## NO. 12-07-00279-CR IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

NO EL S . HA RRIS

, § APP EAL FRO

M T HE 2 41 ST APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF
TH E ST ATE OFTEX

AS, APP ELL EE § SMI TH CO UN TY

, T EXAS
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Noel S. Har

ris appea ls h i s conviction for tampering with evidenc e, for which he w as sentenc ed to imprisonment for sixteen ye ars. I n three issues, Appellant cha llenges the suff iciency of the e vid e nc e a ndarg ue s th a t hi s se nte nc e c on sti tut e d c ru e l a ndun us ua l pu nis hme nt. W e a ff ir m.
B ACKG ROUND Appellant wa s char ged by indictment with ta mpering with evidenc e. The indictment further contained a n enhanc ement all eg ation that Appellant had be en pre viously convicted of the f elony of fe ns e of dr ivi ng wh ile int ox ic a te d. Ap pe lla nt ple a de d “ no t gu ilt y, ” a ndthe matte r p ro c e e de d to a jury trial. At the outset of trial, a hea ring was he ld on Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court de nied Appellant’ s motion, and the parties proc eede d with the prese ntation of evidenc e. Of fi c e r T ho ma s Gue rr e ro of the Ty le r Poli c e De pa rt me nt te sti fi e d as the Sta te ’s fi rs t w itn e ss. Guer rer o testified that on Janua ry 17, 2007, he was a trainee in t he first pha se of the de partment’s field training progr am under the supervision of Offic er Damon Swan. Guer rer o further

testified that at 7:00 p.m. on the day in question, he a nd Swan w er e o n patrol whe n they observe d Appellant riding a bicyc le on the wr ong side of the r oad and without proper illumi nation. Guer

rer o stated that he stopped Appe llant for the violations. Guer rer o further

stated that whe n h e as k ed Appellant qu e sti on s con c e rn ing his ide nti ty, Ap pe lla nt mumble d his a ns we rs a ndapp e are d to a tte mpt to a vo id2

opening his mouth. Guerre ro testified that Appel l an t ’s behavior conce rned him bec ause he suspected A ppellant was trying to consume something ill egal or had something in his mouth t hat he was not supposed to have . Guer rer o further

testified t h at , as a r esult of Appellant’ s behavior a nd be c a us e the y w e re in a

kn ow n “ hig h- dr

ug ” are a , he be ga n to in ve sti ga te wh e the r A pp e lla nt w a s in possession of any type of controlled substance. Guer rer o stated that he asked A ppellant what wa s in h is m ou th a ndthat A pp e lla nt r e sp on de d th a t it wa s a “ma ri jua na ro a c h. ” Gu e rr e ro e xp la ine d to the jury that a ma

rijuana r oach is whatever is left o f a m ar i

j u an a j oint or any kind of a ma rijuana blu nt a ft e r i t ha s b e e n s mok e d. Gu e rr e ro fu rthe r s ta te d t ha t he loo ke d in to A pp e lla nt’ s mo uth multipl e times and obser ved a gr een le afy substanc e, which ba sed on his training and e xperie nce he believed to be marijuana . Guer rer o testified that they we re not a ble to rec over the marijuana as evidenc e bec ause A ppellant intentionally or knowingly destroyed it by che wing it and swallowing it, thereby impairing its availability as evidenc e in the investigation of hi s possession of marijuana

. Of fi c e r D a mon Swa n te sti fi e d a s th e Sta te ’s ne xt w itn e ss. S wa n’ s te sti mon y w a s la rg e ly

c on sis te nt w ith Gu e rr e ro ’s te sti mon y. Swa n te sti fi e d th a t w he n G ue rr e ro ini tiate d c on ta c t w ith Appellant, Swan obse rved f rom the vehic le that Appellant wa s chew ing on something. Swan f urther testified that he a

pproac hed Appe llant a nd asked him to spit out wha tever was in his mouth. Swan state d th a t a s A p p e ll a n t s p a t, h e o b s e r v e d s ma ll g r e e n f la k e s in th e s p it tl e th a t h e s u s p e c te d wer e marijuana . Swan further st ated that the green flakes he observed we re not re trievable for e vidence

