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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

WORLD LEADERSHIP PROGRAM 

INSTITUTE, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 9, 2017 

v No. 330516 

Washtenaw Circuit Court 

NANCY BURNS, DAVID HOWELL, 

SHERMAN JACKSON, and MARK TESSLER, 

LC No. 15-000655-CK 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and O’CONNELL and METER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Plaintiff, World Leadership Program Institute (the Institute) appeals as of right the trial 

court’s order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (8) on complaints of 

breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel against 

defendants, Nancy Burns, David Howell, Sherman Jackson, and Mark Tessler. The trial court 

also awarded sanctions against the Institute. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The Institute’s complaint arose from a dispute involving expenses that the Institute’s 

founder, Margaret Cone, incurred after the University of Michigan canceled an international 

learning program. The incidents took place from March 2008 to May 2010. In November 2008, 

Cone established the East West Learning Initiative, Inc. (EWLII) to oversee the administrative 

activities of the international learning program, but Cone did not establish the Institute until 

October 2010. In filing for summary disposition, defendants argued that the Institute lacked 

standing to bring the claims because the Institute did not exist at the time the alleged wrongdoing 

took place. 

 In response to defendants’ motion, the Institute argued that it was a “nonprofit 

corporation that existed prior to and during the activities in question as a Michigan non-profit 

corporation . . . .” The Institute repeatedly interchanged its references to EWLII (founded in 

November 2008) and the Institute (founded in October 2010), as though they were a single 

entity. Defendants responded that the Institute was attempting to mislead the court, noting 

among other things that EWLII was a for-profit entity and that the Institute was not associated 

with EWLII in its articles of incorporation, or vice versa. 
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 In granting summary disposition, the trial court noted that the Institute did not exist until 

October 2010, after the events in the complaint, and that there was no evidence that the Institute 

and EWLII were related entities. The trial court additionally ordered sanctions under MCR 

2.114, finding that the Institute “deliberately and blatantly misrepresented its status to the parties 

and to the Court.” The Institute now appeals. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

 “This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s denial of a motion to amend 

a complaint.” Tierney v Univ of Mich Regents, 257 Mich App 681, 687-688; 669 NW2d 575 

(2003). We also review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision on a motion for 

reconsideration. Woods v SLB Prop Mgt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 629; 750 NW2d 228 (2008). 

The trial court abuses its discretion when its outcome falls outside the reasonable and principled 

range of outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). 

 We review for clear error a trial court’s finding that an action is frivolous. Kitchen v 

Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 661; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). “A decision is clearly erroneous where, 

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 661-662. 

III. AMENDMENT TO THE COMPLAINT 

 The Institute argues that the trial court should have granted its motion to amend its 

complaint because filing suit as the improper party was a mistake, not an intentional 

misrepresentation. We disagree. 

 The Institute did not preserve this issue because it did not request to amend its complaint 

until their motion for reconsideration. “Where an issue is first presented in a motion for 

reconsideration, it is not properly preserved.” Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 284 

Mich App 513, 519; 773 NW2d 758 (2009). We will therefore review this issue for plain error 

affecting the Institute’s substantial rights. See King v Oakland Co Prosecutor, 303 Mich App 

222, 239; 842 NW2d 403 (2013). 

 Leave to amend a pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” MCR 

2.118(A)(2). However, the trial court may deny a motion on the basis of “(1) undue delay, (2) 

bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

amendments previously allowed, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 

allowance of the amendment, or (5) futility of the amendment.” Lane v KinderCare Learning 

Ctrs, Inc, 231 Mich App 689, 697; 588 NW2d 715 (1998). 

 In this case, after defending against defendants’ motion for summary disposition on the 

basis that the Institute was a proper party in interest, the Institute raised a new legal argument in 

its motion for reconsideration—that the trial court should allow it to amend its complaint. This 

occurred after the trial court found that the Institute “deliberately and blatantly misrepresented its 

status to the parties and to the Court.” 

 The record supports the trial court’s finding. After defendants moved for summary 

disposition, rather than acknowledging the error of suing as a plaintiff who did not exist at the 
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time of the facts that formed the basis of the complaint and moving to amend the complaint, the 

Institute doubled-down by asserting that the Institute existed as EWLII at the time of the facts 

leading to the claim and, without any evidence to support its claim, asserted that EWLII and the 

Institute were the same, successor, or related entities. We conclude that the trial court did not 

plainly err by refusing the Institute’s request on reconsideration to amend its complaint.1 

IV. SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS CLAIM 

 The Institute argues that the trial court improperly imposed sanctions because its error 

was a simple misunderstanding. We disagree. 

 The trial court may impose sanctions under MCR 2.114 for an action that is frivolous 

under MCL 600.2591. MCR 2.114(F); MCR 2.625(A)(2). A court may find that a party’s action 

is frivolous under MCR 2.625(A)(2) when the party (1) initiated the suit for purposes of 

harassment, (2) had a legal position devoid of arguable legal merit, or (3) lacked a reasonable 

basis to believe that the facts underlying its legal position were true. MCL 600.2591(3)(a). 

 In this case, the Institute had no reasonable basis to believe that it was the aggrieved party 

in this lawsuit. It did not exist until after the actions leading to the suit occurred. Nevertheless, 

the Institute both asserted that it was the proper party and that it was a successor entity without 

any evidence to support its positions. Because Cone founded and represented both entities, the 

Institute knew or should have known which entities existed at which times during this dispute. 

Whether characterized as a deliberate attempt to mislead the court, or as a mistake, it is clear 

from this record that the Institute pursued its claim after insufficient research into the proper 

party to pursue the claim. The resulting claims lacked legal merit. We are not definitely and 

firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it sanctioned the Institute under MCR 

2.114. 

 We affirm. As the prevailing parties, defendants may tax costs. MCR 7.219. 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

 

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 Even if bad faith was not a valid reason for declining leave to amend the complaint, the fact 

that the Institute waited until after the trial court granted summary disposition to request 

amendment provided another reason to refuse the amendment. See Amburgey v Sauder, 238 

Mich App 228, 247-248; 605 NW2d 84 (1999).