No. 90-171 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1991 

STATE OF MONTANA and 

DOUGLAS A. HEGEMAN, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Jeff Renz, Esq., Billings, Montana 

Eula Compton, Esq., Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General; Kathy Seeley, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

William Schreiber, Esq., Belgrade, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: February 28, 1991 

~ecided: April 2, 1991 

I 

Clerk 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Douglas A. Hegeman appeals his convictions and sentences of 

failing to display a motor vehicle registration on demand, 

disorderly conduct, and obstructing a police officer, following a 

bench trial in the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County. 

We reverse and remand. 

Mr. Hegeman raises the following issues: 

1. Did the District Court lack jurisdiction over this case 

by reason of the city court's failure to enter sentence and 

judgment against Mr. Hegeman? 

2. Did the District Court err when it denied Mr. Hegeman's 

right to a jury trial because Mr. Hegeman failed to demand a jury 

trial in his notice of appeal, in violation of an unpublished court 

rule? 

3. Was Mr. Hegeman charged and convicted of disorderly 

conduct for engaging in speech and gestures that are protected 

under the Montana and United States Constitutions? 

4. Is 5 45-7-302 (I), MCA, on its face, unconstitutionally 

vague and overbroad, or is this statute unconstitutionally 

overbroad as it was applied to Mr. Hegeman? 

On October 2, 1989, Belgrade City Police Officer John Woodland 

observed and stopped a vehicle that did not have a 1990 renewal 

sticker on its front license plate. Upon stopping the vehicle, the 

vehicle's driver, later identified as Douglas Hegeman, loudly and 
vigorously challenged Officer Woodland's authority to make the 

stop, claiming that the officer did not have probable cause. 

Officer Woodland repeatedly requested Mr. Hegeman to produce 

his motor vehicle registration, his driver's license, and his proof 

of insurance. Mr. Hegeman, however, repeatedly refused to provide 

Officer Woodland with the requested documentation. Furthermore, 

Mr. Hegeman exhibited an aggressive and abusive behavior toward 

Officer Woodland through a display of verbal intimidation and 

threatening arm gestures. Accordingly, Officer Woodland mentally 

reviewed possible defensive actions he could employ to defend 

himself. 

After several minutes of this continued behavior, Officer 

Woodland repeatedly requested Mr. Hegeman to exit his vehicle. 

Mr. Hegeman repeatedly refused Officer Woodland's requests. Mr. 

Hegeman finally exited his vehicle when Officer Woodland assured 

him that he would not be physically harmed. 

Following his departure from his vehicle, Officer Woodland 

once again requested Mr. Hegeman to produce his motor vehicle 

registration, his driver's license, and his proof of insurance. 

Mr. Hegeman responded that he did not know where his driver's 

license was, but produced several documents from his vehicle's 

glove compartment one of which was his motor vehicle registration. 

Attached to his motor vehicle registration was the 1990 renewal 

sticker, which should have been on the vehicle's front license 
plate. At a later time, Mr. Hegeman produced his driver's license 

and proof of insurance. Officer Woodman then inquired if Mr. 

Hegeman was in fact Douglas A. Hegeman; Mr. Hegeman did not 

respond. Officer Woodman then informed Mr. Hegeman that he was 

under arrest for disorderly conduct and effected the arrest. 

On November 28, 1989, Mr. Hegeman, appearing s, was 

convicted of failing to display a motor vehicle registration on 

demand, disorderly conduct, and obstructing a police officer 

following a jury trial in city court. Immediately after the jury 

rendered its verdict, Mr. Hegeman filed a notice of appeal. Mr. 

Hegeman included a claim in his notice of appeal that "Until a 

decision is rendered by the District Court, the City of Belgrade 

is further barred from action toward the defendant pursuant to [§I 

46-20-204 (3) [ , ] [MCA] . 'I The city court thereafter noted: "Request 

to continue sentencing until after appeal--approved.@' 

On February 9, 1990, Mr. Hegeman, again appearing pro se, was 

tried & novo at a bench trial before the District Court, and was 

again convicted of the charges. Mr. Hegeman received the following 

sentences: a $25.00 fine plus a $10.00 misdemeanor fee for failure 

to exhibit his motor vehicle registration when requested; two days 

in jail, a $100.00 fine, and a $10.00 misdemeanor fee for disorderly conduct; and thirty days in jail, a $300.00 fine, and a $10.00 

misdemeanor fee for obstructing a peace officer. These sentences 

have been stayed pending this appeal by Mr. Hegeman. 
1. Did the District Court lack jurisdiction over this case 

by reason of the city court's failure to enter sentence and 

judgment against Mr. Hegeman? 

Mr. Hegeman argues that because the Belgrade City Court never 

imposed sentence, or entered judgment against him, the District 

Court never obtained jurisdiction of Mr. Hegeman's case. We agree. 

A district court may have concurrent original jurisdiction or 

appellate jurisdiction over criminal matters involving misdemeanors. See Mont. Const., Art. VII, s 4 (jurisdiction of 

district courts) ; 55 3-5-301 to -303, MCA (original jurisdiction 

and appellate jurisdiction of district courts). In particular, 

§ 3-5-302(2), MCA, provides: 

The district court has concurrent original 

jurisdiction with the justice's court in the 

following criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor : 

(a) misdemeanors arising at the same time as 

and out of the same transaction as a felony or 

misdemeanor offense charged in district court; 

(b) misdemeanors resulting from the reduction 

of a felony or misdemeanor offense charged in 

the district court; and 

(c) misdemeanors resulting from a finding of 

a lesser included offense in a felony or 

misdemeanor case tried in district court. 

Except in these identified instances, a district court is limited 

to appellate jurisdiction of misdemeanor cases. Mont. Const. Art. 

VII, !j 4; 55 3-5-301 to -303, MCA. However, imposition of sentence 
and final judgment by a justice or city court are a prerequisite 

to appeal to a district court. See §§ 46-17-311(2), 46-20-104(1), 

MCA. Furthermore, a party may not consent to subject matter 

jurisdiction nor waive the want of jurisdiction. State v. Akers 

(1938), 106 Mont. 43, 57, 74 P.2d 1138, 1145. 

Clearly, this case was not within the District Court's 

original jurisdiction as it does not fall into any of the identified instances under 5 3-5-302(2), MCA. And, this case was not 

within the District Court's appellate jurisdiction because the 

city court failed to impose sentence and enter a final judgment 

against Mr. Hegeman. We therefore hold that the District Court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the 

District Court's sentence and judgment and instruct the District 

Court to remand this case to the Belgrade City Court for imposition 

of sentence and final judgment. Because we find reversible error 

in this first issue, we decline to discuss the other three issues 

raised by Mr. Hegeman in this appeal. 

Reversed and remanded. 

Chief Justice 
We concur: