NUCLEAR THREATS FROM SMALL STATES

Jerome H. Kahan

June 13, 1994
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The author is Director of Regional Studies at the Center for

Naval Analyses (CNA). The views expressed in this monograph are

his own and do not necessarily represent those of CNA, the

Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Government.

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This study was originally presented at the U.S. Army War

College Fifth Annual Strategy Conference held April 26-28, 1994,

with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as

part of its Conference Series.
FOREWORD

What are the policy implications regarding proliferation and

counterproliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World states?

How does deterrence operate outside the parameters of superpower

confrontation as defined by the cold war's elaborate system of

constraints enforced by concepts like mutual assured destruction,

and counter-value and counter-force targeting? How can U.S.

policymakers devise contingencies for dealing with nuclear

threats posed by countries like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran,

and Syria?

These are some of the unsettling but nevertheless important

questions addressed by the author in this monograph. In his

analysis, Mr. Jerome Kahan examines the likelihood that one or

more of these countries will use nuclear weapons before the year

2000. He also offers a framework that policymakers and planners

might use in assessing U.S. interests in preempting the use of

nuclear weapons or in retaliating for their use.

Ironically, with the end of the cold war, it is imperative

that defense strategists, policymakers, and military

professionals think about the "unthinkable." In the interest of

fostering debate on this important subject, the Strategic Studies

Institute commends this insightful monograph to your attention.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JEROME H. KAHAN is Director of Regional Studies at the Center for

Naval Analyses (CNA). He joined CNA in 1990 after retiring from

the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor.

During his State Department career, Mr. Kahan held positions as

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Deputy

Director of the Political- Military Affairs Bureau, Member of the

Policy Planning Staff, and Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in

Turkey. In addition to experience in the private sector, Mr.

Kahan also served in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

and the Department of Defense. Between government assignments he

was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution where he

authored or coauthored three books and a series of articles on

strategic policy and arms control. Mr. Kahan is a member of the

Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of

Strategic Studies.
NUCLEAR THREATS FROM SMALL STATES

For decades, the United States has pursued nuclear

nonproliferation as an important national security goal. At

times, this objective was masked or even compromised by the

overarching needs of managing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance and

maintaining the Western Alliance. As the cold war faded, the

problem of proliferation assumed an ever more prominent place in

U.S. national security strategy. During the Bush administration,

this issue was especially visible when the defeat of Iraq in the

Gulf War showed how close that nation was to having developed

nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration's national security

policy puts priority on nonproliferation and assigns to the

Department of Defense the mission of "counterproliferation"—that

is, the strategic means of dealing with new nations that cross

the threshold and actually obtain weapons of mass destruction.1

This monograph focuses on counterproliferation, with special

attention to crises involving Third World states that, in the

near term, may produce or acquire militarily usable nuclear

weapons. It addresses four questions of interest to national

security planners and policymakers:

• What is the likelihood of Third World nations obtaining

and using nuclear weapons in ways that endanger U.S. interests?

• Under what circumstances might the United States turn to

military force if faced with Third World nuclear crises?

• How might the United States apply its military capability

in responding to nuclear crises in regional settings?

• What strategic and force structure guidelines should be

followed in planning to deal with Third World nuclear

proliferation?

NUCLEAR CHALLENGES

By the year 2000, seven so-called Third World countries

along with Israel can be posited to have acquired potentially

usable nuclear forces—weapons and delivery systems. These

countries are India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya,

and Syria. Some of these states may have already crossed the

nuclear threshold, but none has declared that it has done so. All

have a national interest in either obtaining nuclear forces or

retaining and possibly improving nuclear forces they may

presently possess.

The means as well as the motivations shaping the nuclear

ambitions of these states vary widely. Along with Israel, some

Third World countries now have a substantial capacity to produce

nuclear weapons themselves (Pakistan, India, and North Korea). By

the end of the decade, these nations could develop relatively

sophisticated nuclear forces consisting of dozens of weapons
capable of delivery by advanced aircraft and ballistic missiles

of medium range. Others (Iran, Libya, and Syria) may be forced to

purchase weapons or high-grade fissionable material from external

sources. The nuclear arsenals of these states will tend to be

relatively small and unsophisticated, consisting of a few weapons

outfitted for delivery by aircraft or short-range missiles. In

one case (Iraq), international restraints would have to be

overcome for nuclear weapons to be obtained, whether through

indigenous or external means. We assume that Iraq would be able

to acquire a nuclear force of moderate capacity by the end of the

decade.2

Israel, alone among the nations cited, is and will

presumably remain a U.S. ally. Although a nuclear-armed Israel

can complicate U.S. security interests, nuclear weapons in the

hands of the seven other states can lead to more direct

challenges. A few years ago, the list of potentially worrisome

small nuclear powers would have included South Africa, Brazil,

and Argentina, but these states have rolled back their programs.

A number of the new nations formed after the collapse of the

Soviet Union have inherited nuclear weapons. This analysis,

however, deals with only Third World nuclear challenges.

Likelihood of Nuclear Use.

The likelihood that the eight nations listed above would

actually use or threaten to use nuclear weapons is, in brief,

significant enough for the United States to take this possibility

seriously. Moreover, the chances of use are driven by a number of

rational factors, not by the specter of irrational governments

lurching out of control or the prospect of nuclear-armed

terrorists. These factors can be identified as contributing

singly or in combination to the likelihood of nuclear use by

Third World states.

Latent Conflicts. Regional rivalries will inevitably lead to

crises and armed conflicts between two small nuclear states or

between a nuclear-armed nation and a nonnuclear adversary. Crises

can turn into military conflict, and, at any point in such

dynamic situations, nuclear threats and use may well become

deliberate instruments of policy. This would be more likely to

occur if a nuclear-armed state, embroiled in a conflict and

deficient in conventional forces, starts to lose a conventional

war and is facing a nonnuclear adversary.

Weakened Constraints. During the cold war era, the United

States and the USSR were wary that regional conflicts might

escalate into a full-blown nuclear confrontation. Washington and

Moscow intervened to dampen local nuclear conflicts and offered

security umbrellas to their allies and friends. But now that

these constraints and connections are weak, small nuclear states

may feel isolated and more prone to use whatever military means

are necessary to protect their interests. Third World nuclear
states may not be inhibited from nuclear use for fear that the

United States or Russia will retaliate against them or that the

world community will punish them. President Clinton has

threatened to respond with all means necessary against North

Korea if that country uses nuclear weapons,3 but the credibility

and effectiveness of this policy have yet to be tested.

Dynamics of Deterrence. The United States and the USSR spent

decades developing a stable nuclear relationship based on an

understanding of mutual deterrence that evolved through years of

difficult dialogue and debate. An arcane set of doctrinal

principles slowly emerged, and nuclear force postures on both

sides were eventually guided, at least in theory, by these

principles. But deterrence may not be seen the same way or work

the same way with newly formed small nuclear states. Strategic

discourse between two small nuclear-armed adversaries may be

nonexistent, raising the prospect of a breakdown in deterrence at

the regional level. New Third World nuclear states may not be

inhibited from attacking nonnuclear states in their region if, as

suggested above, extended deterrence flowing from the threat of

superpower retaliation is not seen as credible.

Intelligence Gaps. Third World states tend to have imperfect

and incomplete intelligence information about their relative

positions in a conflict. Policymakers in these countries

therefore assume the worst and may decide to launch nuclear

weapons prematurely, based on the misperception that an opponent

is about to conduct a preemptive strike against its nuclear

arsenal. A situation along these lines almost developed in 1992

during a clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, with the

United States stepping in to provide information and diffuse the

crisis.4

Technical Deficiencies. Small nuclear forces, especially in

the hands of technically unsophisticated countries, may well be

deficient in command and control arrangements. These forces may

also be vulnerable to attack, at least until relatively

survivable launch platforms are acquired. These features increase

the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. When combined

with less-than-perfect information, the chances of nuclear use in

a Third World setting increase further due to "the reciprocal

fear of surprise attack"—a concept coined during the early days

of the U.S.-USSR strategic balance when the superpower deterrent

relationship was not yet stable.5

U.S. Interests and Stakes.

For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that none of the

Third World nuclear states being considered will be capable of

credibly attacking the U.S. homeland with long-range delivery

systems by the year 2000. Nor is it assumed that these states

will attempt to sneak a nuclear bomb into the United States by

unconventional means (e.g., suitcase bombs in commercial aircraft
or ocean freighters carrying clandestine devices). Given these

assumptions, why should the United States be concerned if Third

World states in remote places use nuclear weapons?

Following is a review of U.S. interests that could be

endangered if a Third World nuclear crisis arose. Not all these

interests would necessarily be challenged in every particular

Third World nuclear crisis, but the actions we take and the risks

we run will be governed, in part, by the range of interests at

stake and their relative importance.

Risks to U.S. Citizens and Forces. Protecting U.S. nationals

living abroad, as well as defending U.S. military forces

stationed overseas, is a primary responsibility of our president.

By the year 2000, thousands of U.S. nationals and substantial

numbers of U.S. military forces will be in foreign lands and

vulnerable to potential nuclear attack by nuclear-armed regional

states. This is true when we look in Asia, South Korea and Japan,

the Indian subcontinent, or the Middle East.

Risks to U.S. Allies. Whether dictated by formal treaties or

not, the United States would place prevention of nuclear use

against our allies or close friends very high on our list of

national priorities. In some cases, the existence of U.S. bases

on the soil of these countries would strengthen our

determination. Examples of nonnuclear nations under a potential

nuclear threat are Japan, South Korea, Egypt, the Gulf

Cooperation Council states, and Italy.

Risks of Escalation. Even though the cold war is over,

localized nuclear use could risk "horizontal" escalation, whereby

adjacent countries would feel forced to use their nuclear

weapons. There is also a risk of "vertical" escalation, where one

of the larger nuclear powers could become involved. An example of

the former might be an Iran-Iraq conflict with one or both sides

nuclear-armed, forcing Israel to make a military move with its

posited nuclear systems. An example of the latter is a Korean war

where North Korean nuclear weapons might bring China's nuclear

arsenal into the picture.

Humanitarian Concerns. Any nuclear use would create enormous

devastation from blast and fallout effects in the target country

and adjacent states. The Chernobyl incident, orders of magnitude

less serious than a nuclear detonation, has not yet been

forgotten, and its consequences linger. The United States has

responded to natural disasters and human suffering abroad in such

cases as Bangladesh and Somalia; it's difficult to believe we

would not, as a nation, respond to a nuclear-use disaster.

Risk to Resources. A regional nuclear conflict could

jeopardize our access to overseas resources or our ability to

conduct trade in or near certain areas. Nuclear conflict in the

Middle East, which would destroy oil fields or block shipping, is

the example that springs to mind. The Gulf War, which did not
involve nuclear weapons, highlighted this problem. But nuclear

use in Asia, whether on the Korean Peninsula or against Japan,

could also have serious economic consequences.

Risk of Precedent. Nuclear weapons have not been used in

anger since the raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United

States has sought to maintain the nuclear "firebreak" and to

persuade existing or potential nuclear states that these weapons

should not be used as military or diplomatic instruments.

Although use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict could

strengthen the barriers against subsequent use, it could have the

opposite effect in certain situations and stimulate interest in

acquiring nuclear weapons.

Conclusion.

It might be useful to put the Third World nuclear danger in

perspective. On the one hand, these dangers are less severe but

more likely than nuclear risks in the context of the relatively

stable East-West balance that characterized the last few decades

of the cold war. On the other hand, the presence of nuclear

weapons in the Third World makes future regional crises more

severe but less likely than the conventional Third World crises

we have expected and experienced thus far. If nothing else, U.S.

planners and policymakers need to pay more attention to

prospective Third World nuclear threats, lest we risk facing this

new challenge unprepared.

PROPENSITY TO USE FORCE

Whether the United States would turn to the actual use of

military force in dealing with a future Third World nuclear

crisis is a complex issue. A highly specific but operationally

significant question is whether we would decide to preemptively

attack and attempt to destroy a hostile Third World country's

nuclear force before it can be used, assuming that deterrence no

longer seems to be working and that defenses cannot be relied

upon to protect our interests. Whether and how U.S. military

force is used would clearly depend on the details of each case,

but we can develop guidelines before crises arise to assist in

preparing contingency plans. The approach we will follow is to

present plausible hypotheses about the propensity of U.S. leaders

to use military force preemptively and then "test" these

hypotheses against a range of representative scenarios involving

the Third World nuclear states of interest.

Setting the Scenarios.

Seven scenarios are sketched below, posited to take place by

the year 2000. They are all familiar crises, but with the crucial

exception that one or more of the regional protagonists is now

assumed to possess usable nuclear weapons. The scenarios

deliberately stop short of actual nuclear use by a regional state
as a means of focusing on the role of U.S. military forces for

purposes of deterrence and preemption. Each scenario can, of

course, be "pushed" to the point where a regional protagonist

uses nuclear weapons, thus raising the question of whether and

how the United States might use military force for purposes of

retaliation.

Scenario 1. In the midst of a leadership succession crisis,

North Korea launches a massive conventional attack against South

Korea, including an attack on U.S. forces stationed in South

Korea. Republic of Korea (ROK) forces counterattack while an

increasing number of U.S. military reinforcements enter the

country. North Korea threatens to use its nuclear-tipped missiles

against Japan as well as ROK and U.S. targets. The tide turns,

and allied forces push the attacking army back across the

Demilitarized Zone. U.S. intelligence sources detect North Korean

missiles being placed on full alert, with associated arming and

fuzing steps suggesting imminent launch...

Scenario 2. Iraq convinces the world community that it has

complied with the U.N. mandate, but manages to successfully

pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons program and acquire a new

arsenal of mobile missiles. Estimating that the United States is

too preoccupied with domestic problems to intervene, Iraqi

conventional forces once again invade Kuwaiti territory. Kuwaiti

forces slow down the attack and the government requests U.S.

military assistance. Saudi Arabia also requests U.S. assistance

and offers the United States permission to use its ports and

bases. Iraqi threats mount, and its mobile missiles are dispersed

and put on alert...

