. EP 870-1-24

August 1985

Water Resources

People and Issues

An Interview With

William R. Gianelli

U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers

Office of the Chief

of Engineers
W A T E R R E S O U R C E S

P E O P L E A N D I S S U E S

An Interview With

WILLIAM R . GIANELLI

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)

EP 870-1-24

August 1985

This edited manuscript is the product of a tape-recorded

interview conducted by Dr . Martin Reuss of the Historical

Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, with William R .

Gianelli in the Pentagon on June 20, 1984, and at Mr .

Gianelli's home in Pebble Beach, California, on August 9,

1984 .
FOREWORD

At a time when serious questions are being raised about the

manner in which the nation utilizes its water resources, it is

important to gain the insights of past leaders in the field of

water resources development . This volume is the first in a new

publication series, Water Resources : People and Issues , that

will include interviews with individuals both inside and

outside the Corps of Engineers .

William R. Gianelli's tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Civil Works) was an important period in which the Corps of

Engineers was challenged to rethink many of its policies and

procedures . As a result of Mr . Gianelli's actions, our

organization responds more quickly to, public needs in carrying

out its regulatory responsibilities . I recommend this interview

to thoughtful officers and civilian members of the Engineer

family .

THE INTERVIEWER

"//Paul 'W . Taylor

Colonel,

Corps of Engineers

Chief of Staff

Dr . Martin Reuss is a historian in the Historical Division,

Office of the Chief of Engineers, specializing in water

resources development . He holds a Ph .D . from Duke University

and is the author of Shaping Environmental' Awareness : The

United States Army Corps of Engineers Environmental Advisory

Board, 1970-1980 .
PREFACE

William R. Gianelli joined the Department of the Army as

Assistant Secretary for Civil Works in 1981 after 40 years of

experience in government and in the private sector . Because

virtually all of this experience was in water resources

development and management, Secretary Gianelli brought with him

a clear vision of the appropriate role of government in this

area . In his view, the situation in 1981 called for major

changes in two areas of the Corps of Engineers' water resources

activities . These were reform of the financial terms under

which federal water resources development were undertaken and

reform of the process by which the Corps of Engineers carried

out its regulatory responsibilities .

In both areas Bill Gianelli boldly proceeded to carry out his

vision in spite of many objections and reservations . Because

of his unquestioned commitment to responsible water

development, he was able to bring proponents of the status quo

and other nay-sayers to a committed, if not enthusiastic,

support for new ways of doing business . Consequently,

fundamental and far-reaching redefinitions of the federal role

in water resources development and in the regulation of dredgeand-fill material in the nation's waters have been achieved .

Moreover, Bill Gianelli's unquestioned reputation as the

administration's foremost authority on water development made

him the administration's focus for water issues . As a result,

the role of the Army and the Office of the Assistant Secretary

for Civil Works, in particular, in federal water resources

development and management was enhanced and became more fully

appreciated by the water community.

While the accomplishments of Secretary Gianelli in the water

program are significant without question, their implications go

beyond the programs directly affected . The principles of

responsive government, timely decision-making, cost-effective

use of resources, and the impact one man with vision,

competence, and motivation can have are equally applicable to

other areas of government . Accordingly, it is important that

his thoughts be widely circulated ; they contain valuable

insights concerning effective and efficient government .

Robert K . Dawson

Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Civil Works)

WILLIAM R. GIANELLI

When William R. Gianelli became Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Civil Works) in April 1981, he brought with him 35 years'

experience in the field of water resources development . He

graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1941

with a BS in civil engineering and a reserve commission in the

U. S . Army Corps of Engineers . On active duty during World War

II, Gianelli rose to the rank of major in positions from platoon leader to battalion executive officer . He served with

Engineer troops engaged in building airfields, water supply

facilities, and other construction projects at installations in

Hawaii, Saipan, Okinawa,,and Korea .

In January 1946 Gianelli began ten years' service in the State

Engineer's Office of- his native .-California . Next he served in

the California State Department of Water Resources (1956-1960)

and was the senior partner in the firm of Gianelli and Murray,

consulting civil engineers (1960-1967) .

When Roanld Reagan became governor of California in January

1967, he appointed Gianelli to head the State Department of

Water Resources. In that position Gianelli supervised the

completion of the first phase of the California State Water

Project, at the time the largest non-federal water conservation

Gianelli left government service in 1973 to return to consulting as a specialist in water supply and water rights issues .

In that year the American Public Works Association named him

one of the top ten Public Works Men of the Year and

Engineering-News Record magazine named him Construction Man of

the Year . He served under presidential appointment on the

National Commission on Water Quality (1973-1976) and was

chairman and a member of the board of directors of the Monterey

Peninsula Water Management District (1978-1980) .

In April 1981 President Reagan selected his former state water

resources chief as Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil

Works) . In that position Gianelli oversaw the civil works

program of the U .S . Army Corps of Engineers, chaired the board

of directors of the Panama Canal Commission, and administered

the Arlington and Soldiers' Home National Cemeteries .

and conveyance system of its type ever built . The first phase

involved constructing facilities at a cost of $1 .5 billion .

The direct beneficiaries provided a large portion of the

project's cost .
In three years as Assistant Secretary, Gianelli was responsible for major reforms in the Corps of Engineers' regulatory

program that cut the average processing time for permits in

half .- He challenged the Corps to rethink its cost-sharing and

project-financing policies . Under his direction the federal

government obtained voluntary commitments to a higher level of

non-federal funding for water projects, an important step in a

period of fiscal restraint and shifting national priorities .

The changes he introduced in the Corps' repayment policies

accelerated the recovery of federal investments . In his role

as overseer of Arlington National Cemetery, Gianelli was instrumental in obtaining congressional approval of funding for

a permanent visitors' center . His efforts also culminated in

the interment of a Vietnam War unknown soldier at the cemetery

on Memorial ;,Day 1984 .

In a relatively short time, William R. Gianelli left an indelible mark on the civil works programs and policies of the U.S .

Army Corps of Engineers. In May 1984 he resigned as Assistant

Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) and returned to

California . Gianelli works part time as a consultant and,

under special legislation enacted by Congress in June 1984,

continues to serve as chairman of the board of directors of the

Panama Canal Commission .
PART I

Q : Mr . Gianelli, the first question I want to ask you is

when you came to the job as the Assistant Secretary of

'the Army, Civil Works, did you have any definite ideas

about what you wanted to do in that office?

A : Yes . I had a couple of very definite things in mind .

One of them was to bring about regulatory reform because

I had known about the Section 404 program and all of the

problems in connection with it . I felt that there needed

to be a major reform of Section 404, particularly the

processing of applications for permits, the amount of

time it took, whether or not an applicant, for example,

would get an opportunity to get a fair shake, and whether

some of the single-purpose agencies had an undue

advantage . I wanted to try and correct things like that

so that it would'be a more efficient program and so that

the government could make a decision much more promptly

than it had in the past . So that was one of the major

goals that I had in mind .

The other one was, of course, due to my long familiarity

with the nation's water programs : that something had to

be done with respect to federal water development if we

were going to build needed federal water projects .

The problem as I saw it was that some additional means

had to be found for financing federal water projects .

Due to the pressures on the budget--particularly in the

defense area and the social programs--we couldn't expect

a large amount of federal money to be allocated on the

same basis that it had in the past to finance federal

water projects .

Having had a considerable amount of experience in the

financing area in California with respect to the

financing of the California State Water Project, which

was a $2 .5-billion water project, I felt that I could

bring to the job some new ideas and hopefully talk to the

Congress about some new formula for developing federal

water projects, particularly the financing and the

repayment of those projects .

So I would say overall, from the standpoint of goals as

related to the Corps of Engineers' programs, these were

two areas where I came into the job with some very strong

feelings that something needed to be done .
Q : Now, at this time, Mr . Gianelli, did you have any

particular perceptions of the Corps of Engineers?

A : Oh, yes . I was very familiar with the Corps of Engineers

from, you might say, a different perspective .

First of all, I was a reserve officer in World War II and

wasr called to active duty as a young second lieutenant

for the Corps of Engineers in the summer of 1941, immediately after I graduated from college . And for almost

the next five years during World War II, I was a Corps

officer, attaining the rank of major by the time that

World War II ended .

And during all of my service during World War II, I

served with the Army Engineer Construction troops,

primarily in the Pacific Theater of operations . So I was

very familiar with the Corps as a member of the Corps of

Engineers during World War II and as an officer of the

Corps .

Following that, my entire career has been in water

resource development, and as such, primarily in my

activities as an official of the state of California, I

had occasion to work very closely with the Corps Division

and the Corps Districts in California .

So I was very familiar with the Corps' operations and

very familiar with Corps projects and very familiar with

how the Corps of Engineers operated in the civil works

area, by virtue of my experience in California .

Q : Familiarity sometimes can breed contempt .

A : Right .

Q : Can you tell me a bit more what you thought about the

Corps of Engineers as an agency--positively, negatively,

and so forth and so on .

A : Well, I had views--for example, during World War II in

the combat area--that I thought the Corps did an

outstanding job, and I always looked upon my own career

and my service in World War II as a Corps officer as one

of the outstanding events of my life . As a result I have

a very high respect for the Corps, being part of it in a

combat situation .

Following that, as a civilian primarily employed for the

most part with the state of California and then later as

an individual consultant, I had a very high regard for

the Corps in terms of their technical capabilities and in

terms of their ability to get something done : i .e ., their
ability to design and their ability to construct water

proj ectsI had some problem with the Corps' planning effort, which

I think was reinforced after I came into the job . I had

some reservations about how the Corps carried out its

planning operations, but overall I had a very positive--

and I still have a very positive feeling with respect to

the Corps' ability to get a job done . For example, in

times of emergencies, there is no finer organization in

the world than the Corps of Engineers to take care of

problems that come up as a result of natural disasters

and things of that nature .

Q : Well, when you look back over your time as the Assistant

Secretary, and you look at the perceptions you came into

the office with about the Corps, and then as you left the

office, do you have any significant changes in those

perceptions?

A : Yes . One of the things that 'I became aware of very early

in my position as Assistant Secretary was that the Corps,

over the years, had been very used to considering itself

almost as an arm of the Congress . In other words, what I

found was that Corps officials were very conscious of

their relationship with the Congress and actually, it

seemed to me, did more toward working with the Congress

sometimes, almost, than they did working with the

executive branch of government .

One of the things that I tried very hard to correct was

to have the Corps recognize that it really is a part of

the executive branch of government and, as such, has

certain responsibilities as part of the Department of

Army ; and at certain times those activities may not be in

consonance with the views of the Congress .

So I would say that one of the things or one of the

perceptions which I had when I left my position as

Assistant Secretary was recognition of the problem of

the Corps in having to work directly with the Congress on

one hand, particularly in connection with all of the

things that the District Engineers and Division Engineers

came up against in the field, versus being part of the

administration team . That particularly is apparent with

respect to the funding of water projects .

Congress, of course, each member of Congress--and I am

certainly not being critical, I think it is a very

natural thing--is very interested in getting all kinds of

water projects for his area . And the Corps, I felt,

always tried very hard to accommodate the members of
Congress in the planning for water projects in their

areas .

From an administration standpoint, where there were

severe restraints on the budget, it was necessary for

this office--the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil

Works--as part of the administration team and as a

presidential appointee, to be aware of the financial

problems of the administration and the need to balance

the budget . Therefore, I often found that we were not

able to comply with a lot of the things on which the

Congress wanted us to spend money . So I became much more

aware, after I was in the job and at the time I left, of

that kind of problem than I was before I assumed the

position .

Q : To what extent, if any, did you review the working

policies of your predecessor when you came into the job?

Did you feel that that had a bearing on your job, or were

you starting off with a clean slate?

A : Well, I didn't know Mr . Blumenfeld, who was my immediate

predecessor . However, I met him on a number of occasions

subsequently . I did not have a chance to talk with him

before I actually came into the jobs but later on I had

an opportunity to talk with him about a number of issues

and found that we agreed on a great number of things .

I am not quite certain of all the things with which he

was involved . Mr . Blumenfeld was not an engineer and,

therefore, probably didn't come from the same perspective

that I did . I suspect that one of the things the Corps

probably experienced was that they found I would get into

much more detail on their work than my predecessors,

largely because of my familiarity with the subject .

That might have added to the discomfort that the Corps

might have felt with my being in this job, because I had

so much background knowledge with respect to water

projects .

I found myself questioning many of the Corps' projects

and asking for details, which my predecessors may not

have done . In some instances I actually gave the Corps

some rather positive directions with respect to a number

of its projects .

Q : Let me get philosophical for a second . Let's not talk

specifically about the Reagan administration, but let's

talk about administration X and how water resources ought

to be administered in any administration . Do you have

some specific ideas about that?
A : Yes . Again, I don't view myself really as a political animal . I have served the President in a capacity in California as one of his appointees, but basically I have been a professional engineer throughout my' career and have not been a politician .

And so, therefore, I have in my tenure as an Assistant Secretary, I would honestly say, tried to administer the activities of the Assistant Secretary's office as I

thought was appropriate, not giving consideration to politics . And I think that I was able to do that, and I

have a good feeling about that . The things that I was

trying to do in my position as Assistant Secretary were

things that were important for the betterment of the

program and were not in any way connected with political

expediency .

Q : You, of course, were a member of the President's Council

on Water Resources and worked with the Department of Interior and so forth . How well did that Council work?

A : Well, I ended up being a little bit unhappy with the

Cabinet-Council arrangement, and let me indicate why .

The primary interface that we had with the Cabinet

Council was as a member of the Cabinet-Council on

Natural Resources and Environment . And that CabinetCouncil was headed by the Secretary of the Interior .

The Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of Defense was

not officially a part of that Cabinet-Council . But

largely, probably as a result of my knowledge in the

field and my prior acquaintance with Jim Watt, I was

asked to be a part of those Council deliberations

whenever it involved the subject of water . And as a

matter of fact, Secretary Watt, very early in this

administration, asked me to head a sub-Cabinet group of

Assistant Secretaries concerned with problems in water

resources development . And I did that . I acted as the

head of a task force of Assistant Secretaries who looked

at problems referred to it by the Cabinet-Council and

made recommendations to the Cabinet-Council .

But one of the things I found was that after, for

example, we were able to get concurrence of the CabinetCouncil on such things as cost sharing, the Department of

Interior had different views which Jim Watt reflected

independently as a Cabinet officer . And I guess I felt

at the end of the Cabinet-Council deliberations,

particularly on cost sharing, after about two years that

the Secretary of Interior could independently reflect

different views on water policy, notwithstanding actions

5
of the Cabinet-Council .

This troubled me . And so I guess, in summary, I am

troubled by the Cabinet-Council arrangement because it

seems to me that the Corps of Engineers, which has the

major water program of the federal government, is

somewhat at a disadvantage as opposed to the Department

of Interior, which had a much smaller program but had a

Cabinet members whereas the Corps of Engineers had only

sub-Cabinet representation by the Assistant Secretary of

the Army .

So I guess,in the last analysis, I did not feel too good

about the Cabinet-Council arrangement on water policy and

the ability of the Assistant Secretary of the Army to be

on a par with the Secretary of a large department .

Can you outline more specifically what the major areas of

disagreement were between you and the Department of the

Interior?

A : Well, one of the things that came about was that I was

able to get the Cabinet-Council to support a formula with

respect to cost sharing for federal water projects for

different purposes . And I felt very strongly that this

was necessary in order that everyone be treated the same .

For example, the Corps has a large number of flood

control projects in the United States and a large number

of them on the drawing boards . I believed it was

important to have some guidelines to give to the Corps in

the field with respect to cost sharing--say, on flood

control .

The Bureau of Reclamation projects are somewhat

different . For the most part, they are very large

projects. They involve primarily irrigation, whereas the

Corps' projects might incidentally involve irrigation .

And so the primary difference came, I would say, when the

Bureau of Reclamation, through the Secretary of Interior,

wanted to develop cost-sharing formulas on a case-by-case

basis .

My concern on a case-by-case basis was that you had to be

consistent ; with the large number of projects that the

Corps has, I viewed consistency as very important,

because you certainly can't have one area of the country

paying one amount for a flood control project and another

area of the country paying a different amount .

In other words, I felt that while federal government has

a certain financial responsibility with respect to flood
control projects, that responsibility has to be

orchestrated on an equal basis throughout the country . So

I would say the primary difference that finally evolved

between the Secretary of Interior or the Department of

Interior and the Department of Army, as represented by

the Assistant Secretary, was the need to have a

consistent formula provided throughout all the Corps

areas, throughout the 50 states, as opposed to the

Bureau's desire to proceed on a case-by-case basis in

their areas of responsibility, which were the 17 western

states .

Q : You would be in a position to know what, if any, specific

ideas President Reagan has on water policies . Do you--

can you explain to us what his views were? Were his

views basically the same as yours?

A : Well, when I--let me give you an example . For example,

when Reagan became Governor of California, as a result of

the election in November 1966, I-,didn't know him . I had

never met him . One of his key Cabinet officers at that

time was the Director of Water Resources for the state of

California . The state was just beginning this mammoth

$2 .5-billion project that had been approved by the

legislature and by the voters several years before .

Just before Christmas in 1966, I got a call from the

Governor-designee, Reagan, introducing himself and saying

that I had been highly recommended to head the Department

of Water Resources, and would I accept an appointment as

its director . He volunteered that he was not a water

expert . We talked for a short time about the issues,

after which I agreed to be his Director of Water

Resources .

During my whole tenure as Director of Water Resources,

which lasted almost seven years and allowed us to

complete this major project to deliver water from the

northern to the southern part of the state ; the Governor

was very supportive of what I wanted to do ; and basically

his only instruction to me was to carry out the mandates

of the legislature and the people to build this project

in an efficient and cost-effective manner . The project

was in great financial trouble at that time because there

were inadequate funds provided to complete it .

During our tenure, none of the disputes or contractor

claims were ever settled in the Governor's office . Any

inquiries that the Governor received with respect to the

water program, he referred to me as the Director of Water

Resources, and we worked them out .
However, he did support my effort to get additional

funding from the legislature and supported me when I was

criticized by people around the state on the job that was

being done . So I would say that the Governor during that

period got considerable exposure to water development,

and I found his ideas pretty well coincided with mine .

When I came into the Assistant Secretary position, I knew

pretty well what the President's views were with respect

to water policy .

Did you have an opportunity to speak to the President

about water resource policy after you took the job?

A : No, not directly . I spoke to a number of his staff and,

of course, worked closely in the early days with White

House staff and other departments .

Q : Let me ask you a series of questions dealing with the

relationship between this office--OASACW--and other parts

of the Department of Defense and the federal government .

What kind of a relationship developed during your

tenure between this office and the Secretary of the

Army? Did you see the Secretary of the Army much? Was

he interested in the program? And what was the communication?

A : Yes . Let me just say, from a personal standpoint, I felt

I had a very good relationship with Secretary Marsh . I

was the senior assistant of the four Assistant

Secretaries of the Army : and whenever the Secretary and

the Under Secretary were absent, I acted as Secretary of

the Army .

I also made a great effort to attend things which weren't

directly related to the Corps' civil works programs . For

example, the Army Policy Council . I was a member of

that . I attended a lot of Army functions in my role as

one of the four Assistant Secretaries of the Army .

So I felt very comfortable, I felt very good about my

relationship with the Secretary and my relationships with

the Army . And even though my day-to-day exposures were

not many, for example, with the Army Chief of Staff, we

did interface, because I had additional responsibilities

other than the Corps in my job .

One of these other responsibilities was Chairman of the

Panama canal commission . As such, I worked very closely

with the Southern Command in Panama, and that brought me

into another kind of relationship with the Department of

Army and the Department of Defense .
A third area of my responsibility was Arlington Cemetery .

Again, this function heavily involved the Secretary of

the Army . For example, our office advised the Secretaries

on such things as the identification of a Vietnam

unknown, determination of burial eligibility, and other

problems of Arlington .

So I would say that I had an excellent relationship with

the Secretary . I would also say that in the areas of my

responsibility, which were the three--the civil works

program, the Panama Canal, and Arlington--the Secretary

left them very much up to me . In other words, he relied

upon me to run those programs .

The only time he really became involved in our activities

was when, for example, there was a particularly

controversial subject . I tried to keep him advised on

any controversy, so that when he had inquiries from

members of Congress, he could be pretty well informed on

the subject . And on a number, of occasions, when I made

decisions that were not popular with a member of

Congress, the Secretary of the Army would get a call and

be asked to intervene in the matter .

But let me say, the Secretary was always very good in

that area ; and while we had quite a number of meetings

with members of Congress, he pretty well delegated to me

the responsibility for running the Corps' civil works

program, and only got into it when brought in either by

me or by some member of Congress . That was also true

with respect to the Panama Canal Commission and Arlington

Cemetery .

Q : So you can't recall any instances where the Secretary of

the Army actually said to you, "No, we are not going to

do it this way," or something like that?

A : No, I don't . I don't recall a single situation . There

were times when I think the Secretary said, "You know, I

think we ought to try and see what we can work out here,"

but I don't ever remember a mandate he gave me that I

didn't pretty well agree with .

And let me say the same thing is true with the Secretary

of Defense . My primary dialogue with the Secretary of

Defense came in connection with my chairmanship of the

Panama Canal Commission . Because under the law, he is a

member of that commission and that delegation comes down

through the Secretary of the Army to me .

The Secretary of Defense has a great interest in the

activities of the Panama Canal Commission, and I :will
relate to you later how that is still being carried on,

even though I have officially left the position of

Assistant Secretary .

I have known the Secretary of Defense for 30 years and

worked with him in California . He was a Cabinet officer

for Reagan during part of the time that I was also a

Cabinet officer . So I felt very comfortable with him on

a personal basis .

Q : Let's go outside of DOD for a moment . How about OMB--

your relationship with the people in the Water Resources

Branch or with Mr . Stockman .

A : Well, most of my dealings with OMB were at a lower level

than Mr . Stockman . In fact, I think I only remember a

few meetings that involved Mr . Stockman .

Quite a bit of the policy activity was carried on with

one of Mr . Stockman's assistants--qne of his appointees,

Mr . Khedouri, who had, in his area of responsibility,

things such as the water resource programs of the Corps

and the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Soil Conservation

Service .

And then below him, I dealt very directly with Don Cluff,

who headed the division that dealt with the water

programs of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil

Conservation Service, and the Corps of Engineers . So

most of my activities with OMB were with him . Sometimes

with Mr . Crabill, who is one level above Mr . Cluff . The

rank in OMB starts out with Stockman, Khedouri, Crabill,

and then Cluff . Cluff has a number of people below him

we sometimes worked with also . So most of the contacts

were made and most of the activity was carried on at the

Cluff level, with Cluff and his assistants ; although on

occasion we got involved with Mr . Crabill and, from a

policy standpoint, every once in a while with Mr .

Khedouri .

Was it a good relationship?

A : I would say the relationships from Crabill down were

good--were very good . I would say that relationships

above Crabill were pluses and minuses . I think there

were some negatives as well as some positives .

Q : Were you--some policies that you were in favor of--were

they overruled by OMB?

A : Well, one of the prime complaints, if you want to call it

that, that I had with OMB is that they are in a key

1 0
position, not only in terms of budget but in terms of

legislation .

And I really believed that, for example, in some areas of

legislation which involved, say, the Corps programs, we

should have been more a part of formulating those

programs in the beginning rather than coming on later .

Ah example, just to pick out a case in point, is the

subject of cost sharing for navigational projects . The

subject is highly controversial, and I really believed

that it would have been beneficial to the administration

if they could have really turned the Assistant Secretary

of the Army's office and the Corps loose on working

directly with the Congress on formulas to revise costsharing programs for navigational projects .

However, the upper levels at OMB held that subject pretty

close to themselves ; and I really felt that some of those

legislative directions and implementations should have

been worked out more, I guess, together than I felt they

were .

Q : What was OMB's reasoning for that?

A : Well, I'm never quite sure . Of course, OMB has a very

broad responsibility in terms of the federal budget that

goes far beyond the Corps of Engineers' program . And I

think there, of course, is a need for them to keep in

perspective, say, the water resource programs as

contrasted with a number of the other programs . Neither

I nor the Corps would have knowledge of all of the

pressures on OMB for other programs and the other demands

for federal funds .

As a result, I believe one of their prime reasons for not

delegating was the need for them to keep budgetary

control over whatever was being proposed in the way of

federal programs . I suspect that was the underlying

reason why perhaps we weren't turned loose a little bit

more toward developing formulas and working more closely

with the Congress to solve the problem of cost sharing

for navigational projects .

Q : Let's turn our attention for the moment to the

relationship between your office and the Corps of

Engineers . And, of course, right now what I am

interested in is a general portrait by you . We will get

into specifics later .

Let me take the bull by the horns and suggest that people

feel that you got more involved in the bowels of the

organization, so to speak, than your predecessors did .
What do you think should be the proper relationship

between OASACW and the Corps of Engineers? And maybe we

should divide it up and talk about OCE and then talk

about the field .

A : Okay . Well, I--this comes back to an earlier comment I

made which is that I think the Corps has a difficult

problem as a result of their close relationship with

members of Congress in the field, and that gets reflected

up through OCE . It is an important relationship because

the members of Congress look upon water projects as

something positive for their areas ; and they look upon

the Corps, which has the expertise, to develop projects

that will solve water problems for their particular area .

The Corps has a strong desire to maintain good

relationships with the members of Congress and, as a

result, tries to accommodate, I think, wherever possible,

members - in solving a water problem . From ASA's

viewpoint, it may be that those projects which the Corps

tries to develop for the benefit of a particular

congressman or senator or for a particular area do not

fit in with the administration's policies as reflected by

ASA .