. Swan testified that Appe llan t ad m itted to them that he had bee n chew ing a “r oach,” which Swan explained he understood to be the r emnants of a partially smoked marijuana cigar ette. Swan f urther te sti fi e d th a t it

app e are d to him

that A pp e lla nt ate the mari jua na in q ue sti on to c on c e a l it

. Following Swan’s testimony, the State reste d. Appellant moved f or a dire cted ve rdict, which the tria l c o u r t d e n ie d

. T h e r e a f te r , A p p e ll a n t r e s te d

. U lt im a te ly , th e ju r y f o u n d A p p e ll a nt to be “guilty” as c harge d. The matter proce eded to a

jury trial on punishment. At t h e outs et of Appellant’s tria l on punishment, Appellant pleade d “true ” to the enha nceme nt al l egation in t he indictment. Foll owing the pre sentatio n of evide nce, the jury assesse d Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for sixteen ye ars. The trial court se ntence d Ap pellant ac cordingly, and this appe al followed.3 E VI DE NT I ARY S UF FI CI E NCY In his fi rs t a nd se c on d issu e s, Ap pe lla nt ar gu e s tha t the e vid e nc e is both le ga lly a ndfa c tua lly insufficient to support that he kne w at the time he ate the substance that an investigation and off icial proce eding wer e impending or in progr ess. Legal Su fficie ncy L eg al s ufficie ncy

is the constitutional mi nimum required by the Due Proc ess Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt to sustain a criminal conviction. See Ja c ks on v . V irg inia , 4 4 3 U. S

. 3 0 7, 31 5– 16 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 6- 87 , 61 L

. Ed

. 2d 56 0 ( 19 79 ); see also Esc ob e do v . St ate , 6 S.W .3d 1, 6 (T ex
. Ap p
. – S an An t o n i o 1 9 9 9 , p et

. re f’ d ). T h e s t an d ar d fo r r evie wi n g a l ega l s u ff

i ci en cy ch al l en ge is whether a

ny rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the offe nse beyond

a re asonable doubt. See Jackson , 44 3 U .S. a t 32 0, 99 S. Ct . at 27 89 ; see also Jo hnso n v . St ate , 871 S.W. 2d 18 3, 18 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ). Th e e vid e nc e is e xami ne d in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the ver dict. See Jackson , 4 43 U. S. at 32 0, 99 S. Ct

. at 2789 ; Johns on , 871 S.W .2d at 186. A

su c c e ssf ul l e g a l su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e wi ll r e su lt in re nd iti on of an a c qu itt a l by

the re vie wi ngc ourt

. See Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 41–42, 102 S. C t. 2211, 2217–18, 72 L . Ed. 2d 652 (1982). Th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is m e a sure d a g a ins t th e of fe ns e a s d e fi ne d b y

a hy po the tic a lly

c o r r e c t ju r y c harg e. See Ma li k v

. St ate , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a char g e would include one that “ac curately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not

unnece ssarily

incre ase the State’s burde n of proof or unnec ess ar i l y

restric t the State’s theorie s of liability , and ade quately

descr ibes the par

ticular off ense f or which the defe ndant is tried.” Id. I n th e c a se a t ha

nd , to su pp or t App e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n for tampe ri ng wi th ev ide nc e , th e State

wa s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e e ith e r t hat ( 1) Ap pe lla

nt, kn ow ingtha

t an inve sti g a tio n w a s p e nd ingor in prog ress, a ltered, d es t ro y ed, or conce aled a ny thing with intent to impair its verity , leg ibilit y , or availability

as evide nce in the inve stigation or (2) Appe llant, kn o wing that an off ense ha d been committed, altere d, destroy ed, or c oncea led any thing with intent to impair its verity , leg ibilit y , or availability

as evide nce in a

ny subsequent investig ation of or of ficial pro cee ding r elated to the offe nse. See T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 37.09(a) (1), ( d)(1) (Ve rnon Supp. 2007). Thoug h Appellant

wa s c ha rg ed pu rs ua

nt t o Su bs e c tio ns 37 .0 9( a )( 1) and 37 .0 9( d) (1 ), he ha s ma de no argume nt w ith reg ard to the c ommiss i o n of the off ense of tamperingwith evidence as set for th in Section4

37.09(d)( 1). I f we deter

mine there is leg ally sufficie nt e vidence to suppor t Appellant’s convic tion purs ua nt t o Se c tio n 37 .0 9( d) (1 ), we ne e d no t a dd re ss the su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt his conviction pursuant to Section 37.09(a )(1)

. Acc ording to Guer

rer o’s t estimony , he st opped Appe llant for a violation of the traff ic code

. Guer rer o stated t hat when he asked Appellant questions conce rning his identity , Appellant mumbled his answer s and appe are d to a ttempt to avoid opening his mouth. Guerre ro testified that Appe llant’s behavior conce rned him bec ause he suspected Appellant was trying to consume something illeg al or had somethingin his mouth that he was not supposed t o have. Guerr ero f urther te stified that, as

a re su lt o f A

pp e lla nt’ s b e havio r a

nd be c a us e the y were in a kn ow n “ hig h- dr ug ” are a , h e be g an to investigate whethe r Appe llant was in possession of any ty pe o f c o ntrolled substance . Guer rer o stated that he aske d Appellant what was in his mouth and that Appellant re sponded that it was a “ marijuana

roac h.” Guer

rer o explained to the jury that a marijuana roac h is w hateve r is left of a ma rijuana joint

or any kin d o f a mari

jua na blu nt af te r it has be e n smok e d. Gu e rr e ro fu rt he r state d that he l oo ke d in to Appellant’s mouth multiple tim es and obse rved a g ree n leaf

y substance, which base d on his training and experienc e he be lieved to be mar ijuana. Gue rre ro testified that they wer e not able to recove r the marijuana as evidence beca use Appellant intentionally or knowingly destroy ed it by chew ing it and swallowing it, thereby

impairing its availability

as evide nce in the i nvestig ation of his possession of marijuana . Additionally , Swan t estified that when Guerre ro initiated contac t with Appellant, Swan observe d from the ve hicle that Appe llant was che wing on something. Swa n further testified that he approa ched A

ppellant and a sked him to spit out whatev er wa s in his mout h. Swan stated that a s Appellant spat, he observe d small g ree n flake s in the spittl e that he suspected wer e marijuana

. Swan further stated that the g ree n flake s he observe d wer e not r etrieva ble for evidenc e. Swan testified that Appellant admitted to them th at h e h ad bee n chew ing a “roa ch,” which Swan explained he understood to be the r emnants of a partially smoked marijuana

cig are tte. Swan further

testified that it a pp e are d to him

that App e lla

nt a te the mari

jua na in q ue sti on to c on c e a l it

. Ex aminin g t h e afor ementioned e vidence in the light most favor able to the ve rdict, we conclude that the j ury could have deter mined bey ond a re asonable doubt that Appellant knew thatSee T EX
. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A NN
. § 4 8 1

. 1 2 1 (a) (V ernon 2 0 0 3 ). 1
5 he had c ommitt ed the of fense of possessing marijuana and, with the intention of impairing the 1 marijuana ’s ava ilability

as evide nce in a

ny subsequent investig ation related to the offe nse, destroy ed

or concea led t he marijuana. There fore , we hold that the evidence was leg ally sufficie nt to support the jury ’s ver dict. Appellant’s f irst issue is overruled. F actual Suf

fi ciency Turning to Appellant’s conte ntion that the evidence is not fa ctually sufficie nt to support the jury ’s v erdic t, we must first assume that the e vidence is leg ally sufficie nt under the Jackson standard. See Cle wis v

. St ate , 9 22 S.W. 2d

12 6, 13 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). We t he n c on sid e r a ll of the e vid e nc e we ig he d by the tr ia l court that ten ds to p ro ve the e xiste nc e of the e le me nta l f

a c t in dispute and compare it to the evidence that tends to disprove that fa ct. See Sant e lla n v . St ate , 939 S.W .2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Although w e ar e auth o ri zed to disagr ee w ith the trial

c o u rt’ s d e te r

mi n a ti o n , e v e nif

p r o b a ti v e e v id e n c e e xis ts th a t s u p p o rts th e v erdic t, see Cle wis , 922 S.W. 2d a t 13 3, our e va luatio n s ho uld no t su bs tanti a lly

int ru de up on the tr ia l court ’s ro le a s th e so le judge of the we ight a

nd cre dibilit y

of witness testimony

. Sant ellan , 939 S.W .2d at 1 64. Where there is c o n f

li c ti n g e v id e n c e , th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s v e r d ic t o n s u c h matt e r s is g e n e r a ll y r e g arde d as

co n cl u s i v e. See V

an Z and t v . St ate , 9 3 2 S. W. 2 d

8 8 , 9 6 ( T e x. A p p
. – E l P a s o 1 9 9 6 , p e t. r e f ’d). Ul ti mate ly , w e mu s t a s k w h e th e r a n e u tr a l r e v ie w o f a ll th e e v id e n c e , b o th f o r an d a g a inst the finding , demonstrates that the proof of g uilt is so obviously

weak as to undermine our confide nce in t he tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n, or the pr oo f of g uil t, al tho ug h ad e qu a te if take n a lon e , is g re a tly outweig hed by contra

ry proof. Jo hnso n v

. St ate , 2 3 S. W.3 d 1 , 1 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); se e als o Wa tso n v . St ate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (evidenc e is fac tually insuf fi cient only when r eviewingcourt objec tively conclude s that the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e contr adicts the ve rdict). I n the instant case , Appellant argues g ener ally that the evidenc e tendingto show that no inves ti g ati o n w a s “ im

p e n d in g o r in p r o g r e s s ” w h e n A p p e ll an t s w a ll o w e d th e ma r ij u an a w as fa r g reater than a

ny evidenc e supporting that such an investigation was underw ay . Appellant make s no argument with reg ard to evidence supporting his conviction pursuant to Texas Penal Code, section6

37 .0 9( d) (1 ). As in o ur

c on sid e ratio n of A

pp e lla nt’ s le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e , w e ne e d n ot a dd re ss Ap pe lla nt’ s argume nt w ithre g ard to S ub se c tio n 3 7. 09 (a )( 1) if we c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e is fac tually sufficie nt to support his conviction pursuant to Subsection 37.09(d)(1). We have re v ie w e d

th e r e c o r d

in it s e n ti r e ty

. We it e r a te th a t o u r e v a lu a ti o ns h o u ld

n ot sub s t an tially

intrude upon the trial c ourt’s role a s the sole judg e of the weig ht and cr edibility of witness testimony , see Sant ellan , 939 S.W .2d at 164, and whe re there is conf licting e vidence , the trial court’s verdict on such m atters is gene rally reg arde d as conc lusive. See V an Zandt , 932 S.W .2d at 96. Our r eview of

the re cord as a whole, with consideration g iven t o all of the e vidence , both for and ag ainst the jury ’s ver dict, has not reve aled to us any evidenc e that cause s us to conclude that the pr oo f o f App ell ant’ s guil t a s c ha rg e d und e r s ub se c tio n 3 7. 09 (d )( 1) is s o o bv iou sly we a k o r i s otherwise so g reatly outweig hed by contra ry proof as to rende r Appellant’s conviction clearly wrong or manife stly

unjust. Theref

ore, w e hold that the evide nce is fa ctually sufficie nt to support the jur y ’s verdic t. Appellant’s sec ond issue is overrule d.

C RUE L AND U N U SUA L P UNI S HM E NT I n his third issue, Ap p el l an t co n t ends that the sixt een year sentenc e imposed on him for tamperingwith e vidence constitutes crue l and unusual punishment under both the Te x as and U nited States constitutions . Howeve r, Appe llant made no timely objection to the trial cour

t raising the issue of cr uel and unusua l punishment and has, there fore , waived such an issue on appe al. See Rhoades

v . St ate , 934 S.W .2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (waive r with reg ard to rig hts under the Te x as Con sti tut ion ); Curr

y v . St ate , 9 10 S.W. 2d 49 0, 49 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ) ( wa ive r w ithre g ard to ri g hts un de r t

he Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit

uti on ); se e als o T EX R. A PP
. P. 33.1. Howeve r, eve n absent wa iver, we conclude that Appellant' s sentenc e did not constitute crue l

an d unu s u a l p u n is h me n t. A p p e ll an t w a s c o n v ic te d o f ta mp e r in g w it

h evidenc e. See T EX
. P EN AL C ODE ANN . § 37.01(a) , (d)( 1). T h e p u n i shment rang e for such an of

fense , consideringthe enhanc ement alleg ation, is betwee n five a nd ninety -nine y ear s, or life. See T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN
. §§ 12.33(a) , 12.42, 37.09(c) (Ve rnon 2003 & Supp. 2007)

. Her e, the sentenc e imposed by the trial court fa lls withi n the ra

ng e set for

th by the leg islature. Id. There fore , the punishment is not prohibited as cr

uel, u nusual, or excessive pe r se. See Har ris v . St ate , 6 5 6 S. W. 2 d

4 8 1 , 4 8 6 ( T e x.U nd er this t est, t he p ro p o rti o na l i t y of a sen t en ce i s eva l ua t ed b y co nsid ering (1 ) t he gra vit y of t he o f f en se 2 and t he hars hness of t he p enal t y , (2) t he sent ences i m p o sed o n other cri m i nal s i n t he same juri sdi ct i o n, and (3) t he
se n te n c e s im p o se d fo r c o m m issio n o f t h e sa m e c rim e in o the r j u risd ic tio n s. Sol em , 463 U

. S. at 292 , 103 S. Ct

. at 3 0 1 1

. 7 Cr im. Ap p. 19 83 ); Jo rd

an v . St ate , 49 5 S. W.2 d 9 49 , 9 52 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 73 ); Da v is v . St ate , 905 S.W .2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. re f’d)

. No ne the le ss, we have c on sid e re d the thr e sh old qu e sti on of wh e the r Ap pe lla nt’ s se nte nc e is g rossly disproportionate to the c rime. See, e .g., Mc Gr ude r v . P uc ke tt , 954 F.2d 313, 316 ( 5th Cir.), cert. de nied , 5 06 U. S. 84 9, 11 3 S. Ct. 14 6, 12 1 L . E d. 2d 98 (1 99 2) ; se e als o Ja c ks on v . St ate , 989 S.W. 2d 84 2, 84 5–46 (Tex . App .– Te xar ka na 19 99 , n o p e t.) ; see also Harm elin v. Michigan , 501 U. S. 9 57 , 10 05 , 1 11 S. Ct . 2 68 0, 27 07 , 1 15 L . E d. 2d 83 6 ( 19 91 ); Sol

e m v. H e lm , 463 U.S. 277, 298–300, 103 S. Ct . 3001, 3013–15, 77 L . Ed. 2d 637 (1983). I n rea ching this conclusion, we ar e g uided by the holding in Rumm e l v

. Es te lle , 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct . 1133, 63 L . Ed. 2d 382 (1980), in which the Supreme Court upheld the appe llant’s mandatory life sentenc e under

a prior ve rsion of the Tex as habitual offe nder statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pr etense s. Id. , 445 U. S. at 26 6, 10 0 S. Ct. a t 11 35 . Si nc e he re th e of fe ns e c omm itt e d b y

Ap pe lla nt— tampe ri ngwi th evidenc e—is no less serious than any of the offe nses committed by the appe llant in Rum m el , w hil e Ap pe llant’ s sixtee n y e ar s e nte nc e is f ar l e ss s e ve re tha

n th e lif e se nte nc e up he ld b y

the Sup re me Court in Rum m el , it follows that i f t h e s entenc e in Rum m el wa s n ot u

nc on sti tut ion a lly di s p roportionate, then neither is the se ntence assessed a g ainst Appellant in the ca se at ha nd. There fore , since we do not f ind the threshold test to be satisfied, we ne ed not apply the re maining elements of the Solem test. Appellant’s third issue is over ruled. 2

D I S P OS I T I ON Havingoverr

uled Appellant’ s first, second, a nd t h ird issues, we a

f f ir m the trial cour

t’s jud g me nt. JA M ES T. WOR THEN Chief J ustice Opinion delivere d J uly

23, 2008. P an el consi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. and G r i

f f i t h, J. (DO N OT PUBL I SH)