1 

### IN THE S UPREME COUR T OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE Ju ne 4, 200 8 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE V 

### . P HE D R EK T. D A V IS
App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-D- 2992 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2006- 00198-SC-R11- CD - F iled October 17, 2008

G AR Y R. W ADE , J

. , co n cu rr i n g.
The specific question prese nted for our re view is whethe r the a cquittal-first jury instruction, in t he c on te xt of

the ri g ht t o a c omp le te c ha rg e on the c ount i n th e ind ic tme nt a s w e ll a s any and a ll lesser- included off

enses supported by

the evidenc e at tria l, either is violative of our c onstitut ion or should be overr

uled for policy

rea sons. See Sta t e v
. E l y , 4 8 S.W .3d 710 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Bur ns, 6 S.W .3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). The ma jority conclude s that the instruction meets constitutional
mus te r, and

Iam in c lin e d to c on c ur wi th that a sse ssm e nt; ho we ve r, an a c qu itt a l- fi rs t ins tr uc tio n in Tenne ssee lar g ely

qualifies as le g al fiction bec ause the trial judg e is requir ed under our constitution to instruct o nth e p r im ar y c h ar g e an d

th e f u ll p an o p ly

o f le s s e r - in c lu d e d

o f f e n s e s in a dv an c e of deliberations. That is, the jury , by beingprovided with the e ntirety of the instructions as a

ppropriate , nece ssarily

considers a

ny lesser- included off

enses be fore conveningfor de lib e r a ti o n s

. It i s my

belief, there fore , that as a matter of pr actica lity and for sound policy

rea sons, Tennesse e should retr eat f rom acquittal-f

irst and forma lly

adopt an alternative instruction – one which fits w ithin the framew ork of a c riminal jury

trial and which best confor ms to specific pr ovisions withi n our state c onstitut ion.

No t surp ri sin g ly , o ur

fe de ra l and

state c ourt s a

re no t un ani mous a s to ho w j ur ie s sh ou ld consider the primary

char g e in the indictment and the le ss er -i n cl u d ed off enses. This Court’s majority identifies the acquittal-f

irst a pproac h as the rule of this state, wher eby the jury is instructed not to consider a le sser off ense until it unambiguou s l y ac quits on the gr eate r off ense. See , e.g ., Pe op le v. Boet tch er, 505 N .E .2 d 5 94 , 5 98 (N .Y . 1 98 7) . Ase c on d a pp ro a c h p e rm its the jur

y to consider the primary

char g e and the lesser of fense s simult aneously

but re q u i re s that verdic ts be
rea ched in a

preor dained or der. See , e.g ., Dre snek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), af f’d pe r curiam, 718 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1986) , cer t. denied sub nom. Spiering s v. Alaska, 479 U.S. 1021 (1986). A third approac h permits a def endant to make an ele ction betwee n two options as to the nature of the de libera t i o n s

– eit her ( 1) the a cquittal-first appr oach or (2) a n approa ch“ T h e j u r y i s , ab o v e a ll, a p o lit ic a l i n stitutio n a n d it m u st b e re g a rd e d in this ligh t i n o rd e r to b e d u ly 1
ap p reci at ed

. ” A l exi s d e T o cq uevi l l e, 1 D em o cracy i n A m eri ca 2 8 2 (Alf red A

. K no p f

19 4 5 ) ( 1 8 3 5 ).
2 permitting c onsideration of the g reater c harg e and its lesser included off

enses at the same ti me. See, e.g ., U.S. v. Tsanas, 572 F .2d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1978). I t is my opinion, however , that the method that best fits w ithin our sy stem, best acc ounts for the nature of jur ies, and most likely ensure s the
e c on omy , c on sis te nc y , r e lia bil ity , and th orou g hn e ss o f t he jud ic ia l pr oc e ss, is the “ re a so na ble eff orts” appr oach – the most popular alternative amongcourts that have addre ssed the issue and, in m y v i ew , t h e m o st logica l. See, e.g ., State v. L eB lanc, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (Ar iz. 1996). For a
v ar i et y o f re as o n s , th er ef

o re , I wo u l d

en co ura ge t h e r ej ec t i o no f t h e a cqu i t t al -f i rs tap p ro ac han d

urge thi s Co ur t to da y or at so me tim e in t

he futur e to ad op t the re a so na ble e ff or ts i ns tr uc tio n – no t on ly the pre vailing r

ule amongthe cour

ts that have a ddresse d the issue – but the rule that strikes perf ect harmony with Article I , section 6 of the T ennesse e Constituti on.
Th e Ar izon a