Scenario 3. The peace process falls completely apart and

Israel moves to annex the West Bank. An Arab coalition, including

a nuclear-armed Syria, strikes back with massive conventional

force against the invading Israeli army. The Arab coalition hopes

that Syria's nuclear capability will deter Israeli nuclear use.

Israel launches a massive conventional counterattack that pushes

Arab forces out of the West Bank. Israeli conventional forces

also attack Syria's nuclear capabilities, but fail to destroy all

nuclear-armed delivery systems. Syria threatens to use its

remaining nuclear weapons against massed Israeli armed forces.

The United States detects the arming and fuzing of Syrian

missiles...

Scenario 4. Iran, governed by Islamic Fundamentalists,

acquires nuclear weapons from one of the former Soviet Republics.

In the meantime, Iraq, having rebuilt its military forces to

include its own nuclear arsenal, launches a surprise conventional

attack into Iran to retake territory, overthrow the regime,

destroy the army, and negate Iran's nuclear capability. The

attack fails to destroy all of Iran's nuclear forces. Iran

prepares for a massive counterattack. Both sides issue nuclear

threats and move all available mobile missiles out of garrison...
Scenario 5. This scenario is a replay of the shipping war in

the Gulf (Earnest Will), with Iran threatening to block the

Straits of Hormuz but in possession of a small number of

externally acquired nuclear weapons. U.S. naval forces escorting

commercial ships are vulnerable to an Iranian nuclear strike. The

United States continues its escort operations and moves

additional forces into the area. Iran announces it is prepared to

use nuclear weapons either against U.S. forces or countries in

the region friendly to the United States...

Scenario 6. Pakistan launches a conventional strike into

Kashmir but soon finds itself losing the war as superior Indian

conventional forces counterattack. As part of this counterstrike,

India attempts to de-nuclearize Pakistan by preemptively

attacking Pakistani air bases and known missile sites. A few

Pakistani nuclear-armed mobile missiles survive and the

government of Pakistan threatens to destroy the massed Indian

army unless India retreats. India returns the threat...

Scenario 7. Libya purchases a few nuclear weapons and

supports another terrorist attack against U.S. nationals in

Europe. This time, Libya threatens nuclear weapons use if the

United States conducts military reprisals. The United States

launches selected conventional strikes against Libyan

headquarters and known nuclear sites, but a few Libyan mobile

missiles survive. Libya directs a specific threat against the

Italian government and U.S. bases in southern Italy...

Testing the Hypotheses.

As noted earlier, we assume that deterrence is about to fail

in connection with each scenario. Given this assumption, we offer

four hypotheses about the factors influencing U.S. decisions on

whether to use our military power to preemptively destroy the

Third World nuclear force in question:

• The higher the U.S. interests at stake, the stronger the

desire to use force to prevent nuclear use.

• The greater the likelihood of imminent nuclear use by an

adversary, the more pressure there will be for turning to

military solutions.

• The more sophisticated a nuclear opponent, the less likely

that U.S. decisionmakers will consider use of military force.

• The more domestic and international political opposition

to the use of military force, the greater the chance that

decisionmakers will rule out this option.

U.S. Interests. In all cases, the United States is concerned

about preventing nuclear use for nonproliferation, stability, and

humanitarian reasons, but the fundamental U.S. interests at stake
vary across the different scenarios.

U.S. interests are very high in the case of Korea. North

Korea's nuclear capabilities threaten U.S. forces in South Korea

and Japan, and endanger the populations of both these countries.

Moreover, we are tied to South Korea and Japan by security

alliances. We also want to prevent a Libyan nuclear strike

against Italy, a NATO ally. U.S. interests are high in the case

of a nuclear-armed Iraq for different reasons: to protect oil

resources and the sovereignty of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

In the case of Syria and an Arab-Israeli war, we have a

long-standing commitment to the Israeli nation, which, in this

case, needs to be balanced against the high stakes we have in our

relations with the Arab world and its oil resources. We might

well consider counterforce strikes against Syrian nuclear forces,

while restraining Israel from using its nuclear power—unless of

course Israel destroys Syria's nuclear arsenal first.

U.S. interests in the case of Iran are moderate to high,

partly to ensure that Gulf oil will keep flowing and partly to

protect U.S. ships in the area. A nuclear replay of the Iran-Iraq

War is of low to moderate interest to the United States, raising

questions of whether oil resources will be endangered and of the

risk of a wider war affecting Israel and Saudi Arabia. Finally,

in the Indo-Pak case, U.S. interests are limited to preventing or

containing nuclear use and protecting U.S. nationals that might

not have been evacuated.

