formal

investigations are limited to the IG or to an investigating officer appointed by the

commander under the provisions of AR 15-6, Procedure for Investigating Officers and

 

24 SSG is the acronym for staff sergeant, E-6; SFC is the acronym for sergeant first class, E-7; MSG is

the acronym for master sergeant, E-8; and SGM is the acronym for sergeant major, E-9.
53

Boards of Officers. Many EOAs believe they are hampered by this limitation on their

authority to conduct an investigation. The Panel also saw evidence of poorly

conducted AR 15-6 investigations. Some investigating officers are very junior and do

not have the experience necessary to conduct proper investigations. Equal opportunity

advisors and, in some instances, judge advocates are not consulted during the course

of investigations. The Panel also heard many comments relating to perceptions of

bias, e.g., some investigating officers were believed to be too closely tied to the unit

they were tasked to investigate.

♦ Survey tools available to commanders are inadequate.

Climate assessments are a key mechanism for commanders to anticipate and

prevent problems. Climate assessments are designed to be used by commanders and

other leaders to identify issues that might not otherwise come to their attention. The

current array of climate assessment tools available to commanders do not adequately

meet their needs.

Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, published August 18, 1995, directs that

the Services “[r]equire commanders to assess their organizational EO climate,

preferably as part of their assumption of command, and schedule follow-up

assessments periodically during their command tenure.” The current version of AR

600-20 (Interim Change 4) recommends that commanders conduct a unit climate

assessment within 90 days of assuming command and then annually thereafter. While

this guidance is not in compliance with the DoD Directive, the draft revision to

AR 600-20 remedies this shortfall by requiring commanders to conduct a unit climate

assessment within 90 days of assuming command and annually thereafter.

The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) is the most common

assessment survey instrument currently in use across the Army. Commanders who

request this survey must send the completed survey forms to DEOMI for analysis and a

report. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute has indicated that,

because of insufficient staffing, it will be unable to meet the demand for analysis of

MEOCS, once the AR 600-20 provisions requiring all commanders to conduct an

annual climate assessment are put into effect--assuming MEOCS is the assessment

tool commanders employ.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-69, Unit Climate Profile Commander’s

Handbook, also contains a climate assessment survey instrument available to

commanders. It does not include questions on sexual harassment, but does include

three questions asking if the officers, NCOs, or immediate leaders in the unit treat

soldiers fairly without regard to race, ethnic background, or sex.

The current Army-wide survey of command climate, the biannual Sample Survey

of Military Personnel (SSMP), includes items on sexual harassment on a recurring

basis. This survey is targeted at the whole Army with the exception of soldiers in
54

training, in transit, in the hospital, or attending school, and does not provide an

assessment specifically geared to one commander.

The Human Resources Directorate, ODCSPER has developed a short command

climate survey instrument. This instrument is only now being fielded and feedback is

limited. Another comprehensive human relations climate assessment survey

instrument is being developed under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).

Other Issues

EOAs of Tenant Organizations

Equal opportunity advisor resourcing of tenant units25 is another issue that

concerns the Panel. For example, a medical center that is part of the Army Medical

Command (AMEDD) but resides on a TRADOC installation is considered a tenant unit,

with a requirement to report both to the AMEDD and TRADOC commanders. A tenant

unit without an assigned EOA is usually required to go to its next higher headquarters,

from which it is geographically separated, for EO coverage and complaint processing.

This was often found to be the case, even if there was a designated installation EOA.

The impact of this situation is a lack of effective EOA coverage and confusion on the

tenant unit's part. Little guidance on this issue exists--tenant units are not addressed in

the current version of AR 600-20.

EO Program Funding

Equal opportunity program funding varied with command interest. According to

AR 600-20, commanders of major Army commands are required to provide personnel,

funding, and other resources to carry out the EO program. The Panel found some EO

programs had insufficient funding to adequately maintain awareness and conduct

external training for EOAs.

Racial Discrimination

The Panel’s written survey data reflected that the majority of those surveyed do

not believe that there are high levels of racial or ethnic discrimination in their companysized units. Likewise, race did not surface as a factor in sexual harassment reporting.

In line with this finding are the results of the SSMPs conducted from 1992 to 1995,

which consistently reported a decrease in racial discrimination. The Panel found little

evidence of overt racial discrimination, but noted many expressions of subtle racial

discrimination, similar to those concerns noted in the Report of the Secretary of the

Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activity issued in 1996. Focus group data also

 

25 A tenant unit is an organization that resides on another major command’s installation.
55

indicated that many soldiers believe they are not treated fairly in terms of promotions

and job assignments, and that subtle racial discrimination is a problem.

The Inspector General released findings of its Special Assessment of Equal

Opportunity in November 1990. It found significant achievements with the Army’s EO

since the 1970s and predicted no imminent return to the widespread racial unrest of

that period. It also found, however, that EO program emphasis was declining in the

Army, as evidenced by poor training, lack of visible chain of command participation in

the program and training, and the consolidation and elimination of EOA positions. The

Panel shares the same concerns in 1997 that the IG surfaced in 1990. Under current

practices, the individual soldier is not well served by the EO system.
56

THE EXTENT AND IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

AND SEX DISCRIMINATION

Panel Assessment

The Panel’s assessment of survey results, focus group discussions, and

individual interviews has produced four significant findings pertaining to sexual

harassment in the Army:

Sexual harassment. Sexual harassment exists throughout the Army, crossing

gender, rank, and racial lines.

Inappropriate behavior. Inappropriate behaviors are commonplace throughout

the Army. In many cases, however, soldiers subjected to such behaviors do not

equate them with sexual harassment. Further, soldiers seem to accept such

behaviors as a normal part of Army life.

Sex discrimination. Sex discrimination is more common throughout the Army

than is sexual harassment. Soldiers often misconstrue and report sex

discrimination as sexual harassment.

Perception of disparate treatment. Some male soldiers perceive that certain

Army policies are inequitable in that they establish less demanding standards for

female soldiers.

♦ Sexual harassment exists throughout the Army, crossing gender, rank, and

racial lines.

Over a period of years, a number of surveys administered by a variety of

agencies, to include the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences, DoD, independent research teams, and other military services, have

assessed and reported on the extent of sexual harassment experienced by soldiers.

Likewise, the Senior Review Panel found sexual harassment to be a serious problem

throughout the uniformed Army.26 Although both male and female soldiers are

subjected to sexual harassment, women are disproportionately impacted. These

findings are consistent with those of previous surveys.

The results of the SSMP, a semi-annual Army-wide survey conducted by the

U.S. Army Research Institute indicate the rate at which both male and female soldiers

responded affirmatively to the question, “Were you sexually harassed in the last 12

months?” The rates for males remained level throughout survey years 1992, 1993, and

 

26 The findings concerning sexual harassment reported in this section pertain to soldiers who are other

than training base personnel. Those findings concerning trainees and trainers appear in the subsection

entitled “Initial Entry Training.”
57

1995. The drop from 1992 to 1993 for women was a statistically significant difference.

The same question was posed in precisely the same language on the Panel survey. In

the SSMP surveys, the definition of sexual harassment was provided to participants.

The Panel survey did not advise participants of the definition of sexual harassment.

Yet, the responses were similar. Table 3 records soldiers’ affirmative responses to the

question, “Were you sexually harassed in the last 12 months?”, categorized by survey

and gender of the respondent.

Table 3--Were you sexually harassed in the last 12 months?

SSMP (1992)

N = 8,849

SSMP (1993)

N = 9,130

SSMP (1995)

N = 15,113

Panel (1997)

N = 14,498

Men 2.9% 2.6% 2.8% 7%

Women 29.8% 24.4% 24.9% 22%

The number of male soldiers who responded that they had been sexually

harassed increased substantially from the SSMP surveys to that of the Senior Review

Panel. The number of women who reported having been sexually harassed remained

generally constant across the 1992, 1993, and 1995 SSMPs and the Panel survey.

Although the consistency in statistical findings supports the scientific validity of

the Panel survey instrument and sample, the result suggests that this issue is one of

which the Army has been long aware, and that to date, Army policies and processes

implemented to combat and eradicate sexual harassment have had little, if any, impact.

As one soldier noted, “Women have been reporting sexual harassment for five years,

and the Army’s just now looking into it.” Many soldiers believe that their complaints and

concerns have been ignored and that only the recent media attention has forced Army

leaders to focus on this issue.

Table 4 sets forth the percentage of soldiers, broken out by rank and gender,

whose Panel survey responses indicate that they had been subjected to sexual

harassment. Junior enlisted women reported experiencing substantially higher rates of

harassment than any other rank category. Although higher rank and status does not

protect a soldier from sexual harassment, it appears that soldiers’ junior rank and status

may invite harassment or establish them as the harasser’s most likely targets.

Table 4--Sexual Harassment by Rank and Gender

N = 14,498 Junior Enlisted NCOs Officers

Men 10% 5% 2%

Women 29% 17% 6%
58

Table 5 shows the percentage of sexual harassment, by race and gender, as

reported on the Panel survey. Black male soldiers reported experiencing slightly higher

levels of sexual harassment than did white male soldiers (10% to 6%), while black

female soldiers reported slightly less sexual harassment than did white female soldiers

(20% to 23%).

Table 5--Sexual Harassment by Race and Gender

N = 14,498 White Black Other27

Men 6% 10% 7%

Women 23% 20% 27%

♦ Inappropriate behaviors are commonplace throughout the Army.

Table 6 presents the findings of both the DoD Defense Manpower Data Center

(DMDC) 1995 Sexual Harassment Survey and the Senior Review Panel survey,

concerning the extent to which soldiers reported having experienced uninvited,

unwanted sex-related behaviors.

Table 6--Experienced Behaviors Described in Sexual Experiences Questionnaire

Crude or

Offensive

Behavior

Sexist

Behavior

Unwanted

Sexual

Attention

Sexual

Coercion

Sexual

Assault

DMDC (1995)

Army N = 13,599

Men 35% 16% 8% 4% 2%

Women 74% 67% 47% 18% 8%

Panel (1997)

N = 14,498

Men 76% 63% 30% 8% 6%

Women 78% 72% 47% 15% 7%

The behaviors about which soldiers were queried were derived from Fitzgerald’s

(1988) Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ).28 A comparison of survey results

reveals that female soldiers participating in the Panel survey reported experiencing

SEQ behaviors at a rate almost identical to that of the DMDC survey. Male soldiers

 

27 The relatively small number of other minorities surveyed makes descriptive statistics difficult to

interpret.

28 The behaviors of the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (Fitzgerald, 1988) can be divided into five

categories. Crude or offensive behavior includes unwanted sexual jokes, stories, whistling, and staring.

Sexist behavior includes insulting, offensive, and condescending attitudes based on the gender of the

person. Unwanted sexual attention includes unwanted touching or fondling and asking for dates even

though rebuffed. Sexual coercion includes classic quid pro quo instances of job benefits or losses

conditioned on sexual cooperation. Sexual assault includes attempted and actual rape.
59

participating in the Panel survey reported experiencing significantly higher levels of

SEQ behaviors than did male soldier participants in the DMDC survey.29 Overall, the

Panel found that 84% of Army women and 80% of Army men reported experiencing

some type of SEQ behavior.

It should be noted that there was a definitional distinction between the 1995

DMDC survey and the Panel survey. The 1995 DMDC survey defined sexual

harassment as experiencing any one of Fitzgerald’s SEQ behaviors. The Panel survey

queried soldiers about their experience of SEQ behaviors, but did not define these

behaviors as sexual harassment or tie SEQ behaviors to that term. Rather, the Panel

survey contained three separate types of questions: one asking soldiers if they had

experienced SEQ behaviors; the second asking soldiers if they had been sexually

harassed; and the third, whether sexual harassment was a problem in the soldier’s unit.

Although soldiers reported being subjected to inappropriate sexual behaviors at

high rates (80% of men and 84% of women, as illustrated in Figure 1, below), many

soldiers, apparently, do not perceive these SEQ behaviors as sexual harassment. A

large number of soldiers reported experiencing at least one of the categories of SEQ

behaviors. However, the number of soldiers who reported having been subjected to

sexual harassment was substantially smaller (7% of men and 22% of women). The

number of soldiers who believed that sexual harassment was a problem in their unit

also was relatively small (10% of men, 17% of women). From these statistics and from

focus

 

29 The higher percentages for experienced SEQ behaviors for men on the Panel survey in relation to the

DoD survey may reflect a slightly different wording. The Panel survey asked only if the SEQ behavior

was experienced. The DoD survey asked for frequency of experienced behavior, but also qualified the

behavior as being offensive. The difference between the Panel and DoD surveys may show that men

experience the behaviors at the higher rates, but do not consider it offensive. Interestingly, the

percentages for women did not differ across the surveys.
60

 group input, the Panel learned that many soldiers do not equate SEQ behaviors with

sexual harassment. Nevertheless, the Panel notes that all of the SEQ behaviors may

meet the criteria for sexual harassment under the DoD and Army definitions.

Any SEQ

Behavior

Sexually

Harassed

Problem in Unit

80% 84%

7%

22%

10%

17%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Any SEQ

Behavior

Sexually

Harassed

Problem in Unit

Men 

Women

Figure 1--Percentage Reporting any SEQ Behavior, Sexual Harassment,

or that Sexual Harassment was a Problem in their Unit

Of soldiers who reported experiencing crude or offensive behaviors, sexist

behaviors, or unwanted sexual attention, only 11% believed they had been sexually

harassed. This statistical finding was borne out by focus group research. One soldier

commented about “lots of low level sexual harassment . . . but they don’t define it as

harassment. [It’s] just part of the environment.” Focus group participants alternatively

referred to the existence of these less offensive behaviors as “noise,” “static,” or

“clutter.” Although soldiers expressed some level of discomfort with such noise, static,

and clutter, soldiers perceive that their exposure to these behaviors is inevitable. The

high level of SEQ behaviors experienced and tolerated by Army men and women, when

compared to the much smaller number of soldiers who stated that they were sexually

harassed, indicates that, for whatever reasons, some SEQ behaviors that may fall

within the official definition of sexual harassment are “the norm” throughout the Army.

This difference in percentages of soldiers reporting the experience of SEQ

behaviors and those who believed they were sexually harassed can be attributed to

several factors. First, many soldiers have low expectations of what constitutes

acceptable behavior. One soldier commented that, “If I reported it [these

behaviors/sexual harassment] every time it happened, I’d keep reporting it every day.

But I handle it better than most.” Another soldier stated that, “I have an established

tolerance level.” Second, although soldiers generally understand the Army’s

organizational definition of sexual harassment, they tend to apply a different, personal,

informal, working definition of sexual harassment to their personal experiences. One

soldier commented that the official definition of sexual harassment is “too broad now. If
61

someone came into our unit who is not part of the group, they would take things as

sexual harassment when it is really only bantering back and forth.”

The Panel found that soldiers are likely to perceive that they are being sexually

harassed only when SEQ type behaviors rise to the level of sexual coercion or sexual

assault. Of the soldiers reporting that they had been subject to sexual coercion or

assault, 52% believed that they had been sexually harassed. These SEQ behaviors

are the most serious and, inherently, are the most likely to cause physical, mental, and

emotional harm to their victims. As one soldier stated, “As long as no one is touching

me, I don’t care.”

Further, many soldiers commented on the key role perceptions play in identifying

sexual harassment. As one officer stated, “It’s all in how you perceive it. You may go

home and think--was it sexual harassment?”

♦ Sex discrimination is more common throughout the Army than is sexual

harassment.

Focus group participants who responded that they had been sexually harassed

described experiences that do not comport with the official definition of sexual

harassment, but are more appropriately characterized as sex discrimination (e.g.,

soldiers given certain duties solely because of their gender). As stated in Part III of

Volume I, sex discrimination is discrimination based solely on an individual being male

or female. It is often linked to a set of assumptions and sex role stereotypes

concerning the abilities, competence, status, and roles of the particular gender, which

results in the disparate treatment of or negative impact on that gender. Sex

discrimination takes a variety of forms including, but not limited to, sexist remarks,

assigning soldiers to particular duties that “fit” their gender, and generally disregarding

or discounting the value of a soldier’s contributions to mission accomplishment based

on gender. The Panel found that incidents of gender bias, sexism, and sex

discrimination occur often throughout the Army.

In the Panel survey, soldiers were asked if they were treated differently because

of their sex. Many of the women (51%) and few of the men (22%) said they were

treated differently because of their gender. These percentages are significantly higher

than the 22% of the women and 7% of the men who reported that they had been

sexually harassed.

Focus group commentary supports this statistical data. A group of female senior

NCOs spoke heatedly to Panel members about having no voice in meetings with male

NCOs of their units. “We speak, but it’s as if we do not exist. They ignore us,” said

one NCO. Focus group discussion also revealed that, although participants perceive

“zero tolerance” within the Army for racial discrimination, the same standard is not

applied to sex discrimination. This perception exists even though the standard has

been repeatedly used by DoD leaders in describing the Department’s policy with
62

respect to sex discrimination. A female soldier remarked, “You can’t get away with

saying blacks shouldn’t be in the Army, but you can say women shouldn’t be in the

Army . . . or call us dumb females. How can they [men] get away with that?” When

soldiers are taken out of their MOS to perform stereotypical “women’s work” or “men’s

work” in their units; when commanders refuse to consider qualified soldiers for certain

duty positions (e.g., driver, aide-de-camp) because of their gender; when women’s

contributions to unit mission are given less weight than that of men; the Army is

allowing the practice of sex discrimination to exist.

In group discussions with soldiers worldwide, the Panel asked them to describe

the most and the least satisfying aspects of their careers. The often-cited positive

aspects included working with and helping soldiers, learning new skills, travel and

educational opportunities, and personal growth.

Of the dissatisfying aspects, one of the women’s most frequent responses was

that they feel devalued as soldiers and marginalized in their units just because they are

women. One female field grade officer said, “I always have to fight the male mind set

about what a woman can and cannot do.” A female junior NCO remarked that a male

new to the unit is accepted at face value, but that a new female soldier has to prove

herself and her competence repeatedly. This theme of having to “prove yourself” was

restated to Panel members many times in many locations. A young enlisted woman

observed that “in working with males, you’re discounted and accused before you ever

get a chance to explain.” One junior enlisted woman said, “This is the first time I’ve

been stationed in a unit where 90% of the soldiers are men. The automatic perception

they have of me is that I don’t know my job. If you’re a female, you’re always tested.”

Male soldiers also are dissatisfied with unfair treatment and double standards.

One soldier said, “Double standards--officer/enlisted, male/female, black/white--they’re

all here [in the unit].” An officer said, “No longevity anymore, no job security, retirement

benefits are getting cut, reduced family support; everything is being taken from us.”

♦ Some male soldiers perceive that certain Army policies are inequitable in that

they establish less demanding standards for female soldiers.

The likelihood of polarization along gender lines and its corresponding detriment

to the human relations environment is heightened by the perception among some male

soldiers that certain Army policies hold female soldiers to a less demanding standard.

The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)

The Army has considered gender, as well as age, in establishing the different

standards to be achieved by male and female soldiers on the APFT. The APFT is

designed to measure the fitness of an individual soldier. A soldier’s fitness is

measured on a graduated scale adjusted for gender and age. The differences in

performance standards reflect physiological differences between genders and between
63

younger and older soldiers. Soldiers understand and accept the age standards, but

they question the different standards based on gender. Some male soldiers

commented that the lower APFT standards for women are “too low”; that the APFT is

“biased in favor of female soldiers”; and that “the lower standards reflect that a woman

will never be in as good physical shape as a man.”

Generally, men believe that both men and women should be required to perform

the same number of repetitions of push-ups and sit-ups, and complete the two-mile run

in the same period of time in order to achieve a passing score on the APFT. Generally,

the few women who agree with this proposition expressed themselves to the Panel as

follows: “I’m just so sick and tired of being told by men that I’m ‘getting over’ on the PT

test. Let’s just make one standard.” The criticism that women are “getting over” in

physical training adversely affects some women’s morale. A junior female NCO

commented that “when a general officer had a discussion about the PT [physical

training] standards, he made jokes about females not being able to run.”

Soldiers who participated in focus groups voiced complaints about leaders who

set PT standards above those required by regulation. The women perceived that their

leaders established these more stringent standards not as a means of promoting the

unit’s overall fitness and mission accomplishment, but rather as a means of excluding

women from full participation in an important and visible unit function, that of group PT.

One female NCO said, “Male soldiers always lead PT and expect us to meet unrealistic

standards, for example, pyramid pushups and a five-mile run in 30 minutes. The men

always dog out the women if they can’t finish. I can blow them away with sit-ups, but I

don’t dog them out about it.”30 As another female senior NCO stated, “It’s just another

way for men to tell us that we can’t hang, that we don’t belong. When men see a

woman falling out of a three-mile run at a seven minute mile pace, they automatically

lose respect for her. Suddenly, she doesn’t deserve to be part of the unit.”

Pregnancy

Male soldiers also perceive that the utilization of pregnant female soldiers is

governed by special policies that negatively and unfairly impact the unit. Pregnancy

requires the issuance of a temporary physical profile to the pregnant soldier.

Essentially, a pregnant woman is limited in the type and extent of physical training she

can perform. Further, her utilization to perform workplace duties is often curtailed by

the number of hours she is able to work without fatigue and the types of work she is

able to perform. One example cited by a focus group of male officers was that of a

pregnant pilot. The woman had to be temporarily grounded and removed from flight

status, rendering her non-deployable. The remaining pilots, both men and women, had

to fly the pregnant pilot’s missions and “pick up the other slack” caused by her

absence.

 

30 The APFT has been redesigned and is awaiting implementation. The redesign marks the first time the

Army has validated the principal of equal effort based on scientific evidence and the reality of

physiological differences between men and women.
64

Another example cited in a focus group was that of a battalion-level fuel handler

who became pregnant. Because the chemical hazards associated with her MOS could

seriously impact her unborn child’s health, Army policy prohibited the fuel handler from

working in her MOS until after the birth of her child and her convalescence. The

pregnant fuel handler was assigned to “desk-duty.” As it happened, the female was

one of only a few fuel handlers in her unit; fuel handling is considered a critical, but

low-density MOS. While she was prohibited from performing fuel handler duties, the

battalion was left short-handed. The female fuel handler remained “on the unit books,”

however, assigned against her fuel handler position, which effectively precluded the

unit from requesting and receiving a replacement fuel handler. The unit suffered, as

did the pregnant soldier, because the other fuel handlers in her unit reacted negatively

to her, making plain their dissatisfaction at having to “do her work on top of their own”

particularly when they were already undermanned. Despite the fact that the female fuel

handler had no control over Army policy and its application to her personal situation,

the male soldiers considered her to be personally responsible for her circumstances.

The Panel found that some pregnant women make a conscious decision to place

themselves and their unborn child “in harm’s way” in an effort to prevent similar

negative reactions from members of their units. Although many women’s ability to work

and to engage in physical activity is unaffected by pregnancy, medical considerations

require other women to cut back on the number of hours they work, the types of tasks

they perform, and to modify the intensity of their physical training routines. The Panel

found that despite physical discomfort, some pregnant women continue to perform

strenuous duties, work long hours, and participate in unit physical training, simply to

avoid derision at the hands of their counterparts. Other profiles given to both male and

female soldiers (e.g., for temporary injuries or illnesses) were not listed in the same

negative manner as pregnancy.

Work Assignments

Almost one-half of the men surveyed believe that women in their units are

treated more favorably. Eighty percent of female soldiers disagreed with that premise.

Table 7 reveals that while most female soldiers believe that they “pull their load” in their

unit, only one-half of their male peers agreed. By contrast, almost all soldiers of both

genders believe that male soldiers “pull their load.”

Table 7--Perceptions of Contribution

Men Women

N = 14,498 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree

In this company, the male

soldiers pull their load. 81% 7% 83% 7%

In this company, the female

soldiers pull their load. 50% 30% 77% 11%
65

Some female soldiers complained that their units effectively preclude them from

working in their MOS or from performing all tasks associated with their MOS. Rather,

they are assigned to administrative duties viewed as “more appropriate work for a

woman.” Women noted that, in many cases, male soldiers step in and perform duties

that fit the stereotype of “men’s work.”

For whatever reason, some leaders afford deferential treatment to women in

assigning unit work tasking. Contrary to soldiers’ perceptions, this perceived favoritism

is usually unsolicited by female soldiers and has no basis in Army policy. One female

soldier, the only woman in a unit of 200 men, complained that her first sergeant would

not let her go to the field with her unit. Leaders who show deferential treatment to

female soldiers in the assignment of tasks reinforce erroneous perceptions held by

many males that the contributions of female soldiers are not essential to the unit’s

successful performance of its mission. Leaders must make the conscious decision to

distribute the workload equitably, without regard to the gender of the soldier, and to

hold all soldiers to the same performance standards. Soldiers of both genders must be

tasked with an equal number of “clean” and “dirty” tasks. Gender considerations

should have no part in a leader’s determination of how to task any job, whether

administrative duties or ditch digging.

The Effects of Sexual Harassment

In more than 200 company-size units in the United States and overseas, in

leader interviews, and in interviews with EOAs, the Panel asked soldiers about the

effects of sexual harassment. Those soldiers who believed they had suffered or had

directly observed sexual harassment most frequently cited “the erosion of trust between

soldiers in my unit.” A soldier said that sexual harassment “causes a lot of chaos

because certain people can’t work together.” In one unit with significant levels of

sexual harassment, none of the female soldiers wanted to come to work. A female

junior NCO who was leaving the Army after six years said that throughout her career,

wherever she was assigned, men in her unit “hit” on her. Even when she reported the

incidents to her chain of command, no action was taken. These experiences, not

surprisingly, had prompted her decision to leave the Army for good.

A number of male soldiers expressed a fear of being falsely accused of sexual

harassment. Men who raise this concern apparently believe that their careers will be

permanently damaged by the allegation alone whether they are guilty or not. Many

men have determined that the only way to avoid such an allegation is to avoid

interaction or contact with women. Female soldiers confirmed this trend in male

perception and behavior, expressing concern about being isolated in their units by male

soldiers who no longer even speak with them. Many women also feel that they are

being blamed by the men “for all the negative events happening in the Army since the

Aberdeen Proving Ground scandal.” In the present tension-ridden atmosphere, male
66

and female soldiers are far less likely to interact normally, much less to work as

members of a cohesive team.

Despite the common occurrence of sexual harassment, inappropriate behaviors,

and sex discrimination throughout the Army, soldiers of both genders assured Panel

members that “the mission is still being accomplished.” As one junior enlisted soldier

said, “Things are getting done; it’s the individuals, not the unit, who are affected by

sexual harassment.” An NCO shared that the “mission gets done, but cohesion among

the soldiers is affected.” Another soldier said that “sexual harassment doesn’t do

anything to the unit. It continues to function. A private can’t take it anymore and ETSs

[leaves the Army]. There’s a new private to replace them. We’re expendable.” Panel

members noted that sexual harassment, inappropriate behaviors, and sex

discrimination are not viewed by many soldiers as affecting a units’ ability to do its job.

The Panel believes that, although “the Army goes rolling along,” it rolls more slowly and

less effectively when its soldiers live and work in a negative human relations

environment.

Today, there exists in our force a degree of tension and uneasiness grounded in

the perception of many soldiers that the Army’s leaders have overreacted to highly

publicized incidents of sexual harassment and sexual misconduct and the media fallout

from those events. Soldiers expressed concern that leader attention will diminish once

the media attention diminishes. Many soldiers, both male and female, believe that the

Army has strongly overreacted to “Aberdeen” and is trying to train itself out of a human

relations problem by mandating excessive POSH training. Most soldiers feel the

current training is ineffective and “by-the-numbers,” with little discussion between or

interaction among the soldier participants.

One particular form of sexual harassment not addressed in the survey but

commented on in a few focus groups and by other female soldiers in informal

discussions, was the fear of being accused of being a homosexual. Female soldiers

who refuse the sexual advances of male soldiers may be accused of being lesbians

and subjected to investigation for homosexual conduct. As in the case of men falsely

accused of sexual harassment, women accused of lesbianism believe that the mere

allegation harms their careers and reputations irreparably.

Another effect of sexual harassment in the current environment is the reluctance

of male leaders to mentor female soldiers, much less select women for coveted

assignments. Again, the fear of a false allegation of sexual harassment holds many

men in its grip. As one soldier remarked, “Sexual harassment has generated a ‘close

ranks’ mentality, and mentoring is out the window.”31

 

31 Panel members found that very few soldiers are being mentored. The few who are, however, are male

soldiers. Mentoring for female soldiers seems to be virtually nonexistent.
67

Other Issues--Personal Relationships

Sexual harassment is sometimes confused with fraternization. Fraternization in

itself is a confusing and often misunderstood area of interpersonal relations. Army

legal and policy prohibitions on fraternization focus on the relationship between a

superior and a subordinate, when such relationship (1) causes actual or perceived

partiality, preferential treatment, or unfairness; (2) undermines authority, morale, or

discipline; or (3) involves an abuse of rank, position, or authority for personal gain.32

Fraternization is not limited to sexual relationships or interactions. Both leaders and

soldiers expressed a general sense of confusion regarding the circumstances that

constitute fraternization and emphasized the need for a clarification of Army policies in

this regard. As one leader stated, “The bare-bones definition just does not provide any

help when I am trying to determine whether a particular relationship is acceptable.”

Similarly, Army policies governing senior-subordinate relationships that exist

both inside and outside the chain of command are a concern of leaders and soldiers.

They both openly discussed with Panel members the problems created by consensual

sexual relationships between members of the same unit, particularly when such

relationships involve soldiers of different ranks. Table 8 shows that nearly one-fifth of

the soldiers surveyed believe their units would tolerate sexual relationships between

leaders and subordinates; one-fourth of the survey participants were “not sure.”

Table 8--Toleration of Senior-Subordinate Sexual Relationships

N = 14,498 Agree Not Sure Disagree

Sexual relationships between leaders

and their subordinates would not be

tolerated in this company. 58% 24% 18%

Some field commanders complained to the Panel that DA policy on seniorsubordinate relationships is overly vague, leaving local leaders in the difficult position

of interpreting policy, and leaving soldiers without behavioral guidance. Both

commanders and soldiers emphasized the need for “clear rules” and effective training

in applying those rules.

A number of soldiers believe that the Army’s shift to mixed-rank club facilities

sets-up soldiers for social interactions that are improper. As one NCO stated “With

everyone in civilian clothes, how can we know if we can associate with someone unless

we ask about the person’s rank.”