Sup re me Court

de sc ri be d th e re a so na

ble e ff or ts a pp ro a c h a s f

oll ow s:
Under this method, jurors may

rende r a ve rdict on a lesser- included offe nse if, af ter full and ca

ref ul consideration of the evidenc e, they are [first] unable to re ach ag ree ment with respec t to the c harg ed crime. Thus, the jury may deliberate on a lesse r offe nse if it either ( 1) finds the de fenda nt not g uilty on the g reater c harg e, or ( 2) af ter rea sonable e ffor

ts cannot agree whether

to acquit or c onvict on that char g e.
State v. L eB lanc, 924 P.2d at 442. The Arizona hig h court obser ved that this method protects “ the state’s intere st in a full and fa ir adjudication of the cha rg ed off ense” by assuringthat g reater c harg es are considere d first. I d. at 443. Ther e ar e other advanta g es. The instruction also per mits a jury

the fl e xibil ity to av oid g ri dlo c k (and a re su lta nt mist ri a l) , to move de lib e ratio ns fo rw ard wh e n th e re is
no un anim ity , a

nd to r e vis it the g re ate r o ff

e ns e if de ve lop me nts so re qu ir e . F ina lly , th e re a so na ble
e ff or ts a pp ro a c h, at le a st i n my

op ini on , b e st r e fl e c ts t

he mann e r i n whic h T e nn e sse e jur ie s a c tua lly pe rf or m th e ir dutie s g ive n th e or de r a

nd c on te nt o f t

he ir ins tr uc tio ns

. Th e e xce lle nt r e se arc h p e rf or me d b y the ma jori ty confi rm s th at th e “ re a so na ble e ff or ts”
a pp ro a c h r e pr e se nts the ma ins tr e am of th e vario us a lte rn ativ e s. Th e re is g oo d r e a so n f or that. Ty pically , state cour

ts, while respe ctful of the pr osecution’s e ntitlement to full consideration on the primary char g e, ar e equa lly

sensitive to the singula

r role pla y ed by juries in our c ri m i n al j ustice sy stem; there e x ists a ge nera l relucta nce to dive st that body of its a utonomy

. In my

assessment, the 1
rea sonable e ffor

ts approac h strikes the appropr iate balanc e betwee n the interests of the state a s the prosec utorial entity

and the ultimate re sponsibili ty of the jury

to rea ch a r ational ver dict.

Th e Or e g on

Sup re me Court

ha s a lso sp ok e n o n th e su bje c t: [ B ] e c a u s e o f th e c o mp l e x i ty o f

s u b m i t t i n gmu l t i p l e c r i m i n a l c h ar g e s t o a j ur y, g ener ally jurors ar e better serve d if the trial judg e g ives them some format to follow,
rathe r t ha n in str uc tin gthe m on

a ll the po ssi ble ve rd ic ts a nd le avin gthe m toT he O r egon Supre me C ourt’ s a d o pt i on of t he r eas onabl e e f

f ort s approach ha s been s uper s eded by s t at ut e. 2 N o s uch det er mi nat i ve s t at ut e e xi s t s i n T enn es s ee. 3 deliberate as they

see f it. The [reasonable eff

orts approa ch] se ts f

orth a more orde red proce dure w ithout creating a ny coer cion. State v. Allen, 717 P.2d 1178, 1181 ( Or. 1986) (empha sis a dded). Unlike the other, le ss-popular 2 alternatives employ ed throug hout the United States, the rea sonable e ffor ts method assures that e very question of law a