Imminent Use. This factor greatly depends on the details of

the scenario, but some generic observations can be made. In

situations where U.S. intelligence detects the arming and fuzing

of nuclear warheads, and does so with great reliability, nuclear

use would be considered imminent—as in the Korean and

Arab-Israeli scenarios. At this "peak period" of decision, U.S.

policymakers must recognize that deterrence is about to fail, and

face a difficult choice between two risky actions:

• Launching a preemptive counterforce strike, which may not

be successful and could cause both actual and political fallout,

or

• Taking no offensive actions, and hoping that the adversary

will not launch his missiles or that available missile defenses

will intercept any such attacks.

In other scenarios, where there are nuclear threats and

force deployments but no sign of imminent use, U.S. leaders can

continue to try diplomatic and economic means to deter use.

Military forces can be applied for this purpose by moving them to

the area, putting them on alert, and conducting exercises. U.S.

officials can also issue warnings of dire consequences if nuclear

weapons are used.
Sophistication of Opponent. In considering military

counterforce, U.S. policymakers must calculate the feasibility of

success. This creates a prospective dilemma: Would we attack when

our interests are seriously threatened in order to prevent

localized nuclear use, even if we are not confident of success?

Or would we use force aggressively only when we are sure of an

effective outcome, even if this meant accepting the severe

consequences of nuclear use by a Third World state?

Our interests are extremely high in the case of Korea, but

our capacity to effectively preempt against a relatively large,

hardened, and dispersed target set is low, which highlights the

dilemma noted above. We would be more capable of conducting

relatively effective attacks against a rejuvenated but moderately

sophisticated Iraqi nuclear program, learning from our past

experience and assuming our intelligence information is accurate.

This could be an instance where high interest might be matched by

usable military power.

In the case of Indo-Pak, where there is a coincidence of

relatively low interests and high to moderately sophisticated

arsenals, the decision would presumably go against preemption.

Here is a situation where low interests and nonusable military

force are aligned. The case of Libya threatening Italy, on the

other hand, is characterized by relatively high U.S. interest and

a relatively unsophisticated nuclear arsenal, suggesting a

greater propensity to contemplate a U.S. preemptive move. This is

also true in the case of Syria threatening Israel, although the

Israelis may de-nuclearize their enemy before we act. In the

Iran-Iraq missile war and the Iran "Earnest Will" case, we see

moderate to low capabilities and moderate U.S. interest. Here the

issue is whether the smaller risk of military action is worth

taking, recognizing that the stakes involved are modest.

Political Acceptability. Military calculations and strategic

assessments by themselves will not determine whether the United

States initiates an action of such import as launching a

preemptive attack in a time of nuclear crisis. Congressional

attitudes and U.S. public opinion, as well as world opinion

generally, will be very much taken into account by the President

and his advisors.

In the Korean war and Iraqi invasion scenarios, U.S.

domestic and international public opinion would probably support

active military action. Both adversaries would undoubtedly be

seen as rogue states which have flaunted U.N. mandates. In the

case of Libya, support might also be high, given Libya's past

record and the fact that a U.S. ally is under the nuclear gun.

Falling in the middle range of moderate or mixed support

would be the cases of Iran in the Gulf and Syria in connection

with an Arab-Israeli war. The former would raise the specter of

an oil cutoff, but the situation would not necessarily be seen by

the U.S. public and the world community as warranting such
drastic action. The latter situation would raise enormous debates

in the United States over whether we should engage in a nuclear

conflict to protect Israel, given that nation's own capabilities

and the critical importance of preserving relations with the Arab

states.

The Indo-Pak and Iran-Iraq scenarios would probably not

engender strong political support for serious U.S. military

actions. Diplomatic and economic instruments would be favored.

Striking the Balance. As suggested earlier, decisionmakers

would have to balance the four countervailing factors in deciding

whether to launch a preemptive military strike. Table 1 rates

these factors in relationship to each of the scenarios.

 Imminence of Sophistication Political

Scenario U.S. Interests Nuclear Use of Opponent 

Acceptability

North Korean Very High High High High

 Invasion

Iraq (Gulf War) High Moderate Moderate Moderate

Syria (Arab- High High Low* Moderate

 Israeli War)

Iran-Iraq Moderate to Low Moderate Low/Moderate Low

 Missiles

Iran (EARNEST Moderate to High Low Low Moderate

 WILL)

Indo-Pak Low Low High/High Low

 (Kashmir)

Libya Threat High Low Low High

*Israeli capabilities are high, but it is assumed that the United States would

not consider targeting this force.

Table 1. Propensity to Preempt.

MILITARY OPTIONS

In discussing the propensity to use force, we highlighted

the particular question of whether U.S. leaders would consider

preemptive strikes against small nuclear states under certain

crisis conditions. We now explore more broadly and systematically

the issue of what range of military options could further U.S.

interests in dealing with regional nuclear crises before and

after nuclear use by a Third World adversary.

