FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-5063

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CHARLES W. BURNSED,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON 

OFFENDER REVIEW,

Respondent.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

November 27, 2018

B.L. THOMAS, C.J.

This petition for writ of certiorari seeks review of an order 

denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner raises 

four arguments, three of which were not raised below, and which 

we therefore will not discuss. Our review is limited to a 

determination of whether the circuit court afforded due process 

and whether it observed the essential requirements of law. See 

Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 720 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998). We 

deny the petition.

Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Department of 

Corrections. In 1997, he entered a plea to attempted capital 

sexual battery and four counts of handling or fondling a female 
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child under the age of sixteen. The parties stipulated to an 

offense date of 1991. The trial court declared Petitioner a sexual 

predator, but, in light of the stipulation, the Second District 

subsequently reversed that declaration, finding that the sexual 

predator statute specifically applied only to convictions for crimes 

committed on or after October 1, 1993. See Burnsed v. State, 743 

So. 2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). 

Petitioner was released onto conditional release for the first 

time in 2010 and his supervision was to last until 2026. The 

Florida Commission on Offender Review imposed 30 conditions of 

release, including special condition 28, which mandated that 

Petitioner was not to access the internet “until your sex offender 

treatment program has completed a risk assessment and 

approves and implements a safety plan for your access to the 

internet.” Petitioner signed these conditions, but included the 

caveats “under 947.1405 my offense date is 1991 I am not subject 

to these conditions.” From 2010 to 2015, Petitioner was alleged 

to have violated the conditions of his conditional release six 

times. Each time, the Commission elected to continue his 

conditional release supervision. 

In April of 2016, the Commission issued a warrant alleging 

that Petitioner twice violated special condition 28 by accessing 

the internet on his cell phone to search “Kowasaki.” Petitioner 

entered a plea of guilty, and a Commission Investigator 

recommended that supervision be reinstated. Instead, the 

Commission voted to revoke Petitioner’s conditional release. 

Petitioner challenged the revocation of his conditional 

release by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit 

court. In the petition, he argued that he had been placed on 

conditional release for crimes he never committed. He also asked 

the circuit court to “offer an opinion” on the mandatory language 

in section 947.1405, Florida Statutes, noting that in Biller v. 

State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court 

found that conditions imposed as part of probation must be 

related to the offense. 

Petitioner first argues to this Court that the Commission 

violated his due process by imposing special conditions of 

conditional release that applied to sexual predators. He argues 
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that because he committed his offenses in 1991 and is not a 

sexual predator, section 947.1405(7), Florida Statutes, which 

requires the imposition of special sexual offender conditions for 

offenses committed after 1995, cannot apply to him. This Court 

rejected this argument in Grace v. Florida Parole Commission, 

985 So. 2d 1213, 1214-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), where we found 

that “[a]lthough the special sexual offender conditions imposed on 

the petitioner are similar to the mandatory special sexual 

offender conditions set forth in section 947.1405(7), Florida 

Statutes (2005), the FPC’s discretionary authority under section 

947.1405(6), Florida Statutes (1990), to impose any special 

conditions it considers warranted based on its review of the 

petitioner’s record was not limited in any way.” As in Grace, here

the Commission had the discretion to impose any special 

conditions it deemed warranted, including special condition 28. 

See also Velez v. State, 23 So. 3d 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). 

Petitioner also argues that the special terms and conditions 

had no relationship to the crime for which he was convicted, 

citing Spano v. State, 60 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Even 

if we agreed with Petitioner’s characterization of the special 

conditions imposed, Spano is not applicable here; in that case, the 

Fourth District struck a special condition of probation, applying 

the rule that “‘[a] special condition of probation cannot be 

imposed if it is so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation.’” 

Id. at 1109 (quoting Williams v. State, 474 So. 2d 1260, 1260 (Fla. 

1st DCA 1985)). See also Biller, 618 So. 2d 734. The restrictions 

on special conditions of probation do not apply to special 

conditions of conditional release. By statute, the Commission 

may impose any special conditions it deems warranted after a 

review of an offender’s record. See § 947.1405(6), Fla. Stat. (1990)

(“The commission may impose any special conditions it considers 

warranted from its review of the release plan and 

recommendation.”). 

DENIED.

MAKAR and WINSOR, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Charles W. Burnsed, pro se, Petitioner.

Rana Wallace, General Counsel, Commission on Offender 

Review, Tallahassee, for Respondent.