 

32 Commissioned officers, warrant officers, and NCOs may be criminally punished under Article 134,

UCMJ, for fraternizing with subordinates on terms of military equality. Early case law held that the

offense of fraternization under the Manual for Courts-Martial did not apply to senior enlisted persons.

Later case law put NCOs on notice that fraternization with enlisted subordinates may now be charged as

a violation of UCMJ, Article 134. See United States v. Clarke, 25 M.J. 631 (A.C.M.R. 1987).
68

Some male soldiers said that a heightened level of consensual, sexual activity in

a unit can create an atmosphere in which the female soldiers are viewed as sex

objects, not fellow soldiers. Rather than operating as a cohesive team, the unit

structure fragments along the lines of these informal relationships. As one soldier

stated, “Everyone’s more concerned about who she’s [female soldier] dating now than

about doing their jobs.”

The Panel agrees that the boundaries between professional and personal

relationships have become blurred, posing issues of good order and discipline. It is

essential that clear lines of professional conduct be established and observed,

especially in terms of senior-subordinate relationships. Abuse of power is a prevalent

theme in dealing with cases of sexual harassment and sexual assault, not only in the

military but in society at large. The Panel believes that the current Army policy

concerning senior-subordinate relationships is appropriate but often misunderstood.

Training in this area is almost nonexistent. Given the lack of understanding among

soldiers and leaders concerning senior-subordinate relationships, a renewed training

effort is required.
69

LEADERSHIP

Panel Assessment

Explicit in our charter from the Secretary of the Army was the mandate “to

examine how Army leaders throughout the chain of command view and exercise their

responsibility to address sexual harassment.” We found issues of leadership

throughout our review. In fact, it has become a common thread of discussion

throughout this report. In this section, we present four main findings: the synergy

between leadership and human relations; distrust of leaders by soldiers; tentative

commitment to the human dimension; and a void in central oversight of leadership and

human relations programs.

Leadership and Human Relations

♦ Concerned, committed leadership is integral to the creation of a positive

human relations climate.

Good leadership is crucial to the creation and maintenance of a positive human

relations environment. The truth of this basic tenet was reinforced in every aspect of

the Panel’s assessment. Data from the Panel survey revealed a direct correlation

between good leadership and a reduction in inappropriate behaviors. Respect

between soldiers and increased acceptance of soldiers of diverse backgrounds as

team members also correlated with positive leadership.33 Army leaders define and

reinforce the Army’s culture--those shared values, beliefs, norms, and assumptions the

Army holds true. The Army’s desired culture is based on the core values of honor,

integrity, selfless service, courage, loyalty, duty, and respect.

In cases where the Panel noted a successful human relations environment, the

chain of command “made it happen.” Good leaders can create and maintain a positive

human relations environment in even the most challenging situations. In fact, one of

the most positive examples of a healthy, flourishing human relations environment

observed by the Panel was in a forward deployed unit. The operational tempo

(OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) were accelerated, and the physical

environment was harsh and demanding. The chain of command refused to allow these

challenges to detract from either mission accomplishment or from its commitment to

taking care of soldiers and ensuring that soldiers took care of each other. The chain of

command had repeatedly emphasized that each soldier, male and female, was

important, both as a member of the unit team, and as an individual. Soldiers were

encouraged to voice complaints and to suggest solutions, without fear of retaliation.

Though performing an arduous mission under great physical and mental stress,

soldiers evidenced extraordinary personal discipline, coupled with a positive attitude.

 

33 For a more detailed discussion, see Table 4 in Survey Results, Volume II.
70

Their comments to the Panel about their leaders and their living and working

environments reflected general satisfaction.

Good Leadership

In our travels and research, the Panel found four characteristics common to and

necessary for the exercise of good leadership. Good leaders set standards for

members of their organizations; exemplify adherence to those standards in their

personal conduct; enforce and maintain those standards for other members of the

organization; and demonstrate genuine care and concern for their soldiers. These

leadership characteristics are universal, that is, they can be applied effectively to the

development and sustainment of tactical and technical military skills, as well as to the

creation and maintenance of a positive human relations environment. The Panel is

convinced that should a leader lack any one of these characteristics, both the unit’s

tactical and technical readiness and human relations environment will be adversely

impacted.

Setting, Maintaining, and Enforcing Standards

Soldiers participating in the Panel survey were asked to respond to a series of

questions pertaining to leadership in their companies. As shown in Table 9, many male

and female soldiers agreed that leaders in their companies set and enforce high

standards for soldiers in terms of good behavior and discipline.

Table 9--Leaders Set and Enforce Standards

Men Women

N = 14,498 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree

The leaders in this company set high standards

for soldiers in terms of good behavior and

discipline. 71% 19% 61% 28%

The leaders in the company enforce the

standards they set for good behavior. 65% 17% 54% 26%

Exemplifying Standards

Policies, regulations, or decrees alone will not create or enforce a positive

human relations environment. The old adage that “actions speak louder than words”

has never been more true than in this instance. As one focus group participant said,

“The more you hear leaders speak it, and then watch them do it [maintain standards],

you know that it is important.” The chain of command must “lead by example,”

maintaining high standards of personal conduct.
71

♦ Soldiers do not necessarily perceive that leaders hold themselves to the same

standards they set for soldiers.

Panel survey data reveal that while many soldiers believe that their leaders set

high standards for behavior, fewer perceive that their leaders actually behave as good

examples. As shown in Table 10, soldiers do not necessarily perceive that leaders

hold themselves to the same standards they set for soldiers.

Table 10--Leaders Exemplify Standards

Men Women

N = 14,498 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree

The leaders in this company set good examples for

soldiers by behaving the way they expect soldiers

to behave. 54% 30% 41% 43%

The leaders in this company are more interested in

looking good than in being good. 43% 41% 47% 38%

The leaders in this company are more interested in

furthering their careers than in the well-being of

their soldiers. 37% 43% 40% 42%

Quotations from soldier focus group participants anecdotally support the survey

data. The Panel frequently received focus group comments to the effect of “Yeah, most

of our leaders do [exemplify the standard]. There’s one or two that walk a thin line

though.”; and “We have some commanders who say do what I say and not what I do.”;

and “An officer here struck a tree DUI and was allowed to remain in command.”; and

“Leaders have slack standards--they don't even take the PT test.”

Distrust of Leaders by Soldiers

♦ Some soldiers perceive that leaders are not interested in their welfare.

Caring for Soldiers

When officers and NCOs were asked by the Panel what they found most

satisfying about their time in the Army, most cited the opportunity to work with and to

develop young soldiers. Panel survey data reveal, however, that in a majority of cases,

this care and concern is not transmitted to or perceived by soldiers.
72

Table 11--Perceptions of Company Leadership

Men Women

N = 14,498 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree

My officers are interested in what I think and how I

feel about things. 47% 31% 41% 36%

My officers are interested in my personal welfare. 47% 27% 42% 32%

My NCOs are interested in what I think and how I

feel about things. 61% 24% 55% 32%

My NCOs are interested in my personal welfare. 62% 20% 57% 27%

I am impressed with the quality of leadership in

this company. 39% 40% 31% 51%

I would go for help with a personal problem to

people in the company chain of command. 46% 37% 34% 52%

This perceived lack of interest on the part of leadership has contributed to a

weakening of the essential bond of trust between leaders and their soldiers. This

breakdown is evidenced by the survey finding that less than one-half of the soldiers

responding to the Panel’s survey indicated that they would approach their company

chain of command for assistance with a personal problem.

In focus groups, soldiers remarked that “I just don’t feel comfortable going to my

squad leader about this,” or that “I would never trust my chain of command to deal with

sexual harassment.” Many leaders recognize this breakdown in trust; one field grade

officer remarked, “I don’t think we know what goes on with the junior enlisted.”

Additionally, many leaders, because they have not experienced it, deny the existence

of sexual harassment. A leader must be sensitive to the possibility that enlisted

soldiers’ experiences may be outside of the realm of the leader’s personal experience.

Distrust of leaders is particularly evident in the survey responses of female

soldiers. Only one-third would “go for help with a personal problem to people in the

company chain of command.” In focus group sessions, soldiers, especially women,

repeatedly asserted that they require a system through which they can report

inappropriate behaviors or other complaints without fear of reprisal. They expressed

concern that existing agencies (e.g., IG, EOA, chaplain, etc.) work more for the chain of

command than for soldiers. Soldiers seek only fair, respectful, and dignified treatment

from their chain of command and agencies to whom they go for support and assistance.

Unfortunately, many soldiers simply do not trust the present system to deal with their

concerns.

♦ Some leaders’ concern for their own career progression takes priority over

caring for their soldiers.

The Panel is disturbed by the perception, as expressed by a number of soldiers

in their survey responses and recorded in both Tables 10 and 11, that some leaders’

concern for their own career progression takes priority over caring for their soldiers.

Over one-third of male (37%) and female (40%) soldiers agreed with the survey
73

statement that leaders are more interested in furthering their careers than in the wellbeing of their soldiers. More female soldiers (47%) than male soldiers (43%) agreed

that the leaders in their company are more interested in looking good than in being

good. Only 39% of the men and 31% of the women agreed that they are impressed

with the quality of leadership in their company. Focus group comments reinforced

these survey findings. Many enlisted soldiers, particularly those in the grades of staff

sergeant and below, believe that their leaders’ paramount concerns are for themselves

and their careers. “They [leaders] see us [soldiers] as getting them where they want to

go. They could care less if we get where we need to go or what we have to put up with

to get there.” Survey data, focus groups, and personal interviews consistently

reinforced the concept that the Army must make a concerted and continuous effort to

improve and maintain our soldiers' trust and confidence in the chain of command.

Commitment to Soldiers

♦ The Army is sending a mixed message about its commitment to its soldiers.

The Panel notes several factors that detract from leaders’ efforts to create a

positive human relations environment. The stresses of expanding missions,

diminishing resources, and increasing competition for advancement are real challenges

confronting our leaders. One leader complained in a focus group that “there is simply

not enough time, money, equipment, or people to get the mission done and to

concentrate on maintaining a positive human relations environment.” The high

OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO of today’s Army also leave soldiers confused and

without a clear mission focus. Complicated by the downsizing of the force, a high

OPTEMPO requires leaders and soldiers to do “more with less.” This reality is

reflected in soldier perceptions that there are not enough dollars to buy modernized

equipment, maintain their workplaces and housing, and to improve their quality of life.

Further, many soldiers expressed concern that key medical, educational, and

retirement benefits are eroding. Consequently, many believe that the Army has

violated or broken its commitment to them.

Zero Defects

In focus groups, leaders vocalized distress at the existing “zero defects

mentality,” typified by an intense competition for promotion and advancement, wherein

any mistake is perceived as a “discriminator” and, in effect, a career terminator.

Leaders at all levels claimed to avoid risk-taking and creativity in problem solving

because “failure is simply not tolerated.” “Zero defects is affecting how I make

decisions. One bad decision and my career is over.” Another officer commented that,

“zero defects determines if you do the right thing or please the person above you. It

creates a moral dilemma.”

One collateral effect of this “zero defects” environment is that “bad news,” to

include incidents of sexual harassment or sex discrimination, is consciously contained
74

at the lowest level of command. In an effort to prevent their more senior leaders from

recognizing that one of their subordinates has a problem or has failed, junior leaders

avoid reporting “bad news” to their superiors. The Army’s leadership philosophy of

“solving problems at the lowest level,” designed to promote the exercise of personal

responsibility by lower level leaders, has in certain cases served to delay the resolution

of issues and to perpetuate problems. Panel assessments reveal that when senior

leaders say “solve problems at the lowest level,” junior leaders perceive them as

meaning “I don’t want to hear your problems.” When junior leaders fail to bring

problems to the attention of their superiors, they are deprived of the benefit of the more

extensive leadership and human relations experiences of their higher-level

commanders. In turn, higher-level commanders are deprived of the capacity to monitor

and assess trends in their subordinate units, and to implement measures to correct

current defects and to forestall future problems. In the end, it is the soldier and the unit

who pay the price.

Soldiers easily recognize their leader’s fear of failure or reluctance to ask for

assistance from higher-level leaders. Soldiers perceive these traits as conclusive

evidence that their leader is concerned only for his or her own career and will sacrifice

the welfare of individual soldiers and the unit to secure personal advancement. One

typical response from a soldier was that “senior NCOs and officers worry more about

ticket stamps [punching]. The morale goes straight down the tubes when that

happens.” Another soldier noted that “leaders are more worried about their next

promotion than their people.” As stated by a female soldier commenting on her own

experience in reporting an allegation of sexual harassment, “Things are always swept

under the carpet to keep the unit or officer from looking bad. They just move the

harasser.”

Job versus Profession

Many leaders and soldiers expressed concern that the Army is becoming more

like a civilian job than a profession. Individual rights and privacy concerns, they say,

are beginning to receive priority over the core values espoused by the Army. This

attitude engenders a “9 to 5” mentality where only a soldier’s workplace behavior is

deemed subject to leader scrutiny or concern. Any intrusion, inquiry, or demand

related to a soldier’s private life and personal values is considered “off-limits” to the

military leader.

The result is twofold. First, many leader focus group participants reported a

reluctance to get involved in the private lives of their soldiers. Leaders shrink from

venturing into the barracks, visiting the homes of their soldiers, or simply getting to

know their soldiers. As a result, human relations problems grow unnoticed. One NCO

remarked, “There is a hands off mentality. What they do on their own time has become

their own business.” Many leaders appear to have misinterpreted the Better

Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS) program and Single Soldier Initiatives, which

promote the overall quality of life for single and unaccompanied soldiers, as imposing
75

limits on leader involvement in the lives of soldiers. Focus group comments routinely

indicated that leaders have “walked away from the barracks.” Many leaders have

asserted, incorrectly, that the BOSS program (and Single Soldier Initiatives) have

deprived them of the authority to intervene in the barracks or in soldiers’ private lives.

Erosion of Bedrock Values

Second, the shift from the perception of military service as a profession to “just a

job” encourages soldiers’ beliefs that the requirement to adhere to Army values and

standards extends only as far as their installation’s front gate. Like their leaders,

soldiers perceive that anything that occurs “outside the gate” is personal, private, and

beyond the bounds of legitimate Army concern or interest. One soldier characterized

the situation saying, “We lead dual lives.” One life applies in the workplace where the

soldier adheres to the values, rules, and norms of the Army. The other life revolves

around private values, personal rules, and “off-time” activities.

Further, some soldiers reported their belief that the moral code applicable to

other soldiers did not apply in their specific duty location. One soldier referred to his

one year overseas tour as “TDY,”34 or “Temporarily Divorced for a Year.” The Panel

believes that this unacceptable and inappropriate mindset results from the absence of

command support for and enforcement of Army values.

♦ Women perceive that the Army is not committed to accepting them as

members of the force.

There exists a general perception that, while the Army as an institution claims to

have fully accepted women as an essential element of the force, it has not taken the

steps necessary to inculcate this commitment into the Army culture. Many female

soldiers routinely hear that their selections for promotion, schooling, command, or other

highly visible assignments have taken slots and opportunities away from male soldiers.

In addition, females are often excluded from competition for positions for which male

soldiers of their same rank/grade and branch/functional area are considered. Women

perceive that they are selected for administrative and staff positions as opposed to

operational or line assignments, and are often denied assignments in their primary

career field in favor of work deemed “more appropriate for a woman.”

Mentoring

Of particular concern to the Panel is the lack of mentoring, coaching, and career

counseling available to all soldiers, and female soldiers in particular, on both formal

and informal levels. Many male leaders expressed a reluctance and even an inability

to address what they perceive as “women’s issues.” The Panel believes that this

absence of mentoring stems from a lack of commitment on the part of many of our

 

34 TDY is an acronym that in the normal usage means Temporary Duty. Here, the soldier was referring

to a one-year tour overseas in which his family did not accompany him.
76

leaders, coupled with male leaders’ fear that a close relationship with a female soldier,

although professionally based and conducted, will generate perceptions of impropriety

and prompt allegations of sexual harassment.

Central Oversight of Human Relations and Leadership Programs

♦ There is no departmental cell specifically charged with strategic oversight of

the human relations environment.

Commitment to a positive human relations environment begins at the highest

levels of leadership. As the Panel conducted its review of policy and survey of soldier

opinions, it became apparent that in the area of human relations, the Army has been in

the reactive mode too long. There is no cell in the Army staff specifically tasked to

provide strategic oversight of the Army’s human relations environment, leadership

doctrine, and leader development. Although a human resources directorate exists in

ODCSPER, that directorate has been downsized dramatically and must, of necessity,

devote most of its efforts to reacting to problems. In the past, the directorate was led

by a major general. For the past year, however, it has been headed by a colonel.35

Officers assigned to the EO desks frequently lack command experience and EO

training.

Headquarters, Department of the Army staff responsibility for leadership and

leader development policy is divided between the DCSPER and the DCSOPS.

Because the definitions of leadership and leader development are not clearly

delineated in AR 600-100, Army Leadership, the division of responsibilities and

functions between ODCSPER and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

(ODCSOPS) staffs is confusing. Key issues that are not addressed by AR 600-100

include the assignment of primary responsibility for advising the Army Chief of Staff on

leadership and leader development policy, and what resources are required by

MACOMS.

There is currently no Army agency responsible for the integration of research

and policy in the human relations area. Also, the Army lacks both an effective reporting

requirement, and a central repository to receive, analyze, and maintain such

information. Neither DA nor individual commanders have any way to monitor the "big

picture" in important human relations trends. Without a strategic view of the human

relations environment, the Army will never be able to anticipate or take proactive steps

to forestall or prevent problems.

In recent years, the Army has not made a substantive commitment to human

resource issues, as disparities between policy and practice are prevalent. Soldiers

view the Army’s reaction to the so-called “sex-scandal” at Aberdeen Proving Ground as

 

35 As this report was being written, a brigadier general was named to be head of the human resources

directorate.
77

“knee-jerk” and believe that, without the intense media interest, the Army would not

have altered its “business as usual” practices. Further, many soldiers believe that once

media attention to this issue abates, command emphasis will dissipate similarly.

Only good leadership can alter these soldiers’ perceptions. Army leaders are

the critical factor in creating, maintaining, and enforcing an environment of respect and

dignity in the Army. Army leader action will ultimately determine the impact of the

Panel’s report.
78

INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING

Background

Civilian to Soldier

Young men and women obtain their strongest and most enduring impressions of

the Army when they are making the transition from civilian to soldier. It is at this time

that they learn Army values and gain discipline from being held to standards. Trainees’

first contact with the Army is through their recruiters. Once recruited, trainees are

qualified for enlistment at a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). After

successful qualification, they enlist for a MOS and are given a date to begin IET. Upon

arrival at a training installation, new recruits report to a reception battalion. Usually

recruits spend three to seven days in reception processing before being sent to a

training company.

Training Components

There are three training components of IET: Basic Combat Training (BCT),

which is followed by Advanced Individual Training (AIT), or a combination of BCT and

AIT called One Station Unit Training (OSUT). Most soldiers in combat support and

combat service support MOSs enter the Army through BCT and are trained in genderintegrated companies. After they complete the eight-week BCT course, they proceed to

AIT where each will receive instruction and training applicable to their specific MOS

(such as cook or light vehicle mechanic). Advanced Individual Training can last from

four to 52 weeks depending upon the specific MOS. All AITs are gender-integrated.

Soldiers in combat arms and some combat support MOSs enter OSUT,36 completing

their basic combat skills and advanced individual training in one unit, at one location,

with one group of soldier peers, and one group of drill sergeants and instructors. In all

components, drill sergeants and instructors are key to the training process. They not

only teach technical skills necessary for survival on the battlefield, they instill personal

and unit discipline and Army values. They are the influential link between the trainee

and the rest of the Army and serve as role models for new soldiers.

In BCT and OSUT, training is usually conducted by drill sergeants. In AIT, drill

sergeants are primarily responsible for the daily administrative management of soldiers,

physical training, and common soldier tasks training. Most of the MOS specific training

in AIT is committee taught37 by senior NCO instructors who hold that MOS. After

completing OSUT or AIT, soldiers report to their first duty assignment with a unit. This

progression from recruit to new soldier is depicted in Figure 2.

 

36 The OSUT military occupational specialties include the Armor, Chemical Corps, Engineers, Field

Artillery, Infantry, and Military Police. Currently, 7% of OSUT trainees are women, almost all of whom

are training in the Chemical and Military Police MOSs. All other MOSs go to BCT and AIT.

37 The term “committee taught” refers to the system of instruction used at AIT. An instructor, from a

group or “committee” of instructors, is assigned to teach specific classes on a rotational basis.
79

IET

 Figure 2--The Flow from Recruiter to First Duty Assignment

Panel Assessment of Initial Entry Training

What We Did

The Panel’s review of the Army’s training base consisted of written surveys and

focus groups for trainees, drill sergeants, and instructors. The Panel traveled to training

installations throughout the Army to document and record information depicting

trainees’ and trainers’ experiences and opinions regarding sexual harassment,

discrimination, and their perceptions of fair treatment. It also solicited the opinions and

experiences of drill sergeant and instructor candidates attending schools designed to

prepare them for their new duties, and spent a considerable amount of time observing

training and talking with trainees, trainers, officers, command sergeants major, and

civilian employees at both training installations and drill sergeant/instructor training

schools.38

 

38 A detailed training base scope, methodology, and data analysis discussion is provided in Volume II.

Reception Station

One

Station

Unit

Training

11 to 13

Weeks

Basic

Combat

Training

8 Weeks

Advanced

Individual

Training

4 to 52

Weeks

First Duty Assignment

Recruiters

MEPS
80

What We Found

There was a very positive aspect of the Panel’s review in that it found trainees

believe that the overwhelming majority of drill sergeants and instructors perform

competently and well. The Panel’s personal observations were similar. Panel

members saw and met many hardworking drill sergeants who impressed them with

being committed to the welfare of new recruits entrusted to their care and dedicated to

training them to be proficient, disciplined soldiers. However, four major concerns were

identified: lack of dignity and respect in the IET environment; inadequate preparation

of trainers for IET duty; inadequate selection and assignment of trainers; and negative

consequences of the focus on sexual harassment in IET.

Lack of Dignity and Respect in the IET Environment

♦ Soldierization in IET tolerates sexualized behaviors that are inconsistent with

instilling respect as an Army core value.

Extent of Sexual Harassment among Trainees

Initial Entry Training is designed to challenge trainees mentally and physically

and to develop in them the ethical base, discipline, and team spirit to become

professional soldiers. Nevertheless, trainees experienced rates of sexual harassment

lower than the rest of the Army in BCT and OSUT, and higher in AIT. In a single

question assessing sexual harassment rates, 7% of the men and 24% of the women in

AIT asserted that they had been sexually harassed since joining the Army. This

corresponds to 7% of the men and 22% of the women in the Panel’s Army-wide survey.

Higher Rates in AIT

As seen in the following table, trainees in AIT reported experiencing higher rates

of sexual harassment and inappropriate behavior than trainees in either BCT or OSUT.

Female trainees in AIT said they had experienced sexual harassment, crude or

offensive behavior, or unwanted sexual attention at a rate greater than female soldiers

who participated in the Panel’s Army-wide survey. The percentages of trainee survey

participants reporting any of the SEQ behaviors are shown in Table 12.
81

 Table 12--Trainees Responses: Experienced Sexual Harassment and

 Inappropriate Behaviors in the Different Training Components

BCT OSUT AIT Total IET Army-wide

Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women

N = 1613 778 1154 288 3415 1979 6182 3045

Experienced

Sexual

Harassment

39 6% 15% 4% 15% 9% 30% 7% 24% 7% 22%

Crude

behavior 64% 64% 70% 74% 71% 82% 69% 75% 76% 78%

Sexist

behavior 43% 56% 50% 65% 55% 71% 50% 65% 63% 72%

Unwanted

sexual

attention 17% 27% 21% 33% 28% 50% 24% 41% 30% 47%

Coercion 3% 3% 2% 4% 7% 13% 5% 10% 8% 15%

Assault 1% 2% 1% 3% 3% 5% 2% 4% 6% 7%

As discussed in the “Extent of Sexual Harassment” section of Part IV, Volume I,

IET soldiers are being subjected to inappropriate behaviors but do not define or identify

those behaviors as sexual harassment. This is particularly true of female soldiers in

the AIT environment. Most trainees are able to generalize parts of the Army’s definition

of sexual harassment without truly understanding that inappropriate behaviors may

lead to and include sexual harassment. Many trainees reported that they do not view

many of the behaviors encompassed in the Army’s definition of sexual harassment as

harassment or as inappropriate. These trainees view such acts as consensual

behavior or flirting. In trainee focus groups, most trainees indicated that sexual jokes,

sexual comments, and touching are common and are often not viewed as offensive by

either the perpetrator or the recipient. There are, however, some trainees who do not

like or condone such actions or language. They reported that this behavior is endured

because, “it’s just the way the Army is.” A female trainee said, “Males make comments

that are uncalled for. They need education and/or manners. I know it’s because of

how and where they grew up, but they need to stop.” Clearly the soldierization process

has failed to adequately promote a climate of dignity and respect and an understanding

of appropriate and inappropriate behavior.

When asked to provide examples of sexual harassment, trainees’ answers

covered a wide range of behaviors from “simply talking to women” to committing rape.

A trainee said, “I don’t think it can be explained. It depends on the individual.” Another

trainee reported, “I think I’m supposed to read minds.” Supporting this comment was a

response by a female trainee, “If one guy looks at you but you like him, it’s flirting. If he

gives you the ‘creeps,’ it’s sexual harassment.” The lack of a clear understanding of

 

39 BCT, OSUT, and AIT were asked, “Have you ever been sexually harassed since joining the Army?”

The Army wide survey asked, ”In the last 12 months, have you been sexually harassed?”
82

sexual harassment leads to continued incidence of inappropriate behaviors and a

normalized environment that is counter to Army core values.

Some male and female trainees reported that “sexual harassment is ‘blown out

of proportion.’ The media is taking it further than it should go.” A few trainees said,

“It’s gone way, way too far. You don’t know what it [sexual harassment] is anymore.”

Many trainees of both sexes wanted concrete examples or a “list” of behaviors that

constitute sexual harassment. The Panel questions whether such a list would be

beneficial. It could be used as a means of getting “off the hook," without taking

responsibility or being held accountable for potentially offensive behavior unless it is

contained within a specific list. What is certain is that sexual harassment in the

broader context of dignity and respect is not part of trainees’ frame of reference.

♦ Some drill sergeants harass their soldiers and/or do not correct inappropriate

behavior between trainees.

Our data analysis suggests that sexual harassment is degrading good order and

discipline in some parts of the training base. Some drill sergeants are committing acts

of sexual harassment/misconduct as well as failing to set the proper example or

correcting inappropriate behavior between trainees. The majority of trainees who

reported that they had been sexually harassed since joining the Army indicated that the

harassment had occurred either during training or in the barracks. As seen in Table

13, the major source of sexual harassment for male trainees was drill sergeants, while

female trainees identified other trainees as the major source of sexual harassment.

Table 13--Sources of Harassment

Trainees Drill Sergeants Other Trainees

Men (N = 736) 42% 22%

Women (N = 409) 27% 42%

This personal misconduct and/or failing to correct inappropriate behavior

between trainees affects not only the trainee who is being victimized, but all trainees in

the unit who fail to learn appropriate behavior because of a lax attitude on the part of

some drill sergeants. Trainers, as well as trainees, must be more conscious of Army

core values, especially in terms of their leadership responsibilities.

♦ Generally, trainers reported they have not observed sexual harassment in their

unit, but a significant number of female trainers reported they have

experienced sexual harassment.
83

Extent of Sexual Harassment among Trainers

Of the 254 trainers surveyed, 75% were men and 24% were women.40 Most of

the men (83%) and many of the women (67%) had not observed sexual harassment in

their current training company. However, 39% of the women and 2% of the men

reported that they had been subjected to sexual harassment in the last 12 months.

They reported that the most frequently observed behaviors were crude or offensive

behavior, sexist behavior, and unwelcome sexual advances. Male trainers indicated

that, with regard to the most recent act of sexual harassment to which they had been

subjected, AIT instructors, officers in their chain of command, or other drill sergeants

had been the harassers. Female trainers identified other drill sergeants, first

sergeants, and other NCOs as the prevalent harassers in their most recent experience.

Overall, 92% of the trainers reported experiencing at least one of the SEQ

behaviors. As shown in Table 14, most male and female trainers reported that they

had been subjected to crude or offensive behaviors and sexist behaviors. Trainers

were more likely than soldiers in the Panel’s Army-wide survey to report experiencing

crude or offensive behaviors, sexist behaviors, and unwanted sexual attention.

Because of the small sample of female trainers, their data should be viewed with

caution. Trainers experienced SEQ behaviors in higher numbers than any other group

surveyed.

Table 14--Trainer Responses: Experienced SEQ Behaviors41

Crude or

offensive

behavior

Sexist

behavior

Unwanted

sexual

attention

Coercion Assault

Men

(N = 190) 90% 73% 39% 6% 2%

Women

(N = 61) 93% 93% 83% 40% 10%

One trainer commented, “I see more gender discrimination than sexual harassment.”

Another trainer reported, “I had a complaint on my First Sergeant. . . . He was allowed

to PCS42 and I was moved to another unit.”

♦ Drill Sergeants, instructors, and officers are treating each other with varying

degrees of respect, dignity, and support.

 

40 Question response rates for each question vary as not all respondents answered all questions.

41 Percentage experiencing at least one inappropriate behavior. The data for trainers are based on a

small number of cases and should be viewed with caution.

42 PCS is an acronym for Permanent Change of Station. In other words, a soldier moves on to his or her

next duty assignment.
84

Peers

Trainers were asked a series of questions about their relationships with one

another and with their officer leaders. Most of the male and female trainers reported

fair treatment from peers. Men more than women mentioned in surveys and focus

groups that trainers treat one another with respect and courtesy and work together as a

team. Female trainers, however, reported negative relationships with male trainers due

to gender conflicts.

Chain of Command

Over two-thirds of the male trainers, but only half of the female trainers, believe

they have been treated fairly by their chain of command overall or in sexual harassment

matters. Most of the male trainers and many of the female trainers feel they have the

support of their chain of command. Most men reported, however, that officers do not

treat them with respect and dignity. Many women echoed this concern. A few drill

sergeants complained that officers are spending too much time with trainees doing

“sergeant’s business," either out of boredom or a distrust of the drill sergeants, and

they view this as disrespect. A male trainer said, “Commanders are too involved;

officers do too much of our business.” Two other trainers said, “Commanders are

running scared because of the media blitz," and “Officers will support you until he or

she gets in trouble. The staff sergeant or sergeant first class will take the fall, not the

officer.” Men frequently mentioned disrespect from senior officers as contributing to

negative relationships.

Inadequate Preparation of Trainers for IET Duty

♦ Trainers complain that current EO training is not preparing them to handle

sexual harassment situations.

In assessing their Drill Sergeant Course or Instructor Training Course, most

trainers said they had been trained in effective ways to train soldiers; however, only

some said their training prepared them for their current job. Trainers complained that

most of the training they received consisted of memorizing modules or regulations, but

did not teach them how to handle sensitive situations when they occurred. One trainer

highlighted this point by saying “[I was] not trained to deal with [sexual] advances by

trainees.” Another trainer said, “They show you a little film [on sexual harassment],

they show you how to recognize it, but not how to handle it.” Finally, another trainer

discussed the problem with the current training by saying, “[The] course [on sexual

harassment] needs to be updated. [The] situations are too old.”
85

POSH Training

All trainers interviewed had received POSH training in the last 12 months. Many

of the men reported that this training was effective in making them aware of behaviors

that might constitute sexual harassment, but many women viewed the training as

ineffective. Many trainers said they were receiving POSH training too frequently; the

Army was “oversaturating” them with POSH training.

The Panel believes training for drill sergeants should address the fact that

attraction between drill sergeants and trainees does occur. Thus, drill sergeants need

training in recognizing inappropriate feelings/behaviors in themselves and taking action

to control the situation. Currently, the Drill Sergeant Course and Instructor Training

Course do not prepare trainers to handle sexual harassment/misconduct challenges

that confront them in the IET environment. The POSH training the Panel reviewed

used simplistic examples of appropriate/inappropriate behavior that offered little

guidance in helping a trainer work through difficult and complex interpersonal

situations.

Drill Sergeant School

Drill sergeant training is conducted at three separate locations (Fort Leonard

Wood, Fort Jackson, and Fort Benning). The Panel sees a true advantage in

combining the three schools into one. There would be an efficiency in resources and a

uniform standard of quality for EO training, affording candidates a common, shared

understanding of sexual harassment issues and Army ethics. Ultimately, the human

relations environment in the training base and in the Army as a whole would benefit.

Selection and Assignment of Trainers

♦ The screening of candidates for drill sergeant duty lacks rigor.

Selection

Drill sergeants and instructors are the most important contact new trainees have

with the Army. The demanding nature of drill sergeant/instructor duties places these

NCOs in positions of high authority, autonomy, and respect. It is vitally important that

these NCOs be persons of the highest caliber, who demonstrate personal discipline

and character, and are held to strict standards of professionalism.

The Army has established standards of selection for drill sergeants.43 AR 614-

200, Selection of Enlisted Soldiers for Training and Assignment, states that, “Since the

drill sergeant is the primary representative of the Army during the formative weeks of an

enlistee’s training, only the most professionally qualified soldiers will be assigned these

 

43 An NCO either volunteers or is selected by DA to attend the nine-week Drill Sergeant Course.
86

duties.”44 In fact, however, the Panel observed a general lack of rigor in the drill

sergeant/instructor selection process. Most of the drill sergeant candidates are

selected at DA level. Selectees are subjected to a records check that includes, among

other things, a personnel records screen. When a soldier volunteers, the candidate’s

current chain of command must review and endorse the candidate’s suitability for the

position. There is no psychological testing of any type, other than a check of medical

records. Once soldiers have been selected as drill sergeant candidates, they risk

serious harm to their careers if they turn down or otherwise fail to complete the

program.

♦ The number of drill sergeants and their utilization present issues for Army

review.

Assignment

Army regulations require that BCT and OSUT drill sergeants be assigned on a

ratio of one drill sergeant for every 20 soldiers. In AIT, drill sergeants are supposed to

be assigned on a ratio of one drill sergeant for every 50 soldiers. While the Army

generally meets standards for BCT and OSUT units, the Panel found that the number

of drill sergeants in AIT is woefully inadequate.45 No training unit visited by the Panel

had a full complement of drill sergeants. The Panel noted ratios as large as one drill

sergeant for every 200 soldiers in AIT units. Some of the problems resulted from drill

sergeants’ attendance at schools, being TDY, or being assigned to perform additional

duties not normally assigned to a drill sergeant (i.e., they were assigned these duties

because other support positions in units had been cut). The Army must ensure drill

sergeants are utilized appropriately, are of sufficient number to maintain good order

and discipline, and oversee the soldierization process of their soldiers.

Negative Consequences of Sexual Harassment Focus in IET

♦ Trainees report a negative backlash in the form of ad hoc segregation as a

consequence of emphasis of sexual harassment training.

The publicity over sexual misconduct has prompted the Army to increase

requirements for POSH training. As a result, trainees perceive that the Army is trying

to prevent sexual harassment by “scaring” them into compliance, rather than teaching

them how to behave properly and professionally. The result is that some soldiers

reported alienation between men and women.

Some trainees said that the Army has “gone overboard” with POSH training.

One male soldier said, “It becomes a joke if you receive too much training. People stop

 

44 Dep’t of Army, Regulation 614-200, Selection of Enlisted Soldiers for Training and Assignment, para.

8-16b (September 17, 1990).

45 Twenty percent of Army accessions are women, but the training base is composed of only ten percent

female drill sergeants.
87

paying attention.” The established training policy is to encourage gender-integrated

training that reflects the reality of a mixed-gender Army. It appears that, out of fear for

their own careers or possible embarrassment, some leaders have implemented an

unofficial policy of gender segregation within an integrated unit. This results in

divisiveness between soldiers, not the unified, high performance team the Army must

bond to ensure mission readiness.

Trainees note that gender segregation is occurring in their units. Some male

trainees stated they are afraid to even talk to female trainees, not to mention working

side-by-side with them every day. One male trainee said, “In BCT, we are told to stay

away from females. Climb up a tree, whatever, avoid at all cost.” One trainee reported

that men and women eat separately in the same dining facility, and that they shine their

boots on different bleachers. Some trainees reported that gender-integrated basic

training is “de facto” a “segregated-integrated” basic training. A female trainee

reported that, “If they won’t let us [men and women] talk to each other or help each

other, why are we training together?” In some of the male trainee focus groups, a

number of trainees said, “We are expected to work together. Why can’t we train

together?” and “We are integrated, but segregated within.”

♦ Trainers fear that if they are charged with sexual harassment, they will be

treated unfairly by their leaders.

Some male trainers indicated that they are fearful of potential sexual harassment

charges due to possible retaliation from trainees. Many male drill sergeants and

instructors expressed a belief that trainees’ complaints against drill sergeants are

automatically viewed as credible, even if lacking in merit. Most feel they receive

adequate support from their leadership--until they become the subject of an accusation

of sexual harassment. A male trainer said, “I’d be gone. . . people are expendable.”

Another trainer reported, “Once your name is mucked up with a false allegation,46 the

privates get away with making a false allegation, but you never can clear your name.”

Overall, trainers asserted the need for more strict punishment for individuals who

make false allegations. Many drill sergeants believe that trainer and trainee roles have

been improperly reversed with regard to authority and credibility. According to many

drill sergeants, trainees who allege harassment or abuse at the hands of a drill

sergeant are more likely to be believed than the drill sergeant who denies the

allegation. Once a sexual harassment allegation is made, the trainer is suspended

 

46 A false EO complaint is one “containing information or allegations that the complainant knew to be

false.” AR 600-20, para. 6-8q.

 “A substantiated EO discrimination complaint is a complaint that, after the completion of an inquiry or

investigation, provides evidence to indicate that the complainant was more likely than not treated

differently because of his or her race, national origin, gender, or religion and that corrective action must

be taken.” AR 600-20, para. 6-8j.

 “There are two types of unsubstantiated complaints--complaints for which there is no corroboration and

those for which the corroborating evidence is insufficient to substantiate the allegations.” AR 600-20,

para. 6-8k.
88

from his/her training responsibilities. Even if the allegations are unfounded, many drill

sergeants expressed a belief that the damage to their careers and reputations is

permanent. Although the UCMJ and Army regulations provide commanders with the

authority to process those who make false allegations, trainers do not perceive that

their leaders would take any action to punish trainees who complain falsely.

Most drill sergeants understand the Army’s definition of sexual harassment. A

few, however, complained of inconsistency in the application of standards to NCOs and

officers against whom an allegation of sexual harassment is made. For example, a few

NCOs thought it “unlikely” that any officer would be charged with sexual harassment,

even though an NCO would be punished severely for the same conduct. One trainer

said, “An O-6 [Colonel] gets away with things an E-6 [Staff Sergeant] would be killed

for.”

The Panel believes leadership is central to dealing with these negative

consequences. As discussed in the “Leadership” section of Part IV, Volume I, leaders

who practice good leadership can mitigate such adverse effects.

Other Issues

♦ Generally, trainees perceive drill sergeants treat men and women equally, but

some male trainees perceive they are expected to meet a higher standard.

Fair Treatment

Most male trainees and many female trainees reported that, regardless of

gender, all soldiers receive equal encouragement to succeed and complete training by

both male and female drill sergeants. Men and women believe that the drill sergeants

uphold the same standards for all trainees. Several female trainees reported, “I don’t

like the drill sergeants, but they are all very fair,” and “We all get our fair share of being

picked on.” A few female trainees, however, indicated that female trainers are harder

on female trainees than on male trainees. In a trainee focus group, a female trainee

said, “Female drills are harder on females because they want you to succeed.” Another

trainee reported, “Female drill sergeants have high[er] expectations which leads to the

perception that women drill sergeants are harder.”

Although the majority of trainees reported that drill sergeants encourage men

and women equally, more than one-half of male trainees believed that they are

expected to train to a higher standard than women. Most female trainees, however,

believe that women are expected to achieve the same training standards as men. This

perception of inequity by men may lead to resentment and further alienation. A male

trainee reported, “[We are assigned] different details--females do paperwork and males

dig up trees.” This has the consequence of reinforcing sex role stereotypes and

diminishes the value of female trainees in the unit.
89

Some male and female trainees reported that male/female double standards are

a problem in their training, but most trainees were referring to physical training

standards established by Army policy. Physical training remains a misunderstood

program when it comes to male and female standards. Most soldiers understand

different standards based on age group, yet different standards based on gender

receive much more negative attention. A few male trainees also complained that the

military demeanor and conduct of female soldiers is more lax and attributed this to

more lenient treatment during training. Again, leaders hold the key. It is their

responsibility to maintain uniform standards and to dispel misperceptions of preferential

treatment or double standards.

Other detractors also exist at AIT. Service members from other military services

and reclassified soldiers attending AIT are treated in a different, much more collegial

manner than trainees. Trainees view this treatment as a double standard that further

degrades an already troubled environment. Drill sergeants must take on a more

meaningful training role in AIT.

♦ Trainees are more likely to report sexual harassment than soldiers in the rest

of the Army.

Reporting Sexual Harassment

When asked if they would report an incident of sexual harassment or

discrimination, most trainees replied that they would report an incident of sexual

harassment, if they were unable to handle it on their own or if the harassment

continued. One male trainee said, “The standard is zero tolerance and if we don’t

report it we are wrong.” Several female trainees echoed this sentiment. One female

trainee stated, “We feel we have an obligation to report. If we don’t report, the violator

could continue to harass others.”

If unable to resolve a sexual harassment incident informally on their own, most

trainees stated that they would use formal methods to resolve the situation. Most of the

male trainees (70%) and many of the female trainees (66%) agreed that the formal

complaint procedures are clear. Both male and female trainees said they would first

report a sexual harassment incident to their chain of command, specifically to the

officers in their chain of command, then to drill sergeants or instructors, and finally to

an outside source like a chaplain, an EOA, or an EOR.

In many units, however, the EOR was a drill sergeant. Some trainees

complained that it is difficult to bring an EO or sexual harassment complaint to an EOR

who is a drill sergeant, particularly if the complaint concerns another drill sergeant in

the same unit.
90

EPILOG

The preceding pages represent the views of thousands of soldiers who met with

the Senior Review Panel. They have told the Panel their perceptions of the Army’s

human relations environment and the impact of that environment on their lives. The

recommendations that have been made to address problems in soldier workplaces are

but the critical first steps that Army leaders must take to improve the Army’s human

relations environment.

This Report, the Panel’s analysis in this volume and the data contained in

Volume II, represents the most comprehensive exploration of the human relations

environment of the United States Army ever compiled. Its very existence underscores

the Army’s commitment to its soldiers.

Lastly, Panel members believe that one of the most important benefits of its work

is the impact its travels have had, and will continue to have, on soldiers. They will long

remember the great soldiers, men and women, with whom they were privileged to meet.
91

ANNEX B

SENIOR REVIEW PANEL MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

Major General Richard S. Siegfried

Chair of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. MG Siegfried retired

from the U.S. Army on October 1, 1995, after 34 years of service and was recalled to

active duty by the Secretary of the Army to chair the Panel. Previous assignments

include Commanding General of Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and Deputy Inspector

General, Department of the Army. His last assignment in the Army was as Inspector

General, U.S. Army.

Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote

Vice Chair of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. BG Foote retired

from active duty on September 1, 1989, and was recalled to active duty in December

1996, to serve with the Senior Review Panel. During her 29 years of duty, she held a

variety of command and staff positions to include Deputy Inspector General

(Inspections), Department of the Army. Her career culminated with her assignment as

Commanding General of Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Mr. John P. McLaurin, III

Assistant Vice Chair of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment.

Mr. McLaurin is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Military Personnel

Management and Equal Opportunity Policy. He is a retired Colonel of the U.S. Army

and a lawyer. His key active duty assignments before concluding his career in the

Judge Advocate General’s Corps included Staff Judge Advocate of the 2nd Infantry

Division in the Republic of Korea, and of the Health Services Command in San Antonio,

Texas. In 1996, Mr. McLaurin served as a member of the Secretary of the Army’s Task

Force on Extremist Activities.

Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. LTG Kennedy has

served for over 28 years in first the Women’s Army Corps and then in the Army as a

Military Intelligence Officer. She has held a variety of command and staff positions
92

both in the United States and in overseas assignments. LTG Kennedy is currently

serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

Major General Larry R. Ellis

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. MG Ellis has

served for over 27 years as an Infantry Officer in various command and staff

assignments in the United States, Vietnam, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the

Republic of Korea. From October 1996 to May 1997, he served as the Assistant

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. MG Ellis is currently assigned as the Commanding

General of 1st Armored Division.

Mrs. Ruby Butler DeMesme

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. Mrs. DeMesme is

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Force Management and Personnel.

She has served both the Army and the Air Force at the Senior Executive Staff level

since 1990. Mrs. DeMesme is a former Senate staffer and has been an Army spouse

for over 30 years.

Command Sergeant Major Cynthia A. Pritchett

Member of the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. CSM Pritchett has

served for over 23 years in leadership positions including Drill Sergeant, student and

faculty Battalion Commander at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy.

CSM Pritchett is the Army’s Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Defense Advisory Committee

on Women in the Services. In 1996, she worked on the Secretary of the Army’s Task

Force on Extremist Activities. CSM Pritchett is currently assigned as Post Command

Sergeant Major at Fort Belvoir, Virginia--the first woman chosen to serve in this

position.

ANNEX C

ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS

AAP Affirmative Action Plan

AIT Advanced Individual Training

AMEDD Army Medical Department
93

APFT Army Physical Fitness Test

AR Army Regulation

ARI Army Research Institute

ASI Additional Skill Identifier

BCT Basic Combat Training

BG Brigadier General

BOSS Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers

CAL Center for Army Leadership

CONUS Continental United States

CSM Command Sergeant Major

DA Department of the Army

DACOWITS Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services

DA Pam Department of the Army Pamphlet

DCPC Direct Combat Position Coding

DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DEOMI Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute

DIBRS Defense Incident-Based Reporting System

DoD Department of Defense

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DRRI Defense Race Relations Institute

EEO Equal Employment Opportunity
94

EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

EO Equal Opportunity

EOA Equal Opportunity Advisor

EOR Equal Opportunity Representative

ETS Expiration Term of Service

FM Field Manual

FY Fiscal Year

GAO U.S. General Accounting Office

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army

HRD Human Resources Directorate

IET Initial Entry Training

IG Inspector General

LTG Lieutenant General

MACOM Major Command

MEPS Military Entrance Processing Station

MEOCS Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey

MG Major General

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MPR Military Police Report

MSG Master Sergeant

MWR Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

NAFI Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality
95

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NCOER Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report

NIBRS National Incident-Based Reporting System

OCONUS Out of the Continental United States

OCS Officer Candidate School

ODCSOPS Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

ODCSPER Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

OEOP Office of Equal Opportunity Programs

OER Officer Evaluation Report

OPTEMPO Operational Tempo

OSUT One Station Unit Training

PERSCOM U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

PERSTEMPO Personnel Tempo

PME Professional Military Education

POI Program of Instruction

POSH Prevention of Sexual Harassment

PT Physical Training

Ret. Retired

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

RR/EO Race Relations/Equal Opportunity

SEQ Sexual Experiences Questionnaire

SFC Sergeant First Class
96

SGM Sergeant Major

SIR Serious Incident Report

SQI Skill Qualification Identifier

SSG Staff Sergeant

SSI U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute

SSMP Sample Survey of Military Personnel

TC Training Circular

TDA Table of Distribution and Allowances

TDY Temporary Duty

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSP Training Support Package

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

USMA United States Military Academy

WAC Women’s Army Corps
97

ANNEX D

INSTALLATIONS AND LOCATIONS VISITED

The Panel visited the following installations/locations between January 21, and

May 21, 1997:

CONUS (Continental United States)

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

Army Materiel Command (AMC)

 Headquarters, Virginia

Baltimore Recruiting Battalion,

 Maryland

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Fort Benning, Georgia

Fort Bliss, Texas

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Fort Carson, Colorado

Fort Drum, New York

Fort Eustis, Virginia

Fort Gordon, Georgia

Fort Hood, Texas

Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Fort Irwin, California

Fort Jackson, South Carolina

Kansas City Recruiting Battalion,

 Kansas

Fort Knox, Kentucky

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Fort Lee, Virginia

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Fort Lewis, Washington

Fort McClellan, Alabama

Fort Meade, Maryland

Headquarters, Department of the Army

 (Pentagon)

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Fort Rucker, Alabama

Fort Sam Houston (AMEDD School),

 Texas

Seattle Recruiting Battalion,

 Washington

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Tobyhanna Army Deport, Pennsylvania

U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

 (PERSCOM), Virginia

Walter Reed Army Hospital, District of

 Columbia

White Sands Missile Range,

 New Mexico

OCONUS (Out of the Continental United States)

Alaska

Fort Richardson

Fort Wainwright

Bosnia

Tuzla

Italy

Vincenza

Japan

Camp Zama

Okinawa
98

Germany

Heidelberg

Mannheim

Ramstein

Baumholder

Darmstadt

Wurzburg

Hawaii

Johnston Island

Schofield Barracks

Tripler Army Medical Center

Honduras

Joint Task Force Bravo

Korea

Camp Casey

Camp Humphries

Camp Stanley

Yongsan

Kuwait

Camp Doha

Panama

Fort Clayton

Saudi Arabia

Dhahran

Riyadh
99

ANNEX E

REVIEW OF POLICIES

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Before describing current Army policy regarding equal opportunity (EO) for

soldiers, it is appropriate to synopsize the Army’s efforts during the last thirty years. In

1964, in response to Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5120.36, Equal

Opportunity in the Armed Forces, the Army implemented its first regulation concerning

EO, Army Regulation (AR) 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military

Personnel. Since then, the Army’s efforts to achieve equal opportunity have centered

around three issues: improving race relations, eliminating gender discrimination, and

eliminating sexual harassment.

Race Relations

During the late 1960s and early to mid 1970s, the Army concentrated on the

problem of race relations. The Civil Rights movement, the accompanying unrest of the

1960s, the institutional turmoil caused by the Vietnam War, the end of the draft, and the

need to establish a volunteer Army all exacerbated tensions and heightened racial

polarization in the Army. Concerned that these problems were affecting unit readiness,

the Army directed its efforts toward educating soldiers and leaders, and placing trained

EO experts into the field. By 1972, more than 2000 school-trained EO officers and

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were on hand, filling formally established positions

in the Army unit organizational manning tables, to assist commanders in eliminating

racism and discrimination in the Army.

As stated in AR 600-42, Race Relations Education for the Army, the objective of

the Army race relations education program was “to maintain the highest degree of

organizational and combat readiness by fostering harmonious relations among all

military personnel under Army control.”

1

 Army policy mandated a yearly 18-hour block

of race relations and equal opportunity (RR/EO) instruction for all soldiers, taught by

instructors trained at the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI), now known as the

Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI). Unit commanders,

however, had no responsibility for EO training. Regulations did direct leaders to

consider the quality and effectiveness of subordinates’ leadership and support of

RR/EO principles and policies when evaluating them and made the command

 

1 Dep’t of Army, Regulation 600-42, Race Relations Education for the Army, para. 2 (December 11,

1973).
100

implementation of the EO program and race relations program a special subject for

inspections.

In 1973, AR 600-21, newly titled as Race Relations and Equal Opportunity, and

AR 600-42 placed the responsibility for conducting the unit RR/EO program squarely

on the chain of command. The Army developed leader handbooks, discussion outlines,

and subject schedules to assist commanders in training their soldiers. Surveys showed

this directed focus increased soldiers’ trust that the Army was serious in solving the

most pressing EO problems.

Company-level commanders became ambivalent about their training

requirements, however.

On the one hand, they claimed that they did not have the time to

devote to it; that they did not have the training to teach them how to

conduct an effective program; that their personnel were not

interested in it; that they had a difficult time getting personnel to

attend because of conflicting “mission related” duties; that the

RR/EO staff did not really provide adequate support; and that the

program was being “crammed down their throats.” On the other

hand, they maintained that they wanted more responsibility for

determining whether they needed a program in their units, how

often training should be conducted, what topics should be covered,

and who should attend.2

Army Proponency

The responsibility for monitoring the Army EO program was assigned to the

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army--Equal Opportunity. The Deputy Chief of Staff

for Personnel (DCSPER), a member of the Army General Staff, was responsible for the

development, management, and execution of the EO program. In 1971, the Office of

Equal Opportunity Programs (OEOP) was established as a division in the Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) to carry out this function. “This Office

developed the policy and guidance for the Army’s EO program, and served as the

Army’s principal action office in helping to resolve RR/EO problems throughout the

Army.”3 The OEOP was originally under the direction of a general officer and senior

colonels. By 1985, the OEOP was a just small branch within the Leader Policy Division

of the Human Resources Directorate (HRD), ODCSPER, under the direction of a major.

In 1986, the HRD was disestablished with its remaining functions going to other

directorates. In 1990, the HRD was reestablished to more centrally manage human

 

2

James A. Thomas, ed., Race Relations Research in the U.S. Army in the 1970s, A Collection of

Selected Readings (United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,

1988), p. 47.

3

Ibid., p. 36.
101

resources programs. Today’s OEOP, now authorized a lieutenant colonel and sergeant

major, is located within the Leadership Division of HRD, ODCSPER.
102

Women in the Army

While women’s issues were evident during the years of the Women’s Army

Corps (WAC), the WAC chain of command typically ensured the resolution of problems

when and where they occurred. Change began in 1973 with the end of the draft and

the beginning of the all-volunteer Army. That same year, Army policy changed to

provide for equal opportunity and treatment for uniformed members without regard to

not only race, color, religion, or national origin, but also gender. On an individual

basis, women were no longer required to leave the service when pregnant, married

women were allowed to enlist, and women were given full benefits for their dependents.

Organizationally, the years 1972 to 1978 were years of change: women entered the

Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program in 1972, began integrating into

Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units in 1975, enrolled at the United

States Military Academy (USMA) in 1976. By 1977, women started training alongside

men in basic training, and female officers served in all branches of the Army except

combat arms. In 1978, the Women’s Army Corps was disestablished and women were

integrated into the Army.

During the early and mid 1980s, changes in the Army’s interpretation of the

combat exclusion policy resulted in several military occupational specialties (MOSs)

being closed to women and thousands of positions, once open to women, being

recoded male only. The Army reexamined its policy in response to criticism from the

General Accounting Office (GAO) and the DoD Task Force on Women in the Military.

By 1990, women could serve in 90% of the Army enlisted MOSs; the remaining 10%

were primarily combat arms, which were closed to women by the combat exclusion

policy, designed to keep women out of direct combat. In January 1994, the Secretary

of Defense directed that all positions be opened to women except those units below

brigade level that had a primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat.

In 1977, the Army consolidated AR 600-21 and AR 600-42 under a new AR 600-

21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army. This regulation affirmed that the EO

program was a single, integrated program that concerned all members of the Army.

Commanders at all levels were responsible for the development and implementation of

an EO program for their organization. The major commands (MACOMs) specified

minimum unit EO training requirements for subordinate organizations consistent with

command needs and local conditions. It was left to individual commanders to

determine the content and development of local programs. In 1988, the Army

incorporated AR 600-21 into AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, sending an even

stronger signal that EO was a command program.

Policy on Sexual Harassment

Department of Defense and Army policies have prohibited sexual harassment of

military and civilian personnel since 1981. Since then, numerous policy memoranda by

the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the Army Chief of Staff have
103

emphasized that sexual harassment will not be tolerated and that successful mission

accomplishment can only be achieved in an environment of mutual respect, dignity, and

fair treatment. In 1984, the Army added to AR 600-21 a paragraph defining sexual

harassment. Since the first policy definition of sexual harassment in 1981, the Army

has revised and updated the definition several times.

When Army-wide training on sexual harassment was mandated in 1982, the U.S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed standardized training

plans for use in all service schools and ROTC courses. In 1986, Headquarters,

Department of the Army (HQDA) mandated an intensification of unit EO and prevention

of sexual harassment (POSH) training in response to survey and anecdotal evidence

that female soldiers were not receiving proper treatment.
104

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (EO) POLICY

In Executive Order 9981 of 1948, President Harry S. Truman declared it “to be

the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for

all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national

origin.” Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense Military Equal

Opportunity (MEO) Program, provides current policy guidance on military equal

opportunity. Its directives include the following:

2. Promote an environment free from personal, social, or institutional

barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the highest level of

responsibility possible. Service members shall be evaluated only on

individual merit, fitness, and capability. Unlawful discrimination against

persons or groups based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is

contrary to good order and discipline and is counterproductive to combat

readiness and mission accomplishment. Unlawful discrimination shall not

be condoned.

3. Use the command to promote, support, and enforce the MEO

program. The chain of command is the primary and preferred channel for

identifying and correcting discriminatory practices. This includes the

processing and resolving of complaints of unlawful discrimination and

sexual harassment, and for ensuring that human relations and EO matters

are taken seriously and acted upon as necessary. The chain of command

is responsible for creating and maintaining a MEO environment that

incorporates the policies set out in this Directive.

6. Provide for an environment that is free from unlawful discrimination and

sexual harassment.4

The Army established its EO program in 1964 to ensure equal opportunity and

just treatment of soldiers and their families on and off post. Chapter 6 of AR 600-20,

Army Command Policy, establishes the current Army EO program and states that the

program “formulates, directs, and sustains a comprehensive effort to maximize human

potential and to ensure fair treatment of all soldiers based solely on merit, fitness, and

capability, which support readiness.”5

Army Regulation 600-20 is explicit in affixing responsibility for EO to the chain of

command.

The chain of command, whether military or civilian, has the primary

responsibility for developing and sustaining a healthy EO climate. This

responsibility entails, but is not limited to, promoting positive programs that

 

4 Dep’t of Defense, Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program,

para. D (August 18, 1995).

5 Dep’t of Army, Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 6-1 (March 30, 1988) (IO4, September

17, 1993).
105

enhance unit cohesion, esprit, and morale; communicating matters with

EO significance to unit personnel and higher headquarters; correcting

discriminatory practices by conducting rapid, objective, and impartial

inquiries to resolve complaints of discrimination; encouraging the surfacing

of problems and preventing reprisal for those who complain; and taking

appropriate action against those who violate Army policy.6

Chapter 6 also establishes EO hotlines at all installations, prescribes EO

policies, defines sexual harassment, lists the staffing requirements and duties of equal

opportunity advisors (EOAs), explains the complaint process, addresses mandatory

unit training requirements, and outlines the parameters for professional military

education course training support packages.

The Army last updated Chapter 6 of AR 600-20 in September 1993, with Interim

Change 4. Change 4 expired in September 1995. The proponent, ODCSPER, has

continued the regulation until the new AR 600-20 is published.7The current regulation

does not incorporate the 1995 DoD definition of sexual harassment, as required by

DoD Directive 1350.2.

Under the provisions of AR 600-20, commanders must review their affirmative

action plan at least annually. Guidance to the field in this area also is outdated in that

the Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan, found in Department of the Army

Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-26, was last published in May 1990.

EOA/EOR Duties and Responsibilities

In accordance with Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, military personnel with EO as their

primary duty are assigned to assist commanders at installations, organizations, and

agencies that are brigade-level or equivalent and higher commands. The Commanding

General, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), is charged to select

officers and NCOs for training and duty as EOAs. Most officers assigned to EO

positions are graduates of the two-week Equal Opportunity Program Manager course

taught by DEOMI. Noncommissioned officers assigned to EOA positions must be

graduates of the 16-week DEOMI resident course.

Equal opportunity representatives (EORs) assist commanders at battalion-level

and below in carrying out the EO program within their units. Unlike EOAs, EORs do not

attend the 16-week DEOMI program of instruction and are not utilized in special duty

assignments. Equal opportunity representative duties are a part-time, secondary

responsibility.

 

6 Dep’t of Army, Reg. 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 6-5 (March 30, 1988) (IO4, September 17,

1993).

7

 ODCSPER is currently revising and updating AR 600-20 pending the recommendations from this

Panel’s report.
106

Complaint System

In 1993, the Army restructured the complaint system described in AR 600-20 in

response to a reported lack of confidence in the old system. Although the primary and

preferred channel for identifying and correcting discriminatory practices is the chain of

command, the new system gives a soldier a number of alternate channels for filing

complaints if the complainant feels uncomfortable in filing a complaint with the chain of

command, or if the complaint is against a member of the chain of command. Other

channels available to soldiers include the EOA, inspector general, chaplain, provost

marshal/criminal investigation command, medical agencies, staff judge advocate, and

housing referral office. Ultimately, the chain of command is responsible for ensuring

that human relations issues are taken seriously and acted upon as necessary.

Command Authorities

Commanders have the authority under current law, rule, and regulation to deal

with cases of unlawful discrimination or sexual harassment. Army Regulation 600-20,

paragraph 4-4, “Soldier Conduct,” provides that “[e]nsuring the proper conduct of

soldiers is a function of command. Commanders rely upon all leaders in the Army . . .

to . . . [t]ake action against military personnel in any case where the soldier’s conduct

violates good order and discipline.” Although Chapter 6 of AR 600-20 is not punitive,

the commander’s inherent authority to impose administrative sanctions and the

nonjudicial punishment and punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ) provide commanders with sufficient authority to enforce Army policy in matters

of discrimination and harassment.

Commanders have the full range of administrative actions available to them to

deal with violators of Army policy on equal opportunity, including sexual harassment. A

commander can initiate administrative action against a soldier who committed an

offense, as a single action or in conjunction with action under the UCMJ.

Administrative action is meant to be corrective and rehabilitative. These actions range

from counseling to involuntary separation.

When administrative measures are inadequate due to the nature of the offense

or the record of the soldier, nonjudicial punishment and trial by court-martial are

available for use by a commander depending on the severity of the offense.

Nonjudicial punishment is authorized by Article 15 of the UCMJ. Its purpose, according

to the Manual for Courts-Martial is to provide “commanders with an essential and

prompt means of maintaining good order and discipline and also promotes positive

behavior changes in servicemembers without the stigma of a court-martial conviction.”

8

 

8

 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. V, para. 1c (1995).
107

If a commander decides, after investigation, that an offense is too serious for

nonjudicial punishment, then the commander may seek to have charges referred for

trial by court-martial. A commander may also forward charges for disposition by a

superior commander. Figures 4-7 and 6-1, DA Pam 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity

Training Guide, list sexual harassment behaviors and equal opportunity violations

subject to UCMJ actions.

DoD Sexual Harassment Definition

Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense Military Equal

Opportunity (MEO) Program, August 1995, requires that the military services adopt the

following definition of sexual harassment:

[1] A form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual

advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical

conduct of a sexual nature when:

a. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly

a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career, or

b. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used

as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person, or

c. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably

interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be actionable as

“abusive work environment” harassment, need not result in concrete

psychological harm to the victim, but rather need only be so severe or

pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and the victim does

perceive, the work environment as hostile or offensive. (“Workplace” is an

expansive term for Military members and may include conduct on or off

duty, 24 hours a day.) [2] Any person in a supervisory or command

position who uses or condones any form of sexual behavior to control,

influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a Military member or civilian

employee is engaging in sexual harassment. [3] Similarly, any Military

member or civilian employee who makes deliberate or repeated

unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact of a sexual

nature is engaging in sexual harassment.9

This definition of sexual harassment consists of three parts. The first part,

indicated by [1] above, is similar to that used for civilian employee cases under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and as defined by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

10 A case law commentary by DoD follows part [1].

The second and third parts, indicated by [2] and [3] above, are agency policies on

sexual harassment that DoD has added to the traditional Title VII definition.

 

9 Dep’t of Defense, Directive 1350.2, supra note 4, Definitions para. 15.

10 The EEOC definition of sexual harassment is at 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 1604.11.
108

There are two categories of sexual harassment addressed in the first part of the

definition. These categories are quid pro quo and hostile environment. Quid pro quo

literally means “this for that,” and encompasses those behaviors defined in paragraphs

a and b of the definition. A hostile environment occurs when soldiers or civilians are

subjected to unwanted behavior of a sexual nature that causes unreasonable

interference with work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment, i.e., paragraph c of the definition. This type of behavior may include

verbal behavior, such as deliberate or repeated comments of a sexual nature, and/or

nonverbal behavior, such as leering, ogling, display of pinup calendars, or

inappropriate touching.

A hostile environment is measured by its impact upon those affected, not by the

intent of those exhibiting the behaviors. Impact, not intent, is the key. Whether an

environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the

circumstances. One must consider whether a reasonable person would find the

environment hostile or abusive as well as the victim’s subjective perception that the

environment is abusive.

Gender, or sex, discrimination is defined as discrimination based solely on an

individual being male or female. Discrimination based on one’s sex is often linked to a

set of assumptions based on sex role stereotypes concerning the abilities, competence,

status, and roles of the particular group, resulting in a disparate treatment of or impact

on that group.

Some conduct based on sex role stereotypes falls into a gray area. Although it

may not particularly create a hostile environment or set up a quid pro quo situation, the

conduct is offensive and intimidating for the recipient. The conduct might be based on

everyday misunderstandings in communication or customary, taken-for-granted

remarks and actions that may or may not be classified as discriminatory or harassing.

Fraternization

Sexual harassment is sometimes confused with fraternization. Fraternization

occurs when an officer or NCO engages in a relationship with a subordinate that (1)

causes actual or perceived partiality, preferential treatment, or unfairness; (2)

undermines authority, morale, or discipline; or (3) involves an abuse of rank, position,

or authority for personal gain. The Army policy on fraternization is in AR 600-20,

chapter 4, and DA Pam 600-35, Relationships Between Soldiers of Different Ranks,

which define and distinguish proper and improper relationships between soldiers of

different ranks. Fraternization focuses on the senior-subordinate relationship, and

does not necessarily depend upon a male-female or sexual relationship.

Commissioned officers, warrant officers, and NCOs may be criminally punished

under Article 134, UCMJ, for fraternizing with subordinates on terms of military
109

equality.11 The gist of this offense is a violation of the custom of the service. The

Manual for Courts-Martial explains that not all contact or association between officers

and enlisted persons is a criminal offense; it depends on the surrounding

circumstances. “The acts and circumstances must be such as to lead a reasonable

person experienced in the problems of military leadership to conclude that the good

order and discipline of the armed forces has been prejudiced by their tendency to

compromise the respect of enlisted persons for the professionalism, integrity, and

obligations of an officer.”12 Regulations, directives, and orders may also govern

conduct between officer, NCO, and enlisted personnel on both an Army-wide or local

basis. Violations of such regulations, directives, or orders may be punished under

Article 92, UCMJ.

 

11 Early case law held that the offense of fraternization under the Manual for Courts-Martial did not apply

to senior enlisted persons. Recent case law has put NCOS on notice that fraternization with enlisted

subordinates may now be charged as a violation of UCMJ, Article 134. See United States v. Clarke, 25

M.J. 631 (A.C.M.R. 1987).

12 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, para. 83c (1995).
110

TRAINING

In the early 1970s, EO training was a mandatory 18-hour standardized program

taught annually by DRRI-trained instructors. Today, EO training is required at least

twice a year, with commander discretion in determining some of the program content,

duration of training, the attendees, and the instructor.

Department of Defense Directive 1350.2 requires that all military personnel, from

trainee to general officer, receive training in EO, human relations, and POSH on a

recurring basis, and at all levels of professional military education. Training is to

include comprehensive material on leadership roles and responsibilities for EO

programs, complaints processing, legal implications, reprisal prevention and detection,

climate assessment methodologies, and managing civilian equal opportunity (EEO)

systems. Army training policy meets the mandatory training requirements of DoD

Directive 1350.2.

Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, mandates the conduct of unit

EO training at least twice a year. This guidance differs from AR 350-1, Army Training,

and 350-41, Training in Units, which require commanders to conduct refresher training

on EO and POSH, but leave the frequency of training up to the commander. Refresher

training is used when periodic or recurring emphasis is required. This type of training

depends on the local situation and the commander’s assessment of need. Refresher

training may be designed to support unit cohesion, discipline, and morale, the lack of

which can adversely affect the command climate and unit readiness, and, therefore,

mission accomplishment.

Training materials, such as DA Pam 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity Training

Guide, and Training Circular (TC) 26-6, Commander’s Equal Opportunity Handbook,

provide the commander with a limited array of off-the-shelf training programs.

Unfortunately, some commanders with whom the Panel spoke were unaware of the

existence of such training aids.

The extent and quality of human relations training that officer candidates receive

varies greatly depending upon their source of commission. The United States Military

Academy employs a comprehensive program entitled Bedrock II: Consideration of

Others. This program provides 58 hours of human relations training over a cadet’s

four-year term, of which 25 hours deal with EO and gender issues. The Military District

of Washington has adopted USMA’s program for its Army installations. Reserve

Officers’ Training Corps human relations training is not standardized. The U.S. Army

Cadet Command has directed local ROTC commanders to evaluate and devise their

own programs based upon training needs. Soldiers at the Officer Candidate School

(OCS) receive a two-hour block of instruction in the area of human relations.

The Army is providing relatively little emphasis on human relations training in its

service schools. For example, the Command and General Staff College teaches only
111

3.2 hours of EO out of 1,616 contact hours, and only 20 minutes of POSH. The

Sergeants Major Academy currently has 4.7 of EO training, of which 30 minutes are

devoted to POSH. The Army War College has no POSH training, but will add a block

of instruction for academic year 1997-98. The following tables show the current

enlisted and officer training hours for EO and POSH.

13

Table 1--EO and POSH Training in Enlisted Service Schools

Training Course Total Hours of

Training

Equal

Opportunity

Course Hours

Prevention of

Sexual Harassment

Course Hours

Basic Combat Training 320 hours 3.2 hours 40 minutes

Primary Leadership Development Course 160-179 hours 4.7 hours 15 minutes

Basic NCO Course 208-279 hours 5.1 hours 35 minutes

Advanced NCO Course 200-744 hours 6.0 hours 25 minutes

Drill Sergeant Course 344 hours 3.0 hours 50 minutes

First Sergeant Course 200 hours 4.9 hours 50 minutes

Sergeant Major Course 1536 hours 4.7 hours 30 minutes

Command Sergeant Major Course 40 hours 1.5 hours 20 minutes

Table 2--EO and POSH Training in Officer Service Schools

Training Course Total Hours of

Training

Equal

Opportunity

Course Hours

Prevention of

Sexual

Harassment

Course Hours

Officer Basic Course 400-892 hours 5.2 hours 25 minutes

Officer Advanced Course 200-800 hours 6.3 hours 25 minutes

Warrant Officer Candidate Course 240 hours 5.2 hours 25 minutes

Warrant Officer Advanced Course 240-560 hours 6.3 hours 30 minutes

Pre-Command Course 40-80 hours 1.5 hours 20 minutes

Command and General Staff College 1616 hours 3.2 hours 20 minutes

Within the last two years, TRADOC has developed a common core concept that

has reduced the number of training support packages (TSPs) required for EO and

POSH from fifteen to four and standardized training on these subjects at the following

levels: basic leader level (platoon leaders and squad leaders) through the senior

leader level (sergeants major, warrant officers, and majors). Upon implementation of

these TSPs, all soldiers from accession through separation will receive discussionbased, non-repetitive, progressive, and sequential training. The EO TSPs for initial

entry training (IET) and drill sergeant school are not included as part of the common

core, but are separate training requirements. Updated TSPs are being implemented in

IET and drill sergeant school training.

As stated earlier, EOAs attend the 16-week DEOMI program of instruction.

Equal opportunity representative training is a command/installation responsibility.

 

13 The figures used in these tables were current at the time of the Panel review. The Army is in the

process of revising the period of time devoted to human relations training.
112

There is no uniform training of EORs. Commands and installations have developed

their own training materials. DEOMI-trained EOAs train EORs with a local 80-hour

course, but the course is often erratic: training aids are limited and some EOAs do not

have all the necessary skills to conduct the training adequately. The EO proponent for

the development of TSPs for Army schools is the Adjutant General’s School, U.S. Army

Soldier Support Institute. In order to better support commanders, the Adjutant

General’s School is developing a program of instruction (POI) for EOR training.

Implementation of the POI is scheduled for October 1998.

SURVEY OF LEADERSHIP IN ARMY DOCUMENTS

The leaders we develop must be competent in and dedicated to the

profession of arms and experts in the art of war; they must be committed

to upholding the dignity and respect of all soldiers, civilians and

subordinates; they must be dedicated to the nation; they must

demonstrate physical and moral courage; and they must be forthright and

candid in all their dealings.14

The Senior Review Panel reviewed AR 600-100, Army Leadership; DA Pam 350-

58, Leader Development for America’s Army, The Enduring Legacy; DA Pam 600-50,

White Paper, Leadership “Makes the Difference”; DA Pam 600-80, Executive

Leadership; FM 100-1, The Army; FM 22-100, Military Leadership; FM 22-102, Soldier

Team Development; and the three volumes of TC 22-9, Leader Development Program,

Military Professionalism. Throughout Army leadership doctrine, mission

accomplishment and unit readiness are tied to Army values and the need to treat

soldiers with dignity and respect. What follows is a précis of these regulations.

Integrity. This is the thread woven through the fabric of the

professional Army ethic. Integrity means honesty, uprightness, the

avoidance of deception and steadfast adherence to standards of behavior.

All leaders are responsible for: (1) Accomplishing the unit’s

mission. (2) Ensuring subordinates welfare to include physical, moral,

personal, and professional well-being. . . . (4) Setting and exemplifying the

highest professional and ethical standards. . . . (13) Treating subordinates

with dignity, respect, fairness and consistency.

Senior level leaders promote Army values by establishing and

maintaining the command climate of their organizations through sound,

ethical organizational policies and practices. . . . Senior leaders must

consider individual perceptions and their effects in establishing and

maintaining a healthy command climate.

 

14 Dep’t of Army, Pamphlet 600-32, Leader Development for the Total Army, The Enduring Legacy, p. 7

(May 1991).
113

Leaders at the direct level affect values and behavior by

establishing day-to-day procedures, practices and working norms, by their

personal example, and by building discipline, cohesion, motivation,

consistency and fair play. . . . The values leaders personally practice have

a major impact in determining unit and organizational value systems.

AR 600-100, Army Leadership, pp. 1-2 (September 1993)

Behavior refers to actions or reactions to specific situations based

on attitude, beliefs, and values. Unlike attitudes, behavior is easily

measured and influenced through positive and negative reinforcement.

DA Pam 350-58, Leader Development for America’s Army, The Enduring

Legacy, p. 3 (October 1994)

Caring means much more than a cursory interest in others. It

means sincere involvement in helping to find solutions to problems and

improving welfare. Caring means setting examples of moral and

professional excellence in order to inspire the subordinates to new

heights. It means talking with and listening to subordinates, not simply

talking at them; doing something about hardships or problems, not paying

lip service to them; teaching individuals by counseling, not by abusing

them. Caring means fostering a command climate where people are

challenged, where they feel their contributions make a difference, and

where they feel good about themselves and the Army they serve. Caring

and leading go together. You can’t have one without the other!

DA Pam 600-50, White Paper, Leadership “Makes the Difference,” p. 8

(April 1985)

The young people who join the Army and each of the other

Services come with their own hopes and expectations. The commitment

of a human resources program is to these young people, but it is also to

their parents, families, and communities. These young people are the

nation’s most valuable resource for the future. Their service may span a

single enlistment or an entire career. If, during that time, they learn

fairness and justice, if their experience has led to growth in skills and

maturity--then the Army will have fulfilled a most important obligation to

society. This is a contribution to nation-building in the truest sense, and is

fundamental to defending the Constitution--not by arms alone. . . .

Society’s view of whether or not the obligation is fulfilled will be

determined, in large part, by the perceptions of “reality” at the operating

level, as seen by serving sons and daughters.

DA Pam 600-80, Executive Leadership, pp. 43-44 (June 1987)

As a leader, you are responsible for understanding and directly

transmitting the Army’s values to your soldiers. . . . Since the Army’s

purpose is to protect the nation and its values, the Army’s ethic must be
114

consistent with national will and values. . . . Beliefs are assumptions or

convictions you hold as true about some thing, concept, or person. . . .

Values are attitudes about the worth or importance of people, concepts, or

things. . . . Norms are the rules or laws normally based on agreed-upon

beliefs and values that members of a group follow to live in harmony.

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, pp. 22-24 (July 1990)

A mature soldier develops physically, socially, emotionally, and

spiritually. Physical fitness and development provide the stamina

necessary for sustained action and intense stress. Social maturity

provides the willingness to work with others in cohesive teams. Emotional

maturity gives stability to deal with the stress of combat. Spiritual maturity

gives the soldier hope and purpose to face the dangers and uncertainty of

combat.

Research has shown that during IET values that enhance

teamwork become more important while values that reflect individual

accomplishment become less important. IET begins to instill team values,

and the process continues as the soldier moves from unit to unit.

Teaching such values is not an attempt to drastically change the

soldier. . . . If soldiers are going to become productive team members,

they must begin to share the values that enhance team performance.

These values will become the standards of the unit. Standards are

those principles or rules by which behaviors and tasks are measured as

successfully accomplished. . . . Soldiers will measure other soldiers by it.

It gradually becomes a criterion for acceptance into the team. . . . When

members of a squad, section, or platoon share these values and adhere

to the standards that flow from them, they are a more cohesive team.

FM 22-102, Soldier Team Development, pp. 3, 18-19 (March 1987)

The Army ethos, the guiding beliefs, standards and ideals that

characterize and motivate the Army, is succinctly described in one word--

DUTY. Duty is behavior required by moral obligation, demanded by

custom, or enjoined by feelings of rightness. . . . It requires the impartial

administration of standards without regard to friendship, personality, rank,

or other bias. . . . Compassion is basic respect for the dignity of each

individual; treating all with dignity and respect. It is the personification of

the “Golden Rule,” treat others as you want them to treat you.

FM 100-1, The Army, pp. 5-9 (June 1994)

American soldiers come from a wide range of cultural backgrounds.

Upon entering the military service, they are called upon to adapt their

individual values to those of the military profession.

FM 100-1, The Army, p. 10 (June 1994)
115

1. Compliance with a specific value occurs when a soldier behaves

in a particular manner based solely on anticipated reward or punishment.

Compliance requires the actual or imminent presence of the leader. The

statement, “I don’t cheat because I may get caught,” is an example of

compliance. 2. Identification with a value set occurs when a soldier acts

in accordance with the value set of the group in order to become a full

member of the group rather than to avoid punishment. The statement, “I

will not cheat on the rifle range because 1st Platoon does not cheat on the

rifle range and I am a member of 1st Platoon,” reflects a group value a

soldier adheres to in order to be an accepted member. 3. Internalization

occurs when a soldier adopts the group’s value set as his own. The

soldier believes in the values and acts accordingly in any circumstance.

The soldier’s behavior persists regardless of the situation. “I don’t cheat

because it is wrong to cheat,” is an example of internalization.

STP 21-II-MQS, Military Qualification Standards II, Manual of Common

Tasks for Lieutenants and Captains, Leadership S1-9001.10-0002 Explain

the Professional Army Ethic (January 1991)

Army leaders must not only be technically and tactically competent,

they must commit themselves to the highest standards of ethical conduct.

They must understand the values of the professional soldier and model

them in their daily lives. Only in this way will they earn the trust,

confidence, and respect of their subordinates and fellow soldiers.

TC 22-9-1, -2, -3, Leader Development Program for Military

Professionalism, p. iii (May 1986)

Every organization, no matter whether a squad, platoon, or

company, has only a finite amount of energy to expend to accomplish its

mission. That energy can be wasted or enhanced. In a unit with a

positive healthy climate, that energy is, or can be, more than the sum total

of the energy of its members. . . . But the energy of an organization can

be wasted as well. If you are forced to expend energy looking over your

shoulder, preparing to cover yourself for some inspection, building a wall

of numbers and statistics to look good, you will have little energy left to

teach your soldiers, be innovative, or accomplish your mission.

TC 22-9-2, Leader Development Program for Military Professionalism

(Company/Battery Instruction), pp. 60-61 (May 1986)

Many of our ethical conflicts in peacetime occur because we have

some members of the profession who forget that the real test occurs on

the battlefield. Everything we do must be geared to preparing for combat.

And that includes our ethics. . . . Our values of fairness and of concern for

the individual are supported by our national values, but they also

contribute to unit loyalty and cohesiveness. Military values originate and

command our adherence primarily because they are useful. They create
116

standards of behavior that members of a professional Army need if we are

to fight and win the next war. And that is the only reason we are here.

TC 22-9-3, Leader Development Program for Military Professionalism

(Battalion Instruction), p. 10 (May 1986)
117

DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING

The Senior Review Panel reviewed Department of Justice and DoD

requirements for data collection and reporting of discrimination and sex crimes. Also

analyzed were Army reporting requirements as contained in AR 190-40, Serious

Incident Report; AR 190-45, Law Enforcement Reporting; AR 195-2, Criminal

Investigation Activities; AR 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning

Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations; and Chapter 6 of AR 600-20, Army

Command Policy.

On October 15, 1996, DoD published DoD Directive 7730.47, Defense IncidentBased Reporting System (DIBRS). The Defense Incident-Based Reporting System is a

data collection system and repository meant to be responsive to a series of statutory

reporting requirements and to anticipated congressional and DoD information needs. It

will meet data requirements for the Uniformed Crime Reporting Act of 1988 and the

Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act of 1994 and permits DoD to monitor and

measure compliance with the Victims Rights and Restitution Act of 1990.

The Uniformed Crime Reporting Act of 1988 established the National IncidentBased Reporting System (NIBRS), the national counterpart of DIBRS. The National

Incident-Based Reporting System collects and annually reports statistics on crime in

the United States. The Department of Defense must report incidents in accordance

with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime

Reporting Handbook. According to a recent DoD point paper, “only ten states and no

federal agencies are fully compliant with the provisions of NIBRS.”

15

Department of Defense 7730.47-M, Manual for the Defense Incident-Based

Reporting System, requires the submission of specified data elements. Reportable

incidents include (1) those reportable under the Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook;

(2) criminal incidents not reportable under this handbook, but punishable under the

UCMJ, which include such high-interest incidents as sexual harassment, sexual

assault, rape, and fraternization; (3) civilian criminal incidents committed by military

personnel on active duty resulting in a felony conviction; and (4) other reportable

incidents, such as sudden infant death syndrome and suicide. The Department of

Defense and the military services are currently working on implementing DIBRS. There

is some concern that, in its present form, DIBRS is an unnecessary and offensive

invasion of privacy. “When finished, DIBRS will provide a standard data system that

tracks criminal incidents from initial allegation to final disposition through the law

enforcement, criminal investigation, command action, judicial and corrections

phases.”16

 

15 Point Paper by Mike Pearce, OUSD(PI), undated, subject: Defense Incident-Based Reporting System

(DIBRS).

16 Ibid.
118

Army Regulation 190-40 mandates submission of a Serious Incident Report

(SIR) to HQDA for selected serious incidents or criminal offenses. The SIR contains a

data entry for racially or ethnically motivated criminal acts. Field experience, however,

finds that racial or ethnic motivation is not always immediately discernible. Often, such

determinations are made later in the investigation, after the SIR has been submitted.

There is no requirement for a subsequent “add-on” report once this determination has

been made. Although no data entry currently exists for crimes resulting from religious

intolerance or sexual orientation, a forthcoming revision to AR 190-40 will encompass

all forms of significant hate and bias crimes.

Under the provisions of AR 600-20, paragraph 6-15, the Office of the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA, collects, records, and maintains racial, ethnic

group, and gender data and statistics needed to support the Army EO program, to

include affirmative action plan (AAP) reporting requirements. Heads of DA staff

elements, MACOMs, separate agencies, and other activities and units required to

publish AAPs are authorized to collect, record, and maintain data and statistics.

Statistical data is maintained for the various AAP subject areas using racial, ethnic, and

gender designations.

Major commands and the designated heads of Army staff agencies, directorates,

and field operating agencies submit an annual narrative and statistical report on equal

opportunity progress to HQDA. The report includes (1) progress made in achieving

established EO goals; (2) unit EO complaints by type (race, national origin, religion,

gender, and sexual harassment) with race and ethnic group, gender, and method of

resolution marked for each type on DA Form 7280-R, Unit EO Complaint Report; and

(3) the number of subordinate units by echelon and the number of unit climate

assessments conducted.

Department of Army Pamphlet 600-26, Department of the Army Affirmative

Action Plan, has various reporting requirements to HQDA for annual narrative and

statistical reports on affirmative action progress.
119

CLIMATE ASSESSMENTS

Climate assessments are a key mechanism for commanders to anticipate and

prevent problems. Climate assessments are designed to be used by commanders and

other leaders to identify issues that might not otherwise come to their attention. The

current array of climate assessment tools available to commanders do not adequately

meet their needs.

Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, August 1995, directs that the Services

“[r]equire commanders to assess their organization EO climate, preferably as part of

their assumption of command, and schedule follow-up assessments periodically during

their command tenure.”17 The current version of AR 600-20 (Interim Change 4)

recommends that commanders conduct a unit climate assessment within 90 days of

assuming command and then annually thereafter. While this guidance is not in

compliance with the DoD Directive, the draft revision to AR 600-20 remedies this

shortfall by requiring commanders to conduct a unit climate assessment within 90 days

of assuming command and annually thereafter.

Training Circular 26-6, Commander’s Equal Opportunity Handbook, uses

language similar to that contained in AR 600-20. It, too, must be revised to be in

compliance with DoD Directive 1350.2 and to be consistent with the draft revision to AR

600-20. Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity Training

Guide, references AR 600-20, but notes “commanders must conduct a climate

assessment and unit training needs assessment NLT [not later than] 60 days after

assuming command.”18 Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20, thus, differs from

both the current and the draft revision to AR 600-20.

Assessments of unit climate can and should be based on several methods.

Methods described in TC 26-6 include surveys, interviews, sensing sessions,

observations, and reviews of records and reports. While most assessment methods

require no particular tools, the survey method requires careful development of an

appropriate instrument. Although a number of survey instruments have been

developed for the Army or DoD over the years, most climate assessment survey

instruments are dated and do not include questions about sexual harassment.

The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) is the most common

assessment survey instrument currently in use across the Army. Commanders who

request this survey must send the completed survey forms to DEOMI for analysis and a

report. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute has indicated that,

because of insufficient funding, it will be unable to meet the demand for analysis of

MEOCS, once the AR 600-20 provisions requiring all commanders to conduct an

 

17 Dep’t of Defense, Directive 1350.2, supra note 4, para. F.2.b.

18 Dep’t of Army, Pamphlet 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide, lesson plan 10 (August 30,

1993).
120

annual climate assessment are put into effect--assuming MEOCS is the assessment

tool commanders employ.

DA Pam 600-69, Unit Climate Profile Commander’s Handbook, also contains a

climate assessment survey instrument available to commanders. It does not include

questions on sexual harassment or hostile environment and barely touches the issue of

gender discrimination. It does include three questions asking if the officers, NCOs, or

immediate leaders in the unit treat soldiers fairly without regard to race, ethnic

background, or sex. The assessment does not allow for certain demographic

information of the respondent, such as race, gender, and rank.

The current Army-wide survey of command climate, the biannual Sample Survey

of Military Personnel (SSMP), includes items on sexual harassment on a recurring

basis. This survey is targeted at the whole Army with the exception of soldiers in

training, in transit, in the hospital, or attending school, and does not provide an

assessment specifically geared to one commander.

The Human Resources Directorate, ODCSPER has developed a short command

climate survey instrument. This instrument is only now being fielded and feedback is

limited. Another comprehensive human relations climate assessment survey

instrument is being developed under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the

Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).
121

ACCESSIONS

The Army regulations governing enlisted and officer accessions include 

AR 145-1, Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Program: Organization,

Administration, and Training; AR 351-5, United States Army Officer Candidate School;

and AR 601-210, Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program. Personnel

enter the Army by enlisting or by obtaining a commission as an officer. The sources of

officer commissioning include USMA, ROTC, OCS, and direct appointments (e.g., as

with some physicians, nurses, lawyers).

The accessions process utilizes local police and national security checks for

information on prior offenses that might indicate an applicant’s unsuitability for military

service. During the applicant interview, the recruiter questions the applicant on any

records of arrest, charges, juvenile court adjudications, traffic violations, probation

periods, dismissed or pending charges or convictions, including those ordered

expunged or sealed. A police records check is only initiated if the applicant states that

he or she has a prior record or if the recruiter has reason to believe that the applicant is

concealing information. Although a police records check may be warranted, law

enforcement authorities within the jurisdiction queried may refuse to provide any

information contained in sealed juvenile records. If a written refusal is received or if the

information requested is subject to charges or a fee, the police records check is not

required. A police records check is performed on all officer accessions subject to the

same limitations regarding sealed records, written refusals, and fee demands. Army

Regulation 601-270, Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), requires that a

preenlistment interview be conducted prior to the oath of enlistment to obtain any

additional information that may have a bearing on the applicant’s qualification for

military service.

In 1996, USMA instituted a requirement for a local police records check on all

academy applicants. If an arrest and/or conviction is cited by the local law enforcement

agency queried, a judge advocate review is required before the candidate is rejected.

In addition to the police records check, a prospective candidate must complete a

personal data record that includes the question, “Have you ever been arrested for any

offense?” The normal admissions process also includes letters of recommendation that

are reviewed for negative comments concerning sexual harassment, discrimination, or

acts in violation of USMA’s Consideration of Others program. Any adverse information

is verified to determine whether the event represents an isolated incident.19

The commissioning process for officers includes the requirement for a national

security clearance. Prior to appointment, all applicants (USMA, ROTC, OCS, and

direct appointments) must possess a secret security clearance based on a favorable

National Agency Check. Any applicant, whether officer or enlisted, may be rejected

 

19 Conversation with Colonel Michael L. Jones, Director of Admissions, Office of Admissions, U.S.

Military Academy, May 22, 1997.
122

based on the provisions of AR 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness. Doctors may

medically reject applicants for personality or behavior disorders, as evidenced by

frequent encounters with law enforcement agencies, antisocial attitudes, or behavior

that would prevent the individual from adapting to military service.

REVIEW OF THE PRACTICES OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

REGARDING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE PREVENTION OF

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

In addition to reviewing Army policies and procedures regarding EO and POSH,

the Panel examined the practices of other organizations, both public and private sector.

The following practices were common among organizations that have distinguished

themselves as leaders in the human resource arena and in the prevention and

elimination of sexual harassment:

♦ Diversity is linked to strategic vision.

♦ Management is responsible for and held accountable for setting a positive climate.

♦ Human resource programs have top level support.

♦ Systems and procedures support diversity.

♦ Recruitment, promotion, and development trends are continually monitored.

♦ Awareness education is an organizational priority.

♦ Rewards are based on results.

♦ Benefits are enhanced to recognize diverse needs.

♦ A multi-pronged approach is utilized regarding the advancement of women and

minorities.
123
124

ANNEX F

EVENTS CONNECTED WITH EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMY SINCE 1947

Oct 47 The President’s Committee on Civil Rights condemned racial injustice in the United States in its

report, To Secure These Rights. The biracial group called for a positive program to eliminate

segregation from American life.

Jun 48 The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 established the Women’s Army Corps in the

Regular Army and authorized the enlistment and appointment of women in the Regular Air Force, Regular

Navy and Marine Corps, and in the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine

Corps.1

Jul 48 In Executive Order 9981, President Truman declared it “to be the policy of the President that there

shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race,

color, religion or national origin.”2

Jul 50 When the first U.S. ground troops landed in South Korea, only 22,000 women were on active duty--

approximately one percent of the total force.

May 51 President Truman issued Executive Order 10240, which authorized the services to terminate the

commission, warrant, or enlistment of any woman serving in the Regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air

Force, regardless of rank, grade, or length of service, “(2) whenever it is established . . . that the woman

(a) is the parent, by birth or adoption, of a child under such minimum age as the Secretary concerned

shall determine, (b) has personal custody of a child under such minimum age, (c) is the step-parent of a

child under such minimum age and the child is within the household of the woman for a period of more

 

1

 Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, ch. 449, Pub. L. 625 (1948).

2

 Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948).
125

than thirty days a year, (d) is pregnant, or (e) has, while serving under such commission, warrant, or

enlistment, given birth to a living child.”3

Oct 51 The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) was established by then

Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall, to advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on policies and

matters relating to women in the Armed Services. Still in existence today, its members are non-federal

government civilian members and serve for three years.4

May 54 The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, concluded that "in the field of public education

the doctrine of ‘separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."

The court heId that the segregation of white and black children in state public schools solely on the basis

of race denies to black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment.5

Oct 54 The Defense Department announced that there were no longer any all-Negro units.

Dec 55 Montgomery bus boycott began. Local black leaders, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., launched a boycott

against the local bus company to petition the city of Montgomery, Alabama, to desegregate its bus

system.

Sep 57 Little Rock desegregation crisis. In September, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus intervened to halt a

local plan for the gradual desegregation of Little Rock's Central High School. Faubus mobilized the

Arkansas National Guard to block the entry of black students. Later that month, bowing to a federal

judge's order, Faubus withdrew the guardsmen. The next day, fearing violence, President Eisenhower

federalized the Arkansas National Guard and dispatched paratroopers to Little Rock to ensure the

children's safety.

Feb 60 Sit-in, Greensboro, North Carolina. In February 1960, four black students from North Carolina

Agricultural and Technical College in Greensboro ordered coffee at a department-store lunch counter.

Told that "we do not serve Negroes," the students refused to budge. Thus began the sit-in movement,

which quickly spread northward.

Apr 60 Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) formed. This movement, inspired by the

 

3

 Exec. Order No. 10240, 16 Fed. Reg. 3689 (1951).

4 See Dep’t of Defense, Directive 5120.14, Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) (April 3, 1987); Dep’t of

Defense, Directive 1304.3, Establishment of a Unified Recruiting Program for Women in the Services (October 12, 1951).

5

 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
126

Greensboro sit-in, sought to challenge the status quo through nonviolent protest acts.

Jul 62 AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure.

“10. Chain of Command. Every commander has two basic responsibilities in the following priority:

accomplishment of his mission, and the care of his personnel and property. . . . A superior in the chain of

command holds his subordinate commanders responsible for everything their command does or fails to

do. Thus, in relation to his superior, a commander cannot delegate any of his responsibilities.

34. Relationship of superiors toward subordinates. Second only to the accomplishment of their

military mission, leaders are responsible for the welfare of their troops. Commissioned officers, warrant

officers, and noncommissioned officers will enhance the will to fight for their country in their subordinates

by instilling in them a sense of responsibility as citizens of the United States, a sense of responsibility in

conduct and behavior as service members, and a spirit of loyalty to the democratic principles on which

the American way of life is based. . . . Commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned

officers will keep in close touch with personnel within their command, will take an interest in their

organization life, will hear their complaints, and will endeavor on all occasions to remove those causes

which make for dissatisfaction.”

Jan 63 George Wallace inaugural address as governor of Alabama included "Segregation now. Segregation

tomorrow. Segregation forever."

Jun 63 The Gesell Committee (The President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces)

submitted to the President an initial report, Equality of Treatment and Opportunity for Negro Military

Personnel Stationed within the United States. Findings included the following:

The military had made far-reaching advances toward complete integration. With some variations from

service to service, there had been substantial progress toward equality of treatment and opportunity. The

progress made was not enough, however.

Blacks in the military and their families were daily suffering humiliation and degradation in communities

near bases at which they were stationed.

No one in the military was charged with responsibility to listen to equal opportunity complaints. There

was no satisfactory method for handling complaints.

Installation commanders lacked specific directives to guide them in dealing with off-base discrimination

and, in fact, did not view this as a military command responsibility.

Jun 63 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, in its study entitled Overall Evaluation and Comments on the

Department of Defense Study: The Services and Their Relations with the Community, reported that
127

off-base discrimination had a detrimental effect on the morale and efficiency of a significant number of

military personnel.

Jul 63 DoD Directive 5120.36, Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces.

“It is the policy of the Department of Defense to conduct all of its activities in a manner which is free

from racial discrimination, and which provides equal opportunity for all uniformed members and all civilian

employees irrespective of their color.” (para. I.)

“The military departments shall . . . issue appropriate instructions, manuals and regulations in

connection with the leadership responsibility for equal opportunity, on and off-base, and containing

guidance for its discharge.” (para. II.B.1.)

“Every military commander has the responsibility to oppose discriminatory practices affecting his men

and their dependents and to foster equal opportunity for them, not only in areas under his immediate

control, but also in nearby communities where they may live or gather in off-duty hours.” (para. II.C.)

Aug 63 “The largest single protest demonstration in United States history occurred at the Lincoln Memorial in

Washington, D.C., where 250,000 blacks and whites gathered to lobby for passage of sweeping civil

rights measures by Congress.” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his “I Have a Dream” speech at the

Lincoln Memorial.6

Jul 64 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a sweeping civil rights act, which included provisions

prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations and discrimination in employment.

Jul 64 AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel.

“3. Policy.

a. It is the policy of the Army to conduct all of its activities in a manner which is free from racial

discrimination, and which provides equal opportunity and treatment of all uniformed members irrespective

of their race, color, religion, or national origin.

b. All actions taken to implement the above policy will be based on the following fundamental principles:

(1) Equal and just treatment of all personnel exerts direct and favorable influence on morale, discipline,

and command authority. Since these are key factors contributing to combat efficiency, such treatment is

related to the primary mission of command.

(2) In opposing discriminatory practices and in providing equal opportunity to Army personnel and their

dependents, the unity of purpose and spirit essential to the creation of effective military organizations is

more readily developed.

 

6

 Alton Hornsby, Jr., Milestones in 20th-Century African-American History (Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1993), p. 73.
128

(3) Commanders at all levels being responsible for the well being of their personnel, can best discharge

their responsibility by the early detection of, and continuing efforts to remove, those influences which

adversely affect their personnel.

4. Responsibility. Every opportunity will be afforded the local commander to resolve problems

peculiar to the local environment. Problems that require assistance at departmental level will be brought

to the attention of appropriate authorities without delay.

10. Racial Incidents. Racial incidents will be reported in accordance with applicable provisions of AR

1-55. Commanders will insure that their higher headquarters are notified concurrently with notification to

Headquarters, Department of the Army.

11. Complaints.

b. Installation commanders should be aware of and maintain such records as are necessary to reflect

the number, type, validity, and disposition of racial complaints submitted by military personnel of their

commands.”

Jul 64 Race riots broke out in the first of the "long hot summers." In Harlem and Rochester, New York, and in

several cities in New Jersey, brutal actions by white police officers, including vicious unprovoked beatings

in police stations, sparked riots in black neighborhoods.

Sep 64 AR 600-22, Processing Requests of Military Personnel For Action by the Attorney General Under

the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

“1. Purpose. This regulation is in implementation of DoD Instruction No. 5525.2, dated 24 July 1964,

providing command assistance to military personnel requesting action by the Attorney General under

Titles II, III, and IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241). Its purpose is to promote

Department of Defense and Department of the Army policy of fostering equal treatment for military

personnel and their dependents by prescribing policies and procedures for the processing of requests for

civil rights suits by military personnel electing to utilize command assistance in forwarding such requests

to the Attorney General.

13. Discrimination not covered by Civil Rights Act of 1964. The fact that the Civil Rights Act of

1964 does not provide a judicial remedy in a given case of discrimination affecting military personnel or

their dependents does not relieve a commander of the responsibility affirmatively to seek equal treatment

and opportunity for his men, and for their dependents, off the installation as well as on.”

Feb 65 Malcolm X was assassinated. For many blacks, Malcolm X, the chief spokesperson for the Black
129

Muslims, symbolized black frustration with the white establishment. A compelling figure in life, in death

he would become a hero to increasing numbers of black nationalists and proponents of Black Power.

May 65 AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel. Superseded AR 600-21, Jul 64.

Oct 65 Change 8 to AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure, Jul 62.

“46.1 Participation in public demonstrations.

(Added) Participation in picket lines or any other public demonstrations, including those pertaining to

civil rights, may imply Army sanction of the cause for which the demonstration is conducted. Such

participation by members of the Army, not sanctioned by competent authority, is prohibiteda. During the hours they are required to be present for duty.

b. When they are in uniform.

c. When they are on a military reservation.

d. When they are in a foreign country.

e. When their activities constitute a breach of law and order.

f. When violence is reasonably likely to result.”

Jan 67 AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure. Superseded AR 600-20, Jul 62, including

changes.

Jul 67 Race riots erupted in Newark, Detroit, and other cities, making it the worst summer of racial

disturbances in American history.

Nov 67 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Public Law 90-130, an “Act to amend titles 10, 32, and 37, United

States Code, to remove restrictions on the careers of female officers in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine Corps, and for other purposes.” This new law removed restrictions on women’s promotions

(including general/flag grades); equalized retirement rules; and removed the 2-percent ceilings on regular

line officer and enlisted strengths.7

Mar 68 The Kerner Commission (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders) issued its report,

warning that the United States was “headed toward two communities, ‘one black, one white, separate and

unequal.’”8

Apr 68 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated. Blacks rioted in 168 cities and towns, looting and burning

white businesses and properties. Incidents also occurred in Vietnam, such as the burning of a wooden

 

7

 Act of November 8, 1967, Pub. L. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 32, and 37 U.S.C.).

8 Hornsby, supra note 6, p. 90.
130

cross and the flying of a Confederate flag at the base at Camranh Bay.

Aug 68 “More than a hundred black soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, staged an all-night demonstration to protest

being sent to Chicago for possible riot control at the Democratic National Convention. They feared that

they might be used to combat Chicago blacks.”9

Sep 68 Riot at the Long Binh stockade outside Saigon, an overcrowded stockade where the majority of

prisoners were black. One white soldier was killed and several wounded after a black takeover of the

stockade.

Jul 69 Violence exploded at Camp Lejuene, North Carolina. One white marine was killed in a fight allegedly

begun in an attack by 30 black and Hispanic Marines on 14 white Marines.

Aug 69 In Executive Order 11478, President Nixon declared it to be “the policy of the Government of the

United States to provide equal opportunity in Federal employment for all persons, to prohibit

discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and to promote the

full realization of equal employment opportunity through a continuing affirmative program in each

executive department and agency. This policy of equal opportunity applies to and must be an integral

part of every aspect of personnel policy and practice in the employment, development, advancement, and

treatment of civilian employees of the Federal Government.”10

Aug 69 DoD issued its first Human Goals Charter. The charter is the foundation of DoD EO programs. Since

it was first issued, it has been endorsed by each Secretary of Defense

Sep 69 Army Chief of Staff directed that race relations training be incorporated into the Army’s educational

system. The U.S. Army Infantry School created a 4-hour block of instruction, "Leadership Aspects of

Race Relations," by September 1970.

Jan 70 An Army study of race relations in U.S. Army bases throughout the world reported a widespread

increase in racial tensions. It warned that increased racial confrontations could be expected unless

immediate action was taken. The Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, commissioned

the study in the summer of 1969.

Jul 70 Close to 1000 black soldiers met at the Heidelberg University campus for a day of protest and planning.

From this meeting came an announcement of the intention to unite all black soldiers in West Germany to

protest discrimination in assignments, promotions, military justice, housing, and recreational facilities.

 

9

 Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History (New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 212.

10 Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969).
131

Nov 70 The first Army-wide race relations conference, held at Fort Monroe, Virginia, examined the race-related

problems facing the Army.

Dec 70 Department of Defense Directive 1100.15, Equal Opportunity Within the Department of Defense.

Dec 70 Change 2 to AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel, May 65.

“6. The Department of the Army views off-post discrimination as a serious detriment to morale and,

ultimately, to combat efficiency. It is inimical to the welfare of Army personnel. Every commander has the

responsibility to oppose discriminatory practices affecting his men and their dependents and to foster

equal opportunity for them, not only in areas under his control, but also in nearby communities where they

live or gather in off-duty hours.”

Jan 71 In response to requests from black soldiers stationed in Europe, as well as news accounts of increased

racial tensions there, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sent a

team to Germany to evaluate the situation in West Germany. It submitted a report, The Search for

Military Justice, Report of an NAACP Inquiry into the Problems of the Negro Serviceman in West

Germany, to the Secretary of Defense in April 1971. In its conclusion, the report stated that “an

uncomfortable number of the younger Negro servicemen are disenchanted, alienated, and have lost faith

in the capacity and the will of the Armed Forces to deal honestly with their problems.”

Mar 71 Army established housing referral offices to address issues of off-post housing discrimination.

Apr 71 AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure. Superseded AR 600-20, Jan 67, including all

changes.

Jun 71 DoD Directive 1322.11, Department of Defense Education in Race Relations for Armed Forces

Personnel.

Established the policies and designated the organizational elements assigned responsibility for

developing an active DoD program of education in race relations and for assuring the attainment of those

objectives. Established the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) as a DoD field activity. “The

mission of the DRRI will be to conduct training for Armed Forces personnel designated as instructors in

race relations, develop doctrine and curricula in education for race relations, conduct research, perform

evaluation of program effectiveness, and disseminate educational guidelines and materials for utilization

throughout the Armed Forces.” (para IV.B.2.)

Nov 71 Chief of Staff Regulation 15-11 established the Army Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Committee as a

continuing committee at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).

Nov 71 Racial disturbances at Fort McClellan, Alabama, resulted in the arrest of 139 black soldiers. Some
132

alleged that the Army was punishing only blacks.

Dec 71 The Office of Equal Opportunity Programs was established as a division of the Office of the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), HQDA. It developed the policy and guidance for the Army’s

equal opportunity program, and served as the Army’s principal action office in helping to resolve race

relations/equal opportunity problems throughout the Army.

Jun 72 The Army “adopted the policy that every unit in the Army would have a race relations training program

using the Core Curriculum and other materials developed by the DRRI. This 18-hour program, designed

to improve interracial communications, was to be taught by DRRI-trained instructors in prime training

time, and all military personnel were required to attend one such session per year. . . .This Core

Curriculum was organized around six themes or phases:

Discussion of DoD and service race relations policies and goals to set the tone and direction of the

educational program;

Recognition of personal racism, intentional or otherwise, in oneself and others and how ignorance

sustained it;

Understanding of how institutions founded upon majority values tended to ignore minority values, thus

polarizing these two groups;

Examination of the misunderstanding generated between minority and majority groups in the service

because of poor communication;

Understanding that the racial problems in the armed services were an extension of those in the civilian

community and require a knowledge of all the cultural elements represented; and

Examination of the particular duty station for its peculiar racial problems.”11

Jul 72 The first Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) was published.

Nov 72 DoD Report of the Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces. The

Task Force affirmed that vestiges of discrimination remained in the military system. It identified two types

of racial discrimination, intentional and systemic. It defined intentional discrimination “as the policy of a

military authority or action of an individual or group of individuals which is intended to have a negative

effect on minority individuals or groups without having such an effect on others.” It defined systemic

 

11 United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), Race Relations Research in the U.S. Army in the 1970s,

A Collection of Selected Readings (James A. Thomas, ed., 1988), pp. 36-7.
133

discrimination “as neutral practices or policies which disproportionally impact harmfully or negatively on

minorities.”12

Dec 72 The Secretary of the Army signed an order allowing WACs to command any unit in the Army except

those with a combat mission.

Feb 73 The first General Officer Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Orientation and Seminar was conducted at

various locations across the Army.

May 73 The Supreme Court held in Fronterio v. Richardson that certain challenged statutes, which required a

female member of the uniformed services to prove the dependency of her husband, but did not require

the same for male members, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.13

Jun 73 DA Pam 600-16, Improving Race Relations in the Army, Handbook for Leaders.

Jul 73 AR 600-21, Race Relations and Equal Opportunity. Superseded AR 600-21, May 65, including all

changes.

“This regulation establishes the requirement for development of race relations/equal opportunity

affirmative actions plans; contains guidance for the use of equal opportunity staff personnel; considers

operation of equal opportunity programs as a criterion for evaluating leadership performance of military

personnel; . . . and also provides for equal opportunity for military women. Local limited supplementation

of this regulation is permitted, but is not required.” (p. i)

“3. Principles.

a. The primary goal of all Army race relations and equal opportunity actions is the positive creation of

an atmosphere of racial harmony; it is not the simple avoidance of racial disorders.

b. Army commanders at all levels are responsible for achievement of race relations and equal

opportunity (RR/EO) objectives.

c. Army RR/EO activities are based on affirmative actions which go beyond nondiscrimination to

planned and positive steps to identify and correct existing discrepancies and inequities as a matter of the

highest priority.

f. Effective implementation of the Army RR/EO program requires high level policy formulation,

decentralized execution, maximum participation by all levels of command, and compliance monitoring

 

12 Letter, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Equal Opportunity), Task Force on the Administration of

Military Justice in the Armed Forces, Nov. 30, 1972, subject: submission of the Task Force report to the Honorable Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of

Defense.

13 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
134

procedures.

g. The primary emphasis of Army race relations education and training is the changing of behavior and

the creation of an improved appreciation of individuals and members of groups as human beings.

4. Policy. a. It is the policy of the Army to provide equal opportunity and treatment for uniformed

members, irrespective of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Accordingly all personnel, male and

female, consistent with law and physical capabilities, must be afforded equal opportunity and just

treatment.

5.d. Equal Opportunity Program. Actions designed to correct structural deficiencies, eliminate personal

and institutional discrimination against minorities and assure upward mobility of all qualified personnel.

5.e. Race Relations Program. Actions designed to eliminate prejudice and to promote racial harmony

and attitudes supportive of Army objectives.

8. Efficiency report entries. Commissioned and noncommissioned officers at all levels of command

and supervision are responsible for implementing and supporting DA policies, practices, and procedures

in support of equal and just treatment of military personnel and their dependents, both on and off post.

Rating and indorsing officials . . . will consider the quality and effectiveness of . . . support of RR/EO

principles and policies.

9. Race relations/equal opportunity staff personnel. a. Personnel will be assigned primary duty as

RR/EO staff personnel by commanders of units, installations, and agencies down to and including

brigades and brigade equivalent units.

c. Equal opportunity personnel within a single office should represent a racial-ethnic-age-sex mix (when

possible) and, to preclude stereotyping, should be of a different racial or ethnic group than their

immediate predecessors.

d. Command priority, commitment and involvement in equal opportunity matters are directly related to

the positioning and use of equal opportunity staff personnel. RR/EO staff offices will remain in the

DCSPER/G1/S1/DPCA family and will be positioned no lower than one step below the

DCSPER/G1/S1/DPCA. Commanders retain the prerogative of elevating the RR/EO staff office to the

personal or principal staff level if desired. In any case, the RR/EO officers will be positioned so as to

have access to the commander.”

Dec 73 AR 600-42, Race Relations Education for the Army.

Implemented DoD Directive 1322.11 concerning the establishment of a comprehensive educational

program of race relations for all members of the military services and provided guidance for developing

race relations training programs and related activities within the Army.
135

Jun 74 DoD “told the services that policies permitting involuntary separation of women for pregnancy and

parenthood were no longer ‘viable’ and that separations would be voluntary. The services objected, but

the DOD stuck to its guns and told them to develop joint policies to carry out this concept. The date set

for the new rules to take effect was 15 May 1975.”14

Jul 74 WAC Career Management Branch was discontinued. All WAC officers were transferred to combat

support and combat service support branches of the Army.

Aug 75 The Army revised its Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) to “place responsibility for Affirmative Action in the

hands of commanders and their managers in order to infuse affirmative actions into the traditional system

of command management.”15

Oct 75 Section 803, Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, required the services to

admit women into the three service academies (United States Military Academy, United States Naval

Academy, and United States Air Force Academy) beginning in calendar year 1976.16

Jan 76 Effective 1 January, single men, single women, and unaccompanied soldiers were to serve the same

length overseas tours.

May 76 First women graduated from Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) programs and were

commissioned.

Jun 76 DoD reissued Department of Defense Directive 1100.15 to outline the DoD Equal Opportunity

Program, expand and update the Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity policies, and assign

responsibility for assuring DoD-wide compliance with equal employment opportunity laws and regulations.

Jul 76 Women first entered the United States Military Academy (USMA) (Class of 1980).

Oct 76 After 1 October, female and male officer candidates trained together at the U.S. Army Officer Candidate

School.

Dec 76 In January 1976, the DCSPER directed his staff to revalidate the program for the expanded utilization of

women in the Army. The study was published in December 1976, and was known as the Women in the

Army (WITA) Study.

Dec 76 Uniform Service School Standards for Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Instruction contained

guidance and specific content for standardized instructional programs in the Army. “For each course at a

 

14 Maj. Gen. Jeanne Holm, USAF(Ret.), Women in the Military, An Unfinished Revolution (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 300.

15 ARI, supra note 11, p. 42.

16 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-106, § 803, 89 Stat. 531, 537 (1975).
136

given racial awareness training level, the standards provided for specific outcomes and goals that must

be reached by the student at the end of training, specific lesson plans that led to the achievement of

these goals, objective tests to measure the achievement of the students, and supplementary annexes to

be used with the lesson plans.”17

Mar 77 DA Pam 600-42, Unit Equal Opportunity Discussion Outlines.

“2. Objective. The objective of the Unit Equal Opportunity Discussion Outlines is to help maintain the

highest degree of unit readiness. The outlines are designed to expand upon and support the unit training

prescribed by AR 600-42.”

Apr 77 DA Pam 600-43, Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial Discrimination in the Army.

Apr 77 The Army held a “symposium, ‘Women in the Army,’ during which representatives from all major

commands, the other services, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense discussed women’s issues and

their resolution.”18

Jun 77 AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army. Superseded AR 600-21, Jul 73.

“This regulation establishes the requirement for the development and implementation of an Equal

Opportunity Program throughout the Active and Reserve Components. . . . Supplementation of this

regulation at MACOM level is required.” (p. i)

“CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

1-2.b. Personal, direct and continuous involvement of commanders at all levels is essential. What the

commander does to assure evenhandedness, to eliminate activities which are divisive, and to translate

goals into action sets the tone for the entire organization in equal opportunity.

1-4.b. The chain of command is the primary channel for correcting discriminatory practices and for

communications on equal opportunity matters.

1-4.d. Army Equal Opportunity activities are based on affirmative actions which go beyond

nondiscrimination and include planned and positive steps to identify and, where found, eliminate existing

discriminatory practices, past or present.

1-5.b. The Affirmative Actions component consists of a series of initiatives aggressively pursued to

search out areas of inequity and discrimination to take corrective action. The objective is to assure that

treatment of all personnel is based on merit, fitness, capability and job-related factors, and not arbitrarily

on race, color, sex, age, national origin, religious, or other irrelevant factors.

 

17 ARI, supra note 11, p. 42.

18 Col. Bettie J. Morden, USA(Ret.), The Women’s Army Corps, 1945-1978 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 388.
137

1-5.c. The Education and Training component is a continuing Army-wide effort to impart to all members

of the Army an awareness concerning equal opportunity matters, to develop positive attitudes toward the

program, and to foster good relationships among individuals and groups. Special attention will be given

to the Army’s expectations concerning the behavior of individual members in carrying out their duties and

responsibilities and in their interacting with other personnel.

CHAPTER 3 EDUCATION AND TRAINING

3-1.c. Education and training courses will be conducted through formal training in Army training

centers, Army Service schools, USAR schools, Army area schools, and individual units; through special

training of Army leaders and managers; and through unit training sessions which stimulate lateral and

vertical communications on equal opportunity matters. Instruction will focus on interpersonal relations;

the impact of institutional discrimination; equality of opportunity; and contemporary factors influencing unit

harmony, effectiveness, and mission accomplishment.

3-2. Entry level training. Formal training on equal opportunity will be included in the program of

instruction given to all trainees during BCT/BT/OSUT and all newly commissioned officers during the

Officers Basic Course.

3-3. Individual education for Army leaders, managers and supervisors. a. Education in equal

opportunity will be institutionalized in the Army Service school system at all levels so that officers, warrant

officers, noncommissioned officers, and their civilian counterparts know their responsibilities under the

Army EO program and have the requisite sensitivity and skills in dealing with all matters pertaining to

equal opportunity within their authority.

3-4. Unit training. a. The thrust of unit training will be toward informing unit members of policies and

activities concerning equal opportunity; familiarizing unit members with racial, ethnic, cultural, and

gender-related differences so that such differences can more readily be accepted as positive aspects of

American and Army life rather than as negative; and impressing upon unit members the importance of

open communication among all unit members as essential to unit effectiveness.

c.(1) Members of the chain of command, to include supervisors, will participate in unit equal opportunity

sessions as instructors, discussion leaders, or as resource persons for answering questions concerning

policy and practices.

3-5.c. Unit Discussion Leaders [UDL], whose role is to assist commanders in the conduct of unit EO

training and to act as discussion leaders, moderators, or facilitators, will be selected, trained and made

available locally, as prescribed by MACOM’s.

3-5.d. UDL duty will be accomplished on a part-time or additional duty basis. Majority group members
138

and minority group members, men and women, will be given equal consideration in selection for

attendance at a UDL course.

CHAPTER 4 ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OFFICE

4-1. In reality, the commander is the Equal Opportunity Officer and, as such, is assisted by staff

members having Equal Opportunity responsibilities.

4-2.a. Command priority for, commitment to, and involvement in Equal Opportunity matters is reflected

in the organizational placement of Equal Opportunity Offices. The Equal Opportunity Staff Officer will

have direct access to the commander at all times.

4-3.a. [I]t is not intended that the EO staff officer’s charter usurp or duplicate the traditional functions of

other staff officers who must be involved in EO matters as an integral part of their day-to-day activities.

4-5.a. Equal Opportunity and Organizational Effectiveness are complementary and mutually reinforcing

functions, directed toward a common goal.

APPENDIX D GUIDELINES FOR UNIT EO TRAINING

D-1.b. There are four specific learning objectives.

(1) To facilitate and improve the soldier’s understanding of the entire Equal Opportunity Program for the

United States Army.

(2) To inform unit members about potential sources of minority/gender dissatisfaction and

interracial/intersexual tension in the Army and about what the Army is doing to remove any grounds for

dissatisfaction and tension in specific areas.

(3) To increase the soldier’s understanding and acceptance of different cultural modes.

(4) To provide the chain of command with contemporary information and feedback on the status and

progress of the Equal Opportunity Program.”

Jun 77 The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel authorized the Army Research Institute (ARI) to evaluate the

performance of women in their military occupational specialties and their ability to adapt to field

conditions during the Army’s annual REFORGER (Repositioning of Forces in Germany) exercise between

July and October 1977. ARI reported its findings of REFORGER 77 to the Army staff in November 1977,

finding that the addition of women had no adverse impact on unit missions.

Sep 77 Integrated basic initial entry training for men and women began at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and Fort

Jackson, South Carolina. Integrated training began at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri, in October 1978.

Dec 77 Secretary of the Army announced the Army’s combat exclusion policy. “It applied to all women in the

Army--Regular Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard. An all-Army message stated: Combat
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Exclusion Policy. Women are authorized to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty except those listed

below, at any organizational level, and in any unit of the Army, except in Infantry, Armor, Cannon Field

Artillery, Combat Engineer, and Low Altitude Air Defense Artillery units of battalion/squadron or smaller

size.”19

There are no statutory combat restrictions for Army women. With the dissolution of the WAC in October

1978, and the subsequent integration of women into the Army’s mainstream, the Army developed its own

combat exclusion policy based on its interpretation of congressional intent as reflected in the statutes

affecting the other services.

Oct 78 The Army revised its AAP to extend coverage to ethnic minorities and women. The previous Army AAP

focused almost exclusively on racial minorities.20

Oct 78 Women's Army Corps disestablished.21

Aug 79 DRRI changed its name to the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI).22

1979-1980 Senate and House subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees held hearings on the issues of

women in combat and registration of women for the draft.

80 By 1980, over 170,000 women were on active duty, making up 8.5 percent of the U.S. armed forces.

Oct 80 AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedures. Superseded AR 600-20, Apr 71, including all

changes.

“5-7. Relationship of superiors toward subordinates.

e.(1) . . . Moreover, they should emphasize the importance of individual conduct and behavior as

service members.

f. Relationships between service members of different rank which involve (or give the appearance of)

partiality, preferential treatment, or the improper use of rank or position for personal gain, are prejudicial

to good order, discipline, and high unit morale. Such relationships will be avoided. Commanders and

supervisors will counsel those involved or take other action, as appropriate, if relationships between

Service members of different rank-

 

19 Ibid., p. 384.

20 See Dep’t of Army, Pamphlet 600-26, Department of the Army Affirmative Action Plan (October 1, 1978).

21 Department of the Army, General Order No. 20, November 21, 1978, disestablished the Women’s Army Corps effective October 20, 1978,

pursuant to Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1979, Pub. L. 95-485, § 820, 92 Stat. 1611, 1627 (1978).

22 See Dep’t of Defense, Directive 1322.11, Education and Training in Human/Race Relations for Military Personnel (September 12, 1978) (C1,

August 2, 1979).
140

(1) Cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness,

(2) Involve the improper use of rank or position for personal gain, or

(3) Can otherwise reasonably be expected to undermine discipline, authority, or morale.

Chapter 5 Section V Pregnancy and Dependent Care Counseling

5-35. Counseling Procedures. a. Commanders will identify members of their command whose status

is defined . . . below. They will counsel them on their rights and responsibilities for the care of their

dependents as they relate to their responsibilities to the Service.”

May 81 The Army established the Women in the Army Policy Review Group (WITAPRG). This group

analyzed Army personnel policies as they related to mission, combat readiness, quality of life, and

utilization of female soldiers.

May 81 The Secretary of the Army signed a memorandum, Department of the Army Policy on Sexual

Harassment, for all personnel emphasizing the unacceptability of sexual harassment. The memorandum

urged individuals subjected to sexual harassment to make it clear to the offending person that such

behavior is offensive and to report the harassment to the appropriate supervisory level.

Jun 81 The Supreme Court held in Rostker v. Goldberg that Congress has the constitutional authority to

exclude women from the military draft.23

Jul 81 President Reagan nominated Sandra Day O’Connor as the first female Supreme Court Justice.

Jul 81 DoD policy memorandum, Department of Defense Policy on Sexual Harassment, signed by the

Secretary of Defense, was the first to address this issue at the DoD level.

82 The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed standardized training to counter

sexual harassment for use in all enlisted and officer service schools and in Reserve Officers’ Training

Corps (ROTC) courses. The Army also produced standard training programs on the prevention of sexual

harassment to present to civilian employees and their supervisors.

Jan 82 The Secretary of Defense directed the military services to “aggressively break down those remaining

barriers that prevent us from making the fullest use of the capabilities of women in providing for our

national defense.”

Fall 82 The Army discontinued coeducational basic training. Many women leaders considered the decision to

end coed basic training a step backward. Army spokesmen, however, insisted that it was not meant to

discriminate against women but to toughen the men. Men and women had been training in integrated

 

23 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
141

companies since 1977.

Nov 82 The Women in the Army Policy Review Group completed its report. Its conclusions were “(1) The

Army should implement a system whereby soldiers are matched to the physical demands of their job. (2)

Assignment policy for each MOS must recognize the combat probability of each MOS and restrict

assignment of women in those with a high probability of routinely engaging in direct combat.”24

83 The Army developed the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) system, which ascribed to each

Army job an assessment of the probability of that job participating in direct combat. Direct combat was

defined as engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct

enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy, and a substantial risk of capture.

Direct combat occurs while closing with the enemy in order to destroy or capture, or while repelling

assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.

Jul 83 The Secretary of Defense stated that it “is the policy of this Department that women will be provided full

and equal opportunity with men to pursue appropriate careers in the military services for which they can

qualify. This means that military women can and should be utilized in all roles except those prohibited by

combat exclusion statutes and related policy. This does not mean that the combat exclusion policy can

be used to justify closing career opportunities to women. The combat exclusion rule should be

interpreted to allow as many as possible career opportunities for women to be kept open.”

Fall 83 170 women deployed to Grenada in Operation Urgent Fury.

Jan 84 AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army. Superseded AR 600-21, Jun 77; DA Pam 600-

16, Jun 73; and DA Pam 600-42, Mar 77.

“Chapter 2 Policy

2-1.a. The policy of the United States Army is to provide equal opportunity and treatment for uniformed

members and their families irrespective of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and to provide an

environment free of sexual harassment.

2-2. Sexual harassment

Sexual harassment is an unwelcome form of sex discrimination. It is not limited to the work environment

and can occur at almost any place. Sexual harassment violates acceptable standards of integrity and

impartiality required of all Army personnel and interferes with mission accomplishment and unit cohesion.

Many of the acts and neglect that constitute sexual harassment are prohibited and punishable under civil

 

24 Dep’t of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Women in the Army Policy Review, p. 9 (November 12, 1982).
142

and military law as criminal acts of a sexual nature, and should be treated as such. Any military member

or civilian employee is engaging in sexual harassment whoa. Through behavior of a sexual nature attempts to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of

a military member or civilian employee.

b. Makes deliberate or repeated verbal comments or gestures of a sexual nature that are offensive to

the person to whom addressed

c. Makes abusive physical contact of a sexual nature.

2-4.b. Command and Staff relationships. The principal EOA will have direct access to the commander

at all times. So long as the above condition is met, where the EO office is placed within the organization

is a matter of local command discretion or other applicable directives.

2-4.d. Roles and duties of EOAs.

(3) Recognizes sexual harassment in both overt and subtle forms.

(4) Recommends remedies appropriate to reduce or prevent discrimination and sexual harassment.

2-12. Training

a. Minimum DA criteria for local unit training programs are as follows:

(2) Unit training will focus on the following:

(a) Army policies on EO, affirmative actions, and sexual harassment.

(b) Objectives of the Army EO program.

(c) Objectives of affirmative actions.

(d) Behavioral characteristics and other indicators of EO problems.

(e) The impact of individual and institutional discrimination on mission accomplishment.

(f) Identifying and countering sexual harassment.

(g) Legal consequences applicable to individuals participating in acts of sexual harassment.

(h) Individual responsibilities concerning equal opportunity and prevention of sexual harassment.

(i) The importance of honest and open interpersonal communications in promoting a healthy equal

opportunity climate.

c.(1) Formal training on EO subjects will be conducted during initial entry training and will include-

(b) An awareness of racial, cultural, and gender-related differences and attitudes as they relate to Army

missions and activities.

(c) Complaint procedures according to this regulation and AR 20-1, AR 210-51, and AR 600-20.

(d) Legal and career consequences for those who do not comply with EO policies.

(e) Identifying and countering sexual harassment.
143

(5) Command and staff college-level (CSC) and enlisted skill level 5. Training conducted during CSC,

the warrant officer senior course, the first sergeants’ course, and the sergeants major course will include-

(b) Specific roles and responsibilities of senior officers and NCOs in carrying out installation and

MACOM EO programs.

(c) Effective employment of the staff EO advisor.

(d) Impacts of individual and institutional discrimination on mission accomplishment.

(f) Identifying and countering sexual harassment.

(6) Army War College.

(b) The international (host nation) aspects of EO.

(c) The relationship of EO to readiness and mission capability.

(d) Army leadership responsibilities in identifying and countering sexual harassment.

(7) Training for senior officials. Emphasis will be on contemporary problems in EO, sexual harassment,

and other topics.

Glossary

Sexual harassment

Advances, requests for favors, and other sexually related verbal or physical conduct whena. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a condition of a person’s job, pay ,

or career status.

b. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment

decisions affecting this person.

c. Such conduct interferes with a person’s performance of duty or otherwise creates an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive environment.”

84 The Army eliminated the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 00U (full-time, school-trained EO

specialists) for EO advisors (EOAs). The theory behind this shift in approach was a vision that more EO

trained soldiers would move into leadership positions over time and, thus, institutionalize EO. The Army

still trained EOAs at DEOMI for assignment at brigade level and higher staffs. After a successful tour of

duty as EOAs, the soldiers were to return to duty in their primary MOSs.

Apr 85 AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army (30 Apr 85 Update with change 3 to AR 600-21,

Jan 84).

This Update changed the word “sex” to “gender” throughout.

“2-6. Procedures for processing complaints
144

a. Individuals will be encouraged to use command channels for redress of grievances. Commanders

will ensure that members are fully aware of procedures for obtaining redress of complaints including

those against members of the chain of command. These procedures will be in writing and will be

displayed at all times where all unit members have access to them.”

May 85 The Secretary of Defense reiterated his policy statement on sexual harassment.

Apr 86 AR 600-21, Equal Opportunity Program in the Army (30 Apr 86 Update with change 4 to AR 600-21,

Jan 84).

2-2. Sexual harassment

Added following to discussion of sexual harassment: “Army leaders at all levels are responsible for

taking both preventive and appropriate corrective action to combat this unacceptable form of behavior.”

“2-4.a.(2) One full-time enlisted EOA will be available to each brigade-level or equivalent commander,

and one full-time officer EOA will be available to the commander of each major combat formation

(division, corps, Army) and at each MACOM.

Glossary

Sexual harassment

Any soldier or civilian employee is engaging in sexual harassment whoa. Through behavior of a sexual nature attempts to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of

a soldier or civilian employee.

b. Makes deliberate or repeated verbal comments or gestures of a sexual nature that are offensive to

the person to whom addressed.

c. Makes abusive physical contact of a sexual nature.”

Aug 86 AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedures. Superseded AR 600-20, Oct 80.

“5-7.g. Relationships between officer and enlisted soldiers are prohibited and are contrary to the

custom of the service and may constitute the offense of fraternization under the provisions of Article 134,

UCMJ.”

Oct 86 Change 2 to DoD Directive 1325.6, Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities

Among Members of the Armed Forces, September 1969.

“III.G. Prohibited Activities. Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse

supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or

national origin; or, advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts, to deprive individuals
145

of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and

training members, and organizing or leading such organizations is incompatible with Military Service, and is

therefore prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures,

including separation or appropriate disciplinary action against military personnel who actively participate in

such groups.”

Dec 86 The Secretary of Defense reiterated his policy statement on sexual harassment.

88 The DoD risk rule was developed to help standardize the services’ assignment of women deploying to a

hostile area. The rule stated: “Risks of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or capture are proper

criteria for closing noncombat positions or units to women, when the type, degree, and duration of such

risks are equal to or greater than the combat units with which they are normally associated within a given

theater of operations. If the risk of non-combat units or positions is less than comparable to land, air or

sea combat units with which they are associated, then they should be open to women. Non-combat units

should be compared to combat land units, air to air and so forth.”

Jan 88 DoD Task Force on Women in the Military Report was published. “The Secretary of Defense

established this Task Force as a direct result of continuing concerns raised by the DACOWITS about the

full integration of women in the armed forces. The Secretary’s direction was to address three primary

topics: attitudes toward and treatment of women in the military, and their impact on the morale and

quality of life for women; consistency in application of combat exclusion statutes and policies, and their

impact on effective utilization of women; and the manner in which various force management policies may

impact adversely on women’s career development. Discussion and recommendations for action in

response to that direction are contained in the sections [of the report] that follow.”25

Feb 88 DoD Instruction 1350.3, Affirmative Action Planning and Assessment Process. This prescribes

DoD policy, assigns responsibilities, and establishes minimum reporting requirements by category and

subject for annual Military Equal Opportunity Assessments submitted to DoD.

Mar 88 AR 600-20, Army Command Policy. Superseded AR 600-20, Aug 86, and AR 600-21, Apr 85.

“4-1.b. While military discipline is the result of effective training, it is affected by every feature of military

life. It is manifested in individuals and units by cohesion, bonding, and a spirit of teamwork; . . . and by

fairness, justice, equity for all soldiers, regardless of race, ethnic origin, gender, or religion.

 

25 Dep’t of Defense, Report, Task Force on Women in the Military, pp. 1-2 (January 1988).
146

4-12. Extremist Organizations

The activities of extremist organizations are inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service.

Active participation by soldiers is prohibited.

a. Military personnel, duty bound to uphold the Constitution, must reject participation in organizations

which-

(1) Espouse supremacist causes.

(2) Attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national

origin.

(3) Advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their

civil rights.

b. Passive activities, such as mere membership, receiving literature in the mail, or presence at an

event, although strongly discouraged as incompatible with military service, are not prohibited by Army

policy. Positive actions to limit soldier participation are listed in d below.

c. The prohibited activities concerning extremist groups include the following:

(1) Participating in a public demonstration or rally.

(2) Knowingly attending a meeting or activity while on duty, when in uniform, when in a foreign country,

or in violation of off- limits sanctions or commander's order.

(3) Conducting fund-raising activities.

(4) Recruiting or training members (including encouraging other soldiers to join) .

(5) Organizing or leading such a group

(6) Distributing literature on or off a military installation.

(7) Participating in any activity that is in violation of regulations, constitutes a breach of law and order,

or is likely to result in violence.

d. Commanders should take positive actions when soldiers in their units are identified as members of

extremist groups and /or when they engage in extremist group activities.

e. Actions taken by commanders must be appropriate to the specific facts surrounding any incident.

Not every incident warrants separation or UCMJ action.

4-14. Relationships between soldiers of different rank

b. The commander will be responsible for establishing the leadership climate of the unit. This sets the

parameters within which command will be exercised and, therefore, sets the tone for social and duty

relationships within the command.

d.(3) . . . A leadership climate in which all soldiers are treated with fairness, justice, and equity will be
147

crucial to development of this confidence within soldiers.

e. All soldiers and Army civilians must understand that this policy is based on the principle of good

judgment. . . . Just because a certain relationship does not break the law, does not mean it is acceptable

or appropriate.

(1) Prejudgements in evaluating relationships and associations between soldiers of different rank have

no place in military society. An association between soldiers of different rank who also are of different

gender does not necessarily create a greater potential for impropriety than one between soldiers of the

same gender. Relationships between males of different rank in the male-dominated military organization

have as much potential for real or perceived partiality.

(3) Same sex relationships between soldiers of different rank may cause problems. The Army affirms

managing our personal relationships to promote the health and welfare of all concerned and maintaining

good order, morale, and discipline.

(5) Certain structures within the military demand closer scrutiny because of the greater risk that they

will involve partiality or an abuse of authority. . . . These include Initial Entry Training (IET), Advanced

Individual Training, and military schools. Military commanders have always closely controlled

relationships between trainers and trainees. . . . These relationships are regulated in a very restrictive

manner. Also discouraged are relationships between senior and subordinate members of the same unit

or between soldiers closely linked in the chain of command or supervision. They are fraught with the

possibility of actual or perceived favoritism, and are, therefore, potentially destructive of discipline,

authority, morale, and soldier welfare.

4-15. Trainee and soldier relationships

Relationships between permanent party personnel and IET trainees not required by the training mission

are prohibited. This prohibition applies to permanent party officers and noncommissioned officers without

regard to the installation of assignment of the permanent party member or IET trainee.

Chapter 6 Equal Opportunity Program in the Army

6-1. Concept

a. The Equal Opportunity Program formulates, directs, and sustains a comprehensive effort to ensure

fair treatment of all soldiers based solely on merit, fitness, capability, and potential, which supports

readiness. As such, EO is a responsibility of leadership and a function of command.

6-6. Staffing

b. Command and Staff relationship. The principal EOA has direct access to the commander at all

times. . . . EO office placement within the organization is a matter of local command discretion provided it
148

is in compliance with AR 5-3.”

Jun 88 U.S. Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) released its report, Sexual Harassment in the Federal

Government: An Update. This report discussed the results of a MSPB study to determine the nature

and extent of sexual harassment in the federal government. It updated the findings of an earlier study

reported in 1981. The 1988 report found that sexual harassment remained a widespread problem in the

federal workplace.

Sep 88 The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released its report, Women in the Military: More Military

Jobs Can Be Opened Under Current Statutes. “This report responds to your . . . request that we

review how service policies implementing the combat exclusion provisions affect the number and

assignment of women in the military, and whether other factors limit job opportunities for women. In the

report we address the numerical impact of the statutory restrictions, and how service policies unrelated to

statutory restrictions limit the availability of jobs for women.”26

Dec 89-Jan

90

During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, women in several specialties--particularly aviation, military

police, transportation, and medical support--found themselves involved in combat in the streets of

Panama City.

Sep 90 DoD Defense Manpower Data Center released its report, Sexual Harassment in the Military: 1988.

“This report provides the results of the 1988 DoD Survey of Sex Roles in the Active-Duty Military,

mandated by then Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci in response to a recommendation of the Task

Force on Women in the Military.”27

Nov 90 A DA Inspector General Assessment on Equal Opportunity indicated a need for renewed emphasis

on sexual harassment and equal opportunity training throughout the Army.

90-91 “Of the more than half a million U.S. troops deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, approximately 7 percent (about 41,000) were women.”28 About 26,000 female

soldiers were among those deployed (8.6 percent of all soldiers deployed).

Jul 91 The Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum, Department of Defense Strategies to Eradicate

Sexual Harassment in the Military and Civilian Environment, to all DoD components, directing each to

 

26 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Women in the Military: More Military Jobs Can Be Opened Under

Current Statutes, GAO/NSIAD-88-222, p. 1 (September 7, 1988).

27 Dep’t of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Sexual Harassment in the Military: 1988, p. iii (September 1990).

28 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Secretary of Defense, Women in the Military: Deployment in the Persian Gulf War,

GAO/NSIAD-93-93 (July 13, 1993).
149

implement a program emphasizing that sexual harassment will not be tolerated. Each program had to

incorporate seven specified actions. Components were tasked to provide annual updates to DoD on the

progress and effectiveness of their program.

Sep 91 The 1991 Tailhook Convention was held at the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada, from

September 5-8, 1991. Hundreds of aviators, male and female, including active duty, reserve, and retired

officers from both the Navy and Marine Corps aviation communities attended. The Tailhook Convention

was an annual event sponsored by the Tailhook Association. Allegations of assaults on female attendees

and other inappropriate conduct at the convention were later made public.

Sep 91 Fort McClellan conducted prototype of gender-integrated One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for military

police and chemical military occupational specialties (MOSs).

Dec 91 In Section 531 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Congress

repealed 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 8549, which restricted the Air Force’s assignment of women to

aircraft engaged in combat missions, and amended language in 10 U.S.C. 6015 relating to the

assignment of women in the Navy and Marine Corps to aircraft or naval vessels engaged in combat

missions. (The Army has never been statutorily restricted from assigning women to combat aircraft.)

Sections 541-550 of the Act established the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the

Armed Forces. The purpose of the Commission was to assess the laws and policies restricting the

assignment of female service members and make findings, conclusions, and recommendations on such

matters.29

92 The Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP) survey questions in the areas of EO and sexual

harassment were modified.

Apr 92 Change 2 to AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, Mar 88.

“6-4 Sexual Harassment

a. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcomed sexual advances,

requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, when:

(1) submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of

a person’s job, pay, or career;

(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment

decisions affecting that person; or

 

29 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. 102-190, §§ 531, 541-550, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991).
150

(3) such conduct interferes with an individual’s performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or

offensive environment.

b. Any soldier or civilian employee:

(1) In a supervisory or command position who uses or condones implicit or explicit sexual behavior to

control, influence, or affect the career, pay or job of another soldier or civilian employee is engaging in

sexual harassment.

(2) Who makes deliberate or repeated unwelcomed verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact of a

sexual nature is engaging in sexual harassment.

c. Sexual harassment is not limited to the workplace, can occur at almost any place, and violates

acceptable standards of integrity and impartiality required of all Army personnel. It interferes with mission

accomplishment and unit cohesion. Such behavior by soldiers or Army civilians will not be tolerated.

6-6a.(2) One full-time enlisted EOA will be available to each brigade-level or equivalent commander,

and one full-time officer EOA will be available to the commander of FORSCOM, TRADOC, and

USAREUR.”

Apr 92 DA policy memorandum, Army Policy Statement on Equal Opportunity, signed by the Secretary of

the Army and the Army Chief of Staff.

Spring 92 Fort Jackson, South Carolina was tasked with running a test of squad level gender-integrated Basic

Combat Training (BCT). The test found no differences in performance between men and women trained

in single gender and gender-integrated companies.

Jun 92 At the request of Congress, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the issue of sexual

harassment at all three of the service academies. It presented its preliminary results at a hearing before

the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee, on June 2, 1992.30

Jul 92 The Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, testified before the House Armed Services

Committee on the subject of sexual harassment in the Army. He stated that “the Army is firmly opposed

to sexual harassment in any form. . . . The Army is dependent on cohesion and trust among its soldiers

and leaders to be able to accomplish the difficult and often dangerous tasks of training for war. In such

an environment, sexual harassment is dysfunctional; it undermines the fabric of the force; it is contrary to

what we stand for as an institution. . . . I want to reinforce the commitment of the Department of the Army

 

30 U.S. General Accounting Office, DoD Service Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student Treatment, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41 (June 2,

1992).
151

to providing those serving the nation under the Army Seal an environment free of any form sexual

harassment.”31

Nov 92 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces submitted to the

President its final report containing a review of existing laws and policies and its recommendations for the

future assignment of women in the Armed Forces. It defined 17 critical issues relevant to this matter.

Nov 92 Training support packages (TSPs) in equal opportunity and the prevention of sexual harassment were

developed for Individual Entry Training (IET) and for every Army leadership course. These TSPs were

implemented in early 1993.

92-93 “More than 18,000 U.S. Service members are sent to Somalia to assist the United Nations in a

humanitarian relief mission, Operation Restore Hope. Over 300 of the service members participating

are women.”32

Feb 93 The U.S. Army Soldier Support Center conducted an assessment of Army school implementation of the

EO TSPs.

Mar 93 DA Sexual Harassment Action Plan published. Army’s senior leadership mandated that the plan be

periodically reviewed and revised.

Apr-May 93 The U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Inspector General conducted a follow-on

assessment of EO training in Army schools.

Spring 93 The Inspector General School added a four-hour block of instruction for all new inspectors general. The

instruction covers equal opportunity, to include the prevention of sexual harassment.

Questions for sexual harassment were fielded in the Spring 1993 SSMP survey.

Jun 93 Army installations established EO/prevention of sexual harassment hotlines. Operating 24 hours a day,

the hotlines “provide procedural information on the filing of complaints and advise callers in identifying

acts or behaviors which constitute sexual harassment.”33

Aug 93 DA Pam 350-20, Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide.

Sep 93 Change 4 to AR 600-20, Army Command Policy.

 

31 Statement by General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army, before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives,

102d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 30, 1992).

32 Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), History and Accomplishments, p. 18 (February 1997).

33 Sexual Harassment of Military Women and Improving the Military Complaint System, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House

of Representatives, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1994) (statement of Joe R. Reeder, Under Secretary of the Army).
152

“6-3. Equal opportunity policy

a.(2) Extends to soldiers, civilian employees, and their families.

b. . . . The following are exceptions to a totally nonbiased personnel management process:

(1) The assignment and utilization of female soldiers.

(2) Support for established equal opportunity goals, such as to increase representation of a particular

group in one or more monitored area(s) of affirmative action plans (AAPs).

6-5. Chain of command responsibilities

The chain of command, whether military or civilian, has the primary responsibility for developing and

sustaining a healthy EO climate. This responsibility entails, but is not limited to, promoting positive

programs that enhance unit cohesion, esprit, and morale; communicating matters with EO significance to

unit personnel and higher headquarters; correcting discriminatory practices by conducting rapid,

objective, and impartial inquiries to resolve complaints of discrimination; encouraging the surfacing of

problems and preventing reprisal for those who complain; and taking appropriate action against those

who violate Army policy.

6-6. Staffing

c. Command and staff relationships. The principal EOA will have direct access to the supported

commander at all times and that commander will be either the EOA’s rater or senior rater.

6-8. Procedures for processing complaints of discrimination

a. Individual rights. Soldiers and their family members have the right to--

(1) Present a complaint to the command without fear of intimidation, reprisal, or harassment;

(2) Communicate with the commander concerning their complaints;

b. Individual responsibilities. Individuals have the responsibility to --

(1) Attempt to resolve a complaint by first informing the alleged offender that the behavior must stop.

(Depending upon the severity of the offense, this may not always be plausible);

(2) Advise the command of the specifics of sexual harassment and discrimination complaints and

provide the command an opportunity to take appropriate action to rectify/resolve the issue; and

(3) Submit only legitimate complaints and exercise caution against unfounded or reckless charges.

c. Entering the complaints processing system.

(1) Informal Complaint.

(2) Formal Complaint.

f. Actions of the commander.

(2) The unit commander will conduct an inquiry to determine if sufficient evidence exists to warrant a
153

full investigation. . . . Should such evidence exist, the commander must refer the case to the battalion- or

brigade-level commander for the appointment of an AR 15-6 investigating officer.

(3) . . . The EOA will review and comment on the findings of the investigation to ensure compliance with

DoD /DA policies and objectives.

h. EOA assistance. . . . An EOA’s skills in complaint handling and conflict resolution and training in the

subtleties of discrimination and sexual harassment enable him or her to advise the commander or any

investigating officer in this complex area.”

Nov 93 The Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, directed the reinstatement of EOAs in Army divisions and the

warfighting Corps headquarters.

Jan 94 The Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, announced a new policy regarding women in combat that

rescinded the 1988 “risk rule.” Under the new policy, soldiers are eligible to be assigned to all positions

for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below brigade

level with the primary mission of engaging in direct combat on the ground. As a result of this policy, 80

percent of all military positions can now be filled by either men or women.

Jan 94 DA policy memorandum, Army Policy Statement on Equal Opportunity, signed by the Secretary of

the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. “People are the cornerstone of readiness. Sophisticated

weapons systems and modern technology are of little value without a dedicated, trained team of

professional soldiers and civilians. They must know they will be treated fairly, and with dignity and

respect in all aspects of performing the mission.”

Jan 94 The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released its report, DoD Service Academies: More

Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual Harassment. GAO “reviewed the issue of sexual harassment at

all three of the service academies. This report addresses (1) the extent to which sexual harassment

occurred at the academies, the forms it took, and its effect on those subjected to it and (2) an evaluation

of the academies’ efforts to eradicate sexual harassment. This report expands upon the preliminary

results we presented at the hearing on the service academies before the Subcommittee on Manpower

and Personnel on June 2, 1992.”34

 

34 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, DoD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual

Harassment, GAO/NSIAD-94-6, p. 1 (January 31, 1994). See also U.S. General Accounting Office, DoD Service Academies: Status Report on

Reviews of Student Treatment, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41 (June 2, 1992).
154

Mar 94 The DoD Inspector General noted in a report that several EO specialists it interviewed indicated they

did not have the direct access to commanders their responsibilities required.35

Mar 94 The House Armed Services Committee held hearings on Sexual Harassment of Military Women and

Improving Military Complaint System.

36

Mar 94 The Deputy Secretary of Defense expressed concern in a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air

Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) that DoD had yet to develop

and implement fully the policies and procedures necessary to rid DoD of sexual harassment. He

requested a plan of action and a calendar for developing and implementing these policies and

regulations.

Apr 94 The Secretary of the Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

submitted a sexual harassment policy action plan to the Deputy Secretary of Defense containing five main

elements. One of those elements was to establish the Defense Equal Opportunity Council Task Force

on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment to review the military services’ discrimination complaints

system and recommend improvements.

Jul 94 DA policy memorandum, Army Policy on Sexual Harassment, signed by the Secretary of the Army and

the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Aug 94 The Secretary of Defense issued a policy memorandum, Prohibition of Sexual Harassment in the

Department of Defense (DoD).

Oct 94 “As of October 1994, 67% of all positions in the Army are open to women, with the Navy at 94%, Air

Force at 99%, Marine Corps at 62%, and the Coast Guard at 100%.”37

Oct 94 Section 532 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 stated:

“(d) MILITARY DEPARTMENT POLICIES. -- (1) The Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air

Force shall review and revise the regulations of the Department of the Navy and the Department of the

Air Force, respectively, relating to equal opportunity policy and procedures in that Department for the

making of, and responding to, complaints of unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment in order to

ensure that those regulations are substantially equivalent to the regulations of the Department of the

 

35 Dep’t of Defense, Assistant Inspector General for Departmental Inquiries, Review of Military Department Investigations of Allegations of

Discrimination by Military Personnel (March 1994).

36 Sexual Harassment of Military Women and Improving the Military Complaint System, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House

of Representatives, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1994).

37 DACOWITS, supra note 32, p. 20 (February 1997).
155

Army on such matters. . . . (3) The Secretary of the Army shall review the regulations of the Department of

the Army relating to equal opportunity policy and complaint procedures and revise the regulations as the

Secretary of Defense considers appropriate to strengthen the regulations in accordance with the

recommendations and experience described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2).” [Paragraph

(2) references approved recommendations of the Department of Defense Task Force on Discrimination

and Sexual Harassment and experiences of the Services regarding EO cases.]38

Oct 94 Training Circular (TC) 26-6, Commander's Equal Opportunity Handbook.

Fall 94 The first companies at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri and Fort Jackson, South Carolina completed coed

basic training under the newly approved policy of "gender-integrated basic training."

Dec 94 A House Armed Services Committee task force conducted focus group sessions with soldiers at 19

installations to determine their views on EO. It issued its report in December 1994.39

Mar 95 GAO released it report, DoD Service: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment. ”On January 31,

1994, we issued a report on sexual harassment at the three Department of Defense (DoD) service

academies as part of a series of reports originally requested by Senator Nunn and Senator Glenn. As

requested, we updated that previous work, and this report compares the results of our 1990-91 survey

with the extent to which sexual harassment was reported to have occurred at the academies in the 1993-

94 academic year, the forms it took, and the views of academy men and women on the consequences of

reporting it.”40

May 95 Defense Equal Opportunity Council, Report of the Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual

Harassment.

Report identified goals and principles for an effective equal opportunity system. Recommended 48

improvements in the way the Armed Services deal with discrimination and harassment.

Aug 95 DA policy memorandum, Army Policy Statement on Equal Opportunity, signed by the Secretary of

the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Aug 95 DA policy memorandum, Army Policy Statement on Sexual Harassment, signed by the Secretary of

the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

 

38 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. 103-337, § 532, 108 Stat. 2663, 2759 (1994).

39 House Armed Services Committee Task Force on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, An Assessment of Racial

Discrimination in the Military: A Global Perspective (December 30, 1994).

40 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, DoD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment,

GAO/NSIAD-95-58 (March 31, 1995).
156

Aug 95 DoD reissued DoD Directive 7050.6, Military Whistleblower Protection. This directive extended

protected communication to include complaints of sexual harassment or unlawful discrimination.

Aug 95 DoD reissued DoD Directive 1350.2, Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO)

Program.

“C. DEFINITIONS. Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2. Service implementing

documents shall adopt the terms contained herein and shall define those terms exactly as they are

defined in this Directive.

DEFINITIONS

15. Sexual Harassment. A form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances,

requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:

a. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person’s

job, pay, or career, or

b. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment

decisions affecting that person, or

c. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work

performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be actionable as “abusive work environment”

harassment, need not result in concrete psychological harm to the victim, but rather need only be so

severe or pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and the victim does perceive, the work

environment as hostile or offensive. . . . Any person in a supervisory or command position who uses or

condones any form of sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a Military

member or civilian employee is engaging in sexual harassment. Similarly, any Military member or civilian

employee who makes deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact

of a sexual nature in the workplace is also engaging in sexual harassment.”

Dec 95 Two white soldiers killed two black civilians in Fayetteville, NC.