nd fac t will benefit from thoroughness and st ru ct u re , o n the one ha nd, and jury independe nce, on the other. See State v. Rey es, 706 P.2d 1326, 1330 n.5 (Ha w. Ct. App. 1985) (“ the jury must alway s cons id e r

th e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e ” b efor e conside ringlesser- included off enses) . Having said that, the elimination of t h e possibili ty of coe rcion may

qualify as the be st featur e of the ins tr uc tio n. I t is my be lie f that e a c h and e ve ry jur or sh ou ld b e e nc oura g e d to c on sid e r a lte rn ativ e s, we ig h a ll p ote nti a l outc ome s, and re -t hink the ir ini tia l de te rm inatio ns ba se d up on dis c us sio ns wi th their pee rs. Such fre edom to deliberate fl u i d l y will result in care fully -consider ed ver dicts, rather than those base d upon a for ced c ommitm ent abse nt any knowledg e of the alternatives.

Th e sanc tit

y of a jur y ’s de lib e ratio ns is a s c ru c ia l to the c ri min a l pr oc e ss a s th e c on te nt o f i ts ve rd ic t. T he ins tr

uc tio ns by

Te nn e sse e c ourt s sh ou ld r e fl e c t th at pr e c e pt. Th e Was hin g ton Sup re me Court , whil e a

pp lyingthe re a so na

ble e ff or ts r ule , ma de the fo llo wi ngc omm e nt:
The menta l proce sses by which indiv i dual jurors re ache d their re spective conclusions, t h ei r m otives in arrivingat their ve rdicts, the ef fec t the evidenc e may have ha d upon the j urors or the weight particular jurors may

have g iven to particula

r evidenc e, or the jurors’ intentions and be liefs, ar e all fa ctors inher i n gin the jury ’s proce sses in arr iving at its verdict, and, ther efor e, inher e in the ver dict itself.

State v. L int on , 1 32 P.3 d 1 27 , 133 (Wa sh . 200 6) (q uo tatio n omitte d)

. Th e a do pti on of the re a so na

ble
e ff or ts m e tho d s ho uld

re du c e “ the ri sk

of c omp ro mis e ve rd ic ts b y

e na bli ngthe fi nd e rs of

fa c t to better g a u g e th e f it b e tw e e nth e e v id e n c e a d d u c e d at t r ia l a n d th e o f f e n s e s b e in gc o n s id e r e d ” and minimi ze the prospec t of “hung juries and the signific ant costs involved with retria l.” Gre en v. State, 80 P.3d 93, 96 (Ne v. 2003). Many states have opted for the rea sonable eff orts instruction o n t h at basis: “Retrials, nec essitated by hungjuries, ar e burde nsome to defe ndants, victims, witnesses and the c ourt sy ste m it se lf

.” State v. L a

ba no ws ki, 81 6 P. 2d

26 , 34 (Wa sh

. 19 91 ). Ev e n our own c ourt s have rec og nized that discourag ing retrials helps avoid “the monetary costs, as we ll as the emotional
and phy sic a l c os ts o f a g a in g oin gto t ri a l.” State v. Spe ars , 7 80 S.W. 2d 77 6, 77 7- 78 (T e nn . Cr im. App. 1989).

I t is my op ini on tha t juri e s, kn owingof

le sse r c ha

rg e s, a s is re qu ir e d und e r o ur state constitution, wil l unavoidably be influenc ed by

that knowledg e. The majority conce des this point by acknow ledg ing that a jury consideringa g reater c harg e “simultaneously considers, a lbeit notI n a f oo t not e, t he major i t y s ug ges t s t hat t hi s i s t r ue “ at l eas t wi t h r es pect t o t hos e l es s er - i ncl uded of f ens es 3 whos e s t at ut ory el ement s ar e i ncl uded wi t hi n t he s t at ut ory of f ens e cha r ged. ” I ag r ee t hat we can not as s ume t hat j ur i es lim it the ir sim u ltan e o u s c o n sid e ra tio n o f l e sse r-inc lud e d o ff e n se s to o n ly l e sse r-inc lud e d o ff e n se s in th a t ca te g o ry.

