FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:	ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

JAMES BOPP, JR.	Counsel for Governor

BARRY A. BOSTROM	JEFFREY A. MODISETT

Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom	Attorney General of Indiana

Terre Haute, Indiana

			A. SCOTT CHINN

DORIS ANNE SADLER	GEOFFREY SLAUGHTER

Legal Counsel	Special Counsels to the Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana	Indianapolis, Indiana		

			Counsel for Unity Team

			BARRY A. MACEY

			Macey, Macey and Swanson

			Indianapolis, Indiana

			Counsel for AFSCME

			MARY JANE LAPOINTE

			RICHARD J. DARKO

			Lowe Gray Steele & Darko, LLP

			Indianapolis, Indiana

	IN THE

	COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CONNIE NASS, AUDITOR OF THE STATE	)

OF INDIANA,	)

			)

	Appellant-Defendant,	)

			)

		vs.	)

			)

STATE ex rel. UNITY TEAM, LOCAL 9212,	)

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED	)

AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND	)      No. 49A04-9901-CV-34

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS	)

OF AMERICA (UAW) and AMERICAN	)

FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFT), and,	)

pursuant to Trial Rule 19, FRANK O'BANNON,	)

GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF INDIANA,	)

and as intervening Relator, AMERICAN	)

FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND	)

MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 62 	)

(AFSCME),		)

			)

	Appellee-Relators.	)

	APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

	Civil Division, Room No. 11

	The Honorable John L. Price, Judge

	Cause No.  49D11-9805-CP-675

	October 12, 1999

	OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

RUCKER, Judge

Case Summary

	This is an appeal by the Auditor of the State of Indiana challenging the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment arising out of a complaint for mandamus.  On petition by

several unions and the Governor of the State of Indiana, the trial court mandated the Auditor

to honor certain voluntary wage assignments for the deduction of fair share payments from

the paychecks of non-union member State employees.  The wage assignments were an 

outgrowth of labor settlement agreements negotiated between executive branch department

heads and several unions.  The agreements were approved by the Governor.  In addition to

the order of mandate the trial court also declared that the fair share provision contained in

the settlement agreements was legal and enforceable.  The Auditor raises several issues for

our review.  We address the following dispositive issues rephrased as:  (1) did the Governor

have the authority to approve the settlement agreements without specific enabling legislation; (2) did the trial court err in declaring legal and enforceable the fair share provision contained

in the settlement agreements; and (3) were the voluntary wage assignments authorized by

statute.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts and Procedural History

	In 1990 then Governor Evan Bayh issued Executive Order 90-6 which laid the

groundwork for executive branch State employees to join labor unions.  In issuing the Order

the Governor acknowledged that he could not institute meaningful and responsible collective

bargaining by executive order.  However, according to the Governor he did have the

authority to lay the foundation for collective bargaining by providing for elections of

employee representatives.  Accordingly, Executive Order 90-6 created a procedure for the

recognition of an employee organization as the exclusive negotiating organization for

members of an appropriate unit.  Among other things, the Order provided that the negotiating

organization was entitled to meet and negotiate with the State Personnel Director on matters

of wages, hours, and working conditions in an effort to reach a settlement subject to the

Governor's approval.  In addition, the Order required the negotiating organization to

represent all employees of the bargaining unit regardless of whether the employee was a

member of the organization. 

	Pursuant to Executive Order 90-6 employees in various units chose representation by

either the "Unity Team"1 or the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) (referred to collectively as "the Unions").  Thereafter the Unions proceeded to negotiate with the State Personnel Director and other executive branch

department heads extensive and detailed labor agreements which the parties refer to as

"Settlements."  The Settlements covered wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of

employment.  They applied to union and non-union members alike.  In 1994, the Settlements

were approved by Governor Bayh through Executive Orders 94-1 and 94-2.  Those

Settlements expired by their terms at midnight June 30, 1997.  Thereafter the Settlements

were renegotiated and on October 1, 1997, were approved by present Governor Frank