Before Nuclear Use.

During this phase, the U.S. objective would be to prevent

nuclear use. Five strategies can support this objective.

Dissuading or deterring the adversary not to use nuclear

weapons. Missions to accomplish this strategy primarily involve
posturing and positioning military forces to demonstrate resolve

and imply that severe actions entailing the actual use of U.S.

military force might be forthcoming. Forces and activities to be

employed could include forward- basing strategic bombers and

tactical aircraft, placing strategic missiles on alert, moving

carrier battle groups closer to the country in question, flying

reconnaissance aircraft over potential targets, and conducting

joint and combined exercises in the region. Nuclear capable as

well as conventional systems could be used, accompanied by

appropriate high-level statements and warnings by senior

officials.

Care should be taken, however, not to posture and threaten

to the point that the opponent, fearing a U.S. preemptive attack,

decides to launch his own nuclear weapons first. In the extreme,

conventional forces such as cruise missiles could be used to

attack high-value nonnuclear weapons targets in the adversary

country to make our threats credible. But this is risky and can

stimulate rather than deter nuclear use by the adversary.

Neutralizing the ability of a Third World country to use its

nuclear weapons. In theory, this option would entail the use of

externally based devices to remotely disable the nuclear- related

command, control, and communications network in a target country

or neutralize the arming and fuzing mechanism on the adversary's

nuclear weapons. Theoretically, various techniques could be

potentially useful in this regard, such as electronic warfare and

long-distance lasers housed in satellites. In practice, these

technologies do not exist, and it is not likely that reliable

systems with such capabilities will be available within the next

10 to 15 years.6

Destroying enemy nuclear weapons before they are launched. This strategy involves a preemptive counterforce strike against

all known nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems, both

on-line and backup. Conventional forces would be preferable for

this mission, because it would be politically difficult for the

United States to justify striking first with nuclear weapons to

prevent a smaller state from using its nuclear weapons. Moreover,

nuclear weapons attacks would cause serious collateral damage and

radioactive fallout. Depending on geography, base availability,

and the size and sophistication of the target set, the United

States could use a wide range of weapon systems to conduct a

counterforce strike—strategic bombers, conventionally tipped

strategic missiles, land- and sea-based tactical air, and cruise

missiles.

Successful execution of such a mission is very demanding.

Unless we faced an extremely small and unsophisticated force in a

country where our intelligence was superb, we would almost surely

not be able to identify and locate all nuclear targets—mobile,

fixed, and hidden. Even if all targets were known by U.S.

intelligence, destroying all of them simultaneously to avoid

launchings under attack could not be guaranteed. Failure to fully
and effectively accomplish this mission raises the prospect of

nuclear retaliation against U.S. forces or allies.

Capturing and disarming enemy nuclear forces before they can

be used or deployed in more survivable modes. This strategy

involves gaining physical control over the enemy's nuclear

weapons, whether in storage or installed on delivery systems.

Potentially, this is a job for U.S. special forces— inserting

themselves clandestinely in enemy territory, finding all the

nuclear weapons, and capturing or permanently disarming them. As

a practical matter, the chances of successfully accomplishing

such a mission are extremely low. Further, attempting the mission

runs the risk of U.S. forces being discovered, captured,

displayed publicly, or possibly executed. On balance, the risks

seem to outweigh feasible gains.

Protecting U.S. forces and other endangered targets. If a

Third World adversary is convinced that U.S. defensive systems

can provide protection from nuclear attacks against U.S. forces,

bases, or allies, deterrence would be strengthened. Moreover,

both active and passive defenses can help make preemptive strikes

more feasible by protecting targets against any adversary nuclear

systems that survive a counterforce strike or those that are

launched on warning of an impending U.S. attack. Passive

defenses, such as shelters and radiation protection, are

marginally useful, but active defenses—both air and missile

defenses—are potentially capable of making a significant

difference. Of these, ballistic missile defenses are the most

important to deploy and the most challenging to develop, given

the nature of the evolving Third World threat.

The United States is pursuing a number of theater missile

defense programs, including land-based systems such as the

Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and sea-based

systems such as the SM-2 deployed on Aegis cruisers.7

 By the year

2000, some of these systems will be able to provide some

protection for particular types of targets facing missile threats

of various levels of sophistication, but it is unlikely that we

will have high confidence in being able to intercept all incoming

ballistic missiles that could be launched in the scenarios we

postulated. Also, unless defensive systems had been predeployed

at an earlier stage,8 the United States will have to solve the

problem of moving enough of them into the appropriate theater in

time to respond to a crisis.

After Nuclear Use.