For example, I have always believed the Corps doesn't

worry too much about the cost of a project . In other

words, they go to Congress for the appropriations and

Congress appropriates the money . And I think the Corps,

for example, in making recommendations for the

development of a water project to solve a problem, will

develop what it believes to be the best engineering

solution, which may end up costing a lot more than

alternatives that might do the job .

One of the difficulties arises--and I think the Corps

gets caught in the middle here--on the one hand of

developing a project, the best project from an engineering standpoint, to solve a problem in a particular

congressional district . On the other hand, there may be

a lesser project, lesser in terms of scope and lesser in

terms of cost, that might solve the problem from the

vantage point of the administration and available funds .

This has created a problem on some occasions between ASA

and the Corps . To use an example, I guess Mount St .

Helens is probably one of the best examples . We finally

asked the Corps, instead of making a specific

recommendation on how to solve the problems brought about

by Mount St . Helens, to give this office a number of

alternatives from which we would make the selection of

which project ought to go ahead . That created some real

1 2
problems because of the Corps' dialogue in the field,

since it had developed a rapport with the local people on

what it thought ought to be done . It turned out from the

standpoint of ASA that something different should be

done . This created some real problems between ASA and

members of Congress who had been convinced that the

Corps' solution to the problem should have been followed

rather than what we decreed should be done .

Q : As a result of experiences such as that, did you try to

sort of put a cap on the contact between Division and

District commanders and congressmen?

A : No . No . I think it is important that they have a good

relationship . But what we tried to do was to make

certain that the Corps understood what we were trying to

do--for example, from ASA's standpoint . And the second

thing, and I think we were moderately successful but not

completely, was to have the Corps' field people inform

ASA on their various dealings with members of Congress .

For example, if a member of Congress called about a

particular problem--and they frequently did call a

District Engineer or a Division Engineer, and that's

appropriate for their area--but to let ASA know whatever

dialogue took place so that when we got a question from

the Hill with respect to the same problem, we would at

least have been informed as to what dialogue had

previously taken place between the Corps at the field

level and the members of Congress .

I believe we made substantial progress in that area

because now ASA is better informed from the field in its

contacts with members of Congress . That is extremely

important .

Q : I am going to get back to this a bit later ; but the

general thrust of your comment, it seems to me, impresses

me right now as suggesting that you wanted to get some of

the political considerations, political philosophy of

this administration injected into the planning process

earlier .

A : Let me talk about planning--not so much political

considerations as economic and financial considerations--

because if there is any part of the Corps' program that I

have been more critical of than others, it is the

planning process . Let me explain why .

Take a look, for example, at the Corps' planning program

that would generally lead to water projects . Early in

our administration, we examined some 500 planning reports

that the Corps prepared, looking toward the solution of a

1 3
problem by the development of a project . Over half of

those studies developed into a report which showed no

feasible project could be constructed . The Corps spent,

as I recall, some $100 million on those project reports,

which, it seemed to me, the Corps could have screened out

at a much earlier date and saved the federal government

large amounts of unnecessary expenditures .

That was the reason I asked the Corps to split its

feasibility reports into two phases . The first I called

a reconnaissance level report, which would be done at

100-percent federal cost in one year at about 20 percent

of the cost of the full feasibility study . Then, if the

Corps found that there was a project that looked like it

might be feasible, to have the local project

beneficiaries pay half of the remaining cost of preparing

the feasibility report, while the federal government

would pay the other half .

I further went on to say that of the one-half that would

be borne by nonfederal interests,'lhalf of that could be

an in-kind service . For example, if it were a state, the

state has expertise in terms of information--basic data

that it could supply to the Corps . I believed that any

financial contribution from the local people in the

planning process would do a lot toward screening out

infeasible projects, because my experience in California

told me that the minute project beneficiaries had to put

up any money at all, they would look more carefully at

whether they really needed a study . A review of the

Corps' efforts in the past made it very clear that

because the local people were not putting up any money,

the Corps was spending substantial federal funds

developing reports on projects which would never be

built .

One of the things that I tried to do, and I think had

some support in the Congress, was to have the Corps'

planning process screen out infeasible projects at a much

earlier date before so much time and effort and money had

been spent unnecessarily . That, to me, is not

politicizing the Corps . That is just good sense, good

water resource planning ; and it is the way good water

projects ought to proceed, in my judgment . So when you

asked the question--commented that I was attempting to

politicize the process--I don't view it that way at all .

What I think I was trying to do was to make more sense

out of the Corps' program, recognizing the constraints on

the federal budget . I really tried to give the Corps

direction which would assist in making the water projects

more responsive and more meaningful .

14
A : Sure .

Well, let's pursue this for a moment since we are talking

about planning .

Q : One person in the Corps paraphrased a comment of yours .

I don't remember where he heard it, but he said that you

had said once that the goal of a planning process ought

to lead to project construction . That is, plans that do

not lead to work are basically a waste . Can you

elaborate on that a bit?

A : Yes . I think--and I am not singling out Corps planners

because I think this is true with planners in many

organizations, and I know it is true in large water

organizations--a lot of the planners like to plan for the

sake of planning and to develop projects which will never

be feasible to be implemented .

It seems to me that the planning process ought to develop

programs in ways in which those programs can be

implemented . If you are going to study a project which

has no chance of going ahead, it seems to me the earlier

you can determine that and cut off the effort, the more

time, effort, and money will be saved by whoever is

paying for the planning .

In the case of the federal government, it would save the

federal government a considerable amount of money if you

could determine infeasibility at a much earlier date . And

so, yes, I believe that the planning for projects should

lead to implementation . It should not be merely a

planning effort which is discarded because it cannot be

implemented .

Q : Of course, planning depends on authorizations and

appropriations . If you are developing an early plan of

feasibility study, and the project is either not

authorized or else there is no appropriation passed, it

is difficult to--well, I mean, how does the Corps take

into account that kind of . . .

A : Well, I am not making the point with respect to the other

activities of Congress . I am talking about a project

that doesn't muster up and have a positive benefit-cost

ratio . If you are only going to construct feasible

projects as demonstrated by the benefit-cost ratio, then

that ought to be determined at as early a date as

possible, and efforts shouldn't be spent on projects

where the benefits don't exceed the costs .

15
Q : Are you in a way faulting the Corps' economic analysis

too, then, or are you just suggesting that they go beyond

a reasonable point in developing the studies?

A : Well, I am not so much questioning the Corps' economic

analysis, but what I am saying is that there ought to be

a"greater effort made earlier to determine how far to go

in that planning process, particularly in the feasibility

report . And if you can determine, say, through this

reconnaissance effort which I asked the Corps to

institute, that a project is not feasible, then that

effort should be terminated .

Q : How do you feel about nonstructural solutions?

A : Oh, I think very often nonstructural solutions do have a

place . On the other hand, I think you have to be careful

that nonstructural solutions do not increase or take any

more property off the local tax rolls than absolutely

necessary . Often nonstructural solutions involve the

acquisition of large amounts of land taken off the local

tax roll, which presents some real problems to local

government . Whereas, for example, a structural solution

might result in much less property having to be taken off

the tax roll .

Let me go on to say that land acquisition is not the only

consideration . You have environmental considerations . s o

you have to balance all the issues . I believe that there

are places for nonstructural solutions, but I think that

you have to be extremely careful because so many of them

involve such large acquisitions of property .

Q : Let's turn our attention for a moment from planning to

one of the important thrusts of your tenure in office,

and that is cost sharing .

A : Yes .

Q : You indicated in an earlier interview with John Greenwood

that you wanted to do something to make nonfederal

interests bear a greater share of the water resource

costs . How successful do you think you were?

A : I would say only moderately successful . Maybe a better

word would be minimally successful . I believe there are

probably several reasons for that .

First of all, I think Congress, particularly certain

members of Congress, like very much to demonstrate to

their constituency their ability to get large amounts of

federal money to build projects in their area . And it is

1 6
much more popular for a congressman, if a federal project

has to be'built to solve a problem in his area, to get

all the money from the federal government than it is to

tell the local people, "You are going to have to pay for

part of it ."

So - my perception is that there was considerable

resistance from some members of Congress who like the

system the way it is, even though the present system and

the stalemate in water project authorizations and funding

have resulted in very few new projects being started in

the last few years . My perception is that Congress has

had a hard time biting the bullet, so to speak, to

require nonfederal interests to pay a larger share of the

cost of the projects, even though those nonfederal

interests will be the primary beneficiaries .

The other thing that I think had a bearing on it--I have

never felt that the Corps, including OCE, the Divisions,

and the Districts, 'was very enthusiastic about going out

to nonfederal sponsors and asking them to put up the

money . This is a natural thing . I am not being unduly

critical, but I have believed that while we tried to

orchestrate what we wanted done from the standpoint of

cost sharing at the ASA level, there has not been great

enthusiasm in the Corps, particularly in OCE, to pick up

that effort and to try to promote it with the field .

Instead the Corps passively acceded to whatever we asked

be done, but used very little in the way of initiative to

further the effort .

That's been borne out by the fact that where we went out

and developed some projects--I think we developed about

16 over the course of my tenure--Corps projects where the

local people were willing to contribute more than the

historical formula, most all of those had to be

orchestrated from the office of ASA, rather than having

the field use some initiative with respect to augmenting

or facilitating those efforts .

Let me quickly say that I suspect part of the field's

reluctance has been some uncertainty as to how far they

could go with respect to some of these things . We tried,

particularly in my last year, to correct that by being

more positive with the field in terms of instructions, so

that they could go ahead and make some overtures to the

local people and bring in to ASA projects which they

thought would pass muster under our cost-sharing goals,

rather than having everything orchestrated solely from

ASA .

Q : Well, let me ask you a question I am sure must have been

17
asked of you several times while you were in this office,

particularly relating to flood control . How do you

reconcile one situation where you have a relatively poor community that is going to be threatened by floods and devastated, and the cost sharing that would be imposed

upon them, with another community that is rather well to

do and presumably could afford to bear a greater

financial contribution?

A : Well, that point has been raised a number of times and I

always answer it this way--that the whole theory of

feasible federal water projects is based upon a favorable

benefit-cost ratio . In other words, the benefits should

always exceed the cost .

As a result, the criteria which determine what is a

feasible federal project are discriminatory already ;

because if, for example, you have an agricultural area

that gets flooded very badly, and the benefits of

providing that agricultural area with flood control don't

exceed the costs, then the project is not feasible . So

you are, in effect, discriminating against the poor areas

or those that don't have the benefits already in your

benefit-cost analysis by which you determine a federal

project is feasible .

And so where you have limited funds, my perception is

that the federal government can't take care of

everybody's problem everywhere in the United States .

There is just not enough money in the federal treasury to

do it, and Congress and administrations before have

indicated no willingness to try and do that . So you--

what do you do? You try and spend federal money on those

projects that are the most--that have the most benefits

that come from the costs that you put in them . So you

develop a benefit-cost ratio, and you say the best

projects are those where the benefits are the highest

because you benefit a larger number of people, at least

in terms of the Corps' dollar evaluation .

So all that cost sharing proposes is extending that idea

and basically trying to spread out what limited federal

funds are available to the better projects . the better

projects are those that have the highest benefit-cost

ratio .

Q : Well, I can think of two possible answers from people who

might oppose that position . one is that perhaps there is

something wrong with the way in which the Corps develops

its benefit-cost ratio . That perhaps there is a better

way of going about it . And the other one is related, and

that is simply that we are not just talking about

1 8
property values and so forth and so on . We are talking

about lives of people and how does that figure into . . .

A : Well, presumably the Corps, when it makes its benefitcost evaluation, takes into account those things .

But again, let me just say that if you look at the number

of Corps projects that are either under construction,

have been authorized, or are under study, you can add up

to some $36-billion worth of projects . Those projects

aren't going ahead for lack of funding . So what is the

sense of developing another theory which would act to put

more projects on the board, when you cannot construct

projects under the present rules . How then do you

allocate the limited federal funds to water projects? It

seems to me that one of the logical ways, and this has

already been started over the years by the benefit-cost

evaluation, is to take the limited federal funds and use

them for those projects where the benefits are going to

be the greatest and where there is a federal responsibility .

Accordingly, my answer to the question--how do you take

care of the poor areas or how do you take care of the

poor areas if the benefit-cost ratios don't exceed one to

one now? The answer is, you can't . This may result in

certain inequities, but the system is the best one we

have . You have to have some screening device because you

can't take care of everybody's problems all of the time .

That is the dilemma that the federal government faces .

What about a situation where you might have a community

that has spent a substantial amount of money on flood

control, and it has not been--it has not been successful,

and therefore they appeal to the federal government for

the funding to do a much more massive kind of a project,

probably . Do you think the amount of money that the

community has already invested in flood control ought to

be considered in terms of federal investment?

A : Yes . As a matter of fact, one of the inequities of the

present system for flood control is the way it has been

administered in recent years under the law . When a

federal project involves levees, then the nonfederal

interests have to put up the costs of land, easements,

and rights of way and the relocation of utilities .

On the other hand, if a flood control project involves

the construction of a reservoir, then the federal

government pays the entire cost . That to me is

inequitable . That's why in the cost-sharing formulas

19
Q :

that I have been advancing for flood control, I talk

about 35-percent nonfederal contributions, whether it is

a reservoir or whether it is a levee project . At least

everybody then would be getting a fair shake, as opposed

to the present system where nonfederal interests on levee

projects have to contribute substantially, whereas in

reservoir projects nonfederal interests pay nothing .

But the reservoirs might offer significantly additional

protection to . . .

A : Well, you know, the engineers design projects to provide

certain levels of protection, whether it is a levee or

whether it is a reservoir--whether it is 100-year

protection, 200-year, or whatever it is . So you build a

reservoir to give yourself a certain degree of

protection, whether it is 100-year or 200-year, and you

design a levee project for exactly the same thing . So I

don't--I don't see the argument there .

Q : Well, what I am suggesting is that, okay, if you have to

build a reservoir to achieve that same amount of

protection, the reservoir is probably going to cost more ;

and therefore the argument might be that in that case,

you have to get more federal investment . Because . . .

A : Well, I don't think that argument makes sense . But there

may be a further involvement when you have reservoirs .

Very often the reservoirs are multipurpose ; and if they

are multipurpose features, then the other purposes should

pay an appropriate allocated cost of that particular

reservoir . It shouldn't all go to flood control, because

very often now you build a flood control project that has

other substantial benefits . The other beneficiaries--for

example, hydropower, municipal purposes--should pay their

own way, certainly .

Q : Let's talk about another aspect of cost sharing and that

is deep port dredging . What was your position as

Assistant Secretary on the question of deepening some of

the major ports?

A : Well . I--here again--if you take a look at all the

reports which the Corps prepared on the deepening of

harbors--I can't remember the amount, but they run up to

many billions of dollars--where every port envisages

itself as developing, say, as a major coal export

facility . That was popular about three years ago when

there were big plans for coal . However, those plans have

been somewhat dampened . At any rate, under the

historical formula where the federal government paid the

entire cost of deepening deep water channels, the project

2 0
beneficiaKies should now pay a share of the cost of

deepening, just as is being proposed in the case of flood

control .

This is one of the areas where I have had a problem with

OMB . OMB has only allowed us to talk about recovering

100 percent of the costs, whereas now the federal

government recovers zero . My feeling was that there is

still a federal interest in deepening channels, for

example, and that there ought to be some middle ground

between zero and 100 percent . The zero being the present

system, and the 100 percent being what OMB has been

advocating the last three years since I have been here .

I think there ought to be a middle ground ; and when I

commented earlier about my problems with OMB, I really

felt that our office should be the lead agency in this

area, working with the Department of Transportation . We

should have been given the task of trying to work out an

acceptable formula with the ports,`t in the case of deep

water ports, and with the users of the inland waterway

system . I would have hoped we could have developed a

compromise which would move in the direction of

nonfederal participation . There has been a complete

stalemate in that area, which I don't think serves the

interests of the country well . Some of those ports need

to be deepened, and I think one way to screen out the

better of them is again through a financial contribution .

I have an underlying theory on water projects, that the

minute you ask people to contribute, you have an

automatic screening device which is far better than any

analysis that could be made by the technicians .

Q : Well, let's talk about another area then of cost sharing,

and that is the area of recreation . Also, I think we get

into the questions of water supply here . There is a

letter that Don Cluff, chief of the Water Resources

Branch of OMB, sent you on 3 March 1982, and I will read

part of it just to remind you of what it says .

It says, "Unless further actions refine the administration's position on cost sharing, nonfederal interests

should bear 100 percent of the costs of vendables such as

recreation and water supply . Also projects recommended

by agency heads are required to have the highest possible

net national economic development--NED--benefits, or be

specifically exempted from meeting this criterion by the

Secretary . Rationale_ for the waiver and submission of

the NED (plan) to OMB at the time of the review are

required ." Did you concur with this position?

2 1
federal governmentkept certain of its commitments on

recreation development on completed Corps projects .

What we did was to go back and have the Corps look at

those parts of recreation facilities which were important

from the standpoint of the health and the welfare and the

safety of the people who would use a reservoir facility .

For example, supposing that it was necessary to build

certain minimal sanitary facilities . We were able to get

the position at OMB modified on some completed Corps

projects to allow us to go ahead at full federal expense

to provide certain minimal facilities .

We were also able to secure OMB's approval for a

development of recreation at a multipurpose Corps project

where there was substantial nonfederal participation in

that recreation, on a 50-50 formula as I recall . Again,

the justification of the federal interest being the

welfare and the safety of the public who would use a

particular multipurpose facility .

Still another thing which we have done is to develop

criteria for the kinds of recreation facilities which we

felt were appropriate for federal assistance . I believe

the Corps in the past has gone a little bit too far in

the kinds of recreation facilities that were being

prepared . For example, providing tennis courts, baseball

diamonds, and other similar facilities that we thought

should have been provided by the nonfederal interests, as

opposed to sanitary facilities required for sanitary

purposes .

As a result, we are still able to provide some recreational facilities at federal expense, notwithstanding

the fact that it is not a high priority item . I think

the feeling is that limited federal funds should be used

for higher purposes--for example, flood control,

navigation, and other such purposes . I generally agree

2 2
Q :

Q :

A : Yes .

A : Yes .

with that philosophy .

Would you explain one point to me in this letter?

Because I frankly don't understand it . How does one

devote the highest possible NED? Is that not eventually

a kind of subjective decision?

A : No, I think what he is saying is that you develop the

project that has the most favorable benefit-cost ratio,

and that if you want to develop a project that has a

lesser benefit-cost ratio than the one with the highest,

then you have to get an exception from the OMB and

develop the rationale why you should go ahead . And let me

give you an example of that . We had this come up .

You may have the highest NED, for example, on a project

involving flood control that would only provide, say, 25-

year protection . And my own feeling is that the Corps,

if it is going to build a flood control project, should

have a minimum level of protection, like 100-year

protection . We had this happen, as a matter of fact,

just before I left my position .

We were successful in at least two cases in getting a

waiver on that maximum NED plan because it didn't make

sense to provide a--to spend federal money for a flood

control project that wouldn't provide a reasonable amount

of protection .

Okay . Another area which you got involved in that sort of

bears on cost sharing is the area of mitigation .

Q : And there was an issue involving contiguous versus noncontiguous lands and so forth .

Q : Before we get into that, maybe you could explain your

philosophy about mitigation to me, about the acquisition

of lands to mitigate wildlife loss .

A : Well, let me say that, first of all, it has always been

my feeling that appropriate mitigation is a project cost

and should be paid for like other project costs . For

example, if it is a--just to pick a point--supposing you

have a multipurpose reservoir project for hydropower,

flood control, and for municipal purposes ; then it is my

view that, to the extent the project needs to provide

certain mitigation, then that mitigation ought to be a

project cost and it ought to be paid for by the various

2 3
beneficiaries of that project .

Now, the thing I do feel quite strongly about is that if

mitigation is required because of a reservoir project,

then it is my view that you ought to mitigate as close as

possible to that project and not thousands of miles away .

The second thing is that, if possible, mitigation ought

to be provided on land already acquired rather than

proposing acquisition of more land off the tax roll .

So if it involves management of land, then the first

thing you ought to do would be to look at whether or not

you can manage the lands that you are acquiring for other

purposes, for mitigation also . Or perhaps to better

manage federal lands, say, that may be in the area for

other purposes .

The other thing I have always believed is that, for

example, in terms of fisheries, if you built a reservoir

project and it destroys a certain kind of fishery--say a

stream trout fishery--but at the same time, you create a

large reservoir fishery of another species that you

didn't have, there ought to be some way to balance out

the enhancement that you have provided versus the

benefits foregone .

I believe there has been a tendency to say that the way

we take care of mitigation problems is-to, go out and

acquire large blocks of land and do certain things on

those new lands . My feeling is that there ought to be a

look taken at other things you can do that don't

necessarily involve the acquisition of large amounts of

land to be removed from the tax roll solely for

mitigation purposes .

Q : Were you able to discuss this with people like Mr . Arnett

and people at the Fish and Wildlife Service and so forth?

Did you ever have a colloquy about this?

A : Yes . Mr . Arnett and I worked very closely in California

in a similar relationship where I was Director of Water

Resources and he was Director of Fish and Game . I don't

expect that he agrees 100 percent with my theory on

mitigation versus his, but I think we agree on a number

of things--particularly the need for better management .

Are you familiar with what is called HEP--Habitat

Evaluation Procedures--that I guess were mainly

established by the Fish and Wildlife Service to evaluate

the impact of a particular project by the Fish and

Wildlife Service?

2 4
A : I am generally familiar, yes .

Q : Did you find it to be a satisfactory way to . . .

A : Well, I think their evaluation probably is about as good

as you can get . You know that evaluation of fishery

resources and wildlife resources is not an exact science .

I believe we might question what the fishery and wildlife

people conclude with respect to the amount of fish that

are lost or the amount of wildlife habitat that would be

lost, say, as a result of the construction of a certain

project . So it is not surprising that there is probably

not complete agreement between the project builders and

the single-purpose fishery and wildlife people, in terms

of their evaluation process . Certainly, their technology

has come a long way and probably is about as good as is

available at the present time .

I think the more difficult problem comes in after you

identify it ; what do you do about it?

Q : Did you ever--were you ever concerned about the kind of

criticism that was generated at the local level by Fish

and Wildlife officials at the Corps, you know, rather

than coming up through channels in Fish and Wildlife? It

would be criticism at the local level, that they would

get out in the public arena .

A : Oh, yes . Very much so . In fact, this gets into the area

also on regulatory reform, Section 404 . Just to

elaborate on the problem, the Corps, in administering the

404 program, has to take into consideration the views of

the U .S . Fish and Wildlife Service, with respect to the

effect of granting an individual permit . Also, to a

lesser extent, the views of NOAA, who have

responsibilities in ocean waters, and EPA .

I view these agencies to be single-purpose agencies .

Their whole reason for existence is to protect and

enhance, say, in the case of the U .S . Fish and Wildlife

Service, the fishery and wildlife resources of the

country . That is admirable, and I think it is an

important function ; yet, on the other hand, the Corps has

the difficult job of balancing the environmental concerns

with economic concerns and making decisions in the public

interest .

For example, just to pose an exaggerated situation,

suppose the Fish and Wildlife people say a particular

project shouldn't be built because it is going to do a

certain kind of damage to the fishery or the wildlife of

the area . But suppose the Corps, as it gets all of its

2 5
input frog various agencies and makes its own evaluation,

says, "Sure it will damage the fishery to a very minimal

extent, but the benefits of this project," for example,

for flood control, "far outweigh the damage it is going

to do to the fish and the wildlife ." So therefore, the

Corps determines that a permit should be granted for a

local flood control project . Now, very often the fishery

people, to get support for their position, will go out and get support of the local community from people who

are concerned solely about the fishery . And it makes the Corps' job more difficult .

Getting back again to the 404 program, I think the Corps

has to get the advice from the fishery people, for

example, on the effect of a particular project on the

fishery ; but that can't necessarily control the Corps'

decision because the Corps has a broader interest, a

broader public interest, to look at than solely the

matter of protecting the fishery in the given instance.

Let me give you an example . of that . The city of

Chesapeake in Virginia had a need to construct a flood

control project because a number of years ago, under

excessive rainfall conditions, many of its residents were

flooded . As a result the town of Chesapeake wanted to

spend its own money cleaning out an existing ditch so the

water would drain from the area that had been flooded and

thereby provide flood control protection . The fishery

people and EPA said that you would destroy a wetland area

if you cleaned out this channel and put the spoil on the

banks . These agencies threatened to override the Corps'

decision, which was to allow the flood control project to

go ahead .

Members of Congress got involved in the act and were

infuriated that the Fish and Wildlife people and EPA had

been successful in holding up the construction of that

flood control project by virtue of their ability to

escalate decisions of a District Engineer to successively

higher levels, thus delaying the time protection could be

afforded to the area .

We finally got the problem worked out, but there is a

case in point . In other words, I am not critical of Fish

and Wildlife or EPA for advancing their point ; but once

they advance their point and the Corps takes it into

consideration, then the Corps' decision should stand .

The Corps' evaluation of that case was that the public

interest provided such great flood control benefit to

such a large group of people that it more than offset the

17 acres of wetlands that would be lost by cleaning out

this channel and placing the spoil on the banks .

2 6
Q : Mr . Gianelli, one of the areas in which you were active from the very beginning was the area of new starts for

the Corps of Engineers . Can you explain to me exactly

what you had in mind ; did you have in mind specific

projects or just the idea of identifying projects that

met the maximum standards of NED and so forth?

A : No . Let me say that one of the things that I had hoped

was that I .could get a chance to take whatever moneys might be available to the Corps for water projects and spread these moneys out over a larger number of projects,

using innovative ways to secure nonfederal financing and cost sharing .

