United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1995 PERSONNEL

SECURITY

Pass and Security

Clearance Data for the

Executive Office of the

President

GAO/NSIAD-96-20

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-265771 

October 19, 1995

The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.

Chairman, Committee on Government

 Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

The Honorable Porter J. Goss

House of Representatives

You asked us to review the White House’s procedures for access passes

and security clearances issued since January 20, 1993. Because of reported

delays of over a year in issuing passes, you expressed concerns about how

the White House was managing the access pass and security clearance

processes. As agreed with your offices, this report presents our

(1) analysis of the steps in the access pass approval process for 1993 and

1994 and (2) observations on internal controls over the access pass and

security clearance processes.

Background One of the ways the Secret Service protects the President and other senior

officials is the use of a system of access passes to the White House

complex. According to the Secret Service, about 7,000 people have passes

allowing access to the White House complex, which includes the White

House, the Old Executive Office Building, and the New Executive Office

Building. The number varies daily and includes members of the press,

military personnel, Secret Service employees, as well as employees of the

Executive Office of the President, detailees from other government

agencies, volunteers, contractor employees, and residence staff. Our

review covers staff and contractors from selected offices of the Executive

Office of the President, totaling 638 individuals.

The various types of White House access passes1

 fall into two

categories—temporary passes, which are issued initially for 90 days and

can be extended beyond the initial period, and permanent passes. The

process, as first documented in March 1994, for obtaining a temporary

access pass requires employees to

1

The Secret Service identified 35 different types of access passes, including several for access to the

White House, several for access to the Old Executive Office Building, several for access to the New

Executive Office Building, and 3 for members of the press to gain access to limited parts of the White

House complex.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
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• complete and submit required paperwork, including the Questionnaire for

Sensitive Positions Form (Standard Form (SF)-86) and

• undergo limited background checks by the Secret Service and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The process for obtaining a permanent access pass generally requires the

following:

• The relevant Executive Office of the President security office reviews the

required paperwork and forwards it to the FBI.

• The FBI conducts a background investigation.

• The Executive Office of the President reviews the FBI report and other

information and determines whether to recommend approval of a

permanent pass.

• The Secret Service issues the pass, if it has no objections relating to

protective interest issues.

See appendix II for a detailed discussion of the above processes.

The White House allows employees of the White House Office, the Office

of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development with

permanent White House passes and a need-to-know to have access to

information classified up to the top secret level. Staff from other offices

within the Executive Office of the President grant security clearances

under Executive Order 10450, as amended.2

To measure timeliness of the pass process, we analyzed dates in the

process for employees who entered on duty between January 20, 1993, and

September 16, 1994. These 638 individuals were paid from appropriations

available to 5 offices of the Executive Office of the President.3

 As agreed

with your offices, the scope of our work was to determine the time it took

to obtain passes and analyze time intervals for selected steps in the

process. The White House explained the reasons for some of the

processing times and we incorporated these statements as appropriate.

However, we did not evaluate the reasons for time frame delays or the

2

Executive Order 10450 provides the basic security standards for agencies to follow. Executive 

Order 12968, issued on August 4, 1995, updated and revised the government’s personnel security

program, but did not supersede Executive Order 10450.

3

These included employees who were, according to White House officials, on track to receive a

permanent pass. The employees included current and former staff, contractors, and detailees who

worked for one of the following offices within the Executive Office of the President: the White House

Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Policy Development, the Office of Administration,

and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Not included were unpaid volunteers and individuals

who were employed for short periods early in the administration.

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White House explanations. Appendix I describes, in detail, the scope and

methodology of our review.

Results in Brief Individuals entering on duty during 1993 received final approval for

permanent White House access passes an average of 346 days from their

start date, but the average time of approval fell to 98 days for staff entering

in 1994.4

 According to White House officials, the White House has not

historically tracked time interval data related to the access pass process,

thus we could not compare the information we analyzed to prior

experience.

Figure 1 shows the relative time needed to obtain a permanent pass in

1993 and 1994 for each process step.

4

These are the averages for all individuals approved for access passes. In the appendixes, we also

discuss averages based on adjustments reflecting cases where an individual deviated from the steps

generally followed in the process. For example, an individual may have completed certain paperwork

for the process because of prior employment before entering on duty with the Executive Office of the

President.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
B-265771 

Figure 1: Average Time Required to Complete Selected Steps in the Permanent Access Pass Process During 1993 and 1994

1993

1994

0 100 200 300 400 500

Calendar year

Days

Date entered on duty

to date SF-86 signed

Date SF-86 signed to 

date investigation started

Date investigation started

to date investigation finished

Date investigation finished

to date pass recommended

Date pass recommended

to date pass approved

Note: The times for individual steps do not add to the total processing times because not all

individuals were involved in every step. Also, no interval is shown for the submission of the SF-86

in 1994 because the SF-86 was signed on average before an individual entered on duty.

The longer time needed to process 1993 entrants was primarily

attributable to the time individuals took to complete the SF-86 and to

subsequent actions taken by the Executive Office of the President. These

actions include the time taken to review the SF-86; and then to review the

FBI investigative report and other reports, and recommend that a

permanent access pass be approved.

During 1993, there were no written time standards for completing the

various access pass processes, except for goals set by the FBI relating to its

segment of the process. The White House set a standard in March 1994

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B-265771 

that gave each employee 30 days to complete the SF-86. The Treasury,

Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act for 1995 

(P.L. 103-329), enacted in September 1994, made this standard a legal

requirement and also mandated that, with certain exceptions, an

appropriate access pass be recommended for approval within 6 months

after a person entered on duty with the Executive Office of the President.

The FBI raised its goal for completing background investigations from 

45 days to 60 days in late 1994. Although the FBI did not always meet this

goal, FBI and Secret Service actions did not substantially add to the

processing time in 1993.

White House and congressional actions have established process changes

and controls to improve the access pass and security clearance processes.

For the time intervals and offices we reviewed, with few exceptions, the

time intervals declined, and the procedures were adhered to. However, our

observations indicate a potential for strengthening controls in several

selected areas, particularly at the start of a new administration. The areas

related to renewing temporary passes, revoking passes after separation,

and granting security clearances. The scope of our work did not address

whether problems occurred as a result of the potential control

weaknesses. While we did not identify specific problems, we believe it is

appropriate to consider improving these controls.

Processing Times

Were Longer in 1993

Than in 1994

The processing time between when a person entered on duty, obtained a

temporary pass, and received Secret Service approval for a permanent

pass was substantially shorter in 1994 than in 1993.5

 The White House

attributed the time reductions in the process to the following reasons: the

number of individuals entering on duty decreased in 1994; the White

House corrected inefficiencies and implemented computerized tracking;

the White House and Congress established time standards; and staff and

officials became more experienced with the process. The two steps that

most contributed to the lengthy processing time during 1993 were the time

taken by employees to submit paperwork and the Executive Office of the

President to review it.

Employee Timeliness The amount of time individuals took to complete the SF-86 after entering

on duty was reduced from about 100 days to a few days or less from 1993

to 1994. According to White House officials, this change occurred because

5

Unless otherwise specified, a specific year refers to when an action began, but did not necessarily

conclude.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
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the White House issued standards in March 1994 that required individuals

to submit the SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty. Public Law 103-329

put this 30-day requirement in law. Prior to these actions, there were no

documented Executive Office of the President standards for this part of

the process. However, White House officials said that informal standards

existed. (See app. III.)

Agency Timeliness The times needed by the Executive Office of the President to (1) review

the SF-86 for completeness before submitting it to the FBI and (2) review

the FBI’s investigative report and other documentation and recommend to

the Secret Service that a permanent pass be issued declined from 1993 to

1994. The second step took 174 days in 1993 and 46 days in 1994.

The FBI was not always able to meet its goal for conducting background

investigations during either 1993 or 1994 and increased its goal from 

45 days to 60 days in late 1994. FBI officials cited several reasons for not

meeting the goal, including an increased overall caseload and reduced

resources.

The average number of days it took the Secret Service to approve a

permanent pass after the Executive Office of the President recommended

that a pass be approved decreased from 29 days in 1993 to 7 days in 1994.