Dec 95 The Secretary of the Army established a task force to examine extremist activities in the Army.

Jan 96 GAO released its report, Military Equal Opportunity: Problems With Services’ Complaint Systems

Are Being Addressed by DoD. GAO had been asked to identify the Services’ processes for handling

EO complaints and determine whether there were opportunities for improving the processes. This report

completed a three-part effort. In April 1995, GAO issued a report that identified previous DoD studies on

discrimination in the military. In November 1995, it issued a report that examined the services’ military
157

EO assessment.41

Mar 96 The Secretary of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities issued its report.

“The Task Force found no widespread or organized extremist activity in the Army.” (p. 5)

“Most majority and many minority soldiers believe overt racism and discrimination are suppressed by the

Army’s unequivocal Equal Opportunity policy and firm enforcement of that policy.

The human relations environment is best where the chain of command is clear in its policy, proactive,

and both quick and unambiguous in its response to incidents or complaints.

Many soldiers believe teamwork, racial integration, and equitable treatment occur in the workplace, yet

most minority and many majority soldiers believe that subtle racism exists. Most report that off-duty

socialization often polarizes along racial, ethnic, cultural, or other lines. This behavior, however, is often

viewed as natural and acceptable.

Senior Army leaders believe the Army’s human relations environment is shaped by institutional mores

and operational requirements and reflects Army values. . . . Junior soldiers reported an undercurrent

which . . . focuses on racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, stereotyping, separatism, self-polarization,

misperception and individual racial animosity.” (pp. 13-14)

“The Army relies on its Equal Opportunity Program and requisite training to address these issues. The

quality of Equal Opportunity Advisors and Representatives was found to range from excellent to fair,

resulting in uneven unit Equal Opportunity training throughout the Army. . . . The assessment also

revealed several installations where Equal Opportunity staffing was inadequate.

Recently, equal opportunity training has focused predominately on sexual harassment and sexism.

Currently, most soldiers and leaders believe that sexism is more prevalent than racism at the unit level.”

(p. 14)

“The high Operational Pace for units is contributing to a stressful human relations environment.

Today's Army is still experiencing the effects of downsizing, base realignments, and increased

contingency operations, which contribute to a perception of instability and career insecurity in the force. .

. . [M]any soldiers and leaders . . . perceive a zero-defect environment developing. Zero defect is viewed

as no tolerance for mistakes, no opportunity for recovery, and a demand for perfection.” (p. 15)

Jun 96 The Supreme Court ruled that the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) all male policy violates women’s

 

41 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Equal Opportunity: Problems With Services’ Complaint Systems Are Being Addressed by DoD,

GAO/NSIAD-96-9 (January 26, 1996). See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Equal Opportunity: DoD Studies on Discrimination in the

Military, GAO/NSIAD-95-103 (April 7, 1995); U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Equal Opportunity: Certain Trends in Racial and Gender

Data May Warrant Further Analysis, GAO/NSIAD-96-17 (November 17, 1995).
158

constitutional rights to equal protection.42

Nov 96 Allegations of sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving Ground brought to public’s attention.

Nov 96 The Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army Inspector General to review and assess

the sexual harassment policies and procedures at basic and advanced individual training organizations

and units at Aberdeen Proving Ground and throughout the Army Training Base.

The Secretary established the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment.

Dec 96 DoD Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 1995 Sexual Harassment Survey report published.

The three survey forms used in the study “document a decline in harassment experiences and reflect

DoD and the Services’ increased emphasis on combating sexual harassment.”43

 

42 United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996)

43 Dep’t of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, 1995 Sexual Harassment Survey, DMDC Report No. 96-014, p. viii (December 1996).
159

ANNEX G

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY DOCUMENTS RELATING TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE UNIFORMED ARMY
160
161

Date Document Quote Remarks

May 94 DoD Human Goals

Charter

In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the

servicewoman, the civilian employee, and family members, recognizing their

individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities.

Aug 94 Secretary of

Defense

Memorandum,

Prohibition of

Sexual Harassment

in the Department

of Defense (DoD)

It remains the policy of the Department of Defense (DoD) that sexual

harassment is strictly prohibited in the Armed Forces and the civilian work force.

Aug 95 DoD Directive

1350.2,

Department of

Defense Military

Equal Opportunity

(MEO) Program

C. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2. Service

implementing documents shall adopt the terms contained herein and shall define

those terms exactly as they are defined in this Directive.

D. POLICY

It is DoD policy to:

2. Promote an environment free from personal, social, or institutional

barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the highest level of

responsibility possible. Service members shall be evaluated only on individual

merit, fitness, and capability. Unlawful discrimination against persons or groups

based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is contrary to good order

and discipline and is counterproductive to combat readiness and mission

accomplishment. Unlawful discrimination shall not be condoned.

3. Use the command to promote, support, and enforce the MEO program.

The chain of command is the primary and preferred channel for identifying and

correcting discriminatory practices. This includes the processing and resolving

of complaints of unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment, and for

ensuring that human relations and EO matters are taken seriously and acted

upon as necessary. The chain of command is responsible for creating and

maintaining a MEO environment that incorporates the policies set out in this

Directive.

4. Ensure that the Military Services (to include the Reserve components)

establish MEO and affirmative action programs that identify and resolve EO

problems through formulating, maintaining, and reviewing affirmative action

plans (AAPs) with established objectives and milestones, including

accountability in personnel management, consistent with DoD Instruction

1350.3.

5. Provide periodic, mandatory education and training in EO and human

relations at installation and fleet unit commands, during pre-commissioning

programs and initial entry training, and throughout professional military

Basis for chapter 6 of AR 600-20, Army Command

Policy.
162

education (PME) systems, as part of the overall effort to achieve EO within the

Department of Defense. This training shall be provided to all Service members,

enlisted and officer, including flag and general officers. The training shall

include comprehensive material on leadership roles and responsibilities for EO

programs, complaints processing, legal implications, reprisal prevention and

detection, climate assessment methodologies, and managing civilian equal

employment opportunity (EEO) systems.

6. Provide for an environment that is free from unlawful discrimination and

sexual harassment.

7. Ensure that all on-base activities and, to the extent of the ability of the

Department of Defense, any off-base activities available to military personnel are

open to all military personnel and their family members regardless of race, color,

religion, age, physical or mental disability, sex, or national origin, as called for by

the DoD Human Goals Charter.

F. RESPONSIBILITIES

2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for EO and

for ensuring compliance with this Directive within their respective Services and

shall:

b. Require commanders to assess their organizational EO climate,

preferably as part of their assumption of command. Commanders shall be held

accountable for the EO climate in their commands.

DEFINITIONS

15. Sexual Harassment. A form of sex discrimination that involves

unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or

physical conduct of a sexual nature when:

a. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term

or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career, or

b. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis

for career or employment decisions affecting that person, or

c. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with

an individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

working environment.

This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be actionable as

“abusive work environment” harassment, need not result in concrete

psychological harm to the victim, but rather need only be so severe or pervasive

that a reasonable person would perceive, and the victim does perceive, the work

environment as hostile or offensive. . . . Any person in a supervisory or

command position who uses or condones any form of sexual behavior to control,

influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a Military member or civilian

employee is engaging in sexual harassment. Similarly, any Military member or

civilian employee who makes deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal

comments, gestures, or physical contact of a sexual nature in the workplace is

also engaging in sexual harassment.

This 1995 DoD definition is not in published Army

documents; included in draft revision of chapter 6,

AR 600-20.
163

Feb 88 DoD Instruction

1350.3, DoD

Affirmative Action

Planning and

Assessment

Process

A. Assigns responsibilities and establishes minimum reporting requirements

by category and subject for annual Military Equal Opportunity Assessments.

C. It is DoD policy for the Military Services to monitor and report on selected

dimensions of their personnel programs to ensure equal opportunity and fair

treatment for all Service members through affirmative actions and other

initiatives.

Basis for DA Pam 600-26, Department of the Army

Affirmative Action Plan.

Aug 93 DoD Directive

5500.7, Standards

of Conduct

Aug 93

w/ c2

Mar 96

DoD 5500.7-R,

Joint Ethics

Regulation

CHAPTER 12 ETHICAL CONDUCT

SECTION 3. CODE OF ETHICS FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE

SECTION 4. DoD HUMAN GOALS

SECTION 5. ETHICAL VALUES

12-501.g. Respect. To treat people with dignity, to honor privacy and to

allow self-determination are critical in a government of diverse people. Lack of

respect leads to a breakdown of loyalty and honesty within a government and

brings chaos to the international community.

Aug 95 DoD Directive

7050.6, Military

Whistleblower

Protection

D. POLICY

1. Members of the Armed Forces shall be free to make a protected

communication to a Member of Congress; an Inspector General (IG); a member

of a DoD audit, inspection, investigation, or law enforcement organization; or

any other person or organization (including any person or organization in the

chain of command) designated under Component regulations or other

established administrative procedures to receive such communications.

3. Members of the Armed Forces shall be free from reprisal for making or

preparing a protected communication.

4. No person may take or threaten to take an unfavorable personnel action,

or withhold or threaten to withhold a favorable personnel action, in reprisal

against any member of the Armed Forces for making or preparing a protected

communication.

Included in draft revision of AR 600-20.

Aug 95 DA Memorandum,

Army Policy

Statement on

Equal Opportunity

People remain the cornerstone of readiness. . . . Each must be treated fairly

and with dignity and respect in all aspects of daily interactions. We expect all to

treat one another as they would want to be treated. Leaders at all levels must

continue to establish and maintain command climates that focus efforts toward

mission accomplishment. If either the perception or the reality of unequal

treatment exists in the organization, the mission suffers. We all rightfully expect

standards to be enforced as we live the Army’s values.

Aug 95 DA Memorandum,

Army Policy on

Sexual Harassment

The policy of the United States Army is that sexual harassment is

unacceptable conduct and will not be tolerated. Army leadership at all levels

must be committed to creating and maintaining an environment conducive to

maximum productivity and respect for human dignity. . . . To this end, we expect

the commitment of each of you to establish and maintain a work and duty
164

environment free of sexual harassment for all personnel, whether civilian or

military, active duty or reservist. . . . The Army bases its success on mission

accomplishment. Successful mission accomplishment can only be achieved in

an environment of mutual respect, dignity and fair treatment. This necessitates

zero tolerance of sexual harassment.

Mar 94 AR 20-1, Inspector

General Activities

and Procedures

1-4. Responsibilities

a.(10)(a) Provide a system for resolving problems of soldiers, family

members, civilian employees, and retirees; protect confidentiality to the

maximum extent possible; and guard against reprisal.

a.(10)(c) Process Equal Opportunity complaints, to include complaints of

sexual harassment, as Inspector General Assistance Requests.

Chapter 1 Section IV Punitive Prohibitions

1-10.b.(2) Prohibition on reprisal against a military whistleblower.

6-6. Actions on certain types of Inspector General Action Requests

b. Soldier EO Complaints. The EO advisor, under provisions of AR 600-20,

the IG, or an investigating officer appointed under AR 15-6, may address EO

complaints made by soldiers. The manner in which EO complaints are

addressed and who specifically addresses the complaint is a command decision.

Aug 94 AR 27-10, Military

Justice

Chapter 18 Victim/Witness Assistance

This chapter implements . . . Victim/Witness Protection Act of 1982 . . .

Victim of Crime Act of 1984 . . . and Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990.

It also establishes policy, designates responsibility, and provides guidance for

the assistance and treatment of those persons who are victims of offenses under

the UCMJ and those persons who may be witness in proceedings conducted

pursuant to the UCMJ.

Aug 95 AR 40-501,

Standards of

Medical Fitness

2-32. Personality, behavior, or academic skills disorders

The causes for rejection are as follows:

a. Personality or behavior disorders, as evidenced by frequent encounters

with law enforcement agencies, antisocial attitudes or behavior which, while not

sufficient cause for administrative rejection, are tangible evidence of impaired

characterological capacity to adapt to military service.

Jun 93 AR 190-24, Armed

Forces Disciplinary

Control Boards and

Off-Installation

Liaison and

Operations

2-4. Duties and functions of boards

The AFDCBs willb. Receive reports, and take appropriate action on conditions in their area of

responsibility relating to any of the following--

(1) Disorders and lack of discipline.

(5) Racial and other discriminatory practices.

Nov 93 AR 190-40, Serious

Incident Report

1-4. Responsibilities

b. Commanders of major Army commands (MACOMs) will-

(3) Implement a reporting system . . . and ensure that the MACOM

headquarters submits the SIR to HQDA (overseas MACOMs only).

c. Continental United States (CONUS) installation commanders willUnder revision.
165

(1) Report serious incidents to HQDA.

d. All Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), or United States Army

Reserve unit (USAR), agency, or activity commanders, to include commanders

of Army elements of unified or combined commands, will-

(1) Expeditiously notify the CONUS installation commander having

geographic reporting responsibility or the overseas MACOM commander, as

appropriate, of serious incidents.

2-3. Incidents not reportable by Serious Incident Report

h. Incidents involving subversion and espionage directed against the U.S.

Army and deliberate security violations.

Appendix C Category 2 Reportable Serious Incidents

C-1. Actual or alleged incidents involving the following:

c. Racially or ethnically motivated criminal acts.

r. Maltreatment of soldiers or DA civilians to include assaults, abuse, or

exploitation, when the offender has a trainer, supervisor or cadre-trainee

relationship with the victim, regardless of whether they are members of the same

organization. Instances of consensual sex are not reportable unless other

considerations such as sexual harassment or adverse publicity are involved.

C-2. Any other incident that the commander determines to be of concern to

HQDA based on the nature, gravity, potential for adverse publicity, or potential

consequences of the incident.

Sep 88

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Sep 93

AR 190-45, Law

Enforcement

Reporting

4-2. Military Police Report (MPR)

b. Cautionary rule. An incident will not be reported as a founded offense

unless adequately substantiated by police investigation.

DA Form 3975, Military Police Report

DA Form 4833, Commander’s Report of Disciplinary or Administrative

Action

Table 4-2 Offense Code List

5E Civil Rights

6 Sex Crimes

DA Form 2819, Law Enforcement and Discipline Report

Proponent changing MPR, DA Form 3975, to include

NIBRS requirements. Dissemination of MPR: local

commanders and supervisors, U.S. Army Crime

Records Center, other. No requirement to report to

HQDA.

Oct 85

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Sep 93

AR 195-2, Criminal

Investigation

Activities

Describes the investigative authority of the U.S. Army

and provides guidelines for determining if an Army

interest exists in a given criminal offense.

Oct 90 AR 210-1, Private

Organizations on

Department of the

Army Installations

and Official

2-5. PO [Private Organization] employment and membership practices

a. POs will not be allowed to operate on DA installations if their employment

practices discriminate based on-

(1) Sex, age, religion, race, color, national origin, or marital status.

(2) Lawful political affiliation.

(3) Labor organization membership.
166

Participation in

Private

Organizations

(4) Physical handicaps.

b. POs will not discriminate in membership on the basis of race, color, sex,

national origin, or religion.

c. The installation commander may approve the operation of certain POs

that restrict membership to one sex. One or more of the following must apply-

(1) The PO’s purpose is philanthropic and, by tradition, its membership has

been of one sex.

(2) The PO’s purpose and function is to benefit one sex, and its membership

is composed of that sex. (Examples are scouting organizations or women’s and

men’s sports associations.)

(3) The PO has a specific purpose and function that restricts membership to

one sex, but also has a counterpart organization with the same purpose and

function. (Examples are women’s and men’s sports clubs, women’s and men’s

civic associations, and boy and girl scouting organizations.)

May 90 AR 210-50,

Housing

Management

1-14. General policies

f. Housing will be provided on a non-discriminatory, equal opportunity basis

regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, gender, age, or disability.

Chapter 6 Housing Referral Service

Section III Housing Discrimination Complaints [discusses equal

opportunity in off-post housing program].

Sep 95 AR 215-1,

Nonappropriated

Fund

Instrumentalities

and Morale,

Welfare, and

Recreation

Activities

7-33. Nondiscrimation

MWR activities do not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,

age, national origin, marital status, political affiliation, or physical handicap. A

NAFI may not be affiliated by membership, dues or non-dues paying, with any

private sector recreational, trade, or professional association that practices

discrimination in any form. No MWR facility or activity will be made available to

any organization that practices discrimination nor will any NAFI use the land,

facilities, or services of such organizations.

8-11. Entertainment, commercial

Performers, shows, or acts that are known to have given offense to any

racial, ethnic, or religious group, or entertainers who are attired in a manner that

may offend members of the audience are not booked. Female topless and

female and male bottomless entertainment is prohibited.

Jul 85 AR 340-21, The

Army Privacy

Program

1-5. Policy

b. Collect only the personal information about an individual that is legally

authorized and necessary to support Army operations. Disclose this information

only as authorized by the Privacy Act and this regulation.

3-2. Blanket routine use disclosure

c. Disclosure of requested information. If the information is relevant and

necessary to the requesting agency’s decision, a record may be disclosed to a

Federal agency in response to its request in connection with-
167

(1) Hiring or retention of an employee.

(2) Issuance of a security clearance.

(3) Reporting of an investigation of an employee.

4-5. First amendment rights

No record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the

first amendment will be kept unless expressly authorized by Federal statute, by

the subject individual, or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an

authorized law enforcement activity. Exercise of these rights includes, but is not

limited to, religious and political beliefs, freedom of speech and the press, and

the right of assembly and to petition.

Aug 81

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Aug 83

AR 350-1, Army

Training

4-6. CMT [Common military training] categories

a. Program (P). Program training applies to the majority of soldiers and is

conducted in a structured manner as follows:

(1) [T]raining base (resident training) is conducted in accordance with an

approved Program of Instruction.

(2) [T]raining in units is conducted on a continuing or cyclical basis.

c. Refresher ( R). Refresher training is used when periodic or recurring

emphasis is required. This type of training depends on the local situation and

the commander’s assessment of need. In some instances, refresher training is

needed to reinforce or review important skills or knowledge acquired during

initial entry training. In other cases, it is training designed to support unit

cohesion, discipline, and morale. Refresher training frequency is left to the

commander’s discretion.

e. Awareness (A). Awareness training can be accomplished by briefings or

orientations. . . . How and when this training is conducted is discretionary and

depends on the commander’s evaluation of need.

Table 4-1 Common Military Training

Subject AR Proponent Enlisted Officer

Equal Opportunity 600-21 DCSPER R R

Moral & Ethics Dev. 600-30 CC A A

Guidance differs from AR 600-20. AR 600-20

requires unit EO training twice a year. AR 350-1

leaves frequency of EO training up to the

commander.

Program training in schools.

Awareness training in schools.

Mar 93 AR 350-41,

Training in Units

B-3. CMT codes and examples

b.(1) Program (P) training code. Program training applies to the majority of

soldiers and is conducted in a structured manner as follows:

(a) [T]raining in schools is programmed.

(b) [T]raining in units is conducted on a continuing or cyclical basis.

(9) Refresher ( R) training code. Refresher training is used when periodic or

recurring emphasis is required. . . . In other cases, refresher training is designed

to support unit cohesion, discipline and morale. The lack of any of these three

factors can adversely affect the command climate and unit readiness and,

therefore, mission accomplishment. . . . Refresher training frequency is left to

the commander’s discretion.

(11) Awareness (A) training code. Awareness training . . . can be

Guidance differs from AR 600-20. AR 600-20

requires unit EO training twice a year. AR 350-41

requires refresher training on EO and sexual

harassment, but leaves frequency of training up to

the commander.
168

accomplished by briefings or orientations. . . . How and when this training is

conducted is discretionary and depends on the commander’s evaluation of need.

Table B-1 Common military training in units

Subject AR Proponent Enlisted Officer

EO/Sex Harass 600-20 DCSPER R R

Legend

R--Refresher

Table B-2 Common training in Army Schools

Subject AR B A P Bn An S F Ob Oa C

Cg

EO/Sex Harass 600-20 P P P P P P A A A A

Standards of Conduct 600-50 P R R P R

Legend

B--BCT/OSUT, A--AIT/OSUT, P--PLDC, Bn--BNCOC, An--ANCOC, S--SMC,

F--Functional, Ob--OBC/WOCS, Oa--OAC/SWOT, C--CAS3 , Cg--CGSC/MWOT

Oct 89 AR 360-81,

Command

Information

Program

2-12.l.(2) The masthead for CE [civilian enterprise] publications that have

advertising will also contain the following statements:

(a) “Everything advertised in this publication shall be made available for

purchase, use or patronage without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national

origin, age, marital status, physical handicap, political affiliation, or any other

non merit factor of the purchaser, user or patron.”

Jul 95 AR 600-8-24,

Officer Transfers

and Discharges

Chapter 4 Eliminations

4-1. Overview

c. An officer who has his or her security clearance withdrawn or withheld due

to unfavorable information regarding loyalty, subversion, or security may be

processed for involuntary separation according to AR 604-10.

4-2. Reasons for Elimination

While not all inclusive, when one of the following or similar conditions exist,

elimination action may be or will be initiated as indicated below fora. Substandard performance of duty.

b. Misconduct, moral or professional dereliction, or in the interest of national

security.

(5) Acts of personal misconduct (including but not limited to acts committed

while in a drunken or drug intoxicated state).

(8) Conduct unbecoming an officer.

(13) Failure to respond in a reasonable length of time to rehabilitative efforts

regarding repeated acts of child/spouse maltreatment or abuse and/or acts of

family violence.

Mar 92 AR 600-13, Army

Policy for the

Assignment of

Female Soldiers

1-12. Overall policy for the female soldier

a. The Army’s assignment policy for female soldiers allows women to serve

in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties,

positions, or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine
169

mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocate routinely with units

assigned a direct combat mission.

c. Female soldiers will be provided full and equal opportunity to pursue

careers in the military and will be assigned to all skills and positions according to

the above policy.

2-2.b. The following two codes will be used to classify positions:

(1) P1 will indicate those positions to which women may not be assigned.

(2) P2 (open to women) will be used for all other positions.

2-3.b. Procedures for classifying positions under DCPC [Direct Combat

Position Coding] will be accomplished as follows.

(1) Positions will be coded closed (P1) only if-

(a) The specialty or position requires routine engagement in direct combat.

(b) The position is in a battalion or smaller size unit that has a mission of

routine engagement in direct combat.

(c) The position is in a unit that routinely collocates with battalion or smaller

size units assigned a mission to engage in direct combat.

(d) The position is in a portion of a unit that routinely collocates with a

battalion or smaller size unit having a direct combat mission.

(2) Positions will be coded open (P2) if they do not meet the criteria of a

closed (P1) position as defined above.

Mar 88

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Sep 93

AR 600-20, Army

Command Policy

2-1. Chain of Command

b. Commanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails

to do.

d. Soldiers have a responsibility to ensure their unit commander is made

aware of problems which affect the discipline, morale, and effectiveness of the

unit.

4-4. Soldier Conduct

a. Ensuring the proper conduct of soldiers is a function of command.

Commanders rely upon all leaders in the Army, whether they are on or off duty

or in a leave status, to-

(2) Take action against military personnel in any case where the soldier’s

conduct violates good order and military discipline.

6-3. Equal opportunity policy

6-3.a.(2) Extends to soldiers, civilian employees, and their families.

b. The following are exceptions to a totally nonbiased personnel

management process:

(1) The assignment and utilization of female soldiers. (AR 600-13, Army

Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers, prescribes policies, procedures,

responsibilities, and the position coding system for female soldiers.)

(2) Support for established equal opportunity goals, such as to increase

representation of a particular group in one or more monitored area(s) of

affirmative action plans.

Undergoing revision.
170

6-5. Chain of command responsibilities

The chain of command, whether military or civilian, has the primary

responsibility for developing and sustaining a healthy EO climate. This

responsibility entails, but is not limited to, promoting positive programs that

enhance unit cohesion, esprit, and morale; communicating matters with EO

significance to unit personnel and higher headquarters; correcting discriminatory

practices by conducting rapid, objective, and impartial inquiries to resolve

complaints of discrimination; encouraging the surfacing of problems and

preventing reprisal for those who complain; and taking appropriate action

against those who violate Army policy.

6-6. Staffing

6-6.c. The principal EOA will have direct access to the supported

commander at all times and that commander will be either the EOA’s rater or

senior rater.

6-6.e. Roles and duties of EOAs.

(11) Receiving and assisting in processing individual complaints of

discrimination and sexual harassment.

6-8. Procedures for processing complaints of discrimination

a. Individual rights. Soldiers and their family members have the right to--

(1) Present a complaint to the command without fear of intimidation,

reprisal, or harassment;

(2) Communicate with the commander concerning their complaints;

b. Individual responsibilities. Individuals have the responsibility to --

(1) Attempt to resolve a complaint by first informing the alleged offender that

the behavior must stop. (Depending upon the severity of the offense, this may

not always be plausible);

(2) Advise the command of the specifics of sexual harassment and

discrimination complaints and provide the command an opportunity to take

appropriate action to rectify/resolve the issue; and

(3) Submit only legitimate complaints and exercise caution against

unfounded or reckless charges.

c.(1) Informal complaints.

c.(2) Formal complaints.

6-8.f.(2) The unit commander will conduct an inquiry to determine if

sufficient evidence exists to warrant a full investigation. . . . Should such

evidence exist, the commander must refer the case to the battalion- or brigadelevel commander for the appointment of an AR 15-6 investigating officer.

(3) The EOA will review and comment on the findings of the investigation to

ensure compliance with DoD/DA policies and objectives.

h. An EOA’s skills in complaint handling and conflict resolution and training

in the subtleties of discrimination and sexual harassment enable him or her to

advise the commander or any investigating officer.

Dec 86 AR 600-37, Chapter 3 Unfavorable Information in Official Personnel Files
171

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Oct 94

Unfavorable

Information

3-4. Filing of nonpunitive administrative letters of reprimand,

admonition, or censure in official personnel files

Sep 93 AR 600-100, Army

Leadership

1-8.a.(4) Integrity. This is the thread woven through the fabric of the

professional Army ethic. Integrity means honesty, uprightness, the avoidance of

deception and steadfast adherence to standards of behavior.

Chapter 2 Responsibilities

2-1. General

a. All leaders are responsible for:

(1) Accomplishing the unit’s mission.

(2) Ensuring subordinates welfare to include physical, moral, personal, and

professional well-being.

(4) Setting and exemplifying the highest professional and ethical standards.

(13) Treating subordinates with dignity, respect, fairness and consistency.

b.(2) Senior level leaders promote Army values by establishing and

maintaining the command climate of their organizations through sound, ethical

organizational policies and practices. . . . Senior leaders must consider

individual perceptions and their effects in establishing and maintaining a healthy

command climate.

b.(3) Leaders at the direct level affect values and behavior by establishing

day-to-day procedures, practices and working norms, by their personal example,

and by building discipline, cohesion, motivation, consistency, and fair play. . . .

The values leaders personally practice have a major impact in determining unit

and organizational value systems.

Jul 84

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Sep 90

AR 600-200,

Enlisted Personnel

Management

System

Chapter 7 Section II Advancement to Pay Grades E-2, E-3, E-4

7-13.i. [B]oards may only be used for soldiers who need a time in service

waiver.

(2) The board will include voting members of minority ethnic groups. The

board will also include at least one voting member of the same sex as those

being considered, if available.

Section III Promotion to Pay Grades E-5 and E-6

7-19.a.(5) [T]he board will be comprised of at least one voting member of

the same sex as those being considered.

(6) [W]ill appoint members of minority ethnic groups . . . even though the

board may not be considering soldiers of minority ethnic groups. No specific

number or ratio of these soldiers will be on any given board; however, the board

will not be comprised of all minority ethnic group members.

Section IV Promotion to Pay Grades E-7, E-8, E-9

7-38. Selection boards

a. Composition. . . . Female officers and enlisted women will be routinely

appointed to serve as members of the board. . . . Minority ethnic group

representation will be routinely provided.

Mar 92 AR 601-1, 2-4. Selection criteria
172

Assignment of

Enlisted Personnel

to the U. S. Army

Recruiting

Command

a. To qualify for selection as a U.S. Army recruiter, either as a volunteer or

as a DA selected recruiter, a soldier must-

(20) Never have had action taken (including proceedings under the

provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice) . . . by any authority

for-

(b) Any offense that involves moral turpitude, regardless of sentence

received. (No waiver authorized.)

Feb 95 AR 601-210,

Regular Army and

Army Reserve

Enlistment Program

2-10. Moral and administrative criteria

a. Applicant Interview. Recruiter will interview applicant on any records of

arrest, charges, juvenile court adjudications, traffic violations, probation periods,

dismissed or pending charges or convictions.

(1) If applicant claims none, processing may continue without a police

records check.

(3) If applicant admits to an offense, or recruiter has reasons to suspect

applicant may be concealing a record, start police records check procedures.

b. Police Clearance.

e. Delay of police reply. If reply from police authorities is not received within

21 days, a copy of the DD Form 369 request will be forwarded to the [battalion]

whose area includes the city in question. [Battalion] commander will exert every

effort to obtain police clearance and return results to requesting recruiting

station. If efforts to obtain information fail, process allegation as self-admitted

offense.

i. Police records check not required. If law enforcement agency states, in

writing, that it will not provide information or that a fee is required and copy of

that statement is maintained in recruiting battalions, police records check will not

be required. DD Form 369 will contain reference to that written statement. The

form will be forwarded with enlistment packet.

4-24. Nonwaiver medical, moral, and administrative disqualifications

The following are disqualifications that cannot be waived:

c. Questionable moral character.

f. Sexual perversion.

h. History of antisocial behavior.

Chapter 6 MEPs Processing Phase

Section II Guidance Counselor Processing Phase

6-5.c. Specifically, question applicant on existence of juvenile and youthful

offender records. Explains thoroughly to each applicant the Army policy that

adjudication as a youthful offender or juvenile delinquent by a State, or

disposition by Federal juvenile authorities, will not prevent enlistment if applicant

is otherwise eligible.

Apr 86 AR 601-270,

Military Entrance

Processing Station

Chapter 6 Operating Procedures

6-5. MEPS preenlistment interview

MEPS will interview applicants (before the Oath of Enlistment is
173

(MEPS) administered) for the purpose of assisting recruiting activities. . . . Any additional

information obtained from applicants which may have a bearing on their

qualification for military service will be furnished to the appropriate MEPS

examining officer . . . for resolution. Specific interview requirements and

procedures will be established by the Commander, USMEPCOM, in coordination

with recruiting Service commanders.