Q :

What I asked the Corps to do early on was to identify

some of its better projects, where we could then go out and talk to the project beneficiaries about contributing

more and particularly, also, maybe getting involved with

what I called the,up-front financing of some of these

projects . My theory being that it we could demonstrate

both to OMB and to the Congress that we could do that,

then my hope was that the Corps could take whatever

moneys were available to it and build many more projects

than under the historical system .

The primary reason for my new-start effort was to demonstrate my conviction that there were people out there in

the field, nonfederal sponsors, who would be willing, in

order to get a project under way, to assist in financing

and to guarantee a higher repayment than historically had

been the case .

I didn't have any specific projects in mind when I

started out, but I did have a particular theory that I

wanted to demonstrate would work . As I anticipated,

there are federal project beneficiaries who would be

willing to share in the financing and provide additional

repayments so that the projects could be expedited .

Do you feel your expectations were met? I mean, in terms

of identifying local sponsors?

A : Yes, in part, because we were able to identify a total of

about sixteen projects, where we talked to the project

beneficiaries, and we took that initiative from here . I

brought back to Washington as a special assistant to me

in this area, Mr . Robert Eiland, who had worked with me

in California and who was familiar with these new ways of

financing . I asked him to be the person that went out

with the Corps and tried to put some of these proposals

together . He was successful in doing that on some sixteen

water projects ; and we were able to get OMB's approval to

2 7
include ~n the President's budget the federal share of

these projects, with the locals being agreeable to doing

more than they would have done normally .

So I was successful, I believe, in demonstrating that it

could be done . Where I was not successful was in having

Congress allow us to go ahead to implement these

proposals . And that was, I would say looking back upon

my tenure, one of my biggest disappointments . Congress

either didn't recognize or has not been willing thus far

to recognize the need to move in a new direction and to

go along with us in some of our efforts as a way of

expediting project construction .

As a matter of fact, Congress prohibited our going ahead

on these new starts until the policy committees of

Congress took a look at what we were trying to do and

agreed with our approaches, notwithstanding the fact that

OMB had approved them and they were in the President's

budget . In this year Congress deadlocked again, and

neither the omnibus bills nor new starts were allowed to

proceed .

Q : Let's turn our attention, then, to the subject of

regulatory reform . Let's start at the top with the Task

Force on Regulatory Reform . You are a member of the Task

Force .

A : In fact, I was chairman of the Task Force .

Q : Did the Task Force work well together?

A : Yes . I think it was an excellent Task Force . You may

recall that the Vice President's office was given the

responsibility by the President of instituting regulatory

reform in a large and quite a broad number of areas . And

one of the areas that was identified, as a result

primarily of complaints that the incoming administration

received from people in the field, was the Corps' 404

program, which was simply not working . Number one, and

the main point, was that the decisions were just not

being rendered promptly . And further, that applicants

were being required to do much more than could be

reasonably expected in order to get a project under way .

And so the Vice President's office created a Task Force

that made OMB and the Assistant Secretary of the Army's

office responsible for heading the regulatory reform

effort, and asked me to chair that effort . Participation

included all of the agencies that were involved in the

404 process : for example, EPA, Interior, Commerce, and a

few other less important agencies . The Soil Conservation

2 8
Service was also involved because of the projects of the

Department of Agriculture and the interest of the Forest

Service .

We were given certain mandates, among which was to modify

the administrative processes so that the decisions could

be reached in 60 days . Some decisions had taken months

and even several years . Our first effort, then, was to

work with some of the agencies with which the Department

of Army and ASA had memoranda of understanding in

connection with processing applications for 404 permits .

Again, primarily, they were the Department of Interior,

EPA, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of

Agriculture . We were successful in revising the

memoranda of understanding that dealt with the 404

process for those agencies .

The principal change that we made was to shorten the

process . Under the historical process, the District

Engineer would make the original decision on a 404

permit . However, if any of the other federal agencies

didn't like that decision, they could appeal it

successively up to the Division Engineer, to the Chief of

Engineers, to the office of the Assistant Secretary of

the Army for Civil Works, and finally to the Secretary of

the Army .

Just that elevation process could take a year and a half

or two years--just the time of referring it upward . It

didn't seem to us that time was necessary ; so what we did

in the MOUs was to work out a process where instead of

having all those successive levels, the decision would be

made by the District Engineer . Then if one of the other

agencies didn't like that decision, it would have to be

appealed by the Assistant Secretary level of that agency

to the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Civil Works . The office of the Assistant Secretary would

make the decision on whether it should be elevated and to

what level . However, there would be only one elevation .

In other words, supposing the appeal was made to the

Assistant Secretary and he said : "Okay, we will review

it . We will let the Chief of Engineers review the

decision ." That would be it . Or perhaps after we had

listened to the environmental agencies, we could say,

"No, the District Engineer's decision will stand ." That

had the effect of very drastically reducing the number of

elevations, first of all, because they had to go up to

the Assistant Secretary level before an appeal could be

made ; and then it reduced the time that the District

Engineer's decision would become final, because the most

there could be was one elevation .

2 9
Q : Would it also have the effect of injecting again the

politics at an earlier period? In other words, wouldn't

the opponents say that since it is going to be elevated

up to the office of a political appointee, decisions are

no . longer going to be made on the basis of specific

regulations or even of engineering data, but on the basis

of philosophy?

A : No . I don't think so . I don't think it will politicize

it at all, certainly no more than the prior process . Very

few decisions, if any, are made by a political appointee,

say, by the Assistant Secretary himself . Most of the

time, the question is whether or not there is new

evidence which would require the Division Engineer or the

Chief of Engineers to look at the decision of the

District Engineer .

So we have still kept the decision in almost all cases at

the Corps level, but maybe at only one level of the

Corps . So I don't think it politicized the process at

all . I think we did expedite the process materially ; and

our whole effort was to give the District Engineer more

authority on the decisions and make it difficult for

people to overrule his decision, because we felt that he

was the person that had a better grasp of the facts in

all of the public interest that might be involved .

Q : Did you also limit the grounds for appeal? In other

words, that the grounds for appeal would only be

procedural rather than general environmental considerations .

A : Well, generally that's right . And we said, for example,

that we didn't think it was appropriate for the Fish and

Wildlife Service to make an appeal on the basis of the

project's economics . In other words, their appeal should

be limited to their areas of responsibility . For

instance, if the project and applicant were going to do

damage to the fishery, then we felt the comments from the

U .S . Fish and Wildlife Service should be limited to the

effect on the fishery . The comments shouldn't have

anything to do with whether it was a good flood control

project or a bad flood control project . Flood control is

the prerogative of the Corps . So yes, we did limit and

restrict the agencies who appealed the District's

decisions to only their areas of expertise . And this, I

think, was a great improvement .

Q : And the agencies--you signed MOUs with the agency heads

so there was obviously an understanding that this was the

best way to go about it .

3 0
A : Well, I think there was a recognition that the present

system needed to be revised ; and I think at that time we

entered into the MoUs, the agency heads of those other

agencies were satisfied that they would get a chance, if

they really were unhappy with the decision, to ask for an

elevation .

Q : Now, you are no doubt familiar with this Baltimore Sun

article, front page, that suggests that there was a

substantial amount of disagreement between you and Mr .

Arnett over some permit decisions .

A : This goes to what I think has happened in the 404

program, which I reflected in my presentations to the

Congress . Many people now view the 404 program as a

wetlands protection measure, and I don't view it that way

at all, nor did the Congress intend it to be when it

enacted the Clean Water Act . If you go back and look at

the origin of 404, its purpose was'°to protect the quality

of the nation's waters . It didn't have anything to do

with the wetlands .

Subsequent court decisions and administrative actions of

prior administrations have focused largely on wetlands .

However, you can destroy wetlands by a large variety of

means other than a dredge-and-fill operation . You can

destroy them by draining, clearing, and erosion, for

example, all without a permit .

Part of the problem we had as we went through our

regulatory reform was that people viewed it as an attack

on the wetlands, and I didn't view it that way at all .

It is not a wetlands protection measure per se, in my

judgment, because it doesn't protect wetlands from the

major causes of destruction . I believe that one of our

problems, in regulatory reform, has been the perception

that we are destroying the wetlands by the process that

we have worked out . And I don't think that is true at

all .

Q : Can you have good water quality without protecting

wetlands?

A : Yes . It is stretching things pretty far to say that

there is a relationship between wetlands protection and

water quality in most cases . This is not to say whether

or not wetlands should be protected . Some no doubt

should be . However, Congress needs to bite the bullet

and do it out in the open ; Section 404 will not do it .

Q : of course, the definition of what is a wetland was a

3 1
judicial decision that expanded the Corps' responsibility

so much and that, I guess, was . . .

A : Well, this is what I said to Congress ; the Corps is

charged with balancing environmental concerns and

developmental concerns . They will look at the

presentations that have been made by the Fish and

Wildlife Service and by EPA and by NOAA in regard to a

wetland, and then make a decision on an individual basis,

based upon public interest considerations . The Corps has

denied some applications where they believed there was

some relationship to water quality that could be

demonstrated, and the public interest required denial .

I believe the primary problem we have had on our

regulatory reform is the perception that 404 is a

wetlands protection measure, and it is no such thing .

That is one of the things that I have said to Congress .

If Congress wants to protect the wetlands, then maybe

what they ought to do is pass a-, law that protects

wetlands from all damage or all destruction . Then they

ought to assign this responsibility to EPA or to the Fish

and Wildlife Service . But it shouldn't be a Corps

responsibility .

I question whether--if Congress reviewed the situation--

whether they wouldn't come to the same conclusion I

have--that 404 related to water quality, because it was

part of the Clean Water Act, and was not a wetland

protection measure, except in those cases where it could

be demonstrated that the destroying of the wetland does

have some effect on water quality .

Q : Do you think that the nation is suffering from too much

wetlands loss? Of course, the environmentalists point

out--and I think you got this article in the Baltimore

Sun--point out that about a half a million acres will be

lost each year .

A : Yes . But again, the inference is that it is being lost

because of the Corps' 404 program, which is incorrect . We

had the Corps take a look at the acreage that the Corps

grants under 404 permits, and it is insignificant

compared to the total acreage of the wetlands that is

lost from other causes . For example, large amounts of

wetlands are lost along the coastal areas, as in

Louisiana, by erosion each year . Large numbers of

wetlands are lost by draining the land, and that is not

related to the 404 program .

So, again, the perception that all of the loss of

wetlands is tied into the Corps' 404 program is

3 2
completely erroneous in my judgment, and I think we were

able to demonstrate that . Nevertheless, there are still

people who say that it's a wetlands protection measure ;

and therefore you are destroying our wetlands in your

modification of the regulatory reform program .

Well, it seems, in a sense, the issue is how much faith

can these other agencies have and the American public

have in the Corps? Because if you are suggesting that

the Fish and Wildlife Service ought to confine their

views to their particular responsibility, and the same

with the National Marine Fisheries, EPA and so forth, and

then those views are sent to the Corps and the Corps is

the one that does the balancing act . . .

A : Which is exactly my view of what ought to happen .

Q : Then that suggests something--an attitude-- that probably

is not shared by a fair number of people, who think of

the Corps as specifically a construction agency that

cannot be viewed as an agency that is going to view

sympathetically environmental considerations .

A : Well, I don't think the record of the Corps verifies that

at all . I think the Corps has been very sensitive to

environmental concerns, and I think, if anything, the

Corps may have given over-consideration to some of the

environmental aspects, say, of an application for a 404

permit versus some of the benefits that would accrue .

Any criticism that the Corps has not done a good job

balancing, I think, is incorrect . In my view, the Corps

has done an excellent job ; I am sure, though, that some

of the single-purpose environmental agencies will not .

view it that way, because they think the Corps ought to

uphold the single-purpose views .

But again, they are single-purpose agencies . They don't

have the responsibility to balance all the issues

Congress gave the Corps . I believe that's why Congress

gave the program to the Corps, because of its feeling

that the Corps would do a better job balancing the

issues . If you turned the 404 program over to the U .S .

Fish and Wildlife Service, I suspect that there would be

a great outcry to the Congress, because I don't think the

Service has the ability to balance the issues like the

Corps .

Q : How about the idea of the states taking over the 404

program? The general permit program . Are you in favor

of having the states take over as many of these 404

responsibilities as possible?

3 3
A : Yes, I am . . I think that the more the states assume, the

better it would be, because they are in an even better

position to balance some of the issues closer to them ;

and they have a better ability to develop a feel for

local interests . Yes, I would be in favor of states where

they have a capability to do the kind of job that the

Corps does in terms of balancing the issues .

Q : Well, that would involve the development, presumably, of

a new office, and hiring people, and so forth .

A : Well, not necessarily . Some of the states have

departments of environment or departments of development,

or whatever they call them, where they could expand their

activities to include the 404 program . I don't think

many of them would have to establish new entities ;

instead, they could very well integrate the 404 program

with some of the functions of those existing agencies .

Many of the states have agencies that deal with water

quality, and those agencies already do a lot of work in

this area .

Q : Virginia, for instance, has a Water Quality Commission, I

think it is called, which has very restricted powers in

dealing with water quality . If they took over the 404

program as it is presently defined by the judiciary with

all these navigable or potentially navigable areas, then

there would be a substantial increase of their functions

and probably of their expertise, wouldn't you think?

A : Well, it is pretty hard to generalize, because I think

the states are so variable in terms of their

capabilities . Some of the larger states could absorb a

function, you know, with very little effort and probably

without any great expense . For some of the smaller

states, it might be much more of a problem . It is pretty

hard to generalize .

Q : Let me go back to a presidential document, Executive

Order 12291, issued 17 February 1981 . This was one of

the first ones that President Reagan issued . It deals

with regulatory reform, and it says,, among other things,

"Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the

potential benefits to society for the regulations

outweigh the potential cost to society ." And "regulatory

objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits

to society ."

It sounds nice, but how do you come up with a decision

about the potential benefits to society versus the

potential costs? Are we talking--was the President

talking basically about your B-C ratio again?

3 4
A : No . This statement was not intended for regulatory

reform efforts like ours and does not fit the 404

program . It would seem to apply more to somebody who is

starting to promulgate a new regulation . However, the

principle could certainly be applied to 404 and some

tough questions asked on whether we get enough benefit in

water quality improvement for the long delays,

uncertainties, and public discontent we found in the

program .

Basically we had a more direct mandate with respect to

the 404 program when we received the specific

instructions from the Vice President . So I believe we

have to look more to what we received from the Vice

President, as related to the 404 program .

Q : Another one of the statements is "Except as provided in

section 8 of this order, agencies shall prepare

regulatory impact analyses of major rules, and transmit

them along with all notices of proposed rulemaking, all

final rules, to the Director as follows ." The Corps has

prepared these regulatory impact analyses on the proposed

revisions to 404?

A : Again, I don't believe this applies to what we were doing

on revising the 404 program .

Q : Before I go on to another subject, are there any other

concerns or views you wanted to raise dealing with

regulatory reform? I know it is a controversial issue .

A : Well, yes . It is sort of interesting--we have had our

memoranda of agreement in place now for about two years,

and my own feeling is that they are working pretty well .

But there are a number of other actions that have to be

taken . The Corps' regulations have to be revised, the

regulations of other agencies also have to be revised,

and definitions of jurisdiction have to be agreed to by

EPA and the Corps, to name a few .

So there is still a lot of work to be done to complete

the regulatory reform effort . That has been sort of

frustrating because it seems to me that it has taken us

far too long to complete the revision of the 404 program .

This is due to the large number of regulations and the

large number of other agencies who have to do their

thing,, in order to make the regulatory reform effort

complete . It has been troubling to me that at every step

of the way special interests have been able to slow down

the process of regulatory reform, and I have been

concerned about it . Recently the agencies that entered

into the memoranda of agreement, because of pressure from

3 5
some of their single-purpose constituency, would like to

change what we have already put in place . As a result, I

don't believe the single-purpose agencies now view with

complete satisfaction the way the system has been working

since we provided for expedited action . For example, it

has been clear to me that the U .S . Fish and Wildlife

Service, prior to our reform effort, thought that it was

a co-decisionmaker in the 404 process .

I have detected from the single-purpose agencies that

they believe they may have lost a little of their clout,

and I think it is true . However, I think it was neces

sary that it happen . I don't view that as negative . I

view it as positive, and it demonstrates to me that previously they had undue influence on the Corps' decision .

Let me illustrate the point . There are some cases where

a threat of elevation by a single-purpose environmental

agency would cause an applicant to make unjustified

concessions just to expedite the process . I believe our

effort has stopped some of that from happening . In other

words, I don't believe that the single-purpose agencies

under the prior process should be allowed to blackmail an

applicant who, because of time constraints, agreed to

something that wasn't appropriate, just to prevent these

agencies from elevating and delaying issuance of a permit

for a matter of years .

As a result, I feel good about our regulatory reform

effort . It has been a major effort of this office . Bob

Dawson, my deputy, has headed it . We brought in various

people from the field . We made Morgan Rees a special

assistant in this area . Overall, I am very proud of our

record with respect to regulatory reform .

Q : Do you feel that the reform effort has sort of petered

out at all or . . . ?

A : I feel that it has lost some of its initial momentum, and

it is harder now to complete all aspects of the reform

effort than it would have been two years ago .

Q : Has there also been increased political sensitivity,

particularly now in an election year?

A : I think that's probably inherent in a lot of things, and

I think it is probably inherent in this process, too .

Let me turn our attention for a moment to the area of

environmental impact statements . I think fairly early,

actually, in your administration you criticized the cost

of environmental impact statements, and I think you also

3 6
criticized. the length of time it took to prepare them .

Could you elaborate on that a bit and tell me how

successful you were in changing this?

A : Well, of course, the whole subject of environmental

impact statements goes far beyond the Corps . It goes to

agencies like the Council of Environmental Quality that

have a large input and a large say as to the contents of

the environmental impact statements .

I do worry sometimes about the degree of detail that some

environmental impact statements become involved in, where

there isn't a particular environmental problem . In other

words, it has always seemed to me that if there is a

specific environmental problem, that the environmental

impact statement ought to try to address that very

seriously in whatever detail is necessary . On the other

hand, if there isn't, there should not be a great effort

made to try and look at things which are not going to be

important .

Q : You say apparent environmental impact, and I guess that's

an important point because, well, take an obvious areaarcheology . A lot of your archeological investigation--

it is not going to be apparent at the beginning that

there is anything six feet underground . How do you

reconcile that to what you just said?

A : Well, all right, that is a good case in point . Suppose

the Corps wants to build a reservoir which may inundate

quite a large area . There are archeological consultants

available who have expertise in areas in which there

might be archeological finds . The advice of those people

should be solicited before the Corps goes out and spends

a large amount of money without some indication that

important archeological finds are in the area .

So that's what I have in mind--that for example the Corps

not, say, on its own, go out looking for all of these

kinds of things, but rely on expertise that might be

available that could zero in on a particular area, for

example, that might be explored at whatever depth they

think is appropriate . And I think that would be a good

kind of example .

Q : Of course, archeologists are rather self-interested

individuals, as most people are who get involved in

consultant work . It would be to the archeologist's

advantage to say, "Well, it's a possibility and maybe we

should do it," and so forth and so on . I don't know--how

would you get around that?

3 7
A : Well, you know, I believe any professional as time goes

on is going to be evaluated on the basis of his record .

If you have an archeologist who has struck out, in

effect, after he has made many recommendations for

detailed explorations without any finds, then I believe

people will tend to discredit his abilities and look to

others whose recommendations have resulted in substantial

finds .

The same thing might be true with respect to fisheries

and endangered species . It's a matter of judgment and of

the importance of a particular application . If, for

example, you are going to build a Westway project in New

York, which involves several hundreds of millions of

dollars, obviously it warrants spending more time and

effort than should be spent on an application that

proposes to fill in a small area to build a garage .

Q : Let's talk for a moment about relations with

environmental groups . Did you have the opportunity to

meet with the heads of some of the major environmental

organizations in town?

A : Yes . In fact, I guess overall I felt pretty good about

my relationship with the environmental organizations . The

first thing'we did was to--and we did this on a number of

occasions--invite representatives of the various

environmental organizations to meetings on matters of

interest--organizations such as the Environmental Defense

Fund, the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation,

the National Resources Defense Council, and others . I

believe we were successful in establishing an important

dialogue . Also, I was invited to address the annual

meeting of the Environmental Defense Fund Associates in

New York by Dr . Janet Brown, the Executive Director of

the Environmental Defense Fund . And she said, "You know,

I think you would help our attendance if you came, and

people would like to hear your views," and I said great .

I talked about regulatory reform and had a good dialogue

with those present . After I returned to Washington I

received a nice letter from her, in which she cited me as

an example of a public official who was open in terms of

things that he did and who wasn't reluctant to dialogue

with the environmentalists .

Also we had strong support from the National Wildlife

Federation and the other environmental organizations on

our cost-sharing effort . So while I don't expect these

environmental organizations to view me as one of their

people, I think we developed a rapport and a relationship

which involved mutual respect .

3 8
3 9

Q : Did you in any formal fashion solicit the views of the

environmental organizations? The private environmental

organizations on the 404 program, regulatory reform . . .

A : Well, yes . We had a number of direct dialogues with

these organizations, and they did provide substantial

input to our efforts . And, of course, these entities

commented formally just like all the other interested

parties in a very open reform process .

Q : Well, let's turn then to your relations with Congress,

and here I am going to talk about people, names .

A : All right .

Q : Several of the important people involved in water

resource development are Mr. Bevill, Mr . Whitten, and Mr .

Roe . What kind of working relationship did you have with

Mr . Bevill?

A : Well, let me say I never had a very close relationship

with Mr . Bevill . We talked on a number of occasions, and

I always felt he was a little resistant to our efforts on

additional cost sharing and new starts . In fact, the

appropriation committees did not go along with the new

starts that we developed .

I am not sure Mr . Bevill is very enthusiastic about any

change in the system which would have the effect of

impinging upon the ability of the appropriation committee

to get those projects that they want built versus what we

might come up with on our new starts with additional cost

sharing . I believe Mr . Bevill had certain projects in his

own district which we had some problems supporting, and I

think that may have caused a little strain .

Q : Did this involve the Tennessee-Tombigbee?

A : No . I think we were completely together on the

Tennessee-Tombigbee Project itself . I believe our views

as to the elaborateness and extent of the recreation and

visitor facilities might have differed substantially with

those of Mr . Bevill . So I viewed it as an honest

difference because of our--coming from a different

perspective . obviously he wanted a facility in his area,

say, a visitor facility or a recreation facility, that

would please his constituents . However, we felt that

there had to be constraints and that certain of those

things should be funded by nonfederal interests if they

were to be built . So that put a little strain, I would

say, in the relationship .
Q : Where were the problems?

A : Oh, I think I just indicated that to you--primarily it is

in connection with some of the small projects that

involved improvements in his area, such as the

elaborateness of visitor facilities or recreation

facilities . Then also I suspect that our efforts at cost

sharing were viewed skeptically .

Q : On Mr . Whitten, he is, of course, chairman of the House

Appropriations Committee and I guess the dean of the

House in terms of tenure in office . He has an enormous

amount of influence . And he also has an enormous amount

of interest in the Yazoo Basin ,in Mississippi--that

area .

A : Well, let me say I had very little contact with Mr .

Whitten, and, as I recall, the primary exchanges we have

had were at Bevill's hearings, when he has appeared and

generally offered his views on things in general . He has

been, of course, very supportive of water development in

the past . I don't recall any serious problems with Mr .

Whitten .

Q : How about Mr . Roe?

A : I think the relationship with Bob Roe has been much

closer than, for example, with Mr . Bevill, very largely

because Mr . Roe is head of the Policy Subcommittee which

is concerned with the Corps activities . I felt very good

about my relationship with Bob Roe, and I think we see

eye to eye on a great many things . I doubt he is willing

to go as far as we wanted to go on cost sharing and upfront financing, but I think he recognizes the need for

those things and moves, you know, in accordance with his

own views on it . I appeared before him a great number

of times on a variety of subjects .

But on Tennessee-Tombigbee, itself, there was no

argument .` The administration has actively supported the

finishing of Tennessee-Tombigbee and funding for it : and

certainly on the big issues like that, there is no

problem .

Let's turn to the Senate side . Senators Abdnor and

Stafford . Could you give me a thumbnail sketch of your

relationships with those two?

A : Yes . Senator Abdnor, of course, being the chairman of the

Policy Subcommittee, and I had a very close relationship .

I would say a very good relationship with both him and

his staff, similar to that of Congressman Roe . Probably

4 0
not quite as close as the relationship with congressman

Roe, but almost . However, I felt very good about it ; and

I think he must have felt partly good about it because he

put quite a statement into the record on the Senate floor

when I left, complimenting me on the work that we had

done . Congressman Roe was also quite complimentary upon

my departure from Washington . I believe those statements

reflected their views on our relationship, which were

very positive .

Senator Abdnor has not had the same degree of experience

in the water field and on the Corps' programs as

Congressman Roe .

Q : How about Senator Stafford?

A : Senator Stafford--much less contact with, but a good

relationship . Again, Senator Stafford was supportive of

some of the things we were trying to do, and I would

invite you to the statement that he, put in the record too

on my leaving, which indicated a concurrence and an

appreciation of some of the things we have been trying

to--that I have been trying to do as Assistant Secretary .

So the relationship with Stafford was good .

Q : Two other senators who take an active interest in water

resources, Senators Stennis and Hatfield .

A : Senator Stennis, I'd say minimal exposure, but good

relationship . When I first came in, he was one of the

first people that I dialogued with, and his great concern

was Tennessee-Tombigbee . And so I think there was no

problem there, because the administration was fully

supportive of Tennessee-Tombigbee .

Senator Hatfield, the relations have been rocky ; and let

me say about that, I have an acquaintance with the

senator that goes back to when he was Governor of Oregon .

I knew him fairly well up there, and he knew me because

of the problems of the two states that we worked on

together . I believe he was Governor of Oregon at the time

that President Reagan was Governor of California . He has

a major concern which gets reflected in some of the

problems of his area . One of them was deep water port

navigation and the additional locks at Bonneville . Also,

the senator has been very active, and we have dialogued,

about Mount St . Helens .

Again, I have been disappointed that his committee has

not been willing to go along with some of our new starts .

Both he and Congressman Bevill have been waiting for the

policy committees to give their stamp of approval on what

4 1
Q : Let me just drop one more name . Senator Moynihan .

A : Yes . I enjoyed Senator Moynihan very much . He was

always, in a very gentlemanly way, needling me

extensively when I came before his committee . He was

very active on Senator Abdnor's committee . His needling

took the form of pointing out I was a westerner, and he

thought that the west had gotten too much of the federal

share on water projects . He had some very competent

staff members that, particularly in the early years of

our administration, we worked very closely with . His

staff agreed with many of the things,, that we were trying

to do, and,I believe the senator does also .

Q :

we have been trying,to do, or to come up with their own

cost-sharing formulas .

So, again, I feel good about my relationship with senator

Hatfield . I think we had a couple of . spirited

discussions initially, but I think the problems were

worked out satisfactorily .

On the 15th of December 1981, then Congressman Toby

Moffitt, Chairman of the Environment, Energy, and Natural

Resources Subcommittee of the Committee on Government

Operations, wrote you a letter in which he talks about 42

projects that are between 21- and 25-percent complete .

He says that "at today's interest rates, all but a

comparative few of these projects would have negative or

modest benefit-cost ratios ." And, of course, requests

that you take a look at them . What was the subsequent

outcome of this letter, do you recall?

A : Yes . I think it resulted in an appearance that I made

before his committee . His interest related to specific

projects . The difficulty that I had with the points he

was raising was that some related to projects that were

either substantially under way or almost completed . I

didn't feel that it was appropriate to go back and try to

re-evaluate those projects because of, say, changed

interest rates or whatever, when they were so far along

in terms of being completed . I'm afraid he was

reflecting the views of some of the opponents of certain

projects .

Q : Environmental groups?

A : Primarily environmental groups, yes . But not always

environmental groups . I believe one of the projects on

his list was a reservoir project where substantial

agricultural land would be flooded out . He seemed to be

reflecting the views of those who would lose valuable

4 2
Q :

agricultural land by virtue of being in the reservoir

area . `

His questions were asked in sort of an oversight

capacity ; and I don't think they resulted in any major

change, as I recall, in direction .

Q : Did you ask OCE to investigate all of these . . . ?

A : I don't know if we asked for all of them, but we asked

about certain ones that we felt were appropriate . We

asked OCE for some information on them . But I think that

with others that were so far along, we pointed out the

inappropriateness of trying to go back and evaluate or

undo them at that late date .

Let's turn our attention, then, to some of the projects

that were fairly visible at one time or another during

the time you were in office . Just begin with the letter

A--Atchafalaya . Of course, this,,is a project that goes

back some time, but . the report came to your office--I

think it was some time . . .

A : I think it was probably about the middle of my tenure .

Q : As you know, but just for the record, the report comes

out of a long planning process that at one time or

another involved private environmental groups, the

federal Fish and Wildlife Service here, the state

Department of Public Works in Louisiana, and so forth .

The plan was viewed as a compromise among all these

various construction and environmental agencies, and

finally was accepted by the Governor of Louisiana, a

Republican governor, Governor Treen .

Yet, when it got to your office it stayed there for a

long time . And as a matter of fact, it has still not

been--it has still not come out of this office . Can you

explain the reasons why in light of the amount of

interest in the report and support from the state of

Louisiana?

A : Yes . Let me--I think there are two kinds of problems

connected with the Atchafalaya . One of them is that all

of the groups that did work on developing a compromise

were not concerned about the cost and were free to

recommend large expenditures of federal money . In other

words, the people that worked out the compromises were

not concerned about any limitation on availability of

federal dollars, number one .

The second part of the problem--and this is still

4 3
unresolved, as far as I know--is a dispute between the

local people around Morgan City as to whether or not the

Avoca levees will be extended to provide flood control

and possibly result in damage to the shrimp fishery in

some of the waters in the adjacent areas . And with all

due respect to the governor and with all due respect to

the local politicians and the Congress, as far as I know

none of them have really taken a strong stand with

respect to that controversy . on the one hand, the people

in Morgan City desire flood control, as opposed to some

of the environmental groups and the fishery interests,

who are very desirous of protecting the shrimp industry .

A large portion of the project will depend upon what

finally is done with respect to that levee extension,

which is still under considerable controversy . Certainly

one of the concerns that I have had is that before you

can really plan that project in its entirety, you have

got to decide whether the project is going to go ahead on

the basis of its original design, which provided for that

levee extension, or whether it is going to be eliminated .

Going back to the first part of the problem, the

project's total cost, as I recall, involves a federal

expenditure in excess of a billion dollars . Whether or

not such a large federal expenditure can be justified is

still a question .

It seems to me that those two problems have to be

addressed and resolved before that project is going to be

able to move ahead in part or in full .

Well, now this extension you are talking about is the

Avoca Island?

A : Yes .

Q : And as I recall, in the report that came to your office,

the Chief [of Engineers] made a recommendation for

further study of the Avoca Island extension, but the plan

as drawn up by these various groups and approved by the

Chief of Engineers suggested that what had already been

agreed upon be built independently and would not be

dependent upon the extension .

A : I don't think that's true . I think a lot of what has to

be constructed down there in the lower end depends upon

whether or not you are going to extend that Avoca Island

levee . So I think there is not, maybe, agreement on the

assumption you are just making .

The other thing, of course, as I say, is the large cost,

the large federal nonreimburseable cost that would go

4 4
Q :

into that project ; and much of it is for enhancement

purposes, for recreation and fish and wildlife . Again,

at the appropriate time, a decision will have to be made

by the Congress and the administration on whether or not

funds should be spent for those purposes as opposed to

other perhaps higher uses elsewhere in the United States .

Well, is there any question about the local contribution?

I mean, it is substantial . So that really is not the

issue .

A : Well, I believe the amount of local contribution is still

an issue . While the state of Louisiana has agreed to do

certain things, it's true, the last effort that was put

forth by the governor went to Secretary of Interior

Clark and proposed using some Interior funds for lands

which might be acquired as part of the project, solely

for wildlife and fishery enhancement .

Q : Could you be more specific about what you believe are

the appropriate times for the administration to reach a

decision and for Congress to reach a decision?

A : Well, I view the Avoca Island thing as almost a decision

precedent, which is necessary to define specifically what

the project is and what it is going to do . Fish and

Wildlife are looking again at it . The Corps is looking

again at it . I don't have any timetable on when that

thing is going to come to any conclusion which may be

acceptable to all of the parties of interest there,

particularly the flood control interests versus the

fishery interest in Louisiana .

And then, after that is resolved, it has got to be a

matter of priority . The Corps has got many billions of

dollars of authorized projects . There is also a further

complication relating to authorizations . The project as

set forth in the Corps' report involves parts of a

project that are already authorized, parts of it involve

a project which the Chief could authorize under his

authority, and part requires authorization from the U .S .

Congress . one of the problems that we had on detail was

that Governor Treen wanted us to spend some money on

parts of the project which Congress still has not

authorized . I believe that is why he went to Interior .

So there will have to be those parts of the puzzle fitted

together ultimately, but again, I come back to--I don't

think that could be done until the problem is worked out

on the Avoca Island levee, which is one of the major

features of the problem .

4 5
Q : Okay . I . think you have some very definite views about

the Red River project that the Corps is involved in .

Could you . . . ?

A : Well, I think the principal problem on the Red River

project, which would establish a shallow navigation

channel from Shreveport down to the Gulf, that needs to

be looked at is whether the benefits of that project will

exceed the costs .

Another problem on this project is the considerable

amount of erosion that has taken place along the natural

channel . The Corps has spent large sums of money trying

to prevent extreme erosion in that reach of the Red River

channel . I am quite concerned about what is going to

happen when that project is complete, with respect to the

erosion problem .

Q : So you are really questioning whether the project should

be built at all?

A : Well, the first lock is essentially constructed .

Q : Yes .

A : The lock is completed and the second one is under way,

since Congress has appropriated the necessary moneys and

has required the Corps to proceed . It still doesn't mean

that the project is going to be successful unless its

problems are addressed . of course, the Corps will do

what the Congress demands be done and will use whatever

funds are made available .

Q : so, to pursue it just for a moment, you are questioning

two things about what the Corps has done : the

geotechnical analysis regarding erosion, and also the

cost-benefit--the economic--analysis about the potential

benefits at the end . , Would that be a fair statement?

A : I think that's a fair statement . Yes .

Q : Oregon Inlet .

A : Oregon Inlet . Yes .

Q : Do you want to tackle it?

A : Yes . Oregon Inlet as I viewed it when I first became

involved represents a very difficult problem on the east

coast . The problem is that you are trying to maintain a

navigational channel into a development which has

partially already taken place . In other words, there has

4 6
been substantial public moneys used to develop a fishery

port, I' guess you would call it, with processing

facilities in Oregon Inlet . And that has envisioned the

need to keep a channel open so that the fishery boats

could use the facilities that have been constructed in

Oregon Inlet .

Unfortunately, Oregon Inlet is located in an area where

there is considerable shoaling and sand movement every

year, and an area which is extremely susceptible to

storms and movement of materials as a result of those

storms . As a result, the Corps has had a very difficult

time keeping the existing channel open . It has spent

large amounts of money trying to accomplish that . In

fact, the Corps has spent in the last two years, double

or triple the amount that has been spent in prior years,

using every conceivable way to keep those channels open,

using both side-caster dredges and hopper dredges .

The problem has been that when that-area shoals up, you

can only get very shallow draft dredges in there, like a

side-caster, to open it up . You haven't been able to get

the bigger dredges in . It has been very difficult . Then

after the Corps gets the channel opened, it has been very

difficult to maintain .

The Corps developed a jetty plan involving the

construction of two Jetties . The jetties would be

located, in part, on land that is under the control of

the Department of Interior . That department has very

strenuously objected to the jetty plan .

On what basis?

A : On the basis that--well, two bases . On the basis that

they, number one, don't have the authority :to give the

Corps the necessary land without legislation .

Incidentally that problem is being addressed by

legislation . Secondly, Interior claims it would cause

untold damage to the refuge and other lands that are

under their control . The present posture is, as I

recall, that the project will have to be authorized by

the Congress ; and the Corps' report, as I recall, has

just recently been finalized . We made certain

recommendations to the office of Management and Budget,

where it is pending .

In the meantime, legislation has been introduced to allow

Interior to give the Corps the necessary lands for the

jetty, and I believe there will probably be efforts from

the local people to secure the necessary authorization .

4 7
Q : Isn't there a touch of irony in this whole situation in

the sense that if the Corps proves it can be successful

in dredging, then it undermines the Corps' justification,

it undermines the Corps' jetty plan . If you can clear

the channel through dredging, you don't need a jetty .

A : That's the controversy . The Interior people have said,

"Look, we think the Corps can keep the channel open, if

they bring a hopper dredge in there ; open it once and it

will stay open ." But the Corps did that last year and

two years ago, and it hasn't stayed open . The Corps, I

believe, now feels that while the channel opening with

hopper dredges might have given temporary relief at a

cost of several millions of dollars, it does not meet the

objective of keeping the channel open .

The Corps, even with the increased effort and the money

that was spent on trying to keep the channel open,

believes the only long-term solution involves the

construction of jetties . So I don't think there is any

irony . I think it is a conclusion the Corps has

reached, which I think Interior still doesn't buy ; but

here again, you know, this goes to one of the things that

I said earlier . I don't think that Interior has the

expertise to evaluate what is necessary to keep a channel

open, as opposed to the Corps' expertise in this area . I

don't think Interior ought to be telling the Corps and I

don't think the public ought to be listening to the U .S .

Fish and Wildlife Service as to what is the best way to

keep that channel open . I think that is an area of Corps

expertise and Corps responsibility, and, by golly, that's

where it ought to rest .

Q : Okay, continuing on with this list of projects,

Yatesville . There were some questions there of land

acquisition and . . .

A : Well, let's see . Yatesville, I believe, is a dam that

was criticized, as I recall, by a lot of people who

argued that it would take out of production valuable

agricultural land and that the construction of the dam

would be more detrimental than beneficial insofar as

overall benefits are concerned . As I recall, this was a

project of particular interest to Congressman Perkins,

who has been very adamant in having that project go

ahead .

The project, in addition to the problems that surfaced

with respect to its benefits and its costs, as I recall,

had a significant pollution problem in the upper reaches

of the tributaries to the reservoir . I believe the Corps

felt it might cause some difficult water quality problems

4 8
in any lake which was created there . I believe the Corps

is still continuing to study that problem and is

reluctant to see that project go ahead until the pollution problem can be solved .

Congressman Perkins has been successful in getting money

into the appropriation act, which requires the Corps to

make certain expenditures in respect to the project . It

has been controversial . Certain moneys have been spent

on land acquisition, and I think certain other moneys have been dictated to be spent last year, which the Corps is spending . But as far as I know, the Corps has not finally reached closure on the potential pollution

problem .

Q : Just one more project--Westway .

A : Yes .

Q : To what extent did your office get involved with this

project? Of course, there was a lot of controversy down

at the District level .

A : Yes, it involved a Section 404 permit .

Q : The Chief of Engineers, himself, got involved in it,

developing a . . .

A : Yes . We got involved to the extent of asking the Chief

of Engineers to review a decision of the District

Engineer which would have required two years more of

fishery studies . That's been about the extent of our

involvement as I recall .

It seemed to me that we ought to try and expedite a

decision by the Corps on the Westway project so the

project sponsors would know whether or not that project

could go ahead . And so my main concern has been that the

Corps, whatever its decision be, reach an expeditious

decision, and that is why we asked the Chief to review

the need for a two-year fishery study . The Chief

concluded the environmental impact report could be

completed without an additional two-year fishery study,

but suggested that the Corps go ahead and complete this

last winter's study, which now has been completed .

When I left my position, the Corps had not reached a

decision on the results of the fishery studies that were

made this year and its input into the environmental

impact statement . My main concern has been the length of

time it has taken to get a decision in that case, part of

which is the Corps' fault and part of which is not . Part

4 9
Q :

of it involves things mandated by the court over which the Corps had no control .

I said the last one, but maybe we ought to add one more right here ; and that is Mount St . Helens .

A : Well, yes . I would hope you would ask about Mount St .

Helens, because I think of all the projects that I have been involved in while in Washington, that's been the toughest and the most persistent . It probably is the single project that I have spent the most time on personally .

Basically, our administration came in early in 1981, the

first year after the eruption of Mount St . Helens ; and

the Corps, when we came in, had spent pretty close to a

quarter : of a billion dollars cleaning up the Columbia River channel and building a number of settling basins,

etc ., to try and neutralize or partly control the

problems caused by the eruption . When I arrived, there

was a great push on behalf of the local people to have

the Corps spend additional large amounts of money on

Mount St . Helens' problems . The President himself got

involved because the Governor of Washington made an

appeal to him to expedite certain work .

I, working with the White House, felt that the problem

was going to be with us for a long time, and that the

Corps should look at the long-range solution to Mount St .

Helens, rather than pouring in these very large amounts

of money solely on an annual basis without any firm idea

of long-term solutions . The President directed the Corps

to develop a long-range plan to address the problems of

Mount St . Helens, at Spirit Lake, and the sediment

deposition downstream . He gave the Corps 18 months to

develop this plan . The Corps prepared a plan and

submitted a report in the time requested by the

President . Some of the local interests and their

representatives in Congress were unhappy that more funds

were not provided to carry on more construction

immediately .

The Corps came up with a report which, first of all,

addressed the Spirit Lake problem . However, before we

had a chance to address the Spirit Lake problem, the USGS

came up with a report which indicated that Spirit Lake

might fill more rapidly than originally planned, and

therefore a potential crisis situation existed with

respect to whether or not Spirit Lake would overtop and

cause a tremendous amount of damage downstream . The

Corps presented some alternatives to take care of that

immediate problem right away before the long-term

5 0
solution could be put in effect . And as a result of an

emergency effort in the fall of 1982, the Corps installed

a large temporary pumping installation in a matter of 30

or 45 days, the purpose of which was to keep the level of

Spirit Lake down so that it wouldn't overtop . The

pumping was effective in keeping the water at a safe

level .

In the meantime, OMB has approved the Corps' going ahead with the construction of a permanent outlet to Spirit Lake, to be completed in the spring of 1985 .

The Corps is addressing the sedimentation problem which

probably will involve the construction of a structure at

the Green Valley site . The Corps is carrying out further

studies to indicate the extent to which a structure at

the Green Valley site could be staged, and how much each

stage would cost . This report will be due in the fall of

1984 and will also indicate the extent to which there

should be nonfederal participation in that sedimentation

structure .

I believe we are headed toward a good solution--as good a

solution as can be developed with respect to the whole

Mount St . Helens problem, but it has been a very

difficult one because of the uncertainty of the problem .

Also, there has been a lot of criticism, because the

Corps hasn't expended more money there . Our office has

resisted efforts to have the Corps do work which we think

is not going to contribute to the long-range solution . I

believe the fact that we have been able to provide flood

control and maintain navigation attests to the validity

of our actions thus far the last three years .

Q : The Corps has been criticized because people have

expressed concerns about the possibility that an

earthquake or an eruption would spoil the tunnel again .

A : Well, you know, you can always hypothesize all kinds of

conditions, and no one knows what mother nature is going

to do at Mount St . Helens . We have to assume that there

probably will be continual eruptions of steam and maybe a

little material from Mount St . Helens, but nothing like

what was experienced in 1980 .

Even if there is a problem with a tunnel at Spirit Lake,

the Corps has demonstrated it can put in emergency

facilities to pump that lake down very rapidly . So that

at the very worst, if the tunnel were blocked, you could

reinstall the pumping installation . So I don't think

failure of the Spirit Lake tunnel is one which changes

the course that the Corps is following .

5 1
Q : Mr . Gianelli, one of the things that you got involved with basically had to do with a problem of definitions

and I am talking in particular about the definitions having to do with such things as standard project flood, maximum probable flood . Some of these questions came up, particularly relating to the Tug Fork Project . Could you

explain a little bit about what the problems were there?

A : Tug Fork, if you are talking about the Tug Fork Project,

presented some very unusual problems . First of all, the

difficulty that you have in the Tug Fork area is that you have a very narrow canyon at the bottom of which are located towns and residences and a small amount of industry and business . You also have a highly variable

flood situation . The difficulty is to provide a degree

of flood protection in such a confined area that makes

sense . The Corps has developed a number of plans for

treating the whole area .

The Tug Fork Project was authorized in a rather unusual

fashion . It did not have a detailed Corps report," and

there was no limit put on the amount of funds that might

be spent to provide flood control in that area . The

problem we had was to address the most urgent problem to

provide the most protection for the most people . The

Corps developed a plan which involved flood-proofing and

relocations, as well as some very massive structures .

The result of all of the dialogue that has taken place on

Tug Fork has been an effort to construct certain

structural features which will give the maximum

protection to the maximum number of people . The Corps is

proceeding on that basis . There are still unresolved

problems of whether you build a new community for the

relocated homes, and the extent to which you ought to

spend money flood-proofing individual houses where the

cost of flood-proofing might result in more than the

property is worth .

Tug Fork is a difficult area to cope with . It is an area

that is subject to highly erratic and big floods, but

there are a lot of areas in the country that are

similarly situated, and sometimes there is--it is just

almost impossible to guarantee everybody that lives in

such a confined area protection from any kind of flow

that might occur . So I guess my view has been to try and

do those things which make sense at reasonable cost and

provide a maximum degree of flood protection to as many

people as possible, and I think that's what the Corps has

been doing .

5 2
The question you raised with respect to the definition of

probable maximum floods is something which both the Army

and the Bureau of Reclamation are looking at in

conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences . One

of my concerns has been that when we talk about maximum

probable floods, we are unable to define exactly what

protection that involves . And it has always seemed to me

that we ought to talk about providing flood protection

for floods that occur once in 100 years or once in 200

years, rather than some hypothetical value which is not

possible to define with any degree of consistency

throughout the country .

The problem of how much flood control should .be provided

at federal expense will be a continuing and controversial

one, but I am hopeful that the National Academy of

Sciences will be of assistance on standards which could

be applied by all federal agencies .

Did you have some feeling that if the Corps built a

particular project--take the Tug Fork again--to standard

project dimensions, the degree of protection afforded

would be somewhat illusory?

A : Well, standard project flood is an evasive thing . I have

never been able to get a specific answer to how much

protection can be afforded a community . I guess I have

been hopeful we would be able to develop better criteria,

which would be more easily explainable to the general

public . If you could say to them, you are protected

against a flood that would occur only once in 200 years--

that is something that they can understand . If you say

you are going to be protected from a probable maximum

flood but you are unable to define that, that may mean

different things to different people in different areas .

Q : The Corps sometimes talks about protecting a particular

area against catastrophic floods . Is there again the

problem of what you mean by catastrophe?

A : Yes, I think there is . Again, rather than saying that, I

think it is more meaningful to everybody if we could say

that you will be protected from a certain frequency of

flooding . I don't think you can ever guarantee everybody

under all situations that they will be protected from any

flood . We do not live in a risk-free society . I don't

think we can afford to live in a completely risk-free

society ; so you do what makes sense, what is reasonable,

and what you can afford .

Q : Would you be in favor, then, of a situation in which you

build a flood control structure to somewhat lower

5 3
A : Yes .

standards than what the Corps has normally done, with

the idea that in fact you are going to be imposing a

limit on economic development in that area? In other

words, you are saying, well--this is going to increase

more and more if you keep on building in that area later

and therefore, you know, don't . Basically you are

telling people not to build too much in that area .

A : Well, I think the government has already established some

guidelines before you can get flood insurance . There is

some sort of a criterion that has already been provided

there which relates to a 100-year flood . There is a

Q : Another definition that you have is,.of a maximum credible

earthquake .

Q : Can you explain?

A : Well, earthquake is the same thing as flood . I mean, I

think it is almost impossible to design something that

you can guarantee to protect against any kind of a

catastrophe which mother nature might create . Again, you

have got to use what looks like reasonable criteria,

based upon the experiences of the past ; and if mother

nature deals you a more severe blow, then maybe you won't

be protected . At least you will have an element of

protection for things that have occurred in the past .

Let me tell you--there is one other thing that needs to

be considered in this matter of risk factor, and that is

the potential for loss of life . For example, I think you

ought to provide a higher degree of flood protection when

you are constructing a dam and a reservoir above a

populated area versus one that, if it failed, would

merely flood agricultural land . I am hopeful that out of

the study under way now, using the National Academy of

Sciences, whatever they come up with as a suggested

criterion for providing for flood control as a federal

responsibility, that they do differentiate between those

areas of large population which would be flooded, versus

agricultural areas .

Q : Do you think the Corps has gotten involved too much in

building dams in largely rural areas? That perhaps . . .

5 4

recognition that, for example, the one-in-a-hundred-year

flood may not be too unreasonable because, if you are

ready to give flood control insurance with that level of

protection, what that says to me is that there may be

some risks beyond that ; but that's one measure of an

element of reasonableness .
A : Well, I wouldn't say that . I think if we stay with the

benefit-cost criterion, it seems to me that acts as a

guide to the Corps on which projects are feasible from an

economic standpoint . If you abandon the benefit-cost

criterion and say we have got to protect this area no mdtter what the costs are, then it seems to me you do have a problem of priorities .

Q : one of the things that we sort of passed over before, and

we didn't really get into when we talked about the

planning process, was the principles and guidelines that

were promulgated while you were in office, that replaced the earlier principles and standards .

A : Yes .

Q : Can you explain briefly, if possible, what the major

advantages of the principles and guidelines are over the earlier principles and standards?

A : Well, this is one the Cabinet-Council did deal with, and

I headed a task force on it . I think it was resolved

pretty well with all agencies in agreement . The

principal reason for the change was to simplify the

planning process and to expedite it . The biggest change

was to provide that projects be studied for the best NED

plan .

Under the old principles and standards, if you came up

with a plan which, from an environmental standpoint, was

viewed as being the most attractive, there was no way to

fund and to justify those things under the rules of the

game that the federal government has to operate . So I

think it wasn't that the new principles and guidelines

wanted to ignore the environment . That wasn't the point

at all . The point was that it just avoided having the

Corps take all the time to prepare an environmental plan

that never could be implemented ; and so the rules, the

new guidelines were developed with the idea of having the

Corps take into account environmental concerns as it

developed a plan to solve a particular problem, rather

than a hypothetical plan which couldn't be implemented .

The Water Resources Council was also eliminated in the

process, which heretofore had been a major bottleneck in

the processing of reports .

Q : Essentially, as I understand it then, in the planning

process it was decided rather early in the procedure

that, for instance, a nonstructural flood control

solution was going to be inappropriate for this project .

Rather than pursuing that at all, you just dropped it and

5 5
proceeded with the concrete--the structural solution .

And, of 'course, that was determined by the B-C ratio .

How about rather subjective environmental considerations

or aesthetic considerations, things of that sort, which

are probably not easily quantifiable but which, in fact,

might be the preference of the local citizenry?

A : Well, of course, part of the idea of the new principles

and guidelines was that there would be a much higher

degree of local participation in the development of the

plan in the first place . In other words, there would be

a higher degree of identification of a problem and a

working with them much more closely than perhaps the

federal agencies had in the past .

Q : I want to turn our attention for a few moments here to

the review process within the Corps, and I want to talk

particularly about the Board of Engineers for Rivers and

Harbors and also tangentially about the Mississippi River

Commission . Turn to the Board-for,,a moment :

I understand you were concerned about the Board considering certain things earlier in the planning process

than otherwise had been done before . That, in fact--and

I don't have it with me--you wrote a letter suggesting

that certain political considerations be addressed

earlier in the Board's review rather than just a strictly

engineering and environmental analysis, which the Board

had done before . Maybe you can clarify this for me .

A : Yes, let me first talk a little bit about the Corps'

organizational structure and the problem that I see

exists with its organization . The Corps, in recent

years, apparently adopted the plan of decentralization

of its activities extensively . And I have no quarrel

with that . But it seems to me that one of the things

that has happened is that the Chief of Engineers' office

has lost control, in fact, of what comes up through the

Districts and through the Divisions . In other words, it

seems to me that one of the important functions of the

Chief's office, in addition to review, is to insure that

there is some sort of a consistency or standardization

among the Districts and among the Division planning

efforts .

In other words, you have to be careful when you

decentralize that you don't at the same time fail to give

adequate guidelines of how plans are to be developed ; let

me give you an example . We have felt--and I think it has

come down from OMB, and I think you alluded to it

earlier, and I made a comment about it too--that there

should 'be a de-emphasis on recreational plans,

5 6
formulation .

The same thing is true with respect to mitigation . We

have got instructions from OMB--.I think there is a

memorandum on this that came down from OMB--that before

you propose the acquisition of large new blocks of land

for mitigation purposes, you look at several other

things, for example, better management of the lands that

are under federal control and use of other project lands

for mitigation purposes ; look at some offsets or

enhancements provided .

So what we are saying is, with those kinds of

instructions and guidelines from OMB, the word ought to

get all the way down to the Districts . OCE and the Board

for Rivers and Harbors should reflect that in their

review process, too, so that the reports don't come all

the way up the line knowing in advance we are not going

to be able to get OMB's approval to forward it to the

Congress .

Q : Of course, as I am sure you know, when the Board was

originally created back in 1902, the whole idea was that

the Board be an independent board that would objectively

analyze Corps projects and come up with a recommendation based on the best engineering and economic

data . And you know, in other words, the reason for the

development of the Board was to get the Corps out of the

political arena . Do you think that what you are doing is

basically reversing things and, if so, is new legislation

necessary?

A : Well, I don't view some of the things I have talked about

as political decisions . I view them as management

decisions based upon- today's realities . In other words,

if there is a limited amount of money and management says

5 7
Q : Another agency that is involved in the review process

within the Corps is the Mississippi River Commission .

This has become a somewhat controversial commission in

the sense that people argue about whether in fact it

needs to exist at all nowadays . ' Could I get your views

on that?

A : Well, 1--of course, the Mississippi River Commission has

a long history, as I am sure you know, and a lot of

reasons for it . The problems of , the Mississippi River

are so large and so complicated that I suspect originally

it was believed that you needed a special commission to

deal with those problems . The commission was created

before you had some of the other organizational

structures that are now in place .

we ought to give priority to certain types of uses over

others, I don't view that as being a political decision .

I view that as being a management decision which ought to

be reflected by the organization from top to bottom.

Now, a political decision, in my judgment, is a decision

about whether a project goes or it doesn't go on the basis of political considerations ; and I don't view what I have been talking about as a political decision at all .

I believe it is a management decision .

Looking at it from a management standpoint, I don't know

whether you really still need a Mississippi River

Commission . It seems to me those functions of the Mississippi River are no different than the problems of

the Columbia River Basin and other big basins, except of

course that they are much larger and encompass a much

larger area of the United States than any other river

basin .

I think maybe their usefulness and their need may not be

as great now, certainly as they were originally ; and I

think it does put another layer in the bureaucracy . In

other words, you already have in place the Districts that

deal with the problems . You have the Divisions, which

deal with the problems of several Districts . And, of

course, the Commission encompasses several Divisions or

parts of several Divisions . But I would think that this

function could be coordinated and carried on by something

within the Chief's office rather than by a separate

Mississippi River Basin Commission .

The problem, it seems to me, with a separate commission

is that it has a tendency to go around the other

institutional arrangements that are in place for other

areas, and I don't know if that is particularly

desirable . I guess politically it has been good for the

58
area because a great number of the key legislators have

come from that area, and they can very well look out for

the needs of the Mississippi area drainage basin . But

whether that commission is still necessary may be

questioned . I have a feeling that the need may not be as

great now as it was originally, and that it does create

some problems within the Corps' internal organization

structure .

Q : You know, the MRC was created originally to dilute the

power of the Corps down there .

A : They've been very successful at getting federal water

projects . If you take a look at the dollars the Corps

has spent nationwide, my guess is that the Mississippi

River Basin has received a disproportionate share .

Q : Of course, they would argue that also the amount of local

investment has been greater down there--I mean,

historically, going back to the 19th century .

A : If you take New Orleans, for example . I don't know what

would happen in New Orleans if the Corps, under the

auspices of the Commission, hadn't come in and done all

the work they have done down there . I doubt if that area

could have survived without the federal assistance

provided .

As an aside, in today's atmosphere, just on the subject

of wetlands that we talked about earlier, I wonder if you

would have had the extent of development in the Louisiana

area now, given the environmental laws that are now in

place . It would be a very interesting thing to speculate

on, I suspect .
FART II

I guess I have some mixed feelings about the study .

Apparently the driving force behind the legislation was

6 0

Q : Mr . Gianelli, one of the studies that was done, or at

least completed, while you were Assistant Secretary was

the National Waterways Study, done by the Institute for

Water Resources . As you recall, this was a study that

was authorized by Congress ; it was designed to show what

the future of America's waterway system was going to be

until the end of the century, and what needed to be done

to rehabilitate the system . When the study came to your

office, as I recall, you put it on hold for a while ;

evidently you had some question about what to do with

it . And I am wondering if you could elaborate on that a

bit .

A : I'm a little hazy on this . As I remember, the study

started quite a bit in advance- of my arrival on the scene

in Washington . It is my recollection that when the

report came across my desk, a question arose as to the

economics and the usefulness of the study . Another

question related to the assumptions made in the

projections used in the study .

Q : Do you have any recollection about any of the specific

assumptions that you questioned or people questioned?

A : No, I can't recall .

Okay . Another project, if you want to use that expression, that was authorized by Congress--ordered by

Congress, really--was the idea of the minimum dredge

fleet .

A : Oh, yes . I am familiar with that .

Q : And I want your impression of whether you, first of all,

support it . Whether you think it is a good idea .

Whether you think that having a minimum dredge fleet perhaps has put the Corps in a difficult position in terms

of gearing up for wartime .

A : Well, I think--here again, this was a subject where

legislation or direction was given by Congress before I

arrived . But I am well familiar with the study, and I

remember some of the dialogue that took place with

respect to it .
Q :

the private sector dredgers, who believed that if the

Corps was not doing so much in the way of dredging, there

would be more available for the private sector .

Apparently the private sector had constructed a number of

dredges in certain areas which were underutilized because

the Corps had so many of its own dredges that it was

operating .

But again, I have--as I say, I have mixed feelings . I

think there is a need for the Corps to have some

capability . Exactly what that capability is, and what

it should be, is certainly arguable and, I would say,

quite controversial . The matter of eliminating, for

example, the dredges on the Great Lakes has been one of

great controversy . But here again, the Corps, working

with the private sector, determined that the private

sector dredges would be available in the Great Lakes area

to take care of any problems there, and that therefore it

wasn't necessary for the Corps to have any dredgers in

that area .

Again, as I say, I think the Corps needs to have some

capability . Exactly what it ought to be I don't have any

strong views on . And certainly the Corps has been trying

to work with the private sector, so that, in case of

emergency, the private sector fleet would automatically

be made available to the Corps for that emergency work .

If that all takes place and works out satisfactorily,

that might be a partial answer then for the Corps having

to maintain such a large fleet . Again, I believe there

is some need for the Corps to have some basic capability

in this area .

Q : Would you be in favor of using private sector vessels in

a war zone?

A : Well, it isn't a matter of whether I would be in favor of

it . I think it is probably a matter of whether the

private sector would be willing to take that risk without

some sort of guarantee . I believe that would be the

issue . The issue would be whether or not you could get

private sector dredges to operate, for example, under a

condition of war . I don't know .

Okay, let me turn to a completely different subject . And

that's the subject of hydropower . I guess the easiest

way to ask the question is just to ask, first of all,

what do you think the Corps' role should be in hydropower

development?

A : Well, first of all, I think you have to break hydropower

down into several component parts . For example, if

6 1
Q :

hydropower is a part--a minor part, say--of a multipurpose Corps project, where the major purpose is flood

control or navigation, then it seems to me hydropower

should be constructed at the same time by the Corps .

That doesn't mean that the Corps shouldn't try to work

out an arrangement for some financial participation from,

say, a power company who might be interested in the

output . In that case, the Corps probably ought to go

ahead and construct the power facilities ; and some

arrangement ought to be worked out, if possible, with the

private sector to have them assist in the financing of

the multipurpose project and to take over the power

output .

In those cases where there is single-purpose hydropower,

then I doubt very much whether the Corps should construct

such a -facility . In other words, if you are talking

about a dam and reservoir that would be operated solely

for hydropower, then it seems to me that it should be a

nonfederal effort . I believe you have to look at the

hydropower development in terms of what kind of

hydropower you are talking about . Is it combined with

another use, or is it a single-purpose use?

Isn't it rather unlikely that you would have a project

that would be solely hydropower without some kind of

other benefits?

A : Oh, I don't think so . There might be a very minor amount

of recreation--if it involved a reservoir pool . Very

often power plants are constructed along a river, a socalled run-of-the-river plant, where it merely uses the

flow that comes down that river . There are also several

that are single-purpose hydropower reservoir projects

which wouldn't have any appreciable multipurpose usage

connected with them .

Q : Do you think that it would be possible for nonfederal

entities to build a massive power project like we have

had on the Columbia River for instance?

A : Well, yes . I believe so . The state of California, and

this is my favorite subject, built a hydropower project

at Oroville Dam . It is a multipurpose project, and it

entered into a contract with the private power utilities

in the state to purchase all of the power . The state

took that contract and converted it into a quarterbillion-dollar revenue bond issue, which financed half

the cost of the dam and reservoir . So, yes . I think it

is absolutely feasible .

6 2
6 3

Q : Of courge, California is a large state with a large

population, and it might be more easily done in

California than, say, in North Dakota or South Dakota .

A : No, I don't think the size of the state is the only

criterion . The real criterion is whether or not there is

a need for the power, and there is some power entity

which would utilize all the power . For example, you

could take Montana Power in the state of Montana .

Montana is a very small state, but Montana Power Company

is a large electrical power utility operating in that

state, and certainly they would have a capability to

build a very large plant .

Q : Okay . Let's go from the sublime to the pedestrian for a

moment . When you were Assistant Secretary, you

articulated some distinct views and, I suppose to some

Corps employees, distasteful views, dealing with Corps

conference schedules, travel and so . . .

A : Oh, yes . One of my pet peeves .

Q : Can you elaborate on that?

A : Well, yes . One of the problems, I think, with federal

government agencies--and I don't think the Corps is

necessarily alone on it--is that they are so far removed

from the taxpayer that they don't stop and think about

what things cost and who is paying the bill . It has

troubled me a very great deal when the Corps schedules

conferences around the United States where Corps

employees have to come long distances and spend a day or

two traveling for the purpose of attending a conference .

It may be important for some participation, but my

experience is that the Corps has an excess of employees

attending conferences. Let me give you an example of

something that has happened in the last couple of weeks .

I just received a brochure from the American Society of

Civil Engineers, of which I am a member, announcing a

dredging conference in Florida some time this fall . The

dredging conference is sponsored by ASCE, the Corps of

Engineers, and a couple of other agencies . But anyway,

looking through that three- or four-day conference

schedule, there were 112 presentations scheduled by Corps

employees .

Q : Different employees? 112 different employees?

A : I don't know if they are all different, but I suspect

that probably there will be between 75 and 100 different

employees traveling from all over the United States to
Q :

participate in this conference . It seems to me that some

responsible Corps official ought to sit down and figure

out whether or not something like that is really

worthwhile, and whether or not it warrants that large a

number of Corps people participating in the conference .

In addition, I suspect there are more Corps employees

attending who will not be presenting papers .

That's of course one type of situation . Another one

involves conferences in which the Corps is not making a

presentation, but in which they like to participate . I

have the same criticism there . That the Corps very often

sends, in my judgment, large numbers of employees to

listen to presentations that are made by others, when it

seems to me the Corps could very well send maybe a couple

of people . Somebody could tape it, if necessary, and

then a summary of that conference could be put out by the

Corps' public relations officer or whatever, so that it

could be disseminated widely among the Corps employees

who might be interested .

It costs large amounts of money for people to sit in and

attend conferences all over the United States . I suspect

some of the other federal agencies are just as guilty,

although I haven't had exposure to them to that same

extent . Yes, I have been and I still am very critical of

the large number of Corps employees that attend meetings

and conferences . I believe the number is grossly in

excess of what really is necessary .

To be a gadfly for a moment, I suppose that many of the

engineers, the professionals in the Corps would argue

that attendance at not all but some of these conferences

is part of being a professional . That you can't do the

work without exchanging information and participating and

frankly making yourself visible among your professional

colleagues . Given that, do you still believe that

Corps involvement is top heavy?

A : Well, I believe it is very excessive, and I feel very

strongly about that . Take the case I just cited--and I

think if you go back and look at a number of other cases,

you will find similar situations . For example, if you

are a professional engineer in the private sector, you

have to screen very carefully what things you attend

because it costs you money to go to those things, as well

as not being productive during this period . The Corps

doesn't worry because it is not paying for it . The Corps

employees, I think, go because they like to go or feel it

is of some value . But I doubt very much whether anybody

ever sits down and figures out whether the exact benefits

obtained by that participation would be worth the cost of

64
sending that person from wherever they have to come to

attend it .

Let me say that I am not necessarily picking on the

Corps . In my old Department of Water Resources in

California, I had them adopt some very stringent rules

concerning participation in conferences and attendance,

because again the taxpayers are footing the bill ; and it

seems to me that federal employees, as well as state

employees, have a responsibility to report to the

citizenry about the desirability of attending .

Let me make one other point, too, in this regard . There

is nothing that makes private citizens so unhappy as

going to a meeting and finding a bunch of people who are

being paid by the taxpayer sitting in at that meeting . I

am not saying one or two, but I am saying ten, fifteen,

or twenty . And that really gives the organization a bad

name in terms of its public .image, because the public

understands that it is paying the bill . There is a very

careful balance that has to be kept in this regard .

Q : One of the first meetings you attended when you became

Assistant Secretary was a meeting of the Environmental

Advisory Board that the Corps has . Can you, in a

nutshell, give me your impression of the Environmental

Advisory Board, its use, its effectiveness, and whether

the Corps should retain it .

A : I talked to General Bratton at some length, as I recall,

after I attended the first meeting, about that subject

generally, concerning boards and commissions . It was my

suggestion that perhaps it would be well to broaden the

scope of that Environmental Board to include people of

other disciplines, for example, to include folks like

economists . As a matter of fact, I believe General

Bratton has moved to broaden the scope of that board, and

I think he feels that it does perform some service to

him . It is largely an entity which serves the Chief of

Engineers of the Corps . It doesn't serve the Assistant

Secretary's office . And, apparently, there has been

some feeling in the past that it provides some value, and

I wouldn't argue with that .

One of the problems I think you have--and the same thing

would be true, for example, if you had a board composed

of all economists or if you had a board composed of all

engineers--is that there needs to be an interchange among

some of the key disciplines to bring balance into

whatever comes out of such a group . For example, if you

had strictly wild-eyed environmentalists on a board, then

it seems to me the results that the Corps might obtain

6 5
Q :

wouldn't be.as useful as they might be otherwise, because

the board might propose solutions which are not

implementable . Whereas, if you have a broader sector of

maybe an economist, engineer, environmentalist, or

whatever, then it seems to me the positions that the

board may arrive at originally will have the benefit of

the dialogue that might take place among all the

disciplines .

A : Yes, it was at the Marriott Hotel .

6 6

Again, I believe the Chief of Engineers has felt that the

board provides some service to him .

Are you suggesting that the board should not strictly

reflect the traditional environmentalist point of view

then? It ought to be more responsive to the economics of

a particular project?

A : Well, again, if I were the Chief, it seems to me I would

view such a board as one which might give advice in a

number of areas .

Q : What was your impression of the board meeting you

attended?

A : Well, I didn't attend the whole meeting . I just attended

a part of one . And I don't even recall, as a matter of

fact, what the principal topic was at that time .

Q : Well, let's see . I think it was held in Washington, in

Arlington as I recall . I attended that meeting myself .

Q : That's right . And you had representatives from the EPA

and the Fish and Wildlife Service and a number of

services there . I forget--I think the subject was

mitigation . Okay . I want to ask you a number of

questions . . .

A : Well, one of the things that has been suggested, I think,

is that a mitigation bank be established . And that every

project would provide certain benefits, if you want to

call it that, or certain monies or whatever to that

environmental or to that mitigation bank .

My feeling is--and I think OMB sort of reinforced this--

for example, take a reservoir . A reservoir is

constructed . It may cause certain in-stream values to be

lost or whatever . I'm not quite sure . Maybe certain

wildlife . And I think it--certainly it has always been

my feeling that you ought to try and mitigate in an area

where the damage has occurred .
In other . words, it didn't seem appropriate to me to

provide a mitigation bank, for example, in the state of

California and contribute to mitigation damage, say, in

the state of New York . It seems to me that if there is

damage in the state of New York, by virtue of a Corps

project, then the mitigation should take place as close

to the area where the damage occurs as possible . That's

one theory that I feel fairly strong about .

Another one is that, say in a reservoir project, the Fish

and Wildlife people fail to include positive values that

might occur as a result of constructing a project . Let

me give you an example of that . supposing a reservoir

inundates a certain number of miles of stream in which

there had been trout . Okay, on the other. hand, the

creating of a reservoir there might create, for example,

a great bass fishery .

So it has always seemed to me that as the Corps gets

criticized for creating problems by virtue of

constructing a project, it never gets credit for some of

the good things that those projects do . And so I have

always felt that when you say to the Corps, "Certain

damages occurred here as a result of the loss of the

trout fishery," you ought to, on the other side of the

ledger, say to the Corps, "but you have created a

reservoir here which has a great striped bass fishery,

and so therefore we will provide mitigation to the extent

that one doesn't take care of the other ." I think you

have to be a little careful how you apply that, but the

main point I want to make is that it seems to me that as

you consider mitigation, it is necessary to consider

enhancement . And I have a feeling that the singlepurpose environmental agencies at times don't look at the

good that is created by Corps projects . They always look

at the bad, and they want the bad mitigated . And I don't

think that's quite fair .

There are a couple of other points, too, that it seems to

me are important . Very often, I think, the singlepurpose environmental agencies will ask the federal

government to acquire large additional land areas in

order to mitigate . While that may be advisable in some

areas, it seems to me that the first thing that should be

considered, rather than to suggest that the federal

government take more private property off the tax rolls,

would be to see if you could better manage whatever

federal properties might be in the area .

For example, often when you acquire land for a reservoir,

you acquire it along ownership boundaries, instead of

6 7
just around the edge of the reservoir . So, before going

out and acquiring large acres of additional federal lands

for mitigation, they ought to consider better management

of the lands that are available .

I .just wanted to add those points because I think

mitigation is important . However, I believe people have

taken advantage of the Corps and tried to get it to

provide much more than is fair, particularly in the way

of acquiring large amounts of additional land to be taken

off the private tax roll .

Q : Do you think--do you attribute something a bit

underhanded to these single-purpose agencies when they

try to get the Corps to pay more money for this kind of

mitigation activity? Or do you think perhaps these

agencies basically have bad planning, or the

prognostications are too cautious? In other words, you

know, you talk about the lake. being converted to a bass

lake from a fishing stream ; but it'will take a few years

presumably for it to turn into that bass lake, and maybe

the people in, say, Fish and Wildlife are simply erring

on the side of caution and are not making any assumptions

about what is going to happen to that project . Do you

think there is anything like . . .

A : Well, I think the--I think one of the problems is that

some of the single-purpose environmental agencies tend to

look at every project as being bad . I think that is

unfortunate because, looking at the many projects which

the Corps has built around the United States--and

elsewhere, too, as a matter of fact--a lot of them are

providing great environmental benefits . For example, I

think the recreation that is provided around Corps lakes

and the scenic values are tremendous . Yet, the Corps

never gets credit for that in terms of the single-purpose

agencies which are always trying to get them to do more .

My experience tells me that the single-purpose

environmental agencies, like Fish and Wildlife Service,

have a tough time getting funds to carry out what they

would like to do in terms of enhancing what they view to

be their areas of responsibility . And so I think they

look at the Corps, and I suppose the same thing is true

with the Bureau of Reclamation or a power company or

whatever, as somebody who has a source of funds which can

help them accomplish their objective . I think that's

probably the real problem, if you shake it down . It's

the concept that these single-purpose agencies can get

more by beating the developing agencies, if you want to

call them that, over the head and knowing that certain

projects are needed and that they can sort of blackmail a

68
Q :

project into providing, for example, things that perhaps

are not quite justified or warranted .

Q : How would you resolve the problem?

A : I would resolve it hopefully by providing a more balanced

analysis of what is required in the way of mitigation,

looking at some of the things I mentioned earlier : in

other words, looking at some of the plus values that

Corps projects might provide as well as just the negative

values .

Q : So you are talking about a guidance that presumably would

cover OMB, and it would apply to all federal agencies .

A : That's right . In fact, as I recall, I think OMB has

issued some instructions on this along the lines of what

we have been talking about--my recollection of it anyway .

And I think that is appropriate . I don't see that there

is anything wrong with that . I think honest mitigation

should be provided for . But I think at the same time

certainly you should give credit, and you should avoid

taking large amounts of property off the tax rolls that

might not be necessary if you can provide the mitigation

some other way .

Let's turn our attention to the Corps, and particularly

to the Corps' leadership . First, let me ask you a

general question . Can you characterize the senior civil

works civilian staff and the senior civil works military

staff? Do you see differences in the outlook of the

military versus civilian? Who does the job better?

A': First of all, I have been very impressed with the

military officers of the Corps . I think they are

outstanding people, and by and large they do',an excellent

job . Comparing them with the Corps' Civil Service

civilian staff, I think the Corps' military officers are

more flexible and more willing to look at things from a

variety of different ways than the Civil Service staff .

This is not surprising and it is not unnatural . I think

any time you have a civilian bureaucracy, there is a

desire to protect one's own turf ; and I think there is a

concern that change presents uncertainties . Civilian

personnel recognize that it may be a long-term career

with them, and they may view suggestions for change as

possibly threatening to their careers . I don't think the

military component of the Corps looks at it that way,

since they change assignments on a regular basis .

The Corps officers are going to be serving in the Army of

the United States in some capacity, whether there is a

6 9
Q :

Q :

Corps civil works function or not ; so they are not

threatened in the same way that the Civil Service work

force is . So again in making the comparison, I have felt

that the Corps' military personnel are more flexible in

trying to deal with changes that may be attempted in an

organization . I want to be sure, however, that what I

am saying is not interpreted as picking on the Corps'

civilians . I am not at all . I think what I have said is

true with any large Civil Service organization . It is

interesting with the Corps though, because you have the

military and the civilian force integrated . Normally you

don't have that in most organizations ; they are composed

entirely of civilians .

But it makes an interesting comparison, and the

comparison is the one I think I alluded to that the Corps

officers have impressed me . I think they are more

flexible . I think they are more willing to try something

new because I don't think they view their current jobs as

ones that are going to go on forever ; and eventually they

will be moving on to other assignments .

So, in short, you consider the military officers in the

Corps a distinct plus for the Corps of Engineers .

A : By all means . That is correct .

Q : One argument that might be made by people who would argue

otherwise is that the civilian leadership comes to their

jobs with a tremendous amount of experience, and that

they may see some problems that the military wouldn't

see, and therefore they may be more cautious than the

military leadership . Would you agree with that?

A : Well, I think they are more cautious . I don't think

there is any doubt about that . But, again, the situation

is changing in the federal government, particularly in

all of the federal water agencies--the situation being

one that requires some changes in past practices if the

programs are going to survive .

This gets back to the thing that we talked about before,

and that's the subject of cost sharing and financing . In

my view, the civil works program, as it has been known

historically, is not going to survive if some way isn't

found to take a little of the burden off the federal

taxpayer or the general fund of the Treasury .

Would you say that the civilian leadership in the Corps

is dishonest?

A : Oh, no . Oh, no . Certainly not . I would say that they

70
are overly rigid, in my view, and narrow in terms of some

of their thinking, but certainly not dishonest, no .

Q : Did you feel that they were loyal to you when you were

Assistant Secretary? Were you satisfied with their

follow-through, I suppose?

A : I don't think anybody was disloyal . We may have had

differing views, but I don't see that as being disloyal .

I think there was a reluctance--let's put it this way--on

the part of a number of civilian personnel to pursue some

of the objectives we were trying to accomplish . But

again, I don't view that as being disloyal . It is a

differing of views, and again, as I indicated earlier, I

think it is natural that the Civil Service personnel have

some turf to protect . As a result, I may have

represented the unknown, which is what happens when you

start talking about changes .

Q : Mr . Gianelli, you have been particularly critical of the

Corps' planning process ; what I would like to do is ask

you a number of questions that mainly relate to the

planning process, and a number of these questions are

outgrowths of the first interview we had .

Let's first of all talk about the review process in the

Corps of Engineers . You said something to the effect in

the first interview that you felt more projects ought to

be able to be lopped off at the District Engineer level

and never go through this multiple review process that

the Corps has . The question is, don't you believe,

though, that the proper authority to make a final

decision on a project is the Chief of Engineers?

A : No, I don't think so . If the money comes from the

federal taxpayer and the federal budget, the Secretary of

the Army has an overall responsibility in this area . And

it seems to me that someone who is more familiar with

the, you might say, objectives of a particular

administration should be making some of the critical

decisions, because of limited funds . Let me put it that

way .

Now, I don't mean to say that they have got to make every

one . For example, I think there are some delegations

that can be made and have been made which allow the Chief

and lower echelons to make decisions . But again let me

point out that the Chief of Engineers is a career

military man . He doesn't worry particularly about the

goals of a particular administration in terms of

balancing the budget and so forth . And it seems to me,

when you are talking about projects to be pursued, those

7 1
critical decisions have to be made by people who are part

of an 'administration and are responsible to that

administration .

And I think they should preferably be made at the

Secretarial level, delegated down--in this case in the

civil works projects--to the Assistant Secretary .

Because I think if the administration--any

administration--makes enough bum decisions, then, of

course, that will show up in the polls, and they will be

replaced by people,who have different priorities .

Again, I don't agree that all the critical decisions on

programs should be made by the Chief .

Q : If I understand you correctly then, what you are saying

is that the District Engineer ought to be basically

representing the administration's position on some of

these basic issues when it comes to . . .

A : Let's back down a little bit on the chain of command . I

think this is one of the things we talked a little bit

about before . I have felt all along that the Chief's

office and even the Divisions have delegated perhaps too

much authority to the Districts without an opportunity to

review . And let me elaborate on that .

A District Engineer may see certain needs from his own

perspective that may be absolutely justified . On the

other hand, if there is some limitation in funds, for

example, maybe his priorities and his projects can't be

implemented . There might not be enough money to go

around . So there has to be somebody who can take that

District Engineer's request, for example, along with all

the other District Engineers' requests ; and the first

screening level should be at the Division Engineer level ;

and then certainly the critical decisions need to be

made, in my judgment, at the Chief's level, at the Corps'

Washington office .

Because only there can all of the Corps' programs be put

into perspective and be looked at in terms of need, given

whatever constraints exist, particularly fiscal

constraints . So I think that it's well for a District

Engineer to make recommendations, but I think the actual

decisions on what finally is done in that District, for

example, need to be carried up the line into the

Washington area .

I think that is inevitable . And that isn't a criticism

of the District Engineer . It's a need to balance all of

the needs throughout the country with the limited

7 2
financial resources and personnel that are available to

carry out those things . So I don't view the District

Engineer as working for the Assistant Secretary . I think

that coming down through the Chief's office, the District

Engineer has a certain kind of direction in terms of what

an administration feels should be emphasized, for

sxample, certain kinds of projects, just to take a case

in point .

Q : Last time we talked together, I asked you a few questions

about the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors . I

would like to pursue that line for a moment . Do you

think the board is really capable of performing an independent review?

A : Well, it's tough for them to do that . They are an

integral part of the Army, an integral part of the Corps

of Engineers, and it'seems to me it is very difficult to

keep them in a posture where they have all of the

expertise and they have the freedom to be completely

objective without any influence at all . I think it is

very difficult for them . I think it is an important

role, but, in answer to your question, I think it is

difficult for them to retain a completely independent

posture .

Q : Should they? Let me ask you that .

A : Well, I think if they are going to perform a function--

and I think they can perform a function--they should be

as independent as possible . One of the suggestions we

had with respect to the Board for Rivers and Harbors was

that they be more familiar from a direct standpoint with

some of the policies of an administration .

Just to give you an example, I think the administration

through OMB had adopted a rather strong position with

respect to recreation development . And it seemed to me

that it would have been helpful for the Rivers and

Harbors Board to know of that position, with respect to

recreation development, before they passed on Corps

projects where there might be recreation involved . In

other words, I think they could provide an independent

check and provide an independent view, recognizing what,

for example, some of the policies of an administration

might be--again using recreation as a case in point .

Q : Well, how do you reconcile that, then, with being an

independent review board?

A : Well, I think the independent review, as I see it, is

necessary to take a look at whatever the Corps sends up

7 3
Q :

and to see whether it makes sense from an economic

standpoint, from a political standpoint, if you will, and

certainly from an administration standpoint . So I think

they can be independent, but still be cognizant of the

objectives of a particular administration .

So they won't necessarily then make the decision based on

the best engineering or the best environmental

consideration or the best financial package, if you will .

The decision will be based at least partly, then, on

administration policy .

A : I think it would be, partly, yes . I am not suggesting

that they ought to, for example, recommend an infeasible

project . I think it goes without saying that that's an

important part .

But again, coming back to the case I cited--and again, I

think the administration felt very strongly because of

the limited funds--development, .- say, of projects solely

for recreation should take a back seat, and perhaps not

move at all . The Rivers and Harbors Board ought to know

that, it seems to me, and certainly shouldn't keep

sending up projects for recreation time after time, if,

for example, we know in advance that they are not going

to be able to pass muster .

Q : Well, if the board were more as you describe it or wish

it, then what would be the function of OCE in reviewing

the board's reports?

A : Well, I'm a little fuzzy on how OCE interfaces with the

board, frankly . I never have completely understood how

that works . The Chief, of course, gets his recommendations from the Rivers and Harbors Board, but he also

gets them from his own staff, I assume . And I am not

clear how the Chief, for example, in rendering a

decision--if the Rivers and Harbors Board came out with

one recommendation and his staff came out with another

recommendation--would view the respected positions or the

respected recommendations . I am just not sure how he

would handle that .

But I guess the way I would look at it is the OCE would

largely be responsible for, you might say, issuing the

directions down to the Divisions and down to the field in

terms of the kinds of things they ought to be doing .

Then, the Rivers and Harbors Board would be the review at

that level . In other words, I would view the task of the

Office of the Chief of Engineers and his staff, OCE, to

be one of direction . But, again, when the reports come

back in, I am not quite clear as to how the Chief views

7 4
Q :

Q :

the two entities .

Well, in your mind, if the board did act as you suggest

it should, would there be any reason for a review process

within OCE?

A : dell, I think OCE needs to be sure that its directions

are being implemented, and that when things get done,

for example, in the field, they are being done on a

consistent policy throughout all of the Corps . I think

that is one of the great needs, to make certain that

every Division and every District operates on a

consistent basis ; end there is a great need that

certainly would have to be filled by the Office of the

Chief of Engineers .

So I view the OCE as more of an in-line staff operation

from the Chief down to the Division, then to the

Districts ; and I view the Rivers and Harbors Board as

solely a board which would review something before it

becomes a finished product .

You, of course, tried to work with Congress on developing

some various cost-sharing programs, including programs

for navigation projects . To what extent were you

successful with cost sharing in navigation ; and to the

extent that you weren't, can you identify what the major

problems were?

A : Yes . I think, looking at the whole subject of cost

sharing, I would say the most frustrating area of cost

sharing is in the navigation area--in both the deep draft

and inland waterways systems . I felt that OMB put some

unnecessary constraints on our office in terms of

dealing with the subject of cost sharing for navigation

and the inland system, both . For example, they took a

very hard-nosed position with respect to cost sharing on

deep water navigation, namely, all the cost had to be

repaid . On the inland system, OMB wanted operation

maintenance also to be taken over 100 percent by

nonfederal interests, as well as all costs to be repaid

100 percent .

My view on the whole subject of navigation, both the

inland system and the deep water ports, is that

traditionally the federal government paid for the whole

thing . Now, OMB seems to be going to the other extreme,

deciding that the U .S . government shouldn't pay for any

of it . I still feel that there is some area of federal

responsibility in navigation projects, just as there is

in flood control ; and that we, ASA, working with the

Corps, should have been afforded more flexibility in

7 5
working ,Kith the Congress on that particular issue .

I still believe that there is a middle ground that could

be reached which would allow navigational projects to go

ahead . But at the time I left, at least, that wasn't

apparent--that progress would be made in that area .

Q : In response to another question I asked last time, you

said that the Corps doesn't always worry much about the

cost of a project, that they simply developed what they

considered to be the best engineering solution and then

let the costs work out for themselves or whatever . On

what basis could the Corps recommend a project which was

not in the NED plan based on the administration's

guidance?

A : Well, of course, we hope to address the issue in part by

having, under the new planning guidelines, the NED plan

as the one that would be advanced . That would presumably

take care of the matter, because You would plug into the

economics the benefits as well as cost . You wouldn't

just have the best engineering solution . Hopefully that

would partly take care of that problem .

Another thing that I have been concerned about, and just

to illustrate the point, the Corps has some tremendously

large projects which haven't been authorized . For

example, let me pick out one in California--the Santa Ana

River Flood Control Project . That project is going to

cost well over a billion dollars . From the very

beginning, the Corps developed an all-river plan there

for 500-year flood protection, as I recall, based upon

certain assumptions that would take place in upstream

development . It was my view that such a plan would never

get off the ground because, first of all, it is too

expensive ; and I am not sure that the local people would

be able to .carry their end of it . It is partly a levee

project for which the locals, even under the present

rules, would have to pay land easements and rights of way

and relocation of utilities, and that would be a pretty

substantial amount .

So I felt that in developing the report--and I asked the

Corps to do this--to come up with some alternatives and

also some staging which would allow the policy-makers and

the budget people some flexibility in dealing with a

solution of the Santa Ana river flood control problem .

The Corps did work out, then, a series of alternatives

which, in effect, involved a staging of the overall

project, and then attached different degrees of flood

protection to those various stages .

7 6
Q

To me, that's what the Corps should be doing . That, to

me, gave them, the decision-makers, a chance to see what

the alternatives would be, to see what the benefits would

be, and to see what you could get by with in terms of

cost and protection . Then, the policy-makers could make

.a decision based upon those alternatives . But when the

Corps, as they did originally, only presented the allriver plan with no staging at all and at a cost of more

than a billion dollars, the project could not move .

Did the staging involve different stages of construction?

In other words, would you perhaps build stage one,

construct stage one first, and then stage two? or could

they be done together?

A : No, basically it was to build part of the project which

would give you a lesser degree of flood protection at a

much lesser cost, and then come along later when the

need arose and add on other elements . Now, as I recall,

and I think the discussion is still pending, part of the

staging might involve some funds which couldn't be

economically used for subsequent stages . If that is the

case, then you have to rack up what the staging is going

to cost and how long it may last, to see whether it is

worthwhile foregoing some of the benefits that would be

provided if you built it all at once .

Q : Well, yes, that's really what I was getting to in a

sense--that the staging, while it might make it more

feasible for the locals to get themselves involved, might

in the end result in a higher cost for the project .

A : But the alternative very well may be that if you try to

go the whole way at one time, you may find the cost so

prohibitive that nothing is done . Then you have to ask

yourself the question, "Is it better to do nothing or is

it better to do something to give some additional

protection, recognizing that you aren't giving as much as

the ultimate desirable plan would provide ."

Q : Would the protection be enough to warrant continued

activity in the area? ~In other words, would it give a

false sense of protection to the inhabitants, do you

think?

A : Well, it would have to be made very clear what they were

getting for whatever they were buying . Some of the

alternative plans provided 100-year protection . We made

it very clear that that's exactly what they were getting .

They weren't getting 500-year protection . They were

getting 100-year protection . Well, if that is all they

can afford, the choice then should be largely local--if

7 7
A : Yes .

they are putting up a fair amount of money--as to what do

they want . Do they want to take the risk, or do they

want to try and raise the additional money?

So, to me, that's the way a planning project should come

forward . It should, come forward with maybe the best

+ engineering solution : but if that looks like it is going

to be terribly costly, then it seems to me the decisionmakers need to have some options available to them so

that decisions can be made not merely on the basis of

taking it all or nothing ; but, maybe, is there something

we can do to give some additional benefits at costs that

can be afforded?

Q : You also mentioned in the first interview your

consternation over these 500 reports that the Corps has--

planning reports--most of which do not result in

projects . Why do you feel that the Corps could have

screened out these reports at an earlier date?

A : Well, one of the things I advocated, and I think Congress

has picked up on it, was to break down the feasibility

reports into two parts . And I think we covered this

maybe in part of our earlier conversation . If you follow

that procedure, then the Corps could prepare a

reconnaissance report which would give some feeling for

whether or not a project was feasible and whether there

were project sponsors willing to contribute . That could

be done at roughly a fourth or a fifth of the cost of the

full feasibility report and within a shorter period of

time .

So what I am saying is that if there is some way to break

down these project reports, as we have asked the Corps to

do, and if you had a repetition of the 500 reports, you

could' save, as I recall, probably $75 to $100 million of

what otherwise would be the cost of preparing the full

feasibility reports for those 500 projects .

Do you think the reports would be better reports with the

locals sharing in their cost?

A : Excuse me--I am not clear on your question .

Q : You suggested that the feasibility reports would involve

cost sharing, too .

Q : Do you think that the quality of the report would be

better because of the cost sharing?

7 8
A : Well, I don't know about the quality of the report, but I

know it would be more responsive . For example, if a

project's sponsor or project beneficiary is going to have

to pay for part of the feasibility cost, then he will be

pretty sure that he's serious about what he wants . He is

not merely trying to have a study made that is not going

to go anywhere .

I don't know about the quality of the report, but I do

feel that it would be much more responsive to the local

interests if there was a degree of financial participation . That's what we are talking about in the

second stage of the feasibility report, as opposed to the

reconnaissance stage which we suggested would still be

funded 100 percent by the federal government .

Q : You also suggested that the acid test of a good report is

that it leads to a project . Do you feel that there might

be some studies the Corps makes that are good studies

simply because they provide information, statistics, and

insights, even if the study does not lead to a project?

A : Well, you know, we talked a little earlier about the

waterways study . Now, the waterways study was not

designed to lead to a project . It was designed to

provide an inventory of requirements . I assume that is

basically what it was . So I don't have any problem with

that kind of report . But I am talking about reports that

relate to specific projects, as opposed to reports of a

general nature which would be informative--again, using

the waterway report as an example of what I would say is

an informative report .

Q : Well, okay, let's get away from those kinds of studies on

the national waterways and just talk about feasibility

reports . Do you think that specifically there may be

some validity in having feasibility reports that don't

lead inevitably to projects ; but because the survey has

been done and a lot of information has been gathered

about a particular proposed project, just the gathering

of that information and statistics might have some value

to the Corps and to the general public?

A : Well, of course, the theory of the reconnaissance level

report is that you don't collect information that you

don't need . The hypothesis you are making is that just

because you collected a bunch of data you therefore ought

to put it in a formal report ; then my answer to that is

you shouldn't have collected the data in the first place .

So, no, I haven't been able to figure out what advantage

there is to having everybody go to the trouble of putting

out a feasibility report if we know it is not going

7 9
anywhere .

Q : Well, okay, if I may press it just for a moment .

A : That's all right .

I am a historian so let me give you a historical example .

Back in the 19th century the Corps was asked to survey

various railroad routes to the Pacific . I think there

were five railroad routes that were surveyed, and private

interests, as it turned out, with a lot of government

support, built railroads on two of those five routes .

But wasn't the information the Corps gathered on those

three other routes of some use?

A : Well, I don't know whether that's a very good example .

You are talking about an overall report for

transportation on the nation's railroads, and at that

time the federal government, . as I recall, deeded land to

private railroads to help them`get along, too . So I

would assume there is an overriding national interest

there, as much as there might have been in the waterways

study, which would dictate a special consideration of

that .

But I am talking about where you build a flood control,

irrigation, or recreation project to serve Podunk

Community . That's what I am talking about, and that's

normally what your reports are all about . And I can't

see any advantage in going to a feasibility study with

respect to a report for Podunk Project if there is no

chance of that project being built .

Q : Well, I guess what I am saying is, what if you genuinely

aren't certain that the project will be built or could be

built there? I mean, aren't there a substantial number

of projects--proposals--where it is not clear that route

X for a waterway or location Y for a reservoir is

necessarily that much better than location A for a

reservoir, and therefore you have got to do reports on

both sites?

A : Well, that's the purpose of a reconnaissance level

report, to do just exactly what you are saying--to look

at possible alternatives in a general sort of a way and

come up with what is the best solution for a full

feasibility report . So it seems to me, and I might say

that I have been involved with a lot of these things, I

can't see any value to pursuing it to the degree you are

talking about under the cases you cite .

Q : So you would say that the reconnaissance reports do

80
Q :

Q :

provide gnough data to .

A : Tell you whether a project is good or bad or should be

pursued . And particularly if you ask the project

sponsors for the next stage to put up part of the funds

to carry it to a full feasibility study .

This really, I think, relates back to the answer you just

gave me . You mentioned at one point in the last

interview that you feel that planners like to plan for

the sake of planning .

A : Yes . That's a general characterization, you understand .

I am not accusing every planner . But I am saying that,

generally speaking, I think this is a syndrome that goes

through almost all the planning activities .

Can you pinpoint any particularly egregious-examples of

this?

A : Well, I think the fact that you had to go back to these

500 reports that I was talking about, of which less than

half were determined to have any feasibility at all, is

perhaps a pretty good example of that .

Q : In those 500 reports, of course, some are still with us .

I guess a fair number of them are .

A : Well, as a matter of fact, of those that were determined

to be feasible, these reports, as I recall, were written

between the period of 1973 and 1981 . And I think you can

count on one hand the number of projects that are

proceeding, even with those that showed some feasibility .

So just because you had a feasible project--the Corps had

feasibility reports on those--it didn't mean those

projects were going ahead .

Q : Well, one reason why the projects might not be going

ahead, of course, is because Congress didn't appropriate

the money .

A : Well, that's right . If you add up all of the Corps'

potential projects, as I remember, the figure was some

$36 billion worth of projects . There is no way in the

world that you are going to get money from the general

taxpayer, the general fund, to build the kind of projects

that the Corps is talking about in this feasibility

report category .

Well, to what extent should the Corps take that kind of

practical, political consideration into its planning

process? In other words, the Corps says to the Congress,

8 1
"Okay, -here are 400 projects, 500 projects, that to a

greater or lesser extent, depending on benefit-costs and

so forth and so on, are feasible projects ."

A : You mean the benefit-cost ratio is greater than one to

.one .

Q : Exactly . Yes . So, "Congress, now you decide . You tell

us what is supposed to be built and what shouldn't be built ." Is there anything particularly wrong with that?

A : Yes, I think the Corps is abrogating its responsibility,

and that is to provide the best technical expertise and the best recommendation possible . And when you present

the Congress with, say, let's take half of those 500

reports, which is about what I think they determined to

be feasible, then you would only have a handful of them

that are going to be augmented .

It seems to me that there is`something wrong in the

system somewhere if you can't at least prioritize those

projects that have the best chance of going ahead . And

that's why I come back to the point that there is no

greater way to determine whether a project is going to go

ahead than by having the project beneficiaries willing to

put up a little money . That's the best criterion that

there is . You can run all of the benefit-cost ratios you

want, but if there isn't the project beneficiary willing

to assume some of the financial responsibilities with

respect to that project, it is not worth a darn in my

view .

Q : So, following your philosophy, too, you would require a

substantial increase in cost sharing to get these

projects done .

A : Well, wait a minute . Let's back up . We are talking

about the reports now . What I have said before and what

I have advocated is that the reconnaissance level study

be conducted at about 20 percent of the cost of the full

feasibility study . And then the remaining feasibility

study would be 75 or 80 percent of the total cost

remaining to be paid : And that 75 or 80 percent would be

cost-shared by the nonfederal interest to the tune of 50

percent .

Then, I further said that if the local entity has some

capabilities, like a state or organized district, to

provide in-kind services, that could take up the 25

percent . So what we are really finally saying is that in

some situations, the local interest could get a

feasibility report by only putting up 25 percent of the

8 2
cost of that feasibility study, the federal government

putting up 50 percent, and the locals putting up the rest

by an in-kind service .

Q : I see .

A : So it's not that costs are going to be the same . It is

just that you have somebody who thinks they may want to

go ahead and build a project, be a financial participant .

And again, I say, that's the best test of feasibility

there is--the willingness of a project beneficiary to put

up some money, particularly at that stage .

Q : This suggestion that the local interests do provide some

degree of cost sharing, 20 percent or whatever, for

feasibility reports--what kind of a response did you get

from OCE on that?

A : Oh, considerable resistance, because, first of all, it is

a difficult and unpleasant task to go out and ask people

to do that . And secondly, once people are putting money

into a study, they are going to demand a product for the

money they put out . In the past, if the Corps runs out

of money it goes back and gets Congress to give it some

more to finish a particular feasibility study . In the

future the Corps would have to be accountable to local

interests .

Q : You also mentioned the 16 projects that were passed down

while you were Assistant Secretary, where the locals were

willing to contribute more than what had traditionally

been asked of them ; and you mentioned that these projects

really were orchestrated from your office rather than

from the field . Didn't you actually direct that these

projects would be done under your centralized direction?

A : Well, here's--let me go back and reconstruct how we got

into that--the whole aspect . First of all, we adopted

some cost-sharing percentages . Rightly or wrongly, we

said, "Let's see if we can't get this amount of

participation by nonfederal interests," and it varied

depending upon the particular use . And we said, "Let's--

you the Corps give us a list of what you consider to be

your most feasible projects or those that have the best

chance of going ahead . Let's try it out on those

projects ."

So the Corps initially gave us those projects on which it

had completed studies, which it felt were, you might

say, in the upper percentages of having the best chance

of going ahead . Then we, at our office, said, "Okay,

let's take those projects and we will go out with the

8 3
Q : What was his name?

A : His name was Robert Eiland . He had a lot of experience

working with the financial people in California and some

of the things we did, and I asked him if he would take

that experience and try to apply it against these

projects that the Corps had selected . And as I say, I

think the number was 14 or 16 projects over the course of

three years, where the project beneficiaries had

indicated some willingness to proceed with a higher

degree of cost sharing if .-these projects could move

ahead .

Q : I see . In response to another question, you made the

statement that you felt the Chief of Engineers had lost

some of his control over the field, over the Divisions

and Districts .

A : Yes .

Districts and talk to the potential project beneficiaries

and see if they are willing to accept the percentages

that we have said we feel are necessary to move these

projects ahead from the administration's standpoint ."

And that's the way it worked . In other words, yes, I

brought in a special assistant, a fellow who worked with

- me in California, a registered engineer, to help in this

effort .

Q : Did you--I didn't follow that up by asking you whether

you had any specifics in mind . Let me follow it up now .

A : Well, I don't particularly want to get into specific

projects, but there are a number of projects which I felt

should have been screened out by the Chief's office or

the QCE prior to going forward . And basically, it seemed

to me that they needed to make certain that all the

Divisions and all the Districts were operating in a

consistent, uniform way, pretty much in accordance with

the policies that would have been set down through the

chain of command .

And some of the projects, it seemed to me, should never

have reached the Secretary's office, should have been

screened out by the Corps prior to the time they got

there . They were screened out at the Secretary's level

when it was found that the economics didn't prove out or

that some assumptions had been used by the Districts in

preparing them that were not consistent with those being

used by the others .

So that's the feeling, and it partly ties into the dis8 4
cussion we had in the earlier interview on decentralization . I think decentralization is great ; but

there needs to be some control over that decentralization

or you are going to be in a big, fat mess all the time,

because you are going to have inconsistent policies being

followed by a large number of Districts ; and I think that

.is highly undesirable .

Q : Did some of these projects also have a fair amount of

political pressures behind them?

A : I suspect that many of them might have, yes . I suspect

that's so .

Q : Can you give me the names of a few?

A : No, I don't want to get into any specific projects,

because I don't think that would provide any useful

purpose . one indication would be to take a look at some

of the projects that might have been added on by the

Congress over the President's budget . Now that might

give you some inkling of some of those projects . But not

in all cases, certainly .

Q : Let me go backwards in time for a moment . You mentioned

that you had some problems with the Corps' planning

effort prior to taking the Assistant Secretary's

position . You were somewhat familiar with the Corps'

planning process . Can you elaborate for a second on what

those problems were?

A : Yes, and again I don't want to get into specific

projects, but I can give you the kinds of problems that

existed . First of all, the planning process took an

inordinately long period of time . In the case of the one

project I have talked about, I think it took five or six

years . Then, when the report was completed or just

before the report was completed, it was indicated that it

wouldn't be able to be finalized without an additional

appropriation, because they needed some additional

information .

So the net effect of the planning process, at least the

one I am talking about, was that, first of all, it took

too long . And secondly, they ran out of money . And then

there was a delay caused by having to go back and get an

appropriation for a subsequent year from the Congress to

finish the report . And then lastly it came out, I would

say, after much too long a period, in a way that wasn't

particularly useful to the local interests .

Q : Let me throw something at you that actually has been

8 5
thrown at me by a few people in the Corps, and get a

response from you . That you have some problems with

planners, because planners give people hope, and hope

leads to political pressure, and that you would rather

not see projects developed in that kind of way . Is there

anything to that kind of statement?

A : - Well, I think that's accurate . I hate to see the Corps

reduced to building projects that are solely politically

popular or which are built because of political pressure,

because I don't think that does the Corps' reputation any

good . one of the things that I tried to do when I was

Assistant Secretary, with, I'd say, only moderate

success, was to try and have the good projects come to

the top and have those projects go ahead .

Now, politically, that hasn't taken place, and I don't

know whether it will . But it seems to me that the Corps'

future in the civil works area needs a better base under

it than merely a project which is forced upon it by

Congress through legislation : I think that is

unfortunate because then you are going to have some bad

projects, and I think the Corps' reputation will not be

served under that process .

