November 12, 2020

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 1

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Testbed for 

Chinese Power Projection

Matthew Southerland, Former Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs

Will Green, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs

Sierra Janik, Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs

Key Findings

• In recent years, Beijing has increased security cooperation with Central Asian countries under the auspices 

of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to insulate itself from perceived threats in the region. 

Beijing is using the SCO to enhance its ability to project power beyond its borders.

• SCO military exercises offer a unique opportunity for the Chinese armed forces to practice air-ground 

combat operations in foreign countries, undertaking a range of operations including long-distance 

mobilization, counterterrorism missions, stability maintenance operations, and conventional warfare. 

• Beijing has used the SCO to gain experience establishing the diplomatic relationships and arrangements 

necessary to support power projection. Beijing is already using its diplomatic relationships to facilitate an 

active military presence in Central Asia, such as through its military outpost in Tajikistan and 

counterterrorism patrols in the China-Tajikistan-Afghanistan border area. Beijing may be able to replicate 

these diplomatic and military efforts and expand them to other parts of the globe in the future.

Introduction 

In 2001, Beijing established the SCO along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with 

the stated objectives of combatting terrorism and instability, promoting border security, strengthening political ties, 

and expanding economic cooperation.1 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in particular feared that separatist 

movements in the minority-dominated autonomous region of Xinjiang could find support in the newly independent 

Central Asian states.

2 To shore up control in those areas, it made combating the perceived threats of “terrorism, 

separatism[,] and extremism” a central calling of the new organization.

3 Since that time, the SCO has evolved into 

an organization Beijing views as increasingly critical to its security interests. China has used the organization to

extend its defensive perimeter into Central Asia, carrying out military exercises and developing key diplomatic

relationships that facilitate power projection. In recent years, Beijing has leveraged these ties to deploy its security 

forces into the region to patrol beyond China’s borders. In the future, the PLA is likely to build on its experience in

the SCO to extend its defensive perimeter elsewhere in Asia.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2

This issue brief examines Beijing’s efforts to use the SCO as a strategic platform to protect its interests at home and 

abroad. It then assesses the power projection capabilities China is developing through the SCO, including through 

active deployments of Chinese security forces in the region, diplomatic arrangements facilitating the transit and 

care of Chinese forces, and military exercises. The issue brief concludes with an analysis of the implications of 

these activities for the United States.

A Strategic Platform for Securing China’s Interests

China established the SCO along with Russia and the four Central Asian countries to expand engagement on a 

variety of issues and to protect against cross-border threats.

4 Central to Beijing’s motives were its fears of Central 

Asia becoming a conduit through which violence and unrest could spread to China, and particularly to its western

Xinjiang region, home to the Uyghur ethnic group.

5 Upon Beijing’s insistence, the SCO agreed from the beginning 

to oppose the so-called “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.6 Since that time, Beijing has come to 

view the organization as increasingly critical to its security interests.7 The group has also expanded its reach by

granting membership to both India and Pakistan in 2017 and establishing relationships with other countries and 

regional organizations. * 8 (See Figure 1 below for a map of SCO countries.)

Evolution of the SCO: Border Settlement to Comprehensive Regional Framework

In 1996, the governments of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan founded the Shanghai Five, 

the predecessor of the SCO, to decrease military tensions and resolve border disputes left over after the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union.† 9 On April 26, 1996, the five countries signed the Agreement on Confidence 

Building in the Military Field in the Border Area, which identified Russia and the three Central Asian states as a 

single “Joint Party” and China itself as the other party.10 The text of the agreement covered regulation of military 

activities along China’s borders, with the stated goal of promoting “good-neighborliness and friendship.”11 A 

second agreement in 1997 built upon the success of the first in strengthening mutual trust and laying a foundation 

for future cooperation.12

* Since its formation, the SCO has expanded to admit India and Pakistan as members (both joining in 2017) and to add four observer countries 

(Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia) and six dialogue partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey). 

Furthermore, Turkmenistan and members of multiple international organizations, such as ASEAN and the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) have attended SCO meetings as guests. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (上海合作

组织), May 2020. Translation. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_683094/jbqk_683096/t528036.shtml; 

Xinhua, Joint Communiqué of the 18th Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Members’ Heads of Government (Premier) 

Council ( 上海合作组织成员国政府首脑 ( 总 理 ) 理事会第十八次会议联合公报 ), November 3, 2019. 

Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-11/03/c_1125185470.htm; Xinhua, “Press Communiqué on the Meeting of the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Heads of State Council” (上海合作组织成员国元首理事会会议新闻公报), June 25, 2016. 

Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016-06/25/c_129088767.htm; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 406.

† Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and the newly independent Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan inherited portions 

of the highly militarized and unstable China-Soviet Union border, along with lingering disagreements over border demarcation that had 

helped fuel Sino-Soviet conflict. In 1992, the five countries launched nearly four years of talks to address the targeting of nuclear forces, 

reduction of troop levels, and joint demarcation for settlement of the new borders. Talks culminated in April 1996 with the signing of the 

so-called Shanghai Accord, a collection of 14 agreements on border issues. Among them, the Agreement on Confidence Building in the 

Military Field in the Border Area is cited as the formative agreement in the creation of the Shanghai Five and its successor, the SCO. 

Gregory Gleason, “Policy Dimensions of West Asian Borders after the Shanghai Accord,” Asian Perspective 25:1 (2001): 107–131, 107–

108, 112, 116–117; United Nations General Assembly, “Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the 

Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the 

Border Area,” April 26, 1996; Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 2015–2020. 

http://eng.sectsco.org/docs/about/faq.html. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 3

The creation of the SCO in 2001 marked both an expansion in membership and a broadening of the group’s focus. 

On June 15, 2001, the Shanghai Five extended membership to Uzbekistan, and representatives of all six countries 

signed the Declaration of the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 13 The inclusion of 

Uzbekistan, the first country in the group that did not share a land border with China, signified an expansion 

beyond early goals of border stabilization. The same day, members of the new SCO signed a convention on 

counterterrorism and anti-extremism, solidifying China’s concern with the so-called “three evil forces” as a 

priority for the new organization.14 Three months later, members further expanded the SCO’s area of focus with 

an agreement on economic cooperation.15 The SCO charter, signed in July 2002, reaffirmed the foundational 

principles of the 1996 and 1997 Shanghai Five agreements while establishing the “security and stability of the 

region” and multifaceted cooperation in defense, politics, economics, and law enforcement as new objectives.

16

Beijing’s early interests in the SCO were varied, with a particular emphasis on defense against perceived crossborder threats. Counterterrorism, which featured prominently in the SCO charter, was a central concern that 

Beijing considered crucial for stability in China’s western region.17 Other interests included enhanced military 

relations, access to economic growth opportunities and energy resources, and stronger political relationships with 

Central Asian states.18 Beijing saw the SCO as a useful framework for pursuing its interests in Central Asia 

without arousing a defensive reaction from Russia, which considered the post-Soviet states its sphere of 

influence.19

The evolution of the SCO established it as a topic of interest to the United States,* although observers disagreed 

about its implications for U.S. interests.

20 Some U.S. observers considered the SCO a dangerous, nondemocratic 

competitor to NATO or the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe.

21 While also expressing concerns 

about the SCO’s potential to exclude the United States, then Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central 

Asian Affairs Richard Boucher also suggested in 2006 and 2008 that the organization could provide Central 

Asian states a beneficial tool for cooperation and an alternative to domination by Russia in areas such as energy.

22

Some observers also predicted differences in perspective between members would prevent the SCO from 

challenging U.S. interests in a coordinated way, an opinion that has gained additional traction since the inclusion 

of South Asian rivals India and Pakistan in 2017.23 U.S. policymakers have resolved to monitor the development 

of the SCO with an eye toward ensuring it does not become a vehicle for exclusion or domination in the region.

24

* Aware that participation in the group would imply endorsement, the United States did not seek membership in the SCO. It did, however, 

apply for observer status, which the SCO denied to the United States in 2005 but granted to Iran. This rejection fueled concern within the 

United States about the SCO’s potential as an anti-Western or anti-American actor. Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South 

and Central Asian Affairs, oral testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 2006, 8. https://www.csce.gov/internationalimpact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-it-undermining-us-interests-central; Ariel Cohen, written testimony before the U.S.-

China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s Role in the World – Is China a Responsible Stakeholder? August 3, 2006, 

11–12. https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hearing-chinas-role-world-china-responsible-stakeholder; Yang Hongxi, “The Evolution of the 

U.S. Attitude towards the SCO,” in Michael Fredholm, ed., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New 

Directions, Perspectives and Challenges, Stockholm International Program for Central Asian Studies, 2013, 132–134. https://www.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:876570/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 4

Figure 1: Map of SCO Countries*

Source: Various.

25

Over the past two decades, Beijing’s fears of instability and terrorism have grown due to developments in China 

and abroad, and in response it has increased its cooperation with the SCO, among other measures. Coups and 

popular uprisings in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan beginning in 2005 sparked concern that these events could fuel 

instability, dissent, and subversion in China.26 After a handful of violent incidents involving Uyghurs beginning in 

2008, including clashes between Uyghur and Han residents in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, and a police 

crackdown in the city in 2009, Beijing increased its attention to what it believed were acts of Uyghur terrorism.27

* Turkmenistan, members of ASEAN, and members of CIS are designated as “SCO Guests” because they have attended SCO meetings.

Xinhua, “Joint Communiqué of the 18th Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Members’ Heads of Government (Premier) 

Council” ( 上海合作组织成员国政府首脑 ( 总 理 ) 理事会第十八次会议联合公报 ), November 3, 2019. 

Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-11/03/c_1125185470.htm; Xinhua, “Press Communiqué on the Meeting of the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Heads of State Council” (上海合作组织成员国元首理事会会议新闻公报), June 25, 2016. 

Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016-06/25/c_129088767.htm.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5

Chinese authorities responded to these perceived threats by greatly expanding their repression of the Uyghur 

minority.* Beginning in 2014, reports of Uyghurs joining the Syrian civil war and the stated intention of some to 

return to China to carry out acts of violence substantially deepened Beijing’s fears. It also perceived a rising threat 

of instability and violence spreading from Afghanistan to China due to the drawdown of U.S.-led forces in 

Afghanistan and the growing presence there of the Islamic State terrorist organization.28 These latter developments, 

along with a 2016 terrorist attack on the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan,† also increased Beijing’s concern that 

militants connected to these foreign conflicts might target Chinese personnel and economic interests in Afghanistan, 

Central Asia, and Pakistan.29

Beijing has consistently used the SCO as a mechanism to address these concerns. In 2002, Beijing helped to 

establish the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, the organization’s Uzbekistan-based clearinghouse for exchanging 

information on suspected terrorists and promoting common counterterrorism practices. 30 It is one of the two 

permanent bodies of the SCO, along with the Secretariat in Beijing.31 Beijing has sought, in the words of General 

Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping, to “build a robust regional security barrier” through the SCO, extending China’s 

defensive perimeter farther to its west.