Chapter 9 Processing of Selective Service System Registrants

Note: This chapter will be implemented upon direction of Headquarters,

Department of the Army.

9-15. Initial Screening

Registrants are unacceptable when their record of convictions or adverse

juvenile adjudications reflects frequent difficulties with law enforcement

agencies, criminal tendencies, a history of antisocial behavior, alcoholism, drug

abuse, sexual misconduct, or questionable moral character.

Sep 95 AR 601-280, Army

Retention Program

1-8. Authority to act on retention actions

f. In those cases where a soldier is fully qualified for retention but his

commander believes it is not in the best interest of the Army for the soldier to

continue to serve (but a Bar to Reenlistment is not warranted), the commander

may forward the soldier’s request for reenlistment or extension through

command channels to the first Colonel or higher in the soldier’s chain of

command. . . . If denial of the requested action is supported, the commander will

provide his or her comments, attached as an endorsement . . . through the

servicing senior Career Counselor to the Commander, PERSCOM. . . . The

Commander, PERSCOM, may, on a case-by-case basis, deny reenlistment

and/or extension to any soldier who does not have a statutory entitlement to

reenlist. . . . Any commander who is a commissioned officer in the soldier’s

chain of command may stop the process for denial and approve the soldier’s

request.

3-9. Moral and Administrative Disqualifications

8-2. Standards for Reenlistment

a. Only soldiers of high moral character, personal competence, and

demonstrated adaptability to the requirements of the professional soldier’s moral

code will be reenlisted in the Active Army.

8-4. Criteria

d. Soldiers against whom a Bar to Reenlistment may be initiated.

(13) Cannot adapt to military life; uncooperative; involved in frequent

difficulties with fellow soldiers.

(15) Causes trouble in the civilian community.

(17) Personal behavior brings discredit upon his unit or the Army.

8-5. Procedures

a.(2) A Bar to Reenlistment should not be based on generalities,

approximate dates, vague places or time. It should be based on specific

incidents substantiated by official remarks made at the time of each occurrence.
174

The soldier should be counseled on each occurrence and told that all instances

are made matter of official record when acts considered unworthy of the U.S.

Army are performed.

Jun 95 AR 611-101,

Commissioned

Officer

Classification

System

1-14. Female officer designation/utilization

a. It is the current Army policy that female officers may be designated in any

branch or functional area except Infantry (11), Armor (12), Special Forces (18),

and all other AOCs except Cannon Field Artillery (13E) and SHORAD Artillery

(14B).

b. Female officers may be designated in all other branch and functional area

AOCs, but will not be assigned to positions coded with Direct Combat Position

Coding (DCPC) P1; for example, to Mechanized Infantry.

Jun 95 AR 611-201,

Career

Management Fields

and Military

Occupational

Specialty

1-11. Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) physical demands analysis

and ratings

f. Pending publication of an Army Regulation outlining proponent

responsibilities and methodology for assessing physical demands, the

procedures outlined in appendix G, Women in the Army Policy Review,

ODCSPER, DA 12 November 1982 will be used by proponents to prepare the . .

. (Physical Demands Analysis Worksheet).

Chapter 4 MOS, SQI and ASI Not Available to Women Soldiers

4-1. General

The Direct Combat Probability Coding Policy determines where women may

serve. Women may not serve in units or in positions in units that would routinely

require them to perform in direct combat.

4-2. MOS, SQI and ASI closed to women

The Army has recognized the high probability that soldiers classified in some

MOS and SQI will routinely engage in direct combat. Therefore, SQI “G”

Ranger,

SQI “V” Ranger-Parachutist, and the MOS listed in Table 4-1 are closed for

accession or reclassification of female soldiers.

Jul 84

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Sep 90

AR 614-200,

Selection of

Enlisted Soldiers

for Training and

Assignment

1-5.n. The direct combat probability coding (DCPC) policy determines

positions in which women may serve. Under DCPC women may not be

assigned to positions coded P1 on TO&E. The P1 positions have the highest

probability of routine participation in direct combat. DCPC of positions is visible

only on TO&E, male only. Identify codes on MTOE should correctly correlate to

P1 codes on TO&E. Women may be assigned to all other positions.

1-5.v. Soldiers will be given equal assignment opportunity without regard to

race, color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, or whether or not they

will be accompanied by their spouses. Martial status or the employment,

educational, or volunteer activities of the spouse will not be considered in the

selection of a soldier for PCS or duty assignments.

Chapter 8 Section II Drill Sergeant Program

8-17. Selection criteria
175

d. Have no record of emotional instability as determined by screening of

health records.

g. Have no record of disciplinary action . . . during current enlistment or in

last 3 years, whichever is longer.

8-20. Relief form drill sergeant candidate status or drill sergeant

duties.

a.(1) Failure to maintain high standards of military appearance, military

courtesy, bearing, conduct, and/or professionalism.

a.(3) Infractions of training policies or violations of the UCMJ.

k. When a serious incident occurs that requires an investigation to clarify the

issues, commanders will relieve the drill sergeant from assigned duties and

temporarily suspend special duty assignment pay, pending completion of the

investigation. Mere occurrence of an incident or the conduct of an investigation

is not intended to be a basis for relief from the program.

Jul 84

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Jun 96

AR 635-200,

Enlisted Personnel

Chapter 1 General Provisions

1-1. Purpose and scope

b. The separation policies in this regulation promote the readiness of the

Army by providing an orderly means to-

(1) Judge the suitability of persons to serve in the Army on the basis of their

conduct and their ability to meet required standards of duty performance and

discipline.

Chapter 13 Separation for Unsatisfactory Performance

13-2. Criteria

a. Commanders will separate a soldier for unsatisfactory performance when

it is clearly established that-

(3) The seriousness of the circumstances is such that the soldier’s retention

would have an adverse impact on military discipline, good order, and morale,

and

(4) It is likely that the soldier will be a disruptive influence in present or

future duty assignments, and

(5) It is likely that the circumstances forming the basis for initiation of

separation proceedings will continue or recur, and

(6) The ability of the soldier to perform duties effectively in the future,

including potential for advancement or leadership, is unlikely.

Chapter 14 Section III Acts or Patterns of Misconduct

14-12.b. A pattern of misconduct.

(2) Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. Discreditable conduct

and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline includes conduct violative of

the accepted standards of personal conduct found in the UCMJ, Army

regulations, the civil law, and time-honored customs and traditions of the Army.

Sep 92 AR 670-1, Wear

and Appearance of

1-7. Personal appearance policies

a. General. The Army is a uniformed service where discipline is judged, in
176

Army Uniforms and

Insignia

part, by the manner in which the individual wears the uniform as prescribed.

26-28. Umbrellas, black (female only)

c. How worn. Female personnel may carry an umbrella when wearing the

service, dress, and mess uniforms. The umbrella may not be carried when

wearing field or utility uniforms.

Dec 86 DA Pam 165-15,

Moral Leadership/

Values:

Responsibility and

Loyalty

2-18.a. Moral ownership has become an integral part of the life of our

soldiers. Each and every soldier is charged with this obligation. A lack of this

attribute causes unit and personal disintegration.

Aug 93

w/ c1

Jun 94

DA Pam 350-20,

Unit Equal

Opportunity

Training Guide

Lesson plans include: The Army’s Equal Opportunity Program, Duties and

Responsibilities of Equal Opportunity Leaders, Cultural Issues Related to Equal

Opportunity, Prevention of Sexual Harassment, Discrimination, Uniform Code of

Military Justice Implications of the Equal Opportunity Program, Enforcement of

Equal Opportunity Policies, Implementation of the Equal Opportunity Program,

Leadership Issues Related to Cultural Diversity, Techniques for Equal

Opportunity Assessment, Equal Opportunity Action Plan, The Affirmative Action

Plan, Techniques for Equal Opportunity Training, Identification of Current Army

Equal Opportunity Issues, Techniques to Champion the Equal Opportunity

Program.

Lesson Plan 14 Identification of Current Army Equal Opportunity Issues

Racial and cultural differences

Sexual harassment

Women in military service

Proponent to revise this guide after release of new

AR 600-20. This publication provides unit leaders

with standardized lesson plans for a variety of EO

subjects.

Oct 94 DA Pam 350-58,

Leader

Development for

America’s Army,

The Enduring

Legacy

Behavior refers to actions or reactions to specific situations based on

attitude, beliefs, and values. Unlike attitudes, behavior is easily measured and

influenced through positive and negative reinforcement. (p. 3)

May 90 DA Pam 600-26,

Department of the

Army Affirmative

Action Plan

1-4. Objective

a. The thrust of the Army EO Program continues to be, “to firmly embed the

equal opportunity function within the Army’s leadership framework.” Fairness,

justice, and equity for all soldiers, regardless of race, color, ethnicity, gender, or

religion are obligations of leadership and functions of command.

c. The AAP must direct affirmative actions in support of Army policy that will

provide equal opportunity and treatment for all soldiers regardless of race, color,

gender, religion, or national origin. It must reflect the high priority afforded these

important tasks and the commitment of the Army to achieve its objective.

Dec 93 DA Pam 600-35,

Relationships

Between Soldiers

1-1. Purpose. This pamphlet explains the policy on soldier relationships

contained in AR 600-200, paragraphs 4-14 through 4-16.

1-4.c. Professional soldiers consider some relationships, like social
177

of Different Ranks relationships in a training environment or involving the chain of command, as

having so much potential for abuse or having such a damaging effect on morale

or discipline that these are consistently held to be improper.

e. The current policy was first published as a change to AR 600-20, in 1978.

The Women’s Army Corps disbanded and female soldiers were integrated into

the Army in greater numbers, serving in positions not previously filled by women.

Women began to associate with their male counterparts in integrated units.

Female soldiers often no longer had direct tutelage, mentoring and disciplining

by senior women officers and noncommissioned officers. The manner in which

relationships between male and female soldiers had been regulated changed.

1-5.b. Soldiers must remain aware that relationships between soldiers of

different rank may lead to perceptions of favoritism or influence. The

appearance of impropriety can be as damaging to morale and discipline as

actual misconduct.

Apr 85 DA Pam 600-50,

White Paper,

“Leadership Makes

the Difference”

Caring means much more than a cursory interest in others. It means sincere

involvement in helping to find solutions to problems and improving welfare.

Caring means setting examples of moral and professional excellence in order to

inspire the subordinate to new heights. It means talking with and listening to

subordinates, not simply talking at them; doing something about hardships or

problems, not paying lip service to them; teaching individuals by counseling, not

by abusing them. Caring means fostering a command climate where people are

challenged, where they feel their contributions make a difference, and where

they feel good about themselves and the Army they serve. Caring and leading

go together. You can’t have one without the other! (p. 8)

Jul 86 DA Pam 600-66-

85, Leadership in

Action

Oct 86 DA Pam 600-69,

Unit Climate Profile

Commander’s

Handbook

Jun 87 DA Pam 600-80,

Executive

Leadership

The young people who join the Army and each of the other Services come

with their own hopes and expectations. The commitment of a human resources

program is to these young people, but it is also to their parents, families, and

communities. These young people are the nation’s most valuable resource for

the future. Their service may span a single enlistment or an entire career. If,

during that time, they learn fairness and justice, if their experience has led to

growth in skills and maturity -- then the Army will have fulfilled a most important

obligation to society. This is a contribution to nation-building in the truest sense,

and is fundamental to defending the Constitution -- not by arms alone.

The Army’s current leaders have focused attention on this obligation in the

stated values of recruiting themes. Society’s view of whether or not the
178

obligation is fulfilled will be determined, in large part, by the perceptions of

“reality” at the operating level, as seen by serving sons and daughters. (pp. 43-

44)

Jul 90 FM 22-100, Military

Leadership

Leaders must guard against the natural peacetime tendency to use “efficient”

centralized methods of training and “zero defects” approaches to day-to-day

operations. (p. vii)

As a leader, you are responsible for understanding and directly transmitting

the Army’s values to your soldiers. . . . Since the Army’s purpose is to protect

the nation and its values, the Army’s ethic must be consistent with national will

and values. (p. 22)

Beliefs are assumptions or convictions you hold as true about some thing,

concept, or person. (p. 22)

Values are attitudes about the worth or importance of people, concepts, or

things. (p. 23)

Norms are the rules or laws normally based on agreed-upon beliefs and

values that members of a group follow to live in harmony. (p. 24)

Jun 85 FM 22-101,

Leadership

Counseling

Mar 87 FM 22-102, Soldier

Team Development

A mature soldier develops physically, socially, emotionally, and spiritually.

Physical fitness and development provide the stamina necessary for sustained

action and intense stress. Social maturity provides the willingness to work with

others in cohesive teams. Emotional maturity gives stability to deal with the

stress of combat. Spiritual maturity gives the soldier hope and purpose to face

the dangers and uncertainty of combat. (p. 3)

Research has shown that during IET, values that enhance teamwork become

more important while values that reflect individual accomplishment become less

important. IET begins to instill team values, and the process continues as the

soldier moves from unit to unit. (p. 18)

Teaching such values is not an attempt to drastically change the soldier. . . .

If soldiers are going to become productive team members, they must begin to

share the values that enhance team performance. (pp. 18-19)

These values will become the standards of the unit. Standards are those

principles or rules by which behaviors and tasks are measured as successfully

accomplished. . . . Soldiers will measure other soldiers by it. It gradually

becomes a criterion for acceptance into the team. (p. 19)

When members of a squad, section, or platoon share these values and

adhere to the standards that flow from them, they are a more cohesive team. (p.

19)

Jun 87 FM 22-103,

Leadership and
179

Command at

Senior Levels

Jun 94 FM 100-1, The

Army

The Army Ethos

The Army ethos, the guiding beliefs, standards and ideals that characterize

and motivate the Army, is succinctly described in one word--DUTY. Duty is

behavior required by moral obligation, demanded by custom, or enjoined by

feelings of rightness. . . . It requires the impartial administration of standards

without regard to friendship, personality, rank, or other bias. (pp. 5-7)

Compassion is basic respect for the dignity of each individual; treating all

with dignity and respect. It is the personification of the “Golden Rule,” treat

others as you want them to treat you. (p. 9)

The American Soldier

American soldiers come from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. Upon

entering the military service, they are called upon to adapt their individual values

to those of the military profession. (p. 10)

Oct 94 STP 21-1-SMCT,

Soldier’s Manual of

Common Tasks,

Skill Level 1

Oct 92 STP 21-24-SMCT,

Soldier’s Manual of

Common Tasks,

Skill Levels 2-4

May 90 STP 21-I-MQS,

Military Qualification

Standards I, Manual

of Common Tasks

(Precommissioning

Requirements)

Jan 91 STP 21-II-MQS,

Military

Qualification

Standards II,

Manual of Common

Tasks for

Lieutenants and

Captains

Lieutenants

Leadership

S1-9001.10-0002 Explain the Professional Army Ethic

Standards. Describe the process of internalizing values.

Description.

1. Compliance with a specific value occurs when a soldier behaves in a

particular manner based solely on anticipated reward or punishment.

Compliance requires the actual or imminent presence of the leader. The

statement, “I don’t cheat because I may get caught,” is an example of

compliance.

2. Identification with a value set occurs when a soldier acts in accordance

with the value set of the group in order to become a full member of the group
180

rather than to avoid punishment. The statement, “I will not cheat on the rifle

range because 1st Platoon does not cheat on the rifle range and I am a member

of 1st Platoon,” reflects a group value a soldier adheres to in order to be an

accepted member.

3. Internalization occurs when a soldier adopts the group’s value set as his

own. The soldier believes in the values and acts accordingly in any

circumstance. The soldier’s behavior persists regardless of the situation. “I

don’t cheat because it is wrong to cheat,” is an example of internalization.

Soldier and Unit Support System

S3-0010.00-0014 Implement Equal Opportunity at Unit Level

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Action 1. Describe the purpose, policy, procedures, and key terms

associated with the EO program and sexual harassment (SH) at the unit level.

Action 2. Identify the legal implications of adverse EO behavior as a person

or leader.

Action 3. Analyze situations with indicators of positive and negative EO and

SH behavior. Recommend platoon and equivalent level actions.

Jun 93 STP 21-III-MQS,

Military Qualification

Standards III,

Leader

Development

Manual for Majors

and Lieutenant

Colonels

May 86 TC 22-9-1, Leader

Development

Program, Military

Professionalism

(Platoon/Squad

Instruction)

Chapters include Professional Commitment, Honesty in the Military,

Physical and Moral Courage, Professional Competence, Rules of War.

Army leaders must not only be technically and tactically competent, they

must commit themselves to the highest standards of ethical conduct. They must

understand the values of the professional soldier and model them in their daily

lives. Only in this way will they earn the trust, confidence, and respect of their

subordinates and fellow soldiers. (p. iii).

Military ethics.

Teaches Army standards and values.

May 86 TC 22-9-2, Leader

Development

Program, Military

Professionalism

(Company/Battery

Instruction)

Chapters include Introduction to Military Professional Ethics, Ethical

Reasoning, Ethical Behavior in War, Leadership, and Command Climate.

Every organization . . . has only a finite amount of energy to expend to

accomplish its mission. That energy can be wasted or enhanced. In a unit with

a positive healthy climate, that energy is, or can be, more than the sum total of

the energy of its members. . . . But the energy of an organization can be wasted

as well. If you are forced to expend energy looking over your shoulder,

preparing to cover yourself for some inspection, building a wall of numbers and

statistics to look good, you will have little energy left to teach your soldiers, be

innovative, or accomplish your mission. (pp. 60-61)

Military ethics

Teaches Army standards and values.
181

May 86 TC 22-9-3, Leader

Development

Program, Military

Professionalism

(Battalion

Instruction)

Chapters include Loyalty and Professional Commitment, Integrity and

Personal Responsibility, Institutional Pressures, Command Climate.

Many of our ethical conflicts in peacetime occur because we have some

members of the profession who forget that the real test occurs on the battlefield.

Everything we do must be geared to preparing for combat. And that includes

our ethics. . . . Our values of fairness and of concern for the individual are

supported by our national values, but they also contribute to unit loyalty and

cohesiveness. Military values originate and command our adherence primarily

because they are useful. They create standards of behavior that members of a

professional Army need if we are to fight and win. . . . And that is the only reason

we are here.

Military ethics.

Teaches Army standards and values.

Oct 94 TC 26-6,

Commander’s

Equal Opportunity

Handbook

Chapter 1: The Army’s Equal Opportunity Program

Effective human relations and equal opportunity are both moral and

operational imperatives for our Army. Just as a poor safety program will

threaten a unit’s readiness, so too will real or perceived acts of unequal

treatment. . . . The chain of command’s challenge is to provide effective

leadership which promotes a command climate that fosters equal opportunity to

enhance unit cohesion and mission accomplishment. . . . People who work in an

atmosphere free of dissension and sexual harassment, and one containing a

strong sense of equal opportunity, are more productive and team oriented. . . . A

healthy EO environment is a key factor in developing readiness. Army readiness

begins with people. The advanced technology and modernization efforts would

fail if leaders lost the sincere and dynamic commitment to the total well-being of

the Army Family. (p. 1-1)

Chapter 2: Equal Opportunity Duties of Unit Leaders

The Army’s Equal Opportunity program requires a team effort. To make the

program effective, the unit commander and other unit leaders must take a

positive, proactive approach in carrying out their EO duties and responsibilities.

(p. 2-1)

Commanders are strongly encouraged to conduct a unit climate and needs

assessment within 90 days of assuming command and once annually thereafter.

The assessments should have three objectives. The first objective should

provide you with an assessment of how well your unit has implemented the

Army's EO program. The second objective of the assessment area will provide

you with information on your soldier's perceptions about EO, gender, sexual

harassment, and other human relation concerns. Finally, you should be able to

ascertain and identify the direction and scope of future training to include topic

areas and target audiences. (p. 2-2)

As a commander you are responsible for ensuring that soldiers under your

command receive EO training at least twice a year. EO training should be

incorporated as part of the unit's overall training plan. Whenever possible EO

issues should be integrated with other appropriate subject areas. EO training
182

will be documented on the unit's training schedule and on a memorandum which

contains the names of instructors or facilitators who conducted the training,

roster of attendees, date, time, and length of session, and major topics covered

in the session. Commanders at brigade level and above are required to provide

EO training for senior NCOs, field grade officers, and senior DA civilians. (p. 2-

3)

EO training, just like other unit training, should be planned and presented as

an integral part of the unit's training program. From time to time a commander

may conduct EO training in response to a unit incident. However, if the incident

was isolated or its severity affected only a few unit members, then the timing

may not be right for everyone to receive training. If timing for the training is not

considered, it may only be perceived as a form of mass punishment. (p. 2-5)

Chapter 3: Leadership Issues Related to Cultural Diversity

Chapter 4: Prevention of Sexual Harassment

Chapter 5: Equal Opportunity Complaint Process

Chapter 6: Equal Opportunity Climate Assessment

Chapter 7: Intervention and Action Planning

Dec 88 TC 26-10, The

Leader Transition

Preface. When an organization, unit, or staff section becomes aware of a

pending change of leadership, its overall efficiency may be reduced for as much

as three to six months. . . . The reduced efficiency may continue because

personnel are unable to anticipate the new leader’s priorities and plan for

activities that he [she] considers important.

No mention of command climate assessment.
183
184

ANNEX H

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) PROGRAM

Overview

The EEO Program, which covers Department of the Army (DA) civilian

employees, differs significantly from the equal opportunity (EO) program, which covers

military personnel. While philosophically the two programs share the same goals and

objectives, their policies and practices are different. The programs are guided by

separate laws and regulations, and the roles and mission of the equal opportunity

advisor (EOA) and the EEO officer differ with regard to the respective programs.

Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policies, directives, and regulations

outline the procedures and remedies for addressing discrimination and harassment

complaints by soldiers. On the other hand, the Army must conform with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations in implementing the civilian

complaints program. The EEOC is the federal agency with oversight responsibility and

enforcement activities relating to EEO for federal employees and applicants for

employment.

Complaints Process

Federal employees or applicants for employment who file complaints of

discrimination, to include sexual harassment complaints, must follow set procedures

with specified time limits. An employee’s first step in filing a complaint is to contact an

EEO counselor. The EEO counselor conducts an inquiry to obtain that information

necessary to reach an informal resolution of the person’s allegations.

If the complaint is not resolved, the EEO counselor is required to notify the

employee, in writing, of the right to file a formal complaint. The complainant may file a

formal written complaint with the EEO office. The agency may reject or dismiss a

complaint, in whole or in part; for example, a complaint may be rejected because it is

untimely, not within the purview of governing laws and regulations, is duplicative, or not

against the proper agency. If the agency rejects or dismisses the complaint in whole or

in part, the complainant may appeal immediately to the EEOC’s Office of Federal

Operations. If the complaint is accepted, in the Army, it is forwarded to the Office of

Complaints Investigation, a DoD agency, for investigation.

The complainant may request a final agency decision (FAD) based on the record

or, in some cases, request a hearing and recommended decision from an EEOC

administrative judge (AJ). The agency may accept, reject, or modify the findings and

conclusions of the AJ in issuing its FAD. The complainant has the right to appeal the
185

FAD to the EEOC or to file a civil action in federal court. Soldiers who are not satisfied

with the Army’s handling of an EO complaint have no such legally protected right to a

review by federal court.

If the Army or EEOC finds that a civilian employee was the subject of unlawful

discrimination, then the complainant is “made whole.” That is, the complainant must be

placed in as good a position as he or she would have been in the absence of

discrimination. Remedial actions include such things as nondiscriminatory placement,

back pay, fees and costs, and compensatory damages.

EEO Officers

EEO officers are responsible for advising the commander on all matters relating

to EEO. They develop, coordinate, and evaluate the affirmative action programs for

minorities and women and special emphasis programs; manage and operate the

complaints system; supervise and train EEO office staff and counselors; and conduct

training for the work force.

EEO Training

Equal employment opportunity is included in the supervisory training required for

new supervisors, both military and civilian, of civilian employees. The training consists

of a supervisory development correspondence course and the on-site Leadership

Education and Development Course (LEAD). The supervisory development course

includes instruction on a supervisor’s responsibilities in EEO, complaints processing,

and civilian personnel management.

At the installation level, training for managers and supervisors may include

affirmative employment responsibilities, the EEO complaints program, alternate dispute

resolution, diversity, and other EEO related topics. This on-site training is generally

conducted by the installation EEO officer or office staff. The quality of the training

provided varies by installation.

Prevention of Sexual Harassment Training

Army guidance is that there should be annual training in the prevention of sexual

harassment (POSH) for civilian employees and their supervisors, both military and

civilian. Training consists of a basic and a refresher course conducted at the local

level by course managers who have successfully completed a three-day certification

program.

The objectives of the course are to ensure that participants can identify sex role

stereotyping, define sex discrimination, define and recognize sexual harassment, state

the legal bases prohibiting sexual harassment, and identify potential situations and

recognize who has responsibility for dealing with the incident. Supervisors receive help
186

in counseling employees on required behavior standards. Employees learn avenues of

redress for dealing with sexual harassment and are given help in responding

assertively to inappropriate behavior.

SENIOR REVIEW PANEL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVILIAN WORK

FORCE

The Panel’s research efforts included only a limited sampling of DA civilians.

The Panel’s intent was to ascertain the perspective of civilian employees on the human

relations environment in the Active Army. Civilian employees participated in the study

through focus groups and individual interviews. A total of 1,007 civilian employees1

participated in civilian focus group sessions, and the Panel interviewed 20 civilian

managers and 34 EEO officers2.

As noted elsewhere in this report, based on the limited numbers of civilian

employees interviews and surveys conducted, the general conclusions expressed

herein should be viewed as areas of concern meriting further review and clarification by

the Army.

Focus Group Comments

While the Panel was principally concerned with sexual harassment in the Active

Army, civilian employees were asked whether they had witnessed or experienced

sexual harassment in the last 12 months, and whether they felt that they could report

any discrimination or harassment without fear of reprisal. Approximately one fifth of the

female responses and one tenth of the male responses indicated that they had

experienced sexual harassment. Almost one half of the focus group comments by both

men and women indicated that they would report sexual harassment. Only a few

women expressed a fear of reprisal; however, they said that would not dissuade them

from reporting sexual harassment.

In response to the question as to whether they had received POSH training in

the last 12 months, most male participants and many female participants indicated that

they had. Many of the comments from both men and women indicated that the training

was effective in helping them recognize sexually-harassing behavior.

Interview Comments

Interviews were conducted with civilian supervisors and managers at grade

levels GS-12 through GS-15. Questions included whether senior level management

support EEO; how the interview participants support EEO in their organizations; and

steps the participants take to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. Generally,

 

1

 The DA civilian population is approximately 200,000.

2

 The Army has 185 EEO officers.
187

the supervisors and managers said that senior level management at their particular

locations support EEO principles. When the participants were asked what steps they

themselves take to ensure that sexual harassment does not occur in their

organizations, they said that they talk with employees about the issue of sexual

harassment, hold meetings with subordinates to discuss Army policy, monitor the

workplace, and have modified their own behavior.

Of the thirty-three EEO officers and one EEO assistant interviewed, most believe

that both top management and lower-level managers and supervisors support EEO

principles. Most of the EEO officers said that they believe the chain of command at

their locations took quick corrective action to deal with sexual harassment and that the

action taken was effective.

Other Areas of Concern

♦ Misunderstanding and perceived double standards applied toward civilian

employees by military supervisors and peers.

Frequent focus group and individual interview comments from both men and

women concern relationships between civilian employees and military personnel,

especially military supervisors. The significant differences in the military and civilian

personnel systems are not always well understood by either military or civilian

personnel. As a result, these differences can become the basis for misunderstandings

and a perceived double standard in the treatment of military and civilian personnel. As

one focus group participant said, “Civilians are not viewed as equals. You could

answer the question, but they look for green suiters to ask instead.” Another

participant said, “There is partiality among the military. They tolerate more things from

military personnel than they would from civilians. You don’t feel part of the team.”

Many focus group participants expressed their perceptions that military supervisors

treat their military subordinates more favorably than similarly situated civilian

employees. If left unremedied, the general lack of communication and understanding

between civilian and military personnel has the potential to be a serious problem.

♦ Inadequate/insufficient training

Training of the civilian work force in the prevention of sexual harassment is not

being conducted in a timely manner at some locations nor is it being tracked to ensure

that supervisors and managers receive the training. Some civilian supervisors and

EEO personnel believe the training is required only when an employee changes jobs

and then only at the request of the first level supervisor. Few installations have a

mechanism to monitor and evaluate the training.

Supervisory training in its current form is not adequate for new supervisors and,

in many cases, military supervisors of civilian employees do not take the required

courses.
188

♦ Evaluation of EEO program and EEO climate.

Oversight of the EEO program is an important management function and must

be accomplished formally in order to ensure a proactive approach to the human

relations environment for the civilian work force. EEO program evaluation/review is

conducted in conjunction with regularly scheduled civilian personnel management

surveys or one-time special studies, EEO climate assessments, or inspector general

(IG) inspections.

Civilian personnel management surveys typically focus on work force profile,

management support and program administration, and advisory and communication

services. These core elements are designed to measure the effectiveness of

commanders, managers, supervisors, and EEO and other civilian personnel officials in

accomplishing their respective responsibilities for administering a local EEO program.

Information to evaluate the program is obtained from on-site visits and questionnaire

responses.

Whereas EEO climate assessments are usually conducted at the request of a

local commander, DAIG inspections are at the discretion of the Army leadership.

Although somewhat similar in scope to civilian personnel management surveys, climate

assessments are more focused on the perceptions of the work force. Employee

sensing sessions, questionnaires, and statistical and narrative reports are components

of this process. While these tools are available, their discretionary application has led

to their usage almost exclusively in reaction to a problem rather than as a preventive

tool.

♦ Some EEO offices are understaffed and/or staffed with personnel

inadequately trained in EEO.

Some EEO officers are not proactive in their EEO responsibilities nor are they

conducting proper internal evaluations of their programs. Reductions in EEO staff have

placed many EEO staffs in reactive modes as installations face downsizing, reductions

in force, consolidations, and base closures. Just as with the reduction of EOA

positions for the Active Army, similar reductions are taking their toll on some EEO

offices The Army must review its resourcing levels for EEO offices.

Conclusion

This is by no means a thorough review of EEO in the Army for the reasons

previously stated, and these observations need to be validated. They are, however,

concerns of the Panel and are thus included in this report. Headquarters, Department

or the Army should delve into these concerns to determine the best course of action for

each.
189

ANNEX I

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