Fo r an adep t f

i ct i o nal i zed po rt ray al of jury de l i b erat i o ns i n a m urder t ri al , s ee R egi nal d R o se’ s p l ay 1 2 A ngry 4 M en

. In a p arti cu l arly m em o rab l e sc en e, o ne o f t he juro rs says:

It’s ve ry h a rd to ke e p p e rs o n a l p re ju d ic e o u t o f a t h ing like this. A n d no m a tter w h e re yo u ru n into i t , prejud i ce o b scur es t he t ruth. .

. . N i ne o f us now s eem t o f

eel t hat t he d ef

end ant i s i nno cent , but
w e ’re ju st g a m b ling o n p ro b a b ili ties. W e m a y b e w ro n g . W e m a y b e trying to re tur n a gu ilt y m a n to t he co m m uni t y
. N o one can real l y kn o w
. B u t w e have a reasonab l e d o ub t , and t hi s i s a saf eguard whi ch has enorm o us val ue t o o ur sy st em

. N o jury can d ecl are a ma n gui l t y unl ess i t ’ s sur e. W e ni ne c a n ’t u n d e rs ta n d ho w yo u thr e e a re stil l so su re . M a yb e yo u c a n tell us

. 4 e xplic itl y , a ll a

pp lic a ble le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s supp or

te d by the pr oo f. ” I t is pr e fe ra

ble , th e n, to 3 ad dre s s th i s re al i ty

i na s tra i gh t fo rw ar dwa y th atal l o ws th e j ury , af

t er th o ro u gh l y

co n s i d er i n g a g reater c harg e, to consider the alter natives su p p orted by

the evidenc e. At the same time, the jury
re se rv e s th e ri g ht t o r e vis it the pri mar y c ha rg e in t he ind ic tme nt a s n e e de d, or e ve ntu a lly , if
nece ssary , reta ins the ability to consider a ll of the various options at once

. 4

In response to the policy rea sons f or favoringthe adoption of the r easona ble ef forts appr oach, the majority

enumer ates five policy

arguments for permitting acquittal-first instructions. First, the majority s u gg ests that verdic ts render ed pursua nt to acquittal-first instruction will satisfy our constitution’s unanimit y require ment. See Te nn. Const. art. 1, § 6; St ate v. Sca rbrough, 181 S.W .3d 65 0, 65 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) . The st ate men t is bo th t ru e and ir re le va nt. Ve rd ic ts s atis fy

the un anim ity require ment by

beingunanimous, not by confor ming to spe ci fic rule s g overningthe structure of deliberation. See also Cantrell v. State, 469 S.E.2d 660, 662 (Ga

. 1996) (unanimity is not re quired
a s to g re ate r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s if ve rd ic t is un anim ou s o n le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e ); State v. Sand e rs , 344 S.E.2d 5 9 2 , 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), disc. re view denie d, 349 S.E.2d 604 (N.C. 1986) (unanimous ver dicts on lesser c harg es mee t unanimity require ment even if no unanimity is reac hed on g reater c harg es). I f uncertainty as t o unanimity arises at trial, either party may ask that the jury be polled. This pr ocedur e – not an ac quittal-first instruction – insures unanimity . Moreove r, there is n o so lid g ro un d fo r be lie vin g that an a c qu itt a l- fi rs t ins tr uc tio n e nc oura g e s a un anim ou s v e rd ic t. Th e ma jor ity c ite s on ly the c on

je c tur e of ano the r c ourt

that ha s a lso de c ide d to he w t o th e min or ity vie w
. F ar mo r e ju

r is d ic ti o n s h av e r e a c h e d th e o p p o s it e c o n c lu s io n , h av in g d e te r mi ned that the

“ re a so na ble e ff or ts” pr oc e dure is m or e e ff e c tiv e at re du c ingthe ri sk of c oe rc e d v e rd ic ts o r f

a lse unanimity . See L eB lanc, 924 P

. 2 d at 4 4 2 (citingState v. Fletc her, 717 P.2d 866, 872 (1986) (F eldman, J., concurring ); U.S. v. J ackson, 726 F .2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984)). Second, the major ity indicates a desire to add “struc ture” to jury deliberations and to protect the jur or s f

ro m the “ c on fu sin g , ted iou s, and pe rh a ps ini tia lly

ov e rwhe lmi ng ” a sp e c ts o f t he ir dutie s. I t is ind e e d p os sib le tha

t so me jur or s mi g ht b e a ide d b y the str uc tur e pro vide d b y

a c qu itt a l- fi rs t instructions, but that is equally true of the rea sonable e ffor ts rule. Other

jurors, howe ver, mig ht be daunted by

an ironc lad, forma listi c re striction on the nature o f t h ei r deliberations, or might be hamper ed by

an inability

to examine a lesser of

fense in the context of the primary char g e. It is above5

my abilities and, I

think, those of the majority to sugg est how many

jurors will be of the f

ormer ty pe and how many the l atter. For this very rea son, we should avoid any unnece ssary

intrusion as to the nature of jury

deliberations. W hile the judg e’s instructions as to duty and boundarie s are ind isp e ns a

ble to o ur c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m, t he jur y sh ou ld a lw ay s b e at li be rty to ex ercise its ultimate responsibiliti es as pr escr ibed by our constitution. Third, the majority

states that ac quittal-first instructions encoura g e t h oroug h deliberation be c a us e the y wo uld make the jur

y “ mor e lik e ly

to f oc us wi th t

he de pth of c on c e ntr atio n a

pp ro pr iate to the g ra vit y of its ta sk .” Mu c h lik e my c oll e a g ue s, I c an on ly sp e c ulate

. Ne ve rt hel ess , I mu st disag ree with their conc lu s io ns. I f any thing, a cquittal-first instructions artific ially withdraw r eleva

nt considerations from the jury ’s purview and repla ce fluid deliberation with a proc ess-orie nted foc us on fo rc inga ve rd ic t w ith out di sc us sio n of the lawf ul al te rn ativ e s. Whil e the pr ov e rb ia l “ blu e plate specia l” may

be the be st choice at the l o ca l ea t er y , the better policy is to review the e ntire menu befor e plac ing the order

. Four th, the majority

argues that an a cquittal-first jury instruction is necessa

ry to preve nt c omp ro mis e ve rd ic ts. Idis a g re e . Jur ie s are pr e sume d b y law t o f oll owa ll o f t

he ins tr uc tio ns , St ate
v
. R o b i n s o n , 1 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 9 , 4 9 4 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 4 ) , an d th e a c qu i t t a l

- f

i r s tc h ar g e i s m e r e l y a component of a l ar ger te x t which provides a dmonitions , implicitl y or explicitl y , ag ainst any compromise dec ision. Finally , the majority

sug g ests that we should c ontinue to pe rmit a cquittal-first instructions because of th e ir lo n g s ta

n d in g u s e in th is s tate

. In d e e d , in St ate v
. M an n , 9 5 9 S. W. 2 d 5 0 3 , 521 (T e nn . 1 99 7) , th is C o u

r t a f f ir me d, in a c ur so ry mann e r, the a c qu itt a l- fi rs t in str uc tio ns sim ila

r t o th os e inc lud e d in

our p atte rn

jur y ins tr uc tio ns :
I f y o uh av e a

r e a s o n a b le d o u b t a s to th e d e f

e n d an t' s g u il t o f

[i n s e rt o f f e n s e c h ar g e d ],
a s c ha rg e d in [co un t of ] the ind ic tme nt, the n y our ve rd ic t must be no t guil ty a s to thi s offe nse, and then y ou shall proce ed to deter mine whether the defendant is guilty or no t guil ty of [ins e rt of fe ns e c ha rg e d], a s c ha

rg e d in [co un t of ] the ind ic tme nt.

T.P.I .—Crim. 41.02, Mult iple counts: Guilt finding limited to one—Or der of consideration (8th ed. 20 04 ). Whil e I c on c e de that c ourt s mus t pr oc e e d c a uti ou sly be fo re up se tti nge ntr e nc he d p ra c tic e s, the re is n o ju sti fi c atio n f

or the pe rp e tuatio n of an unwo rk a ble sta nd ard

. Mo re ov e r, in r e c e nt ye ars , development of

the law pe rtainingto lesser-inc luded offen s es has bec ome essential to our applications of the Crimin al S entenc ing Re form Ac t of 1989. See B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 465-69 (adoptingModel Penal Code def inition of “lesser- included off ense” and requiringjury

instructions on lesser- included off

enses f or which e vidence in the rec ord supports a cha rg e); State v. Tr

usty , 919 S.W. 2d 30 5 (19 96 ) (d ist inguis hin gbe tw e e n “ le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s, ” wh ic h in c lud e on ly e le me nts of the g reater off

ense a nd for whic h instructions must b e gi v en, and “lesser g rade s” of the greater of fe ns e , f or wh ic h in str

uc tio ns sh ou ld o nly

be g ive n if su

pp or te d by e vid e nc e ), ov e rr

ule d by State
v. Do miny , 6 S.W. 3d 47 2, 47 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) (e lim inatin gdis tin c tio n b e tw e e n “ le sse r gra de or c la ss” and “le sser-inc luded offe nse”) ; Ely , 48 S.W .3d at 718-27 (disc ussing ong oing de velopment of law“F o r a rig h t t o re m a in in v io la te , i t m u s t n o t d im in is h o v e r tim e a n d m u st b e p ro te c te d fro m a ll a ssa u lts t o 5

ess ent i al guarant ees. ” 47 A m

. Jur. 2d Jury § 6 (19 9 5 ).

T h e d ra fter s o f the T e n n e sse e C o n stitutio n m o d e le d this p ro v isio n o n a sim ilar se c tio n o f t h e P e n n sylv a n ia 6 Cons t i t u t i on of

1790. Pa. Cons t

. a r t

. I , § 7. I n t er es t i n g l y , t h e U n i t ed St at es Cong r es s a l s o i n cl u ded a s i mi l ar pr ov i s i on i n t h e mu ch

- mal i g n ed Se di t i on La w pas s ed of 1798. D u r i n g t h e d eb at e on t h e Se di t i on La w i n t h e H ou s e of R e p re se n ta tive s, C o n g re ssm a n W ill ia m C . C . C la ib o rn e o f T e n n e sse e o ff e re d the fo llo w ing a m e n d m e n t: “A n d in a ll
c a s e s a r i s i n g un de r t h i s ac t , t h e j u r y wh o s h a l l t r y t h e ca u s e , s h a l l be j u dg e s of t h e l a w as we l l as t h e f a c t

. ” Af t e r s om e debat e on t hi s propo s al , t he H ous e agr eed t o s i mi l ar l ang uag e f r om t he P enn s y l van i a C ons t i t ut i on, whi ch i s no w also f ound i n t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on at A r t i cl e I, sec t i on 19. See M ar k D eW ol f e H owe, Ju r i es as Ju dges of Cri mi nal Law, 52 Har v
. L

. Re v
. 58 2, 58 6- 87 ( 19 39 )

. Co n g r e s s ma n Cl a i bo r n e w as a f or me r j u s t i c e on t h e f

i r s t T e n n e s s e e S u pr e me C our t , an d he w as appo i nt ed t o t hat posi t i on by G over nor Sevi er i n t he y ear t hat t he f i r s t T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on was e n a c te d , 1 7 9 6

. 6 reg ardinglesser- included offenses)

. I f t he acquittal-first instruction was at one time the best among the var ious alternatives a vailable f or this state, that is no longe r so. The right to appr opriate jury
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e s i s “ o f

c o n s t i tu t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n ” un d e r o ur c o n s t i t ut i o n , E l y, 48 S.W. 3d

at 72 7, and ou r con sti tut ion g ua ra nte e s th at “ the ri g ht o f t ri a l by jur y sh a ll r e ma in inviolate.” Te nn. Const. art. I , § 6. As Ely confirme d, the contents of that rig ht have not bee n frozen to include only

the consider ations rec og nized nearly seventy y ear s ag o in Wi llard v
. S t ate, 130 S.W. 2d 99 , 1 00 (T e nn . 1939) , b ut r athe r h ave be e n a pp lie d to the bo dy

of law m or e re c e ntl y develope d by

our Gene ral Assembly

. In short, the time ha s come for Te nnessee to join the legion of states whic h have se en the wisdom of the r easona ble ef forts appr oach.
Whil e my a dv oc a c y fo r a c ha ng e in t he natur e of

the ins tr uc tio n is ba se d on po lic y

g ro un ds , there are state co n s ti tutional considerations which suppor t the rea sonable e ffor

ts approac h. The rig ht to t ri a l by jur y in t his state ha s it s o ri g in i n th e c omm on law a nd in t he Con sti tut ion

of No rt h Carolina. Patten v. State, 426 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1968); Ga rner v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Y er.) 159 (1833). It is undisput ed that this constitutional provision i ncludes the e ntitlement to have all fa ctual issues resolved dur ing a

tr i al i n b oth civil and criminal ca ses. Hurt v. Ea rnhar t, 539 S.W .2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). O ur guara ntee is that the issues of f act will be dete rmined by twelve juror s pr op e rl y ins tr uc te d b y the tr ia l c ourt . St ate v. Ga rr iso n, 40 S.W. 3d

42 6, 43 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; se e a lso Gr oo ms v . St ate , 4 26 S.W. 2d 17 6 ( Te nn . 1 96 8)

. So, e ve n if the g ua ra nte e of tr ia l by jur

y in Art ic le 5 I , section 6 does not mandate an out rig ht reje ction of the a cquittal-first instruction on constitutional g rounds, the re asonable eff orts approa ch, in my

judgme n t , i s m ore c losely alig ned with the
corr espondingprovision of Article I , section 19 that “the jury shall have the rig ht to determine the law and the fac ts, under the direc tion of t he court

. . . in

. . . criminal cases”; I would add that the 6
c ur re nt e dit ion s o f t

he Te nn e sse e Patte rn

Jury Ins tr uc tio ns a c kn ow le dg e the c on tin ue d v ita lity

of thi s particula r sec tion: You [the jury ] are the e x clus i v e j udg es of the f acts in this case . Also, y ou are the exclusive judge s of the law unde r the dire ction of t h e cour t. You should apply

the law to the fac ts in deciding this c ase. You should c onsider all of the evidenc e in light of your own obser

vations and experienc e in life.As Ch i e f J u s t i c e S n od g r a s s ob s e r v e d o v e r on e h u n dr e d y e a r s a g o, t h e r e h a s be e n “ mu c h c on t r ov e r s y a n d s om e 7

con f u s i on of de ci s i on ” as t o w h at e x t en t j u r i es w er e t o j u dg e t h e l aw

. For d, 47 S. W

. a t 705.

In the w o rd s o f T h o m a s J e ff e rs o n : “W e re I c a lled up o n to d e c id e w h e the r th e p e o p le ha d b e st b e o m itt e d in 8
t he Legi s l at i ve or J udi ci ar y depart ment , I woul d s ay i t i s b et t er t o l eav e t hem out of t he Legi s l at i ve. ” Le t t er f r om T homas J e ff e rs o n to the A b b é A rn o u x (J u ly 1 9 , 1 7 8 9 ), in 1 5 T h e P a p e rs o f T h o m a s J e ff e rs o n 2 8 2 , 2 8 3 (J u lian P . B o y d e d ., 1 9 5 8 ).
7 T.P.I .–Crim. 1.08 J ury : J udg es of f acts a nd law (8th e d. 200 4 ) (e m p h asis added) . By compar ison (and of signific ance ), a judg e’s powe r is circ umscribed by our state c onstitut ion. Article VI , section 9 specific ally

direc ts that “[j] udg es shall not char g e juries with re spect to matters of fac t, but may state the testimony

and dec lare the law.”
Sin c e the Ni ne te e nth Ce ntu ry , Te nn e sse e c ourt s have str ug g le d to de te rm ine jus t ho w Art ic le 1, section 19 define s the balanc e of responsibilities be tween judge and jury

. See, e.g ., McGowa n v. State, 17 Tenn. (9 Y er.) 184 (1836); Nelson v. State, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 482 (1852); Poole v. St ate, 61 Tenn. 288 (1872) ; Harr is v. St ate, 75 Te nn. 538 (1881); Ha nnum v. State, 1 8 S.W . 269 (Tenn. 18 91 ); F or d v . St ate , 4 7 S. W. 7 03 (Ten n. 18 98). Th is C ourt ha s o bs e rv e d th at w ithre g ard to 7 questions of law, juror s are “ju d ges o f l aw a s well as fa cts,” but this “does not diminish the obligation of the court to explain the law.” M cGowa n, 17 Tenn. (9 Y er.) at 195. It has also bee n sa id t hat th e jur

y de te rm ine s b oth

the law a nd fa c ts, and

the jud g e is a

wi tne ss t o what th e law i s. For d, 47 S.W

. at 704; se e also Wright v. State, 394 S.W.2d 883, 885-86 (Tenn. 1965). T he powe rs of a jur y are no t un fe tte re d; our Court ha s a uth or ize d jud ic ia l int e rv e nti on in t he e ve nt a jur y sh ou ld
make up its own idio sy

nc ratic ve rs ion

the law. Se e F or d, 47 S.W. at 70 5 ( statin gthat juro rs “ sh ou ld not set up their own supposed knowle dg e of the law ag ainst that of the cour t”). Throug hout the plethora of commentar

y on this subjec t, tw o d

r iv in g p r in c ip le s have r emained constant about the process of obtaininga ver dict in a cr iminal trial under our c onstitut ion: (1) the judge ’s role is to instruct the jury on the law; and ( 2) the jury ’s role is to dec ide, within acc epted bo un da ri e s, wh ic h o f t

he re le va nt l aws is a

pp lic a ble , d e c ide the fa c ts, and a pp ly the law to th e fa c ts. When an instruction mandates a verdic t on the char g e in the indictment bef ore c onsideration of the permissible alternatives, the j udg e has depar ted from the role of an instructor of the law. In sum, the acquittal-f

irst scheme is that lea st likely to respec t the function of the j ury in its determination of the
a pp lic a ble law an d fa c ts. In c on tr a st, the re a so na ble e ff or ts a pp ro a c h d oe s n o v iol e nc e to t he ro le 8 of the trial judg e, who must alwa y s prese nt the char g ed off ense a nd those that qualify

as lesser and included. When juries dete rmine which la w fits their assessment of the fa cts, “unde r the dire ction of the c ourt,” the judg e still declare s the law. As indicated, that prer og ative does not me an that the jury may “set up their own supposed knowledg e of the law ag ainst that of the cour t.” See F ord, 47 S.W . at 705.

Conclusion

Sound po lic y c on sid e ratio ns su

pp or t th e a do pti on

of the reas on abl e e ff

or ts i ns tr uc tio n to jur or s to a ssi st i n the ir de lib e ratio n of the pr ima ry c ha rg e and its le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s. B e c a

us e8

this Court has traditionally adher ed to the ac quittal-first instruction, Ican a scribe no fault t o the trial judge in this particular c ase. Neve rtheless, I would classify

the instruction as er

roneous, a

nd as fa r less compatible with the provisions of our state constit ution than the re asonable eff orts alternative. Be cause , howeve r, the re cord of the t rial demonstrates that acquittal ins truction had no eff ect on the verdic t in this particula

r case, the err or was harmless. See S tate v. Rodrigue z, 254 S.W .3d 361, 366 (Tenn. 2008) ; Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). Given the overwhe lming evide nce a g ainst the Def endant, I
c anc o n c ur

i nth e r e s u l t

. O na l l o th e r i s s u e s , I j o i nw i thth e m a j o r i ty.

___________________________________ GA RY R. WA DE , JUST I CE