32 It has pursued this objective by increasing intelligence sharing and 

enhancing the capabilities of the member countries’ law enforcement agencies to quell internal unrest and prevent 

terrorist and separatist activities. For example, since 2014, China’s Ministry of Public Security has trained SCO 

officials‡ at its China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation in areas such as 

counterterrorism and combatting transnational crime.33 Military exercises between China and other SCO members, 

discussed in more detail below, also support capacity building for stability maintenance and counterterrorism.

Projecting Power into Central Asia 

Beijing has used the SCO to build its capacity to project military force into Central Asia. Through diplomatic 

agreements with member countries, the Chinese government has been able to use the SCO to build a foundation for 

growing its power projection capabilities, with implications not only for a future crisis in Central Asia but also for 

conflicts in other regions. Central Asia’s proximity to China and the generally favorable views of Central Asian 

governments toward Beijing have made the region an ideal testing ground for China to practice carrying out 

counterterrorism as well as other more conventional military operations beyond its borders.

34 Under the auspices of 

the SCO and related agreements, Beijing has established arrangements for visiting forces participating in exercises;

conducted small-scale, real-world operations; carried out a variety of bilateral and multilateral exercises; and

* Since 2017, the CCP has detained an estimated one to three million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in prison camps it claims are for 

“transformation through education” and vocational training. In fact, detainees are kept in extraordinarily poor conditions, forced to 

denounce their religious beliefs and culture, and subjected to brainwashing, torture, and forced labor. U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, 2019 Annual Report to Congress, November 2019, 88.

† During the attack, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device after ramming a car into the embassy. The driver reportedly was a Uyghur 

of unknown citizenship. Kyrgyz authorities alleged that the Kyrgyz leader of a militant group fighting alongside Uyghurs in Syria directed 

the attack. Catherine Putz, “3 Convicted for Chinese Embassy Attack in Bishkek,” Diplomat, June 30, 2017. 

https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/3-convicted-for-chinese-embassy-attack-in-bishkek/; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Kyrgyzstan 

Sentences Three over Chinese Embassy Attack,” June 28, 2017. https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-china-embassy-jailed/28583623.html; 

BBC, “Chinese Embassy Blast: Car Bomb Attack in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,” August 30, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia37217712. ‡ The China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation claims to have trained over 300 officials from SCO 

member states from 2014 to 2018, an average of 67 officials per year. Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and 

Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 83–84. 

https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-evolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 6

dispatched its paramilitary police force, the People’s Armed Police,

* beyond China’s borders to conduct patrols 

alongside military personnel from Central Asian states. From their earliest incarnation, SCO exercises have included 

a mix of military and these paramilitary forces, which have since been moved under the Central Military 

Commission as an auxiliary military force of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in reforms that began in 2016. 

The People’s Armed Police’s participation in these earliest exercises was likely managed by the PLA and has acted 

as a precursor to the more robust force deployment by the PLA seen in exercises in later years. These activities have 

expanded China’s presence and influence in Central Asia and have given Beijing experience it could use to deploy 

military force to other regions.

Diplomacy Lays Groundwork for Power Projection 

Diplomatic engagement is a key component of China’s development of power projection capabilities. Such 

engagement, particularly involving preparations for SCO exercises, has allowed China to gain important experience 

it could apply to future expeditionary operations.

The SCO’s agreement on military exercises provides the essential legal authority for Beijing to deploy troops to 

Central Asia for military exercises. In 2007, the SCO signed the Agreement of the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization Member States on Joint Military Exercises, which articulates the legal rights and responsibilities of a 

SCO member’s military forces that are visiting another member country for an exercise.35 Isaac B. Kardon, assistant 

professor at the U.S. Naval War College, noted in testimony to the Commission in 2019 that this agreement provides 

China with a model for at least a temporary status of forces agreement. He added that some Chinese scholars have 

pointed to this agreement as a template China can use for future basing agreements farther abroad.36 Beijing may 

have established its People’s Armed Police outpost and operations in Tajikistan under a similar agreement. 

Beijing has also gained key experience through SCO exercises in negotiating the rights for overflight and the use 

of foreign airfields, the transit of a third country by land, and host country logistics support. All of these skills are 

essential building blocks for power projection. For example, prior to the PLA deployment to Tajikistan for a 

multilateral SCO exercise in 2012, China and Kyrgyzstan consulted on arrangements allowing the PLA to transit 

to the exercise through Kyrgyzstan by road—the first time the PLA had travelled to an exercise abroad by this mode 

of transport at such a distance, and the first time it had transited a third country while en route to an exercise.

37

Similarly, China has arranged for PLA aircraft to fly to and operate out of airfields in Central Asia or Russia during 

SCO exercises. In an example of a host country helping arrange logistical support to Chinese operations, Russian 

military aircraft appear to have helped transport supplies to PLA ground forces during a multilateral SCO exercise 

in Russia in 2018.38 Agreements made in peacetime for training exercises do not guarantee that similar arrangements 

can be achieved during a crisis. Nonetheless, they provide Beijing with important experience in coordinating with 

third countries that is necessary for expeditionary operations. These developments also suggest some foreign 

capitals are growing more comfortable with Chinese forces being present in or passing through their territory—

itself a new phenomenon. 

* The People’s Armed Police was established in 1982 as the paramilitary wing of the CCP, with a primary responsibility for maintaining 

domestic stability. For most of its history, it was under the dual leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, 

China’s highest military authority. In 2017, the People’s Armed Police was placed under the sole authority of the Central Military 

Commission. The People’s Armed Police is not a regular force of the PLA, but a paramilitary force made up of demobilized light infantry 

divisions of the PLA Army and was then given additional internal security and policing missions and training and later moved entirely 

under a military chain of command. It retains its distinct organization, command, and training. For more information on the People’s 

Armed Police, see Joel Wuthnow, “China’s Other Army: The People’s Armed Police in an Era of Reform,” China Strategic Perspectives

14 (April 2019), 1–11. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 7

Beijing Begins Real-World Operations in Central Asia

Building on its diplomatic initiatives with Central Asian states, China has taken new steps to extend its defensive 

perimeter by establishing a military outpost and conducting its first real-world military operations in Central Asia

designed to project power.39 Since 2016, the People’s Armed Police, part of China’s armed forces, has operated an 

outpost in Tajikistan near that country’s borders with China and Afghanistan.* According to one Tajik observer, 

there could be up to hundreds of personnel operating out of the facility, which consists of about 20 lookout towers 

and buildings.40 According to Dirk van der Kley, program director for policy research at the policy institute China 

Matters, from this facility, People’s Armed Police personnel have conducted joint counterterrorism border patrols 

with the Afghan and Tajik armed forces.41 In particular, People’s Armed Police troops have reportedly patrolled

alongside Tajik and Afghan forces in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan and in 

Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, which extends from the northern Afghan province of Badakhshan to Xinjiang.42

(See Figure 2 below for a map of the China-Afghanistan-Tajikistan Border Area.)

* Both China and Tajikistan deny the existence of the military outpost. In 2019, however, the Washington Post verified its existence through 

interviews of Chinese personnel and photography of the outpost. Gerry Shih, “Chinese Troops Sit on Afghanistan’s Doorstep,” Washington 

Post, February 18, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomerchinese-troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html; Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in 

Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 85. 

https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-evolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 8

Figure 2: Map of China-Afghanistan-Tajikistan Border Area

Source: Various.

43

The People’s Armed Police’s operations appear to be facilitated by the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination 

Mechanism (QCCM), a four-country counterterrorism forum that was established around the time the operations 

were reported to have begun in 2016. 44 The QCCM, which China formed with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

Tajikistan, enhanced coordination and intelligence sharing between the militaries of the four member countries

through several agreements and regular high-level, multilateral meetings.45 Prior to the formation of the QCCM, 

Beijing had been frustrated by the SCO’s inability to address its concerns that militants could flow from Afghanistan 

into China. Despite Beijing’s efforts, the SCO could not “deliver any direct or actionable security outcomes or tools 

to help manage security questions in Afghanistan,” according to Rafaello Pantucci, associate research fellow at the 

United Kingdom’s Royal United Services Institute.46 It appears the QCCM, in contrast, has enabled Beijing to make 

progress in filling perceived gaps in border security in Central Asia through the deployment of the People’s Armed 

Police to the region.47 Although the QCCM is not directly connected to the SCO, it is likely the relationships and 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 9

practices created through the SCO—which includes three QCCM signatories—set in place conditions that made 

this mechanism successful. 

A Unique Training Opportunity for Expeditionary Operations

Beyond laying the groundwork for its patrolling across the China-Afghanistan-Tajikistan border area, Beijing’s 

membership in the SCO also permits it to conduct exercises with SCO countries that provide unique opportunities 

for the Chinese armed forces to practice other types of expeditionary operations. China is unable to gain this 

experience through most of its other exercises and operations abroad.48 In many cases, SCO exercises have provided 

the PLA its first opportunities to practice key power projection skills. These firsts include transporting entire units 

from multiple military services by rail and air, conducting cross-border airstrikes, and carrying out air assault 

operations from foreign airfields.

China has also significantly expanded the scale and scope of its deployments to Central Asia through SCO exercises.

Beijing, which has been practicing power projection through SCO exercises for more than 15 years, has expanded 

its participation from the first SCO exercise in 2002 in which about 100 PLA special forces soldiers and other 

personnel practiced counterterrorism operations in Kyrgyzstan.

49 Now, entire units from multiple services, at times

numbering more than 1,000 personnel, conduct exercises abroad sometimes involving joint air-ground operations 

with direct application to conventional warfare. Driven by developments in the region and beyond, SCO exercises 

have involved a range of scenarios, including multinational forces combating terrorists, rescuing hostages, quelling 

social unrest, and fighting insurgents.50 (See Figure 3 below for a map of SCO exercises outside China involving 

Chinese forces. See Appendix I for a table detailing each exercise).
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 10

Figure 3: Map of SCO Exercises outside China Involving Chinese Forces, 2002–2019*

Source: Various.

51

Deploying across Borders by Rail, Road, and Air

One of the ways in which the SCO exercises enhance China’s power projection capability is by providing the 

Chinese armed forces with an opportunity to practice transporting and sustaining combat units beyond China’s 

borders. These exercises have involved up to 1,600 Chinese personnel—sufficient to support a multinational 

coalition or local security forces in counterinsurgency or conventional operations.52 In addition to its diplomatic 

utility, transport by rail and road has provided the PLA with valuable operational lessons in transporting and 

sustaining a land-based force abroad. 

* Exercise locations are approximate. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 11

The 2007 multilateral SCO exercise in Russia was the first time the PLA transported entire units and heavy 

equipment from multiple services across borders for an exercise, with multiple PLA Army units traveling by rail.53

SCO exercises have required the PLA to change the track gauges on its railcars to match the railroad tracks of other 

countries and to build specialized platforms for loading tanks and other armored vehicles.54 During the 2012 SCO 

exercise, the PLA traveled a long distance abroad by road for the first time, deploying dozens of military vehicles 

nearly 1,000 kilometers (km) (620 miles) to Tajikistan.55 Road transport gives the PLA an additional option for 

force deployment when railroads or airfields are not available.

The PLA has also used fixed-wing transport aircraft and transport helicopters in SCO exercises, preparing the force 

for scenarios requiring faster and longer-range deployments than rail and road transport allow. During a 2006 

exercise between China and Tajikistan, the PLA Air Force transported a special operations unit to Tajikistan—the 

first time it had transported a unit to an exercise abroad.56 Since then, the PLA has sent transport aircraft and 

transport helicopters to two subsequent SCO exercises abroad.

* 57 In the multilateral SCO exercise held in Russia 

in 2018, the PLA deployed two large transport aircraft, six medium transport aircraft, and four transport helicopters 

in what appears to be the largest PLA deployment of transport aircraft to a SCO exercise to date.

58 These aircraft

could transport about 800 troops in total, approximately the size of a PLA battalion.59 Although the PLA has 

executed many larger exercises within China, these cases provided the PLA with initial experience operating in 

airspace it does not control, coordinating with foreign authorities, and gaining familiarity with larger-scale 

deployment to foreign countries.

Commanding Expeditionary Operations

SCO exercises also serve as a key test bed for the role of the PLA’s new theater commands in leading expeditionary 

operations.

60 Since 2016, when the PLA shifted from a military region to a theater command structure, it has used 

the new structure in at least two exercises with SCO countries.

† For instance, the new Western Theater Command 

led the PLA’s participation in a SCO exercise in Kyrgyzstan in 2016. This exercise appears to mark the first time a 

theater command led the PLA in an exercise outside China.

61 Moreover, it indicated Beijing’s intent to use theater 

commands for more than operations to defend China’s territory and maritime periphery. After the Kyrgyzstan 

exercise, the commander of the Chinese contingent, a senior officer based in Xinjiang, stated that the theater 

command structure was “highly suited” to conducting expeditionary counterterrorism operations, praising its flat 

organizational structure and use of real-time video communications.

62 In 2018, the Northern Theater Command led 

the PLA force that participated in Russia’s “Vostok” exercise.

63 In both the 2016 and 2018 exercises, the PLA’s

theater commands deployed forward command posts to control Chinese forces abroad.64

* These exercises include the multilateral SCO exercises in Russia in 2007 and in 2018. 

† PLA theater commands are designed to enhance command and control by focusing on joint operational warfighting in specific regions, 

whereas the military regions were focused on force building. PLA theater commands were established as part of the broader military 

reorganization in 2016 to strengthen CCP control over the PLA and improve China’s capability to carry out joint military operations. 

Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown and 

Speculation (Part 1),” Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2016. https://jamestown.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/The_PLA_s_New_Organizational_Structure_Part_1.pdf?x39443; Shannon Tiezzi, “It’s Official: China’s 

Military Has 5 New Theater Commands,” Diplomat, February 2, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/its-official-chinas-military-has5-new-theater-commands/. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 12

Finding Distant Enemies, Mapping Foreign Battlefields 

SCO exercises allow the PLA to practice finding and tracking adversaries and mapping the terrain of potential 

battlefields in unfamiliar environments. While the exercises’ focus is to practice these skills on Central Asian 

terrain, China could apply the lessons learned from them on battlefields elsewhere.

65 Ground reconnaissance by 

PLA Army special operations forces and People’s Armed Police reconnaissance units has been a part of SCO 

exercises since they first began.66 China later began using airborne early warning and command aircraft, unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and fighter aircraft for reconnaissance and surveillance as well. For instance, 

in the 2010 multilateral SCO exercise, the PLA deployed airborne early warning and command aircraft as part of 

an integrated air battle group alongside bombers, fighters, and tanker aircraft. 67 SCO exercises also have 

occasionally included satellite and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance.68 UAV, satellite, and electronic 

reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities give Beijing lower-profile, nonkinetic military options for supporting 

Chinese or local forces in a SCO country, but could just as easily apply to supporting military or security forces in 

other Belt and Road Initiative countries. 

Practicing Cross-Border Counterterrorism

Beijing also uses SCO exercises to improve PLA special operations forces’ training for a range of long-distance, 

cross-border counterterrorism operations. China’s special operators still lack the aircraft necessary for long-range 

operations, mostly train for short-range missions, and are organized to operate in proximity to a large ground force 

division or brigade. Through SCO exercises, however, PLA special forces are beginning to move toward a longerrange capability more in line with U.S. and Russian special forces.69 These exercises include urban warfare and 

hostage rescues, with special operations forces travelling by helicopter, armored vehicles, or transport aircraft.* 70

One of the first SCO exercises, held in 2003, featured PLA special operators rescuing hostages aboard a hijacked 

airplane in Kazakhstan, and PLA special forces have practiced hostage rescues in at least two SCO exercises outside 

China since then.

71 Recently, PLA special operators captured simulated terrorists in the 2018 multilateral SCO 

exercise in Russia.

72 China also has begun to use armed UAVs for strikes in support of special operations forces in 

SCO exercises, doing so for the first time in the 2014 multilateral exercise in China.73 In 2019, PLA special forces 

simulated a counterterrorism exercise with their Tajik counterparts that used Chinese UAVs to reconnoiter the 

battlefield and surveil the simulated terrorists’ hideout. As other terrorists were coming to provide support, UAVs 

informed commanders of their approach; the commanders then dispatched combat aircraft and artillery units to 

attack them.74

More broadly, the PLA places special importance on the SCO as a platform for future expeditionary 

counterterrorism operations. The 2015 edition of the Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative textbook 

published by China’s National Defense University, indicates China’s counterterrorism operations abroad will 

increase as “the SCO’s counterterrorism mechanism strengthens.” 75 According to Article 71 of China’s 2015 

counterterrorism law, the Chinese government can “send personnel abroad on counterterrorism missions as 

approved by the Central Military Commission.”76 Although the article does not specify the types of activities the 

law considers to be counterterrorism, according to Human Rights Watch China’s vague and open-ended definition 

of “terrorism” raises the possibility that Beijing could use the law as a pretext to target real or perceived critics of 

the CCP residing in foreign countries.77

* The PLA Army has focused in recent years on developing a “new-type army,” which is smaller, more mobile, and suited for deployments 

abroad to protect China’s global interests. To do so, it has focused on developing its special operations forces, helicopters, and light 

mechanized capabilities. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018 Annual Report to Congress, 2018, 222.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 13

The People’s Armed Police also seeks a role in counterterrorism operations abroad, and SCO exercises allow the 

force to train for such operations. The People’s Armed Police has participated in four multilateral and bilateral SCO 

exercises. Most recently, in a 2019 exercise, the People’s Armed Police and a Russian special operations force 

practiced countering a train hijacking, urban warfare, and air-ground assault. 78 Once exclusively focused on 

responding to domestic contingencies, People’s Armed Police leadership now seek to position the force on the 

frontline of counterterrorism operations outside China. In 2018, the People’s Armed Police’s intelligence chief 

Zhang Xiaoqi stated the force must be “a pioneering force to protect overseas interests and an elite force for 

universal fighting.”79

Ground and Air Forces Training for Conventional Warfare Abroad

Finally, SCO exercises provide the PLA with unique opportunities to train for conventional warfare in foreign 

countries using both heavy equipment and fixed-wing combat aircraft. Scenarios in these exercises, despite being 

described as “counterterrorism” or other unconventional operations, sometimes involve PLA Army tanks and 

artillery surrounding and destroying militant camps and retaking territory seized by militants in conventional land 

operations, even if limited in scope.

80 For instance, during a 2018 exercise in Russia, PLA tanks were among SCO 

multinational forces that surrounded and took control of a village seized by simulated Islamist militants.81

The PLA is also using SCO exercises to practice air-ground operations. During these exercises, the PLA has 

routinely practiced conducting air strikes with bombers and fighters in support of ground troops, including two 

instances of long-range, cross-border bombing operations launched from within China, a unique opportunity that 

China does not have outside its exercises with SCO countries. In a 2010 SCO exercise, PLA bombers and fighters 

supported by aerial refueling attacked a simulated enemy in Kazakhstan after taking off from China, the first time 

the PLA had practiced cross-border bombing in an exercise abroad.82 PLA fixed-wing aircraft practiced crossborder air strikes again in 2016 in the multilateral SCO exercise in Kyrgyzstan. 83 Many SCO exercises have 

involved PLA aircraft conducting strikes on terrorist camps or territory seized by militants in tandem with an assault 

by SCO ground forces.84

Learning from Russian and Central Asian Militaries 

SCO exercises provide an opportunity for the Chinese armed forces to learn from the Russian military’s recent 

expeditionary and other combat experience. In particular, these interactions give the PLA access to insights from 

Russian operations in Syria, Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia’s Northern Caucasus region. In an interview following 

the 2016 multilateral SCO exercise, the commander of the Chinese contingent said the Russian military’s combat 

experience provided valuable lessons for the PLA’s “operational guidance, thinking, and methods” for joint 

counterterrorism operations.85 Senior Chinese officers who participated in the bilateral China-Russia SCO exercise

held in 2009 described valuable lessons pertaining to urban warfare and helicopter operations they learned from the 

Russian participants.86

The PLA has also almost certainly been exposed to Russian and U.S. military knowhow and skills through their 

exchanges with Central Asian militaries. Central Asian militaries have extensive ties to the Russian military through 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 14

training, arms sales, and the presence of Russian military bases in several Central Asian countries.* 87 All Central 

Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—have received 

counterterrorism training and assistance from the United States in the last ten years.

88

Implications for the United States

Through the SCO, China is developing diplomatic relationships and expeditionary capabilities it could use to 

support power projection beyond its borders. It already appears to have begun using these relationships and skills 

for small-scale power projection in Central Asia, albeit in the form of patrols by the People’s Armed Police. 

Moreover, Beijing could use this experience to conduct a growing range of operations farther beyond China’s 

borders. If conducted in line with international norms and best practices, operations such as counterterrorism or the 

evacuation of foreign civilians could contribute to international security and align with the interests of the United 

States. These same operations carried out in a competitive context, however, could easily result in adverse impacts 

to U.S. interests. Chinese expeditionary operations and military presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan may 

present operational challenges for the U.S. military. In the past, the PLA has refused to coordinate with and actively 

interfered in U.S. operations when operating in close proximity.

89 In 2015, for instance, the PLA was unwilling to 

coordinate with the U.S. military during the international response to a major earthquake in Nepal, which may have 

contributed to the avoidable loss of some of the earthquake’s victims’ lives.

90 U.S. and PLA counterterrorism 

operations targeting the same terrorist organization could adversely affect U.S. operations in a similar manner.

Power projection capabilities developed through the SCO could also set the foundation for Chinese military 

operations beyond Central Asia and Afghanistan.91 Through its SCO exercises, Beijing has gained experience 

moving troops and heavy equipment by rail and air thousands of miles outside China’s borders. Beijing could use 

the diplomatic and military skills learned from exercises for deployments to countries farther from China, such as 

in Africa, where it has an established diplomatic foothold and a growing military presence.92 Such deployments 

could constrain the ability of the U.S. armed forces to respond to global crises and present the United States with 

the prospect of coming into contact with Chinese military forces operating beyond the Indo-Pacific region. 

Moreover, there is significant risk that Beijing may be able to leverage its relationships with SCO countries to limit 

the ability of U.S. armed forces to operate in Central Asia. At its 2005 summit, the SCO issued a statement calling 

for a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Pressure from China and 

Russia likely contributed to Uzbekistan’s decision later that year to evict the United States from Karshi-Khanabad 

Air Base, which the United States used to support operations in Afghanistan.

93 Despite the fact that Central Asian 

states desire choices and do not want to be overly reliant on either Chinese or Russian security assistance, U.S. 

security assistance for countries other than Afghanistan has fallen precipitously from a high of $497 million in 2012 

to $41 million in 2020—a roughly 92 percent drop.94 As the United States continues to draw down its forces from 

Afghanistan, China will be likely to continue to eclipse U.S. influence in the region. This trend is already apparent

in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where a 2016 survey showed a significant percentage of respondents believing

* Russia has military bases in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and is the primary source of military equipment and training for Central 

Asian countries. Dmitry Gorenburg, “External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces,” Stockholm International Peace 

Research Institute, January 2014, 26.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 15

China already held more influence than the United States in Asia, with an even greater percentage expecting China’s 

influence to continue growing at the expense of the United States.* 95

According to the U.S. Strategy for Central Asia released by the U.S. Department of State in February 2020, 

Washington’s primary strategic interest for the region lies in promoting the sovereignty and independence of Central 

Asian states, while additional interests include supporting counterterrorism in the region, stability in Afghanistan, 

the rule of law, and human rights.96 These goals are often in contrast with Chinese activities in Central Asia. For 

instance, China’s 2019 defense white paper describes the SCO as dedicated to building a “community of common 

human destiny”—a term used to link the group with the CCP’s goal of building a Sinocentric global order.97 China 

may have leveraged its influence to infringe on the sovereignty of at least one Central Asian state. In 2010, 

Tajikistan agreed to cede over 1,158 square km (447 square miles) of land claimed by China in the Pamir Mountains,

reportedly in exchange for an undisclosed amount of debt forgiveness.† 98 Tajikistan, which has since allowed the 

Chinese government to operate a military outpost on its territory, remains heavily indebted to China.99

Beijing’s use of the SCO to target opponents of the Chinese government similarly runs counter to U.S. interests. In 

2010, for example, Chinese security services used SCO channels to solicit the Kyrgyz government to interrupt a 

film festival in Kyrgyzstan that a Chinese Uyghur human rights activist was planning to attend.100 At Beijing’s 

request, Kyrgyz authorities subsequently stopped the screening of a film made by the Uyghur activist.101 From these 

actions, it is clear China intends to continue using the SCO to advance its goals, undermining democratic 

governance, human rights, and state sovereignty in the process. 

Disclaimer: The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was created by Congress to report on the 

national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the 

People’s Republic of China. For more information, visit www.uscc.gov or follow the Commission on Twitter at 

@USCC_GOV.

This report is the product of professional research performed by the staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to supports its deliberations. Posting of 

the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed 

by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. 

security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an 

endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of 

the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report.

* According to the 2016 survey, when asked which country currently held the most influence in Asia, 8.8 percent of Kyrgyz respondents 

named the United States and 34.1 percent named China (43.2 percent named Russia). Of Kazakh respondents, 8.2 percent named the 

United States and 65.8 percent named China (19.2 percent named Russia). When asked which country would be most influential in ten 

years, 4.7 percent of Kyrgyz respondents named the United States and 47.6 percent named China (24.7 percent named Russia). Responding 

to the same question, 5.5 percent of Kazakhs surveyed named the United States, compared to 67.1 percent naming China (16.4 percent 

named Russia). Julie Yu-Wen Chen and Soledad Jimenez-Tovar, “China in Central Asia: Local Perceptions from Future Elites,” China 

Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 3:3 (2017): 436.

† According to the UN Development Program, Tajikistan owed China roughly $1 billion in 2009–2010. Although it has not been clearly 

proven that Tajikistan ceded the land in exchange for debt relief, evidence strongly suggests China leveraged its economic influence over 

Tajikistan in the negotiations. More recently, in July 2020 Chinese state media began republishing an article by Chinese historian Cho Yao 

Lu arguing that the entire Pamir region belongs to China. According to Paul Goble, an analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, the article 

could signal that the Chinese government sees the 2010 agreement as “only the first step to a broader rectification [of the border dispute]

in the PRC’s favor.” Paul Goble, “Beijing Implies Tajikistan’s Pamir Region Should Be Returned to China,” Jamestown Foundation, July 

30, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/beijing-implies-tajikistans-pamir-region-should-be-returned-to-china/; UN Development 

Program, “Millennium Development Goals: Tajikistan Progress Report,” 2010, 123. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 16

Appendix: Table of SCO Exercises outside China Involving 

Chinese Forces, 2002–2019

Name Host 

country 

Total 

Chinese 

Personnel 

Chinese Systems and 

Units, if Available

Other 

Known 

Participants 

Additional Details

Exercise-01 Kyrgyzstan Around 

100

Special operations 

forces, border troops

Unknown First counterterrorism 

exercise held by SCO 

members.

Coalition2003

Kazakhstan Up to 700 Infantry, artillery, 

People’s Armed Police 

personnel, and support 

forces

Russia, 

Kyrgyzstan 

Counterterrorism 

exercises included 

stopping terrorist 

vehicles, gaining 

control of hijacked 

aircraft, helicopter 

landings, building 

climbing, clearing 

occupied buildings, 

and hostage rescue. 

East 

Antiterror2006

Uzbekistan Unknown Special operations 

forces 

Kyrgyzstan, 

Russia, 

Tajikistan, 

Kazakhstan 

(all 

observation 

personnel 

only)

Focused on a scenario 

in which terrorists 

were targeting 

national 

infrastructure. 

Participants 

established an 

operational 

headquarters, 

intervened against 

simulated terrorist 

attacks on high-risk 

targets, and 

conducted hostage 

rescue. 

Coordination2006

Tajikistan 150 Special operations 

forces, fixed-wing 

transport aircraft, 

helicopters 

Unknown Included transport to 

Tajikistan by the PLA 

Air Force, 

establishment of a 

joint command post, 

fire strikes, target 

encirclement, and 

hostage rescue.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 17

Cooperation2007Russia Unknown People’s Armed Police 

commando unit, 

transport aircraft 

Unknown Designed to 

strengthen relations 

between Chinese and 

Russian internal 

defense forces and 

improve both sides’ 

counterterrorism 

capabilities. Formal 

exercises proceeded 

in three stages: joint 

operations planning, 

deployment, and joint 

implementation. 

Other activities 

included 

familiarization with 

the other forces’ 

equipment.

Peace 

Mission-2007

Russia 1,600 Eight fighter-bombers, 

32 helicopters, fixedwing transport aircraft, 

and army, air force, and 

integrated support 

groups

Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, 

Uzbekistan 

Entailed longdistance transport of 

troops to Russia by 

air and rail. First 

deployment of PLA 

combined arms 

groups abroad. 

Exercise simulated 

the response to 

another state’s 

request for 

intervention to 

prevent an 

international terrorist 

group from taking 

control of the state. 

Included conventional 

air-ground offensive 

maneuvers and 

coordinated airstrikes.

NurakAntiterror2009Tajikistan Unknown Unknown Russia, 

Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan 

Russian and Tajik 

forces conducted the 

bulk of the exercise 

while Chinese forces 

mainly provided 

support. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 18

Bogorodsk 

Disaster 

Relief 

Exercise 

(Held in 

2009)

Russia 20 China International 

Search and Rescue 

Team (including PLA 

personnel) and China 

Emergency Fire Rescue 

Team (People’s Armed 

Police personnel) 

Kazakhstan, 

Tajikistan 

Disaster relief 

exercise. Details 

unknown. 

Peace 

Mission-2010

Kazakhstan 1,000 Two fighters; four 

bombers; tanker aircraft, 

airborne early warning 

and command aircraft;

tanks; and ground force, 

air force, and logistics 

combat groups

Kyrgyzstan, 

Russia, 

Tajikistan 

Fighter and bomber 

aircraft took off from 

within China to 

launch long-distance 

cross-border strikes 

into Kazakhstan. 

Fighters and bombers 

supported by early 

warning aircraft and 

refueled by in-air 

tankers (even though 

the target was located 

within the aircrafts’ 

range).

Peace 

Mission-2012

Tajikistan 369 Six helicopters, a 

motorized infantry 

company, an artillery 

squad, and 

communications and 

engineering vehicles

Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, 

Russia

Large-scale military 

operations with heavy 

equipment. Included a 

motorized infantry 

company and an 

artillery unit.

Peace 

Mission-2013

Russia 600 Fighter-bombers;

helicopters; tanks; selfpropelled guns; and 

army, air force, and 

logistics groups

Unknown Chinese forces 

traveled 4,050 km

(2,517 miles) by air 

and rail to Russia. 

Proceeded in three 

phases: troop 

deployment, planning 

operations, and 

campaign exercises. 

Exercises intended to 

promote armed 

forces’ “effective use 

in real combat 

situations.”