O'Bannon through Executive Order 97-33.  Among other things the Settlements contain what

is commonly referred to as a "fair share" provision.2  In relevant part the provision dictates:  	[a]ll employees hired after October 1, 1997 must begin paying to the Union,

on January 1, 1998, their fair share of the costs of providing Union

representation, in an amount not exceeding eighty-five percent (85%) of the

dues required to be paid by employees who are members of the Union.  The

amounts required of nonmembers shall not include fees, charges, and

assessments involving political contributions.  Employees required to pay fair

share may make such payments by paycheck withholding. . . .  All monies collected by the Union pursuant to this provision must be held in escrow until

it is determined by a court of general jurisdiction that this fair share provision

is lawful.

R. at 44, 102-03 (emphasis added).  In October 1997, the Unions began submitting to the

Auditor authorization forms referred to as wage assignments.  The forms were signed by

State employees requesting that their fair share assessment be withheld from their wages.

However, in April 1998, Morris Wooden, the State Auditor at the time, began printing the

following notation on the pay stubs of State employees:  “THE AUDITOR OF STATE WILL NOT HONOR A UNION FAIR SHARE DEDUCTION.  IF YOU HAVE AN ERRONEOUS

FAIR SHARE DEDUCTION, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR PAYROLL CLERK TO HAVE

THE DEDUCTION STOPPED.”  R. at 23.  The Auditor thus refused to honor the wage

assignments.  This policy has continued under Connie Nass, the current State Auditor. 

	Joining the Governor as a necessary party under Ind. Trial Rule 19, on May 8, 1998,

the Unions filed a complaint for mandate seeking to compel the Auditor to process the wage

assignments.  The Unions also sought damages on its mandate action.  In addition, the

Unions  filed a request for declaratory judgment asking the court to declare that the fair share

provision in the Settlements was lawful and thus entitled to enforcement.  Thereafter the

Unions filed a motion for partial summary judgment reserving only the issue of damages. 

The Auditor filed a cross motion for summary judgment.  After a hearing, the trial court

granted the Unions' motion and entered judgment mandating the Auditor to process voluntary

wage assignments from State employees who are subject to the Settlements.  The trial court

also declared that the fair share provision contained in the Settlements is legal and

enforceable.  This appeal followed.

Discussion

I.  Resolving this Case on its Merits

	We first address a procedural issue.  This appeal is prosecuted as one of right based

on Ind. Appellate Rule 4(B)(1).3  The Auditor relies upon this provision because the issue of damages has not yet been resolved.  As a result, the judgment before us is not final and may

be pursued only as an interlocutory appeal.  Troyer v. Troyer, 686 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (When less than all of the parties' claims, rights, and liabilities have been

adjudicated, then the order or judgment is interlocutory.).  The authority to pursue an

interlocutory appeal before this court is controlled by Ind. Appellate Rule 4(B).  Only Rules 

4(B)(6) and (4)(B)(1) are potentially applicable here.  Rule (4)(B)(6) requires trial court

certification.  The Auditor did not seek certification and accordingly the trial court did not

enter an order of certification.  Thus, unless Rule 4(B)(1) applies to the facts of this case,

then this appeal is not properly before us.

	Matters that are appealable as of right under App. Rule 4(B)(1) involve trial court

orders which carry financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in

final judgments such as payment of money, delivery of securities and so on.  Cua v. Morrison, 600 N.E.2d 951, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).  However, our research reveals no Indiana authority where this proposition has been explored in the context of a party having

no legal or pecuniary interest in the money ordered to be paid.  In this case, the Auditor

concedes that she has "no ultimate interest in whether the employees receive these funds as

salary, or whether, on proper wage assignments, they are distributed to the Relator Unions

in order to satisfy the employee's obligation to pay fair share."  Reply Brief of Appellant at

3.  Absent such interest we are reluctant to declare that a party may avail itself of App. R.

4(B)(1).  However we need not explore that issue today.  Even if the Auditor's appeal is not

properly before us, we have “declined to dismiss improperly brought appeals and retained

jurisdiction of the appeal under [Ind. Appellate Rule] 4(E) in cases of a significant public interest and where the same issue would be raised in a new appeal.”  Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stinnett, 698 N.E.2d 339, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  This is a case of significant public interest the merits of which would again be raised in a subsequent appeal. Accordingly

we exercise our discretion to decide this case on its merits.

II.  The Governor's Authority

	The Auditor contends the Governor lacked authority to enter into Settlements with the

Unions, and thus the fair share provision incorporated into the Settlements are invalid as a

matter of law.  More specifically the Auditor contends "the Governor is without authority to

engage in collective bargaining without an enabling statute."  Brief of Appellant at 27.  In

support of her argument the Auditor cites Rice, Auditor of State v. State ex rel. Drapier, 95 Ind. 33, 44 (1884) in which the court held:

[S]ince a State can not be sued in its own courts without its own legally

expressed consent, the remedy by mandamus is not to be extended so as to

become in effect a process against the State for the establishment of demands

of an unliquidated nature, which properly fall within the cognizance of the

Legislature.

The Auditor interprets this quote as standing for the proposition that the Legislature must 

authorize the Governor to enter Settlements with the Unions.  The argument continues that

because no such authorization was given, the Governor acted without authority, and the

resulting contracts are unenforceable against the State in general and the Auditor specifically.

	Neither the quoted language nor the case itself stands for the proposition the Auditor

advances.  Rice involved an order of mandate directing the State Auditor to pay a claim owed to William Drapier who had been employed by the Indiana Senate and House of

Representatives to report the debates, votes, and proceedings.  Responding to Drapier's invoice for services the Senate passed a resolution ordering the Auditor of State to draw a

warrant in Drapier's favor.  Examining applicable statutes for the payment of claims against

the State, the court noted "[a]fter all that has been said, a single proposition may seemingly

be accepted as decisive of this cause, and that is, can a simple resolution of the Senate be

made to amend, modify or vary the operation of a regularly enacted statute?"  Id. at 47.  The court answered the question in the negative and concluded the trial court erred in issuing the

writ of mandate.  Here, contrary to the Auditor's contention, Rice has no bearing on the facts of this case.  And other than Rice, the Auditor cites no authority to support herits contention that the Governor is without authority to engage in collective bargaining without specific 

enabling legislation. 

	As a technical point we first observe there is nothing in the record before us

demonstrating that the Governor engaged in collective bargaining.  The record shows the

labor settlement agreements were negotiated by executive branch department heads and

thereafter approved by the Governor.  On this record the Governor's involvement was

restricted to issuing an executive order that provided a framework by which collective

bargaining could take place.  Thus, the subsequent collective bargaining occurred not

between the Governor and the Unions, but rather between executive branch department heads

and the Unions.  It is true, executive branch personnel act at the Governor's behest, and in

that sense it may be argued the Governor engaged in collective bargaining at least by proxy. 

Indeed it is through executive branch personnel that the State's chief executive ensures that

the business of the State is properly transacted.  In any event, whether characterized as the

Governor engaging in collective bargaining or approving a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by executive branch personnel, the critical inquiry in this case is whether the

Governor possessed the authority to issue an executive order which set into motion the

bargaining that ultimately took place. 

	In general an executive order is a command or direction issued by the "President of

the United States or the chief executive officer of a State that has the force of law and that

is promulgated in accordance with applicable law."  42 U.S.C. § 14616 (defining an

executive order in the context of public health and welfare).  An executive order must fall

within the authority granted to the Governor by the constitution or statutory provision.  81A

C.J.S. § States 130 (1977).  The question presented is whether the executive order at issue in this case either implemented or gave administrative effect to a provision of Indiana's

Constitution or a statutory enactment.

	 As with most other jurisdictions, in Indiana the executive power of the state is vested

in the Governor.  Ind. Const. art. 5, § 1.  In turn, executive power is the "power to execute

the laws, to carry them into effect as distinguished from the power to make the laws and the

power to judge them."  Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 670, 35 N.E.2d 270, 291 (1941).  Although it is intuitive, by express legislation the Governor has the responsibility of ensuring

the efficient operation of the executive branch of government.  Ind. Code § 4-3-6-3 provides

in part that the Governor shall re-examine from time to time the organization of all agencies

of State government and determine what changes are necessary to accomplish various

purposes including "to promote the better execution of the laws, the more effective

management of the executive and administrative branch of the government and of its

agencies and functions, and expeditious administration of the public business."  In turn, the Governor's authority to regulate the terms and conditions of employment for executive

branch employees is inherent in a number of statutes.  See, e.g., Ind. Code § 4-15-2-11 (pay plan for State employees recommended by the director of State personnel, approved by the

State Budget Agency, and accepted by the Governor); Ind. Code § 5-10.1-2.5-2 (giving

Governor authority to establish a sick pay plan for state employees); Ind. Code § 5-10-6-1

(hourly State employees may be granted vacation pay and paid holidays by executive order

of the Governor).  We conclude that the executive order in this case is a reasonable exercise

of the Governor's responsibility for the efficient operations of the executive branch of

government.  The order was within the broad authority granted the Governor by article 5,

section 1 of the Indiana Constitution and gave effect to various statutory enactments.  In turn,

the Settlements, which are an outgrowth of the order, gave effect to the order itself.  Contrary

to the Auditor's contention no further legislation is required.  We find support for this

conclusion in the case of Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 94 S. Ct. 2770, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1974).  In the context of a  Presidential executive order establishing a labor-management relations system for federal

employees, the Supreme Court observed "Executive Order [11,491] is plainly a reasonable

exercise of the President's responsibility for the efficient operation of the Executive Branch." 

418 U.S. at 274 n.5, 94 S.Ct. at 2776 n.5 (concerning an order giving federal employees "the

right, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, join, and assist a labor

organization or to refrain from any such activity, and each employee shall be protected in the

exercise of this right."). 

III.  The Legality of the Fair Share Provision

	Our conclusion notwithstanding, the question remains whether the fair share provision

contained in the Settlement is legal and enforceable.  Under the express terms of the

provision all fair share fees collected from non-union members will be held in escrow "until

it is determined by a court of general jurisdiction that this fair share provision is lawful."  R.

at 44, 102.  In addition to their complaint for mandate, the Unions also sought declaratory

judgment on this issue.  Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court declared

the fair share provision lawful and enforceable. 

	Our standard of reviewing the grant of summary judgment is well-settled: whether

there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.  Landmark Health Care Assocs., L.P. v. Bradbury, 671 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ind. 1996).  Summary judgment should be granted only if the evidence sanctioned by Ind.

Trial Rule 56(C) shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  The burden is on the moving party to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact and he deserves judgment as a mater of law. 

Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 681 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).  In this case, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Although findings aid appellate

review, they are not binding on this court.  Id. at 222-23.  Rather, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.  We will not reweigh the evidence but will consider the facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.  Id.  We may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any theory or basis found in the material designated to the trial court.  T.R. 56(C); Estate of Miller v. City of Hammond, 691 N.E.2d 1310, 1311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.     	The power of the trial court to render declaratory relief is set forth in the Uniform

Declaratory Judgment Act, Ind. Code § 34-4-10-1, et seq. (the "UDJA").  In order to obtain declaratory relief, the person bringing the action must have a substantial present interest in

the relief sought.  Town of Munster v. Hluska, 646 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 

By the same token there must be someone having a real interest in the relief sought who may

oppose the declaration.  Opposition to a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief must come from

a source legally competent to jeopardize the plaintiff's rights.  Stated differently "[t]he basis

of jurisdiction under the UDJA is 'a justiciable controversy or question, which is clearly

defined and affects the legal right, the legal statuses, or the legal relationships of the parties having adverse legal interests.'"  Indiana Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., Inc. v. State ex. rel. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 662 N.E.2d 950, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting  Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Deets, 133 Ind. App. 444, 449-50, 179 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962) (emphasis added), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 695 N.E.2d 99, 103 (1998).

	In the case before us, the Auditor, the person named as the opponent to the Unions'

complaint for declaratory relief, has no real interest adverse or otherwise in whether the fair

share provision is legal.4  Indeed the legality of the provision itself has no bearing on the critical issue here, namely: whether the Auditor is bound to honor voluntary wage

assignments.  Rather, the persons whose interests are directly affected by a declaration that

the fair provision is legal are the non-union members from whose wages fair share fees are being deducted.  Non-union members have not been joined as parties to this action.5  The importance of parties with adverse interests appearing on either side of an action for

declaratory judgment seeking to declare the legality of a fair share provision cannot be

overstated.  For example, fair share provisions in general are valid in this jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Goetz, 443 N.E.2d 364, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing fair share agreements help ameliorate the problem of "free riders," that is, those

workers who are not members of a union yet reap the benefits of union representation).

However, not all fair share provisions are created equal.  See, e.g., Anderson v. East Allen Educ. Assoc., 683 N.E.2d 1355, 1357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a fair share provision violated the First Amendment because it set a fee without establishing a method

to ensure funds would not be used for activities unrelated to collective bargaining; and that

setting the fair share fee at the amount of full union dues presumptively charged nonmembers

for political and ideological activities); Ford v. Madison-Grant Teachers Ass'n, 675 N.E.2d 734, (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a procedure must be in place which ensures that fair

share funds collected from non-union members will not be used, even temporarily, for

ideological activities); Albro v. Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n, 585 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), adopted on transfer, 594 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. 1992), reh'g denied (holding that the IEA failed to sustain its burden of affirmatively proving the ratio of its chargeable expenses to nonchargeable expenses in establishing a fair share percentage by demonstrating a

methodology which simply proves nonchargeable expenses).

	Among other things, a union carries the burden of showing that it has used the

appropriate methodology in setting a fair share fee.  Flosenzier v. John Glenn Education Ass'n, 656 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).  For example, a union carries the burden of demonstrating the amount of the fair share fee, and it does so by establishing the ratio of

chargeable expenses to total expenses.  Once established, the ratio, expressed as a

percentage, is multiplied by the amount of a union member's dues to determine a non-union

member's fair share fee.  Id.  In the case before us, the Settlements provide in part that the amount of a non-union members fair share fee will not exceed 85% of the dues paid by

Union members and that the amounts required of non-union members shall not include fees,

charges, and assessments involving political contributions.  R. at 44, 102.  However, nothing

in the record shows that the fees will not be used for ideological activities.  See Albro, 585 N.E.2d at 670.  And nothing in the record shows how the Unions arrived at the 85% figure. See Flosenzier, 656 N.E.2d at 869.  In the context of their motion for summary judgment, the Unions have not demonstrated they are entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law.

More importantly for our purposes here, lacking any interest in the fair share fees or how

they may have been calculated, the Auditor did not challenge the Unions' Rule 56 materials

on this point or attempt to put the Unions to their proof.  In essence, the Unions and the

Auditor did not have sufficient adverse legal interests regarding the fair share provision.

Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Unions declaring the fair share provision legal and enforceable.  On this issue the judgment of the

trial court is reversed.                   

IV.  Voluntary Wage Assignments and Statutory Authorization 

	The Auditor argues she has no legal duty to honor the wage assignments in this case

because they are not authorized under Ind. Code § 22-2-6-2.  Thus, the argument continues,

the wage assignments are not valid and the order of mandate is erroneous.  An action for

mandate is an extraordinary remedy of an equitable nature which is generally viewed with

disfavor.  State ex rel. Woodford v. Marion Superior Court, 655 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind. 1995).  "Mandamus does not lie unless the petitioner has a clear and unquestioned right to relief and

the respondent has failed to perform a clear, absolute, and imperative duty imposed by law." 

Yater v. Hancock County Bd. of Health, 677 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), reh'g denied.  A judgment granting a party's request for mandate will be reversed only when the evidence reveals no conflict and points unerringly to the opposite conclusion.  Id.  "An action for mandate may be prosecuted against any inferior tribunal corporation, public or corporate

officer, or person to compel the performance of any:  (1) act that the law specifically

requires; or (2) duty resulting from any office, trust, or station."  Ind. Code § 34-27-3-1.

	One of the Auditor's statutory duties includes drawing warrants on the treasury of the

state directing her to pay funds out of the treasury to "public officers or for any other object as the warrants become payable."  Ind. Code § 4-7-1-2(8) (emphasis added).  The Auditor

acknowledges the foregoing statute requires her to make certain payments but contends that

at most she can only be required to honor valid wage assignments.  According to the Auditor

those at issue in this case are not valid.  Ind. Code § 22-2-6-2 dictates that a wage assignment is valid provided specific content and formalistic requirements are met and is made to pay

one of eleven listed purposes, including: 

(5) Dues to become owing by the employee to a labor organization of which

the employee is a member.

. . . .					

(9) Payment to any credit union, nonprofit organization, or association of

employees of such employer organized under any law of this state or of the

United States.

Ind. Code § 22-2-6-2 (b).  The Auditor does not challenge the content or formal structure of

the wage assignments here.  By statute the assignments must be in writing, signed by the

employee personally, and are revocable at any time by the employee upon written notice. 

Ind. Code § 22-2-6-2(a).  Rather, the Auditor argues that because section (b)(5) specifically

addresses labor unions and makes an assignment of wages valid only for union member

employees, section (b)(9) cannot be interpreted also to include labor unions which would 

allow an assignment of wages for non-union member employees.  The Auditor insists

"[o]bviously, the legislature decided to deal with unions in section (5), and all other

employee organizations in section (9)."  Brief of Appellant at 21.

	When reviewing a statute our main objective is to ascertain and implement the intent

of the legislature.  State Employees' Appeals Comm'n v. Barclay, 695 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.  To effectuate legislative intent, we read the sections of an act together in order that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the

remainder of the statute.  Murray v. Hamilton County Sheriff's Dep't, 690 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).  We are required to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent

absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience.  In re E.I., 653 N.E.2d 503, 507  (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).  In doing so, this court should consider the objects and purposes of the

statute, as well as the effect and consequences of such an interpretation.  State v. Windy City Fireworks, Inc., 600 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), adopted on transfer 608 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 1993).

	We disagree with the Auditor's reading of the statute.  Although section (b)(5) "deals"

with unions, that does not compel a conclusion that unions are thereby excluded from section

(b)(9).  Among other things, (b)(9) concerns any association of employees "organized under

any law of this state or of the United States."  Id.  There is no question that AFSCME and the Unity Team, although unions, are certainly associations of employees organized pursuant to

federal and state law.  Thus we see no reason why they would not be included within the

ambit of section (b)(9).  Further, section (b)(9) specifically refers to wage assignments for 

"payments" to associations of employees.  By contrast section (b)(5) refers to wage

assignments for "dues."  Fair share fees, which are the subject of the assignments at issue in

this case, are not dues within the meaning of the statute.  See supra note 2.  Rather, they can only be considered "payments" as the term is used in section (b)(9).  In essence our reading

of Ind. Code § 22-2-6-2 leads us to conclude the Legislature intended that an employee may

voluntary assign her wages to an association of employees for the payment of fair share fees. 

Accordingly, assuming the content and formalistic requirements are otherwise satisfied, the

Auditor is bound to honor such wage assignments.6 

Conclusion

	The executive order in this case and the resultant Settlements represent a reasonable

exercise of the Governor's responsibility for the efficient operations of the executive branch

of government.  There is no error on this issue.  Nor did the trial court err in mandating the

Auditor to honor voluntary wage assignments.  However, the trial court did err by granting

summary judgment in favor of the Unions, declaring the fair share provision legal and

enforceable.  Accordingly the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in

part.  Thise cause is remanded for further proceedings.

 	Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

BROOK, J., and BAKER, J., concur.