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79–961 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–481

REDUCING THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 19, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

EDWIN K. HALL, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Ford, Hon. Carl W. Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and

Research ................................................................................................................ 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11

Moodie, Michael, President, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute .. 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38

Sands, Amy, Ph.D., Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

Monterey Institute of International Studies ...................................................... 44

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49

Zelicoff, Alan P., Senior Scientist, Sandia National Laboratories ....................... 63

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66

(III)

(1)

REDUCING THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m. in Room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,

chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Helms, Lugar, and Frist.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Carl, welcome

back to the committee. It’s been a long, not a long time since you

were here, but I remember the good old days when you were being

of considerable assistance to our colleague John Glenn and it’s nice

to have you back.

Today the Committee on Foreign Relations continues a hearing

in a series that began in early February, which we entitled Securing America’s Future. The key purposes of these hearings are to

engage in as sober a discussion as we can to determine what the

most urgent threats facing the United States are and to determine

how our nation should prioritize the resources, although considerable, nonetheless limited, to address the most eminent threats.

Two weeks ago the committee heard from a group of America’s

top scientists on the potential dangers associated with so-called

dirty bombs and improvised nuclear devices. Today we look at a

threat posed by chemical and biological weapons or CBW as it’s referred to, especially in the hands of terrorists.

Last fall’s anthrax attacks demonstrated that even a small scale

CBW attack can greatly disrupt our lives. Those attacks resulted

in 23 anthrax cases and five deaths, but the impact on this country, the impact on this city, the impact on this body far exceeded

that number. The next time a CBW attack occurs the consequences

could even be graver.

In the extreme case, the Department of Defense estimates that

on the unlikely prospect that a small pox attack would occur that

could cause as many as 4 million deaths. The intelligence community has warned that al Qaeda was working to acquire dangerous

chemical agents and toxins as well as biological weapons. We do

not know if al Qaeda succeeded in these efforts, but we do know

that they showed their trainees how cyanide works.

And earlier this month, a self-styled anarchist was found to be

storing cyanide precursors in a Chicago subway tunnel, which I

would note parenthetically, I’m going to urge my colleagues as

early as today to take up the Amtrak legislation for threat reducVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
2

tion relating to modernizing the tunnels that Amtrak has. There

are five tunnels under New York City to carry 350,000 people a day

are in those tunnels. There’s no ventilation, there’s no lighting and

there is no means of escape. And the same with the Baltimore tunnel.

But some threats like third world ICBMs or space warfare are

years from becoming imminent notwithstanding their threats, but

the threat of chemical and biological weapons is here today and in

my view we have to deal with it today.

As our first witness will shortly explain, a number of nations are

actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons programs. The

members of President Bush’s axis of evil are on this list and so are

other nations. There’s no single easy way to roll back the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, but we must persist on a

number of fronts. Engaging in tough-nosed diplomacy, enforcing

strong export controls agreed upon with our allies and revitalizing

the two applicable arms control regimes, the Chemical Weapons

Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, and applying

sanctions where appropriate and turning to our military force

where necessary.

Nations can be deterred from using chemical or biological weapons. In 1991, the first President Bush told Saddam Hussein if Iraq

dared to employ chemical weapons against U.S. troops, the United

States would leave no option off the table, implicitly including nuclear weapons. Saddam chose to live another day and did not use

chemical weapons.

Unfortunately, deterrents may not work so well for terrorists. Especially groups like al Qaeda which aim to kill as many innocent

victims as possible, even at the cost of their own lives. Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency

warns that such weapons may be ‘‘attractive to terrorist groups intent on causing panic and inflicting larger numbers of casualties.

The psychological impact of the recent anthrax cases in the United

States did not go unnoticed.’’

How can the United States best contain and reduce this threat?

One answer lies in the arms control agreements we all ready have

at our disposal including the Chemical Weapons and Biological

Weapons Conventions. The CWC allows for both routine and challenge inspections to detect and deter clandestine activities. Moreover, state parties are required to enact legislation with punitive

sanctions to make CWC prohibitions binding on their nationals living both at home and abroad.

Unfortunately, the CWC has not achieved its full potential. The

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the implementing organization for CWC, has struggled with both mismanagement and financial crises over member assessments and reimbursements for inspections costs. The Organization has been

forced to reduce its verification activities and cut back on industry

inspections.

During five years the Convention has been in effect, no party has

requested a challenge inspection. I’m glad to hear the Administration is closely looking at the Organization to resolve its funding

and management challenges, but we need an effective chemical

weapons regime.

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We must also re-emphasize the Biological Weapons Convention.

It is not my intention here today to rehash the debate over whether

the United States should have agreed to the draft compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention last year. I personally

do believe the Administration was needlessly confrontational, but

I understand its concerns over the protocol as drafted.

Today I want to look ahead to the reconvening of the Biological

Weapons Review Conference this November and ask how the

United States can best enhance the implementation of this Convention? One option lies in strengthening global disease surveillance to

help detect and contain infectious outbreaks, whether they are a

result of biological weapons or natural disease.

The Administration has proposed that BWC state parties commit

to strengthening the World Health Organization’s global alert and

response network. However, many developing nations lack the resources and the infrastructure to effectively plug into and contribute to the WHO network.

For that reason, Senator Helms and I at the appropriate time

plan to introduce the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002.

This bill would provide up to $150 million over the next two years

for necessary resources, both expertise and technical equipment to

monitor infectious disease outbreaks within their borders, and cooperate with international investigations. I look forward to working

closely with the Administration as we move forward on this issue.

Another means of reducing the threat of chemical and biological

weapons is to shut off access to those weapons and their infrastructure. I’ve often said that Russia is a virtual bonanza of weapons

grade nuclear material that terrorists might attempt to steal. Well,

guess what folks? Russia can be just as inviting a target for terrorists seeking chemical and biological weapons.

Russia possesses the world’s largest chemical weapons stockpile

estimated at approximately 40,000 metric tons. Eighty percent of

this stockpile consists of nerve agents. Only a few single drops of

which can kill on contact. Russia acceded to the Chemical Weapons

Convention in 1997, but bureaucratic disputes and lack of funding

delayed the start of destruction activities until last year. Russia

was supposed to meet by the year 2007, the chemical weapons

deadline for the destruction of its entire stockpile. It remains

doubtful if Russia can even meet the extended 2012 deadline.

In the meantime, the security of many of these sites where the

chemical and biological weapons are stored is poor and represents

a real proliferation concern. But at least we have handle on the

size of Russia’s CW stockpile. During the Cold War, the Soviet

Union also conducted a massive covert biological program. Roughly

50 former biological weapons institutes, mostly in Russia, are still

open today possibly containing live biological agents. Truth is we

don’t know.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has refused U.S. requests for

access to four former military biological institutes. And as many as

15,000 underpaid, underemployed scientists who worked in the

former Soviet programs are now potential targets for recruitment

by rogue states and terrorists.

Over the past decade, the United States has carried out a number of programs to help reduce the threat of biological and chemical

4

weapons proliferation in Russia and the former Soviet Union. In

particular, I want to salute the International Science and Technology Centers and a more recent program, the Bio-redirection Initiative for providing peaceful civilian research opportunities to

former Soviet scientists who otherwise might be tempted to sell

their wares to the highest bidder.

In it’s review of nonproliferation assistance at the end of last

year, this Administration recognized the value of these programs,

nudged I might add by the distinguished Senator from Indiana and

pledged continued funding. But September 11th should’ve shown

us that we can’t afford to settle for business as usual when it

comes to nonproliferation assistance.

It is time for some creative thinking on the part of both the executive branch and the Congress on how to help Russian secure, consolidate and eliminate its chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and infrastructure. Let me offer a couple suggestions and I

will invite our witnesses in the second panel to comment on them.

We made a good start last year by authorizing the Department

of Defense to spend as much as $50 million in FY 2002 to assist

Russia with its chemical weapons destruction efforts. Russia needs

to step up to the plate with its own funding and we need to push

our European allies to do more, because it’s clearly in their interest

as much as ours.

But the Russian CW stockpile is a ticking time bomb. We need

to accelerate in my view U.S. funding and that may cost as much

as $10 billion over several years. A price we can afford if we want

to neutralize that menacing threat. One option for financing this is

the debt for nonproliferation swaps that Senator Lugar and I have

proposed and the Senate passed in its Security Assistance bill

would include such authorization.

I strongly encourage the Administration to use that option. We

could also turn Russia’s biological and chemical weapons scientists

into public health corps to clean up dangerous former test sites, develop and produce new vaccines and defeat multi-drug resistant tuberculosis and other diseases. Russian chemists and microbiologists

are world class and their work in existing U.S. programs hold great

promise. But Russia’s environment and public health needs are

truly urgent and overwhelming and a massive effort to meet those

needs could easily employ up to a thousand more specialists.

Let me now introduce our witnesses at today’s hearing. Our first

witness will be The Honorable Carl W. Ford, Assistant Secretary

of State for Intelligence Research and as I said my colleagues remember a former staff member here and advisor to Senator John

Glenn.

Mr. Ford will present to the committee a threat assessment regarding the likelihood of possible chemical or biological weapons attacks against the United States both here at home and in our diplomatic facilities and military posts overseas, but obviously this is

an open hearing and Mr. Ford will not discuss some topics and may

in fact decline to answer some questions which I leave fully to his

discretion.

If you’re in doubt, we’ll go in closed session or arrange for a

closed session meeting later. But I want to thank Mr. Ford for

5

agreeing on such short notice to appear before this committee and

I look forward to his testimony.

Our second panel will feature three renowned experts on chemical and biological weapons who can expand on Mr. Ford’s threat

assessment and help us figure out what we need to do. Michael

Moodie, I hope I’m pronouncing that correctly, President of the

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, helped negotiate

the Chemicals Weapons Convention when he was Assistant Director of Arms Control and Disarmament under the first Bush Administration.

He is equally proficient in the Biological Weapons Convention

and I welcome his advice on how we can better utilize these two

arms control regimes if he thinks we can. And Dr. Amy Sands is

Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the

Monterey Institute in California. And if I had to be a director of

anything anywhere, I’d like to do it at Monterey. What a magnificent place to do it. I’ve had the pleasure of speaking there several

times.

Dr. Sands who was Assistant Director of ACDA under the Clinton Administration, will discuss how we can minimize the likelihood that terrorists will gain access to and employ chemical and biological weapons.

And finally, Dr. Alan P. Zelicoff, Senior Scientist at the Sandia

National Laboratory in New Mexico. He can update the committee

on how the United States might best protect against and respond

to a chemical or biological weapons attack. With that I will now

turn to Senator Helms and then we’ll move to the witness. Thank

you, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have certainly

given a wake up call to the people who are not bothered by the

threats by chemical and biological weapons in the hands of rogue

states and terrorist groups. I commend you on your statement and

I think it ought to be inserted into the record and I’ll be glad to

do that if you want me to.

The anthrax attacks this past fall have underscored the peril of

all of these threats highlighting the need to deal with them in a

more direct and determined manner. It’s clearly preferable to deter

and prevent and defend against a threat in the first place rather

than deal with the chaos and death and destruction after the fact.

We can deter the development and use of these weapons by making it crystal clear that to use them against the United States will

expose the attacker to the full retaliatory response of our military

including the potential use of our most destructive strategic weapons. I hope that never happens. I think we all do.

The President is making this a very clear policy of the United

States and I commend him for that. Should the deterrence fail,

however, the likelihood of a chemical or biological weapons attack

can be minimized through strong export controls and nonproliferation regimes that ensure that terrorist groups and rogue states will

not acquire the technology in the first place, along with the expertise to build and deliver these heinous weapons.

Now, our own government meanwhile must do a better job of

controlling sensitive dual use weaponry. The United States also

must pursue initiatives in the states of the former Soviet Union,

6

we all know that, in order to secure dangerous materials and to

keep scientists gainfully employed so that neither can or will be

used by rogue states or anybody else to build weapons of mass destruction.

And we must cause the Russians and the Chinese to halt their

transfers of sensitive items and material that are flowing to many

of these countries. Mr. Chairman, now you have indicated in your

statement, it’s critical that we never lose sight of the fact that the

United States can prevent a nuclear, biological or chemical holocaust by building a robust missile defense system capable of defending if not deterring such an attack.

I don’t know whether you mentioned it earlier in your statement

or not, but a recent national intelligence estimate indicated that

Iran, Iraq and North Korea, if you will the axis of evil, are building

long range missiles and that they have active weapons of mass destruction programs on our hands that will soon pose a direct threat

to us.

It therefore makes sense I think to spend some of our defense resources to develop a missile defense system. In any event, we must

not surrender to the notion that some of these threats are more

likely than others and that they therefore require the greatest

share of resources. When it comes to America’s security, I think we

must be prepared to deal with all threats and to address them with

every bit of the strength and purpose that we possess.

And I join you, sir, in welcoming our witnesses for being here

and as a matter of fact I thank them for doing it because I know

it’s an impingement on their time, but thank you for coming all of

you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Ford, before you begin,

let me apologize to Michael Moodie for mispronouncing his name.

Michael, you can call me Biden when you get up here if it makes

you feel any better. Be fair. Carl, the floor’s yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. CARL W. FORD, JR., ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, as a

former member of the committee staff, I’ve always been delighted

to come back and share my thoughts and information before the

committee. It’s always been a delight. I have been troubled that

this might be the first exception where it wasn’t all that delightful.

I clearly agree with the committee’s emphasizing this very important threat of chemical and biological weapons, but I’m really not

sure I’m up to the challenge of presenting that threat adequately

and coherently and particularly at an unclassified level.

One, I can’t think of an intelligence problem more difficult at any

level than dealing with biological weapons and chemical weapons.

It is a serious concern of the entire intelligence community. A lot

of resources are applied to the problem, it is a hard one.

The second issue has to do with even when I can give you some

of my personal judgments and beliefs based on having seen that information, the sources and methods used to get most of our findings are so sensitive that the evidence I’ll present is sketchy at best

and that for the most part, you’ll have to take on faith that I’m reflecting a deeper study of the information. I urge you to ask us for

7

later, either as individuals or as a group to have a more detailed

intelligence presentation from CIA, DIA as well as INR to give you

a full appreciation for how dangerous we think this is.

What I’d like to do if you’ll indulge me is I’ll make a few more

informal comments and sort of set the scene and then very briefly

summarize the major portions of my written presentation and ask

if you would to take the full testimony and put it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

Mr. FORD. The issue itself is very complicated. I think that some

preparatory remarks are in order so that at least you understand

my biases and my conceptual framework so that when I make

these statements, you’ll at least know where I’m coming from.

I arbitrarily divide chemical and biological weapons into basically

three types, having a lot to do with their delivery. The first group

and in fact the one that we have the most information on, the one

that is in the greatest numbers around the world: battlefield weapons. Weapons that have been produced by a number of countries

since World War I that are designed to be delivered by military aircraft, artillery, or missiles. These normally are designed for specific

battlefield targets, to disrupt the battle area, protect a particular

zone, or provide the opportunity for forces to maneuver.

Even so our own commanders who have looked at the problems

of Russian tactics and our own and thought about warfare and the

age of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, believe that

they’re uncontrollable. And while you may hope to disrupt the maneuver of your enemy, you may also kill a lot of your own people

and have your own maneuver limited. So even the battlefield weapons were, at least in our system, always more for deterrence. Hopefully we would never have to use these weapons. If we did, it was

always seen as a last resort sort of situation.

They also, because of their military nature, may be easy to steal,

but I would say even that is very difficult. They are hard to deliver

by any other than a military organization so that while there are

a lot of these weapons around, that’s probably not the best chance

for a terrorist to get a hold of chemical and biological weapons.

They’re closely guarded even in the most lax systems and even if

you got one, what to do with it is a real problem.

A second category are what I call terrorist weapons. The anthrax

in the letters would be an example, a very concrete example here

in the United States of a terrorist weapon. It didn’t kill a lot of people, but it sure psychologically had a huge impact and scared a lot

of people and made us recognize and realize the dangers of chemical and biological weapons.

Another example of a terrorist weapon would be a nuclear isotope or nuclear waste sort of bomb that killed a few people through

immediate contact, maybe the radiation would affect a few people,

but we’re talking about dozens rather than thousands. While clearly something that we worry about, it’s more in the nature of the

psychological damage and the impact that it might have.

The third category is weapons of mass destruction. And at least

I personally feel that these are the ones that while most unlikely

to be used are the ones that are the scariest and that we have to

be certain that we understand and are carefully protecting ourselves against. Here I mean the notion of being able to attack our

8

livestock or our agricultural areas or poison the water of an entire

city where we’re talking about tens of thousands of casualties from

chemical or biological weapons.

Those are the ones that terrify us the most. Clearly they are ones

that we think of when we think of terrorists, but I would argue

that terrorists alone based on what we know from al Qaeda and

various other groups, almost certainly would have to have state assistance in order to have those sorts of weapons of mass destruction. So you’re really talking about the convergence of the people

on our bad list and terrorists coming together when you get to the

point of weapons of mass destruction.

So with those introductory comments, let me just go through

quickly some of the countries that we are most concerned about on

these various types of chemical and biological weapons, battlefield,

terrorist and weapons of mass destruction.

The first one on my list and I think on most people’s list is Iraq.

Given Iraq’s past behavior, it’s likely that Baghdad has reconstituted programs prohibited under UN Security Council resolutions.

Since the suspension of UN inspection in December of 1998, Baghdad has had more than enough time to reinitiate it’s CW programs.

Programs that have demonstrated the ability to produce deadly CW

before they were disrupted by Operation Desert Storm, Desert Fox

and United Nations inspections.

Iraq’s failure to submit an accurate full, final and complete disclosure in either 1995 or 1997 coupled with its extensive concealment efforts, suggest that the BW program also has continued.

Without inspection and monitoring of programs, however, it’s difficult to determine their current status.

One of the reasons, of course, that Iraq bothers us in particular

is that it is one of the countries that’s actually used weapons

against other forces and against its own people. So that not only

do Iraqis have a capability and an intention, they’ve also done it

and that’s a small group of countries in that category.

The second one on my list is Iran. Iran, a state party to the

Chemical Weapons Convention, already has manufactured and

stockpiled chemical weapons including blister, blood, choking and

probably nerve agents and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver

them. Tehran continues to seek production and technology, training, expertise, equipment and chemicals from entities in Russia

and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal in indigenous nerve agent production capability.

Tehran continued to seek considerable dual use bio-technical materials, equipment and expertise from abroad primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe ostensibly for civilian uses. We

believe that this equipment and know-how could be applied to

Iran’s biological warfare program. Iran probably began its offensive

BW program during the Iran-Iraq War and likely has evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce

small quantities of agent. Iran may have some limited capability to

weaponize BW.

North Korea has a longstanding chemical weapons program.

North Korea’s domestic chemical industry can produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. We believe it has

a sizable stockpile of agents and weapons. These weapons could be

9

on a variety of delivery vehicles including ballistic missiles, aircraft, artillery projectiles and unconventional weapons.

North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, nor is it expected to do so any time soon. While North Korea

has acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention, it nonetheless

has pursued biological warfare capabilities over the last four decades. North Korea likely has a basic bio-technical infrastructure

that could support the production of infectious biological agents.

It’s believed to possess a munitions production infrastructure that

would allow it to weaponize agents and may have biological weapons available for military use.

Lybia continues its efforts to obtain technologies and expertise

from foreign sources. Outside assistance is critical to its chemical

and biological weapons program and the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to expand its procurement effort

with old primarily Western European contacts with expertise, parts

and precursor chemicals for sale.

Syria has also vigorously pursued the development of chemical

and to a lesser extent biological weapons to counter Israel’s superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons. Syria believes that

its chemical and missile forces deter Israeli attacks. Syria has a

longstanding chemical weapons program and is pursuing biological

weapons. Syria depends on foreign sources for key elements of its

chemical and biological warfare program, including precursor

chemicals and key production equipment.

The U.S. has pressed possible supplier states to Syria to stop

such trade, thereby making acquisition of such materials more difficult. The 33 nation Australia Group coordinates adoption of stricter export controls in many countries. As I’m sure you appreciate,

the real complexity here is that many, if not most, of the precursors and ingredients in chemical and biological weapons can be

used in totally non-dangerous and medical and chemical sorts of

experiments, so that it’s very difficult other than from intelligence

sources to know what the intention of the purchaser of this material is.

The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited developmental offensive biological warfare research and development

effort. Cuba has provided dual use bio-technology to rogue states.

We’re concerned that such technology could support BW programs

in those states.

We call on Cuba to cease all BW applicable cooperation with

rogue states and to fully comply with all its obligations under the

Biological Weapons Convention. At least at this point, we don’t see

Cuba involved in chemical weapons research and development.

Serious concerns remain about the status of Russian chemical

and biological warfare programs. Chairman Biden went over those

very accurately in his opening statement. Moscow has declared the

world’s largest stockpile of chemical agents—39,969 metric tons of

chemical agent to be exact, mostly weaponized, including artillery,

aerial bombs, rockets and missile warheads.

According to the Russian CWC declaration, all former Soviet

chemical weapons are stored at seven locations in Russia. In the

late ’80s and early 1990s, it carried out an extensive consolidation

10

process of chemical warfare material from sites within Russia and

from non-Russian locations.

Russian officials do not deny research has continued, but assert

that it aims to develop defenses against chemical weapons, a purpose that is not banned by the CWC. Many of the components for

new binary agents development by the former Soviet Union are not

on the CWC schedule of chemicals and have legitimate civilian applications, clouding their association with chemical weapons use.

However, under the CWC all chemical weapons are banned whether or not they are on CWC schedules.

The former Soviet offensive biological program was the world’s

largest and it consisted of both military facilities and non-military

research and development institutes. This program employed thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians throughout the

former Soviet Union with some biological warfare agents developed

and weaponized as early as the 1950s.

The Russian government has committed to ending the former Soviet BW program. It has closed or abandoned plants outside the

Russian Federation and these facilities have been engaged through

cooperative threat reduction programs. Nevertheless we remain

concerned that Russia’s offensive biological warfare capabilities remain.

The United States remains concerned by the threat of proliferation both of biological warfare expertise and related hardware from

Russia. Russian scientists, many of whom either are unemployed

or unpaid for an extended period, may be vulnerable to recruitment

by states trying to establish biological warfare programs. The availability of worldwide information exchange via the Internet facilitates this process.

I believe that the Chinese have an advanced chemical warfare

program including research and development production and

weaponization capabilities. Chinese military forces have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, having studied the tactics and doctrine of the former Soviet Union. Chinese military

forces conduct defensive chemical warfare training and are prepared to operate in contaminated environments.

I also believe that China’s current inventory of chemical agents

includes the full range of traditional agents and China is researching more advanced agents. It has a wide variety of delivery systems

for these, including tube artillery, rockets, mortars, landmines, aerial bombs, sprayers and SRBMs. China acceded to the Biological

and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1984, though many believe its

declaration under the BWC confidence building measures were inaccurate and incomplete.

China has consistently claimed that it has never researched,

manufactured, produced or possessed biological weapons and that

it would never do so. However, China possesses an advanced biotechnology infrastructure and the bio-containment facilities necessary to perform research and development on lethal pathogens.

It’s possible that China has maintained the offensive biological

warfare program it’s believed to have had before acceding to the

BWC.

Finally, terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons has

been growing and probably will increase in the near term. The

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threat is real and proven. The ease of acquisition or production of

some of these weapons and the scale and terror that they can cause

will likely fuel interest in using them to terrorize.

The transport and dispersal techniques also are manageable and

can be made effective easily as seen recently in using the mail as

a delivery system to spread anthrax. Many of the technologies associated with the development of chemical and biological agents have

legitimate civil applications.

In addition, the proliferation of such weapons raises the possibility that some states or rogue entities within these states could

provide chemical or biological weapons to terrorists. It remains unlikely that a state sponsor would provide such a weapon to a terrorist group. But an extremist group with no ties to a particular

state, but which likely does have friends in state institutions, could

acquire or steal such a weapon and attempt to use it.

We have not completed our study of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and

their chemical and biological capabilities. So that it’s too soon to

give you a complete picture, but at least so far, I think that I would

summarize it as that our basic judgment remains the same: That

they had an almost insatiable appetite for information on biological

and chemical weapons, both how to do it and how to deliver it.

They also were interested in talking to a wide range of experts

from neighboring countries or co-religionists. We find no evidence

so far that they had successfully developed weaponized chemical or

biological agents, but I have to admit that at least so far, we feel

as we did after we got into Iraq and found out after Desert Storm

how much we had missed. I think that many of us are having the

same reaction in Afghanistan, that while they didn’t succeed, their

interests and activities were higher than many of us had imagined

until we saw the evidence and we still are looking. Many of the

documents and areas have not been fully examined. So I’ll have to

only give you a partial judgment.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I will ask that you put the complete

testimony in the record and be happy to take any question that you

or other members of the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Chairman Biden, Senator Helms, I am particularly pleased to come before you

today, as I spent many years working for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. I enjoyed those years, and am pleased now to contribute to your work again,

if in a different way.

More states have credible chemical and biological warfare (CBW) capabilities than

ever before. Advanced CBW capabilities and the widespread public understanding

of U.S. vulnerabilities since the anthrax attacks which followed on the events of

September 2001 makes their use all the more likely. CBW threats challenge not

only our homeland and Americans overseas, but our allies as well. Collaborative

international efforts to meet, reduce and defeat the use of chemical or biological

weapons have become essential. The United States remains committed to enacting

new domestic laws and strengthening treaties and international WMD regimes to

prevent and deter CBW development and use. I will highlight those countries not

in compliance with their international obligations. The Administration has raised

this important issue with a number of countries bilaterally.

Since the worldwide CBW threat is growing in breadth and sophistication, the use

of these weapons anywhere in the world would affect the United States. Crude but

lethal attacks can be small and could strike us in our homes here or in American

communities abroad. More than a dozen nations, including China, Iran, Iraq, Libya,

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North Korea, Russia and Syria have the capabilities to produce chemical and biological agents. Former Soviet biological and chemical facilities still exist in Ukraine,

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, though none is active now. Many have been engaged

by U.S. threat reduction programs to try to control proliferation of equipment, materials and knowledge. Nevertheless, it will always remain difficult to assess how successful we have been in preventing proliferation—especially since basic CBW production does not require large, sophisticated programs or facilities. Additionally, the

worldwide exchange of information via the Internet facilitates this process.

How likely is the use of CBW?

Compared to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons

(SW) are easier to acquire and the inherently dual-use nature of many goods and

technologies needed to produce SW and CW makes their assembly easier. That

makes it likely that we will confront such a threat in the future—again most likely

by terrorists.

Chemical agent development is threatening, and the development and production

of traditional chemical agents may be easier because their formulations are more

widespread than biological compounds. The building blocks of any chemical weapons

program come from the chemical industry. Precursor chemical procurement can be

difficult for a state that cannot produce them indigenously. Nevertheless, World War

I-era CW agents are not difficult to acquire and diagrams and descriptions of chemical weapons from expired patents remain available in public libraries or on the

Internet.

Virtually all the equipment, technology and materials needed for biological agent

research and development and production are available on the open market as well

as in the secondary markets of the world. Vaccine research and disease treatment

require essentially the same equipment. Because biological weapons are relatively

cheap, easy to disguise within commercial ventures, and potentially as devastating

as nuclear weapons, states seeking to deter nations with superior conventional or

nuclear forces find them particularly attractive. Therefore BW will probably continue to gain importance since it can kill or incapacitate military forces or civilian

populations, while leaving infrastructure intact but contaminated. Its great disadvantage, that it can also attack one’s own side, may be blunted by advanced vaccination programs. Traditional controls, similar to those used for fissionable material or delivery systems, cannot be effective when dangerous pathogens occur naturally and do not depend on manufacturing settings for production. Procuring BW

agents and using them can be done in different ways with different effects. While

developing an effective biological weapon is more difficult than popular discussion

may indicate, the degree of difficulty depends on the agent chosen and the sophistication of the delivery method. Biological weapons have been developed by states

for many operational uses, as well as by terrorist groups.

In addition to direct threats to the American people The United States is vulnerable to indirect attack. For example, the United States relies on modern intensive

farming production methods that involve large numbers of healthy susceptible livestock in geographically concentrated areas, a centralized feed supply, and rapid

movement of animals to markets. In addition, U.S. crops generally lack genetic diversity, leaving them vulnerable to disease. An anti-livestock BW attack could result

in multiple outbreaks throughout the United States before the disease is diagnosed.

In most cases, confirmation of a foreign animal disease would result in immediate

termination of exports and potential banning of U.S. livestock products by foreign

governments, probably accompanied by killing infected and exposed livestock. The

economic impact would be enormous; as many as one in eight U.S. jobs is directly

involved in some form of agriculture, from food production to delivery to retail sales.

Chemical and Biological weapons have been used throughout history, and we are

keenly aware of the recent anthrax attacks as well as past Iraqi use of chemical

weapons against the Kurds in 1988 as well as the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas

attack in the Tokyo subway. The threat is real, dangerous and likely to occur again.

Which nations possess weaponized stocks of chemical and biological agents?

Iraq

Given Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that Baghdad has reconstituted programs

prohibited under UN Security Council Resolutions. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December of 1998, Baghdad has had more than enough time to reinitiate its CW programs, programs that had demonstrated the ability to produce deadly CW before they were disrupted by Operation Desert Storm, Desert Fox, and

UNSCOM inspections. Iraq’s failure to submit an accurate Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in either 1995 or 1997, coupled with its extensive concealment efforts, suggest that the BW program also has continued. Without inspection

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and monitoring of programs, however, it is difficult to determine their current status.

Since the Gulf War Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use at locations previously identified with

their CW program. Iraq has also rebuilt a plant that produces castor oil, allegedly

for brake fluid. The mash left over from this production, however, could be used to

produce ricin, a biological toxin. Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use

items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the

suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased.

After Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities

destroyed by the U.S. bombing, including several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, Iraq appears to be

installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these

facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.

UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad

seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM

that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the IranIraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates

that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.

In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the

first in a series of FFCDs that were supposed to have revealed the full scope of its

BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled

with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq’s BW program was not

verified, UNSCOM has reported that Iraq maintains a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW

agents at any time. Iraq also has continued dual-use research that could improve

BW agent R&D capabilities. With the absence of a monitoring regime and Iraq’s

growing industrial self-sufficiency, we remain concerned that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.

Iraq has worked on its L–29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L–29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe.

In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L–29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have

been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.

Iran

Iran, a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), already has

manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons—including blister, blood, choking,

and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them.

Tehran continues to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and

chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach

its goal an indigenous nerve agent production capability.

Tehran continued to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment,

and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—

ostensibly for civilian uses. We believe that this equipment and know-how could be

applied to Iran’s biological warfare (SW) program. Iran probably began its offensive

BW program during the Iran-Iraq war, and likely has evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce small quantities of agent. Iran

may have some limited capability to weaponize BW.

North Korea

North Korea has a long-standing chemical weapons program. North Korea’s domestic chemical industry can produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and

blood agents. We believe it has a sizable stockpile of agents and weapons. These

weapons could be on a variety of delivery vehicles, including ballistic missiles, aircraft, artillery projectiles and unconventional weapons. North Korea has not acceded

to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), nor is it expected to do so any time

soon.

While North Korea has acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it

nonetheless has pursued biological warfare capabilities over the last four decades.

North Korea likely has a basic biotechnical infrastructure that could support the

production of infectious biological agents. It is believed to possess a munitions production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize agents and may have biological weapons available for military deployment.

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Libya

Libya continues its efforts to obtain technologies and expertise from foreign

sources. Outside assistance is critical to its chemical and biological weapons programs, and the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to expand

its procurement effort with old-primarily West European—contacts with expertise,

parts, and precursor chemicals for sale. Libya still seeks an offensive CW capability

and an indigenous production capability for weapons. Evidence suggests Libya also

seeks the capability to develop and produce BW agents. Libya is a state party to

the BWC and may soon join the CWC, however this likely will not mean the end

to Libya’s ambition to develop CBW.

Syria

Syria has also vigorously pursued the development of chemical—and to a lesser

extent biological—weapons to counter Israel’s superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons. Syria believes that its chemical and missile forces deter Israeli attacks.

Syria has a long-standing chemical warfare program, first developed in the l970s.

Unlike Iran, Iraq, and Libya, Syria has never employed chemical agents in a conflict. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be trying to develop advanced nerve agents as well. In future years, Syria will likely try to improve its infrastructure for producing and storing chemical agents. It now probably has

weaponized sarin into aerial bombs and SCUD missile warheads, giving Syria the

capability to use chemical agents against Israeli targets. Syria has not signed the

CWC.

Syria is pursuing biological weapons. It has an adequate biotechnical infrastructure to support a small biological warfare program. Without significant foreign assistance, it is unlikely that Syria could advance to the manufacture of significant

amounts of biological weapons for several years. Syria has signed the BWC.

Syria depends on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical and biological

warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. The

U.S. has pressed possible supplier states to Syria to stop such trade, thereby making acquisition of such materials more difficult. The 33-nation Australia Group coordinates adoption of stricter export controls in many countries.

Cuba

The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use

biotechnology to rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could support

BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.

Russia

Serious concerns remain about the status of Russian chemical and biological warfare programs, the accuracy of the information Russia provided in its declarations,

and the willingness of the Russian defense establishment to eliminate these capabilities. Further, given that Russia still faces serious economic and political challenges and the large number of weapons involved, the possibility that some Russians might sell chemical and biological materials, technologies and knowledge to

other countries or groups continues to exist.

Russia has stated publicly that it opposes proliferation of chemical and biological

weapons. Because of its economic situation and serious financial shortfalls, Russia

remains concerned about the costs of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It believes the high destruction costs of its large chemical weapons stockpile

requires Western assistance.

Moscow has declared the world’s largest stockpile of chemical agents: 39,969 metric tons of chemical agent, mostly weaponized, including artillery, aerial bombs,

rockets, and missile warheads. U.S. estimates of the Russian stockpile generally are

still larger. The inventory includes a wide variety of nerve and blister agents in

weapons and stored in bulk. Some Russian chemical weapons incorporate agent mixtures, while others have added thickening agents to increase the time of contamination on the target.

According to the Russian CWC declaration, all former Soviet chemical weapons

are stored at seven locations in Russia, mostly in the Volga/Ural section of the country. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, it carried out an extensive consolidation

process of chemical warfare material, from sites within Russia and from non-Russian locations.

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Russian officials do not deny research has continued but assert that it aims to

develop defenses against chemical weapons, a purpose that is not banned by the

CWC. Many of the components for new binary agents developed by the former Soviet Union are not on the CWC’s schedules of chemicals and have legitimate civil

applications, clouding their association with chemical weapons use. However, under

the CWC, all chemical weapons are banned,’ whether or not they are on the CWC

schedules.

The former Soviet offensive biological program was the world’s largest and consisted of both military facilities and nonmilitary research and development institutes. This program employed thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians

throughout the former Soviet Union, with some biological warfare agents developed

and weaponized as early as the 1950s. The Russian government has committed to

ending the former Soviet BW program. It has closed or abandoned plants outside

the Russian Federation and these facilities have been engaged through cooperative

threat reduction programs. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about Russia’s offensive biological warfare capabilities remain.

Key components of the former Soviet program remain largely intact and may support a possible future mobilization capability for the production of biological agents

and delivery systems. Moreover, work outside the scope of legitimate biological defense activity may be occurring now at selected facilities within Russia. Such activity, if offensive in nature, would contravene the BWC, to which the former Soviet

government is a signatory. It would also contradict statements by top Russian political leaders that offensive activity has ceased.

The United States remains concerned by the threat of proliferation, both of biological warfare expertise and related hardware, from Russia. Russian scientists,

many of whom either are unemployed or unpaid for an extended period, may be vulnerable to recruitment by states trying to establish biological warfare programs. The

availability of worldwide information exchange via the Internet facilitates this process.

Russian entities remain a significant source of dual use biotechnology, chemicals,

production technology, and equipment for Iran. Russia’s biological and chemical expertise makes it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and

training on BW and CW agent production processes.

China

I believe that the Chinese have an advanced chemical warfare program, including

research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. Chinese military forces have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, having studied

the tactics and doctrine of the former Soviet Union. Chinese military forces conduct

defensive chemical warfare training and are prepared to operate in contaminated

environments. In the near future, China is likely to achieve the necessary expertise

and delivery capability to integrate chemical weapons successfully into overall military operations.

I believe that China’s current inventory of chemical agents includes the full range

of traditional agents, and China is researching more advanced agents. It has a wide

variety of delivery systems for chemical agents, including tube artillery, rockets,

mortars, landmines, aerial bombs, sprayers, and SRBMs. China signed the Chemical

Weapons Convention in January 1993, and ratified it shortly after the U.S. ratification in April 1997.

China acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1984, though

many believe its declarations under the BWC confidence-building measures inaccurate and incomplete. China has consistently claimed that it has never researched,

manufactured, produced, or possessed biological weapons and that it would never

do so. However, China possesses an advanced biotechnology infrastructure and the

biocontainment facilities necessary to perform research and development on lethal

pathogens. It is possible that China has maintained the offensive biological warfare

program it is believed to have had before acceding to the BWC.

What is the potential access of international terrorist groups to these stocks and capability to produce and employ CBW?

Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons has been growing and probably will increase in the near term. The threat is real and proven. The ease of acquisition or production of some of these weapons and the scale and terror they can

cause, will likely fuel interest in using them to terrorize. The transport and dispersal techniques also are manageable and can be made effective easily, as seen recently in using the mail as a delivery system to spread anthrax.

Many of the technologies associated with the development of chemical and biological agents, have legitimate civil applications. The increased availability of these

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technologies, particularly if a group is already in the United States and therefore

not subject to many of the controls in place that monitor and limit the export of

these technologies, coupled with the relative ease of producing chemical or biological

agents, makes the threat very real.

In addition, the proliferation of such weapons raises the possibility that some

states or rogue entities within these states could provide chemical or biological

weapons to terrorists. It remains unlikely that a state sponsor would provide such

a weapon to a terrorist group. But an extremist group with no ties to a particular

state (but which likely does have friends in state institutions) could acquire or steal

such a weapon and attempt to use it.

How well can the U.S. monitor the threat?

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons continues to change in ways

that make it more difficult to monitor and control, increasing the risk of substantial

surprise. Countries and terrorists determined to maintain and develop these capabilities are demonstrating greater proficiency in the use of denial and deception efforts.

State programs have been placing significant emphasis on self-sufficiency. In bolstering their domestic production capabilities, and thereby reducing their dependence on others, they can better insulate their programs against interdiction and disruption. Although these indigenous capabilities may not always substitute well for

foreign imports—particularly for more advanced technologies—in many cases they

may prove adequate.

In addition, as their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of technology could become new suppliers of technology and expertise to others. We are increasingly concerned about ‘‘secondary proliferation’’ from maturing state-sponsored

programs, such as those in Iran and North Korea. These countries and others not

members of the Australia Group do not adhere to its export constraints. Apart from

governments, private companies, scientists, and engineers from countries such as

China and Russia may provide CBW-related assistance to countries or terrorist organizations. Weak or unenforceable national export controls, especially on dual-use

technology and goods, coupled with the growing availability of technology, makes

the spread of CBW easier, and therefore more likely.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I cannot assure you that we can predict and protect

against the threats of CBW attack on the Homeland or American bases, embassies,

and interests abroad. The technology for CBW is too widely available and the precursors too widespread for us to track. Such weapons tend to be clumsy, subject to

vagaries of wind, weather, and ventilation systems. Moreover, the users rarely have

any immunity from them. We must worry, however, that in the hands of a fanatic,

CW or BW agents could cause great loss of life.

I look forward to you questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection we place it in the record and

I’d suggest if the Chairman doesn’t mind we have 10-minute

rounds. There’s only three of us. We could coherently follow-up on

some questions.

Let me say, Mr. Secretary, at the outset, I appreciate the way

you have segmented your presentation and in a sense what, Senator Helms obviously he speaks for himself, but what Senator

Helms and I are attempting to do in a way, my words not his, is

sort of provide a glossary and a vocabulary for our colleagues on

how to begin to get a handle on this issue.

We both agree that this is notwithstanding the degree to which

we each support or don’t support national missile defense and how

fast we move it, et cetera. This is, irrespective of that, whether we

got full bore or we slow or whatever, we both believe this is an incredibly urgent problem that we have to attend to and it has not,

at least speaking for myself, I don’t think it’s sunk into the consciousness of our colleagues or the country how urgent this concern

is.

And so what I don’t want to do, though, and neither of us want

to do is unduly alarm the public. So we’re trying to be as straightforward as we can and to get down if we can and we’re going to

17

have many of these hearings, try to determine whether there’s an

emerging consensus among you and your colleagues behind you

and others in this country and around the world as to what are the

most likely threats, what are the things, how likely are they and

what do they have to be in combination with to come to fruition.

And that’s why I quite frankly like your, as you said it was your

way of looking at it, battlefield weapons, terrorist weapons and

weapons of mass destruction. And so as I go through my questions

here, I want you to understand that if you know the purpose, you

may be able to help me if I don’t ask the question precisely the way

to elicit the answer that you being around this place long enough

know I’m trying to—the issue I’m trying to get my arms around.

And so you had indicated that in your statement, you talk about

the various things we can do to deal with all of this including, and

I’ll get back to it, an arsenal of response including arms control

being part of the mix, but let me leave that aside for the moment.

Why would, in a generic sense, why would a terrorist group like

al Qaeda, let’s just pick al Qaeda. Why would a terrorist group like

al Qaeda in your view need the help of a state, a sponsor in effect,

to be able to utilize a chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction?

Your definition of that is it kills a whole lot of people. Anthrax

is not a weapon of mass destruction necessarily at least as was use

of the mail, but obviously certain pathogens released into the atmosphere in sufficient quantities, obviously certain chemical weapons dispersed in sufficient quantities could in fact have a devastating impact in terms of the number of people killed.

So just muse with us a moment why for the bigger bang for the

buck for the real serious fall out why would an al Qaeda need, hypothetically, one of the states we mentioned to be sponsor, in effect,

to their effort?

Mr. FORD. Well, I must make it clear that I’m not expert on

chemical and biological weapons and I obviously, like you, have

been compelled to try to think about this issue more and more, particularly after 9/11.

My sense is that getting ahold of small quantities of chemical

and biological weapons material is difficult but clearly within the

capability over time for major terrorist groups like al Qaeda,

Hezbollah and others. And we’ve seen in several places in the

world that people are crazy enough or committed enough to blow

themselves up or to kill themselves in order to make a point.

And when you talk about a few dozen people, or even a few more

than that, those types of actions are quite possible by terrorist

groups because you don’t have to have the organization and planning a sophisticated device. It can be a very primitive device equivalent to the conventional weapon of strapping dynamite around

your waist and going into a pizza restaurant and blowing yourself

up.

And I don’t belittle that because as we saw with anthrax, it has

a huge impact. If that happened in Detroit or if it happened in LA,

it would have a huge impact on Americans’ perceptions of their

safety and be concerned about what happened to their kids.

Having said that, I think that many of us believe that the preferred weapon for terrorists right now would still be some sort of

18

conventional explosion. They can kill a lot more people a lot easier

than they can with these exotic chemical and biological weapons

and probably have less chance of blowback or impact on them. And

so that blowing up a school, attacking a sports event, if you want

to have an impact, you probably can do that a lot easier than you

can with trying to use a chemical or biological agent.

If you’re trying to think about how to poison the water of a major

metropolitan area where tens of thousands of people could be killed

or if you’re trying to think about how you would kill over time a

large number of people on the East Coast with some sort of disease, we’re really talking about a sophistication in packaging and

delivery and organization that I think even nation states would

have difficulty putting together.

There’s a logistics and organizational requirement that you can

try it, but you’d probably fail if you’re not careful. So that it’s the

sophistication of the weapon, the sophistication of the delivery

means that while best done by terrorists, probably is beyond their

planning and scientific capability to put together effective weapons

of mass destruction.

One of the states or a group within a state could prepare that,

but not want to be fingered as being the culprit and could pass it

on to a terrorist group. I think at least in my mind, that’s a more

likely scenario than al Qaeda’s thinking this up all by itself.

Now, having been one of those who probably would’ve said you

gotta be crazy if someone came and said I think they might fly an

airplane into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, so part of

the problem for us in the intelligence community is thinking the

unthinkable, the things that might occur even if we don’t have

much faith that it could.

But I still believe that it’s more likely that they would have to

have the aid of some state or some group within a state to pull off

the major weapons of mass destruction sort of effort successfully.

The CHAIRMAN. To put this in context, I asked in the middle of

the anthrax scare and I think it was when our distinguished doctor

colleague was talking to a joint caucus of Democrats and Republicans, Senator Frist, and I remember asking the question about

not of Dr. Frist, but of some of the intelligence people about the

ability to pollute a water supply in a city to such a degree that

thousands of people would die.

And what I wanted to deal with was the image in my home state

of people thinking someone could take a little vial and pour a vial

into the reservoir near where I live or in the Brandywine River

where we get our drinking water and thousands of people die. The

truth is that is not possible. There is no such little vial that I’m

aware of. You’re talking about tons of material being dropped in

some cases, so your point being it is not all that easy, but we have

to anticipate this possibility occurring.

I’m going to come back in the second round and ask you a few

questions about the intelligence community’s assessment of motivation for these countries. For example, unrelated, assume Iran were

a thoughtful democracy. Were I Iran, I might very well be doing

what Iran was doing because of what Iraq did to me. It’s harder

for me to understand why Syria might, but any rate but I’ll come

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back to that. I yield to the Senator from North Carolina, Senator

Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, there was a time when I accepted all of these so-called problems as problems that we ought to be

looking at. These are just as important and so forth. It ain’t so.

You think of it in terms of your children and grandchildren and

what they are facing on this kind of problem and then you have

a wake up call. I remember when Sam Nunn and Jim Woolsey

came here that day. That was sort of a wake up call. I don’t know

whether you know about that or not, but they had visited the sites

and the laboratories in Russia where all this is going on.

So Russia’s not just fooling around with it. It may not be that

we are just not fooling around with it, too. I don’t know, I confess,

the extent to which we are doing it, but we are headed toward the

possibility of something very bad. Now, the most recent national intelligence estimate indicates, we talk about Syria and Iran and

Russia’s assistance to those two countries, and I just wondered

what difference would it make if Russia were to cease its proliferation, total proliferation, what impact would this have on the development of chemical and biological programs in just these two countries?

I think that’s the way to put it in perspective. How much good

would it do if they stopped doing it for those two countries?

Mr. FORD. Well, I think it would make a considerable difference.

I would simply add to your thought that as I was talking to our

friends in Moscow, I think we ought to talk to our friends in Europe and—— Senator HELMS. You mean—— Mr. FORD [continuing].——ask them to do the same thing. Because I think this is one of those cases where it’s not just Russia

and China, ones we sort of look to first for giving these things to

countries in the Middle East, but also in terms of chemical and biological weapons, often the most critical pieces of technology or shipment are from our friends in Europe.

Senator HELMS. Let me go back to my original premise. Do we

have any evidence that terrorist organizations have been able to

acquire chemical and biological weapons from Russia? Now, we’ve

had all sorts of meetings on the fourth floor, Joe, but I have never

heard that question answered to my satisfaction.

Mr. FORD. You know, I’m not sure that I—I can’t really go into

any details, but my sense is that during the Cold War, during the

Soviet Union period, that particularly Russian chemical defense

and biological warfare defense capabilities were shared with many

of their allies and friends.

For most of the countries who have been doing offensive BW and

CW, it starts and is often done under the cover of defensive activities, chemical warfare, biological warfare. So I don’t know, I can’t

give you the exact answer that the Soviet Union did, but they

clearly were helpful in providing chemical and biological weapons

information to a whole host of countries that modeled themselves

after the Soviet military forces.

Senator HELMS. You have made my point. You have made my

point. Neither do we know. And I’ve asked the question and they

would get back to me and all that sort of thing. Now, what is our

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intelligence estimate of the likely use by Iran of these dangerous— I’ll only just pick out one. What’s the likelihood that they would do

it?

Mr. FORD. And the important variable there is the what. What

would they do? I think that Chairman Biden suggested that one of

the reasons that motivates Iran is the concern about past conflict

with Iraq so that some of their chemical and biological activities

are designed as a deterrent or possible use against Iraq should it

attack Iran.

I think there’s also the concern on the part of the Iranians that

if there should be a conflict with Israel that both Israel and the

United States would be involved and that our superior conventional

capabilities would need to be deterred in some way or hope they

could deter it in some way so they would also be motivated to—— Senator HELMS. Of course, they got to think of tit for tat, too.

You know, what are they going to do to their own countries and

this is a factor that’s almost impossible to apply. Now, I don’t want

to leave our friends in Beijing out of this thing, you know. What’s

happening there? What are they doing to proliferate if anything?

Mr. FORD [continuing]. In terms of proliferation, the record is not

clear and particularly we probably could go into somewhat more

detail at a classified level. I think that they have been more involved in dual use and things that could be used by a recipient for

chemical and biological. I have no evidence that I know of that they

have provided chemical weapons or biological weapons——

Senator HELMS. Nor do I.

Mr. FORD [continuing]. They develop for themselves. That has

something—China hasn’t done that.

Senator HELMS. Well, we keep mentioning Iraq and we forget, I

think, that there are a hell of a lot of folks over there who don’t

like Saddam Hussein and if we or somebody or everybody should

concentrate on getting that guy out of there, I think Iraq would be

once more one of the countries that we can most rely upon because

these folks come to see me and I’m sure they come to see every

Senator and House Member, but they are pleading for help and it’s

difficult to know how best to help them.

Now, Joe mentioned and you did, too, I think, the biological

agents and chemicals that Iraq is trying to acquire. What type specifically, do you know that, are they trying to acquire?

Mr. FORD. I would have to take that question and get back to

you. Primarily because any details like that would have been acquired through collection of intelligence and I’ll have to just take

the question if you don’t mind.

Senator HELMS. Very well. I’d like for you to check your sources

and let us know what you find out. Now, back to cousin Saddam

Hussein, I think he’s continuing his ballistic missile program. We

have some indication of that. I will not go further in describing

what the indication is. And I wonder if you have any feeling about

how far if anything he has been able to do to weaponize these

chemo-bio-agents, I suppose you call them, into warheads and

that’s the ultimate answer to what the danger question is all about.

Mr. FORD. Well, both simply by chance and also by emphasis, we

probably know more about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons

programs than many of the other countries that we’re looking at.

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Senator HELMS. I think that’s right.

Mr. FORD. And it’s at least in terms of chemical weapons, not

only do we know that they have built them in the past, as I suggested they had used them in the past, but there are suspicions

based on our inspections and our discussions with Iraqis over many

years that there are a lot of weapons that they can’t account for.

So there is a large consensus that in fact, while I may not be

able to prove it to you today, I certainly believe that they have a

stockpile of chemical weapons weaponized ready to go if they

should need them.

Biological agents are somewhat more problematical, but I think

that most people that look at Iraq on chemical, biological and nuclear will—if they don’t have it now, they’re working on it and that

if given lifting of sanctions or some major change that it makes it

a little bit easier for them they will have them and that the moment that they are no longer under international controls that

they’ll have the whole range of weapons. And we see the activity,

we see the emphasis, we see the resources, we see the brain

power—— Senator HELMS. All right.

Mr. FORD [continuing].——It’s made difficult for them because

we’re all watching very closely, but they’re still trying.

Senator HELMS. No wonder John Glenn was so smart when he

was in the Senate. One final question yes or no, does the United

States have the ability to detect biological and chemical weapons

being smuggled into the United States?

Mr. FORD. Sir, I don’t know, but that’s a good question and I will

try to get you an answer.

Senator HELMS. Okay. If you’ll do that. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Ford,

in your concluding statement of your prepared testimony, you say,

‘‘I cannot assure you that we can predict and protect against the

threats of CBW attack on the homeland’’ and you point out, that

an attack could cause great loss of life.

Isn’t the whole thrust of the Administration’s new policy to address these threats and reduce the possibility of such attacks occurring? By that I mean opening up the countries that have weapons

of mass destruction.

At the heart of the war against terrorism, it seems to me is the

thought that we must gain international transparency with regard

to Iran, Iraq or others or we are going to have war. We’re going

to have military force employed. In other words, the President is

saying this is not something you sort of wait around for for years

and maybe it develops, or maybe it doesn’t. This is a critical point

in history.

A lot of our allies and members of the coalition in Afghanistan

are very nervous about this. They have the same estimate you have

this morning. We’re all vulnerable, but they’re worried the President is serious about eliminating the intersection of terrorist cells

and weapons of mass destruction and that this policy could lead to

a long war.

I suppose what I’m probing for this morning is, is there a sense

and presentation of all this by the Administration so that the

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American people understand what’s at stake here; or are we likely

to have a lot of hearings about who has what, and how they got

it; or are we going to aggressively remove the source?

As I understand the quarrel with Iraq, there is no international

transparency with regard to possible WMD stockpiles. Leaving

aside Saddam Hussein and the past there, the international community shares our concerns. They want to know what Iraq has in

their stockpile.

So, people from Iraq have gone to see Kofi Annan, Secretary

General of the United Nations, offering some arrangement, but apparently it was unsatisfying to everyone, including the Secretary

General. Eventually, if Iraq says, ‘‘No you cannot come in, we are

going to deny you knowledge of what we are doing,’’ then it’s likely

to precipitate military action and we will find out what’s occurring.

I think that there has to be some sense, not necessarily in your

testimony, but in the overall discussion of this problem that we’re

in a war and the objective is to establish transparency. And the importance of doing that is tremendously vital to changing the whole

picture.

As you point out, there could be individual terrorists or groups

of people who get their hands on some dangerous material and kill

people. But as you’re pointing out, it’s very difficult to poison the

whole reservoir or to kill tens of thousands of people in a city without having a fairly active organization. If not a state at least some

portion of a government or some apparatus, some infrastructure.

I think we have the ability to stop that if we have the political

will to do so. We will remove the opportunity for groups to organize

and establish themselves.

This is just a personal editorial, but it’s precipitated by the

thought, as you’ve said, this is a gloomy subject and it is, but it’s

brighter because we’re alert. We’re not passive as we might have

been if you had testified a year ago. We’re prepared to do something about it.

We can do something about it in a big way with Russia now.

Here is a country that in terms of chemical warfare is somewhat

cooperative, and 40,000 metric tons of weapons are reasonably secure in seven locations with Russians and Americans providing security. And the Russians having a palpable fear of the results of

the stuff getting out, as we do, to Chechens or others in their own

country where Russians would be killed.

But the problem, as you pointed out, is the deadline for the

Chemical Weapons Convention may not be met in 2012, and it

comes down to money. There hasn’t been very much in the Russian

budget for this. Now, the current Duma has appropriated some

money, and Congress has stepped forward. So at Shchuchye, there

may be in fact some action this year to start destroying those

weapons.

Although it may be true that nerve gas and other types of weapons are hard to circulate, I observed in Shchuchye as perhaps you

have that there are 2 million hells being stored there. I put three

85mm shells in a thin suitcase that somebody could carry out of

the place. Now nobody’s going to, we’re guarding it, but these

weapons are easily portable.

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For a long time it’s been hard for some of us to convince our colleagues that we ought to cooperate with Russia and destroy these

weapons. Some feel that the Russians made their bed, let them

sleep in it. It’s expensive to do. Why should American taxpayers destroy the first one of those shells? But I think we’re over that hurdle. We sort of understand that the stuff is portable and proliferation could occur.

What is the Administration’s general thrust with regard to this

whole problem? It’s been an ordeal getting to one of the seven locations. We know where they all are. We now agree that 95 percent

of the problem is in Russia and they have a reasonably cooperative

government, but is there an organizational thrust or a budget

thrust on the part of our Administration to get to the source? Find

out about it, work with people to destroy it.

Mr. FORD. Senator Lugar, as I know you appreciate, intelligence

officers are very good at telling you that the sky is falling. We’re

not so good at telling you how to protect yourself from that or what

you need to do. And it may seem like a cop out, but in fact it really

is a different job and I will tell my colleagues at State that they

should come down and brief the committee or see you personally

and talk to you about what we intend to do about this.

What we are telling our policy colleagues is that this is one you

can’t go to sleep on. That everything that we see is that a proliferation of these very dangerous capabilities of chemical and biological

weapons both by states and by terrorist groups and that given that

proliferation, the chances for use are increasing and that if they

are used, we’ll never forgive ourselves if we don’t do something

about it.

I have to tell you that I still am more worried by a nuclear attack than I am a chemical or biological attack. I think that terrorist use of these weapons can occur, and I would mourn the

death of even a few people; but I would also hate to wake up one

morning and realize that instead of just the World Trade Center

disappearing that New York City had disappeared or Washington

or some other place and that either by an accidental launch or by

some five crazy guys that get a hold of an ICBM from one of the

nations that have them and shoot it at us.

But that’s not say that biological and chemical aren’t dangerous.

They are. And they’re very difficult to deal with.

Senator LUGAR. Let me just to say in the limited time I have

that I think nuclear probably is a greater threat, but since we’re

concentrating today——

Mr. FORD. I understand. I understand.

Senator LUGAR [continuing].——on chemical and biological. With

the biological, we have a very talented man working for NunnLugar in the Pentagon now, Andy Webber. His exploits have been

told by Judy Miller in her book, ‘‘Germs.’’ He has visited many biological facilities and made it possible for people like me to get into

them.

I mention this because the sharing of information about what we

have found has not been very wide. I point out anecdotally as I visited with British Intelligence on the way back from NATO in January, they were amazed that we physically had been wandering

24

around biological facilities, examining the contents, trying to put

some security beyond barbed wire around some of these places.

I think you know with our NATO allies, with our European

friends, there’s potential for a great deal of cooperation, as we simply clue them in as to what we know with regard to chemical situations, too. The degree of intelligence perspective in all these things

is very uneven and I think we have the benefit of being far ahead

in that respect due to the intrusions, but the—— Mr. FORD. But I think some our NATO and European friends are

in fact helping very much with Russia—— Senator LUGAR. Right.

Mr. FORD [continuing].——in destruction and control of the

chemical weapons.

Senator LUGAR. They have indeed; and the Germans and the

Norwegians, the Canadians, the British all have stepped up now to

the Shchuchye project, probably because of your efforts and those

at State. I applaud you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Frist.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, Secretary Ford for an outstanding perspective to what I think is one

of the most pressing issues of our time. And that is the threat of

biological, and chemical, but biological terror, in part because unlike the nuclear, we don’t fully understand biological terror.

We saw the assault of anthrax on our soil and we were unprepared. We were unprepared for that. This hearing is very important because it shows the rich matrix involved that is our international intelligence which really hasn’t done a very good job in

speaking, I believe, to our public health system. There hasn’t been

the need to in part because the science hadn’t been there. We

weren’t fully aware that the technology of weaponization is in the

hands of others and it is this far developed as it is.

And I applaud the Chairman and the Ranking Member to paint

this much larger picture and then it’s incumbent upon us in the

United States at Congress with the leadership of the Administration to weave this story together in such a way that families listening to this testimony around this country feel secure and feel safe

and know what to do.

One area we haven’t talked very much about I’d like to come

back to after I make a few more general statements is the whole

issue of smallpox because I don’t want us to leave this hearing and

think that it does take a large state or a lot of money or a lot of

sophistication. Because it doesn’t and that’s what’s unique.

In terms of biological weapons, these germs, these bacteria, you

don’t see the weapon. It doesn’t take very much money. They

spread themselves. They can be contagious, not all of them are.

The perpetrator is long gone. The weapon, you can’t smell it, you

can’t see it, you can’t touch it, you can’t taste it and the victim may

be six or seven days later, plus that victim can spread the germ

to other victims.

As a nation, I don’t think Americans are fully aware of the risk.

In your written statement, ‘‘Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons has been growing and probably will increase in the

near term. The threat is real and proven.’’ You said it in your oral

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testimony as well, but it’s very important that we in Congress hear

that and I would say that local elected officials and local governments hear that as well because they’re the ones who are going to

respond.

It’s not going to likely be the military where conventionally we

think in response to these terrorist assaults. America’s not yet

aware of how real the threat is, even in spite of anthrax which hit

here in Washington, the East Coast and Florida and New York and

Connecticut.

Your statement that it’s increasing or that the threat is real and

proven and probably will increase is important for America to hear

as well. We haven’t seen it yet. I don’t know what’s going to come,

but a terrorist whose purpose is to terrorize, to put fear, to paralyze infrastructure now know that it works. Before anthrax we

didn’t know. Now they know it works even though anthrax in the

large scope of things was quite small. I say that because I think

the risk is real, that it’s increasing, that we remain vulnerable

today.

We’re responding as a government, but we still remain underprepared. The intentional release of potentially deadly bacteria and viruses or poisonous agents or chemical agents that we’re talking

about is a reality today. Ounce for ounce, whether it’s anthrax or

whether it is smallpox, these are among the most lethal weapons

of mass destruction. They’re more powerful than the hydrogen

bomb today potentially, that can be used and if you’re a terrorist

and you know that, it gives you great strength if your purpose indeed is to terrorize.

There have been many past studies that we kind of put aside

that we use as a call to action, but I think we need to go back and

look at those. In 1993, the Office of Technology and Assessment estimated that under the right atmospheric conditions, dispersion by

an airplane of 220 pounds of anthrax spores over Washington, D.C.

could result in up to 3 million deaths.

Well, we’re much better prepared today I believe with the way

government has responded, with the stockpiles of medicines, but

what about smallpox. We didn’t go into the agents today, Mr.

Chairman, but what about botulinum toxin? We will in the second

panel. Or tularemia or the plaque which has wiped a larger percentage of the population than any disease. These agents have been

identified by our intelligence community and now we need to communicate with America to make sure that we do appropriately respond.

As we’ve heard and will continue to hear, the threats from biological agents are real. The terrorist groups have the resources.

They have the motivation now we know to use germ warfare and

indeed, we need to recognize as a country as we merge our foreign

relations, our intelligence, our foreign policy with what goes on

here at home, the weapons of choice in the wars of the 21st century

may well be botulinum toxin, anthrax and smallpox.

You mentioned al Qaeda. Osama bin Ladin has said publicly that

it is his religious duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction including biological and chemical weapons. I appreciate you going far

in saying what evidence we have to date, but in truth as you well

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said and even implied, there may be more than we know today and

we’re aggressively looking in that arena.

People say why today and in part it’s because of these rapid advances in agent delivery. We know that other nations have loaded

warheads, Scud missiles with biological weapons, or you know that

and we on the panel, but a lot of America doesn’t know that. It’s

all ready been done. They’ve been loaded. They haven’t been fire,

haven’t been sent, but that’s how far along.

Technology’s advanced even since that point in time in terms of

how to deliver these agents. Mr. Chairman and Senator Helms, I

think are doing a tremendous job and I look forward to working

with them on their bill, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of

this year. It’s a bill I’ve studied that is very, very important as we

look at both emerging potential agents as well as agents that we

know of today.

This whole issue about are we prepared as a nation is important.

Again, that’s why today’s hearing is so important because physicians are not trained to recognize these agents. Physicians are not

trained to look and see what smallpox is. The anthrax rash, we’ve

simply not been trained to look at that in the past.

Every moment counts here because how quickly we pick up and

diagnose pretty much defines how quickly we can stop the spread.

Therefore, I think it is very important that you brief us either privately or otherwise what are the seven agents? How real is that

risk of smallpox? And I’ll come back and close with a question on

this, but smallpox, it takes one person and if that person’s infected

and they go to an airport, they can infect 10 people and those 10

people can be all across the United States of America.

So it really does go tracing it all the way back. We don’t have

enough vaccine today. Period. Now, I said we don’t have enough

vaccine to vaccinate everybody today. We do have enough vaccine

I think to respond appropriately, but we’re not going to have what

we’re going to have in a year from now. So in the meantime, it’s

important for us to know who has the smallpox virus. It’s been

eradicated as a disease, but who has that virus?

And I’ll close with that question for you and I know you probably

can’t answer that fully right now, but it is important for us to

know.

Let me just say because now I’ve sort of painted this picture that

I’m concerned about that we are responding as a government. It’s

been remarkable to me since October. We passed a Bio-terrorism

Preparedness Act of 2001 that the Senate passed. It sets a comprehensive framework for responsiveness. The President and the

Congress has responded by increasing funding to about $3 billion

from about $500 million in one year. That money’s down to the

local level. In the President’s budget, it will be going up to about

$6 billion if we approve that aspect of his budget, which I’m very

supportive of as we go forward.

With that and I’ll ask that my opening statement be made a part

of the record in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Frist follows.]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL FRIST

We are here to address one of the most pressing issues of our time—the threat

of chemical and biological terror. America is not aware that the risk is real and significant. We are vulnerable. We are not unprepared, but we are underprepared.

Biological and chemical terrorism, the intentional release of potentially deadly

bacteria, viruses, toxins, or poisonous chemical agents, are a terrifying reality.

Ounce for ounce, biological agents such as anthrax and smallpox are among the

most lethal weapons of mass destruction known. In 1993, the Office of Technology

Assessment estimated that under the right atmospheric conditions, dispersion by

airplane of 220 pounds of anthrax spores over Washington, D.C. could result in up

to 3 million deaths. And as we know all too well, the mailing of anthrax-laced letters last fall infected 18 people and killed five innocent Americans.

As we will hear today, the threats from biological and chemical agents are real.

Terrorist groups have the resources and the motivation to use germ warfare. The

weapons of choice in the first war of the 21st century may be tularemia, smallpox,

ebola, botulin toxin, and anthrax. But this should come as no surprise. Osama bin

Laden has said publicly that it is his religious duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons. Rapid advances in agent delivery technology have made the weaponization of germs much easier. Finally, with the

fall of the Soviet Union, the expertise of thousands of scientists knowledgeable in

germ warfare may be available to the highest bidder.

Bioterrorism remains a significant threat to our country. Exposed individuals will

most likely show up in emergency rooms, physician offices, or clinics, with nondescript symptoms or ones mimicking the common cold or flu. Most likely, physicians and other health care providers will not attribute these symptoms to a bioweapon. If the bioagent is communicable, such as small pox, many more people may

be infected in the interim, including our health care workers. Experts say it may

take as long as 24 to 48 hours after a bioterrorist attack occurs before federal assistance can arrive, making it the critical time for preventing mass casualties.

Unfortunately, as we also will hear today, America is not yet fully prepared to

meet the threat of biological warfare. Great strides have been made in the past

three years; but there is much more to be done.

It is a frightening but true fact that a biological or chemical attack on our soil

could be even more deadly and destructive than the recent attacks on the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon. Biological weapons, in particular, pose considerable

challenges which are different from those of standard terrorist weapons. The delayed onset of symptoms, difficulty in tracking the source of an attack and high communicability are among the factors that make bioterrorism a real and serious

threat. A terrorist attack using a deadly infectious agent—whether delivered

through the air, through our foods, or by other means—could kill or sicken millions

of Americans.

To counter this threat, a substantial new federal investment in our public health

infrastructure, increased intelligence and preventive measures, expedited development and production of vaccines and treatments, and constant vigilance on the part

of our nation’s health care workers is required.

Recently, legislation I introduced, with Senator Kennedy, to help prepare to meet

this threat was signed into law. The ‘‘Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act

of 2000’’ provides a coherent framework for responding to health threats resulting

from bioterrorism. It authorizes a series of important initiatives to strengthen the

nation’s public health system, improve hospital response capabilities, upgrade the

Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s rapid identification and early warning

systems, assure adequate staffing and training of health professionals to diagnose

and care for victims of bioterrorism, enhance our research and development capabilities, and authorizes additional measures necessary to prevent, prepare, and respond

to the threat of biological or chemical attacks.

The Frist-Kennedy ‘‘Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001’’ builds on the foundation laid by the ‘‘Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000’’ by authorizing

additional measures to improve our health system’s capacity to respond to bioterrorism, protect the nation’s food supply, speed the development and production of

vaccines and other countermeasures, enhance coordination of federal activities on

bioterrorism, and increase our investment in fighting bioterrorism at the local,

state, and national levels.

The Congress and the Administration has now provided an additional $1.4 billion

for these activities; the vast majority of these funds would go toward a one-time investment in strengthening the response capabilities of our hospitals, health care

professionals, and local public health agencies that would form the front-line response team in the aftermath of a bioweapon attack.

28

Arms control negotiators have used the term ‘‘dual use’’ to refer to biologic production facilities that have the potential to be used by some countries to produce vaccines for children one week and then produce bacteria or viruses for biologic weapons the next. But we can also use the term ‘‘dual use’’ differently: The same infrastructure investments used to prepare our public health communities, doctors and

federal agencies to detect, diagnose and respond to smallpox epidemic resulting from

a biologic attack can also be used to detect and respond to outbreaks of natural occurring diseases like West Nile.

In addition to strengthening our defenses against a bioterrorist event, the improved public health capacities resulting from preparation and planning will lead

to substantial health benefits in dealing with inevitable natural occurrence of

emerging infectious diseases.

Last fall, the GAO released a report, ‘‘Challenges in Improving Infectious Disease

Surveillance Systems,’’ requested by Senators Leahy, McConnell, Feingold, and myself. It concludes that global disease surveillance, especially in developing countries,

is woefully inadequate to provide advance warning about newly emerged diseases,

including antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis, or the suspected use or testing of dangerous organisms as bioweapons. Not only would improving international surveillance networks and capacities help poor countries meet their health care needs, it

is in our own security interest to know about emerging threats if we are to appropriately respond quickly and effectively.

It is essential that we take steps immediately to fill the gaps in our nation’s defense and surveillance system against chemical and biological terrorism, as well as

our public health infrastructure. It is essential that Congress to take the steps necessary to make sure that our nation is fully prepared to respond to any threat to

our people. I look forward to working with my colleagues to meet these goals.

Senator FRIST. Secretary Ford, again I thank you for your overall

presentation. On smallpox itself, is it an agent that we should be

worried about today in terms of international terrorism including

terrorism on our soil here?

Mr. FORD. The very simple answer, Senator, is yes, very much

so. The work that you and others in the Congress have done—at

least from an intelligence officer’s perspective—has not only been

important, but better late than never. This threat has been growing for some time and we can’t warn you enough that the threat

is real and that it’s going to come and that we’re going to need to

be prepared.

At least from the intelligence community, we’re trying to warn

you also that we can’t see all of this. We’re not going to be able,

unless we’re lucky, to give you the sort of specific tactical warning

that you need. That should suggest to most people that we have

to get ready.

Now, I don’t know any intelligence officers who aren’t of a very—

their view is that we should defend as much as we can; public

health, homeland defense, increase the protections at the borders,

et cetera. But most of us believe that we can’t rest just on defense,

that we have to be aggressively going out and with all of our diplomatic and economic—and military, if necessary—means deal with

the problems of terrorism and those countries that are supporting

terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

And that it’s this combination of preparedness at home, being

smarter, the public understanding what the dangers are, the realistic dangers and understanding the exaggerations that have been

made in some cases. But also we need to know that we’re going to

have to go get people. We’re going to have to continue to arrest terrorists. We’re going to continue to have to push diplomatic measures to try to get a handle on this.

But it’s not one we can just ignore any longer. We can’t just walk

away from it. This is one that if we are faithful to our children and

29

our grandchildren, this is one we’re going to work on from now on.

And unfortunately there’s no easy answer. There’s no simple answer. Just simply the interest that you and the others on the committee have added an important step in the right direction.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow-up with just a few questions and

I invite any of my colleagues to either interrupt me and or add

their own questions and I’ll be brief.

As usual, Senator Lugar stated it most succinctly, transparency

or war. And I think that’s really the choice that we’re going to have

to make and the decisions that others are going to have to take in

terms of whether we mean it. With regard to transparency, has the

intelligence community done an assessment as to what kind of inspection regime would be needed in Iraq to satisfy us that there

was transparency?

Mr. FORD. There is not a formal intelligence community assessment of that. I’m sure that various intelligence agencies have

thought about this and written things. We in fact in INR have just

completed in the last week our own assessment of what would be

needed in an inspection regime, but we did it almost as a target

to shoot at rather than a policy prescription. It was, if you’re going

to ask us to monitor and verify, here is what we need from an intelligence perspective. And we’d be happy to—it’s classified of

course, but we’d be happy to share that with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. After consultation with the Ranking Member,

what I’m going to hope we can suggest and I’m sure we can, with

plenty of advanced notice to our colleagues, a couple, a series of

closed hearings—— Senator HELMS. Amen.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing].——on matters that we raised with

regard to the nuclear concern two weeks ago, a week ago as well

as this. But in open session, one of the things that seems to me,

as you just said Carl in response to Dr. Frist, or to Senator Frist,

you said that this is something we’re going to be trying to get our

hands around, this is something we’re dealing with on a daily basis

if we’re serious for a long time to come.

One of the difficulties that I’m having here is it seems to me, at

least on it’s surface, there are certain things that we are able to

do with a fair degree of reliability and there are certain things that

we can do where we can measure, we can measure the results even

though we can’t guarantee that after a full accounting, we’ve taken

care of everything.

And I keep coming back to a place my friend from Indiana has

spent a lot of time thinking about in Russia, keep coming back to

Russia. There’s certain obvious, clear, able to be delineated concerns that unlike with regard to Iraq, unlike Iran, North Korea,

Libya or any other place, there is at least in part a willingness to

genuinely cooperate, genuinely cooperate.

And so I’d like ask a few very just very pointed questions that

you may be able to give very short answers to. If you can’t, I can

defer it to a closed session.

What is the INR’s assessment of A, the willingness and B, the

capacity with our financial and professional assistance of the RusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
30

sians to corral and destroy some of the 40,000 tons of their chemical weapons that they have?

My impression is they mean it. My impression is they desperately need help. My impression is notwithstanding the fact we

talked about them participating, their entire defense budget is

about $5 billion this year. I mean, I wish Americans would think

about that.

Let’s assume they’re lying by a factor of 10. Let’s assume they’re

lying by a factor of 20. They’re still one-third to one-quarter with

gigantic lies what our defense budget is. But if our estimates are

correct that it’s about $5 billion, then I don’t think it’s at all realistic that they’re going to be able to ‘‘chip in.’’ And why is it not in our interest I keep asking myself, for us to spend 8 to $10 billion

to wipe out a significant portion of the chemical capability that exists there?

So my question is again, have you assessed their willingness to

genuinely cooperate in that effort and B, do we have the combined

capacity to destroy a significant portion of this chemical stockpile

if we’re willing to spend the money?

Mr. FORD. My assessment is similar to yours that the Russians

clearly would like to be rid of this problem and that they are willing to cooperate in destroying these chemical weapons capabilities.

Partially for the same reasons that we have of the fear of—you

have so many of these. As Senator Lugar pointed out, they’re afraid

that they’re going to lose some of them, somebody’s going to steal

them, somebody’s going to sell them and so that they’d like to have

them off their hands. They also are clearly understanding that

many of these weapons are deteriorating and that they are a costly

logistic problem in the future for them. Forget all the good things

that would happen if they got rid of the weapons. And the best that

we can tell is that the real issue—well, there are always some on

any side that are suspicious of the U.S. or should we really do this,

but clearly the Russian government is prepared to take this step,

but they can’t afford it. It’s too expensive and—— The CHAIRMAN. It’s much more than that.

Mr. FORD [continuing].——they’re going to have to get some help

from us or the international community or they’re not going to be

able to do it certainly on the time schedule that we’d like to see

them do it.

The CHAIRMAN. There’s much more to pursue about that and I’ll

do some of that in writing. Let me conclude by asking what is

INR’s assessment of the allegations some of the Russian entities

that still are engaged in, that existed for biological research and

development, if not the military, are conducting active biological

weapons programs in contravention of the Biological Weapons Convention and why have the Russians in INR’s view refused U.S. requests for access to four military institutes working on biological

research activities? If you have an assessment.

Mr. FORD. I do and I don’t. I do in the sense that I could talk

to you about this in a little more detail at a classified level. My unclassified answer is that I think that biological weapons research

is a serious and embarrassing subject for a lot of people and that

even if they have changed their mind about the use of biological

weapons and would like to be rid of them as we would, they probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
31

ably have fibbed to us a little bit or fibbed to some people about

it and they don’t want us to find out the extent of their program.

And I think it has more to do with embarrassment of what they

had up their sleeve and what they were doing rather than a desire

to keep a capability back and use it against the Unites States at

some point in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for the answer. For what it’s worth,

I agree with your assessment, because I think about how reluctant

we are about any intention or desire or plan now or in the future

to ever use biological weapons. The American public would be in

this day and age in 2002, shocked and abhorred by knowing what

we considered trying to develop in 1950 in ’60 in ’70 and so—but

any rate, I thank you very much. We look forward to you in a

closed hearing, but I yield to Senator Helms or any of my colleagues.

Senator HELMS. I’ll be very brief. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This question was obviously handed to me by the lady behind me

and it’s important. Let me go back a little bit. The first President

Bush called me one day and said I want to go to one of your universities involved in a very interesting study. Have you got such

a university? I said what city you want to go to? I said in Raleigh

we have North Carolina State University and it’s great and he

said, let’s go there.

So we went there to the university where they were learning all

about a number of things that we are talking about, Mr. Chairman,

and I looked around at whom we were supposed to see and all but

one of the students, and they were the top students, were not

Americans. They were Chinese. I had a Russian and so forth and

so on.

So the question that Miss Patty passed to me, is there any available evidence to indicate that foreign nationals are coming to

American universities, earning degrees in biology or chemical engineering and taking this knowledge back to their home countries to

use against us? And the answer to that I believe is of course.

And I haven’t even thought about what we should do about it or

what we could do about it, but we’re training a lot of these people

to go back and do the things to us that we don’t want to do to them

and we don’t want them to do to us. So give that some thought and

let’s talk about it one day.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just join

Senator Helms in this colloquy. Same problem persists at Purdue

University where there are almost 5,000 people involved in engineering chemistry. The scientific situation’s sort of an equivalent to

North Carolina State in Indiana.

I visited with the president of Purdue about this at great length

because it’s a tradeoff. It’s very tough. On the one hand, a case

could be made that these students by studying in America, learning about us, about our ways of doing business as well as the integrity, carry these values back to their countries. If they head back;

many don’t. They stay in the United States, but a good many do

32

head back. Leadership that in terms of our public diplomacy is very

important.

We constantly worry about the educational system, about al

Qaeda people getting particular religious training without any

grounding at least in things that we believe are fundamentally important here. And so the question is if we were to exclude all of

these people, sort of cancel the visas of 5,000 people and say we’re

going to keep it to ourselves, we could.

But on the other hand, the benefits that come from having tens

of thousands of these students in our country, I suppose it becomes

a problem for you at State, with regard to immigration service, others quite apart from the FBI and counterintelligence to work this

problem. So we have the benefits really of people understanding

America and hopefully cut the liabilities of persons who have bad

designs.

Mr. FORD. I would agree that the loss of the opportunity to go

to the University of North Carolina or Duke or North Carolina

State or other universities, North Carolina or Indiana or Purdue

would be their loss. But my sense is that even if we tried to keep

people away, which I think is totally undemocratic and against

whatever our whole country stands for, but even if we did, this information is too portable that they might not get the best that they

would if they went to North Carolina and to Indiana, but they get

enough by staying at home from other sources.

Senator LUGAR. And long range learning on the Internet perhaps.

Mr. FORD. That’s right. And I’ve always, you know, I may be

naive, but I think that if they come here to the United States and

study that they not only will learn science, but they’ll also learn

a little bit about our democracy and our freedom and maybe carry

that back with them to wherever they’re from.

So obviously there’s a risk there, but I’ve always felt like the risk

was that to close down our society and go against our instincts here

for freedom and education for everybody.

Senator LUGAR. Just one more follow-up. Now, looking at it the

other way, a long time ago when Vice President Gore was meeting

with Russian Prime Minister the Chernomyrdin, I suggested that

one potential solution for the chemical and biological problem in

Russia was for American firms to buy the facilities. Literally, the

scientists want to be employed. There is a tremendous amount of

communication back and forth all the time. I still think that’s a

good idea.

Investors face alot of problems, including the legal system of

Russia, lack of protection for stockholder rights, all that is nightmare for American firms. But if there is to be some degree of constructive movement in these areas it would come, it seems, through

international cooperation with American management working

with Russian scientists. We will need to clean up a lot of old facilities which should be torn down, safely store and secure bad stuff

that should be terminated and this is a time in which the Russians

might be receptive to this kind of cooperation.

So I don’t ask you for a comment, but please carry back to State

at least some impetus that this might be useful.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Frist.

33

Senator FRIST. Just one minute. First of all, thank you very

much for again an outstanding presentation. This whole last colloquy on science and the exchange of intellectual capital I think

does mean that our intelligence community needs to really focus a

lot on science peer review, having our scientists sensitized to what

the relative risks are to a nation and what you pick up as targeting.

That’s in some ways tough for our scientists because they’ve

never been brought into the room. And the same way we’re bringing the CIA and the FBI into the room with public health officials

for the first time looking at homeland security. First time if you

have somebody from law enforcement sitting right next to a doctor

sitting right next to epidemiologist, first time.

But that’s what it’s going to take and because science is going

to continue to progress, we may have smallpox—we may be getting

a good vaccine to smallpox, but with some genetic engineering and

the science is there today, the smart terrorist can simply re-engineer an anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, tularemia. They will be

able to in the next few years and therefore this ongoing integration, openness, transparency, peer review of our scientific community with intelligence, I believe, is going to be critical.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Carl, thanks again and

within the next between now and probably just after the recess, I’m

going to be asking for your help, the committee will, in closed session.

Mr. FORD. And I will bring some of my experts with me who actually know the answers to some of these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You’ve done very well and you’ve framed this in

a way that we have to be able to begin to get a handle on it and

I thank you very, very much for your time.

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we’ll hear from a very distinguished panel.

Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and Biological Arms

Control Institute; Dr. Amy Sands, Deputy Director of Center for

Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey; and Dr. Alan P. Zelicoff,

Senior Scientist, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New

Mexico.

We thank you all very, very much for your patience and for being

here. This is to us a very, very important hearing. Maybe we can

begin with your statements in the order in which you were called.

Dr. Moodie, you first and if you wish to, I’m not suggesting you

have to, if you summarize your statement, be sure the entire statement be placed on the record. This is important so you take the

time you need to make the statement. You’ve come a long way to

help us. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MOODIE, PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL

AND BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE

Mr. MOODIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor

to appear before the committee once again. I’ve got a rather long

statement so I’ll just take a few minutes to summarize it and

appreciate—— The CHAIRMAN. Don’t short circuit. This is important, so take

your time.

34

Mr. MOODIE [continuing]. Yes, sir, but I’ll hit the high points.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Mr. MOODIE. Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, for the

last decade and especially since September 11th, Americans have

been on a steep learning curve about chemical and biological weapons.

In the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein confronted us with a chemically and biologically armed opponent. Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas

attack in the Tokyo subway was a wake up call that showed our

country’s vulnerability to a kind of terrorism that could include unconventional weapons that produce high casualties. And the recent

anthrax mailings and hoaxes have forced us all to learn more about

biological weapons than most people ever wanted to know.

Among the mix of tools on which we must draw to deal with

these challenges is arms control. This is not to argue that arms

control must have pride of place among those tools. Indeed it may

be that arms control is not the most important policy arena for

dealing with chemical and biological weapons proliferation by

states or their potential acquisition by terrorists. But arms control

can make a contribution and it should not be eliminated from the

policy toolbox.

In my statement, I consider some of the factors that are creating

a more complex environment, driving the need for new approaches

for dealing with the CBW challenge and redefining arms control’s

role in helping to meet that challenge. In my oral remarks this

morning, I’d like to focus on meeting the challenges that will confront us as we attempt to move forward.

First, with respect to chemical weapons. The first challenge, as

the last speaker said and as many Members of the committee have

emphasized, is eliminating those chemical weapons that already

exist. Although the destruction process in the United States is proceeding reasonably well, as has already been pointed out, its counterpart in Russia is far behind schedule. It is my view that it is

doubtful in the extreme that Russia will meet the timetable specified in the Chemical Weapons Convention even if it is granted the

one-time five year extension allowed by the treaty.

This predicament is first and foremost a problem for the Russians themselves. Moscow is clearly committed to making progress,

but its financial commitments will not be sufficient to meet its

treaty obligations. Ways must be found to promote a greater commitment from Russia itself. But those countries that have an interest in the destruction of the Russian CW stockpile, which is in essence every state party to the CWC, should also provide more assistance. Not only the United States, but in particular in my view,

the Europeans and Japanese should do more.

The upcoming CWC review conference scheduled for next year

should provide an opportunity for developing a support strategy to

meet this goal, which in my view represents the single most important objective of the CWC.

Another issue that must be addressed relates to challenge inspections under the convention.

In many ways the challenge inspection provision is the single

most important tool in the entire treaty. But to date, that provision

has never been invoked, although suspicions have been raised that

35

some state’s parties are in substantive violation of their commitments. The United States, for example, has claimed publicly for

many years—both the Clinton and Bush Administrations—that

Iran continues to violate the treaty, yet Washington has never followed up these allegations by requesting a challenge inspection in

Iran.

In my view, the longer such provisions are not used, the more

difficult it will become to use them in the future. And as a result,

the international community could lose a critical tool for promoting

the fundamental goals of chemical disarmament.

A third important issue that must be addressed is the adaptability of the convention to advances in chemical science and technology. Certain areas of chemistry and biology relevant to the CWC

are changing rapidly and will continue to do so. In the area of toxins for example, advanced bio-technology can create novel toxins

that have scientific or medical applications but that can also be

misused as weapons.

A consideration should be given therefore to an ongoing process

that provides updated information on critical scientific and technological developments to states parties of the convention on a sustained basis.

A further area of effort should focus on issues of cooperation and

assistance. During the first five years of the implementation of the

CWC, states parties and the Organization for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons have attempted to view assistance issues as

secondary to operational matters such as declarations and inspections. But the issue of international cooperation is important in

light of the ongoing debate over the future of chemical export controls and of the Australia Group in particular.

As science and technology continues to advance and global technology diffusion proceeds, the question of the viability of our export

control arrangements will become increasingly difficult to manage.

The final area which chemical arms control must address relates

to the institutional context within which those arms control efforts

proceed, particularly straightening out the problems of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

First, as the Chairman has all ready indicated, for some time the

OPCW has been plagued with financial and staff problems that

must be fixed. In some cases, the solutions rest in states parties

fulfilling their obligations in a timely manner. But some of the

budget problems are structural and will require the Organization

to define new ways of doing business to set the situation right.

Second, many states parties cover activities at the organization

with a junior diplomat from their bilateral embassy to the Netherlands. This generally low level of representation at the OPCW complicates and hampers the work of the Organization and makes it

less efficient and effective.

Finally, questions of institutional leadership have arisen. It is

clear that the OPCW leadership has lost the confidence of some of

the key CWC states parties. Such a situation cannot be allowed to

continue for very long as it creates an environment that is severely

detrimental to staff morale and effective action.

If the OPCW is not lead in a manner that generates confidence

among those countries whose support is critical, treaty implemenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
36

tation will suffer. The focus of attention will be on internal issues

rather than on getting the job done—and the job is critical and

should come first. Therefore a means for resolving the current dispute about leadership must be found.

Turning to the biological weapons challenge, five issues in particular must be addressed. The first question must be the goals of

the next steps in arms controls. Two sets of possible objectives for

steps suggest themselves. One set relates more to traditional arms

control goals including verification, confidence building, increasing

transparency or enhancing consultations. Of these, effective

verification of the BWC is not possible and each of the other objectives has conceptual and practical political problems associated

with them. And in my view none of them appears to be sufficiently

robust to energize the currently stagnant process.

An alternative approach is to go beyond traditional arms control

goals to define the aims altogether differently. In light of the complex environment with which biological arms control must deal, as

well as the clear lack of success of traditional approaches, the need

for new thinking is clear. In particular—and this may be my most

important point today—the effort must be made to create a new

conceptual and policy environment within which the current BW

challenges can be addressed. Such a new environment would need

a move away from business as usual by all of the critical stakeholders including governments, industry, the scientific community,

the health community and many others.

New partnerships among these key constituencies must be developed. New means must be identified to address the speed of scientific and technological change. This raises questions about the

value of and potential for governance or self-governance of the

international biological, scientific and technological communities.

Second, U.S. officials have stressed that too little attention has

been paid to questions of noncompliance. Given this clear U.S. priority, any next steps must address two core concerns from Washington’s perspective. First, how do BWC states parties meet the essential but often ignored responsibility of dealing with countries

who are party to the treaty, but are either cheating or suspected

of doing so. Second, how do they deal with those countries who are

not states parties and therefore not breaking any commitments,

but are clearly violating a widely held global norm?

These are not questions that members of the international community necessarily are comfortable addressing. They would prefer

to assume that states that join a convention comply with their obligations. The reality, however, is that states cheat and something

must be done about them.

Third, part of the reason that the BWC protocol negotiations did

not focus on core proliferation concerns is that the drafters bent

over backwards to meet the political requirements of some participants that any multilateral agreement treat all states parties the

same. This political objective has been a hallmark of non-aligned

nations’ positions in arms control negotiations since the nuclear

nonproliferation treaty created nuclear haves and have nots.

This nondiscrimination may be politically essential, but it does

not necessarily create good arms control in a situation in which

participants are not equal in terms of their interests, assets or obliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
37

gations. If progress is to be made, somehow these imperatives have

to be reconciled.

Fourth, cooperation and assistance in the life sciences for peaceful purposes is a political imperative of non-aligned countries that

they insist must be included in any nonproliferation agreement.

Some BWC states parties have made no secret of the fact that they

joined the treaty not because of their concerns over biological weapons, but in order to secure access to critical science and technology.

Conventional wisdom holds that no multilateral progress will be

made on harder-edged nonproliferation measures without something on cooperation and assistance. If this is the case, any next

steps must find a way to reconcile these strongly held interests.

The conventional wisdom should also be challenged and consideration of next steps should also explore whether potential hard arms

control and cooperation and assistance measures might be addressed on separate tracks.

Finally, following the failure of the Ad Hoc Group negotiations

and the suspended review conference, some participants might

want to abandon arms control altogether and rely on other measures to fight BW proliferation and biological terrorism. Even if

arms control is included in the toolkit for promoting nonproliferation and counterterrorism, the priority it assumes in relation to

other available tools will be a critical factor in assessing how assertively and successfully one might promote next steps in arms control.

In fact, differences have all ready emerged between the United

States and other countries including friends and allies over these

relative priorities. The United States tends to assess the value of

arms control and the contribution of instruments such as the BWC

in terms that relate them to other tools in the toolkit including intelligence, diplomacy, passive and active defenses, military options

and export controls. Arms control is appreciated for its contributions, but its limitations are also recognized and maximizing its potential is seen to derive from making it work together effectively

with these other policy tools.

In contrast, and to overstate for emphasis, some Europeans for

example, tend to give pride of place in the toolkit to arms control.

Some even view arms control as an alternative to these other policy

tools rather than as a complement to them. The result is that some

friends and allies of the United States rely more heavily on the

contribution of arms control in dealing with the problems of proliferation than does Washington. Such differences must be explored

in an assessment of the potential utility and effectiveness of any

next steps in BW arms control.

Mr. Chairman, in my statement I have concluded with a number

of specific suggestions that I think might help meet these requirements. I would be happy to go into those in more detail during the

question period. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moodie follows:]

38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MOODIE

REDUCING THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT: WHAT CONTRIBUTION FROM ARMS CONTROL?

On July 25, 2001 the United States announced that it would not support the draft

protocol negotiated by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of states parties to the Biological

Weapons Convention (BWC) as presented in the ‘‘composite text’’ offered by the

AHG Chairman. The U.S. statement made clear that further negotiation of specific

language in the draft would not address the major problems the United States had

with the proposed protocol, which was seen as based on a fundamentally flawed conceptual approach and unwarranted assumptions.

Five months later, the Fifth BWC Review Conference suspended its efforts without completing a Final Declaration in light of a demand by the United States that

the Ad Hoc Group process be brought to an end. This last-minute standoff was the

culmination of three weeks of disputes over how best to strengthen the BWC and

to carry forward the fight against biological weapons (BW) proliferation.

Between these two events, the United States was the victim of unprecedented anthrax attacks in the wake of the September 11 destruction of the World Trade Center. The anthrax attacks transformed what had been a theoretical concern for some

people into a very real security threat for the entire country.

While much of our recent attention has focused on biological weapons, concern

about chemical weapons should be no less intense. We have seen chemical weapons

used—both by states and by terrorists. Saddam Hussein’s chemical attacks against

both Iranian forces and his own people introduced this generation to the horrors of

such weapons. The Aum Shinrikyo’s use of sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in

March 1995 served as a wake-up call to the United States, combining with the

bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City to drive home the realization to policy makers and public alike that the United States was not immune

from terrorism, that weapons of mass destruction could be involved, and, perhaps

most importantly, that we were not prepared.

Today, administration witnesses report that perhaps as many as two-dozen countries are pursuing chemical weapons capabilities. A significant number are also

seeking biological weapons. The pursuit of chemical and biological weapons capabilities by terrorist groups such as al Qaida has been well documented in court proceedings as well as in the media.

Among the difficult lessons we have had to learn about chemical and biological

weapons is that they are not the same, and addressing the challenges they pose— whether in terms of proliferation or terrorism—will require a different mix of policy

responses.

Among the mix of tools that must be applied in both cases, however, must be

arms control. This is not to argue that arms control must have pride of place among

those tools; indeed, it may be that arms control is not the most important policy

arena for dealing with either chemical and biological weapons proliferation by states

or their potential acquisition by terrorists. But arms control can make a contribution, and it should not be eliminated from the policy toolbox.

3If arms control is to make an effective contribution to the CBW challenges, however, policy makers must have an appreciation of the changes in the environment

that will shape its application. In particular, a number of factors are driving a need

for new thinking.

The Convergence of States and Terrorists

Before the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks, analysts

tended to conceptualize and address the state proliferation challenge and the problem of terrorism along separate tracks. This split approach prompted a focus on different strategies and different policy tools for dealing with what were considered

distinct aspects of the problem, if not separate problems altogether. Arms control,

for example, was deemed to be targeted against state proliferation and not designed

to address the terrorist threat.

Such a separate approach in the world after September 11, however, will no

longer suffice. The distinction between proliferation and terrorism and between terrorists and the state has become difficult to draw. As a result, the United States

and the international community more broadly must implement a response to the

chemical and biological weapons challenge that deals with state proliferation and

bioterrorism as different aspects of the same problem. This will require an approach

that is strategic in nature, multifaceted in action, and which exploits a range of

tools.

Arms control is important in this context, but the combination of politics, science

and technology, and treaty language that surrounds both the Chemical Weapons

39

Convention and, especially, the Biological Weapons Convention ensures that these

conventions will be insufficient on their own. Nor does an emphasis on arms control

alone provide a sufficiently wide perspective to facilitate all of the varied actions

that will be required by all of the necessary actors—from both the public and private sectors—to deal effectively with the now realities that the convergence of state

and non-state challenges present. What is needed is an approach that goes beyond

the traditional modalities of arms control to new ways of thinking about how to

strengthen the conventions and the norms against biological and chemical weapons

that they embody.

Advancing Science and Technology

Chemistry and biology and their associated technologies have witnessed incredibly

rapid advances in recent years, and, if anything, the pace of change is likely to accelerate. Rapid changes in biotechnology in particular in the next several years will

shape new scientific and business methods and practices far removed from those of

today. Moreover, many of the breakthroughs in the relevant sciences and technologies are likely to be promoted by combining them with other technologies—for

example, nanotechnology, cutting-edge information technologies, and new materials

science. Creative scientists and technologists could find new ways of putting such

things together to advance their CBW capabilities. In essence, advancing science

and technology will allow future proliferators—whether governments or terrorists— to enter the chemical and biological weapons game with a greater scientific and

technological base on which to build their efforts.

Classic arms control will have difficulty in capturing this dynamism. Government

bureaucracies are notoriously slow to adapt. International organizations are no less

so. The vastly different rates at which science will move forward and governments

can adapt, require a broader approach that facilitates an ongoing appreciation of the

evolving scientific and technological landscape in as close to real-time as possible.

Engaging Industry More Productively

In areas associated with commercial activities based on the life sciences in particular, those involved emphasize the vast contributions their rapidly advancing scientific and industrial capability is making to the improved quality of life for many

people. Not everyone shares the view, however, of advancing life sciences in a commercial context as an unalloyed good. Unscrupulous drug companies or other biotechnology enterprises, for example, have recently been portrayed as villains in popular novels and movies. The fact that advanced biotechnology is given a dark dimension in the popular culture captures a sentiment among the public that, at the very

least, reflects uncertainty and uneasiness about industry dealing with issues generated by the advancing life sciences and related technology.

Representatives from U.S. biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries could

argue that they participated extensively in the BWC protocol negotiating process,

at least insofar as they interacted with government representatives engaged in the

negotiations. Some characterizations of industry involvement, however, suggest that

it was industry opposition that influenced the Bush administration’s decision not to

support the draft protocol. While such a characterization is not entirely accurate,

industry certainly preferred a minimalist approach in the protocol that would have

created the least demanding obligations possible. It is also fair to say that industry

often did not display an overly cooperative attitude.

Looking to the future, there is little to suggest that industry would change its approach if another protocol-style effort were put forward as the means by which to

pursue biological arms control. Something different is needed, and governments

must do better with industry. As the drivers of much of the critical science and technology, industry must be made to understand its stakes in the challenge and be

fully integrated into the necessary strategic response. Given the growing public and

governmental concerns over developments in biotechnology, it would also be very

much in the interests of the biotechnology industry to cooperate in promoting proper, safe, and ethical practices around the world.

The Way Forward

In responding to this environment, the arms control contributions to addressing

the chemical and biological weapons challenges begin from different starting points

and are likely to take different courses.

Challenges to Chemical Arms Control

The first challenge in eliminating the scourge of chemical weapons is to destroy

those weapons that already exist. Although the destruction process in the United

States is proceeding reasonably well, its counterpart in Russia is far behind schedule. It is doubtful in the extreme that Russia will meet the timetable specified in

40

the CWC, even if it is granted the one-time, five-year extension allowed by the convention.

This predicament is first and foremost a problem for the Russians themselves.

Moscow is clearly committed to making progress, but its reported financial commitments will not be sufficient to meet its treaty obligations. Ways must be found to

promote a greater commitment from Russia itself. Beyond promoting greater Russian expenditures, however, those countries that have an interest in the destruction

of the Russian CW stockpile—which is, in essence, every state party to the CWC— should provide more assistance. In particular, the Europeans and Japanese should

do more. The CWC Review Conference scheduled for next year should provide an

opportunity for developing a support strategy to meet this challenge, which represents the single most important objective of the CWC.

Moscow is not likely to be the only target of criticism during the Review Conference, however. Washington will come in for its share of censure as well, particularly for the three unilateral exemptions included in the U.S. implementing legislation. Prior to the Review Conference, therefore, the administration should assess the

impact of these provisions on CWC implementation, including their effects on the

general political environment. This assessment would then provide the context for

judging whether the potential benefits of retaining them outweigh the costs. Based

on that assessment, the administration could convey to the Review Conference that

whatever problems have been created for the convention by this legislation will be

addressed.

A third set of issues that must be addressed relates to challenge inspections under

the CWC. In many ways, the challenge inspection provision is the single most important tool in the entire convention. To date, however, that provision has never

been invoked, although suspicions have been raised that some states parties are in

substantive violation of their commitments. The United States, for example, claims

publicly that Iran continues to violate the treaty, yet Washington has never followed

up these allegations by requesting a challenge inspection in Iran.

The longer such provisions are not used, the more difficult it will become to do

so. As a result, the international community could lose a critical tool for promoting

the fundamental goals of the CWC.

A fourth important issue that must be addressed is the adaptability of the CWC

to advances in chemical science and technology. As noted, certain areas of chemistry

and biology relevant to the CWC are changing rapidly and will continue to do so.

In the area of toxins, for example, advanced biotechnology can create novel toxins

that have scientific or medical applications but can also be misused as weapons.

The CWC’s Scientific Advisory Board is engaged in a process with the U.S. National Academy of Science to examine the critical areas of scientific advance that

warrant attention from CWC states parties. Their work will represent an important

input into the forthcoming Review Conference. Consideration should be given, however, to an ongoing process that provides updated information on this critical issue

to states parties on a sustained basis.

A fifth area of effort should focus on issues of cooperation and assistance. During

the first five years of CWC implementation, states parties and the OPCW have

tended to view assistance issues as secondary to operational matters such as declarations and inspections. Because the assistance provisions of the CWC have important political implications, however, they should not be ignored. The Review Conference provides a good opportunity to demonstrate interest in making tangible

progress in this area.

The issue of international cooperation is important in light of the ongoing debate

over the future of chemical export controls. The Australia Group (AG) has been a

particular target for some non-aligned countries that find it to be discriminatory and

inconsistent with the spirit if not the letter of the convention. Australia Group members respond that as long as they have the right to make their own judgments as

to which countries are in compliance with the treaty, they also have the right and

the obligation to determine to whom they will export relevant chemical and equipment and how they will make and implement those decisions.

As science and technology continues to advance and global technology diffusion

proceeds, this question will become increasingly difficult to manage. While export

controls continue to make a contribution, the fact that they only buy time to help

other tools of policy to work raises the question of how much time and effort should

be put into preserving them.

The final area which chemical arms control must address relates to the institutional context within which those arms control efforts proceed, particularly straightening out problems with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

(OPCW). For some time, the OPCW has been plagued with financial and staff problems that must be fixed. In some cases, the solutions rest in the states parties fulVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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filling their obligations in a timely matter. But some of the budget problems are

structural and will require the organization to define new ways of doing business

to set the situation right. On staffing questions the OPCW already has a reputation

of being overly sensitive to ‘‘pay and promotion’’ matters such as its salary scale relative to other international organizations.

A second set of issues relate to national representation to the OPCW. Many states

parties cover activities at the organization with a junior diplomat from their bilateral embassy to The Netherlands. Such officials often lack the technical capability

and political authority to make decisions or even effective interventions. Although

important decisions are matters for national capitals, the current generally low level

of representation at the OPCW complicates and hampers the work of the organization and makes it less efficient and effective.

Finally, questions of institutional leadership have arisen. It is clear that the

OPCW leadership has lost the confidence of some of the key CWC players. Such a

situation cannot be allowed to continue for very long as it creates an environment

that is severely detrimental to staff morale and effective action. If the OPCW is not

led in a manner that generates confidence among those countries whose support is

critical, treaty implementation will suffer. The focus of attention will be on internal

issues rather than on getting the job done. And the job is critical and should come

first. A means for resolving the current dispute must be found.

Challenges to Biological Arms Control

If the international community is to use arms control effectively in addressing biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism, it must address the political problems that plagued past biological arms control efforts, including the Ad Hoc Group’s

attempt to negotiate a legally binding protocol to the BWC. Five issues, in particular, must be addressed.

The first question must be the goals of the next arms control steps. Obviously,

the more robust the goals, the more challenging they will be to implement successfully. The goal clearly cannot be BWC ‘‘verification.’’ Even Ad Hoc Group members

accepted the fact that the BWC cannot be verified under current circumstances. The

AHG goal, therefore, became defining measures that contributed to ‘‘enhancing confidence in compliance.’’ They ultimately fell short of that goal as well, indicating

how difficult real progress in biological arms control is.

Two sets of possible objectives for next steps suggest themselves. One relates to

more ‘‘traditional’’ arms control-related goals, including confidence building, increasing transparency, or enhancing consultations. Each of these objectives has conceptual and practical political problems associated with them. None of them appears

to be sufficiently robust to energize the currently stagnant process.

An alternative approach is to go beyond traditional arms control goals to define

the aims altogether differently. To some extent this was the goal of the Bush administration when it offered its package of alternative measures at the Fifth Review

Conference. In light of the complex environment with which biological arms control

must deal, as well as the clear lack of success of traditional approaches, the need

for new thinking is clear. In particular, consideration must be given to creating a

new conceptual and policy environment within which current challenges can be addressed. Such a new environment would mean a move away from ‘‘business as

usual’’ by all of the critical stakeholders, including governments, industry, and the

scientific community. New partnerships among these key constituencies must be developed. New means must be identified to address the speed of change and integrate

its most important aspects. This raises questions related to the appropriate contributions of each of the key stakeholders, including questions about the value of

and potential for governance or self-governance of the international biological scientific and technological communities.

Second, part of Washington’s problem with the draft protocol was that it proposed

expending considerable resources on activities not clearly or directly associated with

core proliferation concerns. In announcing its rejection of the draft protocol, in its

statement at the Fifth Review Conference, and in discussions after the Conference

was suspended, for example, U.S. officials stressed that too little attention has been

paid to questions of non-compliance. Given this clear U.S. priority, any next steps

must address two core concerns that, from Washington’s perspective, the protocol

did not highlight: First, how do BWC states parties meet the critical, but often ignored responsibility of dealing with countries who are party to the treaty but are

either cheating or suspected of doing so? Second, how do they deal with those countries who are not states parties and therefore are not breaking any commitments

but are clearly violating a widely held norm? These are not questions that members

of the international community necessarily are comfortable addressing. They would

prefer to assume that states that join a convention would comply with its obligaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tions. The reality, however, is that states cheat, and whatever is done in the arms

control arena must provide some attention to what to do about those states that do.

Third, while its currency is military power, arms control is at its core a political

activity, and any successful next steps in the biological field cannot ignore the political stakes to which some participants in the process give high priority. Part of the

reason the protocol did not focus on core proliferation concerns is that the drafters

bent over backwards to meet the political requirement of some participants that any

multilateral agreement treat all states parties the same. This political objective has

been a hallmark of nonaligned nations’ positions in arms control negotiations since

the NPT created nuclear ‘‘haves’’ and ‘‘have nots.’’ Non-aligned states in particular

have used the ‘‘rules of the game,’’ particularly the requirement that any agreement

must be done by consensus, to insist on meeting this political sine qua non.

Non-discrimination may be politically essential but it does not necessarily create

good arms control in a situation in which participants are not equal in terms of

their interests, assets, or obligations. Moreover, the Bush administration has made

it clear that the protocol negotiations and, to some extent, the Review Conference

were conducted in a framework that, if not discredited, must now be set aside. Will

other participants agree since a new ‘‘game’’ may deprive them of some critical leverage for achieving key political goals? If progress is to be made, these imperatives

must be reconciled. But can they, and, if so, how?

Fourth, cooperation and assistance in the life sciences for peaceful purposes is a

political imperative of non-aligned countries that they insist must be included in

any nonproliferation agreement. Some Ad Hoc Group participants made no secret

of the fact that they were involved not because of their concerns over biological

weapons but in order to secure new means of access to critical science and technology. In the minds of some people, therefore, the packaging of compliance measures and cooperation and assistance provisions in the protocol distracted from the

main objective of the protocol and the BWC itself and created potential for confusion

and competition among priorities.

Conventional wisdom holds that no multilateral progress will be made on harderedged proliferation measures without something on cooperation and assistance as

well. If this is the case, any next steps must find a way to reconcile these strongly

held interests. But conventional wisdom should also be challenged, and consideration of next steps should also explore whether potential ‘‘hard arms control’’ and

cooperation and assistance measures might be addressed on separate tracks.

Finally, following the failure of the Ad Hoc Group negotiations and the suspended

Review Conference, some participants might want to abandon arms control altogether and rely on other measures to fight BW proliferation and biological terrorism. Even if arms control is included in the tool kit for promoting BW nonproliferation and bioterrorism, the priority it assumes in relation to other available

tools will be a critical factor in assessing how assertively and successfully one might

promote next steps in arms control.

In fact, differences have already emerged between the United States and other

countries, including friends and allies, over these relative priorities. The United

States, for example, tends to assess the value of arms control and the contribution

of instruments such as the BWC in terms that relate them to other tools in the tool

kit, including intelligence, diplomacy, passive and active defenses, military options,

and export controls. Arms control is appreciated for its contribution, but its limitations are also recognized, and maximizing its potential is seen to derive from making it work together effectively with other policy tools. In contrast (and to overstate

for emphasis), some Europeans tend to give pride of place in the tool kit to arms

control. Some even view arms control as an alternative to these other policy tools

rather than as a complement to them. The result is that some friends and allies

of the United States rely more heavily on the contribution of arms control in dealing

with the problem of proliferation than does Washington. Such differences must be

explored in an assessment of the potential utility and effectiveness of next steps in

BW arms control.

Additional Measures

The United States made it clear that it does not view the package of measures

it proposed at the Fifth Review Conference as a comprehensive list of potentially

valuable and negotiable measures. Indeed, it should not. The U.S. proposals, supplemented by good ideas that emerged through consultations with close friends and allies, form the basis for moving forward, but more could be done. The following ideas

are offered as a contribution to thinking about further measures that might be considered.

43

Strengthening the Ability to Confront the State/Terrorist Convergence

The fact that the terrorist and state proliferation threats have converged requires

that the BWC be considered in light of what further it might be able to contribute

to the problem as a whole. The proposal for domestic legislation that criminalizes

BWC-prohibited activity is one such measure that could be applied to both dimensions of the challenge. Mother possibility, one that also serves the Article X requirement for states parties to promote cooperation and assistance, might focus on international collaboration on biological terrorist issues. Such collaboration might be as

limited as sharing information on lessons learned from exercises. Additionally, it

might extend to direct cooperation in which those states parties that have done

more in the area of biological terrorism preparedness and response assist other

states parties whose capabilities in those areas are more limited.

Such collaboration would have to be done on a voluntary basis. There are obviously areas related to counter-terrorism, including preparedness efforts, that are

highly sensitive and for which sharing with others would not be appropriate. But

the events of September 11 should have led all states parties to recognize that anyone could be the object of biological terrorism and that the threat extends to everyone. In such a situation, one could assume that some states parties will be looking

for help in addressing that threat. Providing assistance under Article X of the BWC

would be one means of meeting their needs.

A second possible measure that could be explored for its value in addressing the

convergence of state BW proliferation and bioterrorism relates to investigations. The

proposed U.S. package included a proposal for a mechanism to investigate suspicious outbreaks of disease or alleged biological weapons use. The prospect of developing a mechanism for investigating facilities that may be suspected of conducting

activities prohibited by the convention should also be considered. While this is certain to be a controversial suggestion, including within the U.S. government, the possibility of a limited measure to this effect should be explored.

The historical example of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak suggests some of the

reasons why. Even if the additional measures the United States proposed had been

in place in 1979, they would have afforded only the opportunity for the investigation

to go to the gates of the facility that was thought to be the source of the release.

No mechanism would exist for allowing access to the facility. Without such access,

the result of any investigation at Sverdlovsk would still have been unanswered

questions, continuing allegations and denials, and, in political terms, insufficient

grounds for mobilizing an international response to a potentially serious treaty violation. This could also be the result of investigations conducted under the new U.S.

proposals if there is no ability to get inside suspect facilities.

The proposal offered here is analogous to the challenge inspection provision of the

CWC, an extraordinary measure that would be used only when strong evidence exists of a serious violation. It is not in any way an endorsement of the elaborate, and

unhelpful, facility declaration and visits system detailed in the draft protocol. Rather, what is needed is a more limited, stand-alone capability that would allow some

means for seeing what is going on inside facilities about which serious suspicions

have been raised. The measure is offered in the full realization that even getting

inside a facility will not necessarily yield a smoking gun.

It may be that the techniques are not yet available to allow for a meaningful facility investigation that can also protect unrelated national security or proprietary

business information. Certainly, there was considerable debate during the protocol

negotiations over differing interpretations of the results of various on-site trial activities. It would be unfortunate, however, if consideration of the possibility of doing

facility investigations stopped completely because it was deemed ‘‘too hard’’ or ‘‘too

dangerous.’’ One need not commit now to the realization of such a measure, but as

monitoring technology continues to evolve, including technology based on advancing

life sciences, exploring further what procedures might be helpful could prove to be

a worthwhile effort.

Coming to Grips with Advancing Science and Technology

In its proposal package, the United States called for better oversight of genetic

engineering on the grounds that certain experiments involving the cutting and splicing of genetic material could have dramatic and unexpected consequences with relevance for biological weapons. However, it is not just genetic manipulation that creates potential and unexpected risks, but the combination of better understanding of

life at the molecular level with other scientific advances, including nanotechnology,

materials science, and bioinformatics. BWC states parties might consider, therefore,

whether there is anything in these combinations of scientific activities that could

also create sufficient risks to warrant greater oversight and reporting. BWC states

parties, therefore, could convene a working group of scientific experts charged with

44

identifying combinations of scientific activity that could create serious potential

threats. The panel could also elaborate what kind of national oversight of such activities would be appropriate.

A further dimension of advancing life sciences and technology that will have important implications for the evolution of the biological weapons threat is their growing global dissemination. Indeed, the way in which science and technology is developed, produced. and disseminated on a global basis has changed significantly in the

years since the BWC entered into force. Much of the material is dual use; the private sector is responsible for most of the advances; knowledge and capability will

only become increasingly dispersed around the world as biology and biotechnology

are applied to more aspects of life.

States parties to the BWC should try in general to identify ways to ensure that

this global diffusion of science and technology does not result in a more serious BW

threat and, in particular, to ascertain ways to bolster Article m of the BWC which

prohibits transfers of biological weapons and related-materials. The draft protocol

included a provision that created a consultation mechanism whereby one state’s concern that an unauthorized, inappropriate, or prohibited transfer has occurred could

be raised with the state party that made the transfer. Although it is an excellent

idea, such a provision would have no chance of being adopted in light of the contentious dispute about export controls that plagued the Ad Hoc Group negotiations.

The continuing debate, however, may provide an opportunity for an evaluation of

longterm management of the diffusion of biological-related science and technology.

This is not a call to abandon the Australia Group whose activities will remain important for the foreseeable future. Rather, it is a plea to recognize that the new environment within which the biological weapons problem must be addressed will include a rapidly changing scientific and technological global landscape.

Fostering Better Appreciation of the Need for a New Conceptual and Policy

Environment

The confidence building measures (CBMs) agreed at the 1986 and 1991 Review

Conferences will remain on the books. These voluntary measures ask states parties

to provide information regarding biological-related activities, including past offensive BW programs, current biological defense activities and facilities at which that

work is being conducted, unusual outbreaks of disease (to be reported to the World

Health Organization), and facilities involved in human vaccine production, among

others. It might be helpful for BWC states parties to take another look at the CBMs

to determine whether they can contribute to the creation of the new broader conceptual and political approach discussed earlier, either in their current or in an adapted form.

Some people might argue that any attempt to return to the CBMs would be a

waste of time. Because the measures are deemed politically rather than legally binding, only a relatively small number of countries provided the information called for

in the CBMs even once, let alone annually. Although the number of states parties

participating in the CBMs steadily increased, the generally poor performance suggests that, left to their own devices, states parties are unlikely to participate more

than they have in the past.

The point, of course, is that states parties should not be left to their own devices.

Some of the CBMs could be replaced by elements of the new U.S. proposal. But

other CBMs will remain as part of the BWC regime, and they should not just be

abandoned. Rather, they should be considered for what they might contribute to the

new conceptual framework. If they are deemed to be of some value, they should not

be dropped.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Sands.

STATEMENT OF AMY SANDS, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. SANDS. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the

committee, let me just thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to examine a topic while extensively discussed deserves, I believe, continued discussion and a new look.

In my comments today, I plan to focus only on the changed nature of today’s world, trying to take a look at some of the assumpVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
45

tions that we should be wary of, especially as they relate to the

chemical and biological threat and then look at a few recommendations I’d like to make. In my written testimony, I have provided

much more detail on the chemical and biological threat, giving specific examples of some state and terrorist aspects.

Several factors have come together today to increase the likelihood of CBW acquisition and use by states and subnational groups.

First, states and terrorists may see CBW as giving them a new advantage. They know that we are incredibly worried about such a

possibility and may believe such an attack will not only kill many

Americans, but also could psychologically freeze the United States.

Second, it has now become apparent that certain thresholds have

been passed. Our speculation of whether terrorists would and could

kill thousands of people has been answered.

Third, chem-bio materials are available and there is clear evidence of terrorists being interested and capable of obtaining these

materials. The supply-demand dynamic definitely favors terrorists.

Fourth, as September 11th events demonstrated, some terrorist

groups exist that are clearly capable of organizing and

operationalizing the type of complex, long-term effort that would be

needed to develop and effectively deliver CBW agents.

Finally, as has been commented already earlier today, the technical workforce needed to develop effective CBW is available and

you might call them cheap. In the former Soviet Union, hundreds

perhaps thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians were

fired or had their wages cut after the Soviet Union’s collapse and

President Yeltsin discontinued the BW program.

It is likely that a substantial number of scientists and engineers

with expertise in the biological and chemical weapons area are disgruntled and frustrated. But the concern about clandestine recruitment of scientists should also include other states, such as South

Africa and the former Yugoslavia, both of whom have discontinued

CBW programs.

So it is not surprising given these factors, specifically the increased access to materials, targets, expertise and technology that

we are now much more concerned about CBW actually being used

by states or substate actors. Against this backdrop, though, I’d like

to just take a look at certain assumptions that we have tended to

make when thinking about this threat.

The first assumption, terrorists don’t have physical locations to

make or store CBW materials. It is often argued that terrorists

may have safe havens, but still lack a physical infrastructure to develop CBW. However, an overlooked point is that terrorist groups

can and have actually possessed recognizable and targetable CBW

facilities. Examples include, the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in

Sudan which according to the Unites States government was really

not a pharmaceutical plant, but a chemical weapons manufacturing

complex that was engaged in the production of nerve agent VX.

Second, I think it is well known that Aum Shinrikyo had a compound in Japan that they used for much of their activities and a

farm in Australia.

Third, a group called the World Islamic Fund Against Jews and

Crusaders which was founded by bin Ladin managed to buy up a

46

set of facilities in the former Yugoslavia that had been used for

chemical and biological weapons.

So as you can see from these cases, terrorists have had access to

or possession of facilities. Some of these may even be located outside the safe havens they have and may appear legitimate, making

the task of detecting and identifying them accurately much more

difficult.

A second assumption. A certain set of chemical and biological

agents such as VX, sarin, anthrax and smallpox are usually considered the most likely CBW agents to be used. This way of thinking

may cause us to miss the obvious. Cyanide for example, is a chemical that has sometimes been overlooked as a weapon in favor of

the more lethal and glamorous chemical agents like sarin and VX,

yet the availability of various cyanide containing compounds which

are used widely in industrial processes, make cyanide one of the

more likely CBW agents to be used.

The WMD terrorism database at the Center for Nonproliferation

Studies at the Monterey Institute records 52 possessions, plots or

uses involving cyanide by terrorists. These cases have, so far, collectively resulted in only 124 injuries and 13 fatalities. But the

danger lies more in the intent of the perpetrators than the results.

My written testimony lists some of the other examples, but today

I’d just like to focus on two specific issues. One is the most recent

case in Chicago that happened in early March where a man was

found to be storing significant amounts of potassium and sodium

cyanide in subway tunnels. It highlights the ease with which even

a lone individual can acquire this poison.

And another example that happened in February 2002, with the

arrest in Rome of nine Moroccans with potential links to al Qaeda

for allegedly planning to poison the water supply of the U.S. embassy using potassium cyanide. It shows that the interest in cyanide is hardly waning.

A third assumption and one that we’ve already talked about a little earlier today is that states won’t provide terrorists with chemical and biological weapons. Many of the states we believe to have

chemical and biological programs also have been linked to numerous terror organizations providing them with a wide variety of assistance. Even though there has been little evidence to indicate

that any of these states have transferred CBW material, technology

or know-how to such terrorist organizations, the possibility cannot

be ruled out.

But even if a state may not be willing to transfer CBW related

technologies to a subnational actor, one cannot discount the possibility of rogue elements within a government or disgruntled or underpaid scientists or individuals sympathetic to terrorist causes

that may be willing to illicitly transfer CBW related technologies

and know-how to such terrorist groups.

A fourth assumption. Terrorists won’t use CBW except in extreme cases. Nonstate players, especially terrorists, do not act

under the same restraints as sovereign states. It is possible that

these organizations do not perceive the WMD threshold the same

way we do. Moreover, their assessment of the costs and benefits of

using CBW may not be necessarily measured on the same scale as

47

that of nations and their concept of ‘‘extreme’’ may differ considerably from ours.

In fact if the motivation of an organization is to infuse terror,

then the use of CBW, even on a small scale, might be seen as furthering their cause. In addition, the disparity between state and

terrorist groups such as that between Israel and Palestinian forces

may create a terrifying inequality that could lead to the use of

CBW in an effort to rebalance the scales. This exact thought was

expressed in a Palestinian weekly, which called for a Palestinian

weapon of deterrence using chemical and biological agents that

would create a balance of horror in the Palestinian and Israeli conflict.

So we should occasionally do a reality check and make sure our

assumptions are still valid. Now I would like to spend a few minutes on some recommendations to try to address some of these concerns.

A general comment. What is required is innovative thinking and

a reconceptualization of threats in the 21st century. It requires a

long-term dedication to a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted approach that seeks to prevent WMD acquisition and use, to

strengthen anti-proliferation norms, to develop adequate defenses

here and elsewhere and to prepare for effective consequent mitigation and management in the advent of a WMD attack.

Specifically what are some of the activities that might need to be

pursued? There are six areas that I outline in my written testimony as being critical for the United States if it is going to be successful in its war on terrorism and WMD proliferation. Let me

mention all six, but I’m only going to talk to three of them.

The six are, first of all, enhancing global WMD materials protection, control and accounting. Secondly, supporting displaced WMD

scientists and technical experts to keep them employed doing constructive socially beneficial projects. Third, enhancing intelligence

collection, analysis, coordination and cooperation. Fourth, strengthening the public health sector within the United States and internationally. Fifth, renewing the international commitment to effective implementation of both the CWC and BWC. And sixth, making

meaningful investments to address underlying causes of terrorism

such as poverty, illiteracy and socioeconomic inequities.

As I said earlier, I plan to only talk to three of these recommendations at this point. The first one I wanted to address is

enhancing global WMD materials protection, control and accounting. It is clear that the United States must continue its support of

improved MPC&A procedures in the former Soviet Union, but it

also must expand these activities to include sensitive, chem-bio materials and it must make them all international in scope.

Specifically though, in evaluating the security and protection

globally of dangerous biological materials, it’s quite apparent that

without much trouble terrorists could easily steal or buy them illicitly. The United States and its allies must make it a priority to fill

the security gap by pursuing vigorously enhanced national regulations that control and secure deadly pathogens and toxins and by

launching the negotiation of a new bio-security convention.

Such a convention would complement the BWC by developing a

set of specific concrete regulations and activities that guarantee the

48

control, accounting, safety and security of dangerous pathogens and

toxins. I’ve attached a paper that’s going to be published in the

next issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that I’ve written

with two of my colleagues from the Center for Nonproliferation

Studies in which we go into much greater detail about this specific

idea of the bio-security convention.

To initiate such a process, the United States should work with

Europe, Japan and other like-minded states to develop the national

legislation needed to prevent misuse and unauthorized access to

dangerous biological agents and toxins. Using these efforts as models, the U.S. must lead the effort on an international level and with

industry and academia to define international standards of safety

and security in the bio-technology sector so that we will have more

control over where the materials of concern are, who has access to

them, how they are controlled and how they are stored and transferred.

A second recommendation is that we strengthen the public

health sector within the United States and internationally. We

need, obviously it’s been said already today, to improve our own

public health sector, but we also need to work with other international groups and foreign governments to the same internationally.

The proposed draft legislation of Senator Biden and Helms called

the Global Disease Surveillance Act of 2002 reflects the fact that

given the speed of international travel, migration patterns and

commercial transportation networks, it will not be enough to shore

up American public health capabilities and capacities, recognizing

that the best BW delivery system might be humans either knowingly or not.

Therefore we must assist others to develop capabilities for disease monitoring, surveillance and response or else leave ourselves

vulnerable to the possible exposure to dangerous diseases that

could be locally contained. Having recognized the need for more

support in this area, the challenge, though, will now be to sustain

these efforts both in the United States and elsewhere.

Since these activities have dual benefits enhancing both national

and international security and public health, it is hoped that their

value will be clearly evident and funding will become an integral

and ongoing element of our national and public security systems.

My final recommendation that I want to talk about is renewing

international commitment to effective implementation of both the

CWC and BWC. Mike has said almost everything I would want to

say to tell you the truth, but let me just make some general points.

As strange as it may seem, the nonproliferation regime is at the

crux of whether many of the dire fears about WMD become reality.

In the last decade, the United States and the UN Security Council

have claimed rhetorically that terrorism and the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction are the greatest threat to U.S. and

international security, but the actions of too many states call into

question their long-term commitment to anti-terrorism and nonproliferation goals.

The rhetoric appears hollow, the commitment to effective action

inadequate to the task. It will require U.S. leadership to move

forcefully forward. Leadership that involves working within the

49

1 I am grateful to the staff at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for their extensive help in preparing this testimony. Specifically I would like to thank Dr.

Raymond Zilinskas, Jason Pate, Eric Croddy, Kimberly McCloud, Gary Ackerman, Cheryl Loeb

and Jennifer Arbaugh.

CWC and BWC context to ensure compliance, to ensure that there

is securing of sensitive and dangerous materials and to strengthen

international nonproliferation norms. It will require the United

States and others to provide substantial new funding and support

to these efforts, to focus on the international needs rather than domestic concerns and to take a long-term rather than short-term approach to these problems.

To conclude, it is clear that what cannot happen is business as

usual. While terrorism and proliferation may not be an issue in all

parts of the world, it remains a substantial threat in several regions and is capable of acting as a catalyst to other states and subnational groups who might rethink their own decisions not to acquire or to use weapons of mass destruction. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sands follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMY SANDS, PH.D.

Dear Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the committee, and guests:

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to discuss a

topic that while, extensively discussed, deserves a new look from a different perspective.1 In the wake of events following September 11th, it is vital that we examine

certain assumptions regarding the acquisition and use of chemical and biological

weapons. It has become crucial that we go beyond traditional thinking and take a

close look at capabilities and motivations, not only of state actors but also sub-national and terrorist organizations.

OVERVIEW OF THE CBW THREAT: A TRADITIONAL REVIEW

Since the end of the Cold War, the acquisition and potential use of chemical and

biological technologies and materials by state and sub-state actors has become an

increasingly real threat. The recent trend towards chemical and biological weapons

(CBW) terrorism—most notably the 1995 sarin nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway and the actual use of anthrax against individuals in the United States, coupled

with the state level proliferation of offensive CBW programs, have created a security

environment in which defending against chemical and biological attacks by states

as well as sub-national groups must be the top priority.

The anthrax letter attacks that occurred last fall only hint at the potential for casualties and widespread panic associated with a BW event. The 9/11 terrorists were

able to plot and train secretly over several years to massacre thousands of people

and die in the effort. It is conceivable that terrorists with similar dedication could

deliberately obtain, weaponize, and disseminate a contagious pathogen such as

smallpox or plague, and the results could make September 11th pale in comparison.

In an era where people can literally move anywhere around the world within 36

hours—far less than the incubation period of many diseases of concern—all nations

could be affected. In addition, advances in biotechnology, and the proliferation of

BW know-how and dual-use equipment, might make it possible for terrorists to engineer highly virulent, antibiotic-resistant ‘‘designer’’ pathogens to suit their needs.

Given the destructive possibility of CBW, it is worth quickly reviewing the ‘‘state

of play.’’ The rest of this section will be devoted to examining state-level CBW capabilities and sub-national groups’ interest in and use of CB agents.

CAW Proliferation: State Level

Although the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) impose restrictions on the acquisition and use of these weapons,

many states continue to pursue clandestine and offensive CBW capabilities. Roughly

13 states are believed to be actively seeking biological weapons and nearly 20 may

be pursuing chemical warfare capabilities. Proliferant states of particular concern

include China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, and

Syria (for more information on state programs please see our website at http://

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2 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Deterrence Series, Case Study 5: North Korea, (Alexandria, VA:

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 5; U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf], pp. 10– 11; Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, Flashpoints and Force

Structure, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), [http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/

inss/sa97/sa97ch11.html]; Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge

After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 99; ‘‘The Actual Situation

of North Korea’s Biological and Chemical Weapons,’’ Foresight, February 17, 2001, pp. 24–25,

translated in FBIS; ‘‘South Korea Says North Has Biological, Chemical Weapons,’’ Kyodo News

Service, October 23, 1992; North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, U.S. House of

Representatives, November 1999; Bill Gertz, ‘‘Hwang Says N. Korea Has Atomic Weapons;

Pyongyang Called Off Planned Nuclear Test,’’ The Washington Times, June 5, 1997, p. A12; Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defence, White Paper, 2000, [http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/

emainindex.html]. 3 North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, November 1999.

www.cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm). The analysis here is divided into two

categories: 1) unique state threats and 2) other state actors.

Unique State Threats:

North Korea

An analysis of open sources indicates that North Korea has operated an extensive

CW program for many years. It is probable that adamsite, mustard, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, sarin, soman, tabun, and VX are among the

agents in its chemical weapons arsenal. In the biological sphere, North Korea has

reportedly pursued BW capabilities since the 1960s, and continues research with

possible production of anthrax, plague, yellow fever, typhoid, cholera, tuberculosis,

typhus, smallpox, and botulinum toxin. North Korea is not party to the CWC but

has acceded to the BWC.2

North Korea’s CW capabilities tell us something about how they might use these

weapons. Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, North Korea has traditionally viewed

chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications that this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious

tactical use of chemical weapons by North Korea would be to terrorize South Korean

civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea’s artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection

against CW attack.3

In terms of more traditional conflicts, the rugged terrain of the northern region

of the demilitarized zone affords two main routes for North Korea to capture, or at

least lay siege to Seoul, while attempting to deny US forces from landing at strategic ports. It is highly likely that chemical weapons would be used against hard

military targets in the South, such as airfields and ports, not only spreading death

and injury to a wide area of South Korean personnel, but contaminating these installations with persistent blister and/or nerve agents for area denial. Finally, because much of the North’s success relies on preventing US assets in the region coming to the aid of the South, especially those forces deployed in Okinawa and Guam,

the latter two could be targeted by Nodong-1, Nodong-2 and Taep’odong missiles,

possibly armed with chemical warheads.

It is unclear how the use of BW agents could play in North Korean military planning. While a number of delivery systems mentioned above could be employed to use

BW agents against South Korean and US forces, is unknown what validated weapons systems are currently in the North Korean arsenal. As part of an overall offensive, Northern infiltrators in the South could conduct sabotage operations using BW

agents, as well as biological assaults from North Korean specialized units. Whether

by sophisticated aerosolized agents (anthrax) or crude contamination of food or beverages, such operations may be set into motion if the North decides to conduct full

scale military operations against South Korea.

Former Soviet Union/Russia

Probably an even more problematic and troubling situation exists in some of the

newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because of the scale of

its CBW programs, which had developed large quantities of chemical and biological

agent for use in a variety of weapons and military scenarios. Insuring the safety

and security of these materials while they await destruction presents a significant

challenge, but it is not the only legacy of these programs that requires attention.

Western security experts and policy-makers must take seriously the dangers

posed by the scope, history, and enduring capabilities of the Soviet offensive BW

program. First, the US government, among others, fears that President B. Yeltsin’s

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4 Amy E. Smithson, ‘‘A Commentary on the Russian Factor,’’ in Brad Roberts, ed., Ratifying

the Chemical Weapons Convention (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International

Studies, 1994), p. 102. 5See: Dr. Vil S. Mirzayanov, ‘‘Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An

Insider’s View,’’ Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995) p. 24–25; Clifford Krauss, ‘‘US Urges Russia

To End Production of Nerve Gas,’’ The New York Times, February 6, 1997. p. A7; and Frank

Von Hippel, ‘‘Russian whistleblower faces jail,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (May 1993),

[http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/m93/m93vonhippel.html]. 6 Ibid., p. 67.

7Proliferation: Threat and Response, Department of Defense (2001), p.15. 8 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence, statement before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, ‘‘Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Continued

1992 decree ordering the dismantlement of FSU’s BW program is being disobeyed

and that secret, BW-related activities contravening the BWC continue in the Russian Federation. The three military biological laboratories at Kirov, Sergei Posad,

and Sverdlovsk, which remain closed to foreigners, are especially worrisome in this

regard.

In addition, we know that FSU’s BW program developed a number of pathogens

and toxins for use as biological weapons. While we may not know all the program’s accomplishments, it is reasonable to believe that some would be state-of-the-art, possibly posing threats to the West that it is unprepared to meet. A Russian BW program, if it exists, can be expected to build on past accomplishments. It is therefore

disturbing to read that Russian military scientists developed new anthrax and

plague bacterial strains resistant to antibiotics. For these reasons, a continuing Russian BW program would pose much greater security threats to the West than would

the suppressed program of Iraq, or the incipient programs of other proliferant nations, who for the most part are believed to depend on classical agents and technologies developed during and just after World War II.

Turning to the former Soviet Union’s CW program, Russia has been in technical

noncompliance with the CWC almost since the treaty entered into force. Dealing

with catastrophic economic, political, and social problems has left Moscow unable to

fulfill its obligations under the CWC. The primary reason for Russian noncompliance has been its inability to destroy its stockpiles in a timely manner. This failure

has more to do with lack of funding and the capacity of existing destruction facilities

than any real desire by Russia to violate the CWC. However, it has been alleged

that Russia purposefully lied in its declarations to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to hide the actual size of its arsenal. In addition,

Russia may have secretly destroyed CW in an effort to help with this obfuscation

as well as providing false information several years prior. In March 1994, Valerii

Menshikov, a consultant to the Russian National Security Council, said that the Soviet Union had indeed lied in its declarations udder the 1989 Memorandum of Understanding with the United States.4

Even more disturbing than the possibility of false declarations and secret efforts

to hide arsenal size is the suspicion that Russia has developed, and may be continuing to develop, a next generation type of chemical agent. 5 The program, nicknamed ‘‘Novichok’’ or ‘‘new guy,’’ might include agents that are outside the current

CWC list of prohibited agents. The first compliance question here is determining the

existence of the Novichok program. The main problem lies in the fact that even if

the program exists, the agents may not be covered by the CWC. It remains then

either to make sure that the CWC covers Novichok, or that there is some way to

address this possible noncompliance that may not violate the letter of the treaty,

but certainly violates its spirit.

Other State Actors:

China

Even though it is a member state of the both CWC and BWC, it is possible that

China is pursuing, or has pursued, chemical and biological weapons programs.

China claims to have destroyed three production facilities in keeping with its obligations under the CWC.6 When looking at evidence of its commitment to the CWC,

China appears not to have any CW stockpiles or current production capabilities.

However, US intelligence sources maintain that China retains a ‘‘moderate’’ stockpile of CW and has ‘‘not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program,’’ even though it ratified the CWC in 1997.7 Moreover, China has a large civilian chemical and pharmaceutical production infrastructure that could quickly be redirected toward the production of chemical and biological agents.8 These uncertainVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
52

Years 1992 and 1993 before the Committee on Armed Services,’’ 102[nd] Congress, Second Session, March 7, 1991, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 107; U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/

ptr20010110.pdf], p. 14; U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Adherence To and Compliance With Arms

Control Agreements,’’ 1998 Report submitted to the Congress, Washington, DC, [http://

www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp98.html]. 9 Avner Cohen, ‘‘Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,’’ The Nonprolferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 27–53; Dany Shoham,

‘‘Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,’’ The Nonprolferation Review, 5 (Spring-Summer

1998), pp. 48–58; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with

Arms Control Agreements: 1998 Annual Report to Congress, [http://www.state.gov/www/global/

arms/reports/annual/comp98.html]. 10 Cordesman, ‘‘Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,’’ [http/www.csis.org/mideast/

reports/WMDinMETrends.pdf], 1999, pp. 38–40; Robert J. Einhorn, Testimony Before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 5, 2000, [http://www.state.gov/www/policylremarks/2000/001005leinhornlsfrc.html]; U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation:

Threat and Response 2001, [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf], p. 36; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘‘Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 2001,’’ (Washington, DC:

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001), [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bianlfebl 2001.htm]; Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran: Delivery Systems, and

Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Programs, (Center for Strategic and International Studies,

April 28, 1998), [http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinIran4-28-98.html]. 11 United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), ‘‘Fourth Report under

Resolution 1051,’’ (June 10, 1997), [http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres97-774.htm]; United Nations, United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), ‘‘Latest Six-Monthly Report,’’ (April 16,

1998), [http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/sres98-332.htm]; U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf] pp. 4 1–42;

Steve Bowman, Iraqi Chemical & Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities, CRS Issue Brief,

(Congressional Research Service, April 1998), [http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/98042705

lnpo.html]; Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and

Analysis, [http://www.fas.org/hwc/papers/hw20th.htm], 2001; Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1995 Annual Report to

Congress, [http://www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/reports/complian.htm].

ties about China’s current activities are compounded by the fact that it has not revealed the scope and nature of its past programs. This lack of transparency, although occurring within the context of technical compliance and diplomatic commitment to the regime, nonetheless fails to provide sufficient confidence-building. In

China’s case, the infrastructure for weapons development might exist, but the state

may have indeed destroyed its stockpile. Simply put, without more information, China’s true capabilities remain a mystery and its intent is clouded.

Egypt

The first Arab country to develop, produce, stockpile, deploy, and use chemical

weapons (Yemen Civil War), Egypt has pursued a chemical weapons program since

the early 1960s. In its chemical weapons arsenal, it is probable that Egypt possesses

mustard, phosgene, sarin, and VX. In the biological sphere, it is believed that Egypt

has been pursuing a BW program since the early 1970s, and likely maintains an

offensive program. Egypt is not a party to either the CWC or the BWC.9

Iran

Even though Iran is a party to both the CWC and the BWC, it appears to have

continued to pursue offensive CBW capabilities. Iran is believed to have initiated

both its chemical and biological weapons programs in the mid-1980s. In its chemical

weapons arsenal, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled mustard, sarin, hydrogen

cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and phosgene. In regards to BW, Iran has conducted research on anthrax, foot and mouth disease, botulinum toxin, and mycotoxins. It is

likely that Iran maintains an offensive BW program.10

Iraq

While the current status of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programs remains unknown due to continuous refusals to allow inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) into the

country, it is widely believed that Iraq is continuing to pursue offensive chemical

and biological weapons programs. Prior to the expulsion of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors in 1998, it was ascertained that Iraq had

mustard, sarin, tabun, VX, and Agent 15 in its chemical weapons arsenal, along

with a sizeable stockpile of chemical munitions. Iraq weaponized the biological

agents anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut, and conducted BW related research on brucellosis, hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus

(Enterovirus 70), rotavirus, camel pox, gas gangrene toxin, and possibly plague.11

53

12 Avner Cohen, ‘‘Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,’’ The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 27–53; Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons

of Mass Destruction, 1993; Cordesman. ‘‘Creeping Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift

in the Cost of War and Terrorism,’’ [http:/www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html]. 13 Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993, p. 100; Cordesman, ‘‘Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,’’ [http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinMETrends.pdf], 1999, p.

17; Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, [http://www.defense

link.mil/pubs/ptr2001O10.pdf], p. 46; Joshua Sinai, ‘‘Libya’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ The Nonproliferation Review, 4, (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 94; Robert J. Einhorn, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 5, 2000,

[http://www.state.gov/www/policylremarks/2000/001005leinhornlsfrc.html]; Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1998

Annual Report to Congress, [http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp98.html]. 14Michael Bartletta, ‘‘Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence,’’ The

Nonprolferation Review, Fall 1998; Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced

Convention Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001 [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

bian/bianljanl2002.htm]. 15 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, [http://www.defense

link.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf], p. 43; Cordesman, ‘‘Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle

East’’, [http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMDinMETrends.pdf], 1999; Cordesman, ‘‘Creeping

Proliferation Could Mean a Paradigm Shift in the Cost of War and Terrorism,’’ [http://

www.csis.org/mideast/stable/3h.html]; M. Zuhair Diab, ‘‘Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations,’’ The Nonproliferation Review, 5, (Fall, 1997), pp.

104–111; ‘‘Devil’s Brews Briefing: Syria,’’ Centre for Defence and International Security Studies,

Lancaster University, 1996; Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on

the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced ConvenContinued

Iraq is not a member of the CWC, but acceded to the BWC as a condition of the

Gulf War ceasefire agreement.

Israel

The roots of Israel’s biological and chemical weapons programs can be traced back

to 1948, and the mid-1950s, respectively. Even though little information on the

highly secretive programs exists in open sources, it is widely believed that Israel

has a large chemical weapons defensive program and is capable of producing and

stockpiling various chemical agents. In the biological sphere, Israel is conducting a

wide array of biological weapons related research, with a possible production of numerous types of agents. The current CBW program is located at the Israeli Institute

of Biological Research (IIBR) at Ness Ziona. Israel is not a party to either the CWC

or the BWC. 12

Libya

Since the 1980s, Libya has produced more than 100 metric tons of nerve and blister agents at the Rabta facility, employed chemical weapons against Chadian troops

in 1987, and has attempted to build an underground production facility at a site

called Tarhunah. Chemical agents believed to be in Libya’s arsenal include mustard,

sarin, tabun, lewisite, and phosgene. Libya has conducted research on biological and

toxin agents, although the extent of the program is unknown. It is possible, however, that Libya could produce small quantities of BW agents. Libya is not a member of the CWC, but has acceded to the BWC.13

Sudan

Although a party to the CWC, evidence in the public domain suggests that it is

likely that Sudan has been developing a chemical weapons capability since the

1980s. Sudan is heavily dependent upon foreign assistance for its program, and has

traditionally sought foreign assistance from a number of countries that have CW

programs, including Iraq. It is possible that Sudan is pursuing a biological weapons

program, but there are no reports in the open source to confirm this. Sudan is not

a party to the BWC.14

Syria

With an estimated CW stockpile in the hundreds of tons, it is likely that Syria

has one of the largest and most advanced chemical weapons stockpiles in the Middle

East even though it is dependent upon foreign sources for precursor chemicals, materials and equipment, it is likely that Syria is capable of producing and delivering

mustard, sarin, and VX. It is likely that Syria conducts biological weapons research

on anthrax, botulinum toxin, and ricin, with possible production of such agents.

Syria is not a party of the CWC or the BWC.15

54

tion Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001,’’ [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/

bianljanl2002.htm]. 16David E. Kaplan, ‘‘Aum Shinrikyo (1995),’’ in Jonathan Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror (Cambridge, MA.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000), pp 123, 128–129.

The Non-State Threat: A Fusion of Factors

Alone, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 should be a wake-up call to action.

When added together with the emergence of state-sponsored and transnational

forms of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies and materials in the post-Cold War period, it is clear that we are living

in a new security era in which the possibility that terrorists could acquire and use

WMD, including chemical and biological weapons, must be seen as real. The anthrax letter attacks, although limited in the scope of their lethality, suggest that future terrorists might well cross the weapons of mass destruction threshold.

It is well known that several terrorist organizations have expressed an interest

in or already obtained chemical or biological agents. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese

doomsday cult, showed its ability to make and use sarin gas in the subway system

in Tokyo, albeit not as effectively as it had hoped or planned. The unknown assailant(s) that have plagued the United States with anthrax-tainted letters have shown

that manufacturing and dispersement of lethal anthrax is possible. Beyond these

well known cases, there are extensive examples of terrorists groups using, or attempting to use chem-bio agents. Other organizations with known interest in chemical and/or biological weapons include: al-Qa’ida. believed to have obtained chemical

weapons from Sudan and Iraq and biological agents from the Czech Republic,

Kazakhstan, and Indonesia; the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, believed to have the precursors needed to produce a sarin bomb; and the Rajneeshees, a religious cult located in The Dalles, Oregon, actually used Salmonella Typhimurium to contaminate

food in local restaurants in order to make voters ill before an upcoming election.16

Related to this sense of an increased threat is the reality that we are all more

vulnerable. Today’s global community is the result of several developments, including the diffusion of and increased reliance on technology; increased access to information, technology, and materials; ease of communication and transportation; and

the openness of more societies. This certainly enhances economic advancement, but

also creates more avenues of access for adversaries. Coupled with this increased access to potential targets is the reality that most countries or sub-national groups

cannot defeat the United States in a direct confrontation. These adversaries then

look for ways to exploit their access and our vulnerabilities. So, what is new is the

vulnerability of modern, open society to terrorists with such an open-ended agenda.

While we have moved away from the threat of global annihilation, we may have

moved closer to the actual use of mass destruction weapons in situations where the

United States may have little influence or be the target. In short, Americans may

not be worried about a Russian nuclear attack, but now must fear a more random

set of events producing some catastrophe in their local environment, without any

notice or early indicators.

Moreover, it now has become apparent that certain thresholds have been passed— until September 11th, no more than 1,000 Americans had died in terrorist incidents

at home or abroad since 1968. Our speculation on whether terrorists would and

could kill thousands of people has been answered. The problem is that this should

not have surprised those of us in the field because, at least since the first world

trade center bombing, it has been clear that there existed a network of terrorists,

loosely tied by extreme Islamic teachings, willing to try to cause harm to large numbers of people. Ramzi Yousef, the perpetrator of that incident was quite clear in his

intent in 1993 to kill 50,000 or more Americans. He and others planned a variety

of terrorist acts that if successful would have caused large numbers of deaths and

casualties.

Several factors have come together to increase the likelihood of CBW acquisition

and use by sub-national groups. First, terrorists may see CBW as giving them a new

advantage. They know we are incredibly worried about such a possibility and may

believe such an attack will not only kill many Americans, but also could psychologically ‘‘freeze’’ the United States.

Second, chem-bio materials are available and there is clear evidence of terrorists

being interested in obtaining these materials. This supply-demand dynamic could

easily be played out at biological research institutions in the FSU. If security is poor

or lacking, as many suspect at these institutions, they would be vulnerable to theft

of pathogens, toxins, and other material of potential use by criminals, other countries, or terrorists. Most important, after theft, it would be easy for the perpetrator

to hide and transport seed cultures of organisms that could be directly used in biological weapons or to produce toxins.

55

17Source: U.S. Department of State. ‘‘Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism’’ in Patterns of

Global Terrorism 2000, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, (April

2001), found on the Internet at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2OOO/]. 18Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa’s Biological Warfare Program, INSS Occasional Paper 37, (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, February,

2001), [http:www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp37.htm].

Third, some terrorists groups exist that are clearly capable of organizing and

operationalizing the type of complex long term effort that would be needed to develop and effectively deliver CBW agents. The planning effort behind the September

11th events was both long term and complex, and it surprised many that terrorists

could sustain such an effort. it clearly signaled a level of commitment and operational thoroughness thought to be beyond most terrorist groups.

Fourth, cooperation between groups and with states possessing CBW capabilities

may be growing. An example of such cooperation is reflected in Iran’s relationship

with three terrorist groups, Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad. In April 2001,

Iran reiterated its unflinching support for those terrorist groups working against

Israel by hosting the International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada in

Tehran, which was convened by the Iranian parliament. Those invited included

leaders from Hamas, Hizbollah. and Islamic Jihad, presumably to encourage greater

cooperation between these groups in their campaigns against Israel. At the conference, Iran’s religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his description of

Israel as a ‘‘cancerous tumor’’ ripe for removal.17

Finally, the technical workforce needed to develop effective CBW is available and ‘‘cheap.’’ This concern about workforce availability deserves more attention. As is

well known by now, the Soviet Union established a powerful, well-funded secret program to acquire biological weapons. In 1992, President B. Yeltsin acknowledged the

BW program’s existence and decreed that it be discontinued and dismantled in Russia. The decree’s effect, when combined with the general decrease in public support

by the Russian government for science, led to drastic funding cuts for the BW program. Although we do not know the full consequences of these measures, some dedicated BW facilities (such as Stepnogorsk) were closed down and many others

downsized (including Obolensk and Vektor). Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of scientists, engineers, and technicians were fired or had their wages cut.

In general, the Western governments have viewed the condition of the FSU weapons research institutions with apprehension. Whether the mission of a weapons research institution lies in the biological, chemical, or nuclear area, the problem is

similar: What will happen to the expertise inherent in these institutions as some

dissolve and others are down-sized? Two concerns of Western governments include:

Might institutions on the verge of extinction be contracted by foreign governments

or sub-national groups to develop weapons? And could scientific workers that they

employ be induced to relocate to proliferant countries by offers of high salaries and

bonuses?

Due to the difficult conditions under which science operates in the FSU, and in

consideration of the dissolving or diminishing weapons research institutions, these

countries are likely have a substantial number of disgruntled and frustrated scientists and engineers with expertise in the biological weapons area. Some may be

enticed by high salaries and other inducements to work for foreign governments,

sub-national groups, and criminals to develop biological weapons. It is known that

especially Iran has made strenuous attempts to recruit weapons scientists to work

in that country by offering them high salaries (in excess of $6,000 per month).

But the concern about the clandestine recruitment of scientists from dismantled

CBW programs should also include South Africa and the former Yugoslavia. CBW

related activities first started in South Africa under British rule in the 1930s and

continued during the Second World War with the production of mustard gas. But

it was not until 1981 that the official South African program, code-named Project

Coast, began operations. Ostensibly to provide the South African Defence Force with

detection and protection capabilities, Project Coast became a highly secretive program that engaged in offensive research. With an annual budget of 10 million dollars a year, and with an estimated staff of 200, Project Coast employed a number

of scientists, physicians, and technicians to work on both chemical and biological

weapons research, development, and production (exact numbers of scientists and

other employees of the program have not been published by the South African Government). 18

When Project Coast was terminated in 1993, it left a number of weapons scientists and technicians suddenly out of work, therefore raising the possibility that

a number of these specialists may have been induced to work for foreign governments and sub-national organizations. Further compounding this threat is the

56

19 James Adams, ‘‘Gadaffi Lures South Africa’s Top Germ Warfare Scientists,’’ Sunday Times,

February 26, 1995; Alexandra Zavis, ‘‘Mandela Says Chemical Weapons Figures May Be in

Libya,’’ Associated Press, March 2, 1995; Peta Thornycroft, ‘‘Poison Gas Secrets Were Sold to

Libya,’’ Weekly Mail & Guardian, 13 August 1998. 20The Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Chemical Agents in the Former Yugoslavia,’’ Nuclear Forces Guide, [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/serbia/cw/index.html], April 23, 2000; Judith

Miller, ‘‘U.S. Officials Suspect Deadly Chemical Weapons in Yugoslav Army Arsenal,’’ New York

Times, April 16, 1999.] After the breakup of the country in 1991, it is believed that the army

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia inherited much of the CBW program, Human Rights

Watch, Clouds of War: Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia, March 1997, [http://

www.hrw.org/reports/1997/clouds/]. 21 James Bennet, ‘‘U.S. Fury on 2 Continents: The Overview; U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike

Sudan and Afghan Targets,’’ The New York Times (21 August 1998): A1.

knowledge that in the early 1990s, after the termination of the CBW program, Dr.

Wouter Basson, the former head of the CBW program, made frequent trips overseas.

Of particular concern were a series of visits made to Libya between 1992 and 1995

as a representative of a South African industrial conglomerate Transnet, to promote

its transportation and hospital equipment interests. His lack of expertise in this

field and his special experience in CBW programs, combined with the efforts of the

Libyan government to develop an indigenous CBW capability, led to concern that

he was selling his CBW knowledge.19

Yugoslavia provides another example. Prior to its breakup in 1991, the Yugoslav

National Army had a chemical weapons program consisting of four weapons facilities, three in Serbia and one in Bosnia. Chemical agents in the Yugoslavian arsenal

included sarin, mustard, and CS.20 It should be noted, however, that there is limited

information in the open source literature to determine accurately where many of the

former scientists currently reside. The possibility exists that former Yugoslavian

weapons scientists could have been recruited by foreign state and sub-state actors

interested in developing a chemical weapons capability.

A CBW THREAT REALITY CHECK

Having outlined the recognized state and terrorist threats, it is worth looking at

these threats from an additional dimension. Too often we comfortably reiterate the

same threat mantra without examining more closely certain underlying assumptions. Discussed below are several traditionally accepted statements often found in

threat assessments that deserve to be challenged.

Assumption: Terrorists don’t have physical locations to make/store materials

It is often argued that terrorists may have safe havens, but will still lack a physical infrastructure to develop CBW. Also, it has been assumed that it will be virtually impossible to detect terrorists hunkering down in caves and basements and

working on CB agents. However, an often overlooked point is that terrorist groups

can and have actually possessed recognizable (and targetable) CBW facilities. While

this possibility is not a new concern, the extent of it occurring and its implications

may not be fully recognized.

The US government has viewed the subject of terrorist facilities with concern, but

little public discussion has developed about terrorists having CBW facilities within

their safe havens as well as within established western states. An early, but well

publicized, example was the Clinton administration’s controversial cruise missile attack on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan on 20 August 1998. It argued

that the plant was linked to Bin Laden and that it was not a pharmaceutical plant,

but a chemical weapons manufacturing complex that was engaged in the production

of the nerve agent VX.

At the other extreme of public exposure are the facilities in the former Yugoslavia.

On 8 July 1999, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Serra indicated that members

of the World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders, which was founded by Bin

Laden, had purchased three chemical and biological agent production facilities in

the former Yugoslavia in early May 1998. According to the article, one such facility

was erected in the Bosnian village of Zenica. The report also stated that another

factory was built near Kandahar, Afghanistan. There was no open investigation or

diplomacy, and certainly no cruise missile, directed against these facilities at that

time. Allegedly, members of the World Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders hired Ukrainian scientists to manufacture unspecified poisons and train Bin

Laden’s activists in the use of these substances as weapons. The activists would be

trained to insert the chemical agents and toxins into explosive devices. Bin Laden

planned to send the chemically-trained warriors back to their home countries or to

cells in Europe. 21

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22 ‘‘Chem-War sites found,’’ Toronto Sun (11 November 2001); 2. 23 ‘‘War in Afghanistan: lnside Bin Laden’s chemical bunker,’’ The Guardian (London) (17 November 2001); 3. 24 Ibid. 25The Covenant, the Sword, and The Arm of The Lord was found in possession of a drum

of potassium cyanide, which was to be used to poison the water systems in New York, Chicago

and Washington, believing that God would ensure that no Aryans would be killed.—Stern J. ‘‘The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord’’ in Tucker, J. (ed.) Toxic Terror: Assessing

Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. (2000), p. 151. 26During court proceedings in 1998, it was revealed that members of a white supremacist

group calling itself ‘‘The New Order’’ proposed the use of a 50-gallon drum of cyanide to poison

the water supplies of major cities. ‘‘Supremacists had hit list, FBI agent says,’’ The New York

Times (7 March 1998): A14. 27Database cases 210, 213, 216.

During the war in Afghanistan, US intelligence officials pinpointed two sites that

may have been used by al-Qa’ida to produce chemical weapons. The United States

believes cyanide was produced at a crude chemical facility in the small village of

Derunta (Darunta), near the city of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan.22 The secret

laboratory contained bottles of cyanide poison and bomb instruction manuals, and

was allegedly run by a man named Abu Khabab.23 A fertilizer plant in the northern

town of Mazar-e-Sharif is also suspected of playing a role in possible chemical weapons production. 24

Beyond al-Qa’ida there is Aum Shinrikyo, who, through substantial contributions

from wealthy members, purchased a wide variety of businesses and facilities including a medical clinic, computer stores, and trading companies. Also, the cult purchased land in Japan, on which they built a compound where they were able to pursue research and development of various dangerous and potentially lethal materials.

Using its businesses as a front, the cult could claim some legitimacy for its pursuit

of certain chemicals and technology. Although most of the chemicals were obtained

from within Japan, Aum purchased some materials from the United States and attempted to buy weapons and technology from Russia. In addition, the cult bought

a ranch in a remote area of Australia to carry out testing of nerve agents.

As all these cases demonstrate, terrorists have had access to or possession of facilities. Some of these may even be located outside of safe havens and may appear

legitimate, making the task of detecting and identifying them accurately much more

difficult.

Assumption: A certain set of CB agents, such as VX, sarin, anthrax, and smallpox,

are the most likely CBW agents to he used

Cyanide is a chemical that has sometimes been overlooked as a weapon in favor

of more lethal and ‘‘glamorous’’ chemical agents like sarin and VX. Yet the wide

availability of various cyanide containing compounds, which are widely used in industrial processes, make cyanide (either in the form of hydrogen cyanide gas or as

a solid or liquid contaminant) one of the more likely WMD agents that can be used

to attack localized targets.

The WMD Terrorism Database of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the

Monterey Institute records 52 possessions, plots or uses involving cyanide by terrorists. These cases have so far collectively resulted in only 124 injuries and 13 fatalities, but the danger lies more in the intent of the perpetrators than their results,

as sooner or later some group or individual will overcome the technical hurdles associated with conducting an effective cyanide attack.

In addition to consumer products periodically being contaminated with cyanide

(the Tylenol and Chilean grape scares in the 1980s are well-known), cyanide has

been extensively used by a variety of terrorist groups. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam) have allegedly used cyanide on several occasions against Sri

Lankan government troops and in 1999 Kashmiri separatists were found in possession of at least 3 kilograms of cyanide which was to be used to poison water tanks

used by the Indian army. Right-wing groups have also shown a particular interest

in cyanide. In both 1985 25 and 1998, 26 domestic right-wing terrorist groups plotted

to inflict large numbers of casualties by poisoning the water supplies of major American cities with cyanide; in 1993, the AWB, a South African right-wing group,

planned a similar action in order to disrupt the country’s first multi-racial election;

and in 1988, a group calling itself the Confederate Hammerskins formulated a plan

to pump cyanide gas into the ventilation system of a synagogue in Dallas, Texas.

Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult, tried on three occasions in 1995 to employ binary weapons that were designed to release hydrogen cyanide gas but failed

either because they were detected in time or did not operate properly.27 The arrest

in Chicago in early March of a man found to be storing significant amounts of potasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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28Steven Grey, Dipesh Gadher, and Joe Lauria, ‘‘What bin Laden taught Ressam: From gruesome experiments with poison gas to the art of bombmaking,’’ The Ottawa Citizen (7 October

2001): A1. 29Steven Edwards, ‘‘Ressam Eyed Canadian Targets,’’ National Post Online (6 July 2001);

Intenet, available from [http://www.nationalpostonline.com], accessed on 7/12/01; and Laura

Mansnerus, ‘‘Testimony at Bombing Trial Outlines Recipe for Mayhem,’’ New York Times (6

July 2001): B2. 30This form of cyanide is however only mildly toxic and would be difficult to turn into an effective weapon.

sium and sodium cyanide in subway tunnels highlights the ease with which even

lone individuals can acquire this poison.

Even the United States’ current terrorist nemesis, al-Qa’ida, has shown an interest in cyanide as a weapon. Ahmed Ressam, the terrorist convicted of plotting to

bomb Los Angeles International Airport during the millennium celebrations,

claimed that in 1998, while in an al-Qa’ida camp in Afghanistan, he had been

trained how to kill people with cyanide.28 Mr. Ressam stated that he was trained

to poison individuals by smearing an oily mixture of cyanide and other toxic substances on door handles. His terrorist masters also taught him how to introduce cyanide gas into public ventilation systems in order to affect the maximum number of

victims, while minimizing the risk to the perpetrator.29 The February 2002 arrest

in Rome of nine Moroccans with potential links to al-Qa’ida for allegedly planning

to poison the water supply of the US Embassy using potassium ferrocyanide shows

that al-Qa’ida’s interest in cyanide is hardly waning.30

Assumption: States won’t provide terrorists with CBW

Compounding the threat to US national security is the possibility that states with

CBW programs or related dual-use technologies could provide sub-national actors

with these deadly tools. The issue of state sponsorship of terrorism has been a problem commonly associated with rogue states in the Middle East. States such as Iran,

Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Sudan have been linked to numerous terror organizations,

providing them with a wide variety of assistance, including financial support, weapons and other equipment and materials, and even specialized training bases. Even

though there has been little evidence to indicate that any of these states have transferred CBW material, technology or know-how to such terrorist organizations, the

possibility cannot be ruled out. The more states that proliferate and pursue chemical and biological weapons programs, the greater the possibility that sub-national

actors will acquire them, either from direct assistance or through other covert

means, including theft.

Many of the same states identified as terrorist sponsors are also those accused

of attempting to acquire CBW capabilities. Under certain circumstances the leaders

of these countries may decide the only practical utility they can derive from their

CBW arsenals is by deploying them covertly, using sub-national actors as means of

delivery.

Even if a state may not be willing to transfer CBW related technologies to a subnational actor, one cannot discount the possibility of rogue elements within a government—such as an extremist clique within the Iranian intelligence apparatus—

being prepared to take more risks than the Government as a whole. Within national

CBW programs, disgruntled or underpaid scientists, or individuals sympathetic to

terrorist causes may also be willing to illicitly transfer CBW related technologies

and know-how to terrorist groups. in summary, the threat that a state actor may

indirectly or directly transfer CBW related technologies, equipment and scientific

know-how to a sub-national actor is a threat the US government cannot ignore.

Assumption: Terrorists won’t use CBW except in extreme cases

With the exception of the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo, the long held assumption has been that sub-national groups and terrorists will not use CBW except as

a last resort. Many state players perceive a threshold created by international

norms that prevents them from openly using CBW. However, non-state players, especially terrorists, do not act under the same restraints as sovereign states. It is

possible that these organizations do not perceive such a threshold. Moreover, their

assessment of the costs and benefits of using CBW cannot be measured on the same

scale as that of nations. Terrorist organizations and religious fanatical groups are

not under the same political restrictions as sovereign states. In fact, if the motivation of an organization is to infuse terror, then use of CBW even on a small scale,

might be seen as furthering their cause. Omar Bakri Mohammed, an Islamic cleric

with ties to Islamic Jihad (and Hamas), advocated the use of biological weapons

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31 ‘‘Refugee Calls for Biological Weapons Against the West,’’ Metro (London), 6 September

1999. 32Taufiq Abu-Khosa, ‘‘Will We Reach the Option of Biological Deterrence?’’ Al-Manar. An

excerpted translation can be found on the Middle East Media Research Institute website at:

[http://www.memri.org/sd/SP25501.html].

against ‘‘western’’ forces, saying ‘‘if any Muslims are under occupation by a western

force, they can use any weapon to survive and that includes biological weapons.’’ 31

The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian forces may lead to the use of CBW

in an effort to balance the scales. This thought was expressed in the Palestinian

weekly Al-Manar:

While the human-bombs [meaning, suicide bombers] may be followed

[and maybe stopped by] preventive measures . . . serious thinking has begun

for a while about developing a Palestinian weapon of deterrence. This weapon terrifies the Israeli security apparatuses, from time to time, mainly because obtaining its primary components, whether biological or chemical, is

possible without too much effort, let alone the fact that there are hundreds

of experts who are capable of handling them and use them as weapons of

deterrence, thus creating a balance of horror in the equation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A few bombs or death-carrying devices will be

enough, once they are deployed in secluded areas and directed at the Israeli

water resources or the Israeli beaches, let alone the markets and the residential centers. [This will be carried out] without explosions, noise, blood,

or pictures that are used to serve the Israeli propaganda. Anyone who is

capable, with complete self-control, of turning his body into shrapnel and

scattered organs, is also capable of carrying a small device that cannot be

traced and throw it in the targeted location.32

Thus, an asymmetric conflict, even where the imbalance is not so great, can be

used as justification for turning to CBW. it would be folly not to recognize and respond to all the trends pointing to the CBW option as one increasingly attractive

to terrorists.

Assumption: US must focus efforts on homeland security and defense

While this assumption is not wrong, it may lead to neglecting other venues in

which US interests or allies are at risk. A good case in point is US Central Command in the Middle East. It is very much at risk given its location in the heart of

some of the most anti-American groups. It would be a mistake to pour so much into

enhancing US domestic security when equal attention should be given to those

Americans mobilized and deployed to protect us. In addition, planning for responding to CBW terrorism must consider providing assistance to allies. What if Italy is

the site of a smallpox attack—we had better have planned some way to have adequate resources available to contain the consequences of such an attack. This means

having vaccine available in some international organization or stockpile above and

beyond what is needed for the US population.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We have to be prepared to respond to chem-bio events and to do everything we

can to prevent them from ever occurring. But, that will require new ways of approaching old, evolving, and emerging perils.

First, what is required is innovative thinking and a re-conceptualization of threats

in the 21st century. In past years, when terrorists were unlikely to have the capability to cause or even seek mass casualties, US foreign policy could focus on the

more critical and traditional problem of state threats. Even in the aftermath of the

collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent re-making of the world order, it was

clear who the enemies were (Iraq, North Korea), and these enemies were defined

not only by their antagonism towards the United States and its values, but also by

the fact that they were seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Addressing even the ‘‘old’’ threats will require more than just military power. It

requires a long-term dedication to a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted approach

that seeks to prevent WMD acquisition and use, strengthens anti-proliferation

norms, develops adequate defenses here and elsewhere, and prepares for effective

consequent mitigation and management in the advent of a WMD attack. Specifically, this means not only putting significant money into US military and intelligence capabilities, but also into international organizations and collaborations. It

involves finding ways to bridge gaps within the US government as well as between

states, communities, and even tribes. It also means forging new partnerships and

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helping to build trust and cooperation in areas where these have been scarce commodities.

Second, the United States, while recognizing the ongoing threat from proliferant

states, also faces a threat from a new type of terrorist. The US appears to be approaching the problem of mass-casualty transnational terrorism, and the possibility

of terrorist use of WMD, in a manner consistent with deeply entrenched Cold War

assumptions about warfare and deterrence. The terrorists of today do not, by and

large, behave like states, nor are they part of the international ‘‘system.’’ Addressing

those terrorists who seek and obtain WMD will require much of the same effort that

has been expended on states in the past, plus a strategy that addresses the root

causes and nature of terrorism. Long-term approaches that go beyond the next election must be incorporated into the national counterterrorism strategy. These approaches include investing in states that are in danger of collapse in order to prevent the spiral into statelessness that creates a haven for terrorism; involving allies

and partners in regional confidence-building measures that are designed to validate

US policy to the publics of other nations rather than just the governments; and creating an international safety net to ensure that the rule of law and social infrastructures remain intact even through conflict.

What are some of the more specific activities that might need to be pursued? The

following six areas of effort emerge as critical if the United States is to be successful

in its war on terrorism and WMD proliferation:

• enhancing global WMD materials protection, control and accounting;

• supporting displaced WMD scientists and technical experts to keep them employed doing constructive, socially beneficial projects;

• enhancing intelligence collection, analysis, coordination, and cooperation;

• strengthening the public health sector within the United States and internationally;

• renewing international commitment to effective implementation of both the

CWC and BWC; and

• making meaningful investments to address underlying causes of terrorism, such

as poverty, illiteracy, and socio-economic inequities.

Enhancing global WMD materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A)

The United States must continue its support of improved MPC&A procedures in

the FSU and expand these activities to include sensitive chem-bio materials and to

be international in scope. Although the United States has supported numerous activities within the former Soviet Union to enhance nuclear weapons and nuclear materials protection, control and accounting since the end of the Cold War, these efforts have not really addressed similar problems with chem-bio materials either in

the former Soviet Union or elsewhere in the world. Chemicals of concern are controlled to some degree under the CWC and the Australia Group which provide a

normative and international framework for national and international regulation.

However, nothing similar exists for dangerous biological materials and this gap deserves greater attention.

The BWC does prohibit the transfer of toxins, agents, weapons, equipment, or

means of delivery prohibited under the treaty to any other state, group of states,

or international organization. However, this prohibition is limited in several ways:

it does not address the concern we now face with terrorists, nor is there any implementing mechanism, nor does it directly address the problem of security and safety

of materials while being transferred, stored, or used. Consequently, there is a missing link in our efforts to contain the threat from dangerous pathogens, one that

must be dealt with on both the national and international levels.

The anthrax incidents of this past fall and the ensuing investigation clearly indicates that the United States does not have good control over the collection of pathogens within US territory. When one looks beyond the United States, the situation

is even more disconcerting. While the World Federation for Culture Collections is

an association of 472 repositories of living microbial specimens in 61 countries, it

lacks any ability to require of its members tight controls on access to these materials, nor can it force compliance on the membership. Also, the WFCC has as members only a small portion (less than 1/3) of the 1500 germ banks worldwide. In evaluating the security and protection globally of these dangerous materials, it is quite

apparent that without much trouble terrorists could easily steal or buy them illicitly. Thus, although the United States needs tighter regulations, such an effort will

have little meaning unless there is a similar international initiative. The United

States and its allies must make it a priority to fill this security gap by pursuing

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vigorously enhanced national regulations that control and secure deadly pathogens

and toxins and by launching the negotiation of a new ‘‘Biosecurity Convention.’’

Such a Convention would compliment the BWC by developing a set of specific,

concrete regulations and activities that guarantee the control, accounting, safety,

and security of dangerous pathogens and toxins. It would include, at a minimum,

the following four components: (1) a legal commitment by the contracting parties;

(2) agreed principles for developing progressively higher standards with respect to

regulation and licensing of microbial culture collections; (3) mechanisms for oversight and their progressive refinement; and (4) compliance and enforcement measures. To initiate this process, the United States should work with Europe, Japan,

and other like-minded states to develop the national legislation needed to prevent

misuse and unauthorized access to dangerous biological agents and toxins. Using

these efforts as models, the United States must lead the effort on an international

level and with industry and academia to define international standards of safety

and security in the biotechnology sector so that we have more control over where

materials of concern are, who has access to them, how they are controlled, and how

they are stored and transferred. By engaging the international community in the

negotiation of a Biosecurity Convention, the United States will be pursuing an activity that will reduce the access to dangerous pathogens and thus reduce the threat

of biological weapons proliferation and terrorism.

Supporting displaced WMD scientists and technical experts to keep them employed

and engaged in constructive projects and careers

A critical aspect of any state or terrorist group effort to acquire and use CBW is

having sufficient technical expertise to develop an effective weapon. As indicated

earlier in this testimony, several states have had CBW programs that no longer

exist and the personnel from these programs (perhaps numbering in the thousands)

may be without jobs or at least without adequate wages. This workforce issue

should not be seen as involving only the FSU, but must address similar concerns

that exist for South African and Yugoslavian former bio-weaponeers.

While the United States through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and

a few other initiatives has tried to address these ‘‘brain drain’’ concerns in the FSU,

the amount of effort directed towards former CBW personnel has been insufficient.

A revitalized and focused commitment to working with Russia and the other relevant states of the FSU to provide adequate jobs, wages, and living conditions to

these experts must be immediately pursued. In addition, collaborative discussions

and programs should be pursued to address conditions in other countries. Finally,

ethics courses should be developed and provided to those entering chemistry or biology fields to put their eventual work and careers into a broader societal framework.

Without a much greater level of attention being given to workforce component of

the threat, we will live in a continued state of fear that these experts may be lured

into working for states or sub-national groups with malicious intentions or may find

themselves disgruntled enough to act alone using their expertise for disastrous results.

Enhancing intelligence collection, analysis, coordination, and cooperation

The issue of improving the capacity and capabilities of the US intelligence community has been discussed in great detail in other contexts, but two points deserve

mention. First, while there have been numerous studies, commission reports, and

meetings concluding that the intelligence community needs to integrate much more

effectively open source information, in reality this has not been done to the degree

needed. In part this is because of a mind set which constrains analysts from seeing

the value in non-classified information; in part it is because there are few analysts

that have the language and area studies expertise to exploit adequately unique open

source materials; and in part it is because there is already too much classified information for most analysts to try to wade through an additional stack of open source

materials on a regular basis.

The first recommendation is to develop incentives and organizational structures

that encourage and facilitate the use of open source materials. The second suggestion is to hire more regional experts and actively encourage the acquisition of such

language and area expertise with scholarships and funding for relevant educational

programs. Finally, information technology is making great strides in being able to

filter, bin, and even prioritize data, but the R&D efforts in this area need to be better coordinated and grounded in reality, i.e., analysts need to be integrated into

these efforts at the beginning, middle, and end of the activities so that they are

given tools that they are willing to use to become better analysts.

The second point has to do with improved cooperation and coordination. Since

September 11th, great strides appear to have been made in inter-agency information

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sharing and collaboration. But, more is necessary and more agencies have to be

drawn into the circle. More importantly, international collaboration must continue

to be enhanced and expanded as appropriate. Success in this area requires highlevel attention and leadership to overcome institutional practices, mistrusts and rivalries.

Strengthening the public health sector within the United States and internationally

My two recommendations in this area reiterate what others in numerous meetings, hearings, and reports have indicated, namely that we need to strengthen our

own public health sector and that we need to work with other international groups

and foreign governments to do the same internationally. Last fall’s events were

unnerving enough to get much-needed political support and funding to strengthen

domestic public health preparedness by improving disease surveillance and monitoring, communication networks, training, response capabilities, and laboratory facilities. In addition, the proposed draft legislation of Senators Biden and Helms

called ‘‘Global Disease Surveillance Act of 2002’’ reflects the fact that given the

speed of international travel, migration patterns, and commercial transportation

networks, it will not be enough to shore up American public health capabilities and

capacities. We must assist others to develop capabilities for disease monitoring, surveillance, and response or else leave ourselves vulnerable to being affected unnecessarily to dangerous diseases (whether intentional or not) that could be locally contained if detected in a timely way. Having gotten more support today, the challenge

now is sustaining these efforts both in the United States and elsewhere. Since these

activities have dual benefits—enhancing national and international security and

public health, it is hoped that their value will be clearly evident and funding will

become an integral and ongoing element of our national and public security systems.

Renewing international commitment to effective implementation of both the CWC and

BWC

Over the last decade, the United States and the UN Security Council have

claimed rhetorically that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the greatest threats to US and international security. Whether it is the inability of the UN Security Council to address effectively the problems of Iraq’s unre- solved WMD capabilities, or the unwillingness of Russia and China to make fully

transparent their past CBW activities, states in general have not recognized their

own need for compliance, nor the need to enforce compliance standards on others.

The regime appears threatened by a degradation in effectiveness that may paradoxically lead to what it was developed to prevent—weapons proliferation, growing security threats, and an increased likelihood of violent, wrenching conflicts. We are

at a critical juncture as far as it concerns proliferation-related security threats, a

time in history when muddling and making political deals may no longer be sufficient, when difficult choices must be made and sacrifices endured to reach the next

level of national as well as international security and stability.

But looking at the record of the last five years does not bode well for the next

ten years. The actions of too many states call into question the long term commitment to anti-terrorism and nonproliferation goals: the rhetoric appears hollow, the

commitment to effective action inadequate to the task. It will require US leadership

to move forcefully forward, leadership that involves working within the CWC and

BWC contexts to ensure compliance, secure access to sensitive and dangerous materials, and to strengthen the international norms. It will require the United States

and others to provide substantial new funding and support to these efforts, to focus

on the international benefits rather than national demands involved, and to take

a long term rather than short term approach to these problems. What can not happen is ‘‘business as usual.’’ While terrorism and proliferation may not be an issue

in all parts of the world, it remains a substantial threat in several regions and is

capable of acting as a catalyst to other states and subnational groups who might

rethink their own decisions not to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction.

Making meaningful investments to address underlying causes of terrorism, such as

poverty, illiteracy, or socio-economic inequities

The United States must realize that problems such as failing states, decades of

unresolved, bitter conflict, or poverty and socio-economic inequalities provide the

breeding ground for angry, alienated individuals and groups. With little to lose and

perhaps much to gain in terms of spiritual or political legacies, these individuals

develop values and moral frameworks that justify violence and possibly mass destruction. If we ignore their efforts to address their grievances, we risk always being

the target, always being hated, and always failing to move our own community and

the international community to greater stability and security. Simply put, this recommendation requires a long term commitment to making the world a better place

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for all, which does not mean that we should impose our way of life on others or accept theirs. It does mean that we remain an active, constructive player in multilateral affairs, that we try to improve the quality of life for everyone, that we help in

whatever ways possible to resolve ongoing conflicts, and that in all of this we act

generously and with humility. While it may not be possible to respect the success

of the Marshall Plan in Europe, it may be worth the effort to try to find a new

version appropriate for areas such as Afghanistan, Somalia, or even the Middle

East.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Doctor.

Doctor Zelicoff.

STATEMENT OF ALAN P. ZELICOFF, SENIOR SCIENTIST,

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

Dr. ZELICOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a high honor to be

asked to testify in front of you today. I’ve followed the committee’s

work for many years and I never really thought I’d have the opportunity to be sitting in this seat testifying in front of you and also

in such esteemed company.

At the same time, I know that I’m charged with profound responsibility to clearly address the role of foreign policy in strengthening

our national security posture with regard to bio-terrorism. My testimony will be based on my very best scientific assessment of the

technologies currently available and unfortunately also on my admittedly limited understanding of the complexities of international

relations.

Nonetheless, I believe there are shared interests among countries, I call it an enlightened self interest, that make possible an

immediate and substantive improvement in our counterterrorism

strategy. Mr. Chairman, I develop technology that I believe assists

the medical and public health community in identifying disease

outbreaks natural or otherwise with more data utility than we currently have and in a much shorter time frame than exists in the

existing surveillance system.

We are in fact testing that technology in the United States and

overseas. Interestingly I would note, that the contributions of our

Russian colleagues has much to everyone’s surprise been profoundly important in fostering and improving these novel approaches. My message today to the committee is a simple one.

The CHAIRMAN. Substantively, Doctor, you mean you’re surprised

that they have attempted to cooperate or that they have made such

a contribution?

Dr. ZELICOFF. Substantively, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Scientifically?

Dr. ZELICOFF. Indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. ZELICOFF. My message to the committee is a simple one. We

must rethink our approach to the unique challenges of bio-terrorism. The standard tools of intelligence and of international diplomacy function very poorly in this arena. I’m no expert in gathering intelligence, but I am a daily consumer of it and the peculiar

aspects of the bio-weapons craft, small sites and absence of signatures, ubiquitous availability of organisms make it awfully difficult

for analysts to locate, predict or anticipate an attack except in the

most general of terms.

64

Similarly, traditional arms control which includes declarations,

inspections, counting and compliance judgments fall flat in adding

any substantive strengthening of treaties such as the Biological

Weapons Convention. Quite to the contrary in fact, U.S. tests of

proposed verification measures under the recently failed protocol

for the BWC demonstrated rather clearly that most measures were

not merely worthless, but actually worse than worthless. They provide data of such ambiguity as to confuse rather than enlighten

and undermine rather than strengthen the confidence and compliance with the convention.

I think that UNSCOM activities further underscored the severe

limits of intrusive on-site inspections in uncovering even an enormous bio-weapons program in Iraq. Thus the Administration was

correct in my view to reject the BWC monitoring protocol that was

but a rehash of highly fallible verification techniques.

But fortunately the news is not all bad here. I believe that we

can address many perhaps most of our counterterrorism needs

through shared interests in the international community in disease

monitoring, bio-security arrangements, as has recently been mentioned and assistance, and at least among our allies, collective preparedness against bio-terrorism.

The central and most substantive facet is an enhanced disease

surveillance system accomplished through an inexpensive, international, secure Internet-based system that’s located in primary

care physicians’ offices and clinics and some hospital emergency

wards and an analogous system in the veterinary community.

In almost any scenario involving the use of a bio-weapon, we

have the ability to prevent illness and death in all but a small fraction of those infected if and only if we have early warning that epidemic is brewing. Hours matter here. Were there to be let us say

dissemination of a few pounds of anthrax from an aerosol device in

downtown Washington, tens of thousands of people would become

expose to anthrax spores. Most would become ill and most of those

would die unless we learned early on of the increase in systems

distributed in an oddly shaped area.

So how might this realization come to pass? Well, think about

the scenario that I just outlined. A terrorist drives a van down

Pennsylvania Avenue at about 8:00 on a Monday morning dispersing an unnoticeable stream of anthrax spores out the tailpipe.

Initially nothing happens. People go about their daily activities despite having thousands of anthrax spores in their respiratory systems. By Wednesday morning or early afternoon, due to differences

in the dose they received and also the normal biologic variability

in the population, a few percent of those exposed, and by the way

a few animals as well, will start to get ill with a cough, a fever and

lethargy.

What is the likelihood that any of these 100 or 200 people end

up seeing the same physician? Well, it’s about zero. So 100 or 200

doctors see what appears to be a bad case of flu, shrug their shoulders and draw no systematic lesson.

But let’s say that a few of those doctors have at their fingertips

an always available easy to use reporting system that demands little of their time and more to the point, doesn’t even demand a speVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
65

cific diagnosis. Instead, the system allows physicians to enter some

symptoms as I’ll illustrate here.

At the same time as the physicians enter these symptoms, a map

will display the existence of the onset of a disease in the local area.

Here’s an illustration for example, in New Mexico of what this system actually looks like, but I’ll use Washington and we’ll just zoom

in on it to illustrate what I’m talking about. What I’m showing is

a zoomable map of the Washington, D.C. area on which physicians

and public health authorities can overlay transportation infrastructure, weather, local vegetation coverage, airports, even per capita

income to see if the diseases that are being seen are associated

with movement of people, might be socioeconomically related.

The CHAIRMAN. How do the diseases get hooked into that?

Dr. ZELICOFF. On this screen that you see here, the physician

merely logs in on a touch screen. I’m not sure why your screen’s

not updating and then within about 30 seconds, can literally enter

all of the data that is required. So we’re looking at only about a

minute of the physician’s time.

The public health officials who are also watching this system

while not seeing any patients, notice on the map that there’s a sudden increase in in this case a flu-like illness in the Capital area.

So they call some of the doctors and perhaps learn that some of the

chest x-rays on a few of these patients demonstrated a peculiar

finding that’s not really well-recognized by physicians, but is well

known to the public health officials as being strongly associated

with anthrax.

An investigation would then immediately ensue rather than five

days later when the first deaths would occur and targeted antibiotic therapy could be given. A specific diagnosis would be available in 18 hours rather than five or six days later. But today and

let me make this very clear, it’s unlikely that local public health

officials who are the true experts in infectious disease in their community would know much of anything about severe symptoms in

the population until the hospitals were overwhelmed with cases or

autopsies revealed the diagnosis in droves.

It would be too late at that point to save the vast majority of people. The reason for all of this is that our current disease reporting

system is stuck in the 19th century. It’s paper-based, it’s disease

specific and it’s so time consuming as to frustrate even the most

well-intentioned of physicians who serve as the true sensors for illness in the community.

I observe this in my practice. Not once in 10 years of practice did

I never see a physician report a disease that they were even legally

mandated to report by local, state authorities. But there is another

way.

In my 10 years of medical practice, not once and I mean never

did I see any physician ever pick up the phone, file the fax, fill out

the form that is required to report a reportable disease. Now occasionally it does happen, but it is merely a matter of chance and the

vast majority of reporting the public health officials have comes not

from doctors who are seeing the patients first, but from laboratories.

That would of course assume that a sample was obtained, not a

very good assumption in the current economic environment, the

66

sample was handled correctly and that the result was available in

a timely fashion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. ZELICOFF. All of those would be very, very bad assumptions

on which to base a disease-based surveillance system. In New Mexico and in collaboration with the New Mexico Department of

Health, we developed this system that I’m illustrating here which

has been in use by 50 physicians for about six months. It’s called

the Rapid Syndrome Validation Project or RSVP for short.

What we’ve learned is that physicians actually do take the time,

about a minute, out of their busy schedules to consult the system

on a daily basis to see what’s going on. In other words, to get the

epidemiologic or public health lay of the land, and further, that

they actually report because they know that they will get an advisory message from the local public health authorities who are

watching the data on a near real time basis.

The cost is very inexpensive. It’s the cost of the computer, a

touch screen and a low speed Internet connection. All of which are

ubiquitously available, including in most of the developing world.

The physicians indeed are delighted to have the information.

They return the favor by entering suspiciously ill patients and are

very, very good at sensing when something is amiss. While the doctor is not necessarily good at making the exact diagnosis of what

is wrong when he first sees somebody, she’s very, very good at

knowing whether or not someone is ill.

I think we’ve been successful in this approach as the government

of Singapore, at least one NATO country and several other public

health, state public health authorities around the country have

asked for RSVP to be implemented and we are in the process of implementing it in those places now.

Mr. Chairman, when all is said and done would be perpetrators

of bio-terror know that the effects of their attacks would be blunted

if not eliminated, they might well rethink their strategy of using

bio-weapons in the first place.

A multinational cadre of clinicians and nurses exchanging up to

the minute information, not delayed by laboratory tests, not delayed by the current existing bureaucracy of reporting is our single

best defense and we have the resources now to so equip them both

nationally and internationally. All that is required is a policy shift

emphasizing and strengthening this linchpin capability.

So I’m looking forward to your insightful questions. I expect that

I’ll learn much more from you than I’ve imparted and I apologize

for the technical glitch. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zelicoff follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN P. ZELICOFF

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee:

It is a high honor to be asked to testify in front of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee. I have followed committee’s work for many years, and never thought I’d

have the privilege of sitting before you and in such esteemed company. At the same

time, I know that I am charged with a profound responsibility: to clearly address

the role of foreign policy in strengthening our national security posture with regard

to bio-terrorism. My testimony is based on my very best scientific assessment of the

technologies currently available, and my admittedly limited understanding of the

complexities of international relations. Nonetheless, I believe that there are shared

67

interests among countries—call it enlightened self-interest—that make possible an

immediate substantive improvement in our counter-terrorism strategy.

Mr. Chairman, my formal scientific training is in experimental physics and medicine. I was a practicing internist and immunologist for about 10 years before joining

the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories in the Center for National Security and Arms Control where I am now senior scientist. I work at the interface between politics and technology. I served as technical adviser on the U.S. Delegation

to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) throughout the 1990s, including the

time of the intensive negotiations on a Protocol to strengthen compliance with the

treaty. I carry out large scale collaborative research projects in disease outbreak

identification with colleagues throughout the Russian biological weapons laboratory

system in an effort to better understand that mysterious archipelago of research

sites, some or even most of which undoubtedly involved in illegal weapons development throughout the much of the past 30 years. I also develop technology that I

believe assists the medical and public health community in identifying disease outbreaks—natural or otherwise—with more day to day utility and in a much shorter

time frame than the existing surveillance system. We are testing that technology

in the United States and overseas. Interestingly, the contributions of our Russian

colleagues has, much to everyone’s surprise, been profoundly important in fostering

and improving these novel approaches.

My message to the committee is a simple one: we must rethink our approach to

the unique challenges of bio-terrorism. The standard tools intelligence and of international diplomacy function poorly in this arena. I am no expert on gathering intelligence, but I am a daily consumer of it, and I believe that peculiar aspects of the

bio-weapons craft—small sites, an absence of signatures, ubiquitous availability of

organisms—make it awfully difficult for analysts to locate, predict or anticipate an

attack except in the most general of terms; the ‘‘take’’ of intelligence is, regrettably,

disappointing. Similarly, traditional arms control—declarations, inspection, counting, and compliance judgments—fall flat in adding any substantive strengthening

of treaties such as the BWC; quite the contrary in fact, as US tests of proposed

verification measures under the recently failed Protocol for the BWC demonstrated

rather clearly that most measures were not merely worthless, but actually worse

than worthless. They provide data of such ambiguity as to confuse rather than enlighten, and undermine rather than strengthen confidence in compliance with the

Convention. UNSCOM activities further underscored the severe limits of intrusive

on-site inspections in uncovering even an enormous bioweapons program in Iraq.

Thus, the Administration was correct, in my view to reject the BWC monitoring Protocol that was but a rehash of highly fallible verification techniques.

Fortunately, the news here is not all bad. We can address many, perhaps most

of our counter-bioterrorism needs through shared interests in the international community in disease-monitoring, biosecurity arrangements and assistance, and at least

among our allies, collective preparedness against bio-terrorism. The central and

most substantive facet is enhanced disease surveillance, accomplished through an

inexpensive, international, secure, Internet-based, system located in primary care

clinics and some hospital emergency wards, and an analogous system in the veterinary community.

In almost any scenario involving the use of a bio-weapon, we have the ability to

prevent illness and death in all but a small fraction of those infected, if—and only

if—we have early warning that an epidemic is brewing. Hours matter. Were there

to be, let us say, a dissemination of a few pounds of anthrax from an aerosol device

in downtown Washington, tens of thousands of people would be exposed to anthrax

spores. Most would become ill, and of those most would die unless we learned early

on of an increase in symptoms distributed in an oddly shaped area.

How might this early realization come to pass? Think about the scenario that I

just outlined: a terrorist drives a van down Pennsylvania Avenue at about 8 AM

on a Monday morning, dispersing an unnoticeable stream of anthrax spores out the

tailpipe. Initially, nothing happens. People go about their daily activities despite

having thousands of anthrax spores in their respiratory systems. By Wednesday

morning or early afternoon—due to differences in dose and biologic variability in the

population—a few percent of those exposed (and, by the way, a few animals) start

to get ill with a cough, fever, and lethargy. What is the likelihood that any of the

one or two hundred people end up visiting the same doctor? It’s about zero. So, one

or two hundred doctors see a single patient with what appears to be a bad case of

flu, shrug their shoulders and draw no systematic lesson.

But let’s say a few of those doctors have, at their fingertips, an always-available,

easy to use reporting system that demands little of their time and—more to the

point—doesn’t demand a specific diagnosis. Instead the system allows the physician

to report the symptoms of a moderately to severely ill patient, and, at the same

68

time, shows the doctor and local public health authorities in the District all cases

of flu-like illness in the area, presented immediately and conveniently enough on

a map. The doctor notices that a few dozen physicians have reported the same thing

in just the past few hours. Public health officials who, while not seeing patients are

seeing the map on their screens, and to them, the sudden spike in flu-like cases in

Zip Code 20501 is unusual. They call some of the doctors, and perhaps learn that

the chest X-rays on a couple of the patients demonstrated a finding whose significance was missed by the physicians who have never seen it before, but well known

to the public health officials, indicating that these cases might well be anthrax. An

investigation immediately ensues, and the diagnosis is confirmed less than 18 hours

later. The geographic pattern of illness proves important, and via the media, everyone in the area or a few miles downwind learns of the potential for exposure. Targeted antibiotic therapy is given. A few hundred people die, but had public health

officials not suspected anthrax until a few days later, many, many thousands would

be dead.

Today, it is unlikely that local public health officials—the true experts in infectious disease in their communities by dint of years of experience and observation— would know much of anything about any severe symptoms in the population until

hospitals were overwhelmed with cases or autopsies revealed the diagnosis in

droves. By then, it would be too late to save the vast majority of people succumbing

to anthrax. Our current disease reporting system is stuck in the 19th century— paper based, disease specific, and so time-consuming as to frustrate even the most

well intentioned physicians who serve as the ‘‘sensors’’ for illness in the community.

I observed this in my clinical practice: never—not once—did I ever see a colleague

report even diseases that they are legally mandated report, let alone a ‘‘suspicious’’ or odd case. But there is another way: in New Mexico, and in dose collaboration

with the NM Department of Health, Sandia has developed and implemented a stable, physician-friendly surveillance system called RSVP—the Rapid Syndrome Validation Project. We’ve had about 50 doctors using the system over the past 6 months.

Physicians actually take the time out of their busy schedules to consult the system

to ‘‘see what is going on’’ in their communities; public health officials review the

data and update advisory messages on a near-real-time basis. The cost is that of

a computer, a touch screen, and a low-speed Internet connection—maybe $5–6,000

per clinic serving 5 to 15 doctors. The physicians are delighted to have the information, and return the favor by entering suspiciously ill patients—and they’re very

good at sensing when something is amiss. And public health officials can quickly

analyze the information with geographic tools that are part of the software.

Have we been successful? Practitioners and local health officials seem to think so.

We’ve had requests from dozens of public health jurisdictions around the US to participate in and use RSVP; about two hundred more physicians are about to come

onto the system. The Government of Singapore is installing RSVP throughout that

island-nation, and other governments have requested the software as well. In the

end, the system works because it is in the enlightened self-interest of doctors and

epidemiologists to have it; sharing the data makes it that much more valuable as

diseases respect no borders. And, this is a ‘‘no regrets’’ approach: even if there is

never a bioterrorism attack, the public health benefits will probably be quite large—

diagnosis and therapy will be much more accurate than in the current clinical setting, even in the United States where sheer guess work dominates the early treatment of most infectious disease.

Mr. Chairman, the traditional approaches to counter-proliferation of bioweapons—

more intelligence spending and arms control treaties—are largely ineffective in this

context. It is simply impossible to detect and thwart all individuals or groups that

are determined to use an infectious organism or a toxin as a biological weapon of

terror. With the anthrax attacks of last year in the Hart building and elsewhere,

we now know that at least some terrorists have learned how to prepare anthrax

spores in a form that will disseminate easily through the air. Please know this: the

challenge to the terrorist never has never been the ability to acquire anthrax spores

in varieties that are reproducibly lethal. Rather, the fundamental roadblock to the

effective use of bio-weapons was the ability to aerosolize it—that is, to make anthrax particle behave like the air itself—infinitely miscible, invisible and odorless.

That this technology, formerly understood by a rare breed of bio-weaponeer that

could be found only in the national biological weapons programs, is now in the

hands of terrorists is chilling. At the very least it means that future biological weapons attacks are not only probable, but that they are likely to be on a large scale.

And, since it is extremely difficult to locate seed stocks, fermenters, and drying

equipment necessary to make aerosolize-able anthrax—or, for that matter, infectious, aerosolize-able organisms of many types—we will have to rely on early detection of cases, in hun-tans and in animals, in order to mitigate the worst conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
69

sequences of a large-scale use of these kinds of bio-weapons. We ignore these conclusions at our peril.

When all is said and done, should would-be perpetrators of bio-terror know that

the effects of their attacks would be blunted if not eliminated, they might well

rethink their strategy in the first place. A multi-national cadre of clinicians and

nurses, exchanging up-to-the-minute information is our single best defense, and we

have the resource—now—to so equip them. All that is required is a policy shift emphasizing and strengthening this lynchpin capability.

I am looking forward to the insightful questions of the committee. I expect that

I will learn from you much more than I impart.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I doubt that, Doctor. Not the technical glitch,

that you’ll learn much more at least from me, but what I’m going

to do because there’s only three of us here and my colleagues—one

advantage of being the Chairman is the hearing doesn’t start until

you get there, but it also doesn’t end until you bang the gavel down

which means I’m here until the end. So I’d be delighted to yield to

my colleagues first.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman for

your thoughtfulness. Dr. Zelicoff, your presentation is certainly

helpful and gives an optimistic sense of, as you say, how to brunt

bio-terrorism, given gifted physicians and alert public health professionals.

I just want to underline, without getting into an over-examination of the whole situation, what we’ve lived through in the wake

of the anthrax attack upon Senator Daschle’s office and the Senate.

The threat was real and the spores present were a problem because

people didn’t know very much about it.

Dr. Frist fortunately knew a great deal and this was of some

comfort to receive some briefings on what was known and what

was not known. But what happened fairly quickly, just following

your analysis, was everybody went to room S. 216, had a swab test,

got three days of Cipro tablets while decisions were made on what

to do next.

Senate officials stopped the ventilation system quickly, emptied

the buildings, sealed off in a time warp all our records, checkbooks,

everything else here; and as a result, probably a lot of lives were

saved. Because people knew it was anthrax, they were able to

begin treating people who needed treatment. That didn’t happen at

the Brentwood post office in quite the same fashion; and therefore,

as you pointed out, time counts in these situations.

But for the first very public attack, the system responded, because of the ingenuity of people. It was extremely costly; and the

taxpayers will be picking up the tab for some time, while trying to

figure out all of what happened here.

But in terms of loss of life, identification and accurate diagnosis

is imperative if somehow, somewhere in the system somebody picks

up a possible threat. Immediate treatment of almost everybody in

sight must occur; if so, there’s a reasonably good chance of blunting

the attack.

This committee, and others, have held hearings exploring the

means of dissemination, such as helicopters, trucks, and crop dusters. I agree that identification and response are terribly important,

and I’m hopeful this hearing will illuminate these issues for a lot

of people.

70

Dr. ZELICOFF. Two comments if I may, Senator. First, you had

a particular advantage in the case of the anthrax letter in Senator

Daschle’s office in that someone recognized there was powder.

Make no mistake, in a large scale bio-terrorism dispersal, you will

not have a powder to look at, raise a suspicion, do early swabs and

determine who needs to be treated and who doesn’t.

Second, even with that advantage, I would hardly call what happened in Washington, D.C. a dramatic success. As a result of a few

people being exposed, five people dead, there were several tens of

thousands of people put on Ciprofloxacin for at least a period of

time. Not exactly our shining hour.

Dr. Ivan Wak, who I believe is the D.C. Public Health Commissioner, at the time of the initial reports asked a question that I

think is truly enlightening here. He came out and he specifically

asked, tell me, who is it that I do not need to worry about? And

no one could give him an answer. Why? Because we had no context,

no surveillance system, for example, to know who likely was not exposed.

In the case of a large scale attack where people start to become

ill, without this kind of geographic information which is currently

not available either to public health officials or to clinicians, that

would mean millions of people put on antibiotics. Not only a

logistical nightmare, but one that will almost certainly result in

untoward side effects that are very unpleasant.

Senator LUGAR. Good point. Mr. Moodie, let me just express, first

of all, a personal thanks to you for working with House colleagues

on the Nunn-Lugar chemical weapons elimination project at

Shchuchye. I want the public to know that through your own quiet

diplomacy and credibility you have been most helpful with congressional movement in these important areas.

You have raised a question, all of you have in one form or another, of what an awesome job is still to be done with cooperative

Russians. As the Chairman has pointed out, this situation is different than noncooperative Iraqis, but nevertheless there is still

much work to do to eliminate this nightmare.

The detritus of the Cold War is a real threat, and it’s very expensive to clean up. We discuss the awesome power of these weapons

and we know that they’re there and the question is just physically

is how to pay for it, how to organize the disposal. What would be

your advice to the Administration?

At best we’re attacking the first of seven locations, the other six

are sitting there and hopefully will just sit there for quite a while

without deterioration or proliferation. What is a reasonable international program and a dramatic way to sort of get a handle on

this while the world is interested in bio-terrorism?

Mr. MOODIE. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you for

your comments. I do think the funding of the Shchuchye facility is

an extremely important step forward. It gets activity going on the

ground which we’ve talked about for a decade or more and never

saw happen and now finally, we’re at the point where some of the

Russian stuff is actually going to be destroyed. And that’s enormously important and a positive step.

I see a two pronged approach. One is encouraging the Russians

to do more themselves. This is their problem first and foremost and

71

yes, they have committed a significant increase in money, but when

you put it against the need, the $120 million a year against the 6

or 8 or $10 billion program isn’t a lot. And I do think, despite the

economic problems they have, there is more money in the Russian

system for this if they want to put it against this rather than some

other things and so I think that we should engage with them on

that. And by we, I mean in this case the entire international community.

The second track I think is one—we have not pushed this issue

as a priority for the last several years in both administrations it

seems to me. And as a consequence, we haven’t pushed our friends

and allies to do as much.

I know in the earlier discussion there was comments about some

of things that European allies are doing, the British, the Germans,

the Norwegians, but that really isn’t a lot of money. The European

Union together 15 countries I think has committed less than 20

million euros to this issue. That really isn’t adequate. Everybody

has an interest in seeing the CW stockpile of the Russians disappear.

It’s closer to the Europeans than it is to us. It’s closer to Japan

than it is to us. And I think what we need to do is make a much

more sustained concerted effort with our friends and allies to join

us. It probably will mean more money for us, too, but I think if we

show that we’re willing to put more money into it and we have a

cooperative Russian government, they should then be pushed. And

I think the place to do this is at the review conference that is

scheduled for next year.

I think one objective we should have for that review conference

is a strategy that everybody agrees to about how to get the Russians from where they are to where they have to be. This is the

single biggest noncompliance issue in the CWC. Not because

they’re evil people in this case. It’s just a huge task.

But they’re never going to get to the 2012 deadline and that not

only has negative implications for the issue itself, but it has severely negative implications for the health of the treaty, too. For

both of those reasons, we’ve got to work with friends and allies to

get them to kick in more money.

Senator LUGAR. I think that’s a tremendously important suggestion that the conference offers a focal point. For example, in the

discussion of the future of NATO, we’re all focusing on Prague and

the membership question, the Russian relationship, the war

against terrorism, but there’s a run up now in this committee with

the Administration. We’re all talking an agenda that is critically

important to achieve.

I haven’t heard of anybody working on an agenda for this conference. As you pointed out, the conference provides an opportunity

for an international wake up call. All the major parties are going

to be there.

It’s sort of like a giant pledging conference in an international

sense in which we all come to the table to see what is attainable.

We need to capitalize on cooperation and expand on addressing

these threats. Furthermore, Russia must work with us to address

noncooperation in other nations.

72

There is every reason to want to have an active diplomatic run

up to this conference. I appreciate that suggestion. It’s one we

should follow-up on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Zelicoff, you said

that every moment counts. Why now do you believe that our public

health system and physicians are adequately trained today to respond in such a way that is adequate?

Dr. ZELICOFF. By and large my answer is yes. Physicians are

very good at recognizing when people are ill, they may not be able

to make the correct diagnosis and unlike most physicians, the vast

majority of public health officials around the country have actually

devoted time to understanding the peculiarities of biological weapons diseases and I think know the earliest indicators of them.

Senator FRIST. And you think—I’m going to ask a whole bunch

of questions now.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Sure.

Senator FRIST. Do you think we’re going to have a manpower or

personpower shortage in terms of trained epidemiologists and people who are experts once you have the technology out there?

Dr. ZELICOFF. Right. I know it’s popular to say that we don’t

have adequate manpower in epidemiology and I would be the last

person to question that. What I do think, though, is that in a world

of limited resources, when we’re faced with a choice between hiring

more epidemiologists who have no data at their fingertips versus

providing the existing epidemiologists with real time information

on which to make decisions, I think the choice is obvious. You go

with the latter.

And make no mistake about it, right now epidemiologists learn

about disease outbreaks usually as a result of an infection control

nurse working in a hospital once enough cases have accumulated

or from a laboratory. That is inherently delayed. The system is currently set up almost precisely to be unresponsive enough in the setting of a bio-terrorism attack.

Senator FRIST. If you took all of the public health facilities in the

Unites States of America, how many would have the capability to

fax, use a fax machine?

Dr. ZELICOFF. It’s a lot less than we might want to think. It’s

probably about 50 or 60 percent are capable of faxing.

Senator FRIST. Just fax machines?

Dr. ZELICOFF. Yeah, just fax machines.

Senator FRIST. Let’s take it one step further. In terms of the public health facilities, the first responders, the people we will go to

depend upon, obviously you’re hitting at the heart of it with your

communication, how many have e-mail capability of all the—and

that’s where we’re going to go. That’s who we’re going to call for

early recognition. How many even have e-mail?

Dr. ZELICOFF. I don’t know the numbers. What I do know——

Senator FRIST. It’s low.

Dr. ZELICOFF [continuing].——what I do know is that in order to

provide that kind of capability that provides enough data flow for

a system like this one for example, is a low speed Internet connection. We’re talking about 50 bucks a month and a computer.

Senator FRIST. But it’s not there and I haven’t gotten there yet.

73

Dr. ZELICOFF. They do have phone lines, though. Let’s be clear

about that.

Senator FRIST. Most of them do have phone lines and capabilities

there. The point of the matter is that it is a pencil and paper system and when every moment counts, it’s inexcusable today when

you’ve got technology like you have that we don’t use blast fax machines which have been around a while, we don’t use the Internet,

not using the e-mail, don’t use Internet, that infrastructure is not

there.

I think you made the case and I agree 100 percent this is where

we need to be, but it’s important for my colleagues to know that

the basic support, and it goes back to what Dr. Sands said in one

of her recommendations, the basic support for our public health infrastructure we have been remiss.

We have undersupported so even when you introduce your program to a community, they do have the telephone line coming in,

but they’re not on the Internet and they need to be. And what is

hard, I believe, is for us to explain, and we all need to do a better

job to communities around the country, that the first responders,

the people we’re depending upon if every moment counts, to look

at that pattern, to communicate from the public health facility to

the hospital to the CDC, it’s just not there.

It is going to require an increased investment to make your sort

of program available. Right now is this in community health centers all across the state?

Dr. ZELICOFF. It’s in community health centers in southern Texas

and in southern New Mexico. Let me tell you why we picked those

community health centers. We tried to pick areas of our part of the

country that were most severely underfunded, most severely taxed

both in terms of their clinical physicians who are seeing patients

and also the public health authorities in those areas and we were

able to set this up painlessly even in the poorest part of southern

New Mexico and south central Texas along the Mexican border.

So I think the message here is that while I quite agree with you

that more resources are needed, let’s not make a mountain out of

a mole hill. The amount of money that’s necessary to accomplish

this kind of connectivity which is an 80 percent solution, it’s not

a 100 percent solution, is trivial. The amount of money that will

be required to get the last 10 or 20 percent is of course enormous.

Senator FRIST. But what my colleagues need to understand, the

touch screen and the computers available are not in the public

health centers today.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Correct.

Senator FRIST. And I’m reinforcing what you’re saying, but my

colleagues don’t realize that when smallpox comes to a community

or anthrax is in the community here——

Dr. ZELICOFF. Yes.

Senator FRIST [continuing].——if you’re a physician, you haven’t

been trained to think anthrax, period. That pattern recognition you

need to report to somebody so the pattern can be picked up and it

becomes even more important—you said anthrax easy. That’s easy

stuff. We knew the powder was here. You could draw a perimeter

around it. You could treat everybody, but what about smallpox

which can travel across the country and as a physician if you’ve

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never—you’re board certified in internal medicine I see from you

bio. Have you seen active smallpox?

Dr. ZELICOFF. No, I haven’t even seen a case of measles and I

don’t think I’d be able to make that diagnosis—— Senator FRIST. No, you wouldn’t, but a lot of children get chicken

pox——

Dr. ZELICOFF. Right.

Senator FRIST [continuing].——and if smallpox is in your community, the doctors are going to see it and they’ve not been

trained—— Dr. ZELICOFF. Correct.

Senator FRIST [continuing].——to make that diagnosis. Well, if

you miss it and every moment does count, right now how infective

is smallpox right now? If I had smallpox sitting around me right

now to the left and right, people would be infected after about an

hour if I had lesions in my mouth. You won’t really understand

how infective, communicable it actually is.

I just think you presentation and then Dr. Sands, in your testimony, you mention Italy in your written testimony. What if Italy

is a site of a small pox attack? We better be planned in some way.

Smallpox’s germs know no boundaries. They don’t care if it’s

United States, Tennessee, California, New Mexico. Smallpox travels and it travels on an airplane pretty easily and it doesn’t have

to be at state.

That’s why when I ask who has this smallpox—smallpox has

killed 500 million people. We’ve eradicated the disease, but there

are a bunch of people running around with the virus in their pocket somewhere and from an intelligence standpoint, we need to figure that out which comes into this whole panel in terms of why

we’re discussing it.

But going from the front line, we’re not trained to recognize

smallpox, we don’t have the communication to address the smallpox today, so we have a long, long, long way to go.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Right, and let’s also add with regard to smallpox

and I quite agree with you, it’s a highly significant problem that’s

overlooked because it almost falls into the too hard to do category,

that once we have our vaccine supply of 300 million doses, that will

not be adequate to solve the problem or address it.

Increasing work in genetic alteration of the organism may in fact

result in a vaccine resistant strain. We have to have at least one

other tool in our toolbox. There is a small program being run at the

CDC with folks from US AMRID to look for antibiotics. They have

succeeded in probably coming up with an animal model.

That’s an enormous breakthrough because for the first time, we

can now test other nontraditional means of treating the disease not

only if there’s a vaccine resistant strain, but more to the point for

the 15 or 20 percent of the population that cannot tolerate the existing vaccine for smallpox because of other conditions.

Senator FRIST. Good. Very well said. Mr. Chairman, I know the

time is late.

The CHAIRMAN. No, take your time.

Senator FRIST. I think the real challenge that we need to face

and it’s so important for this committee to hear this because for the

last four years, I’ve been sort of sitting and listening and our intelVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:30 Nov 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 79961 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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ligence which we heard from an earlier panel a little bit today, has

identified smallpox, anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, tularemia

and the list are there and they’re identified, but some way or another our intelligence community isn’t filtering down to what you

just heard.

Our vulnerabilities are high, they’re huge. We can reduce them

by responding, but our intelligence community’s already identified

these, but we’re not communicating to the doctors, to the public

health communities, to the epidemiologists, to the Appropriations

Committee and now we find ourselves with risk. Everybody said

the risk is there, it’s reality.

Go back to 1995 sarin gas attack, we go back to anthrax right

here where we are in New York City where it took six days, the

little skin lesion of anthrax took six days to diagnose with the very

best doctors, the very best CDC in the world looking at it, it took

six days to diagnose it. That’s not right today.

The risk we’ve heard today is there. The risk is increasing. I

think that’s very important for us to know. Because of technology,

because of all the reasons Dr. Sands outlined in her really great

paper that she didn’t have a chance to go all the way through today

and your annotation in the paper, the risk is increasing today.

Dr. Zelicoff, you said it in your opening statement, the

vulnerabilities are high, but by reducing the vulnerabilities, we end

up reducing the risk. The terrorist wants to terrorize. The terrorist

is going to go where the vulnerabilities are high and that’s the significance I believe of all the recommendations that are being made

today. If we educate people, Bob, if we respond as a government,

if we integrate our intelligence, we reduce the vulnerabilities and

that reduces the risk as we go forward.

I’ll stop with that, Mr. Chairman. I just think it’s important, it’s

really come out in the panel and the earlier panel, this integration,

this matrix where we—I’m optimistic. We can lick this thing, but

it is going to take this integration that’s been demonstrated by the

panel today.

Mr. MOODIE. Mr. Chairman, may I make just one quick comment

on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Mr. MOODIE. I think it’s particularly important for this committee with the mandate that it has. And that is that as much as

we do here at home, that’s still not the end of the story. Anthrax

doesn’t necessarily stop at our border. I think it would be interesting for the committee to examine what other countries are doing

with respect to these kinds of issues.

Our institute has done a lot of work in the issue of promoting

cooperation in dealing with bio-terrorism internationally. You see

a very spotty picture among our Europeans and elsewhere in terms

of how serious they take the threat, the kind of money they’re putting against it, the kinds of issues they’re making, the kinds of

medicines they’re producing. It’s a very mixed picture, and yet

we’re all going to have to be in this together. We can’t do it by ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that’s a valid point and it sure makes you

wish for the good old days of the Cold War, doesn’t it? You know,

then everything was predictable. We knew that the commissars

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were not likely to take great risks and they were concerned about

controlling all of their potential dangerous substances and God, I

never thought I’d look forward to Communist Russia, the Soviet

Union again.

By the way, all kidding aside, I think the greatest frustration

I’ve had as Chairman and Ranking Member of this committee is

again and I don’t know how to say it, I say it ten different ways,

is getting to our colleagues and to the administration, past and

present.

I have an 86 year old dad who’s very ill in the hospital right now,

and he is constantly reminding me of two things about first things

first and if all is equally important to you, nothing’s important to

you. It’s very hard to get, I think you agree, Senator, get a handle

on this and get our colleagues paying attention to it, the administration paying attention.

I mean here we’re talking about it again, I’m not criticizing the

$8.3 billion we’re going to spend this year on national defense.

Great. Wonderful. But we’re going to spend, what’s it up to, $200

million now that we’re talking about dealing or maybe $300 million

dealing with the whole chemical reduction problem. Dealing with

stockpiles of chemical weapons in, you know, in the former Soviet

Union, particularly in Russia.

I mean, it seems to me it’s so out of whack what we’re doing. I

mean, Doctor, I would be willing to bet you, on this I may have

some disagreement with my friend at least in tone with my friend

from Tennessee, if we could somehow get every single state official

and every single governor in one room at one moment and give you

an hour to lay out your presentation, they could fund all by themselves in their states without a single penny.

I mean if we can wire every single solitary classroom in the state

of Delaware, every single classroom from kindergarten through

high school is wired now to the Internet. Every singe one in my

small state. If we can do that, we can do this in a heartbeat.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. We can do this in a heartbeat. And so part of

this problem is getting out A, to the public and to put pressure on

our colleagues and to our colleagues how serious this problem is

and then beginning to move on it. I mean, I can’t understand why,

to be very blunt with you, why every one of our colleagues aren’t

here at this hearing.

I’m having trouble getting it and I’ve been here almost 30 years.

Maybe that’s why I’m having trouble getting it. But let me point

out one of my staff members, actually a fellow that was the science

counselor at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo here in the room right now

at the time of the sarin gas poisoning in the Tokyo subway, he indicated that a doctor who had dealt with a previously unsolved sarin

attack outside of Tokyo faxed his correct diagnosis based on the reports he had heard on the radio and this was critical in saving

lives and limiting the deaths to 12 of the 1,000 people who were

exposed.

And he said there’s real live examples of what you’re talking

about.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Somebody’s going to recognize it. That’s correct.

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The CHAIRMAN. Real live examples of what you’re talking about.

I’d like to pursue three things. One with you, Doctor. You indicated

the first 80 percent is easy, and the last 20 percent is incredibly

expensive. Tell us about the last 20 percent. What does the last 20

percent consist of?

Dr. ZELICOFF. From the standpoint of domestic counterterrorism

with biological weapons, it consists of sensor development, consists

of education and finally, it consists of integrating a wide and disparate flow of data. Things like pharmaceutical sales, absenteeism

from major corporations or from schools on a given day, et cetera.

That’s all going to be much much harder to do.

The information sometimes is proprietary. More to the point, we

don’t often know what do so with that information. So those are the

things that I’m referring to in terms of domestic activities and

that’s going to be very expensive.

The CHAIRMAN. I’d ask both you and it’s not our practice here to

cross-examine our colleagues, but I’d ask him to chime in with you.

What are medical schools doing? What are medical schools doing

about training students?

I’m a lawyer. Law schools are beginning to shift their focus on

how they train lawyers to deal with some of the real and emerging

concerns that exist within the law, different emphasis. For example, my law school which is not one of the top 10 law schools, but

a very good law school, but no, I mean it’s not one of the prestige

law schools. I went to Syracuse. It’s a very good law school.

My law school now is rated one, two or three in terms of their

emphasis on trial practice and clinics and they double the size of

the law school just with one thing, providing clinics so that you

have students in the community dealing with specific advocacy on

specific issues.

Tulane Law School, not one of the top three or five, but a very,

very good law school, has probably the single best environment law

department in the Unites States of America and has through their

law students—I mean, before they even got their degrees, fundamentally altered some of the toxic tort cases that are going on

and so much so the Louisiana legislature is considering defunding

them. I’m told literally, not figuratively. So what are medical

schools doing here?

Senator FRIST. Mr. Chairman, let me just jump in. Because when

anthrax hit here and because I knew at that time before New York

had been exposed to this, I knew that it took six days for, without

going to which patient it was, to make the diagnosis of the anthrax

rash and it was interesting.

If you really walk through that, some of it, most of it’s been

talked about before in the press, but this was with the very best

doctors, with the CDC, with the best in transportation and the finest people, you know, a city that is advanced medically, it took six

days. That’s where we started. So the first letter that I wrote and

contact I made as soon as anthrax hit here on October 14th was

to the American Association of Medical Colleges and wrote every

one of the deans personally myself to basically say, we got work to

do. It’s not their fault. It’s nobody’s fault.

The CHAIRMAN. No one’s suggesting fault. I didn’t mean to imply

that.

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Senator FRIST. Exactly. But it’s very important because as a doctor and I was trained in infectious disease because when I transplant these hearts, the heart transplant’s easy, but it’s keeping the

infections down. So that’s what I spent my life doing yet I never

had seen, the same question I asked—I was pretty confident you

hadn’t seen it. I’ve never seen a picture of the anthrax rash, never

had any reason to. Or Ebola or tularemia or smallpox. Yet those

are the ones that our intelligence community says we’re at risk for

today.

So anyway the response was we got together, the deans together

within about two weeks and it’s sort of working its way through

the curriculum. But that was an immediate response. The American Medical College, a group of medical schools, about 125, got together and the response has been pretty good there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Dr. Sands.

Dr. SANDS. I happen to just know a little bit about this because

my own Senator has been trying to reach out to the medical community in a variety of ways to try to provide training on the broader context. Obviously we aren’t the technical folks, but we know the

political context and the history and something about the interest

and use and perhaps delivery of some of these weapons.

We have talked to a couple groups and actually put together a

proposal that was to fit into curriculum changes that I believe are

happening both in medical schools and the schools of public health.

The funding that you all have provided is actually making a difference that has gone out to schools of public health to really integrate much more extensively information about the medical and

technical components of this concern over biological threats.

I know the American College of, I think it’s called the American

College of Emergency Practitioners has a task force that they’ve

created and actually done a study on WMD concerns and their

major thrust is how to integrate more educational aspects of this

concern into their ongoing curriculum both for the, you know, first

time you come through the curriculum as well as sort of catching

up people who’ve been the field.

They’ve at least got a whole set of recommendations that if implemented effectively, will in fact address some of these concerns,

but they’re just beginning. I mean, but what’s nice to see is they

are actually moving forward on it and I don’t know, Al, you might

know more specifically.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Well there’s an old saw in medicine, I’m sure Dr.

Frist knows it. You see what you know and you know what you

see. And if you’ve never seen a case of smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, botulism, you aren’t about to make the diagnosis.

The point is that there’s always somebody out there who’s seen

it, read about it or like Dr. Frist happened to take a personal interest in it and if simply brought into the net, if brought into the web,

the diagnosis rapidly emerges.

That’s precisely what we’re trying to do here and the good news

is that most public health officials are not only experts at what

goes on in their community on a routine basis, they’re smart

enough to know when something unusual is happening just by dint

of their experience.

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The one thing they don’t have is the data. And if you make that

data available to them, I’m highly confident in the vast majority of

circumstances, they will be able to make the diagnosis early and

get advice to the physician who has done the report in a timely

fashion to not only save that patient, but to anticipate the additional casualties that will be occurring and to prevent them.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason why I asked the question is obvious,

but I want to be a little more detailed. I recall how when Senator

Frist in a joint meeting that we held because we needed a big room

in the Senate dining room when all Senators, all 100, if not 100,

98 were there.

I recall that it was incredibly complicated, but in one sense relatively easy to understand. I’ve been a great consumer of health

care services. I spent seven months in intensive care and/or in an

operating room or in a hospital or in recovery with a couple aneurisms, cranial aneurisms and a little embolism in between and I remember the neurosurgeons what they did with me and I mean, I

know this sounds strange, but I think it’s illustrative of the possibilities here.

Between my first and second aneurism after I got out of the IC

unit after 40 days with the embolism, they would literally have

their staff at Walter Reed come up, the neurosurgeons, and have

me identify, they put angiograms up on a slide for me and had me

identify whether or not there was an aneurism or there was not an

aneurism to teach me about it, knowing I’d be questioned a lot

about this when I left the hospital being a public official and so

that I didn’t indirectly cause cardiac arrest among their organizational structure for identifying or making statements that were

simply not accurate relative to aneurisms.

I remember when Dr. Frist was laying out for us and actually

giving us some and the colleagues he had brought along with him,

what were the signs, what were the symptoms, what to look for,

et cetera, that it struck me at the time, for example, it’s the same

with doctors, lawyers are required to continue to go to CLS classes,

continuing legal services education classes. Once a year you have

to show up for that purpose.

I assume there’s a same thing in most if not all medical societies

in every state. I assume—am I correct in assuming, Dr. Sands,

you’re talking about the emergency physicians. Is there any discussion that part of the continuing medical education of doctors as

they show up that they be educated at least to the four or five or

six or three most likely diseases they may encounter that would be

the result of a natural spread of the disease or as a consequence

of a terrorist taking such action?

Is that being contemplated or is that underway? Again, this is

not casting aspersions or blaming anybody. This is all brand new

to everybody.

Dr. ZELICOFF. It is. There’s one clear piece of evidence for that.

This year on the national boards at least in internal medicine,

there are four questions about bio-terrorism agents. There are four.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s interesting.

Dr. ZELICOFF. The bad news is, to repeat what I said earlier, you

can read about measles for months and if you’ve never seen a case,

you’re not about to make the diagnosis. The point is that someone

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else will almost certainly make the diagnosis of a bio-terrorism related condition outside the clinic where the physician is working

even if they’ve been educated in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, one of the things that we’ve all talked

about in this committee because we have particular jurisdiction

over it is some of these diseases occur naturally in the environment. For example, the plague. I mean there were two significant

cases in India not to long ago. One of the cities was fairly well-educated and responded with serious factual information. One did not.

The damage done varied between the two cities without boring

my colleagues with the detail, but the bottom line is that there are

a number of places where these disease may in fact occur naturally

in the environment, if you will, and they have very little public

health infrastructure.

We talk about it with regard to dealing with AIDS which is a different subject. I’m not suggesting it’s the same at all. In Africa, an

area that Dr. Frist and Senator Feingold and others have spent a

lot of time focusing on and we have an attempt here to try to provide through our foreign assistance budgets the ability of these

public health organizations or the lack thereof in these countries,

assistance.

The thing that I wonder about as a practitioner without any, not

a medical practitioner, a political practitioner of this trade figuring

out how to deal with aid to other countries is these programs tend

to work that we fund if they’re models that are actually able to be

picked up by countries that lack this infrastructure or lack expertise.

I guess the question that I have if anyone wishes to respond to

it, they may or come back in writing or pursue it in another forum,

is what models are there available for helping countries, Third

World countries in particular.

I’m not in anyway, Mr. Moodie, suggesting the Europeans need

not pay more attention where they have the capability, but in those

countries where they do not have much of a public health infrastructure, are there models or are there means by which we can

disseminate information and financial resources to help them? Because, you know, if Ebola breaks out in a country, if smallpox were

to break out, intended or unintended, which is highly unlikely to

be unintended right now.

As you said, an airplane’s a hell of an incubator and it sure can

travel long distances. What should we be doing, this committee,

this Congress, this government to deal with that dilemma?

Mr. MOODIE. Senator, I think that first of all, it’s a huge task because there is such an inadequacy in terms of infrastructure in so

many parts of the world. So it comes back to the point you were

making before about setting priorities. I think both Amy and Al in

their way have stressed what should be the starting point which

is disease surveillance capabilities. The ability to identify, report

and understand has got to be the starting point for doing that.

At the moment, globally, there are a lot of things going on,

whether they’re under the auspices of the World Health Organization or private surveillance activities, PROMED for example, a

number of other things. But there’s nothing that brings these

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ent approach to this, and there are places still where it doesn’t

happen.

So while there are other aspects of public health in parts of the

world that also have to be pursued in terms of capabilities on the

ground, I think that the first place to begin is by emphasizing the

surveillance issue, in part because it serves a dual purpose.

One is that it will help us deal with issues of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. Second, a better global disease surveillance and reporting system might also be helpful in distinguishing between a naturally occurring, although unusual outbreak, and in fact a deliberate attack.

I know that is a very difficult thing to do. But, over time, with

a developing system, we at least are moving in that direction where

nothing exists today. So I think it’s a huge task, but in terms of

setting priorities my own would be to focus initially on disease surveillance and reporting and to move forward on a global basis

working with a number of pieces that are already in place as the

foundations on which to build, to bring together and to move forward.

Dr. ZELICOFF. If I can build on what Mike just said. I think also

we have to do disease surveillance in a different way than we’ve

done it in the past. Our emphasis has always been on spreading

laboratory equipment around and then using that laboratory equipment to make disease specific diagnoses.

That’s scientifically the nice way to go. It’s also by far the single

most expensive way to go. Instead, a surveillance system that focuses not on requiring a laboratory based diagnosis but the physician’s suspicion of unusual signs and symptoms associated with geographic information like this goes a long way, goes 80 percent of

the way to making the diagnosis.

To put it another way, I don’t think in a world of limited resources we need more laboratory equipment sprinkled around the

world. We need much more intelligent use of the laboratory resources we currently have and testing thousands of people for anthrax when a few people have been exposed is an example of exactly what not to do.

Mr. MOODIE. I think part of it also has to do with changing government attitudes. One of the reasons the plague in India had the

impact that it did was the hesitance on the part of the Indian government to acknowledge it, to get the resources in. That is a political issue, and there are a lot of political sensitivities about the way

the WHO does it’s work as an international organization which I’m

sure you all know much better than I do. Part of this also has to

be changed in government attitudes towards the importance of disease surveillance, getting the information out where it’s needed so

that people can deal with it in a way to deal with the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. We see that in Africa with AIDS.

Mr. MOODIE. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. MOODIE. And I think that’s got to be part of the campaign

in addition to getting the kinds of equipment on the ground that

will help move things forward.

Dr. SANDS. Senator, just one other additional comment to add to

what my two colleagues have already said. I mean, I think it would

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be useful to actually review what infrastructure might exist in, you

know, around the world in different regions.

For example, I’m aware of the fact that under the Soviet system

there was a rather extensive system of what we’ll call the antiplague institutes that did in fact disease monitoring for the reasons, I mean, in part because of BW program, I think they were

trying to sort of be ahead of that one for themselves, but have especially in central Asia I think fallen sort into disarray. But they

have a very rich history and they know their communities. They

could be the basis of a capability in central Asia which would be

a critical area I think to be able to get more data out of and it

could be a model for other areas.

Senator FRIST. Mr. Chairman, this is a fascinating discussion.

About a year and a half ago after looking at what was done for our

public health system here, which Dr. Zelicoff hit right on the head,

underinvested, no infrastructure out there, easy to do, we just got

to do it.

Then we went and I and several other people requested from the

GAO a report just on this. I was interested internationally because

now we know germs have no borders, what we’ve heard all day

which is obvious, but it’s not obvious to the way we’ve traditionally

looked at things.

We looked at what we have in public health here, inadequate,

underinvested in the past and we asked for a GAO report about a

year, I think it was last fall, and it was called Challenges in Improving Infectious Disease Surveillance Systems.

It concluded, this GAO report and we can share it with everybody, it concluded that global disease surveillance especially in developing countries is woefully inadequate to provide advance warning about newly emerged diseases including things like antibiotic

resistant tuberculosis or the suspected use and testing of dangerous organisms as bio-weapons.

We got most of the information there. Dr. Sands, I think we need

to update it as we go forward. And I think your bill, Mr. Chairman,

is on this Global Pathogen Surveillance Act this year, you know,

by the time we finish that, I think we can make a great bill which

addresses just this.

One final comment. You mentioned the plague and in our list

that I keep kind of spewing out and Dr. Zelicoff mentioned because

that’s not the focus of this hearing, but things like Ebola we don’t

know anything about. We don’t know why Ebola occurs. We don’t

know why it reoccurs. About 30 or 40 cases in East Africa the other

day, central East Africa, we have no idea really.

Now, the good news, the NIH right now announced four days ago

that they’re developing a vaccine against Ecola, but it’s again

matching how little we know with the intelligence with the response whether it’s NIH or CDC as we go forward.

You mentioned the plague and in passing, Dr. Moodie mentioned

it. What happened there was panic, was surge capacity, overwhelming the system, lack of trust of government, people leaving,

fleeing the city. This is one of the two cases that you mentioned.

This isn’t ancient history, this is recently. And that was a good

point.

83

It’s the exact same thing that happened at an exercise that we

in part funded, a public/private partnership called Top Off and it

was at the Denver Performing Arts, it was an exercise, everybody’s

heard about it. But that was the same plague that you referred to.

It’s the same little entity, little micro-organism and there we found

that through this exercise of using the very best of what we had

in 2000, 2001 and using this model, we had 950 people to 2,000

people dead after just a few weeks, 4,000 people in hospitals and

mass panic, distrust of government, breakdown of civil institutions.

I say all this because what you mentioned recently with the

plague internationally is exactly what we through our best modeling have demonstrated what happened here, all of which we can

fix. We can reduce these vulnerabilities by engaging the sort of legislation you put forward, support of our public health infrastructure, adopting programs like we’ve been introduced to today in

terms communication among health officials as we go forward.

Dr. ZELICOFF. And we know that that works. New Mexico, my

home state, is the land of the flea and the home of the plague. Yet,

there’s never panic when we have plague cases and we have half

a dozen a year. Why is that? It’s because we’re easily able to share

our expertise on that one illness between the public health department and local clinicians.

So when a plague case is announced as it will be announced this

fall, it happens ever year, there’s never panic in New Mexico simply because we have experience in dealing with it and that can be

shared through systems like this.

Mr. MOODIE. I also think it underlines the need to be sensitive

to the whole range of potential problems here. I’m a little bit concerned that because of our recent experience and because of the potential implications of it, we’ve become mesmerized with anthrax

and smallpox and that’s it. That’s where our attention is, that’s

where the money’s going, that’s where the medicines are going, the

stockpiles are dealing with that. But we’ve got plague, tularemia

and who knows what else; water born pathogens of various kinds

that nobody ever talks about; for example, cryptosporidium and a

variety of other things.

It seems to me we are going to do ourselves a disservice. The

agent is part of the risk that we have, but the threat is constituted

by how that agent interacts with who have it, how they’re going to

use it, against what kinds of targets. So I think that, as we move

forward on this, we just can’t be mesmerized by the immediate

event of the day, but recognize the range of potential dangers here

is much greater than it has been suggested. We’ve got to find ways

of dealing with that whole range. Today, things like surveillance

can’t do it. They are the ones that are going to make the distinctions to allow us to react appropriately to the range of agents that

potentially exists.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite frankly, it seems to me this is probably the

biggest bang for the buck. I mean the ancillary benefits that flow

from this kind of initiative in the broader scale are so profound and

so welcome and so beneficial in terms of bang for the buck, it

seems to me that this is the ultimate win/win initiative we could

have.

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I’ve trespassed on your time much too much. I’m going to ask a

number of questions particularly to you, Mr. Moodie and you, Dr.

Sands, about what we didn’t get into at all. The only place I do

have any expertise and that is the arms control side of this agenda

which is we’re in a new age, a new time and in a sense to be overly

simplistic, but we need a new arms control. We need a new way

to deal with arms control.

It’s not the only tool, but it’s an important tool here and I may

ask you to consider whether or not you would be willing to come

back at another time and also whether you would entertain my

staff out in Monterey to go into much more detail with you. I know

they’d hate to be sent there. I don’t why anybody would ever leave

Monterey.

But any rate, for example, there’s a need for new thinking you

point out, Mr. Moodie, but we need some specifics about again

something I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about. I’m not sure I’m

right but, you know, the issue that you point out that how do we

deal with Biological Weapons Convention challenge with those who

are cheating and those who are not parties?

There’s a distinction there and as you recall, because I’ve been

doing the arms control beat for so long on other issues, you now,

the great complaint that began to be mouthed by people like the

former Secretary of Energy.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Slesinger?

The CHAIRMAN. Slesinger was that the Atoms for Peace program,

the IEA, were counterproductive in that they spread knowledge

rather than contained it. Well, you point out this issue of maybe

we separate this notion of access limitation of a capability and aid,

that to join a treaty to gain access may be counterproductive for

our interests.

And I think it’s an entire area we have to explore that we

haven’t paid much attention to. And so I really think your contribution, Dr. Sands, about you know re-examining the assumptions is

probably the most useful way to begin a lot of this discussion.

But I’d like to conclude by again, I’ve taken so much of your

time. As you can tell, my interest is almost unending on this subject, but the thing I want to thank the three of you for is for having

taken this so seriously, taking your invitation to come before this

committee as serious as you have.

It’s obvious from your presentations that you took it very seriously and I just want you to know the committee and I in particular and you could tell by the questions here, we take your input

very, very seriously. And it’s a little big like, you know, when you

sign up and you make a—I could never understand why I thought

it was just purely out a noble instinct why occasionally very

wealthy individuals contributing to a charity wanted to make their

contribution anonymous.

I now understand why and that is they get called on repeatedly

once their name gets put on the list and maybe even sold, which

is another privacy issue we have to talk about, but any rate, I unfortunately for you all your contributions are taken seriously.

You’re about to be put on the list, if you will. I suspect you’ll get

a lot more requests for your input and I want to repeat, Mr.

Moodie, what the guy whose been the leader in dealing with the

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proliferation issue, nonproliferation I guess is more accurate than

proliferation issue, Senator Lugar has said.

Your help on the House side was invaluable. You’ve kicked the

can. You’ve helped us kick up the visibility here. As you recall a

couple years ago, there was talking about zeroing out most of these

initiatives. It’s still woefully inadequate, but it’s at least four to six

times what it was likely to have been and it’s in large part due to

your help and we appreciate it very, very much.

In truth, I would suggest that it’s ultimately because of Senator

Lugar—when the administration testified before this committee

with their budget request, they expected to get a hard time from

me, but I don’t think they expected as blunt and as straightforward, although he would never characterize it this way, as

threatening a response as they got from Senator Lugar.

So maybe together we can continue to make some progress here.

And I thank you all for your input here and assure you we’ll be

asking each of you again hopefully in the not too distance future

for additional help and maybe ways in which we can help implement some of what you’re suggesting, Doctor, with regard to allowing public health officials to have access to this additional information which seems to me to be, although very difficult to put together, an alarmingly simple and cost-effective way to help us

make progress here.

Dr. ZELICOFF. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I am absolutely convinced that the American

people are fully capable of dealing with anything that they face

given sufficient information, given sufficient honest input, there’s

not much we can’t handle and so I thank you all for your input.

If anyone would like to make a closing comment, I’d welcome it.

Not required. By the way, the entirety of each of your statements

will be placed in the record and as a friend and I’m going to take

the time to see that each of my colleagues are not mailed the whole

transcript because they’ll never read that nor do they have time.

There’s no possibility.

It’s interesting, up here we’re, as should be expected by our constituents, to be experts in everything from weapons of mass destruction to HCVA, from the Corps of Engineers to education and

it’s not possible. I think your three individual submitted statements for the record are worth reading for my colleagues and so

I’m going to make sure they get copies of it.

Mr. ZELICOFF. I have one closing thought. What I’ve just heard

you say is that investments in public health are really a no regrets

philosophy. Good counterterrorism is in fact good public health and

even if there is never a terrorist attack on a large scale—and let’s

hope there isn’t—the public health system will benefit and that will

improve the rational care of medical care in the Unites States.

The CHAIRMAN. I just think the benefits are so—I mean, like you

said, if there’s not ever a single solitary additional effort to use any

pathogen or disease as a weapon or I mean, we need this, period.

For example, when I talk about the need to improve our safety

and surveillance capabilities with regard to targets, different issue,

the actual specific targets that terrorists may use, people look at

me because I fixate on the rail system which is so vulnerable. And

I point out to everybody the City of Baltimore shut down for the

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better part of a week because there was a fire in a tunnel. A fire.

A fire. Nothing more. An accidental fire in a tunnel.

And so when my colleagues point out to me that, you know, I

may be wrong about a terrorist attack occurring in whatever form

in one of the tunnels on the system, I point out to them that it’s

a good thing to modernize the tunnel, period, unrelated to whether

or not there is a terrorist attack. It’s a good thing to modernize,

bring into the 21st century our public health system just in terms

of connectivity, as they say in the ads, even if there weren’t any

threat of terrorism.

Mr. MOODIE. Mr. Chairman, if I might make just the last comment on your remarks about where do we go in arms control. Our

institute actually right now is engaged in a study that’s focusing

on exactly that, and we hope to have recommendations well before

the resumption of the review conference in November. We would

very much welcome your personal participation and that of your

staff, not only in terms of the finished recommendations, but also

in the process of getting us there. We’d welcome that support and

very much look forward to it. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are like poor relatives. We show up when

we’re invited. So I thank you all very, very much. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:38 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing. I am grateful for the

opportunity this hearing provides to discuss the threats caused by chemical and biological weapons. This is a serious threat that cannot be ignored. Indeed, I believe

the anthrax attacks on the United States last fall startled all of us. They demonstrated that biological weapons can be delivered with relative ease, resulting in

widespread fear and confusion. And while the loss of life in those attacks was itself

a terrible tragedy, I think many of us were also surprised by the level of disruption

caused by the subsequent clean-up operations. The attack here on the Capitol closed

a large public office building for months, requiring extensive remediation efforts at

significant taxpayer expense. It is clear today that these weapons pose a significant

threat to both our civilian population and to our civilian infrastructure.

We must act forcefully to respond to these threats. But to respond effectively, we

must first understand the nature of the threat, and we must do a better job of monitoring the materials that can be used to make these weapons. If we have had a difficult time in keeping track of some of our own biological materials here in the

United States, we can imagine that the breakup of the former Soviet Union created

an unprecedented opportunity for terrorists and rogue states alike to acquire chemical and biological materials and technologies. The challenge now is to create the

right balance of incentives and mandates to convince all states to adhere to the

international regimes that have been created to control the proliferation of chemical

and biological weapons materials. I trust this hearing today will begin to explore

the contours of a robust and ultimately more effective international regime to reduce the threats posed by chemical and biological weapons.

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