If the United States fails to prevent or fully protect

against nuclear use, policymakers will face the issue of how

military forces should be applied after a Third World nation has

actually used one or more nuclear weapons. It is important to

recognize that even limited use of nuclear weapons is a unique

event. Apart from political and policy implications, the
devastation that would be caused by small numbers of nuclear

weapons used against forces or cities would be magnitudes greater

than "normal" wartime damage.

U.S. military objectives after Third World nuclear use could

be shaped by the number and nature of the targets destroyed. For

analytic purposes, three broad objectives can be identified:

limiting damage, defeating the attacker militarily, and punishing

the perpetrator.

Destroying any residual nuclear weapons to limit further

damage. Unlike the situation before nuclear use, the United

States might now contemplate using its own nuclear weapons to

accomplish this task. Yet even if U.S. nuclear use made military

sense, the broader question of whether we, as a superpower,

should respond in kind to nuclear use is extremely controversial.

Moral as well as political issues are involved. Even in strategic

terms, it is unclear whether responding in kind would deter

further nuclear use by graphically demonstrating the consequences

of such an action or whether such a decision would show that we

are prepared to use our nuclear might and thereby stimulate

proliferation.

Defeating the aggressor militarily by attacking all military

targets, conventional as well as nuclear. The purpose of this

objective would be a combination of limiting damage and crippling

the capacity of the attacker to make war, as in the case of Iraq

in DESERT STORM. This approach might make sense if the attacker

used nuclear weapons in a limited fashion against only military

targets. It would send a message to other nations contemplating

nuclear weapons programs or use of nuclear forces already in

their possession. Conventional weapons would be the system of

choice, because nuclear weapons would be neither technically

necessary nor politically acceptable.

Punishing a perpetrator by retaliating against the enemy's

basic infrastructure or possibly against urban-industrial

centers. Such devastating actions would certainly send a strong

message, but it is questionable whether they would be judged by

world opinion as appropriate, or whether they would help deter

further nuclear use by small states. A crucial issue here is

whether the United States should use conventional or nuclear

weapons to conduct large-scale retaliatory missions. Nuclear

weapons would be more "cost-effective," but, for political

reasons, no U.S. president would find it easy to order such acts.

Perhaps such extreme U.S. reactions could be considered proper

and proportionate if the Third World attacker had deliberately

used nuclear weapons to destroy urban centers with enormous

attendant civilian fatalities.

The Nuclear Hedge.

When facing a nuclear-armed Third World adversary, U.S.
forces would have to be prepared to operate in a nuclear

environment. This would be the case during deterrent and

preemptive phases and also after Third World nuclear use if any

nuclear weapons remain on enemy soil.

Some of the military actions that U.S. forces might take to

hedge against nuclear threats could dilute the effectiveness of

the counterproliferation missions these same forces might be

asked to conduct:

• Dispersal of units, such as ground forces and naval groups

at sea, would be prudent; but dispersal can weaken the capacity of 

our forces to project power and overcome defenses.

• U.S. seaborne and airborne forces should stay out of range

when facing Third World nuclear threats; but not displaying our

power could make deterrence less successful, and attacking from a

distance would make counterforce strikes less effective.

• Active protection can prevent our forces from being

completely vulnerable to nuclear attack; but this requires that

offensive forces remain under the protection of theater ballistic

missile defense (BMD) and could limit their freedom of action to

execute counterproliferation missions.

• Passive defenses, such as "hardening" of systems, could

limit the severity of Third World nuclear attacks; but such

countermeasures could inhibit the effectiveness of offensive

forces by reducing flexibility, increasing weight, and requiring

specialized training.

Summary.

The option or combination of options that make sense would

be decided on a case-by-case basis, but plans should be made to

provide the full range of choices to U.S. policymakers. Among the

criteria to be considered in selecting military options are the

following:

• What would the action accomplish militarily?

• What would be the technical confidence of success?

• What military risks would be faced?

• What political goals would be served?

• What political constraints would have to be dealt with?

• What penalties would be incurred by taking "nuclear

hedging" actions?

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Four conclusions for U.S. policymakers and planners can be

drawn from the analysis presented.

Conclusion 1: The Problem Is Real.

Third World states are acquiring nuclear weapons and the

means to deliver them. Before the year 2000, the world might well

see one or more of these states using nuclear weapons in a

regional setting. It is difficult to assume otherwise, given the

potential for conflict and the political instabilities

surrounding these emerging nuclear states, combined with the

technically unsophisticated characteristics of some small nuclear

forces. The prospect of regional nuclear use creates risks to

U.S. security interests. Our forces, citizens, and allies would

be gravely endangered. Global stability also could be jeopardized

once the barrier against nuclear use is penetrated.

Conclusion 2: Planning Is Essential.

