GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Defense, 

Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives

August 1999 BATTLEFIELD 

AUTOMATION

Opportunities to 

Improve the Army’s 

Information 

Protection Effort

GAO/NSIAD-99-166

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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280565 Letter

August 11, 1999

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Over the next decade, the Army’s modernization objectives include the 

integration of information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ 

timely information throughout the battlespace. Information technology 

integration—or digitization—is to be implemented throughout the Army 

through the development, production, and fielding of over 100 individual 

systems. According to the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget request, the 

Army’s digitization efforts will cost $20.8 billion between fiscal year 2000 

and 2005. The Army expects this investment to result in increased 

survivability, lethality, and tempo of operations. However, it also 

recognizes that reliance on digitization could make its command and 

control systems more vulnerable to enemy activities such as jamming and 

computer network attacks and has developed a Protection Plan for Army 

XXI Information Systems that lays out a general strategy for implementing 

information protection into the design of the digitized battlefield.

This report is in response to a Subcommittee request to evaluate the Army’s 

development and acquisition plans for command and control systems that 

will be part of future digitized battlefield units. Specifically, we evaluated 

the Army’s protection plan to determine whether it ensures sufficient 

assessments to test and develop the defensibility of the digitized battlefield 

against command and control warfare attacks.

Results in Brief The Army has carried out a number of assessments to test and develop the 

defensibility of digitized battlefield systems and forces, but its protection 

plan does not ensure sufficient vulnerability assessments. While the 

Army’s plan provides a general strategy for implementing information 

protection into the design of the digitized forces, it does not constitute a 

detailed implementation plan, one that lays out 

• the specific systems, networks, and infrastructures covered; 

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• their information protection requirements or needs; 

• the information protection knowledge and knowledge gaps for those 

systems; and 

• the tests or other events that will be used to fill specific knowledge gaps 

and address previously identified weaknesses. 

Without such a detailed implementation plan, systems vulnerabilities that 

might otherwise be identified may not be exposed and fixed and the 

substantial investment made by the Army could be at risk. Additionally, 

without a plan that identifies specific needed events, adequate funding may 

not be made available for needed activities, and valuable test opportunities 

could be lost. Furthermore, systems could be developed and tested under 

requirements that are not aligned with the goals and needs of the Army’s 

protection plan. For example, we found that a key digitization effort does 

not have a minimum requirement for development of the protection 

concept outlined in the Army’s protection plan. As a result, systems could 

be developed without providing features needed to achieve that concept. 

We also found that the system that is the centerpiece of the Army’s 

digitization efforts has a key performance requirement that is set for a 

non-jamming environment and is not conducive to judging whether 

sufficient protection has been achieved. While the Army has already 

undertaken a number of activities laid out in its protection plan, much 

remains to be done as its digitization efforts are to extend over the next 

decade and be implemented through the development, production, and 

fielding of over 100 individual systems.

This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense 

regarding the management of the Army’s digitization-related information 

protection activities. 

Background The Army plans to use vulnerability assessments, including red team 

activities, to help develop digitization systems and networks. Vulnerability 

assessments are conducted to determine potential and exploitable 

weaknesses; red teaming activities are a specialized type of vulnerability 

assessment in which a group acting as an opposing force conducts 

offensive actions to generate a reaction or expose a weakness on the 

friendly side.

The Army has defined 16 high-priority systems that, at a minimum, are to be 

fielded to accomplish its First Digitized Division. (The Army plans to field 

its First Digitized Division by December 2000 and its First Digitized Corps 

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by September 2004.) One of these 16 high-priority systems—the Force XXI 

Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system—is the centerpiece 

of the Army’s digitization efforts because of its potential to contribute 

significantly to achieving the Army’s digitization goals.1

 When fielded, 

FBCB2 is expected to provide enhanced situational awareness to the 

lowest tactical level—the individual soldier—and a seamless flow of 

command and control information across the battlespace. 

FBCB2 will be composed of

• a computer that can display a variety of information, including a 

common picture of the battlefield overlaid with graphical depictions 

(known as icons) of friendly and enemy forces;

• software that automatically integrates Global Positioning System data, 

military intelligence data, combat identification data, and platform data 

(such as the status of fuel and ammunition); and

• interfaces to communications systems.

Battlefield data will be communicated to and received from users of 

FBCB22

 through the Tactical Internet—a network of tactical radios3 for the 

transmission and receipt of data needed for battlefield situational 

awareness and command and control decisions. The FBCB2 system 

requires a functioning and protected Tactical Internet to accomplish its 

mission.

Because the FBCB2 system and Tactical Internet are two of the Army’s 

most important digitization efforts, establishing their ability to withstand 

attacks is critical. The Army’s near-term information protection efforts 

have been designed to capitalize on FBCB2 and Tactical Internet 

development and test events “culminating in a ‘no holds barred’ electronic 

and computer attack” during the FBCB2 system’s initial operational test 

and evaluation. This test can serve as a proof-of-concept event to 

determine whether the Army has achieved its intent of developing a level of 

1

 Nearly all of the other high-priority Army digitization systems are dedicated to enhancing the Army 

Tactical Command and Control System.

2

 For further information on the FBCB2 program, please see Battlefield Automation: Acquisition Issues 

Facing the Army Battle Command, Brigade and Below Program (GAO/NSIAD-98-140, June 30, 1998).

3

 The Internet’s tactical radios are currently the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) 

and Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS).
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information systems protection sufficient to allow its critical functions and 

operations to continue.

Information Protection 

Plan Is Not Sufficiently 

Detailed

The Army developed a plan to integrate information protection features 

and capabilities into its tactical systems, networks, and infrastructure. It 

has also carried out a number of assessment activities in keeping with that 

plan. However, while that plan lays out a general strategy for integrating 

information systems protection into the design of the digitized battlefield, it 

is not a detailed implementation plan. Without a detailed implementation 

plan, the Army is not as well positioned as it could be to ensure that 

important test opportunities are not lost, that needed information 

protection activities are adequately funded, and that digitization systems 

development and test requirements accurately reflect the Army’s 

protection needs and goals.

The Army’s Protection Plan In September 1997 the Army Digitization Office published the Army’s 

Protection Plan for Army XXI Information Systems.4 The plan states that 

the objective of information systems protection is to ensure that friendly 

command and control capabilities are available to the commander and 

staff. It then goes on to describe three types of command and control 

warfare threats that are of concern: physical attacks, electronic attacks, 

and computer attacks. 

• Physical attacks involve destruction, damage, overrun, or capture of the 

physical components of “digitization.” Overrunning and capture 

facilitate an adversary’s ability to employ computer attacks on friendly 

forces. 

• Electronic attacks (also referred to as electronic warfare) include 

attacks against communications links and “high energy” attacks. 

Attacks against communications links include (1) signal intercept to 

effect compromise of data, (2) radio emitter direction finding and 

geo-location to support signal analysis and attack, and (3) radio 

jamming, which is usually intended to corrupt data or deny service. 

High-energy attacks include those by electromagnetic pulse generators 

(which destroy or damage electronic components within an area by 

4

 Subsequently, responsibility for oversight and coordination of the efforts outlined in that plan 

transitioned from the Army Digitization Office to the Army’s Director of Information Systems for 

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4).
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overloading them with energy) and directed energy weapons such as 

high-energy lasers (which direct large amounts of energy onto a 

specified target).

• Computer attacks are generally (1) aimed at software or data contained 

in either end-user or network computers; (2) intended to range from 

unauthorized but unobtrusive access to information and unauthorized 

modification of software or data to total destruction of software and 

data; and (3) the least well understood form of attack and may involve 

the most difficult countermeasures to successfully implement.

The protection plan notes that computer attacks can occur in peacetime 

and wartime and comments that the interconnected nature of the 

digitization networks may present the opportunity to create widespread 

service disruption. As a result, the Army plan concludes that computer 

attacks appear to pose the most serious potential threat to digitization.

The Army’s plan lays out an information protection strategy that reflects its 

belief that complete protection against all known and future vulnerabilities 

is not feasible. In line with that belief, the Army’s intent is to field a 

digitized force with a level of protection that is “sufficient” to allow critical 

functions and operations to continue while under computer attack. To 

accomplish this level of protection, the Army has adopted a “defense in 

depth” protection concept consisting of electronically guarded perimeters 

and active information surveillance. The Army’s “defense in depth”, 

depicted in figure 1, is to include

• an external digital perimeter composed of communications security, 

firewalls,5

 security guards, and where necessary, physical isolation 

serving as a barrier to outside networks;

• similar internal perimeters between echelons and/or functional 

communities;

• a secure local workstation environment, consisting of individual access 

controls, configuration audit capability, command and control protect 

tools, and procedures;

• intrusion detection systems;

• extensions to network management capabilities to provide real-time 

network surveillance and reaction to network intrusions; and

5

 Firewalls are hardware and software components that protect one set of systems resources (e.g., 

computers, networks) from attack by outside network users by blocking and checking all incoming 

network traffic. Firewalls permit authorized users to access and transmit privileged information and 

deny access to unauthorized users.
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• a robust, survivable infrastructure designed to “contain” damage from 

attacks and to be readily repairable in the event of an attack.

Figure 1: Army’s “Defense in Depth” Protection Concept

Source: U.S. Army, Protection Plan for Army XXI Information Systems. 

The Army’s plan lays out a strategy to translate this “defense in depth” 

protection concept into action by incorporating lessons learned through 

vulnerability assessment activities into the design and implementation of 

digitization systems, networks, and infrastructures. These assessment 

activities are to be conducted during experiments, training events, and 

development and test events to

External

networks

Internal

perimeter

Digital

perimeter

Local

workstation

security

Network and

security

management/

surveillance

Robust,

survivable

infrastructure
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• determine the level of protection achieved;

• identify vulnerabilities; and

• provide feedback to impact (1) architecture, design and development 

efforts and (2) tactics, techniques, and procedures development and 

training activities.

The Army’s Assessment 

Activities 

The protection plan describes three phases of vulnerability assessments. 

Phase I and phase II have been completed.

Phase I used computer attacks focused on probing the network for 

potential vulnerabilities, but did not involve active attacks. During the first 

phase, electronic attack vulnerability assessments were performed in 

laboratory and other controlled facilities against individual systems, 

including EPLRS and SINCGARS. These assessments were conducted as a 

part of the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE). 

Table I.1 in appendix I lists the phase I Task Force XXI AWE Red Team 

tasks, their objectives, and where and when they were conducted.

In one example of the Army’s phase I activities, the Army’s Electronic 

Proving Ground performed position navigation vulnerability experiments 

using an early version of FBCB2 software and the Tactical Internet. In a 

simulated Global Positioning System jamming environment, the Electronic 

Proving Ground found that the FBCB2 software fluctuated between 

displaying and reporting inaccurate Global Positioning System and 

accurate EPLRS position navigation data. The jamming resulted in not only 

a fluctuating display of inaccurate and accurate positions for the unit’s own 

location, but also the transmission of both inaccurate and accurate position 

reporting through the Tactical Internet to other units on the network. As a 

result of this work, the Electronic Proving Ground concluded that the early 

version of FBCB2 software tested had a major software design problem. 

The Electronic Proving Ground recommended that this finding be 

considered by the system developer.

Phase II involved computer attacks focused on intrusions from both 

outside and inside the network to detect exploitable vulnerabilities. The 

attackers were allowed to leave “markers”6

 but were not authorized to 

cause any physical impact or to disconnect computers from the network. 

Electronic attacks were simulated or conducted surgically. Table I.2 in 

6

 The “markers” left were computer files indicating that unauthorized access had been achieved.
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appendix I lists the September 1997 Army protection plan’s list of phase II 

Division XXI AWE Red Team tasks, their objectives, and where and when 

they were to be conducted.

One example of red team activities in the Division XXI AWE that is reported 

to have occurred during phase II was an examination of the impact of 

jamming the Army’s Mobile Subscriber Equipment.7

 The Army reported 

that it used progressive jamming against the Mobile Subscriber Equipment 

of the 3rd Brigade Tactical Operations Center and learned that

• as expected, the Mobile Subscriber Equipment rerouted traffic around 

jammed frequencies with no initial impact on situational awareness;

• jamming both of the operations center’s main data pipes at artificially 

high levels caused severe slowing of rerouted data traffic; and

• jamming two frequencies with high power for a sustained time would 

make the perpetrator vulnerable to detection and counterattack by 

friendly air or artillery.

As a result, the Army concluded that jamming the Mobile Subscriber 

Equipment would not be a high payoff opportunity for the enemy. Overall, 

the Army reported that the red teaming efforts conducted during the 

Division XXI AWE provided valuable insights into strategies for protection 

of information technologies on the battlefield and reinforced the need for a 

“defense in depth” approach. 

The Army is currently involved in phase III of the vulnerability assessments 

outlined in its protection plan for Army XXI information systems. The 

assessments conducted in this phase are to be progressively more robust, 

more broadly based attacks intended to apply stress to digitization 

systems, networks, and infrastructure. Ultimately, this phase is to 

culminate in a “no holds barred” command and control attack on its 

digitization systems. The Army, however, has not yet defined the scope and 

nature of the attacks that are to occur during that event.

The Army’s protection plan calls for its phase III activities to capitalize on 

the FBCB2 system’s development and acquisition program test and 

evaluation events. While the primary focus of its efforts are to be test and 

7

 The Army’s Mobile Subscriber Equipment provides secure voice telephone and data transmission to 

corps and below forces. All of its equipment is classified secret and all personnel operating on the 

network must have a secret security clearance.
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evaluation events associated with FBCB2 and the Tactical Internet, the 

Army also plans to take advantage of other events to assess its information 

systems protection posture, including events associated with the Army 

Global Command and Control System, the Integrated Combat Service 

Support System, and the Warfighter Information Network. To date, 

however, the Army has not detailed the planned use of non-FBCB2 related 

development and test events. Table I.3 in appendix I lists the Army 

protection plan’s phase III vulnerability assessment tasks with objectives, 

events, and responsible organizations. 

The Army has already carried out some phase III activities. For example, 

information protection activities occurred as a part of both the FBCB2 

Field Test 1 and the FBCB2 Limited User Test. As a part of the Field Test 1 

held during May and June 1998,8

 the Army subjected the FBCB2 and 

Tactical Internet to 2 nights of barrage jamming. Additionally, during the 

last 3 days of the field test, the Army’s Program Manager for Information 

Warfare with the Army’s Communications and Electronics Command 

conducted a Command and Control Protection Advanced Technology 

Demonstration that consisted of localized jamming and information 

warfare attacks. During the August 1998 FBCB2 Limited User Test, the 

Army also carried out some “red team” tasks9

—mapping10 the Tactical 

Internet to gain an understanding of its architecture and possible 

weaknesses and analyzing digitized forces’ susceptibility to signals 

intelligence efforts. 

While the Army has already undertaken a number of activities laid out in its 

protection plan, much remains to be done as the Army’s digitization efforts 

are to extend over the next decade and be implemented through the 

development, production, and fielding of over 100 individual systems. For 

8

 The FBCB2 Field Test 1 consisted of 61 FBCB2 systems spread across the Electronic Proving Ground’s 

east range. Fourteen of the systems were on mobile platforms. Among its other limitations, the test did 

not involve as heavy a command and control message load as had been planned.

9

 Many of the Army’s “red team” tasks are other forms of vulnerability assessments, not “red teaming” as 

has been defined. For example, in discussing the FBCB2 Limited User Test information protection 

efforts, the Army official overseeing those efforts stated that it would be more accurate to call them 

“blue team” activities (i.e., friendly force efforts) because the individuals carrying them out were 

working to identify vulnerabilities and point them out to the “friendly” forces, not to exploit them.

10 Mapping involves sending out “requests for service” to try to determine the structure of the network; 

i.e., who can be identified as being on the Internet. Enemies would use mapping to try to define the 

structure of friendly networks and identify possible points of exploitation. Friendly forces would use 

mapping of their own networks to try to determine if unauthorized equipment or connections (which 

can serve as “back doors” for unauthorized access) are hooked up to the network.
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example, the Army’s report on its Field Test 1 information protection 

activities stated that FBCB2 and the Tactical Internet must undergo more 

extensive electronic and information warfare testing during upcoming 

FBCB2 test events, including Field Test 2, Force Development Test and 

Experimentation, and its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. The 

report also stated that systematic electronic and information warfare test 

and evaluation of the other First Digitized Division systems and networks 

must be initiated and completed prior to fielding. 

Detailed Implementation 

Plan Not Developed

While the Army has developed a general strategy for integrating 

information systems protection and has conducted a number of assessment 

activities, it lacks the specificity that would be contained in a detailed 

implementation plan. The Army’s protection plan does not 

• define the more than 100 systems that are a part of its overall 

digitization efforts;

• detail their specific information protection requirements, what is known 

or unknown about their individual vulnerabilities, or the specific test or 

other events to be used to fill identified knowledge gaps and ensure 

satisfactory resolution of previously identified weaknesses; 

• define specific information protection aspects or issues to be tested 

during specific tests and events or who is responsible for carrying out 

and funding those specific activities; and

• identify the cost of specific protection plan activities or the parties 

responsible for funding those activities.

A detailed implementation plan that provides this information could help 

the Army identify test opportunities, address funding issues, and ensure 

that requirements are aligned with the goals and needs of its protection 

plans. 

Identification of Test 

Opportunities and Funding 

Issues

Because its protection plan lacks sufficient implementation information, 

the Army could lose valuable testing opportunities. For example, during 

our review, we found that guidelines (in draft form as a security annex to 

the Army Digitization Master Plan of January 1999) that would charge 

involved parties with specific tasks contained no more information than 

the Army’s overall protection plan itself. Specifically, the September 1997 

Protection Plan and the security annex both state that follow-on 

assessments will be included in their next updates and that those 

assessment plans will address test and evaluation events such as the 

Maneuver Control System’s Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
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M1A2 (Abrams Tank) System Enhancement Program Initial Operational 

Test and Evaluation, the M2A3 (Bradley Fighting Vehicle) Initial 

Operational Test and Evaluation, and other events as appropriate. In June 

1998 the Maneuver Control System11 (MCS) Block III software underwent 

an initial operational test and evaluation, but that test was not used for 

protection plan activities. The opportunity to use this test for protection 

plan activities was lost because the Army’s protection plan lacked 

sufficient implementation information including specific identification of 

activities to be carried out during that MCS test and because no such 

details were subsequently developed. 

The Army’s protection plan is based on an assumption that sufficient 

resources will be made available to implement a prudent amount of 

information systems protection in the first digitized division and beyond. 

As mentioned, however, the plan provides no funding details. Development 

of a detailed implementation plan could help the Army avoid funding 

shortfalls. For example, last year the Army’s Test and Evaluation 

Management Agency put in a funding request for unfunded requirements of 

over $6 million in fiscal year 1999 and $7 million in each of fiscal years 2000 

through 2006 for the Army’s Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate 

(SLAD) to perform information warfare vulnerability assessments of 

digitized battlefield systems and related activities. The Army was unable to 

locate funds for those activities and included them on a list of unfunded 

requirements sent to Congress. Congress subsequently increased the 

SLAD’s fiscal year 1999 budget for vulnerability assessments by $4 million. 

These funding issues have not disappeared, however, as the unfunded 

requirement for fiscal year 2000 SLAD-led, information warfare 

vulnerability assessments and related activities has grown to $10.2 million.

Ensuring Requirements Are 

Aligned With Plan’s Goals and 

Needs

A detailed implementation plan could help the Army ensure that digitized 

battlefield systems have requirements that are aligned with its protection 

plan’s goals and needs. Two key components of the Army’s digitization 

efforts—the FBCB2 system and the Tactical Internet—have requirements 

that are not in line with the goals and needs of the Army’s Protection Plan 

for Army XXI Information Systems. Specifically, the Capstone

11 The MCS program is intended to develop and field a computer system that provides automated 

critical battlefield assistance to maneuver commanders and their battle staff at the corps-to-battalion 

level. MCS—a key component of the Army Tactical Command and Control System—is 1 of 16 systems 

considered to be critical elements within the Army’s digitization effort because of the expected 

contribution they will make to achieve the required capabilities of the digitized battlefield.
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Requirements Document for the Tactical Internet12 sets an objective, not 

threshold, requirement for the “defense in depth” protection concept 

envisioned in the Army’s protection plan. The capstone requirements 

document states that a “threshold” value is the minimum acceptable value 

necessary to satisfy an operational need and that an “objective” value is the 

desired performance above that threshold.13

To be able to judge whether sufficient protection has been achieved, 

systems’ performance criteria need to be set and systems need to be judged 

for performance in the hostile environment in which they may need to 

operate. The capstone requirements document appropriately sets criteria 

for performance in a tactical environment that includes radio jamming, but 

the program most clearly tied to the Tactical Internet—FBCB2—has 

criteria set for performance in a non-jamming environment. Specifically, a 

key FBCB2 performance requirement, Information Exchange, has not been 

set to demonstrate attainment of a minimal level of performance in a 

jamming environment—a type of threat that the Army protection plan 

seeks to address. 

The FBCB2 operational requirements document states that the requirement 

for Information Exchange, listed as a Key Performance Parameter14 for the 

system, is to provide a capability for the timely and reliable exchange of 

information between a sender and recipient. The document lists four 

categories of messages by type and assigns speed of service requirements 

for the transmission of those messages based on their type. For example, 

as a threshold value, 90 percent of category one messages sent—defined as 

Alerts and Warnings—are to be successfully received within 6 seconds.

12 User requirements may be documented as capstone requirements, which are common systems’ 

requirements (such as overarching inter-operability requirements or standards) that apply to a 

family of systems. 

13 Army Regulation 71-9 states that the “minimum acceptable value (threshold) requirements will be 

truly essential and minimum needs for successful operations and not desires or artificial contract or 

acquisition values.”

14 A key performance parameter is that capability or characteristic so significant that failure to meet the 

threshold can be cause for the concept or system selection to be reevaluated or the program to be 

reassessed or terminated.
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It also includes, however, an assumption of no jamming for the defined 

“Information Exchange” requirements.15

Conclusions The Army’s digitization efforts hold the promise of providing its fighting 

forces with operational improvements. However, they will also provide 

potential enemies new avenues of attack and greater opportunities to 

exploit existing vulnerabilities. Although, the Army has developed a 

general strategy for implementing systems protection into the design of the 

digitized battlefield, its plan lacks sufficient detail. Given the substantial 

digitization work that remains to be done (the integration of information 

technologies into over 100 systems), we believe a detailed implementation 

plan is needed to help ensure that the Army (a) fields a digitized force that 

can carry out its critical functions and operations and (b) is cognizant of 

any residual vulnerabilities—a factor than could prove important in 

recognizing enemy information system attacks. Furthermore, we believe 

such a plan could help ensure that sufficient funding, oversight, and effort 

are applied to developing the needed information protection. To be 

effective, the implementation plan should be a “living” document that will 

extend beyond the First Digitized Division and First Digitized Corps—a 

plan that is continually updated as circumstances dictate. We believe that 

the absence of such a plan places the substantial investment the Army is 

making in digitization at greater risk.

In addition to developing a detailed implementation plan, we believe the 

Army has further opportunities to enhance its information protection 

effort. The Army’s successful implementation of its “defense in depth” 

concept will depend, in part, on how well that concept is reflected in 

requirements placed on individual systems. In our opinion, the threshold 

Tactical Internet information protection requirement should be aligned to 

the Army protection plan concept, that is, Tactical Internet related systems 

should be required to support the development of the “defense in depth” 

called for in the Army protection plan. Also, to help ensure that the 

digitized forces that are fielded provide sufficient protection allowing 

critical functions and operations to continue, the Army needs to set 

minimum performance criteria for systems’ performance in such an 

environment, including setting minimum performance for FBCB2 in a 

jamming environment. We believe that setting such performance standards 

15 The FBCB2 operational requirements document is not entirely clear, and the assumption of a no 

jamming environment may apply to other key performance parameters also.
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will help ensure that systems that cannot carry out critical functions and 

operations when under attack are not fielded.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to:

• Develop a detailed implementation plan for the Army’s protection 

efforts for Army XXI information systems to include information such as 

a system by system breakout of tested and untested (known and 

unknown) areas of vulnerabilities; the specific test events to be used to 

look for systems vulnerabilities or to confirm fixes to previously 

identified, significant vulnerabilities; and responsible performing and 

funding parties.

• Require the Tactical Internet to have threshold information protection 

requirements consistent with the Army’s “defense in depth” protection 

concept.

• Set performance requirements for and test FBCB2 in a jamming 

environment.

Agency Comments DOD generally concurred with the recommendations contained in a draft 

of this report. DOD concurred with our first recommendation stating that 

the Army has already initiated an effort to develop a detailed 

implementation plan for its information protection activities. Regarding 

our second recommendation on tactical internet security, DOD generally 

concurred and stated that the Army will review requirements documents 

for all First Digitized Division systems to determine whether their security 

requirements are consistent with the Army’s “defense in depth” concept. 

DOD generally concurred with our third recommendation, stating that the 

Army will revise performance requirements for FBCB2 to reflect 

performance in a jamming environment and will test in that environment. 

We believe that the actions outlined in DOD’s response should enhance the 

Army’s information protection efforts. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.

Scope and 

Methodology

To evaluate the Army’s protection plans to determine whether they ensure 

sufficient assessments to test and develop the defensibility of the digitized 

battlefield, we reviewed the Army’s overall protection plans by analyzing 
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key Army information protection related documents (including the Army’s 

Protection Plan for Army XXI Information Systems and its draft security 

annex for the Army Digitization Master Plan) and considering them in the 

context of the Army’s larger digitization efforts. In evaluating the Army’s 

near-term plans to develop and test its “defense in depth” protection 

concept, we reviewed its plans to use FBCB2 and Tactical Internet 

development and test events and examined key development and test 

documents for those efforts to determine whether their approach was in 

line with the Army’s protection plan. We obtained briefings from and 

discussed issues with parties directly involved in the development and 

oversight of Army information protection efforts, program managers for 

high-priority digitization systems, and testers.

In the course of our work, we were briefed by and interviewed officials 

responsible for management and oversight of the Army’s 

digitization-related information protection efforts; program managers for 

high-priority digitization systems; officials responsible for planning, 

carrying out, and overseeing system vulnerability assessments; and other 

Army and DOD representatives. We examined DOD and Army information 

protection documents, system requirements, test plans, and other program 

documents. We performed our work primarily with officials from the Army 

Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Computers. We also gathered data from the Army 

Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the 

Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Alexandria, 

Virginia; the Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe and Fort 

Eustis, Virginia; the Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, 

Alexandria, Virginia; the Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, 

California; the Army’s Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona; 

the Army Survivability/Lethality Directorate, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 

Maryland; the Defense Information Systems Agency, Falls Church, Virginia; 

the Army Land Information Warfare Activity, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the 

4th Infantry Division and 3rd Corps, Fort Hood, Texas.

We performed our review from July 1998 to July 1999 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to Representative John P. Murtha, 

Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee; Representative C.W. Bill 

Young, Chairman, and Representative David R. Obey, Ranking Minority 

Member, House Committee on Appropriations; and other interested 
B-280565

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

congressional committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the 

Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable 

Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army. Copies will also be made available to 

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Key contributors to this assignment were Charles F. 

Rey, Bruce H. Thomas, and Gregory K. Harmon.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li 

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation
Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Red Team Tasks

20

Appendix II

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

24

Tables Table I.1: Phase I (Task Force XXI) Red Team Tasks 20

Table I.2: Phase II Division XXI AWE Red Team Tasks 21

Table I.3: Planned Phase III Vulnerability Assessments During

FBCB2 Test Events 22

Figures Figure 1: Army’s “Defense in Depth” Protection Concept 6

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below

EPLRS Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

DISC4 Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Computers

AWE Advanced Warfighting Experiment

MCS Maneuver Control System

SLAD Survivability /Lethality Analysis Directorate
Contents

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

Appendix I

Red Team Tasks ApenxIdi

Table I.1: Phase I (Task Force XXI) Red Team Tasks

Source: U. S. Army, Protection Plan for Army XXI Information Systems.

Red Team task Objective Location Dates

• Position/navigation vulnerability 

assessment

To determine the impact of loss of Global 

Positioning System signal on the Task Force 

information network

Fort Huachuca, AZ

Fort Huachuca, AZ

Apr. 1996

Dec. 1996

• Hacker/virus vulnerability 

assessment

To determine the vulnerability of the Task Force 

information network to hacker, virus, and other 

non-traditional threats

Fort Hood, TX

Fort Irwin, CA

Dec. 1996

Mar. 1997

• Operations security evaluation To determine new/increased operational 

security vulnerabilities due to digitization of the 

battlefield

Fort Hood, TX

Fort Irwin, CA

Dec. 96

Mar. 97

• Signal intelligence/ measurement 

and signatures intelligence 

characterization

To determine unique pattern and signatures of 

the digitized force

Fort Hood, TX

Fort Irwin, CA

Dec. 1996

Mar. 1997

• Security policy evaluation To assess the needs for revised and/or 

additional security policy due to digitization

Fort Hood, TX

Ft. Irwin, CA

Dec. 1996

Mar. 1997

• Tactical Internet components 

vulnerability assessment 

To determine unique vulnerabilities of the 

individual systems comprising the Tactical 

Internet (e.g., SINCGARS and EPLRS)

Fort Monmouth, NJ

Fort Monmouth, NJ

June 1996

Nov. 1996
Appendix I

Red Team Tasks

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

Table I.2: Phase II Division XXI AWE Red Team Tasks

Source: U. S. Army, Protection Plan for Army XXI Information Systems.