Cooperation2016Russia 100 Two People’s Armed 

Police commando units, 

helicopters, and armored 

vehicles

Unknown Two-week joint 

counterterrorism 

training including 

integrated tactical 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 19

exercises, helicopter 

drops and aerial 

transfer, building 

climbing, unarmed 

hand-to-hand combat 

training, police dog 

training, 

familiarization with 

other forces’ 

equipment, and other 

exchanges between 

forces.

Peace 

Mission-2016

Kyrgyzstan 270 Unknown fixed-wing 

combat aircraft, 

helicopters, artillery, and 

armored vehicles

Kazakhstan, 

Russia, 

Tajikistan 

Combat training 

focused on 

surrounding and 

destroying enemy 

targets through the 

coordination of 

ground operations 

and air support, as 

well as air-to-ground 

precision strikes. 

Fighters took off from 

Chinese territory and 

traveled 400 km (249 

miles) to conduct 

airstrikes before 

returning to base. 

Exercise occurred in a 

maneuvering area of 

510 km (317 miles). 

First exercise abroad 

for the newly 

established Western 

Theater Command.

Peace 

Mission-2018

Russia 743 Special operations 

forces, tanks, two 

fighters, four fighterbombers, four attack 

helicopters, eight fixedwing transport aircraft, 

and four transport 

helicopters

Kazakhstan, 

Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan 

(observation 

personnel 

only),

Kyrgyzstan, 

India, 

Pakistan 

Large-scale exercise 

in which Russia 

shared experience 

gained through 

operations in Syria. 

Operations included 

battlefield 

reconnaissance and 

surveillance, aerial 

cover of ground 

forces moving along a 

route, and joint 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 20

strikes. Exercises 

proceeded in three

stages: strategic 

consultation, joint 

campaign 

preparation, and 

campaign 

implementation.

Cooperation2019Uzbekistan Unknown People’s Armed Police 

personnel

Unknown Two-week 

counterterrorism 

training between the 

People’s Armed 

Police and Uzbek 

National Guard with 

the goal of deepening 

interactions between 

the two countries’ 

forces. Included 

individual, group, and 

platoon training and 

activities such as 

hand-to-hand combat 

training, building 

climbing, and 

motorcycle training.

Cooperation2019Tajikistan Unknown Special operations 

forces, fighters, fighterbombers, UAVs

Unknown Operations designed 

to practice integrated 

air-ground control, 

including unmanned 

battlefield 

reconnaissance and 

surveillance, air 

transport, coordinated 

frontal assaults, 

sniper attacks under 

joint fire cover, 

precision air strikes, 

and use of antiaircraft weapons.

Cooperation2019Russia Unknown People’s Armed Police 

commando unit

Unknown Eleven-day joint 

counterterrorism 

training between the 

People’s Armed 

Police and Russian 

National Guard aimed 

at improving combat 

skills and deepening 

cooperation. Included 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 21

Source: Various.

102

tactical coordination 

training, coordinated 

air-to-ground strikes, 

training for gaining 

control of hijacked 

trains, and search and 

suppression 

operations. Also 

included 

familiarization with 

the other forces’ 

equipment, seminars, 

and other exchanges.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 22

Endnotes

1 Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, written testimony before the Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 

2006, 29. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-it-undermining-usinterests-central. 2 Mark Burles, “Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics,” RAND Corporation, 1999, 8–9.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1045.html; Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization,” Asian Survey 53:3 (2013): 436–460, 437–441. 

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2013.53.3.436?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents; Stephen Blank, written testimony for the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in 

Central Asia? September 26, 2006, 45. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-itundermining-us-interests-central. 3 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” June 7, 2002, art 1; “Charter of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization” (《上海合作组织宪章》), June 7, 2002, art 1, via the United Nations Treaty Collection. Translation.

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002803594e2; Michael Yahuda, “China’s Relations with Asia, Continuity 

Amid Change,” in David Shambaugh, ed., China and the World, Oxford University Press, January 30, 2020, 283; U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 406, 408; Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of and 

Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Asian Survey 53:3 (2013): 436–460, 439. 4 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 406; Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 2015–2020. http://eng.sectsco.org/docs/about/faq.html; Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” June 15, 2001. 

http://eng.sectsco.org/documents/. 5 Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Asian Survey 53:3 (2013): 436–460, 

437–441. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2013.53.3.436?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents; U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 393–395; Mark Burles, “Chinese Policy toward 

Russia and the Central Asian Republics,” RAND Corporation, 1999, 8–9. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1045.html. 6 Michael Yahuda, “China’s Relations with Asia, Continuity Amid Change,” in David Shambaugh, ed., China and the World, Oxford 

University Press, January 30, 2020, 283; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, 

November 2015, 406, 408; Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Asian 

Survey 53:3 (2013): 436–460, 439. 7 China’s State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 2019. 8 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 2015–2016. http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sco/. 9 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 2015–2020. http://eng.sectsco.org/docs/about/faq.html; Richard 

Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, oral testimony before the Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 2006, 

3. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-it-undermining-us-interests-central. 10 “Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the 

People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area,” Shanghai, April 26, 1996, via the United 

Nations General Assembly.

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/960426_AgreementConfidenceBuildingMilitaryFieldinBorderArea.pdf; 

Gregory Gleason, “Policy Dimensions of West Asian Borders after the Shanghai Accord,” Asian Perspective 25:1 (2001): 107–131. 

https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704301?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents. 11 “Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the 

People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area,” Shanghai, April 26, 1996, via the United 

Nations General Assembly.

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/960426_AgreementConfidenceBuildingMilitaryFieldinBorderArea.pdf. 12 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 2015–2020. http://eng.sectsco.org/docs/about/faq.html. 13 China Daily, “History of Development of SCO,” June 12, 2006. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020347.htm. 14 China Daily, “History of Development of SCO,” June 12, 2006. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020347.htm. 15 China Daily, “History of Development of SCO,” June 12, 2006. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020347.htm. 16 “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (《上海合作组织宪章》), June 7, 2002, art 1, via the United Nations Treaty 

Collection. Translation. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002803594e2. 17 “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (《上海合作组织宪章》), June 7, 2002, art 1, via the United Nations Treaty 

Collection. Translation. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002803594e2; Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of 

and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Asian Survey 53:3 (2013): 436–460, 437–442.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 23

18 Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, oral testimony before the Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 

2006. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-it-undermining-us-interests-central. 19 Edward Lemon, Research Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, interview with Commission staff, August 6, 2020; Michael 

Yahuda, “China’s Relations with Asia, Continuity Amid Change,” in David Shambaugh, ed., China and the World, Oxford University 

Press, January 30, 2020, 283; Zhao Huasheng, “China’s View of and Expectations from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Asian 

Survey 53:3 (2013): 436–460, 436–437. 20 Yang Hongxi, “The Evolution of the U.S. Attitude towards the SCO,” in Michael Fredholm, ed., The Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives and Challenges, Stockholm International Program for Central 

Asian Studies, 2013, 132–140. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:876570/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 21 Sean Roberts, oral testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 

Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 2006. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghaicooperation-organization-it-undermining-us-interests-central. 22 Yang Hongxi, “The Evolution of the U.S. Attitude towards the SCO,” in Michael Fredholm, ed., The Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives and Challenges, Stockholm International Program for Central 

Asian Studies, 2013, 138. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:876570/FULLTEXT01.pdf; Richard Boucher, Assistant 

Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, oral testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 2006, 7–8. 

https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-it-undermining-us-interests-central; Richard 

Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, written testimony before the Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 2006, 

30. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-it-undermining-us-interests-central. 23 Casey Michel, “It’s Official: India and Pakistan Join Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Diplomat, June 12, 2017. 

https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/its-official-india-and-pakistan-join-shanghai-cooperation-organization/; Martha Olcott, oral testimony 

before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. 

Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 2006. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-itundermining-us-interests-central. 24 Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, oral testimony before the Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is It Undermining U.S. Interests in Central Asia? September 26, 

2006, 3, 9–10. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/shanghai-cooperation-organization-it-undermining-us-interestscentral. 25 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (上海合作组织), May 2020. Translation. 

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_683094/jbqk_683096/t528036.shtml; Xinhua, “Joint Communiqué of 

the 18th Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Members’ Heads of Government (Premier) Council” (上海合作组织成员

国政府首脑(总理)理事会第十八次会议联合公报), November 3, 2019. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-

11/03/c_1125185470.htm; Xinhua, “Press Communiqué on the Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Heads of State 

Council” (上海合作组织成员国元首理事会会议新闻公报), June 25, 2016. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016-

06/25/c_129088767.htm; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, November 2015, 

406. 26 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, Oxford University Press, 2012, 82. 27 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang,” International 

Security, 44:3 (Winter 2019/20): 22–23. https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00368. 28 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” 

New York Times, November 16, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html. 29 Angela Stanzel, “Fear and Loathing on the New Silk Road: China Security in Afghanistan and Beyond,” European Council on Foreign 

Relations, July 12, 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR-264-Chinese_Security_in_Afghanistan_2.pdf. 30 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia: Domestic Order, Social Change and the Chinese 

Factor, Columbia University Press, 2012, 29; Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 2015–2020, 

http://eng.sectsco.org/docs/about/faq.html. 31 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Frequently Asked Questions,” 2015–2020. http://eng.sectsco.org/docs/about/faq.html. 32 Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road 

Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 78. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinasevolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/; Xi Jinping, “Unity and Mutual Aid to Meet Challenges and Promote Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization to Realize New Steps” (团结互助 共迎挑战 推动上海合作组织实现新跨越), July 10, 2015. 

http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-07/11/content_116809.htm. 33 Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 24

 Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 83–84. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiativechinas-evolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 34 Edward Lemon, Research Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, interview with Commission staff, August 6, 2020. 35 China Daily, “SCO Joint Military Exercise Focuses on Combatting the Three Evil Forces” (上合联合军演重在打击三股势力), July 17, 

2007. Translation. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-07/17/content_5437465.htm. 36 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on a “World-Class” Military: Assessing China’s Global Military 

Ambitions, written testimony of Isaac B. Kardon, June 20, 2019, 4. 37 PLA Daily, “Review of ‘Peace Mission-2012’ Military Exercise Highlights” (“和平使命-2012”军演亮点盘点), June 18, 2012. 