U.S. policymakers need to focus on how to dissuade small

nuclear states from actually using their weapons or threatening

such use in an attempt to coerce others. Declaratory policies

warning such states to eschew nuclear use need to be backed by

concrete military planning to develop capabilities to deter,

protect against, and, if necessary, destroy hostile Third World

nuclear forces. Special counterproliferation strategies and force

packages should be developed. Although we must retain powerful

nuclear forces of our own, we should emphasize acquiring

offensive conventional forces that have effective counterforce

potential as well as developing credible theater missile

defenses. It is not correct to assume that such capabilities

would automatically be subsumed within a force structure designed

to deter larger nuclear threats or to prevail in major regional

contingencies facing conventionally armed opponents.9

Conclusion 3: Execution Is Difficult.

Even with careful and high priority counterproliferation

planning, U.S. policymakers would face difficult choices in

dealing with Third World nuclear crises. It would be particularly

difficult to judge whether to intervene and when to move beyond

deterrence and actively apply U.S. military power in an attempt

to disarm an enemy's nuclear force before it is used. U.S.

leaders, under the pressure of a fast-breaking crisis, would

experience "Hobson's choice" in balancing the failure to act

early enough to head off nuclear use against the failure of

acting too early and precipitating such use. Once nuclear use

occurs, how to respond militarily would create a new set of

uncertain and unpleasant choices. Whether available theater

defensive systems can help resolve these dilemmas and offer

acceptable policy options remains to be seen.
Conclusion 4: Think About the "New" Unthinkable.10

Solutions to the problem of dealing with Third World nuclear

threats are not obvious, whether approached from diplomatic,

economic, or military perspectives. To move towards a solution

requires far more attention be paid to addressing this problem

than has been the case in recent years. There needs to be a

recognition that the challenges posed by Third World nuclear

states create differences in kind, not simply differences in

degree, compared with both traditional cold war nuclear challenges

and the conventional contingencies currently driving our

strategic planning. The stakes, risks, constraints, and

uncertainties associated with this emerging nuclear problem are

unique. Mistakes are costly and largely irreversible, even if

limited nuclear use occurs in a distant regional setting. The

United States should not face this challenge alone, but should

exert leadership in organizing the industrialized democracies to

coordinate counterproliferation strategies.

Notes:

1. Remarks by Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to

the National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International

Security and Arms Control, December 7, 1993.

2. For information on the capabilities and intentions of

present and potential Third World nuclear states, see Leonard

Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990;

Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers 263,

Winter 1991; and Gordon Oehler, Director, CIA Non-Proliferation

Center, Testimony Before Governmental Affairs Committee, U.S.

Senate, January 15, 1992.

3. "U.S. Warns North Korea on Nuclear Weapons," The

Washington Post, July 11, 1993, p. A-19.

4. For a discussion of this incident, see Seymour Hirsh, "On

the Nuclear Edge," The New Yorker, March 29, 1993, pp. 56-73.

5. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 207.

6. This judgment is based on the author's assessment of the

technical difficulties of accomplishing this task. For a

reference to the concept, see Earl Lane, "Way To Zap Terrorist

N-Bomb?", Long Island Newsday, May 5, 1993, p. 17.

7. For background on U.S. theater antiballistic missile

programs, see: Steven A. Hildreth, "Theater Missile Defense:

Issues for the 103rd Congress," CRS Issues Brief (IB93064),

August 26, 1993; "Theater Missile Defense Systems," BMD Technical

Information Center Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 2, July/August 1993;Tom

Blau, "TMD in the Clinton Era," Military Technology, July 1993,
pp. 16-23; and Barbara Opall, "DOD Predicts Limited Missile

Defense by 96," Defense News, May 17, 1993, p. 13.

8. In March 1994, the United States deployed Patriot

defenses to South Korea to defend against Scud missiles. These

systems were reasonably effective in defending against Scud

missiles during the Gulf War, but have limited capability against

longer-range ballistic missiles. See "Clinton Orders Patriot

Missiles to South Korea," The Washington Post, March 22, 1994, p.

A-1.

9. The Defense Department, however, has organized an effort

to identify technologies and systems that can contribute to U.S.

counterproliferation strategy. See "DOD Working Groups To Study

Counterproliferation Technologies," Inside the Pentagon, January

20, 1994, p. 7.

10. With thanks to Herman Kahn, who coined the phrase

"Thinking About the Unthinkable" in preparing ourselves to deal

with the risk of a U.S.-USSR nuclear war. For a book well ahead

of its time in thinking about the "new" unthinkable, see Rodney

Jones, Small Nuclear Forces and U.S. Security Policy, Lexington,

MA: Lexington Books, 1984. For a recent assessment, see Robert

Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds, Coping with New Nuclear

Nations, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

and Conference Organizer

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Mr. Jerome H. Kahan

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Conference Cover Artist

Mr. Lawrence C. Miller

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler