alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Third Department,

February, 1967

(February 8, 1967)

#### In the Matter of Louis J. Lefkowitz, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Petitioner, v. Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Albany County, Respondents.

Memorandum by the Court.

The petition fails to disclose any factual or legal basis for petitioner’s assumption that the respondents are “about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction”. (CPLR 7803, subd. 2.) We reach no other question (but, see, *Matter of Barton Realty Corp.*v. *Mangan,*25 A D 2d 730). Petition dismissed, without costs. Stay vacated. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds, Staley, Jr., and Gabrielli, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2570 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2570

 To authorize funds for the United States Marshals Service's Fugitive 
                        Safe Surrender Program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 6, 2006

    Mr. DeWine (for himself, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Kyl, and Mr. McCain) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize funds for the United States Marshals Service's Fugitive 
                        Safe Surrender Program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Fugitive Safe Surrender is a program of the United 
        States Marshals Service, in partnership with public, private, 
        and faith-based organizations, which temporarily transforms a 
        church into a courthouse, so fugitives can turn themselves in, 
        in an atmosphere where they feel more comfortable to do so, and 
        have nonviolent cases adjudicated immediately.
            (2) In the 4-day pilot program in Cleveland, Ohio, over 800 
        fugitives turned themselves in. By contrast, a successful 
        Fugitive Task Force sweep, conducted for 3 days after Fugitive 
        Safe Surrender, resulted in the arrest of 65 individuals.
            (3) Fugitive Safe Surrender is safer for defendants, law 
        enforcement, and innocent bystanders than needing to conduct a 
        sweep.
            (4) Based upon the success of the pilot program, Fugitive 
        Safe Surrender should be expanded to other cities throughout 
        the United States.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) In General.--The United States Marshals Service shall 
establish, direct, and coordinate a program (to be known as the 
``Fugitive Safe Surrender Program''), under which the United States 
Marshals Service shall apprehend Federal, State, and local fugitives in 
a safe, secure, and peaceful manner to be coordinated with law 
enforcement and community leaders in designated cities throughout the 
United States.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the United States Marshals Service to carry out this 
section--
            (1) $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2007;
            (2) $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; and
            (3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2009.
    (c) Other Existing Applicable Law.--Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to limit any existing authority under any other provision 
of Federal or State law for law enforcement agencies to locate or 
apprehend fugitives through task forces or any other means.
                                 <all>
```
#### Illinois National Casualty Company, appellant, v. Fred. Ollech et al., appellees.

Gen. No. 8,774.

Opinion filed October 10, 1934.

Roger E. Chapin, for appellant. John G. Friedmeyer and Herman H. Cohn, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Fulton

delivered the opinion of the court.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-6520

DEVON M. BYRD,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., District Judge. (3:19-cv-00434-JAG-RCY)

Submitted: June 16, 2020 Decided: June 19, 2020

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Devon M. Byrd, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Devon M. Byrd seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018) petition. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 148 & n.9 (2012) 

(explaining that § 2254 petitions are subject to one-year statute of limitations, running from 

latest of four commencement dates enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2018)). The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2018). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2018). 

When, as here, the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition 

states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 140-

41 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Byrd has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Byrd’s motion for a certificate of 

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
#### In the Matter of the Public Administrator of the County of New York, Respondent, v. City of New York, Appellant.

Order entered July 14, 1967, unanimously reversed on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the motion to enlarge petitioner-respondent’s time within which to file notice of claim against respondent-appellant City of New York denied. Special Term was without authority to grant the application under pertinent statutory provisions (General Municipal Law, § 50-e) nor, indeed, was any substantial reason advanced to excuse delay in filing. The claim for. pain and suffering avails not as a device for extending the time within which to file, arising as it did simultaneously with the claim for wrongful death *(Joseph*v. *McVeigh,*285 App. *628Div. 386, affd. 309 N. Y. 877). Concur — Capozzoli, J. P., McGivem, Markewieh, McNally and Steuer, JJ.
Searched for **https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/ES-05-10913.pdf**

 

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*Note:* This calendar view maps the number of captures of **https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/ES-05-10913.pdf**, *not* how many times the site was actually updated.

Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
## TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM FOR CONSUMER PRODUCTS:

ENERGY CONSERVATION STANDARDS FOR RESIDENTIAL FURNACES AND BOILERS

September, 2004

U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Building Technologies Program Appliances and Commercial Equipment Standards Washington, DC 20585This Document was prepared for the Department of Energy by staff members of Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and Navigant Consulting, Inc.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

October 31, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

128559 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 128559 

 COA: 258892 

Oakland CC: 94-135060-FH 

MARK IVAN RICHARDSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 7, 2005 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

p1024 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 31, 2005 

Clerk
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 1163

In re: ALLEN RAY DYER , Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. James K. Bredar, Chief District Judge. ( 1:18

- mc
- 00237 )

Submitted : August 13, 2019 Decided: September 5, 2019

Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges , and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Allen Ray Dyer , LAW OFFICE OF ALLEN DYER, Ellicott City, Maryland, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Allen Ray Dyer appeals the district court’s order entering a public reprimand after Dyer was disciplined by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing reciprocal discipline. See In re Morrissey , 305 F.3d 211, 217 (4th Cir. 2002); In re Fallin , 255 F.3d 195, 197 (4 th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district

court

. In re Dyer , No. 1:18

- mc
- 00237 (D. Md. Jan. 19, 2019). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
be fore this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
#### Mary Schweitzer, as Administratrix, etc., Respondent, *v.*Ernst Sander et al., Appellants.

(Submited May 6, 1884 ;

decided June 3, 1884.)

*Thos. Gorlett*for appellants.

*J. M.. Humphrey*for respondent.

Agree to affirm; no opinion.

All. concur.

Judgment affirmed.
Page 1 of 2

Case No. 4:99cr23-RH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. CASE NO. 4:99cr23-RH

NGHIA LE,

Defendant.

________________________________/

ORDER DENYING THE REQUEST FOR EARLY 

TERMINATION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE AND

ALLOWING A RESPONSE ON WHETHER THE 

CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION SHOULD BE MODIFIED

The defendant Nghia Le was convicted and sentenced. The sentence 

included a term in the Bureau of Prisons and a term of supervised release. Mr. Le 

served his prison term and now is on supervised release. The assigned probation 

officer has requested early termination of supervised release.

This order denies the request. Based on the nature of the offense and all the 

circumstances, I find that termination of supervised release at this time is not

warranted by the defendant’s conduct and the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(e)(1). 

Case 4:99-cr-00023-RH-CAS Document 229 Filed 04/22/14 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Case No. 4:99cr23-RH

This does not mean, though, that supervision should be continued at its 

present level. This order gives the government an opportunity to be heard on 

whether the conditions of supervised release should be modified in a specific 

respect.

For these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The clerk must docket the request for early termination of supervised 

release. The request is DENIED.

2. The government may file a memorandum by May 6, 2014, on whether 

the condition of supervised release requiring the defendant to provide the probation 

officer a report within the first five days of each month should be modified to 

require the defendant to provide a report for a month only if the probation officer 

so requests. 

SO ORDERED on April 22, 2014.

s/Robert L. Hinkle

United States District Judge

Case 4:99-cr-00023-RH-CAS Document 229 Filed 04/22/14 Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE AUDITED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF METAL RECOVERY TECHNOLOGIES INC. FOR ITS FISCAL YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                               7
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                         65
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   170
<PP&E>                                            2592
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   17833
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             4902
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              470
<PREFERRED>                                         44
<COMMON>                                            21
<OTHER-SE>                                       62355
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     17833
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     1047
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  64
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1111)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (1111)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (1111)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.066)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>ANTI-DILITIVE
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### VALENTINI, Respondent, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

June 15, 1906.)

Action by Cecilia W. Valentini against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. C. N. Bovee, for appellant. L. FT. Freedman, for respondent.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. Order filed.
Subpart 7.2 - Planning for the Purchase of

Supplies in Economic Quantities

Parent topic: Part 7 - Acquisition Planning

7.200 Scope of subpart.

This subpart prescribes policies and procedures for gathering information from offerors to assist the

Government in planning the most advantageous quantities in which supplies should be purchased.

7.201 [Reserved]

7.202 Policy.

(a) Agencies are required by 10 U.S.C. 3242 and 41 U.S.C.3310 to procure supplies in such quantity

as-

(1) Will result in the total cost and unit cost most advantageous to the Government, where

practicable; and

(2) Does not exceed the quantity reasonably expected to be required by the agency.

(b) Each solicitation for a contract for supplies is required, if practicable, to include a provision

inviting each offeror responding to the solicitation-

(1) To state an opinion on whether the quantity of the supplies proposed to be acquired is

economically advantageous to the Government; and

(2) If applicable, to recommend a quantity or quantities which would be more economically

advantageous to the Government. Each such recommendation is required to include a quotation of

the total price and the unit price for supplies procured in each recommended quantity.

7.203 Solicitation provision.

Contracting officers shall insert the provision at 52.207-4, Economic Purchase Quantity-Supplies, in

solicitations for supplies. The provision need not be inserted if the solicitation is for a contract under

the General Services Administration’s multiple award schedule contract program, or if the

contracting officer determines that-

(a) The Government already has the data;

(b) The data is otherwise readily available; or

(c) It is impracticable for the Government to vary its future requirements.
7.204 Responsibilities of contracting officers.

(a) Contracting officers are responsible for transmitting offeror responses to the solicitation

provision at 52.207-4 to appropriate inventory management/requirements development activities in

accordance with agency procedures. The economic purchase quantity data so obtained are intended

to assist inventory managers in establishing and evaluating economic order quantities for supplies

under their cognizance.

(b) In recognition of the fact that economic purchase quantity data furnished by offerors are only

one of many data inputs required for determining the most economical order quantities, contracting

officers should generally take no action to revise quantities to be acquired in connection with the

instant procurement. However, if a significant price variation is evident from offeror responses, and

the potential for significant savings is apparent, the contracting officer shall consult with the

cognizant inventory manager or requirements development activity before proceeding with an award

or negotiations. If this consultation discloses that the Government should be ordering an item of

supply in different quantities and the inventory manager/requirements development activity concurs,

the solicitation for the item should be amended or canceled and a new requisition should be

obtained.
#### § 51.782 Very serious damage.

*Very serious damage* means any specific defect described in § 51.784, Table I; or an equally objectionable variation of any one of these defects, any other defect, or any combination of defects, which very seriously detracts from the appearance, or the edible or marketing quality of the fruit.