Translation. http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2012-06-18/0708693295.html. 38 Luo Shunyu, Pan Kai, and Zhang Haijing, “‘Peace Mission-2018’ Joint Counterterrorism Campaign Succeeds Stunningly” (“和平使命

-2018”联合反恐战役震撼打响) China Military Online, August 29, 2018. http://photo.81.cn/pla/2018-08/29/content_9266646.htm;

China’s National Defense, “‘Peace Mission-2018’: Two Bright Spots Worthy of Attention” (和平使命-2018: 两大亮点值得关注), 

August 24, 2018. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm. 39 Edward Lemon, Research Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, interview with Commission staff, August 6, 2020. 40 Gerry Shih, “Chinese Troops Sit on Afghanistan’s Doorstep,” Washington Post, February 18, 2019. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinesetroops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html. 41 Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road 

Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 85. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinasevolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 42 Gerry Shih, “Chinese Troops Sit on Afghanistan’s Doorstep,” Washington Post, February 18, 2019. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinesetroops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html; Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan 

and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 85. 43 Vinayak Bhat, “China Has Built Second Foreign Military Base near Key Afghan Corridor — Just North of PoK,” Print, February 22, 

2019. https://theprint.in/defence/china-has-built-second-foreign-military-base-near-key-afghan-corridor-just-north-of-pok/196321/;

Gerry Shih, “Chinese Troops Sit on Afghanistan’s Doorstep,” Washington Post, February 18, 2019.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinesetroops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html; Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan 

and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 85. 

https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-evolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 44 Mathieu Duchâtel, “Overseas Military Operations in Belt and Road Countries: The Normative Constraints and Legal Framework,” in 

Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 13.

https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-evolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 45 Mathieu Duchâtel, “Overseas Military Operations in Belt and Road Countries: The Normative Constraints and Legal Framework,” in 

Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 13.

https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-evolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 46 Rafaello Pantucci, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road 

Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 64. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinasevolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 47 Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road 

Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 72, 84. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiativechinas-evolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 48 Kevin McCauley, Independent Analyst, interview with Commission staff, March 3, 2020; Kevin McCauley, Independent Analyst, 

interview with Commission staff, February 29, 2020. 49 Marcel de Haas, “War Games of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Drills on the 

Move!” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29:3 (2016): 382; Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police 

Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational 

Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 383, 427; People’s Daily, “Backgrounder: Major PLA-Related Joint Anti-Terror Military 

Exercises and Trainings,” December 21, 2007. http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/6325264.html; CCTV; “Sino-Kyrgyzstan 

Counterterrorism Exercise,” (中吉军演 合力反恐), October 11, 2002. Translation. http://www.cctv.com/lm/522/41/57819.html; 

People’s Daily, “Sino-Kyrgyzstan Military Exercise Catches ‘Terrorists,’” (中吉军演抓“恐怖分子”), October 14, 2002. Translation. 

http://unn.peopledaily.com.cn/BIG5/paper68/7459/715805.html. 50 Lucian Kim, “Russia’s Multinational Military Exercise Last Week Was a Dry Run for Bigger War Games,” NPR, September 5, 2018. 

https://www.npr.org/2018/09/05/644806306/russias-multinational-military-exercise-last-week-was-a-dry-run-for-bigger-war-g; Ben 

Lowsen, “Like a Good Neighbor: Chinese Intervention through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in Andrew Scobell, ed., The 

People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, National Defense University Press, 2015, 262; Roger N. McDermott, 

“China Showcases Expeditionary Military Power in Peace Mission 2010,” Jamestown Foundation, September 28, 2010. 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 25

 https://jamestown.org/program/china-showcases-expeditionary-military-power-in-peace-mission-2010/; Roger N. McDermott, “Rising 

Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007,” Jamestown Foundation, October 19, 2007, 16. https://jamestown.org/wpcontent/uploads/2007/10/Jamestown-McDermottRisingDragon.pdf?x55281. 51 Dennis J. Blasko, independent analyst, interview with Commission staff, March 3, 2020; Xie Xibo, “China-Russia “Cooperation-2019” 

Joint Counterterrorism Exercise Held in Novosibirsk,” (中俄“合作-2019”联合反恐演练在新西伯利亚举行), PRC Ministry of 

National Defense, October 11, 2019. Translation. http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2019-10/11/content_4852704.htm;2019) Li Ming, 

“China-Russia “Cooperation-2019” Joint Counterterrorism Exercise Ends” (中俄合作-2019”联合反恐演练结束), Xinhua, October 

18, 2019. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-10/18/c_1125124388.htm(Cooperation-2019); Lu Peng and Wu Shike, “China, 

Tajikistan Conclude Joint Counterterrorism Drill,” China Military Online, August 16, 2019. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-

08/16/content_9592237.htm (Cooperation-2019); Xinhua, “Uzbekistan, China Wrap Up Joint Anti-Terror Drills,” May 16, 2019. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/16/c_138064037.htm(Cooperation-2019); Gazeta, “Photo: Exercises of the National Guard 

and the People’s Armed Police of China” (Фото: Учения Нацгвардии и Народной милиции Китая), May 7, 2019. Translation. 

https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/05/07/gvardiya/ (Cooperation 2019); Luo Shunyu, Pan Kai, and Zhang Haijing, “‘Peace Mission-2018’ 

Joint Counterterrorism Campaign Succeeds Stunningly” (“和平使命-2018”联合反恐战役震撼打响) China Military Online, August 

29, 2018. http://photo.81.cn/pla/2018-08/29/content_9266646_14.htm (Peace Mission-2018); China’s National Defense, “‘Peace 

Mission-2018’: Two Bright Spots Worthy of Attention” (和平使命-2018: 两大亮点值得关注), August 24, 2018. Translation. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm (Peace Mission-2018); Ethan Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military 

Relations: Moving toward a Higher Level of Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2017, 24–

27; Wang Xuhui and Niu Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace Mission-2016’ Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the 

Joint Exercise’s New Bright Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥员解读联演新亮点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. 

Translation. http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm (Peace Mission-2016); China Military Online, “Chinese Troops 

Arrive in Kyrgyzstan for ‘Peace Mission-2016,’” September 14, 2016. http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-

09/14/content_7258520.htm (Peace Mission-2016); Xinhua, “China-Russia ‘Cooperation-2016’ Joint Counterterrorism Training Comes 

to a Perfect Close,” July 15, 2020. Translation. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-07/15/content_5091381.htm (Cooperation-2016); Qi 

Mingyu and Guang Shusheng, “China-Russia “Cooperation-2016” Joint Counterterrorism Exercise Produces Results,” (中俄“合作2016”联合反恐训练结硕果), July 17, 2016. Translation. http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2016-07/17/content_4695072.htm

(Cooperation-2016); Wang Haiyun, “Joint Drills Vital for Security,” China Daily, August 1, 2013. 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2013-08/01/content_16861213.htm (Peace Mission-2013); Zhao Shengnan, “Sino-Russian Exercise 

to Simulate Combat,” China Daily, August 15, 2013. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-08/15/content_16894911.htm (Peace 

Mission-2013); Yan Meng and Ma Qian, eds., “SCO Member States Hold ‘Peace Mission 2012’ Drill in Tajikistan,” People’s Daily, 

June 15, 2012. http://en.people.cn/90786/7846872.html (Peace Mission-2012); Xinhua, “China Tries Long-Distance Air Attack Mode in 

Drill,” September 21, 2010. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/imqq/china/2010-09/21/content_11336139.htm (Peace Mission-2012); 

Richard Weitz, “China’s Growing Clout in the SCO: Peace Mission 2010,” Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2010. 

https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-growing-clout-in-the-sco-peace-mission-2010/ (Peace Mission 2010); Dennis J. Blasko, 

“People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, ed., 

The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 384–385, 390, 399–400, 428 (Nurak 

Antiterror-2009 and Bogorodsk Disaster Relief Exercise); Marcel de Haas, “The Peace Mission 2007’ Exercises: The Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization Advances,” Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, September 2007, 1, 2, 4. 

https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20070900_cscp_paper_haas.pdf (Peace Mission-2007); Richard D, Fisher, Jr., 

“‘Peace Mission,’” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2007, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118712715268497679 (Peace Mission-2007); 

Xinhua, “China’s People’s Armed Police ‘Snow Leopard Commando Unit’ Arrives in Russia to Participate in Joint China-Russia 

Counterterrorism Exercise” (中国武警 “雪豹突击队”抵俄参加中俄联合反恐演习), Xinhua, September 2, 2007. 

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-09/02/content_734480.htm (Cooperation-2007); Xinhua, “Curtain Rises on China-Russia “Cooperation2007” Joint Counterterrorism Exercise in Moscow,” (中俄“合作-2007”联合反恐演习在莫斯科拉开序幕), September 3, 2007. 

Translation. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-09/03/content_735509.htm (Cooperation-2007); Major General Qian Lihua, “China-Tajikistan 

Counterterrorism Exercise Has Innovative Significance” (钱利华少将:“中塔反恐军演具有开创性意义”), Xinhua, September 22, 

2006. Translation. http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52984/4849775.html (Coordination-2006); People’s Daily Online, “China, 

Tajikistan Holds Military Exercise,” September 23, 2006. http://en.people.cn/200609/23/print20060923_305744.html (Coordination2006); Xinhua, “Joint Counterterrorism Military Exercise between the Tajikistan and Chinese Militaries Begins in Tajikistan,” (中塔两

国军队联合反恐军事演习在塔境内开始举行), September 22, 2006. Translation. http://www.gov.cn:8080/jrzg/2006-

09/22/content_396216.htm (Coordination-2006); Xinhua, “SCO Holds 2006 Joint Counterterrorism Exercise in Uzbekistan in Early 

March” (上合组织 3 月初在乌兹别克斯坦举行 2006 联合反恐演习), March 11, 2006. Translation. 

http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2006/Mar/1150391.htm (East Antiterror-2006); Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization, “On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s ‘East Antiterror Exercise,’” (关于上海合作组织框架内举行
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 26

的“东方反恐—2006”联合反恐演习), March 6, 2006. Translation. http://ecrats.org/cn/news/5597 (East Antiterror-2006); 

Chinanews.com, “A Scan of the Participating Forces in ‘Coalition-2003’ Counterterrorism Exercise” (“联合-2003” 反恐军事演习

参演部队扫描), August 13, 2003. Translation. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-13/0753555451s.shtml (Coalition-2003); Marcel de 

Haas, “War Games of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Drills on the Move!” 

Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29:3 (2016): 382 (Exercise-01); Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed 

Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the 

Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 427 (Exercise-01); People’s Daily, “Backgrounder: Major PLA-Related Joint AntiTerror Military Exercises and Trainings,” December 21, 2007. http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/6325264.html (Exercise-01); CCTV,

“Sino-Kyrgyzstan Counterterrorism Exercise,” (中吉军演 合力反恐), October 11, 2002. Translation. 

http://www.cctv.com/lm/522/41/57819.html (Exercise-01); People’s Daily, “Sino-Kyrgyzstan Military Exercise Catches ‘Terrorists,’” (

中吉军演抓“恐怖分子”), October 14, 2002. Translation. http://unn.peopledaily.com.cn/BIG5/paper68/7459/715805.html (Exercise01). 52 Ethan Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving toward a Higher Level of Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, March 2017, 24. 53 Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy 

Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 392-393; Roger N. 

McDermott, “Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007,” Jamestown Foundation, October 19, 2007. https://jamestown.org/wpcontent/uploads/2007/10/Jamestown-McDermottRisingDragon.pdf?x55281. 54 Roger N. McDermott, “China Showcases Expeditionary Military Power in Peace Mission 2010,” Jamestown Foundation, September 28, 

2010. https://jamestown.org/program/china-showcases-expeditionary-military-power-in-peace-mission-2010/. 55 PLA Daily, “Review of ‘Peace Mission-2012’ Military Exercise Highlights” (“和平使命-2012”军演亮点盘点), June 18, 2012. 

Translation. http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2012-06-18/0708693295.html. 56 Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy 

Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 390. 57 Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy 

Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 393; China’s 

National Defense, “‘Peace Mission-2018’: Two Bright Spots Worthy of Attention” (和平使命-2018: 两大亮点值得关注), August 24, 

2018. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm; Roger N. McDermott, “Rising Dragon: SCO Peace 

Mission 2007,” Jamestown Foundation, October 19, 2007, 14. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/JamestownMcDermottRisingDragon.pdf?x55281. 58 China’s National Defense, “‘Peace Mission-2018’: Two Bright Spots Worthy of Attention” (和平使命-2018: 两大亮点值得关注), 

August 24, 2018. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm. 59 Dennis J. Blasko, Independent Analyst, interview with Commission staff, March 3, 2020. 60 Kristen Gunness, “The Dawn of a PLA Expeditionary Force?” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, National 

Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 45. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-evolving-militaryengagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 61 Wang Xuhui and Niu Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace Mission-2016’ Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the Joint 

Exercise’s New Bright Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥员解读联演新亮点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. 

Translation. http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm. 62 Wang Xuhui and Niu Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace Mission-2016’ Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the Joint 

Exercise’s New Bright Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥员解读联演新亮点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. Translation. 

http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm. 63 Xinhua, “‘Vostok-2018’ Strategic Exercise’s China-Russia Campaign Drill Formally Begins” (‘东方-2018’ 战略演习中俄联合战役演

练正式开始), September 11, 2019. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-09/11/c_1123409611.htm.

64 Xinhua, “‘Vostok-2018’ Strategic Exercise’s China-Russia Campaign Drill Formally Begins” (‘东方-2018’ 战略演习中俄联合战役演

练正式开始), September 11, 2019. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-09/11/c_1123409611.htm; Wang Xuhui and Niu

Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace Mission-2016’ Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the Joint Exercise’s New Bright 

Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥员解读联演新亮点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. Translation. 

http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm. 65 Edward Lemon, Research Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, interview with Commission staff, August 6, 2020. 66 Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy 

Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 385. 67 Xinhua, “China Tries Long-Distance Air Attack Mode in Drill,” September 21, 2010. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/imqq/china/2010-

09/21/content_11336139.htm. 68 Richard Weitz, “Analyzing Peace Mission 2014: China and Russia Exercise with the Central Asian States,” SDInfo.com, October 8, 

2014. https://sldinfo.com/2014/10/analyzing-peace-mission-2014-china-and-russia-exercise-with-the-central-asian-states/; Dennis J. 

Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 27

 Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 385. 69 Dennis J. Blasko, “The PLA Army after ‘Below the Neck’ Reforms: Contributing to China’s Joint Warfighting, Deterrence and

MOOTW Posture,” Journal of Strategic Studies, December 27, 2019. 70 Roger N. McDermott, “China Showcases Expeditionary Military Power in Peace Mission 2010,” Jamestown Foundation, September 28, 

2010. https://jamestown.org/program/china-showcases-expeditionary-military-power-in-peace-mission-2010/; Ben Lowsen, “Like a 

Good Neighbor: Chinese Intervention through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in Andrew Scobell, ed., The People’s Liberation 

Army and Contingency Planning in China, National Defense University Press, 2015, 262. 71 Chinanews.com, “A Scan of the Participating Forces in ‘Coalition-2003’ Counterterrorism Exercise,” (“联合-2003” 反恐军事演习

参演部队扫描) August 13, 2003. Translation. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-13/0753555451s.shtml; Major General Qian Lihua, 

“China-Tajikistan Counterterrorism Exercise Has Innovative Significance” (钱利华少将:“中塔反恐军演具有开创性意义” ), 

Xinhua, September 22, 2006. Translation. http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52984/4849775.html; Lu Peng and Wu Shike, “China, 

Tajikistan Conclude Joint Counterterrorism Drill,” China Military Online, August 16, 2019. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-

08/16/content_9592237.htm. 72 Luo Shunyu, Pan Kai, Zhang Haijing, “‘Peace Mission-2018’ Joint Counterterrorism Campaign Succeeds Stunningly” (“和平使命2018”联合反恐战役震撼打响) China Military Online, August 29, 2018. http://photo.81.cn/pla/2018-08/29/content_9266646_14.htm. 73 Qian Xiaohu, Zhou Meng, and Yan Deyong, “Looking Back at ‘Peace Mission-2014’ Joint Exercise” (回看“和平使命-2014”联合军

演), September 3, 2014. Translation. http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2014-09/03/content_6122367.htm. 74 Lu Peng and Wu Shike, “China, Tajikistan Conclude Joint Counter-Terrorism Drill,” China Military Online, August 16, 2019. 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-08/16/content_9592237.htm. 75 Xiao Tianliang, ed., Science of Military Strategy (战略学), National Defense University Press, 2015 (2017 revision), 286. 76 Timothy R. Heath, “China’s Pursuit of Overseas Security,” RAND Corporation, 2018, 22. 

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/RR2271/RAND_RR2271.pdf; Xinhua, “Anti-Terrorism Law of 

the People’s Republic of China,” (中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法), December 27, 2015. Translation. http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-

12/27/content_6832878.htm. 77 Human Rights Watch, “China: Draft Counterterrorism Law a Recipe for Abuses,” January 20, 2015. 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/20/china-draft-counterterrorism-law-recipe-abuses#. 78 Li Ming, “China-Russia “Cooperation-2019” Joint Counterterrorism Drill Ends” (中俄合作-2019”联合反恐演练结束), Xinhua, October 

18, 2019. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-10/18/c_1125124388.htm. 79 Dirk Van Der Kley, “China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” in Nadège Rolland, ed., Securing the Belt and Road 

Initiative, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 79. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinasevolving-military-engagement-along-the-silk-roads/. 80 Ethan Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving toward a Higher Level of Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, March 2017, 10–11; Ben Lowsen, “Like a Good Neighbor: Chinese Intervention through the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization,” in Andrew Scobell, ed., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, National

Defense University Press, 2015, 262; “Description of the Peace Mission-2013 China-Russia Joint Counterterrorism Exercise’s Live 

Troops Exercise” (和平使命-2013 中俄联合反恐军事演习实兵演习侧记), August 15, 2013. Translation. 

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-08/15/content_2467621.htm; China Military Online, “Eliminating ‘Terrorists’ at Night in ‘Peace 

Mission-2010’ Joint Military Exercise” (“和平使命-2010” 联合军演夜间清剿 “恐怖分子”), September 26, 2010. Translation. 

http://military.people.com.cn/GB/43331/12814707.html. 81 Lucian Kim, “Russia’s Multinational Military Exercise Last Week Was a Dry Run for Bigger War Games,” NPR, September 5, 2018. 

https://www.npr.org/2018/09/05/644806306/russias-multinational-military-exercise-last-week-was-a-dry-run-for-bigger-war-g; China’s 

National Defense, “‘Peace Mission-2018’: Two Bright Spots Worthy of Attention” (和平使命-2018: 两大亮点值得关注), August 24, 

2018. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm. 82 Xinhua, “China Tries Long-Distance Air Attack Mode in Drill,” September 21, 2010. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-

09/21/content_11331146.htm. 83 Wang Xuhui and Niu Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace Mission-2016’ Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the Joint 

Exercise’s New Bright Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥员解读联演新亮点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. Translation. 

http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm. 84 Lu Peng and Wu Shike, “China, Tajikistan Conclude Joint Counter-Terrorism Drill,” China Military Online, August 16, 2019. 

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-08/16/content_9592237.htm; Luo Shunyu, Pan Kai, and Zhang Haijing, “ ‘Peace Mission-2018’ 

Joint Counterterrorism Campaign Succeeds Stunningly” (“和平使命-2018”联合反恐战役震撼打响) China Military Online, August 

29, 2018. Translation. http://photo.81.cn/pla/2018-08/29/content_9266646.htm; China’s National Defense, “‘Peace Mission-2018’: Two 

Bright Spots Worthy of Attention” (和平使命-2018: 两大亮点值得关注), August 24, 2018. Translation. 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm; Wang Xuhui and Niu Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace 

Mission-2016’ Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the Joint Exercise’s New Bright Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 28

员解读联演新亮点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. Translation. http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm; Xinhua, “ 

‘Peace Mission-2016’ Joint Counterterrorism Military Exercise Organizes a Multi-Factor Live Fire Drill” (“和平使命-2016”联合反

恐军事演习 组织全要素实兵实弹合练), September 17, 2016. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com//mil/2016-

09/17/c_129284674.htm; Xinhua, “Live Fire Drill Portion of ‘Peace Mission-2010’ Joint Counterterrorism Military Exercise 

Successfully Held” (“和平使命-2010”联合反恐军演实兵演练成功举行), September 25, 2010. Translation. 

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-09/25/content_1709140_3.htm; Roger N. McDermott, “Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007,” 

Jamestown Foundation, October 19, 2007, 14, 16. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/JamestownMcDermottRisingDragon.pdf?x55281. 85 Wang Xuhui and Niu Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace Mission-2016’ Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the Joint 

Exercise’s New Bright Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥员解读联演新亮点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. Translation. 

http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm. 86 Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy 

Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 403. 87 Dmitry Gorenburg, “External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces,” Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute, January 2014, 26. 88 U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of Department of State Efforts to Measure, Evaluate, and Sustain 

Antiterrorism Assistance Objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 2020, 5. 

https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/aud-mero-20-32.pdf; U.S. Department of State, Antiterrorism Assistance Retrospective: 2018-

2019, 2019, 2–3. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/20-02355_ATABiennial_v3-508-bookmarks.pdf; Eugene Rumer, 

Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, “U.S. Policy toward Central Asia 3.0,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25, 

2016. https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/u.s.-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0-pub-62556. 89 Geoff Hill, “Chinese Military Taking ‘Irresponsible Actions’ toward U.S. Forces in Djibouti, Intel Chief Says,” Washington Times, June 

16, 2019. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/16/china-us-military-clash-over-djibouti-airspace/; U.S. Department of 

Defense, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White in the Pentagon Briefing Room, May 3, 

2018. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1511983/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagonchief-spokesperson-dana-w-whit/; Reuben F. Johnson, “U.S. Warns Pilots of Laser Attacks in Djibouti,” IHS Jane’s, April 27, 2018. 

https://www.janes.com/article/79630/us-warns-pilots-of-laser-attacks-in-djibouti. 90 Matthew Southerland, “The Chinese Military’s Role in Overseas Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Contributions and 

Concerns,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 2019. 91 Edward Lemon, Research Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, interview with Commission staff, August 6, 2020. 92 Will Green, Leyton Nelson, and Brittney Washington, “China’s Engagement with Africa: Foundations for an Alternative Governance 

Regime,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 1, 2020. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-

05/Chinas_Engagement_Africa.pdf. 93 Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?” Brookings Institution, 

June 20, 2011, 25. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland.pdf.; Radio 

Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Central Asia Report: July 14, 2005”, Volume 5, Number 26, July 14, 2005. 

https://www.rferl.org/a/1342122.html.; Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Iran: Prioritising Anti-Americanism over the Muslim cause,” Australian 

Institute of International Affairs, October 22, 2014. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/iran-prioritising-antiamericanism-over-the-muslim-cause/. 94 Edward Lemon, Research Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, interview with Commission staff, August 6, 2020; Security

Assistance Monitor, “Central Eurasia.” http://securityassistance.org/central-eurasia. 95 Julie Yu-Wen Chen and Soledad Jimenez-Tovar, “China in Central Asia: Local Perceptions from Future Elites,” China Quarterly of 

International Strategic Studies 3:3 (2017) 436. 96 U.S. Department of State, “United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity,” 

February 5, 2020. https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-for-central-asia-2019-2025-advancing-sovereignty-and-economicprosperity/. 97 China’s State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 2019, 26. 98 Times Now News, “China’s Rampant Expansionism Continues: It Now Has Its Eyes on Tajikistan’s Pamir Mountains,” August 7, 2020. 

https://www.timesnownews.com/international/article/china-s-rampant-expansionism-continues-it-now-has-its-eyes-on-tajikistan-spamir-mountains/633562; Paul Goble, “Beijing Implies Tajikistan’s Pamir Region Should Be Returned to China,” Jamestown 

Foundation, July 30, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/beijing-implies-tajikistans-pamir-region-should-be-returned-to-china/. 99 Times Now News, “China’s Rampant Expansionism Continues: It Now Has Its Eyes on Tajikistan’s Pamir Mountains,” August 7, 2020. 

https://www.timesnownews.com/international/article/china-s-rampant-expansionism-continues-it-now-has-its-eyes-on-tajikistan-spamir-mountains/633562. 100 Aijan Sharshenova, “Undermining Western Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: China’s Countervailing Influences, Powers and 

Impact,” Central Asian Survey 36: 4 (2017): 453–472. 101 Aijan Sharshenova, “Undermining Western Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: China’s Countervailing Influences, Powers and 

Impact,” Central Asian Survey 36: 4 (2017): 453–472.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 29

102 Dennis J. Blasko, independent analyst, interview with Commission staff, March 3, 2020; Xie Xibo, “China-Russia “Cooperation-2019” 

Joint Counterterrorism Exercise Held in Novosibirsk” (中俄“合作-2019”联合反恐演练在新西伯利亚举行), China’s Ministry of 

National Defense, October 11, 2019. Translation. http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2019-10/11/content_4852704.htm (Cooperation-2019);

Li Ming, “China-Russia “Cooperation-2019” Joint Counterterrorism Exercise Ends” (中俄合作-2019”联合反恐演练结束), Xinhua, 

October 18, 2019. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-10/18/c_1125124388.htm (Cooperation-2019); Lu Peng and Wu Shike, 

“China, Tajikistan Conclude Joint Counterterrorism Drill,” China Military Online, August 16, 2019.

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-08/16/content_9592237.htm (Cooperation-2019); Xinhua, “Uzbekistan, China Wrap Up Joint 

Anti-Terror Drills,” May 16, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/16/c_138064037.htm (Cooperation-2019); Gazeta, 

“Photo: Exercises of the National Guard and the People’s Armed Police of China” (Фото: Учения Нацгвардии и Народной милиции 

Китая), May 7, 2019. Translation. https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/05/07/gvardiya/ (Cooperation 2019); Luo Shunyu, Pan Kai, and Zhang 

Haijing, “‘Peace Mission-2018’ Joint Counterterrorism Campaign Succeeds Stunningly” (“和平使命-2018”联合反恐战役震撼打

响), China Military Online, August 29, 2018. http://photo.81.cn/pla/2018-08/29/content_9266646_14.htm (Peace Mission-2018); 

China’s National Defense, “‘Peace Mission-2018’: Two Bright Spots Worthy of Attention” (和平使命-2018: 两大亮点值得关注), 

August 24, 2018. Translation. http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/24/c_129939733.htm (Peace Mission-2018); Ethan Meick, 

“China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving toward a Higher Level of Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, March 2017, 24–27; Wang Xuhui and Niu Tie, “Commander of Chinese Contingent to ‘Peace Mission-2016’ 

Counterterrorism Exercise Explains the Joint Exercise’s New Bright Spots” (“和平使命-2016”反恐演习中方指挥员解读联演新亮

点), PLA Daily, September 20, 2016. Translation. http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-09/20/content_7266346.htm (Peace Mission-2016); 

China Military Online, “Chinese Troops Arrive in Kyrgyzstan for ‘Peace Mission-2016,’” September 14, 2016. 

http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/14/content_7258520.htm (Peace Mission-2016); Xinhua, “China-Russia ‘Cooperation2016’ Joint Counterterrorism Training Comes to a Perfect Close,” July 15, 2020. Translation. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-

07/15/content_5091381.htm (Cooperation-2016); Qi Mingyu and Guang Shusheng, “China-Russia “Cooperation-2016” Joint 

Counterterrorism Exercise Produces Results” (中俄“合作-2016”联合反恐训练结硕果), July 17, 2016. Translation.

http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2016-07/17/content_4695072.htm (Cooperation-2016); Wang Haiyun, “Joint Drills Vital for Security,” 

China Daily, August 1, 2013. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2013-08/01/content_16861213.htm (Peace Mission-2013); Zhao 

Shengnan, “Sino-Russian Exercise to Simulate Combat,” China Daily, August 15, 2013. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-

08/15/content_16894911.htm (Peace Mission-2013); Yan Meng and Ma Qian, eds., “SCO Member States Hold ‘Peace Mission 2012’

Drill in Tajikistan,” People’s Daily, June 15, 2012. http://en.people.cn/90786/7846872.html (Peace Mission-2012); Xinhua, “China Tries 

Long-Distance Air Attack Mode in Drill,” September 21, 2010. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/imqq/china/2010-

09/21/content_11336139.htm (Peace Mission-2012); Richard Weitz, “China’s Growing Clout in the SCO: Peace Mission 2010,” 

Jamestown Foundation, October 8, 2010. https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-growing-clout-in-the-sco-peace-mission-2010/ (Peace 

Mission 2010); Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-

2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 384–

385, 390, 399–400, 428 (Nurak Antiterror-2009 and Bogorodsk Disaster Relief Exercise); Marcel de Haas, “The Peace Mission 2007’ 

Exercises: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Advances,” Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, September 2007, 1, 2, 4. 

https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20070900_cscp_paper_haas.pdf (Peace Mission-2007); Richard D, Fisher, Jr., 

“‘Peace Mission,’” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2007. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118712715268497679 (Peace Mission-2007); 

Xinhua, “China’s People’s Armed Police ‘Snow Leopard Commando Unit’ Arrives in Russia to Participate in Joint China-Russia 

Counterterrorism Exercise” (中国武警 “雪豹突击队”抵俄参加中俄联合反恐演习), September 2, 2007. 

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-09/02/content_734480.htm (Cooperation-2007); Xinhua, “Curtain Rises on China-Russia ‘Cooperation2007’ Joint Counterterrorism Exercise in Moscow,” (中俄“合作-2007”联合反恐演习在莫斯科拉开序幕), September 3, 2007. 

Translation. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-09/03/content_735509.htm (Cooperation-2007); Major General Qian Lihua, “China-Tajikistan 

Counterterrorism Exercise Has Innovative Significance” (钱利华少将:“中塔反恐军演具有开创性意义“ ), Xinhua, September 22, 

2006. Translation. http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52984/4849775.html (Coordination-2006); People’s Daily Online, “China, 

Tajikistan Holds Military Exercise,” September 23, 2006. http://en.people.cn/200609/23/print20060923_305744.html (Coordination2006); Xinhua, “Joint Counterterrorism Military Exercise between the Tajikistan and Chinese Militaries Begins in Tajikistan,” (中塔两

国军队联合反恐军事演习在塔境内开始举行), September 22, 2006. Translation. http://www.gov.cn:8080/jrzg/2006-

09/22/content_396216.htm (Coordination-2006); Xinhua, “SCO Holds 2006 Joint Counterterrorism Exercise in Uzbekistan in Early 

March” (上合组织 3 月初在乌兹别克斯坦举行 2006 联合反恐演习), March 11, 2006. Translation.

http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2006/Mar/1150391.htm (East Antiterror-2006); Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization, “On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s ‘East Antiterror Exercise,’” (关于上海合作组织框架内举行

的“东方反恐—2006”联合反恐演习), March 6, 2006. Translation. http://ecrats.org/cn/news/5597 (East Antiterror-2006);

Chinanews.com, “A Scan of the Participating Forces in ‘Coalition-2003’ Counterterrorism Exercise,” (“联合-2003”反恐军事演习参

演部队扫描) August 13, 2003. Translation. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-13/0753555451s.shtml (Coalition-2003); Marcel de 

Haas, “War Games of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Drills on the Move!” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 30

 Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29:3 (2016): 382 (Exercise-01); Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed 

Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces, 2002-2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, ed., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the 

Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, 2010, 427 (Exercise-01); People’s Daily, “Backgrounder: Major PLA-Related Joint AntiTerror Military Exercises and Trainings,” December 21, 2007. http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/6325264.html (Exercise-01); CCTV, 

“Sino-Kyrgyzstan Counterterrorism Exercise,” (中吉军演 合力反恐), October 11, 2002. Translation. 

http://www.cctv.com/lm/522/41/57819.html (Exercise-01); People’s Daily, “Sino-Kyrgyzstan Military Exercise Catches ‘Terrorists,’” (

中吉军演抓“恐怖分子”), October 14, 2002. Translation. http://unn.peopledaily.com.cn/BIG5/paper68/7459/715805.html (Exercise01).