Red Team task Objective Location Dates

• Electronic warfare To determine the impact of loss of selected 

communication links on the Division XXI AWE 

experimentation information network 

Simulation Exercise II

Fort Hood

Sept. 1997

Nov. 1997

• Operations security evaluation To determine new/increased operational security 

vulnerabilities due to digitization of the battlefield

Fort Hood Nov. 1997

• Computer attack vulnerability 

assessments

To detect exploitable vulnerabilities of attacks from 

both outside and inside the Division XXI AWE 

information network

Simulation Exercise II

Fort Hood

Sept. 1997

Nov. 1997

• Capture/exploitation of the 

mobile subscriber equipment 

node

To determine vulnerabilities to the Mobile 

Subscriber Equipment network resulting from 

capture of Small Extension Node 

Fort Hood Nov. 1997

• Measurement and signatures 

intelligence characterization

To determine unique patterns and signatures of the 

digitized force

Fort Hood Nov. 1997
Appendix I

Red Team Tasks

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

Table I.3: Planned Phase III Vulnerability Assessments During FBCB2 Test Events

Red Team task Objective Event

Responsible 

organization

System assessments To assess performance of individual systems 

to electronic warfare and command and 

control attack and characterize their 

signatures

• Electronic attack To assess vulnerabilities of new 

communication systems to jamming

Laboratory assessments of Near 

Term Digital Radio, High Capacity 

Trunk Radio, and others as 

required

PM TRCS/CECOM

• Computer attack To assess vulnerability of Army Tactical 

Command and Control System component 

systems to command and control attack

Vulnerability assessments of 

FBCB2, Maneuver Control 

System, other command and 

control systems

• PM Applique

• PM ATCCS

• Other PMs

• SLAD

Technical Network 

assessment

To assess the vulnerabilities of the network to 

attack and characterization in a controlled 

environment

• Electronic attack To assess vulnerability of battalion- and 

brigade-level communication 

systems/networks to jamming

• Field Test I 

• Field Test II 

EPG

• Computer attack To assess vulnerability of information and 

Command and Control systems to attack

• Laboratory and testbed 

assessments

• Field Test I 

• Field Test II 

PM IW/SLAD

• Characterization To assess the ability to identify friendly nodes 

through unique signatures

Laboratories CECOM/SLAD/ 

INSCOM/EPG

Operational network 

assessment

To assess the vulnerabilities of the network to 

attack and characterization in an operational 

environment

• Electronic warfare attack To assess vulnerability of battalion- and 

brigade-level communication 

systems/networks to near-peer live electronic 

warfare attack

IOT&E OPTEC/SLAD/

PM IW

• Command and control 

attack

To assess vulnerability of information and 

Command and Control systems to live attack 

culminating in a full-up near-peer computer 

attack during IOTE

• Limited User Test

• FDT&E

• IOT&E

OPTEC/LIWA/PM IW/ 

SLAD

• Characterization To assess the ability to identify friendly nodes 

through unique signatures in an operational 

setting

Limited User Test CECOM/

INSCOM

• Operations security/ 

computer security

To assess operational and computer security 

procedures and training

• Limited User Test

• FDT&E

• IOT&E

INSCOM
Appendix I

Red Team Tasks

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

Legend:

ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System 

CECOM Communications and Electronics Command 

EPG Electronic Proving Ground 

FDT&E Force Development Test and Experimentation

INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command

IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation

IW Information Warfare

OPTEC Operational Test and Evaluation Command

PM Program Manager, Product Manager, Project Manager

LIWA Land Information Warfare Activity

SLAD Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate

TRCS Tactical Radio Communications Systems

Source: U. S. Army, Protection Plan for Army XXI Information Systems.
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenxIdi
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-166 Battlefield Automation

Now on p. 14.

Now on p. 14.

Now on p. 14.

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