Marine Accident Report

Fire on Board the Small

Passenger Vessel

Seastreak New York

Sandy Hook, New Jersey

September 28, 2001

National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

A

A

N TION

L TRA SPOR

ATIO

N

B OARD

SAF E T Y

N

T

E PLURIBUS UNUM 

NTSB/MAR-02/04

PB2002-916404

Marine Accident Report

Fire on Board the Small 

Passenger Vessel 

Seastreak New York

Sandy Hook, New Jersey 

September 28, 2001

NTSB/MAR-02/04

PB2002-916404 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7494 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted September 17, 2002 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2002. Fire on Board the Small Passenger Vessel Seastreak

New York Sandy Hook, New Jersey September 28, 2001. Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-02/04

Washington, DC.

Abstract: On September 28, 2001, the domestic high-speed vessel Seastreak New York was en route from

Highlands, New Jersey, to New York, New York, with 198 passengers and 6 crewmembers on board. As

the vessel passed Sandy Hook Point, New Jersey, about 0630, a fire broke out on the No. 3 engine in the

starboard engineroom. Flames forced the deckhand who discovered the fire to flee the engineroom. Access

hatches, ventilation, and fuel for the main engines in the starboard engineroom were secured. The fixed

CO2 fire suppression system was then activated. The Seastreak New York proceeded to a nearby Coast

Guard Station, using its port engines, and disembarked its passengers without incident. Local firefighters

arrived on board at 0700. By 0730, a firefighter entered the engineroom and found that the fire had been

extinguished by the CO2 suppression system. There were no personal injuries as a result of this fire, but

the resultant damages were estimated at $81,000. 

The major safety issues discussed in this report are the adequacy of the manufacturer's instructions for the

installation of engine accessories; crew firefighting response; company maintenance and inspection

procedures; and passenger management. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board

makes recommendations to Cummins Engine Company, Inc., and Circle Navigation Company of New

York. 

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2002-916404 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Marine Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Crew Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Regulatory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Deckhand No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Deckhand No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Deckhand No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Deckhand No. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Deckhand No. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Vessel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Main Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Centinel System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Routing of Lube Oil Hoses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Maintenance and Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Waterway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Medical and Pathological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Wreckage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Fire Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Hull Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Muster/Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Passenger Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Lifesaving Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Firefighting Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Emergency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Communications Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Cause and Origin of Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Manufacturerís Instructions for the Installation of Engine Accessories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Crew Firefighting Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Company Maintenance and Inspection Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Passenger Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Contents iv Marine Accident Report

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Appendix 

A: Investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
v Marine Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

COI Certificate of Inspection

OCMI Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection 

NVIC Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
vi Marine Accident Report

Executive Summary

On September 28, 2001, the domestic high-speed vessel1 Seastreak New York was

en route from Highlands, New Jersey, to New York, New York, with 198 passengers and 6

crewmembers on board. As the vessel passed Sandy Hook Point, New Jersey, about 0630,

a fire broke out on the No. 3 engine in the starboard engineroom. Flames forced the

deckhand who discovered the fire to flee the engineroom. Access hatches, ventilation, and

fuel for the main engines in the starboard engineroom were secured. The fixed CO2 fire

suppression system was then activated. The Seastreak New York proceeded to a nearby

Coast Guard Station, using its port engines, and disembarked its passengers without

incident. Local firefighters arrived on board at 0700. By 0730, a firefighter entered the

engineroom and found that the fire had been extinguished by the CO2 suppression system.

There were no personal injuries as a result of this fire, but the resultant damages were

estimated at $81,000. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the fire on board the Seastreak New York was the improper installation of the Centinel

Systemís lube oil hose, which allowed the hose to come in contact with the hot exhaust

manifold. Contributing to the cause of the fire was the absence of detailed guidance from

the manufacturer of the Centinel System on the proper installation of the system. Also

contributing to the cause of the fire was the lack of inspection and maintenance procedures

by Circle Navigation Company that might have discovered the improper installation.

The major safety issues discussed in this report are the adequacy of the following:

ï Manufacturerís instructions for the installation of engine accessories;

ï Crew firefighting response;

ï Company maintenance and inspection procedures; and

ï Passenger management. 

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board makes

recommendations to Cummins Engine Company, Inc., and Circle Navigation Company of

New York. 

1 The Coast Guard defines vessels such as the Seastreak New York, which can attain speeds of 30 knots

or more with a full complement of passengers, as domestic high-speed vessels. U.S. Coast Guard,

Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 5-01, Guidance For Enhancing the Operational Safety of

Domestic High-Speed Vessels (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, April 23, 2001).
1 Marine Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

At 0620 on September 28, 2001, the catamaran ferry Seastreak New York (see

Figure 1), with 6 crewmembers and 198 passengers on board, departed Highlands, New

Jersey, for a regularly scheduled commuter trip to Manhattan piers on the East River in

New York City, New York. The ferry proceeded out the Shrewsbury River Channel

through Sandy Hook Bay and past Sandy Hook Point. All four main engines were

running, and the starboard generator was providing electrical power to the vessel. At the

start of the voyage, the master gave a safety briefing to the passengers over the public

address system on the location of the lifejackets and buoyant apparatuses.

After the vessel departed the Highlands dock, deckhand No. 4, who was serving as

engineer, began a routine inspection of the enginerooms, which are accessed through

hatches on the vesselís main deck. Deckhand No. 4 entered the port engineroom and

visually inspected main engines 1 and 2. He observed that all equipment was operating

normally. He then climbed back to the main deck and walked across to the starboard side

of the ferry to enter the starboard engineroom.

Deckhand No. 4 said that when he opened the access hatch to the starboard

engineroom, he immediately smelled a ìstrange odorî that he could not identify, which he

later described as ìmaybe a wire melting Ö a plastic smell.î As he descended the ladder,

he looked forward at engine No. 4 and saw that it appeared to be operating normally. (See

Figure 1. The Seastreak New York is one of a growing number of high-speed passenger vessels in use as commuter ferries. It had a capacity of 394 passengers.
Factual Information 2 Marine Accident Report

Figure 2.) He proceeded aft and inspected the starboard generator, which also appeared to

be operating normally. He continued aft toward the No. 3 engine. When he stepped on the

platform in front of the engine and looked over the top of the radiator, he saw a ìfoot-long

flameî on top of the engine. He immediately went forward to retrieve a CO2 extinguisher

mounted near the forward access ladder. He grabbed the CO2 extinguisher and pulled the

pin in preparation for applying the CO2 to the fire. With the extinguisher in hand,

deckhand No. 4 went back toward the No. 3 engine. Before reaching it, he stopped at the

engine shutoff switch mounted on the starboard bulkhead just forward of the engine. He

said that as he reached for the switch, the engine ìjust ignited and blew flames across the

whole room,î singeing his eyebrows and hair. Deckhand No. 4 did not activate the shutoff

switch or use the CO2 extinguisher. He dropped the extinguisher, rushed forward, and

climbed up the ladder and out the engineroom access hatch. He stated that he thought his

clothes were on fire and that he intended to jump overboard to extinguish the fire. 

When deckhand No. 4 exited the engineroom he realized that his clothes were not

on fire. He closed the engineroom access hatch, pulled the handle on the manual fire alarm

box nearby, and told deckhand No. 3, who was standing at the snack bar, to notify the

master on the bridge that there was a fire in the starboard engineroom.

During this time, the master and two other deckhands (Nos. 1 and 5) were on the

bridge, located on the second deck. The master said that, about 0630, while watching the

video monitor of the enginerooms, he observed ìa small black cloudî appear above the

No. 3 engine. He then saw deckhand No. 4 run away from the engine. Immediately

afterward, fire alarms sounded on the bridge alarm panel. The master sent deckhand No. 1

to investigate the alarms and instructed him to secure the fuel shutoff switches for the

Figure 2. Sketch of the starboard engineroom of the Seastreak New York showing the 

arrangement of the access hatch, CO2 fire extinguisher, shutoff switch, and main 

engines.

#4 Engine

#3 Engine Electrical H Generator

H

SO

Fwd Starboard Engine Room

H Access Hatch/Ladder

SO Engine Shutoff

 CO2 Fire Extinguisher
Factual Information 3 Marine Accident Report

starboard engineroom, which the deckhand did. The master then made a public address

announcement requesting that all passengers move to the exterior decks and don

lifejackets.

After exiting the engineroom, deckhand No. 4 closed the dampers for the starboard

engineroomís air intake and exhaust plenums. However, the damper for the exhaust

plenum had already been closed automatically when its heat sensor link activated.

Deckhand No. 4 stated that he was then preparing to activate the engineroomís fixed CO2

system, not realizing he needed the masterís permission to activate it. At this point

deckhand No. 1 arrived at the access hatch to the starboard engineroom and was told about

the fire by deckhand No. 4. 

When deckhand No. 1 reached the entrance to the starboard engineroom and was

beginning to open the hatch, deckhand No. 4 warned him not to open it. Deckhand No. 1

went to the starboard electrical control locker, started the port generator, and shifted the

vesselís electrical load to it. Upon confirming that the starboard engineroom dampers had

been closed, deckhand No. 1 said that he returned to the wheelhouse and asked the master

for permission to activate the fixed CO2 system. According to deckhand No. 1, he

received the masterís permission, returned to the starboard locker, and activated the fixed

CO2 system. After the CO2 system was activated, deckhands Nos. 1 and 4 donned

lifejackets and helped the other deckhands move the passengers outside and don

lifejackets.

The master stated that after he authorized the discharge of the CO2 system, he used

the VHF-FM radiotelephone to contact a Coast Guard patrol boat that was passing about a

quarter mile away. He reported that he had a fire on board and requested permission to

moor the Seastreak New York at the Sandy Hook Coast Guard station, which was the

nearest dock (about 1 mile away). The patrol boat and the station acknowledged the

masterís call and gave him permission to moor at the station. The stationís watchstander

also contacted the Highlands, New Jersey, Volunteer Fire Department for assistance.

The only available pier space at the Coast Guard station was the outside wall of the

western bulkhead. At 0641, the Seastreak New York moored with its starboard side next to

the bulkhead and its bow partially aground on the sand beach. The deckhands and Coast

Guard personnel helped the passengers disembark from the vessel. The passengers

climbed over a walkway handrail mounted on the bulkhead and walked along the

walkway to shore. All of the passengers on board were evacuated safely and none

sustained injuries. Circle Navigation, the owner of the Seastreak New York, provided

buses to allow the passengers to continue the trip to New York City.

The Highlands Volunteer Fire Department personnel arrived shortly after the

passengers disembarked, at 0700. A 1 1/2-inch fire hose was run from the Coast Guard

patrol boat, which had moored next to the Seastreak New York, to the forward hatch of the

ferryís starboard engineroom. About 0730, after the access hatch had cooled to the point

where it was only warm to the touch, a Highlands volunteer firefighter outfitted in full

protective gear, including a breathing apparatus, entered the engineroom and found that

the fire had been extinguished. The firefighters then ventilated the engineroom and

declared the fire out.
Factual Information 4 Marine Accident Report

Injuries

There were no injuries to the passengers or crewmembers.

Damages

The damages to the Seastreak New York were restricted to the starboard

engineroom and the starboard side of the vessel. According to Circle Navigation, repair

costs were estimated at slightly more than $81,000. 

Crew Information

Regulatory Requirements 

Small passenger vessels carrying more than six passengers for hire may not be

operated without a valid Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection (COI), which is issued by

the Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI), for the zone. The COI,

among other conditions, stipulates minimum staffing requirements. When determining the

number and competencies of the crewmembers, the OCMI considers many factors,

including the size of the vessel, its route, the type and horsepower of the vesselís

propulsion machinery, the number of passengers, the type and location of lifesaving

equipment, and the hazards peculiar to the route and service. According to its COI (issued

April 26, 2001 by OCMI New York) the Seastreak New York was required to carry the

crewmember complement indicated in table 1.

Table 1. Crewmember requirements for the Seastreak New York as required by its COI

The COI allowed a qualified but unlicensed senior deckhand to be substituted for

the licensed mate. The senior deckhand was required to be qualified in accordance with

the standards set forth in NVIC 1-91. That NVIC requires that a deckhand have 30 days of

experience on board the vessel and 30 hours at the helm under the supervision of a master

or mate in order to qualify as the senior deckhand. Although it was not required by the

COI, company policy required that one or two of the deckhands perform engineering

duties such as engine start-up procedures and routine checks in the enginerooms while

underway. The vesselís log listed the daily crewmember assignments as captain, mate,

engineer, and deckhands.

Number of Passengers Master Licensed Mate Deckhands

0 - 150 1 0 3

151 - 299 1 1 4

300 - 398 1 1 5
Factual Information 5 Marine Accident Report

At the time of the accident, a master and five deckhands were on board. The

master was on the bridge at the controls. Deckhand No. 1 was on the bridge and was

serving as the senior deckhand. Deckhand No. 5 was also on the bridge. Deckhand No. 2

was stationed on the second deck passenger cabin in position to assist passengers if

needed. Deckhand No. 3 was serving at the snack bar on the main deck. Deckhand No. 4

was listed as the engineer in the vessel log and was inspecting the enginerooms.

There is no regulatory requirement for crews on small passenger vessels to have

formal firefighting training. Deckhand No. 2 was the only crewman on the Seastreak New

York who had received formal firefighting training, and that training had occurred 14 years

earlier. 

The Seastreak New York crewmembers had received firefighting instruction from

the master periodically, the most recent being 5 to 6 weeks before the accident. That

instruction typically consisted of rigging a fire hose, starting the fire pump, and

discharging water over the side. The deckhands described additional instruction by the

master that covered how to activate a portable fire extinguisher and procedures for using

the engineroom fire suppression system. 

Master

The master held a Coast Guard license as ìMaster of Steam or Motor Vessels of

Not More than 100 Gross Registered Tons upon Near Coastal Waters.î His license was

endorsed to show qualification for Commercial Assistance Towing and Radar

Observer. He had worked previously on charter fishing boats and had been working on

small passenger commuter vessels since 1996. He had worked on other commuter

ferries for 3 1/2 years and had been the master on the Seastreak New York since its

delivery in April 2001. He had received on-the-job emergency procedures training,

including firefighting, from masters on his previous vessels.

The master was 27 years old at the time of the accident. He started his working day

at 5 a.m. His last day of work before the accident was on Tuesday, September 25. He had

been off duty for the 2 days preceding the fire. The master slept for 8 hours Tuesday and

Wednesday nights and 7 hours on Thursday night, which was the day before the accident.

Deckhand No. 1

Deckhand No. 1 did not have, and was not required to have, a Coast Guard license

or document. He had earlier marine experience as a deckhand on commercial fishing boats

and had served as a deckhand on the Seastreak New York since its delivery in April 2001.

He was the senior deckhand who substituted for a licensed mate and had fulfilled the

requirements for being designated a senior deckhand as indicated in the Coast Guard

NVIC.

Deckhand No. 1 started his working day at 5 a.m. He had worked on Tuesday and

was off work Wednesday and Thursday. Deckhand No. 1 slept for 12 hours Tuesday night,

10 hours Wednesday night, and 7 1/2 hours on Thursday night.
Factual Information 6 Marine Accident Report

Deckhand No. 2

Deckhand No. 2 had approximately 16 years of experience on board various small

commercial vessels. He had worked on the Seastreak New York for 1 week before the fire.

He was awaiting completion of his United States citizenship process in order to obtain a

Coast Guard license. He had taken a formal firefighting course in 1987.

Deckhand No. 2 started his working day at 5 a.m. He was off work on Tuesday and

worked on Wednesday and Thursday. Deckhand No. 2 slept for 7 hours Wednesday night,

and 6 1/2 hours on Thursday night.

Deckhand No. 3

Deckhand No. 3 had 4 1/2 years experience on board various small commercial

vessels. He had served on the Seastreak New York for approximately 5 months. He did not

have, and was not required to have, any Coast Guard licenses or documents. 

Deckhand No. 3 was 23 years old at the time of the accident. He started his

working day at 5 a.m. He had worked on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. Deckhand

No. 3 slept for 7 hours Tuesday night, 6 1/2 hours Wednesday night, and 7 1/2 hours on

Thursday night.

Deckhand No. 4

Deckhand No. 4 was 44 years old at the time of the accident. He had served on the

Seastreak New York for approximately 3 months. He did not have, and was not required to

have, any Coast Guard licenses or documents. 

He started his working day at 5 a.m. He had worked on Tuesday and was off work

on Wednesday and Thursday. Deckhand No. 4 slept for 7 hours Tuesday night, 11 1/2

hours Wednesday night, and 7 1/2 hours on Thursday night.

Deckhand No. 5

Deckhand No. 5 was 19 years old and had less than 2 years of experience on board

small commercial vessels. He had worked as a deckhand 1 year on charter fishing vessels

and had served as a deckhand for 4 months on the Seastreak New York. He did not have,

and was not required to have, any Coast Guard licenses or documents.

Deckhand No. 5 started his working day at 5 a.m. He had worked on Tuesday and

Thursday, and was off work on Wednesday. Deckhand No. 5 slept for 10 1/2 hours

Tuesday night, 5 1/2 hours Wednesday night, and 6 1/2 hours on Thursday night.

Vessel Information

Seastreak New York was owned by Banc One Leasing Corporation of Columbus,

Ohio, and operated by the Circle Navigation Company of New York. It was the only
Factual Information 7 Marine Accident Report

vessel that Circle Navigation operated at the time of the accident. A sister vessel was

under construction at the time of the fire and was delivered in December 2001.

The Seastreak New York provided scheduled passenger service between

Highlands, New Jersey, and New York City, New York (Manhattan). Its normal weekday

schedule consisted of two trips in the morning and two in the evening. The maximum

passenger capacity in this service was 394 passengers. 

The Seastreak New York was a 133-foot-long high-speed catamaran ferry. The

catamaran hulls were of welded aluminum construction. The vessel was built by

Gladding-Hearn Corporation and delivered in April 2001. The Coast Guard inspected it

under the provisions of 46 CFR Parts 114 to 122 (Subchapter ìKî). 

The vessel had three passenger accommodation decks. The main deck had seating

for 209 passengers with a snack bar area aft. The second deck had seating for 132

passengers inside and 12 passengers outside. The navigation bridge was also located on

the second deck. The third deck, also accessible to passengers, was entirely outside with

no fixed seating.

Each catamaran hull was divided into six watertight compartments. In each hull

there were two propulsion engines connected to two water jets, one electrical generator,

one fuel tank, and auxiliary systems. Each catamaran had an engineroom that contained

two engines and a generator. Each engineroom was accessed through two deck

hatches/vertical ladders. The electrical generators were 95 KW Cummins/Onan

MDGDB95. Each engineroom had two air-intake plenums and one air-exhaust plenum. A

fixed CO2 fire suppression system was installed to protect each engineroom.

One 1,400 U.S. gallon-capacity fuel tank was located in a separate compartment

forward of each engineroom. Each engine drove a KAMEWA A50 water jet that was

located in a compartment aft of each engineroom.

Main Engines

Cummins Engine Company, Inc., manufactured the four main engines. Each was a

Cummins KTA50M2 diesel engine capable of producing 1,875 horsepower. Engines No. 1

and No. 2 were in the port hull, No. 3 and No. 4 were in the starboard hull. The engines

had less than 2,000 hours operating time. The engines were installed offset from the hullsí

centerlines and located on opposite sides of a central catwalk. Engine No. 1 was located

outboard forward and engine No. 2 was located inboard aft. Engine No. 3 was located

inboard aft and engine No. 4 was located outboard forward. The diesel engines installed

on the Seastreak New York were purchased and assembled by Cummins Northeast, an

independent distributor of Cumminsí products.

Centinel System

Each main engine had a Centinel System installed to maintain engine lubrication.

Cummins Engine Company, Inc., manufactured the Centinel System. The product

literature states that the Centinel System is ìa continuous oil replacement system of
Factual Information 8 Marine Accident Report

electromechanical design.î It continuously replaced engine lube oil from a reservoir at a

set rate and injected the used lube oil into the fuel line feeding the engines. Oil from the

lube oil reservoir was introduced into the engine sump by the Centinel valve at a rate equal

to the rate of consumption of the used lube oil. The Centinel System could be integrated

into the engine at the factory or retrofitted. Cummins Northeast indicated that it had

assembled the Centinel System on the Seastreak New York during construction.

The components of the Centinel System involved in this accident were the

eliminator oil filter assembly, the Centinel control valve, and the lube oil monitor hose that

connected the two components. On the Seastreak New York, the control valve was located

on the port side forward edge of all four engines. So that crewmembers could easily access

the oil filter assembly from the catwalk, the filter assembly was installed on alternating

rear sides of the two engines. Engines Nos. 1 and 3 each had the oil filter assembly

mounted on the starboard, rear side of the engine diagonally on the opposite side of the

engine from the control valve, which was on the port side forward.

The Cummins Engine Company documentation for installing the Centinel System

does not contain any guidance for routing the lube oil hose from the oil filter assembly to

the control valve around heat sources. However, hose installation instructions in the hose

manufacturerís catalog include the statement, ìWhen hose lines pass near an exhaust

manifold or other heat source, they should be insulated by a heat resistant boot, fire sleeve,

or a metal baffle.î

Routing of Lube Oil Hoses

Because the oil filter assembly and the control valves on engines No. 1 and 3 were

on opposite sides of the engine, the monitor hose connecting these components was routed

forward and across the top of the engine. (See Figure 3.) Product literature provided by the

Cummins Engine Company contained no guidance with regard to the routing of the

monitor hose. Investigators observed that on the Seastreak New York, these hoses came

forward on the right side of the engine and then were routed across the top of the forward

section of the engine and down to the control valve. The hoses were routed near the

forward edge of the exhaust manifold water-cooling shield. The hoses were secured to

other hose bundles by tie wraps as they passed along the side of the engine, but they were

not secured across the top of the engine.

According to Cummins Engine Company, at full power, the temperature of the

water-cooling shield is 170° F to 180° F, and the operating temperatures of the exhaust

manifold banks underneath the shield are 785° F to 847° F. The flash point of the lube oil

was between 400o F and 500o F.1

1 According to the Exxon Mobil Corporation, a major producer of marine lubrication products, the

flash point of its marine lubricating oils is in the range 442o F to 510o F. Information obtained on August 22,

2002 <http://www.mobil.com/mobil_marine_lubes/index.html>. 
Factual Information 9 Marine Accident Report

Maintenance and Inspection

The company had no established preventive maintenance and inspection program

for the vesselís engines and auxiliary systems and none was required. On the Seastreak

New York, deckhands conducted checks of oil and coolant levels and made visual

inspections of the enginerooms as the vessel was operating. 

Waterway Information

When the fire began, the Seastreak New York was transiting Sandy Hook Bay,

which is located in the southern part of Lower New York Bay. The bay is bounded on the

east by Sandy Hook, a low-lying peninsula that juts out into Lower New York Bay and on

the west by the New Jersey mainland. Sandy Hook Coast Guard Station is located at the

northern end of the Sandy Hook peninsula on its western shore. 

Meteorological Information

On the morning of the fire, the temperature was 55° F, and the wind was from the

west-northwest at about 10 knots. The visibility was 10 miles.

Medical and Pathological

The regulations concerning drug and alcohol testing require testing of marine

crews in the event of a serious marine incident.2

 Law enforcement officers or the marine

Figure 3. Sketch of the main engines showing differing routing of the lube oil monitor 

hoses.

Front

Front

#1 and #3 Engines #2 and #4 Engines
Factual Information 10 Marine Accident Report

employer may require testing at any time if they have ìreasonable cause.î3 This accident

did not meet the definition of a serious marine incident, so testing was not required.

Coast Guard station personnel boarded the vessel immediately after it arrived at

the station. Investigators from Coast Guard Activities New York arrived at Sandy Hook

about 2 hours after the accident. None of the responding Coast Guard personnel observed

any indication of impairment in the actions of the Seastreak New York crewmen. The

Circle Navigation manager and the master stated that no Coast Guard personnel asked

about nor directed the company to have the Seastreak New York crewmembers undergo

drug and alcohol testing.

Circle Navigation had a contractor who provided drug-testing services. Upon an

informal recommendation by a Safety Board investigator 2 days after the accident, the

company directed all crewmen to be tested at the contracted testing facility. This testing

took place 96 hours after the accident. The specimens were tested for the presence of

drugs, and the results of the tests were negative. Since the time delay for testing was so

prolonged, testing for alcohol was not undertaken. 

Wreckage

Fire Damage

Examination by Safety Board investigators revealed that the fire damage was

confined to the starboard engineroom. The primary damage was to the forward portion of

engine No. 3, the engineroom overhead immediately adjacent to the engine, and the

electrical fixtures and cables routed through that overhead area. There was soot residue in

the majority of the aft section of the starboard engineroom. The fire melted the heat

detector mounted over the engine.

Investigators noted fire damage patterns that originated at the top forward section

of engine No. 3. From the top of that engine, a pattern of heat damage spread up and to

port in the engineroom. Investigators found the broken end of the lube oil monitor hose

coming from the filter assembly in this area, resting on top of the exhaust manifold

cooling shield of the engine. The other end of the broken hose, leading to the control

valve, was beneath the cooling shield, resting near the forward edge of the left side

exhaust bank.

Because the hose routing for engine No. 1 was similar to that of engine No. 3,

Safety Board investigators examined the routing on the former to gain insights into what

might have caused the fire. On engine No. 1, the monitor line had been routed over the top

2 A serious marine incident is defined by 46 CFR Part 4.03-2 as one that results in death, injury beyond

first aid, damage to property in excess of $100,000, loss of an inspected vessel, or loss of a vessel of 100

gross tons or more.

3 According to 33 CFR Part 95.035, reasonable cause exists when the individual was directly involved

in a marine casualty, which is defined as material damage affecting the efficiency of the vessel.
Factual Information 11 Marine Accident Report

of the engine, underneath the cooling water hoses leading to the cooling jacket.

Investigators found the hose resting near the forward edge of the engine exhaust banks. It

had been routed (or had fallen) in between the forward edge of the cooling shield and the

engine. The sheathing on the hose was partially melted away and the hose was discolored

in the area where it came into direct contact with the engine.

The monitor hoses on engines No. 1 and No. 3 were removed under the

supervision of Safety Board investigators and delivered to the Safety Board Materials

Laboratory for examination (see Tests and Research section of this report).

Hull Damage

The Seastreak New York suffered hull damage while it was moored to the bulkhead

at the Sandy Hook Coast Guard station. During the passenger evacuation and fire

evaluation, wind and seas repeatedly pushed the starboard catamaran hull against the

bulkhead. That bulkhead was not designed to be a mooring site and had protruding bolts

on its pilings. Wave action pushing the vessel against the bolts in the bulkhead punctured

the starboard hull in about 10 places. The holes caused limited flooding in two of the five

starboard hull compartments. Using damage control equipment, Coast Guard personnel

temporarily sealed the holes in one compartment. Seastreak New York deckhands sealed

the holes in the other space. After dewatering pumps cleared the water from each space,

the tug Paul Andrew towed the Seastreak New York to Bay Shipyard in Staten Island, New

York, where the ferry was put into dry dock to repair the damaged hull plating.

Survival Aspects

Muster/Evacuation

Immediately after the fire alarm was sounded, the master made an announcement

over the public address system requesting passengers to don lifejackets, proceed to the

outside decks, and follow the instructions of the deckhands. The deckhands passed out

lifejackets to each passenger and assembled the passengers on the open decks. The

Seastreak New York moored to the outside wall of the bulkhead at 0641, about 11 minutes

after the first indication of fire. The deckhands and Coast Guard personnel from the station

assisted the passengers off the vessel, over a handrail and onto the bulkhead walkway, and

then to shore. All passengers were evacuated safely.

Passenger Comments

Safety Board investigators interviewed several passengers after the fire. They

stated that, during the incident, the crewmembers were very helpful and professional, and

that they were kept informed of the actions being taken by the crewmembers, the

company, and the Coast Guard.
Factual Information 12 Marine Accident Report

Lifesaving Equipment 

Primary life saving equipment on the Seastreak New York consisted of lifejackets

and inflatable buoyant apparatuses. A total of 410 adult lifejackets and 40 child lifejackets

were distributed in various marked locations on all three decks. Eight 50-person inflatable

buoyant apparatuses were stowed in four containers on the third deck amidships, with two

on each side. These containers were stowed in gravity cradles near the deck edge and were

equipped with hydrostatic releases.

Firefighting Equipment

The Seastreak New Yorkís firefighting equipment consisted of a fire main system,

portable dry chemical and CO2 extinguishers, and a fixed CO2 fire suppression system

for each engineroom. Two electric centrifugal pumps, one in each engineroom, supplied

water to the fire main. The vessel had four fire stations, three on the first deck and one on

the second. Each fire station was equipped with an adjustable stream nozzle and 50 feet

of 1 1/2-inch fire hose. Five dry chemical extinguishers were located in the passenger

compartments on the first and second decks. A 15-lb. CO2 portable extinguisher was

located in each engineroom by the forward access ladder. Each engineroom had fire

detectors wired to a remote panel on the bridge and could be monitored via video cameras

from the pilothouse.

Emergency Procedures

The Seastreak New York had a station bill posted on the vessel and provided in the

operating manual. The station bill provided duties for the master and five crewmembers in

the event of fire, man-overboard, or abandon-ship emergencies. In case of a fire, the

master and licensed mate were assigned to the bridge, the ìsenior deckhandî and two

other deckhands were to attend to the fire scene and passenger control, and one deckhand

was assigned to the engineroom. 

Communications Equipment

The Seastreak New Yorkís internal communications system consisted of a public

address system and a seven-station internal telephone system. The telephones were

located at the snack bar, in each engineroom, in each waterjet room, on the bridge, and at

the bow ramp control station. Four portable UHF radios were stored on the bridge. The

crewmembers stated that the hand-held UHF radios were used during excursion trips but

not during commuter runs.

Tests and Research

The lubricating oil monitor hoses installed on the No. 1 and No. 3 main engines

were delivered to the Safety Boardís materials laboratory for examination. Examination of

the hose assemblies revealed that a loose woven nylon sleeve surrounded the hose. The oil

monitor hoses were style FC 332, manufactured by Aeroquip, Inc. The Aeroquip
Factual Information 13 Marine Accident Report

industrial connectors catalog indicates that the FC 332 hose consists of a proprietary AQP

elastomer (rubber-like) tube with a textile braid and an AQP elastomer cover. AQP

elastomer is a proprietary formulation of hose material exclusive to Aeroquip.

The oil monitor hose identified as being from engine No. 1 was damaged in an area

approximately 10 inches long and centered approximately 52 inches from the straight

connection end. The oil monitor hose from engine No. 3 was in two piecesóone 98 inches

long and the other 49 inches. The loose nylon sleeve on the hoses was intended to protect

them from abrasion. An Aeroquip representative indicated that the sleeve had a maximum

working temperature rating of 248o F. A plastics encyclopedia indicated that nylon could

melt at a temperature of 410o F.4

Aeroquipís equipment catalog indicates that the lubricating oil monitor hoses had

an operating temperature range of -40o F to +300o F when conveying gasoline, fuel, or

lubricating oils. Hose installation instructions in the catalog included the statement,

ìWhen hose lines pass near an exhaust manifold or other heat source, they should be

insulated by a heat resistant boot, fire sleeve, or a metal baffle.î The data sheet for the fire

sleeve indicated that it was a braided fiberglass sleeve with a bonded and seamless silicone

rubber cover and had a temperature range of ñ65o F to +500o F. A fire sleeve was not used

in the installation on board the Seastreak New York.

Engine No. 1 Hose Assembly. The No. 1 engine hose had a slightly discolored

area approximately 6 inches long. Squeezing the hose revealed that the discolored length

was hardened when compared to the area that was not discolored. The inside surface of the

removed portion of the abrasion sleeve, approximately at the middle, had melted and

partially melted resolidified strands. In the same area of the hose was a drip consisting of

resolidified material and individual strands. 

Engine No. 3 Hose Section. The damaged portion of the No. 3 engine hose

sleeve was cut circumferentially, allowing the damaged portion to be removed for

examination. Portions of the damaged section of the hose were discolored, and the end of

the damaged sleeve was flat. Squeezing of the hose revealed that the discolored length had

hardened when compared to the nondiscolored area.

The tube retained its black color, but the fracture surface was smooth, with radially

oriented lines. Separations were observed within the tube wall consistent with heat

differentials between inner and outer surfaces during operation. The surface of the cover

was discolored and felt hard to the touch. The underlying material had retained some of its

blue coloration, and the visible edges displayed a rounded appearance consistent with resolidification from a liquid phase. No residual material was observed that would indicate

the presence of the braid. The fracture face indicated separations within the tube wall

consistent with heat differentials between inner and outer surfaces during operation.

4 Modern Plastics, Modern Plastics Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. 1995):

B-160.
Factual Information 14 Marine Accident Report

Figure 4. The fracture face of engine No. 3ís lube oil monitor hose.

Figure 5. A side view of the fracture face of engine No. 3ís lube oil monitor 

hose.
Factual Information 15 Marine Accident Report

Figure 6. The damaged area on engine No. 3ís lube oil monitor hose 

approximately 2.5 inches from the fracture face. 
16 Marine Accident Report

Analysis

General

This analysis first identifies factors that can be readily eliminated as causal or

contributory to the fire and then describes where and how the fire started. The report then

discusses the adequacy of the following safety issues:

• Manufacturer’s instructions for the installation of engine accessories;

• Crew firefighting response;

• Company maintenance and inspection procedures; and

• Passenger management. 

Exclusions

Before the accident, the Seastreak New York did not suffer a propulsion or steering

failure. The crewmembers’ actions did not cause or contribute to the cause of the fire. The

weather conditions were mild and did not hamper detection of the fire or interfere with the

firefighting efforts. Crewmembers had just begun their workday and were well rested. The

crewmembers tested negatively for drugs after 96 hours. No alcohol tests were given,

however, because Coast Guard personnel who were on board the vessel immediately

following the fire reported that the crewmembers did not appear to be impaired, the Safety

Board does not believe that alcohol was a factor. Consequently, the Safety Board

concludes that none of the following were factors in this accident: major propulsion or

steering failure, weather, crewmember actions, fatigue, drugs, or alcohol. 

Cause and Origin of Fire

When deckhand No. 4 opened the access hatch to the starboard engineroom before

entering it, he immediately smelled a “strange odor” that he could not identify, but later

described as “maybe a wire’s melting ... a plastic smell.” As he descended the ladder, he

looked forward at engine No. 4 and saw that it appeared to be operating normally. He

proceeded aft and inspected the starboard generator, which showed no evidence of

abnormal operating conditions. The deckhand continued aft toward engine No. 3. When

he stepped on a platform in front of it and looked over the top of the radiator, he saw a

“foot-long flame” on top of the engine No. 3. Moving away from the engine to reach for

the CO2 extinguisher and then the fuel shut-off valve, deckhand No. 4 looked back to see

the fire flash. He dropped the extinguisher and left the engineroom quickly by the ladder

to the deck above.
Analysis 17 Marine Accident Report

When investigators examined the starboard engineroom after the fire, they found

clear fire damage patterns indicating that the fire had originated at the top forward section

of engine No. 3. From the top of engine No. 3, the pattern of heat damage spread upward

and to the port side of the engineroom. This finding matches the reports of the master and

deckhand No. 4 that the fire began on the top forward section of engine No. 3.

Examining the top forward section of engine No. 3, investigators found the end of

a broken lube oil hose on top of the exhaust manifold cooling shield of the engine. The

other end of this hose was found beneath the cooling shield, resting near the forward edge

of the exhaust manifold.

Deckhand No. 4 arrived in the engineroom just as the fire was beginning. The footlong flame was probably the result of the ignition of the initial leak of lube oil as it came

into contact with the hot engine. The flash of fire was probably the result of the ignition of

pressurized oil spraying from the ruptured hose. The hose began to leak lube oil onto the

exhaust manifold. The heat generated by the exhaust manifold (785° F to 847° F) provided

the ignition source for the lube oil (flash point between 400° F and 500o F), causing a

small flame initially. The flare-up resulted from the complete failure of the hose. The

pressurized end of the hose sprayed lube oil upward and toward the port side. The major

fire damage pattern found during the investigation supports this scenario. Laboratory

analysis of the lube oil hose that ran from the oil filter assembly to the control valve on

engine No. 3 revealed that, before the fire, heat from the exhaust manifold had discolored

the hose and hardened it. The hardening increased until the hose became brittle enough to

fracture when exposed to vibrations and contact with engine parts. The Safety Board

concludes that the failure of the hose caused lube oil to come in contact with the exhaust

manifold and ignite, which resulted in the fire that damaged the Seastreak New York.

Manufacturerís Instructions for the Installation of Engine 

Accessories

The fire damage to engine No. 3 precluded Safety Board investigators from

identifying all possible failure mechanisms. Investigators, therefore, examined engine No.

1, which according to Circle Navigation, had been configured similarly to engine No. 3.

They found that the lube oil hose was routed from the oil filter assembly at the rear

starboard side of the engine over the top of the engine and underneath the cooling water

hoses leading to the cooling jacket. The lube oil hose then led to the control valve on the

front port side of the engine. The hose was not secured. Investigators found that this

routing and the failure to secure the hose above the engine had allowed the lube oil hose

on engine No. 1 to slip down past the forward edge of the cooling shield either during

installation or operation. The hose was found resting on or very near the hot exhaust

manifold of engine No. 1.

The Safety Board is convinced that the lube oil hose was routed similarly on

engine No. 3. When investigators examined engine No. 3 after the fire, they found no

evidence that the hose had been secured. They found that one end of the broken lube oil
Analysis 18 Marine Accident Report

hose was resting on top of the engineís exhaust manifold cooling shield and the other end

of the hose was underneath the cooling shield, lying near the forward edge of the exhaust

manifold.

In the absence of any securing of the lube oil hose in the space underneath the

cooling water hoses, the vibrations of engine No. 3 could have provided the mechanism

for the migration of the hose from its original position to the hazardous location below the

exhaust manifold cooling shield and on or near the forward edge of the exhaust manifold,

where the oil hose was subject to heat stress that eventually caused it to fail.

The Cummins Engine Companyís documentation for the Centinel System does not

contain any guidance for routing the lube oil hose from the oil filter assembly around heat

sources to the control valve. However, hose installation instructions in the hose

manufacturerís catalog state, ìWhen hose lines pass near an exhaust manifold or other

heat source, they should be insulated by a heat resistant boot, fire sleeve, or a metal

baffle.î In this case, the routing of the hose and the failure to secure it as it passed over the

engine allowed the hose to come in contact with the exhaust manifold. Had the hose been

properly secured as it passed over the engine, it would not have come into contact with the

exhaust manifold, and the fire would have been prevented. The Safety Board concludes

that the lack of guidance for the proper installation of the lube oil hose resulted in the lube

oil hose on engine No. 3 being improperly routed and secured, allowing it to migrate to the

forward edge of the exhaust manifold, where it was subject to unintentional heat stress that

eventually caused the hose to fail. Consequently, the Safety Board believes that Cummins

Engine Company should revise its manufacturing and installation literature for the

Centinel System to specify how to safely route and secure the lube oil hose between the oil

filter assembly and the control valves on the engines. 

Crew Firefighting Response

Deckhand No. 4 discovered the fire and acted instinctively to try to extinguish it

using the nearby portable CO2 extinguisher. His first action, however, should have been to

notify the master before attempting to control the fire.5

 Training indicates that the proper

procedures would have been to call the master on the telephone that was located in the

engineroom. This would have given the master the opportunity to shut down the engine,

either remotely or by directing deckhand No. 4 to do so locally. With the engine secured,

the hose would no longer have been pressurized, and the flare-up may not have occurred

or, at least, might have been greatly reduced. This could have lessened the severity of the

emergency, and, possibly, instead of a fire it might have been only an engine failure. 

After deckhand No. 4 retrieved the portable extinguisher, he pulled its safety pin

and moved toward the fire. He did not check to see if the extinguisher was operational by

5 ìThe first actions are to sound the alarm and report the fire locationÖDo not attempt to extinguish a

fire, however small it may seem, until sounding the alarm by voice, telephone, pull box, etc.î Barbara

Adams, Marine Fire Fighting (Stillwater, Oklahoma: Fire Protection Publications, 2000) 241.
Analysis 19 Marine Accident Report

making a quick discharge. Checking the extinguisher in this manner before approaching a

fire is critical to ensuring personal safety. Attacking a fire only to discover that the

extinguisher is not operational creates a serious personal risk.

Had deckhand No. 4 been overcome by the flare-up and unable to exit the engine

room, the situation could have been worse. No personal fire protection equipment

(including SCBA6) was carried on the Seastreak New York, nor is such equipment

required. Entry into the burning engineroom by another crewman would not have been

possible. The crewmembers would have been faced with the choice of closing the

engineroom and using the CO2, which probably would have killed Deckhand No. 4, or

leaving the engineroom open, which could have allowed the fire to spread to the passenger

cabins. 

As the deckhand evacuated the engineroom, he believed his clothes were on fire

and had planned to jump into the water to extinguish the fire. If the deckhand had jumped

overboard, the crewmembersí attentions would have in all likelihood been focused on

responding to the man overboard. The delay in securing the access hatch and responding

to the fire could have created a situation where the fire would have spread to the passenger

cabins. If the deckhand who had left the engineroom collapsed after securing the space

and had not prevented deckhand No. 1 from reopening the access doors to the space, a

sudden introduction of additional oxygen could have caused the fire to flash and could

have resulted in the fire spreading to the passenger cabins. Had the fire spread into the

passenger cabins, there would have been a greatly increased risk to passengers and

crewmembers. Smoke would have filled most if not all of the passenger cabins. The

primary area of refuge from the smoke would have been the exterior third deck. Quick

movement of 198 passengers to that space would have been difficult and hazardous.

Without proper training in firefighting, it is doubtful whether the crewmembers could have

prevented the spread of the fire. Fortunately, the fire extinguishing efforts on the Seastreak

New York were successful. The fire was extinguished quickly and there was limited

damage to the engineroom. The Safety Board concludes that, while the fire was

successfully extinguished, the crewís lack of training could have negatively impacted

passenger safety. 

Once deckhand No. 4 had exited from the engineroom, the crewmembers followed

the proper procedures as far as physical actions required before activating the fixed fire

suppression system. They closed the access hatches, secured the ventilation dampers and

the blower, shifted the electrical load to the port generator, and secured the fuel to all

equipment in the engineroom. However, there was some confusion about getting

permission from the master prior to activation of the CO2 release. Deckhand No. 4 was

unaware that he needed to get permission to activate the system. Accepted industry

practice is as follows: ìWhen to use a fixed fire suppression system is an important

decision that the designated officer in charge of fire control must make after becoming

well informed of the situation and its surrounding circumstances.î7

 On the Seastreak New

6 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus 

7 Adams, 201.
Analysis 20 Marine Accident Report

York, this officer was the master. If the system is activated without the master’s knowledge

or permission, it may adversely affect the results of decisions and actions he is directing. If

he were to direct that an engineroom hatch be opened after the CO2 was discharged, it

would negate the effectiveness of the CO2. The CO2 would also be hazardous, possibly

fatal, to anyone entering the engineroom. 

New York Waterway, another company that operates commuter ferries in the

metropolitan New York area, has voluntarily provided formal firefighting training to its

marine crews. This shows that companies can take action to improve fire safety on their

vessels without having to wait for the development of regulations requiring them to do so.

Firefighting training is critical, not only for the safety of the vessels and crews, but also for

the safety of the passengers carried on board. The Safety Board concludes that the actions

of the crewmembers of the Seastreak New York in this fire show that Circle Navigation

Company marine personnel lacked adequate firefighting training. Consequently, the

Safety Board believes that Circle Navigation Company should develop and implement a

training program in marine firefighting for its crewmembers. 

Company Maintenance and Inspection Procedures

The Seastreak New York had been in service less than 6 months when this fire

occurred. Although there could be a reasonable expectation that components should not

fail in such a short period, attachments to engines are subject to vibration, abrasion, and

heat and may be vulnerable to failure long before the manufacturers recommended

replacement date. Attachments such as hoses are particularly vulnerable and should be

visually inspected frequently and regularly to ensure that they are not subject to stresses

that could materially lessen their service life. The condition of hoses is particularly

important because they typically hold flammable liquids under pressure, and, if the hose

fails for any reason, the likelihood of fire is very high. As can be seen from this accident,

even relatively new hoses can fail, if the conditions are appropriate.

A comprehensive maintenance and inspection program starts when the vessel is

delivered to the owner and should include frequent inspections of the condition, routing,

and securing of hoses attached to the main engine and to other operating diesel engines. If

a comprehensive inspection program had been in place at Circle Navigation, the hose

resting on the manifold would probably have been identified and the hose rerouted and

secured before the hose ruptured, and this fire could have been avoided. The Safety Board

therefore concludes that the lack of a preventive maintenance and inspection program set

the stage for this fire to occur. 
Analysis 21 Marine Accident Report

As discussed in the Safety Boardís report on the fire on the Port Imperial

Manhattan, the airline, rail, and motor carrier industries require preventive maintenance

programs.8 As a result of its investigation into the Port Imperial Manhattan fire, the Safety

Board recommended (Safety Recommendation M-02-5) that the Coast Guard require that

companies operating domestic passenger vessels develop and implement preventive

maintenance programs for all systems affecting the safe operation of their vessels,

including the hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. At the time of this writing, the

Safety Board is still awaiting the Coast Guardís response to this recommendation.

However, recognizing that the Coast Guard rulemaking requiring preventive maintenance

programs is likely to be a time-consuming process, the Safety Board believes that, in the

interim, Circle Navigation should develop and implement a preventive maintenance and

inspection program for systems affecting the safe operation of its vessels, including the

hull and the mechanical and electrical systems. 

Passenger Management

The mustering of, lifejacket distribution to, and disembarking of passengers were

accomplished without difficulty. The master remained on the bridge and in positive

control of the situation and the crewís response. The crewmembers controlled the

passengers, directed and assisted them as needed, and kept them informed of the status of

the situation. The Safety Board concludes that the actions of the crewmembers in

managing the passengers during the emergency were appropriate and effective. 

Because the passengers were daily commuters, they were very familiar with both

the vessel and its crewmembers. When the Seastreak New York moored alongside the

bulkhead at the Coast Guard Station, the passengers were able to disembark with

assistance through the starboard gangway, over the railing, onto the walkway at the top of

the bulkhead, and onto shore. As an additional precaution, the master had positioned the

vesselís bow on the beach in the event it became necessary to use the bow ramp in the

evacuation of passengers.

Although they resulted in some damage to the vesselís hull, the Safety Board

concludes that the masterís actions in coming alongside the bulkhead at the Coast Guard

Station to disembark the passengers as quickly and safely as possible were appropriate. 

8 National Transportation Safety Board, Fire On Board the Small Passenger Vessel Port Imperial

Manhattan, Hudson River, New York City, New York, November 17, 2000. NTSB/MAR-02-02 (Washington,

D.C.: NTSB, 2002)
22 Marine Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. None of the following were factors in this accident: major propulsion or steering

failure, weather, crewmember actions, fatigue, drugs, or alcohol.

2. The failure of the hose caused lube oil to come in contact with the exhaust manifold

and ignite, which resulted in the fire that damaged the Seastreak New York.

3. The lack of guidance for the proper installation of the lube oil hose resulted in the

lube oil hose on engine No. 3 being improperly routed and secured, allowing it to

migrate to the forward edge of the exhaust manifold, where it was subject to

unintentional heat stress that eventually caused the hose to fail.

4. While the fire was successfully extinguished, the crewís lack of training could have

negatively impacted passenger safety.

5. The actions of the crewmembers of the Seastreak New York in this fire show that

Circle Navigation Company marine personnel lacked adequate firefighting training.

6. The lack of a preventive maintenance and inspection program set the stage for this

fire to occur.

7. The actions of the crewmembers in managing the passengers during the emergency

were appropriate and effective.

8. Although they resulted in some damage to the vesselís hull, the masterís actions in

coming alongside the bulkhead at the Coast Guard Station to disembark the

passengers as quickly and safely as possible were appropriate.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the fire on board the Seastreak New York was the improper installation of the Centinel

Systemís lube oil hose, which allowed the hose to come in contact with the hot exhaust

manifold. Contributing to the cause of the fire was the absence of detailed guidance from

the manufacturer of the Centinel System on the proper installation of the system. Also

contributing to the cause of the fire was the lack of inspection and maintenance procedures

by Circle Navigation Company that might have discovered the improper installation.
23 Marine Accident Report

Recommendations

To Cummins Engine Company, Inc.:

Revise your manufacturing and installation literature for the Centinel

System to specify how to safely route and secure the lube oil hose between

the oil filter assembly and the control valves on the engines. (M-02-22)

To Circle Navigation Company of New York:

Develop and implement a training program in marine firefighting for your

crewmembers. (M-02-23)

Develop and implement a preventive maintenance and inspection program

for systems affecting the safe operation of your vessels, including the hull

and the mechanical and electrical systems. (M-02-24)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

CAROL J. CARMODY

Acting Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member 

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

Adopted: September 17, 2002

25 Marine Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation

The U.S. Coast Guard notified the Safety Board of this accident at 1222 on

September 28, 2001. The Safety Board launched a three-person investigative team to the

scene that afternoon and they arrived early that same evening. The Safety Board team

examined the fire scene, interviewed company management officials, shipís

crewmembers, and other witnesses, and examined Coast Guard inspection records. The

on-scene investigation was completed on October 2, 2001. The Safety Board investigated

the accident under the authority of the Independent Safety Board Act of 1997, according

to the Safety Boardís rules. The designated parties to the investigation were Circle

Navigation of New York, the U.S. Coast Guard, and Cummins Engine Company.