Q : You mentioned Mount St . Helens as an example of a project

where the Corps wanted something more expensive than what

you came up with . Can you explain in a bit more detail

what resulted from your intervention in that project?

What specifically did you recommend should be done?

A : Well, let's back up to where I saw the thing headed from

the very beginning, and that was with building a gigantic

structure which may or may not ultimately be needed . And

my problem was that Mount St . Helens was a unique thing

because it was an act of God, I guess you would say . It

presented the Corps and the people with a physical

situation that hasn't existed anywhere in the world as

far as we have been able to tell .

The eruption, in effect, blew off the top of a mountain

and deposited that mountain in some of the valleys around

it, one of them being in the Cowlitz watershed . The

question became, after that happened, what was the best

way to provide a control and protection to people

downstream in particular as a result of this act of

nature that was certainly unforeseen and could never have

been anticipated .

The crux of the whole thing was the estimate of how much

material would move and how fast . The Corps made some

estimates which I believed were on the very high side ;

8 6
g g 

Q : What do you think the Corps was going . . .. ?

A : The Corps wanted to build a massive structure at one

location, which mayor may not ultimately be needed . In

fact, I think the Corps' latest studies indicate that it

may not be needed at all now, because the movement in the

last four years since Mount St . Helens erupted has now

turned out to be much less than the Corps originally

anticipated, particularly in the first year . I am not

saying that critically, because the Corps obviously was

erring on the side of being conservative, but without

regard to the cost . Now this again gets into the matter

of trying to relate cost to solutions .

Q : Getting away from planning for a moment and into

engineering, how would you characterize, generally

speaking, the Corps' engineering efforts? Do you think

the Corps does good engineering?

A : Yes, I think they do . If anything, they do too

conservative engineering, but they certainly do competent

engineering . But, again, maybe over-design, for example,

in some instances . We are looking at that now in

connection with dam safety . You may recall the study

that is under way involving the Bureau of Reclamation and

the Corps and the National Academy of Sciences on the

criteria for flood control, for example .

Q : Well, then, how about the estimates that the Corps comes

up with for its engineering work? I attend civil works

staff meetings, and one thing that impresses and

depresses me at the same time, if you will, is the fact

that Corps estimates are habitually much higher than the

estimates that the private sector is coming up with for

the project .

8 7
8 8

It has been suggested that one reason the Corps estimates

are high is because the Corps doesn't practice some of

the cost-saving methods that you see in the private

sector . That the private sector, because it is

interested in gaining a profit, is looking for ways to

save money, whereas perhaps the Corps isn't . Do you

think there is any validity to this?

A : Well, I think you have got to split down--I think you

have got two things mixed together in your comments, if I

read you right . First is the Corps' original cost

estimates--how good are they? Then, second is what does

the cost of a project turn out to be as related to the

cost estimates? So you really have two separate items .

I think the Corps by and large does a good job in terms

of estimates of what a project will cost based upon its

own design . The design may be a little overly

conservative, but I think they do a good job on the

estimates . By and large, at least with most of the jobs

that I recall, the bids came=in pretty close to the

Corps' estimates . I think they have been pretty good . I

think the thing perhaps you are alluding to is that the

actual cost of the job may turn out more .

Q : Well, what I am talking about are situations where you

have the solicitation of bids--of course, it is based on

government estimate--and it could be for anything from a

dredging operation to a particular stretch of levee,

okay?

A : Yes .

Q : And it has not been uncommon--I can't recollect how it

was two years ago . I've just become more sensitive to

these things in the last two years . But in the last

couple of years it has been not uncommon for your

government estimate for a particular project to come in

at least 40 percent above the low bid for the project .

A : Yes .

Q : And even 30 percent over the high bid in some cases .

A : Yes .

You know--and it seems to me from the outside, not being an

engineer or an economist--that there must be something wrong

when you have such a lack of compatibility between the

government estimate and . . .

A : Well, I think the Corps tends to be conservative in terms
of its estimates . I think that's true . But the other

thing Js we are operating now in some rather unusual

times--at least I would categorize them in that way .

What you have had, for example, going back about ten

years, is, for at least more than half that period, an

extremely high rate of inflation ; so it is pretty hard to

predict how much inflation you have to add to a project

that is going to be constructed over a period of four or

more years .

On the other hand, the last two years, what you've had is

sort of an unemployment situation where contractors will

really cut corners in order to get a bid . So I think

there has been an explanation for some bids coming in the

way they have . The situation is not stable enough to

allow a good estimate to be made which carries

construction over a several-year period .

Now, going back, say, 20 years or more, you could pretty

well figure that you would have an escalation of 2 or 3

percent per year, or whatever it was, and plug that into

your cost estimates and come out pretty good . But when

they varied somewhere between 5 and 15 percent, that

makes it pretty difficult ; and where you are projecting

over a four- or five-year construction period, it makes

it pretty hard .

Q : You know, the whole problem leads to some substantial

complications, it would seem to me . First of all, of

course, you have an inflated budget being worked up by

the Corps, based on these estimates coming in from the

Districts . Secondly, you have money being returned to

OCE because the money is not going to be spent, as it

turns out, and the Corps has to decide how it is going to

spend it . It could return it to the Treasury, of course,

but it could ask, presumably, for the money to be applied

to another project .

Now .

A : And that happens . For example, a case in point . The

dredging, the annual dredging at Mount St . Helens, I

think, was done from funds that were saved from the very

thing you mentioned . So, yes, you are right ; it is used

then for other purposes, and presumably those other

purposes will be screened out as to their desirability

and necessity .

Q : Did your office approve those transfers of money?

A : Yes . Transfers over a certain amount came through our

office for approval, yes .

8 9
Q : And so your office would be able to produce a running total of how much money was being transferred from . .

A : Well, we rely on the Corps to keep a running total, but

on an individual project basis, and the dredging is a

good case in point, we certainly approved the use of funds which the Corps saved from some other construction 'project for that dredging on the Columbia River .

Do you know whether, while you were Secretary, money was

returned to the Treasury from the Corps?

A : I don't know . If it was, it wasn't very much, I assume,

because the Corps has always seemed to me to be pressed

because of inadequate funds .

Q : Excuse me, but, again from the outside, it would seem to

me that since you would be very interested in getting as much bang for the buck as possible from the Corps of

Engineers, your office would be necessarily monitoring

how much money was being returned to OCE for

redistribution and would possibly get on the District

Engineers who perhaps in some cases habitually were

coming up with government estimates that were very, very

high over the private sector bid . I mean, it would seem

to suggest prima facie that there is bad engineering

going on out there, and so it comes as some surprise to

me that maybe you weren't as cognizant of that as I would

have thought you would be .

A : It is a good idea but it would require staff augmentation

in the ASA office . The ASA staff doesn't have great

numbers ; in fact, we have fewer than ten professionals,

and I didn't want to build up another bureaucracy . OMB

suggested we should expand the staff . In fact, OMB

indicated it would approve additional staffing for ASA if

we wanted to exercise additional control over certain of

the Corps' functions .

My decision was no, because -I think we are better advised

to require the Corps to do it, rather than try and, for

example, have our own engineering staff perform a

detailed review of the Corps' material that comes in .

The Corps ought to do that, and I don't think that it

warrants a duplicative staff in ASA . I think we ought to

keep our staff as small as possible to carry out the

responsibility that we have .

And it may be that you are right . It may be that we--

that ASA has not given enough attention to the area of

money management, which is what I guess you are really

talking about .

9 0
Q : I'll tell you what I am talking about--not so much

keeping other books, but simply getting down into the

roots of the organization and finding out why you have

Districts coming up with these high estimates on what I

sense is a habitual basis .

A : + Well, this is an important area ; and maybe ASA, certainly

working with OMB, who has a great interest in that also,

ought to take a look at this thing and see whether or not

we should do something like that . But if it looks like

it is a problem that ought to be looked at, ASA should

watch that very carefully because I think they are

interested in the prudent expenditure of funds--

particularly in these times of budget constraints .

Q : Let me turn our attention to a subject I think we touched

upon last time but maybe not as much as we ought to have,

and that is the question of the Corps' role in

mobilization . To what extent should mobilization be used

to justify the` Corps' continued involvement in civil

works?

A : Yes . That's a troublesome one . I think I mentioned

earlier that I went through mobilization in World War II .

I felt that the work we did with a Corps of Engineers

construction battalion at that time was expedited

considerably by the effort of the District Engineer in

Honolulu, Hawaii, which was the first place we went right

after U .S . involvement in World War II began--we arrived

a month after Pearl Harbor .

And with Hawaii in the mess it wag, if it hadn't been for

the District Engineer doing what he did in-the way of

lining up equipment and supplies, our job over there,

which was to take care of a lot of the damage and prepare

for potential invasion, would have been much more

difficult . I think it is a very important role .

Now, a problem arises if you try to have a large stand-by

force that is justified by mobilization . What are you

going to have them do for a good part of the time until

there really is mobilization? You can do a lot of

mobilization planning, but a couple of people could do

that .

The real demand is when you have a crisis . So it has

always been hard for me to see how you can justify

maintaining a staff solely for mobilization purposes . I

just think that you have to have them doing some

meaningful work while they also have a mobilization

assignment . I have believed that the existing Corps

9 1
organization could be rapidly expanded or diverted in the

case of mobilization, to take care of the country's

needs . That happened in World War II, and I am sure the

Corps didn't have the widespread organization that it has

now .

.So, mobilization is important . The Corps needs to be

prepared for it . But to create a body of personnel who

have that as their only assignment--I have trouble with

that concept .

Q : Well, I know that Senator Moss back in the mid-1960s

suggested one alternative when he was coming up with a

suggestion for a cabinet-level office of water resources .

He suggested that he would reassign the Corps' civilian

personnel--civil works civilian personnel--to this new

Department of Natural Resources, but with the

understanding--the stipulation--that the personnel, when

war seemed imminent, would have some specific

mobilization assignment to do, but under civilians rather

than under military .

Do you think that that kind of . . . ?

A: Well, I think that's basically the situation now . The

Corps has, for example, a large civil works force, which,

if there was a war emergency, would be diverted to those

emergency needs . That is exactly what would happen . So

whether you need more or not is an arguable point . But I

think it is important that the Corps be able to do just

what we are talking about--be able to take their present

forces, redistribute them in terms of a national

emergency, and use them where they would be the most

necessary or most useful .

Q : What's your conception of the Corps as a federal

engineer?

A: Well, as I said before, I think the Corps has the most

competent assemblage of technical experts in the

engineering field of any organization . And I believe

other federal agencies, when they need that kind of

expertise, ought to call on the Corps . I think the Corps

should do more in the way of acting as a federal

engineer . We tried, for example, to enlarge the Corps'

area of responsibility with EPA . And I still feel that

the Corps could do a better job, for example, of managing

the Superfund than EPA . EPA needs to tell the Corps

which sites need to be taken care of, but once that

determination is made, then the Corps could do the job

and, I think, much more expeditiously than EPA.

9 2
That may be true in other areas, too . The energy area has

a number of things which the Corps could do, in the

nuclear and other areas . The Corps in the past has done

that . They had a mission here, quite a number of years

ago, I believe, on post offices . So I believe the Corps

ought to be the federal engineer where it is appropriate

for a federal agency to provide those kinds of services .

Q : Let me pursue this thing with the Superfund for a moment .

As I recollect, the Superfund program was passed during

the Carter administration and had some trouble getting

off the ground ; and it didn't really get off the ground

even after the Reagan administration came into power for

quite some time . Can you explain what the situation was

with Superfund when you came into office, and what you

contributed to getting the thing going?

A : Well, principally, that is an EPA problem . Superfund is

administered by EPA . My perception of the difficulty in

recent years is that EPA had not got its act together

with respect to Superfund . There was money there . It

had to be set aside . There were funds there that could

be available for that clean-up purpose . However, they

hadn't decided what the problem was specifically at each

site, what had to be done to remedy it, and set some sort

of a priority .

The Corps pointed out to EPA that there were certain

bottlenecks that EPA experienced in terms of land

acquisition, etc . ; and we said : "The Corps has got

expertise in this area . Why don't you just tell the

Corps you want them to clean up the site and let them

move ahead doing everything necessary to carry out the

mission ." And I don't think we really ever accomplished

that . I think maybe EPA did a little bit more, but still

my belief is that they haven't called on the Corps as

much as they could to help administer that program for

the benefit of everyone .

Q : Do you have any reasons, have any ideas why they haven't?

A : Well, there may be a couple of reasons . There is the

desire of any agency which has a responsibility to carry

out, to build a work force to carry it out rather than to

rely on a sister federal agency .

The other one is that I think EPA was under great

pressure from the private sector, which felt that they

could do it all . The private sector could not do the

kind of thing we are talking about that I believe the

Corps should do . For example, the Corps could

9 3
standardi;e designs on clean-up and could expedite the

work . Now, I am not arguing that the private sector

shouldn't do much of the work, but I thought there was a

larger role for the Corps to play than the one they have

been playing in the Superfund clean-up program .

Q : To what extent were you involved in attempts to

reorganize the Corps? Actually, I say attempts . There

were some cases where the changes were actually made, of

course . Now, let me divide it into two areas . First of

all, going back to when you first came into your office,

there were decisions about closing down some Districts

and realignment--realignment both of District functions

and specifically of regulatory functions . What was your

feeling about all that? Did you feel the Corps had too

many offices out there?

A : Well, let's break it down into two parts . Let's talk

about the District offices, first of all . I think the

Corps was under considerable pressure from OMB, in terms

of reduction of personnel as a result of budgets going

down, to utilize their personnel in a more efficient way .

The Corps, itself, then determined--because I remember

talking to General Bratton about this--that it could do

that best by closing down certain offices or changing

some of the functions, which it tried to do but

politically could not accomplish .

I agreed with the Corps . I thought that the Corps was

right . If you are going to be squeezed on forces, it is

better to maintain a full capability here and not try to

spread them out and not have the capability anywhere . So

I agreed with what the Corps was trying to do, but it

wasn't able to be accomplished .

With respect to regulatory reform, I think we felt that

the regulatory reform effort throughout the Corps should

be beefed up . In other words, that additional personnel

and the level of those personnel should be higher than it

was . We wanted the Corps--and they did, at our suggestion--to look at, for example, raising the regulatory

personnel in the Districts and the Divisions to a higher

level, so that they more nearly approached that of the

engineers 'rather than a much lower level, so that you

could attract even some engineers into those regulatory

jobs .

So I think, in terms of regulatory reform, we did push

the Corps pretty hard to look at upgrading their

regulatory personnel and augmenting it to take care of

what we perceived to be a pretty important problem .

9 4
Q : Aren't many of the people in the regulatory branches

already engineers?

A : Some of them are . But a lot of them are not--at least,

that was my understanding . There may be more of them

now; but I think if you go back three years, you will

find a lot of those who were heading the regulatory

effort were not . It was difficult to keep good engineers

in regulatory reform due to lower pay and classification .

Q : Do you think there is any way of getting around the kinds

of congressional pressures you have to deal with when you

are talking about closing down District or Division

offices, mainly by reassignment of their functions?

A : There has got to be some way to get around that problem,

because it doesn't make any sense to maintain a District

office where it can't function properly . If you are

going to strip it of some of its key personnel, then you

might as well do away with the office and let that be

handled by an adjacent area, for example .

Q :

Politically, I don't know how you do it . Every

congressman who had a District office, or every senator,

if you were going to take it and move it out of his

state, will be heard on the issue . Hopefully, there will

be enough statesmen around that ultimately they will see

the merit of doing whatever is proposed in the way of

consolidation or whatever, and will not resist us on

that .

I think the only way, probably, to do it is to be careful

that you take into account the political considerations .

For example, if you are going to close down an office in

one area, have some way of offsetting that somehow, so

that it doesn't become completely negative throughout .

Offsetting it presumably by giving that area another kind

of office? I mean, it wouldn't have to be a Corps offset

necessarily--is that what you are suggesting? It could

be an offset from, say, a large Naval contractor or

something like that .

A : It could be--yes . It could be anything along those

lines . The military bases have the same problem . Every

time you try to close down a military base, you have the

same problem . So it is a problem that is not unique to

the Corps' District offices ; but it is a problem that, I

think, runs through the federal government in many

departments where they want to change their

organizational structure .

9 5
Q : Talking to you about reorganization and so forth leads

inevitably to discussing the Grace commission report .

A : Yes .

Q : Let me ask you, first of all, do you know Peter Grace at

all? Did you have any . . . ?

A : No . I don't know Peter Grace .

Q : Did he talk to you, or did any of his people talk to you?

A : I think I had one session with two of the people who

were assigned to the Defense Department, who ultimately

got to work on some of the Corps' material .

Q : They made several rather significant recommendations

concerning the Corps of Engineers . And I would like to

talk about a couple of them . First of all, they

recommended that on the civil works side, the Corps

contract out more AE&D work .

A : Well, let me--before you ask--comment on the Grace Report

in general .

Q : Okay .

A : When Reagan became governor, he did a similar thing . He

appointed what he called a Citizens Task Force to work

with the various departments of state government for a

period of time, and they were on leave from their

industry . The department that I headed had about six of

these businessmen, assigned for six months, who came and

physically were present in our department for the entire

period, talking to all of us, having numerous

conferences, and so forth . They came up with some 85

recommendations, and we implemented about 75 of them .

Their assignment was completed within about nine months

of the time the administration took office .

We couldn't implement some of the recommendations because

it took legislation or involved other parties . But I

viewed their efforts very positively, and they really

brought into state government the private sector

viewpoint .

I don't view the Grace Commission effort quite the same

way . My experience with the Grace Commission, in terms

of, say, the civil works function of the Corps, consisted

of one talk with them for maybe an hour . I made some

suggestions to them, and there was no indication they

followed up on any money-saving suggestions . They also

9 6
came up with some recommendations that, in my judgment,

were impractical . And so, basically, I guess I have kind of a lukewarm feeling about the efforts of the Grace Commission, having seen essentially the same thing in California .

Q : Y am glad you put that in . Well, of course, their recommendations caused some consternation within the Corps of Engineers, and as I was saying before, one of the recommendations was that the Corps contract out a lot

more of its AE&D work . It looked to the military side and saw,there was a substantial percentage of AE&D work

that was contracted out, and the question was, why can't

civil works people do the same amount of contract work .

Do you have any response to that?

A : Well, I think--my own feeling on how you divide up the work is that you try to maintain a capability in the

Corps, for example . In other words, you have to have

enough work to keep a competent hydrologist or a

seismologist, for example . Then you build a work force

that has enough of those disciplines to take care of the

problems that continually confront the Corps .

Then, if you have peak loads, my feeling is that you

ought to handle those peaks with the private sector to

the maximum extent possible . It is very disruptive and

inefficient for an organization like the Corps to have to

go through extremely high peaks and valleys of

personnel . You just can't keep a competent work force

if you have to do that .

The ideal thing would be to have a work force at what you

might call an optimum minimum level, so that you aren't

hiring and firing people every year ; then, as you have

additional needs for something very special, you bring in

the outside sector .

Q : If I can be the gadfly for a moment, then what about the

idea that you simply have a sufficient number of

engineers to act as quality control managers and

administrators, so to speak, but you still let the

private sector do most of the work ; and then the work

would simply have to be approved, of course, through

channels--.through District, Division, and OCE . But it

would be a small body of presumably top-level engineers,

who would be saying, "Okay, this work coming in from

Morrison Knudsen"--or something like that--"it's good

work, you know, go to it ." What about that idea?

A : Well, I think that's going too far . If you are going to

have a federal agency that has a capability to take on

9 7
different kinds of things, then you have to give that

agency, it seems to me, the personnel and the expertise

needed to carry out those things . Remember, also, the

need to have a mobilization capability within the Corps .

Again, I believe that there is an appropriate role for

the federal agencies, as well as state or local agencies,

to have in connection with this kind of a function . It

relates also to maintaining a capability to take care of

emergencies or contingencies . Mount St . Helens is a good

example . I think the Corps responded to that more

quickly, probably, than anybody in terms of going up

there and handling the problems that occurred . If you

had had to staff up for that, it would have taken a long

time, and you'd go out on competitive bidding . So I

think there is a justification for a federal agency, and

the Corps as we are now talking about, to have a

continual capability in certain areas .

I think, really, a quality control plan would not go

nearly far enough . At least, that's my judgment .

Q : Well, another suggestion that came out of the Grace

Commission was that serious consideration be given to the

consolidation of construction agencies . Do you have any

response to that?

A : Well, when you say construction agencies, I don't know

how far you go . If you are talking about water, I

suppose you are talking about, really, three--Bureau of

Reclamation, Soil Conservation Service, and the Corps .

Q : They may have thrown in TVA, too . I'm not certain .

A : Maybe TVA, too . Well, I guess my only response is that,

while there certainly is some overlap--obviously there

is--they have separate functions . For example, the

Bureau of Reclamation operates only in the 17 western

states . Its primary mission is irrigation . Okay . While

the Corps does operate in the western states, it doesn't

have, as I view it, a primary mission of irrigation . So

irrigation takes a special kind of people to make various

crop studies and water requirements and other related

information .

I don't think that there is necessarily a duplication .

So I don't know that you accomplish too much by trying to

bring them all together, because then you would have to

segregate them again, according to their areas of

responsibility . Soil Conservation Service has concerned

itself with small structures, working with the farmers

very meticulously ; so I don't think you save anything by

9 8
Q Would you say that part of the problem was the Secretary

of the Interior?

A : Well, I wasn't too happy with Interior on a couple of

99

bringing the Soil Conservation Service engineers into the

Corps, 'for example . I don't really think you save

anything by putting together these various agencies--the

consolidation of these organizations .

Q : I take it that you would not agree with those people,

those critics, who say that the Corps of Engineers should get out of the civil works business .

A : No . I think there is a need for the Corps in that area,

and I think it fills that need well and should continue

to do so .

One of the other things the Grace Commission said that I

don't agree with is that operation and maintenance should

be turned over to the private sector ; and I can't see that at all . Take, for example, the inland navigational

system . I just can't envision anyone other than the Corps operating the nation's navigation systems . I think

that was a misdirected recommendation . Certainly, as

related to things like navigation that the corps does .

Q : I want to take a moment to talk about some of your nonCorps of Engineers activities as Assistant Secretary, but let me jump to another question and then come back . And

the question is, can you explain why you left the office?

A : It was understood at the White House . I guess it was a

combination of things . First of all, I never had any

intention of staying longer than one term . And,

secondly, I felt that in an approaching election year, I

couldn't really accomplish much more by staying in the

job . And I had a strong desire to return to California .

Q : Could you elaborate on what you mean by stating

that with the election year coming, you wouldn't be

able to . . . ?

A : Well, the Congress seemed to me to have a hard time

dealing with some of the difficult problems, as did the

administration in an election year . For example, in the

areas of cost sharing, there was no great progress going

to be made in that area because people didn't want to

rock the boat . I thought I had given all the input I

could give to the administration and to the Congress on

that subject, and I didn't see any useful purpose in

staying around any longer .
occasions . But I wouldn't say that contributed to my

decision to leave, no .

Q : In the Cabinet-Council, did not you and the Secretary or

the Secretary's representative have some differences of

opinion on cost sharing?

A : Yes . Particularly when Secretary Watt was there . I

wasn't there long enough with Secretary Clark . But I

think Secretary Watt and I did have some differences,

largely by virtue of the different missions of our two

organizations . Reclamation, in my judgment, has a

different kind of project authorization procedure, for

example . Each one of their projects is authorized on an

individual basis . They go before different committees .

And by and large they are very large projects, and each

one of them is different, so they can orchestrate it

without worrying too much about consistency .

I view the Corps' problem as different . I view the Corps

as operating on a 50-state basis, and it is very

important that the Corps deal uniformly with its

constituency . For example, people who were desirous of

flood control--the amount of federal contribution for

flood control should be the same throughout the United

States .

We had some differences of views in that regard ; but

again I don't view them as having been critical, and

certainly they didn't play a significant part in terms of

my decision to return to California .

Q : Well, I can understand your wanting to come back to

Pebble Beach .

A : Yes . It was always my intention to do so .

Mr . Gianelli, let's turn out attention for a moment to

the non-Corps activities that you were involved with as

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works . Two

major non-Corps activities are the involvement in the

Panama Canal and the administration of Arlington

Cemetery . First of all, let me ask you how much time do

you think is spent by the Secretary's office each year on

Corps of Engineers work, Arlington, and the Panama Canal :

Can you give me a rough kind of breakdown?

A :

10 0

Yes, I have tried to do that and thought about that quite

a bit . I'd say, if you took a time allocation, about 75

percent of my time would go to the Corps, about 20

percent to Panama, and maybe about 5 percent to

Arlington, roughly . However, that changes from time to
time .

For example, the Panama Canal Commission required, when

you went to Panama for a board meeting, a week at a time .

But then there might not be anything for a couple of

weeks or very little for the next two or three weeks

after you got back . But I would say that's about a

breakdown in terms of time and probably personnel, too,

if you look at the personnel in the ASA's office .

Q : Do you have many people, or any people, who get involved

in these three different areas--you know, just one person

getting involved in three different areas?

A: Well, before I left, we took steps to reorganize part of

the office . And I might indicate that to you . Before, we

had a military assistant to the Panama Canal Commission

chairman, who operated on a full-time basis on the Panama

Canal activities, provided liaision in defense-related

matters, and so forth . He also had a personal secretary .

So those were two people .

The secretary of the commission has an office over in the

Pennsylvania Building, in the District, and has, in

addition to himself, about half a dozen people that work

with him there . They primarily interface with the

Congress and take care of the commission's activities

that way . That office was responsible to me as the

chairman of the commission, but it was separate from ASA .

In other words, that's all they did .

Just before I left, it became apparent that we didn't

need a military assistant on a full-time basis for

Panama, so the office is now going through a

reorganization . The full-time military assistant left

for another assignment in September . In anticipation of

that, we have taken the assistant executive officer of

the ASA office and,%given him the responsibilities for

Panama Canal and Arlington matters, in addition to

backstopping the executive officer . These are both

military colonels--one is a full colonel ; the other is a

lieutenant colonel . So from now on there will be a

military person who does operate in the three areas, but

his prime responsibility will be Panama . And then,

beyond that, he will do Arlington . If he has any time

left over, he will help out the executive officer .

Q : How about civilian personnel?

A : Civilian personnel, the female secretary, will be the

same way . She will be allocated to the three functions

basically, instead of solely with regard to the Panama
Canal . And that's about the only change, although the

Panama Carial Commission office will stay the same over in

the District .

Okay, well, regarding the Panama Canal, what are the

primary activities that you get involved with?

A : Well, let me also say as a further reasoning for the

reorganization of the military assistants, I believe that

it would be helpful to have a Corps officer as the person

who would be involved with the Panama Canal affairs .

That has not been the case in the past .

The Panama Canal Commission is a unique agency . It is a

nine-person commission with five U .S . members and four

Panamanians . I am the chairman of the commission, and

the law : provides that I can control the vote of the U .S .

members if that were ever necessary . I have only done

that once . My job as the chairman of the commission is

to preside over the commission meetings where policy is

established and budgets are considered . The chairmanship

also requires considerable testifying on the Hill for the

commission .

Q : May I ask what was the particular vote which you . . .

A : It had to do with a wage issue that was presented to the

commission, as I recall .

Q : How many times a year did you go down to Panama?

A : About four or five times a year . While I was in the job

of Assistant Secretary, I went down there 16 times over

the approximately three-year period . The commission

normally has four meetings a year, and three of the

meetings-are in Panama and one in the United States ; but

I found it necessary to go down there between meetings on

occasion to take care of some element of business for the

commission . For example, I accompanied the Secretary of

Defense on one of his visits last year ; I wanted to be

sure he had an opportunity to view some of the canal

operations .

Q : What kind of things are you talking about?

A : Well, some of the commission's activities interface with

the military and the defense of the canal, and the

defense generally . So it is necessary for me, as

chairman of the commission, to keep in touch with the

Southern Command, which operates out of Panama . Many of

the personnel problems we have cover both military and

commission personnel . Mr . Weinberger had not been to

10 2
Panama before, and I was anxious that he see the

operation * of the canal and some of its problems .

The commission will go out of business in the year 2000

when the whole facility is turned over to Panama . In

addition to the full-time U .S . administrator, there is a

Panamanian deputy administrator on the job . The two of

them operate as the managers of the system on site, but

the policy decisions are made by the full commission .

Q : Was there not a Panama Canal Commission before the

treaty, too?

A : Yes, throughout recent years prior to the treat, there

was the Panama Canal Company which was headed by a Corps

of Engineers general acting as Governor of the Canal

Zone . There was also a board of directors that served

this Panama Canal Company . That all changed with the

treaty . The treaty did away with all that, and you now

have a commission, a nine-man commission, which will be

in existence until the year 2000 .

Q : And you are the chairman of the commission .

A : I'm the chairman .

Q : You still are chairman of the commission?

A : Well, yes . What happened was that when I indicated that

I wanted to come back to California and resign my

position as Assistant Secretary of the Army, the

Secretary of Defense indicated that he would like very

much for me to stay on as chairman of the Panama Canal

Commission . I told him I would be willing to do that on

a voluntary basis if the law could be changed that would

authorize me to do that, since the present law assumes

the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works would

carry out that function . Legislation was introduced and

was passed in June and signed by the President, allowing

me, even though I retired from my position as Assistant

Secretary, to carry on as chairman of the Panama Canal

Commission at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense .

Q : Does it specifically name you?

A : Yes . It names me . Now, when I leave, the function will

undoubtedly go back to the ASA unless they change the law

again . But a specific law was passed to allow me to

continue as chairman of the Panama Canal commission on a

voluntary basis, without pay, so long as the Secretary of

Defense wanted me to do so .

103
Q : Why do you think the Secretary was so keen on having you

remain?

A : Well, I think he believes that the chairmanship of the

commission is a very sensitive position . I had been down

there for three years . Practically all of the members of

the commission are recent appointees, except one who

carried over . I believe he just felt that at this

particular time, with the new president of Panama going

to take office in October, it would be better to have an

experienced person involved for the time being .

Q : Does that also mean that, in fact, you still have

authority in OASACW--I mean, in terms of dealing with the

people there who are working on Panama Canal matters?

A : Well, for example, the military assistant that I talked

about will be responsible to me in terms of Panama Canal

Commission activities . He will be responsible to ASA,

whoever is there, for other functions that he performs .

So there will still be an interplay,` that's right .

Q : What is your feeling about the Panama Canal treaty?

A : Well, I think something had to be done down there at the

time they signed the treaty . I am reading another book,

incidentally, which gives the history of the

negotiations, by former Ambassador to Panama William

Jordan . I'm only part way through it . But it talks

about all the negotiations, which I'm finding very

enlightening . I guess my feeling was that something had

to be done down there to change the relationship with

Panama . Whether we had to go as far as we did or not, I

think, is still a question, but I certainly don't think

it is up to me to second-guess those people who were

negotiating the treaties .

We are having some problems now that could have been

avoided if the treaty had allowed more discretion to the

commission . So there are some things, in hindsight, that

would have been a lot easier if they had done them

differently, certainly .

Is the Panamanian government cooperating with American

authorities in general?

A : Well, generally, but one of the things that I have

perceived is that the economy down there is in very bad

shape . Any time the government of Panama can get some

additional outside financial help from anybody, they are

going to try and do it . As a result, it seems to me they

are making continual efforts to get the United States to

104
do more things down there which probably are not

appropriate for the United States to do . For example,

one of the arguments we are having right now is on

widening the canal . The Panamanians think the U .S .

government should provide funds for the enlargement . We

don't think that's the case . It should be funded by

those who will benefit from the work .

The other problem that concerns me somewhat is the lack

of continuity in the Panamanian government . For example,

they will have had four presidents there since I've been

on the commission in the last three and a half years .

The other thing that I worry a little bit about is

whether or not, when the Panamanians assume the

responsibility for operating the canal in the year 2000,

they will perform the necessary maintenance to keep the

canal open and operating . The trans-isthmus railroad,

which was turned over to Panama at the time of the

treaty, is in very bad shape now due to lack of

maintenance and attention .

Q : Are there some issues dealing with Panama that perhaps

you want to put on the tape that I haven't asked you

about?

A: Yes . There are two--two big issues that are going to

have to be faced . One of them is whether or not the

canal can be widened . There are certain stretches of the

canal that are constrained now, . primarily the Culebra

Cut where only one ship can go through at a time . That

widening will cost several hundred million dollars . The

other issue is that the treaty required a study to be

made before the year 2000 on whether or not it was

feasible to build a sea-level canal . And that is going

° to be a controversial and complex issue and a difficult

one . The State Department is heading a task force to

look at that problem . The Corps has a member on that

task force . He attends every meeting on this subject .

They are developing the study plan right now. One of the

things the task force is coming up with, in addition to

studying the sea-level canal, is to look at other

alternatives, like adding other locks or enlarging the

present system .

Those are going to be two issues that will be in the

forefront in the years immediately ahead, in addition, of

course, to the continuing problems that the canal has in

terms of its operation and maintenance .

Q : Well, generally speaking, what kind of problems are you

talking about?

10 5
A : Well, those are the problems of a system more than

seventy years old--keeping it operating. The problems of

setting adequate tolls to make certain the canal

operation is self-supporting .

Q :

Another argument before the Congress now is on accident

claims ; how claims to accidents are to be handled . The

treaty provided that the claims on accidents outside the

locks be handled differently than those inside the locks .

P.L . 96-70, which implemented the treaty, provided that

the Congress had to approve damage claims over $120,000

outside the locks . The Congress has received about a

dozen of those claims in the last few years, and it

hasn't been able to act on them . This inaction presents

a difficult situation .

Another problem is the desire by some of the South

American countries to keep the tolls at a very low rate

and to give themselves some sort of , :a priority, because

they say they have a vested interest in the canal and

should be accorded special treatment . There is also

agitation to make the Canal Commission operate

independently as a corporate entity rather than being an

appropriated U .S . federal fund agency . At present we

have to secure approval of the Congress on

appropriations, yet we have to operate within the tolls

we collect .

You also have the continuing problem that the Panamanians

don't recognize Public Law 96-70, which is the

implementation law passed by the Congress following the

treaty . These are just some of the problems .

When was the last time tolls were raised?

A : We raised them a year ago in March . About a year and a

half ago .

Do you have any idea how many times the tolls have been

raised since . . . ?

A : Not very many times . In fact, I think this was about the

third toll increase . There was an increase when the

treaty was passed, because with the advent of the treaty

we are now paying Panama around $75 million a year,

whereas before they were paid only one or two million

dollars . So there had to be a big increase at the time

the treaty was signed ; but the one last year was the

first one since that time .

We don't believe we are going to have to raise tolls

10 6
again next year so long as the traffic goes up . One of

the things that happened to adversely affect the tolls

was that the Panamanians in 1982 built a trans-isthmus

oil pipeline, which eliminated about six ships a day that

formerly transited the canal . That drop in traffic was a

big drop in revenue for us . That is one of the reasons we

had to raise tolls last year . Those big supertankers

that came down from Alaska pumped oil across the isthmus

in a pipeline instead of using ships. In addition, ocean

traffic was generally down everywhere in the world .

Overall, I believe it makes sense to have the commission

as part of the ASA's civil works activities, because

there are interfaces with the Corps . It is an

engineering job . The Corps did supervise the completion

of the canal ; and if any substantial new work is going to

be carried on there, 'I would expect the Corps to have a

major role in that .

Q : Let's turn our attention to Arlington Cemetery for a

moment . Any particular problems associated with

Arlington?

A : Yes . Arlington has a number of unique problems, and

that's one area in my Washington assignment where I

probably accomplished the most . I was able to get a

commitment out of OMB to build a visitor facility at

Arlington, which is very badly needed . In the budget

that we worked out with OMB this year, $700,000 has been

allocated for design ; and OMB is committed in the next

two years to provide $15-$20 million to complete the

visitor facility . So I am very, very pleased about that .

The other thing that we accomplished was the interment of

a Vietnam unknown . I am pleased now that our efforts

culminated in the interment of a Vietnam unknown, so that

he could be honored as well as the unknowns from World

Wars I and II and the Korean conflict . I feel good about

having a major role in each one of those efforts .

There are other continual problems with Arlington

Cemetery . For example, there is the matter of

qualification for burial . Extremely sensitive . The law

provides that certain criteria have to be met before you

are eligible to be buried there, and there are provisions

for exceptions to those rules . Decisions on exceptions

have to be made by the Secretary of the Army or by the

President . The requests are extremely sensitive

sometimes because they may be from important political

figures or other prominent Americans .

We have been able to administer that program and make

recommendations both to the Secretary and to the

10 7
President on interment with a minimum of conflict . I

believe we have kept it the way it was originally

intended--as a shrine for those war dead who served their

country .

I would just like to ask you a couple of questions in

closing . Were you always a Republican?

A : No . I've not always been a Republican . In fact, I was

appointed by the then Governor Reagan in California when

I was a registered Democrat . I was one of his first

appointees and was his first appointee as a registered

Democrat . I had not been active in politics, but I was

registered as a Democrat at that time . I have since

changed but did not do so until I left the Reagan

administration in California, because I didn't want to be

accused of changing my registration in order to court his

favor . So I stayed a Democrat until I resigned as

Director of Water Resources . Then I changed to a

Republican about 11 years ago and have been one ever

since .

Q : Would you--to what extent would you think of yourself as

a political animal?

A : I really never have thought of myself as a political

animal but rather as a professional engineer . That's

partly responsible for the way I approached some of the

problems that I believed the Corps had . I guess I wanted

the Corps to be nonpolitical, and I wanted to have the

Corps do things which were nonpolitical and based on

merit . In retrospect, I guess that's a little naive .

But I still harbor the desire to see the Corps have to

react to political pressure as an exception rather than

the rule .

I am told that I got much more involved with what the

Corps was doing during my term than any of the other

Assistant Secretaries have since the office was created,

and I guess that reflects on the fact that I feel I am

more of a professional than I am a political person .

You might recall the last time I talked to you ; we had

this little dialogue at one point in which you were

talking about the Board of Engineers for Rivers and

Harbors and about their being more responsive to some of

the administrative positions than they have been . And I

said something to the effect, "Isn't that bad, though,

injecting political questions into an independent review

process?" And you said, well, you just thought that was

good management . And so the question is, do you think

that the Republican philosophy, at least as articulated

10 8
by Ronald Reagan and by the people whom Reagan has

appointed, reflects better management?

A : Well, let me say this . When you talk about the Corps'

civil works programs, I view, for example, the last

administration of the Democrats as being more detrimental

to the Corps' civil works programs than our efforts . For

example, President Carter, as I recall, very prominently

made it known that he wasn't enthusiastic about civil

works projects and even had a hit list of federal water

projects .

I have never been able to tell what the rationale was

for developing that hit list, if he had one . We haven't

approached the problems that way . The President believes

there is a role for the federal government, say, in water

resource development . And there is certainly a role for

the Corps in the federal government . But that role has

got to be an appropriate one . So I guess what we were

trying to do was to build a base which would allow good

Corps civil works projects in the future to go ahead

unencumbered by the political pressure that I think has

existed in the past . That was my goal, at least, because

I could see from my exposure that the Corps was being

required to do some things that didn't make much sense in

terms of project feasibility or needed projects .

So I guess I had hoped to develop a system that would be

more meritorious and more nonpolitical, which would allow

projects to go ahead when they had merit, and which would

provide funding other than solely from the federal

government .

I have viewed what this administration has been trying to

do as being more for good water projects but changing

the way in which they were authorized and funded . We

didn't have any kind of a , hit list . But what we did try

to say was, "Let's have the good projects go ahead and

provide more of a system whereby meritorious works could

proceed whether they were sponsored by an influential

member of Congress or not ." Hopefully, it would remove

connotations of pork barrel . At the same time, the

credibility of the Corps' programs, both within the

government and more importantly with the taxpayers

themselves, would be enhanced .

Q : Well, in closing then, let me give you the opportunity to

make any other comments or observations you wanted to

make that maybe I haven't elicited from you at this

point .

A: No . The only point I want to leave, though, is that I

10 9
had a very high regard for the Corps when I came into the

job, from`my past exposures and from being a World War II

Corps officer . I still have that high regard for the

Corps . I think maybe many of your questions tended to

focus on the negative and to create the impression that I

am not a Corps supporter .

I guess my hope is or was to have the Corps operate in

what I believe would be a highly professional manner,

which would enhance its reputation throughout the nation

as the government's engineer . So I hope that, in

retrospect, anybody who views my time in Washington will

see it as one in which I tried to make some changes but

with the hope and expectation of enhancing the Corps as

an entity, rather than tearing it down . I had no desire

and still have no desire to dismantle the Corps . That is

the furthest thing from my mind . But what I did have in

mind was to try to make it operate in a way that I felt

was more responsible and which would add to its credit in

the future . If anything, I hope people can look back on

some of the things that I tried to do as forerunners of

the future and as attempts to move the Corps in that

direction .

Q : Mr . Gianelli, your answer leads me to another question .

And let me just make one observation before I ask you the

question .

As you must know, or realize, the relationship between

you and the Corps was not always smooth . There were

times that the Corps, I suppose I can speak generically,

was somewhat suspicious of your motives . At least

reluctant sometimes to implement your decisions . And so

the question is, now looking back, is there anything you

think you could have done to smooth the relationship with

the Corps : something that may have gotten what you wanted

done quicker, but might not have ruffled the feathers of

some of the people in the Corps as it did?

A : There is one thing that I did feel bad about and that was

that I wasn't able to spend more time with the Districts

in the field . I really felt that some of the things we

were trying to do didn't get down to the District level

in the way that I intended . I think it would have

helped to have more sessions at the District level with

District staff so that there was a chance for dialogue

back and forth . I think that would have been more

helpful . Unfortunately, there are only so many hours in

the day . In retrospect, I would have tried, somehow or

other, to reprogram myself and let some other things go

at the Washington level in order to spend more time in

the field, particularly with the Districts, because
that's where the people meet the public . And while OCE

is important in terms of the scheme of things, as are the

Divisions, the District Engineers are the fellows who are really on the firing line ; and I think it would have been helpful to spend more time with them .

The + other thing that I wanted to do, and I just got

started at the end, was to make arrangements for

communicating with the field directly . I found that if there was a particular subject of interest, I could bring

in somebody who was an expert in that area and tape an

informal dialogue for immediate distribution to the field . The feedback from those tapes was helpful in knowing how well our messages were getting down to the District level . I used this technique quite successfully

in California . I did that once with the Corps, and it

was in connection with a presentation I made to the

Congress on regulatory reform . I don't know whether you

ever saw it or not, but we found out that it had been taped by one of the public education TV channels . So we got the tape, and I spoke at the beginning and at the end

of the tape to put it in perspective, and we sent it to

the field . I got some very favorable responses .

Q : How about OCE? Is there anything that you think you

could have or would have done differently?

A : I don't know whether there was anything more with respect

to OCE specifically . There might have been some more

informal sessions with key personnel on various subjects,

again, to provide me with their input as well as to keep

them better informed on what I was trying to do . In

other words, more of a two-way dialogue . I always felt

more resistance to change at the OCE level than at the

District level .

Q : How much were you involved in the reorganization of OCE?

A : Practically not at all . It was submitted to me, and I

asked General Bratton to hold it up for a while--which he

did--because, you may recall, it came about at the time

we were having a new Director of Civil Works . I asked the

general to hold it up until we had a new director on

board, which he did . The reorganization was his idea . We

finally signed off on the arrangement, although I still

have some mixed feelings about whether it was good or

not . However, the Chief was anxious to bring it about ;

so when we were able to get the new Director of Civil

Works aboard and he could feel comfortable with it, we

approved implementation . But it was at the Chief's

initiation .
Q : Why would you have to sign off on something like that? I

mean, it is an internal Corps reorganization .

A : Well, the problem was, it changed some of the

relationships that ASA had with the Corps' top people . I

think the Chief did it probably as a matter of courtesy,

and I think if he hadn't done it, it might have created

some problems . I think in anything that affects the

interrelationship of the office, it's good, certainly

good management, to run it by the office of ASA, whether

it is required or not .

Q : Okay, well, thank you very much for your time .

A : Well, I am delighted .
INDEX

Abdnor, James, 40-42

AE&D work, 96-97

Agriculture, Department of, 29

American Society of Civil Engineers, 63

Arlington Cemetery, 9, 100-101, 107

Army, Assistant Secretary of the, Civil Works, 1, 3-13, 17,

20, 28-30, 41, 60, 63, 65, 71-73, 75, 83, 85-86, 90-91,

99-104, 107-108, 112

Army, Department of the, 7, 8, 29 . See also Army, Secretary of the

Army, Secretary of the, 5-9, 29, 71, 107

Army Chief of Staff, 8

Army Engineer Construction troops, 2, 91

Army Policy Council, 8

Arnett, Ray, 24, 31

Atchafalaya (Louisiana), 43

Avoca Island, 44-45

Baltimore Sun , 31-32

Benefit-cost ratio, 15, 18-19, 23, 34, 42, 46, 55-56, 82

Bevill, Tom, 39-41

Blumenfeld, Michael, 4

Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, 56-57, 73-75, 108

Bonneville (Oregon), 41

Bratton, J . R ., 65, 94, 111

Brown, Janet, 38

Bureau of Reclamation, 6-7, 10, 53, 68, 87, 98

Cabinet-Council (on Natural Resources and Environment), 5-6,

55, 100

California, 1-2, 7, 10, 24, 27, 62-63, 65, 97, 99, 100, 103,

108, 111

California State Water Project, 1

Canal Zone, Governor of, 103

Carter, Jimmy (administration), 93, 109

Chesapeake, Virginia, 26

Chief of Engineers (OCE), 29, 30, 44-45, 49, 56-58, 65-66,

71-75, 83-84, 89-90, 97, 111-112

Citizens Task Force, 96

Civil Service, 69-71

Clark, William, 45, 100

Clean Water Act, 31-32

Cluff, Don, 10, 21-22

Columbia River, 50, 58, 62, 90

Commerce, Department of, 28-29

Congress, U .S ., 1, 3-4, 9, 11-13, 15-18, 26-28, 31-33, 39-42,

44-47, 50, 57, 60, 75-76, 78, 81-83, 85-86, 99, 101, 106

Cost estimates, Corps, 87-89

Cost sharing, 5, 6, 11, 16-23, 27, 38-40, 42, 70, 75, 78,

82-84, 99-100
Council on Environmental Quality, 37

Council on Water Resources, President's, 5

Cowlitz (Washington), 86

Crabill, Donald, 10

Culebra Cut (Panama), 105

Dawson, Bob, 36

Deep port dredging, 20-21, 75

Defense, Department of, 8, 96 . See also Defense, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of, 5, 9, 10, 102, 103-104

Department of Natural Resources, 92

Department of Public Works (Louisiana), 43

Department of Water Resources (California), 7, 65

Director of Civil Works, 111

Director of Fish and Game (California), 24

Director of Water Resources (California), 7, 24, 108

. District Engineer, role of, 72-73, 110-111

Eiland, Robert, 27, 84

Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the'

Committee on Government Operations,, 42

Environmental Advisory Board, 65-66

Environmental Defense Fund, 38

Environmental impact statements, 36-37

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 25-26, 28, 3-2-33, 35,

66, 92-93

Executive Order 12291, 34

Feasibility reports, 14-16, 18, 79-83

Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S ., 24-25, 26, 30, 32-33, 36, 43,

45, 48, 66-68

Forest Service, 29

404 program. See Section 404 program

Grace, Peter, 96

Grace Commission, 96-99

Great Lakes, 61

Green Valley (Washington), 51

Greenwood, John, 16

Habitat Evaluation Procedures (HEP), 24

Hatfield, Mark, 41-42

Honolulu, Hawaii, 91

House Appropriations Committee, 40

Hydropower, 61-62

Institute for Water Resources, 60

Interior, Department of the, 5-7, 28-29, 45, 47-48, 99

Interior, Secretary of the, 6, 7, 45, 99-100

Jordan, William, 104

Khedouri, Frederick, 10
Marsh, John 0 ., Jr ., 8

Minimum dredge fleet, 60-61

Mississippi River (basin), 58-59

Mississippi River Commission (MRC), 56, 58-59

Mitigation, 23-24, 57, 66-69

Mobilization, 91-92, 98

Moffitt, Toby, 42-43

Montana Power Company, 63

Morgan City (Louisiana), 44

Morrison Knudsen, 97

Moss, Frank E ., 92

Mount St . Helens (Washington), 12, 41, 50=51, 86-87, 89, 98

Moynihan, Patrick, 42

National Academy of Sciences, 53-54, 87

National Marine Fisheries, 33

National Resources Defense Council, 38

National Waterways Study, 60

National Wildlife Federation, 38

NED (net national economic development.), 21, 23, 27, 55, 76

New Orleans, 59

New starts, 27-28, 39, 41

NOAA, 25, 32

Nonstructural solutions, 16, 55

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 10-11, 21=22, 23,

27-28, 47, 51, 56-57, 66, 69, 75, 90-91, 94, 107

Oregon Inlet (North Carolina), 46-47

Oroville Dam (California), 62

Pacific Theater of operations, 2

Panama Canal, 9, 100-107

Panama Canal Commission, 8-9, 101-104, 106

Panama Canal Company, 103

Pearl Harbor, 91

Pebble Beach (California), 100

Regulatory reforms, 1, 25-26, 28, 31-36, 39, 94-95, 111

Roe, Bob, 39-41

Santa Ana River Flood Control Project, 76

Section 404 program, 1, 25-26, 28-29, 31-36, 39, 49

Shreveport (Louisiana), 46

Pennsylvania Building, 101

Perkins, Carl, 48-49

Planning process, Corps, 13-16, 56, 71, 78-79, 81-82, 84-87

Policy Subcommittee, 40

Public Law 96-70, 106

Reagan, Ronald, 4, 7-8, 10, 34, 41, 50, 93, 96, 108-109

Recreation projects, 21-22, 39-40, 56-57, 73-74

Red River Project, 46

Rees, Morgan, 36
Sierra Club, 38

Soil Conservation Service, 10, 28-29, 98-99

Southern Command, 8, 102

Spirit Lake (Washington), 50-51

Stafford, Robert, 40-41

State, Department of, 105

Stennis, John, 41

Stockman, David, 10

Superfund, 92-94

Task Force on Regulatory Reform, 28

Tennessee-Tombigbee Project, 39-41

Transportation, Department of, 21

Treen, David, 43, 45

Tug Fork Project (West Virginia), 52-53

TVA, 98

USGS, 50

Vietnam unknown, 9, 107

Virginia, 34

Water programs, 1-6, 8, 10-12, 14

Water Quality Commission (Virginia), 34

Water Resources Branch (OMB), 10, 21

Water Resources Council, 55

Watt James, 5, 100

Weinberger, Caspar, 102

Westway Project (New York), 38, 49

Wetlands protection, 31-32

Whitten, Jamie, 39-40

World War 11, 2, 91, 92, 110

Yatesville (Kentucky), 48

Yazoo Basin (Mississippi), 40

*U.S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1985 529 166