The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in part to the Executive

Office of the President not promptly sending pass requests to the Secret

Service and the 1994 average to the time needed to address questions

related to protective interest issues. We analyzed information provided by

the Secret Service for 1994 that showed relatively short processing times

within the Service, but it was not sufficiently detailed to verify the reasons

for delay. Similar data for 1993 were not available. (See app. III.)

Observations on

Controls

White House and legislative actions have resulted in a number of process

changes and additional controls designed to improve the timeliness of the

access pass and security clearance processes. The data we analyzed show

that these changes, with few exceptions, are being adhered to. For

example, when it was discovered that a career employee had taken longer

than the 6 months allowed under Public Law 103-329 to be recommended

for a permanent pass, the Executive Office of the President initiated action

to suspend the employee. The issue causing the delay was resolved within

a month and a pass was issued. Also, most individuals have complied with

a March 14, 1994, Chief of Staff directive to complete the SF-86 within a

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
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specified time, up to 30 days, although 11 did not. As described below, we

have several observations on potential opportunities to strengthen

controls.

First, we noted that the White House procedures and legislative provisions

recognize the possibility of delays beyond employee or Executive Office of

the President control, such as reviews by other agencies taking several

months to complete. Additional attention may be warranted to strengthen

controls when it is necessary to renew temporary access passes in these

situations. Temporary passes give people access to the White House

complex while they wait for a permanent pass and are usually issued to

individuals within a few days of when they enter on duty. Temporary

passes are usually issued for 90 days but may be extended in 30-day

increments. Individuals included in our analysis held temporary passes for

an average of 341 days prior to obtaining final approval for a permanent

pass in 1993 and for 110 days in 1994. Our discussions with Secret Service

officials and our analyses indicated that during the longer processing

times in 1993, the Service routinely granted eight or more extensions to

individuals for temporary passes as requested by the Executive Office of

the President. Secret Service officials stated that during the initial

transitions of administrations it was normal to have more frequent

extensions. (See app. IV.)

Second, additional attention may be warranted to strengthen controls to

ensure that both temporary and permanent passes are revoked when an

individual leaves, when appropriate. Of the 638 records we analyzed, 188

(29 percent) show that the individuals had left their designated Executive

Office of the President organization. We did not verify whether permanent

passes were voided or returned in these cases.6

 However, the data showed

that seven permanent passes were approved by the Secret Service after

the person left. In these cases, Secret Service officials said that they either

did not know these people had left the Executive Office of the President or

were told the person still needed a pass. The Secret Service has no process

to verify an individual’s continued need for a pass. Secret Service officials

stated that they rely on the White House to notify them when an individual

leaves or a pass should be terminated. White House officials stated that

they monitor arrivals and departures of staff closely and that passes are

returned unless retention is justified. We confirmed that the White House

has procedures in this area, but we did not discuss specific cases. (See

app. IV.)

6

We used individual records with specific identifying data excluded and thus could not follow up on

specific cases.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
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Third, procedures may be needed to require interim security clearances

for White House Office staff who later receive access to classified

information if they hold permanent access passes. Through December

1994, 381 of 638 records we analyzed show that the person had been

authorized access to classified information. These included 359 personnel

in the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, and the Office

of Policy Development who could have been given access to classified

information on a need-to-know basis if they held a permanent White House

pass.7

 Also, 22 individuals in the Office of Administration and the Office of

National Drug Control Policy could have been granted access under

Executive Order 10450. The first of the permanent White House passes

was not approved until September 30, 1993, and the first of the 22 security

clearances was not granted until June 22, 1993.8

 We asked how the offices

conducted business involving classified information during these 8- and

5-month periods. White House officials stated that about two dozen senior

staff received interim clearances during this time. They also stated that the

overwhelming majority of the classified work done in the Executive Office

of the President is done by the staff of the National Security Council,

which is not one of the offices included in the data we analyzed.

Procedures for dealing with similar circumstances in future

administrations may be needed. (See app. IV.)

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In oral comments on a draft of this report, White House officials generally

agreed with our statistical analysis. However, they raised concerns about

our observations on the potential for strengthening of selected controls.

They specifically stated that we had not identified actual problems

resulting from these potential weaknesses. We agreed that is the case

because the scope of our work did not extend beyond a review of the

process. We clarified this point in the report where appropriate.

Our position is that selected control measures can be improved and not

that a specific problem has occurred. For example, we discussed controls

over passes and clearances because the procedures we examined

indicated the potential for additional internal controls in these areas. Our

limited review did not examine either the controls or their effects in-depth,

but we believe that the issues warrant consideration. We believe that the

need for such controls is most apparent at the beginning of a new

7

Secret Service officials stated that their procedures for granting access passes do not involve security

clearance issues.

8

In addition, one individual had a clearance at the time he entered on duty.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
B-265771 

administration; thus our discussion of them is not based on the existence

of documented problems.

White House officials also suggested several technical corrections, which

we made as appropriate.

In oral comments on a draft of this report, Secret Service officials

generally agreed with our report. They suggested several technical

corrections, which we made as appropriate.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the FBI asked that we clarify

certain information. We revised the report to reflect the FBI’s comment.

(See app. V.)

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we

will send copies to appropriate congressional committees, the White

House Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for Management and

Administration, the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Secret

Service, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other

interested parties. We will make copies available to others on request. If

you have any questions concerning this report, please call me on

(202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

David R. Warren

Director, Defense Management

 and NASA Issues

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Scope and

Methodology

12

Appendix II 

The Access Pass

Process

15

Step 1: Initiating Pre-Employment Tasks 15

Step 2: Obtaining a Temporary Pass 16

Step 3: Obtaining a Permanent Pass 16

Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event

Time Intervals

19

Time Needed to Be Approved for a Permanent Pass 20

Completion of the SF-86 22

Executive Office of the President Indicators 23

FBI Indicators 24

Secret Service Indicators 25

Drug Test Indicators 26

Appendix IV 

Observations on

Controls

28

Temporary Pass Issuance Data 28

Data Related to Staff Separations 30

Access to Classified Security Information 33

Appendix V 

Comments From the

Federal Bureau of

Investigation

35

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

36

Tables Table III.1: Applicable and Nonapplicable Records for Specified

Intervals

20

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Contents

Table III.2: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the

Date a Permanent Pass Was Approved by the Secret Service

21

Table III.3: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the

Date the SF-86 Was Signed

22

Table III.4: Average Days From the Date an Individual Signed an

SF-86 to the Date the Executive Office of the President

Forwarded the SF-86 to the FBI

24

Table III.5: Average Days From the Date the FBI Concluded the

Background Investigation to the Date the Executive Office of the

President Recommended Approval of a Permanent Pass

24

Table III.6: Average Days From the Date the FBI Initiated a

Background Investigation to the Date the FBI Concluded the

Investigation

25

Table III.7: Average Days From the Date of Executive Office of

the President Recommendation to Secret Service Approval of a

Permanent Pass

26

Table III.8: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the

Date the Drug Test Was Taken

26

Table III.9: Average Days From the Date the Drug Test Was

Taken to the Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued

27

Table IV.1: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the

Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued

28

Table IV.2: Average Days From the Date a Temporary Pass Was

Issued to the Date a Permanent Pass Was Approved by the Secret

Service

29

Figure Figure 1: Average Time Required to Complete Selected Steps in

the Permanent Access Pass Process During 1993 and 1994

4

Abbreviations

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

SF Standard Form

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

To assess timeliness of processing White House access passes and security

clearances, we examined the time intervals associated with each

processing step; reviewed the process and associated laws, regulations,

policies, and procedures; and interviewed officials from the Executive

Office of the President, Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), Office of Government Ethics, and Defense Finance and Accounting

Service.

To calculate the processing time for passes and clearances, we collected

the following key event dates associated with processing steps for staff1

assigned to the White House Office, Special Assistance to the President

(Vice President’s Office), Office of Policy Development, Office of

Administration, and Office of National Drug Control Policy, on or after

January 20, 1993, who were paid with Executive Office of the President

appropriated funds and needed a permanent pass.

1. Date the person entered on duty. 

2. Date the Standard Form (SF)-50 was signed.2

3. Date the person took a drug test.3

4. Date the person signed the SF-86. 

5. Date the person was issued a temporary pass. 

6. Date the FBI initiated a background investigation. 

7. Date the FBI finished the investigation. 

8. Date the permanent pass was approved.4

9. Date the permanent pass was issued.5

10. Date the security clearance was granted.6

11. Date the person separated, if applicable.

For reasons of confidentiality, the White House provided a number and

office designation for individuals covered in our analysis.

1

Staff included long-term contractors, reimbursable detailees (terms of 6 months or more), and

consultants, as well as career and political appointment staff needing a permanent pass.

2

The SF-50 indicates that a personnel action has been completed; in this case, it relates to the date

entered on duty.

3

As indicated in appendix III, this is not a formal part of the access pass process.

4

For this interval, we used the date the Executive Office of the President recommended to the Secret

Service that a permanent pass be approved.

5

For this interval, we used the date the Secret Service approved a permanent pass for issuance.

6

Secret Service officials said that this is not part of the access pass process.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

The White House compiled a database containing an identifier and the key

dates, when available,7

 for each of 638 individuals. Dates were provided

for (1) individuals entering on duty as of January 20, 1993, through

September 16, 1994, and (2) process steps completed by December 13,

1994. Dates associated with processing steps involving the Secret Service

and FBI were supplied to the White House by those agencies. We received

the database containing the key event dates from the White House in

January 1995 and worked with the White House to correct administrative

mistakes found in the database. We also verified a random sample of event

dates using original personnel documents and other records.

We analyzed intervals between key event dates to determine average,

minimum, and maximum processing times as well as trends over time. We

discussed our analyses with White House, Secret Service, and FBI officials

to determine reasons for individual processing times and for overall

trends. We also discussed procedures and controls over granting access

passes and security clearances. In our analyses, we obtained White House

explanations of individual cases and overall trends, but we did not further

examine supporting documentation for these individual cases, as agreed

with the requesters’ offices. The effects of the limited examinations are

noted in the report where appropriate.

After the database was finalized, White House officials proposed that dates

for 54 individuals not be included since they reflected anomalies that skew

the analysis.8

 We agree that these individuals followed a different pattern

than the majority of individuals in the database. However, they do

represent the actual pass approval process for these individuals;

consequently, we present both sets of data in our detailed analyses.

Excluding the 54 individuals, in most instances, increased the average

amount of time for an interval. Some individuals received a pass when

employed by an office that was not subject to this review. For example, a

person who was employed in January 1993 by the Office of Management

and Budget, an office not included in our analysis, could have received a

7

Dates were not always available for such reasons as staff separated before a date was met, contractor

staff did not receive an SF-50, drug testing dates were not provided for contractor staff because such

tests are administered by contractors and not the Executive Office of the President, and not all staff

needed security clearances.

8

Of the 54, 45 transferred from a position within the Executive Office of the President or another

government agency to the position shown in the database, 2 transferred from their position as shown

in the database to another office within the Executive Office of the President, 5 were originally 90-day

hires that became permanent employees, and 2 had background investigations completed prior to

entering on duty. We were not able to determine whether these 54 represented all individuals in these

situations.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

permanent pass and then transferred in 1994 to the White House Office. As

a result, the record would show a 1994 entered-on-duty date and earlier

times for all other key event dates. The effect of this in our analysis is that

when the entered-on-duty date is analyzed against the other key event

dates, the result is a negative number.9

 In our overall analyses, we added

all the time differences, negative and positive, to calculate an average.

We conducted our review from May 1994 to August 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

9

For example, if an individual entered on duty on January 20, 1994, and signed the SF-86 on January 17,

1994, the difference would be calculated as a –3. The average number of days in the unadjusted

database from entering on duty to signing the SF-86 was –52 days, whereas in the adjusted database,

the average was 3 days.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix II 

The Access Pass Process

This appendix describes the process typically followed by White House

complex employees for obtaining a White House access pass and/or

security clearance, according to agency procedures that were first issued

in March 1994 and the statements of agency officials. This process

involved activities related to three generally uniform steps: (1) initiating

pre-employment tasks, (2) obtaining a temporary pass, and (3) obtaining a

permanent pass. Procedures for employees requiring access to classified

information vary by organization. (See app. IV.)

Step 1: Initiating

Pre-Employment

Tasks

The following tasks must be completed concerning each applicant’s

appointment:

• Applicants must undergo a security interview conducted by the relevant

Executive Office of the President security office.

• Applicants must submit to a drug test. It normally takes about 10 days to

get the results, and if the test is positive, the person would be disqualified

from appointment.1

• Applicants must undergo an initial name check in which their name, date

of birth, place of birth, and Social Security number are checked through

the Secret Service’s Workers, Appointment, and Visitors Entrance System.

This consists of checks through four computer databases: the FBI’s

National Crime Information Center database, a criminal history database,

a Secret Service database, and a Washington-area law enforcement

database. According to White House officials, the results are usually back

within a day.

• Applicants must undergo a more extensive FBI name check. The Executive

Office of the President forwards the person’s name and date of birth to the

FBI, which checks the name through the FBI Central Records System,

computer databases, and the Criminal Justice Information Services’

database to identify any derogatory information and prior arrest records.

The FBI has 60 million names in its files. Almost 13,000 name checks were

done for the Executive Office of the President and associated offices in

fiscal year 1993, and over 7,200 checks were done in fiscal year 1994. The

processing time for this more extensive name check typically takes several

days, according to White House and FBI officials.

1

In addition to having a drug test as an applicant, a person is subject to random drug testing once

employed by the Executive Office of the President, in accordance with Executive Order 12564, issued

September 15, 1986, and the Executive Office of the President Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as amended

in December 1992.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix II 

The Access Pass Process

Step 2: Obtaining a

Temporary Pass

Each new employee who is expected to work 90 days or more has 30 days

from the date entered on duty to complete the SF-86, an FBI investigation

consent form, a tax check waiver, and a personal data statement

questionnaire (for employees of certain offices) and provide other

personal data as needed. This 30-day standard was established by the

White House on March 14, 1994. Employees not meeting this standard are

to have their access to the White House revoked and are to be placed on

leave without pay until the paperwork is completed. Prior to March 1994,

there were no written standards for completing the SF-86.

If the person has completed the SF-86 and related paperwork, the results of

the initial name check are satisfactory, and the FBI name check has been

submitted, the person is placed on the White House access list. This means

the person must present positive identification each time he or she enters

the White House complex. Prior to this time, the person is allowed into the

complex only with an appointment and identification.

After a satisfactory FBI name check is returned, the relevant Executive

Office of the President security office recommends to the Secret Service

that a temporary pass be issued to the employee for a period not to exceed

90 days, although 30-day extensions are allowed. The person is

fingerprinted by the Secret Service, and the fingerprints are sent through

the national database. Each new employee is required to attend a security

briefing, and his or her attendance is documented. In the case of an

extension, the Executive Office of the President requests the Secret

Service to extend the temporary pass. After one extension, the Secret

Service contacts the requesting office to provide a rationale for an

additional extension, according to Service officials.

The SF-86 forms from White House Office, Office of the Vice President, and

Office of Policy Development staff go to the White House Counsel’s office.

A security officer in the Office of Administration reviews the SF-86s of

individuals from the Office of Administration and the Office of National

Drug Control Policy. According to White House officials, each SF-86 is

reviewed to verify its correctness and completeness and to determine if

any immediate issues need to be addressed.

Step 3: Obtaining a

Permanent Pass

Before a permanent pass or a security clearance can be issued, the FBI, or

some other agency, must conduct a full-field background investigation.

The Executive Office of the President’s request to the FBI for such an

investigation includes the SF-86 and related documents.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix II 

The Access Pass Process

FBI officials told us that their goal for first-time full-field background

investigations was changed in late 1994 from 45 to 60 calendar days. An

updated investigation, which is done every 5 years, has a goal of 90 days.

According to FBI officials, these goals were changed before 1993 due to FBI

staff shortages and an increased demand for investigations. The goals had

been 35 calendar days for a first-time investigation and 75 days for a

reinvestigation. FBI officials explained that the difference in goals is due to

the urgency of completing first-time investigations. The FBI estimates that

it conducts about 1,000 to 1,500 background investigations a year for the

Executive Office of the President—about 25 percent of the FBI total.

According to FBI officials, if the investigation reveals information that

warrants attention, the FBI notifies the White House Counsel’s Office, the

White House Office of Personnel Security, or the Security Office of the

Executive Office of the President and might provide an interim report. At

the completion of its investigation, the FBI sends an investigation summary

to the appropriate reviewing office, which in turn forwards a copy to the

Secret Service. Depending on the case, the FBI may also send copies of

individual interview summaries but does not typically send the complete

investigative file.

According to White House officials, once the reviewing office receives the

FBI background investigation summary, its review process may involve a

wide range of issues. Such issues may include prior arrests, credit

problems, inability to verify previous employment, mistakes in paperwork,

or employment suitability. The reviewing office determines any needed

follow-up, such as contacting the subject for additional information or

having the FBI investigate further. White House officials said that they

rarely found it necessary to request a follow-up investigation.

White House officials stated they have several sources of information

available to them during the review process, such as the FBI’s background

investigation report; the SF-86; the personal data statement provided by the

employee (if applicable); the tax check results; financial disclosure

information; and the National Crime Information Center check results. As

information is returned from the agencies and departments, White House

procedures, since March 1994, have required that it be reviewed within 

5 days by the White House Counsel’s office and the White House Personnel

Security office. The decision to grant a permanent pass involves not just

security concerns, but also suitability for continued employment, since the

White House may decide, based on its review, not to permanently hire

certain individuals.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix II 

The Access Pass Process

After the reviewing office has resolved any questions, the relevant security

office in the Executive Office of the President sends a written request to

the Secret Service for a permanent access pass for the employee. The

Secret Service, if it agrees there is no danger to the President or other

Service protectees, issues the permanent pass. According to White House

and Secret Service officials, during the period of our review, the White

House never directed the Secret Service to issue a pass in circumstances

that it was otherwise reluctant to do.

According to White House officials, the process for obtaining a permanent

pass is the same for a volunteer as for an employee or contractor. These

officials said that most White House volunteers are citizens who perform

duties related to correspondence and do not have permanent passes, but

are allowed entry based on an access list and identification. However, they

also said that there are about 80 volunteers who work in areas in which a

temporary or permanent pass is more suitable for allowing them to carry

out their responsibilities. For example, the current and most recent White

House Counsel have accepted no salary.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

We analyzed time intervals using both the complete, unadjusted database

and an adjusted database that excluded the 54 individuals referred to in

appendix I. Most of these individuals transferred from one position to

another position within the Executive Office of the President.

White House, FBI, and Secret Service officials provided us with their

explanations regarding the results of our analyses presented in this

appendix and appendix IV. Our analyses did not include verifying the

accuracy of the explanations.

Not all records were applicable to include in averaging the interval

comparisons. Table III.1 shows the number of applicable and

nonapplicable records by category. Records considered to be

nonapplicable include those in which a person separated prior to one or

more key event dates, action was not completed and therefore pending as

of the closure date of the database, or action was taken in some other way,

such as a person having a background investigation conducted by an

agency other than the FBI. (Dates were not provided in these cases.)

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

Table III.1: Applicable and Nonapplicable Records for Specified Intervals

Unadjusted database Adjusted database

Interval comparison

Applicable

records Nonapplicable records

Applicable

records Nonapplicable records

Date entered on duty to date

the permanent pass was

approved

504 134

—112 separated

— 22 pending

— 0 other

458 126

—107 separated

— 19 pending

— 0 other

Date entered on duty to the

date the SF-86 was signed

613 25

— 23 separated

— 0 pending

— 2 other

559 25

— 23 separated

— 0 pending

— 2 other

Date the SF-86 was signed to

the date the FBI initiated a

background investigation

600 38

— 35 separated

— 0 pending

— 3 other

546 38

— 35 separated

— 0 pending

— 3 other

Date the FBI finished a

background investigation to

the date the permanent pass

was recommended

522 116

— 95 separated

— 18 pending

— 3 other

473 111

— 93 separated

— 16 pending

— 2 other

Date the FBI initiated a

background investigation to

the date the FBI finished the

investigation

574 64

— 50 separated

— 11 pending

— 3 other

523 61

— 50 separated

— 9 pending

— 2 other

Date a permanent pass was

recommended to the date the

pass was approved

504 134

—112 separated

— 22 pending

— 0 other

458 126

—107 separated

— 19 pending

— 0 other

Time Needed to Be

Approved for a

Permanent Pass

The processing time needed for an individual to be approved for a

permanent White House access pass after entering on duty decreased from

1993 to 1994, as did most of the individual interval time frames leading up

to final approval of a pass. As shown by table III.2, the average number of

days it took to approve a permanent pass decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

Table III.2: Average Days From the

Date Entered on Duty to the Date a

Permanent Pass Was Approved by the

Secret Service

Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 346 356

1994 98 129

Overall average 295 315

Only 2 permanent passes received final approval prior to September 20,

1993, and of the 400 staff entering on duty during 1993, 250 took over 

300 days to be approved for permanent passes. Only 1 of 104 staff entering

on duty in 1994 took over 300 days. White House officials attributed the

longer processing times in 1993 to (1) operational and administrative

inefficiencies and (2) the large volume of staff entering on duty in 1993.

They said the time decreased in 1994 because (1) fewer people began

work, (2) the White House corrected some inefficiencies in the process,

(3) the White House Chief of Staff and Congress emphasized the pass

process and established standards for it, (4) the White House began using

computers to track the process, and (5) staff and officials became more

experienced in the process.

With the passage of Public Law 103-329, an employee of the Executive

Office of the President must be placed on leave without pay if the person

has not, within 6 months of commencing employment or by October 31,

1994, whichever is later, had a background investigation, if completed,

forwarded to the Secret Service for issuance of an access pass. Two

individuals did not have a permanent pass request made within the

required 6-month time period as of December 13, 1994—the last date

covered by our analysis.1

 Six contractors also did not meet the legal

deadline, but contractors were not considered to be subject to the law,

according to White House officials.2

The following sections describe our analysis related to each time interval

between the date a person entered on duty and the date the person was

approved for a permanent pass. We also discuss key time intervals related

1

According to White House officials, the first individual was a career employee with civil service

protection whose background investigation was completed on November 5, 1994. According to the

officials, proper administrative action was taken on November 18, 1994, to place the individual on

leave without pay. The officials added that a background issue was subsequently resolved and a pass

was issued to this person within 30 days of the administrative action. The second individual was a

person who was waiting for Senate confirmation for a position with the Office of National Drug

Control Policy and had requested that a permanent pass not be issued until confirmed by the Senate.

2

According to White House officials, for purposes of administrative efficiency, contractors are now

treated as if they were subject to P.L. 103-329. According to the officials, this change was made at

some time after October 31, 1994, the effective date of the law.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

to the drug test date. Although the White House does not consider the drug

test to be part of the access pass process, we include information about

the drug test date because our requesters asked that we analyze that data.

Completion of the

SF-86

The first step in obtaining a permanent pass is for the individual to

complete the SF-86 and related paperwork. Table III.3 shows that the

average number of days needed to complete the SF-86 after entering on

duty decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.3: Average Days From the

Date Entered on Duty to the Date the

SF-86 Was Signed Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 100 107

1994 –52a 3

Overall average 66 86

aThe individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, signed their SF-86 52 days prior to

entering on duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order,

resulting in negative numbers.)

For the period of our review, there were 190 individuals who took more

than 100 days to complete the SF-86, including 36 who took over 300 days.

All but 3 of the 190, and all of the 36, entered on duty during 1993.

The White House attributed the time reductions from 1993 to 1994 to staff

compliance with a directive issued by the Chief of Staff on March 14, 1994.

The directive required that (1) all staff who entered on duty prior to

March 1, 1994, complete their SF-86 by March 18, 1994; (2) all staff who

entered on duty between March 1, 1994, and March 14, 1994, complete

their SF-86 by March 31, 1994; and (3) all staff who entered on duty after

March 14, 1994, complete their SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty.

The White House further issued guidelines on March 21, 1994, that gave

each new employee 30 days from the date the individual entered on duty

to complete the SF-86. Prior to these instructions, there were no written

standards for completing these documents. Employees who do not meet

this standard are to have their access to the White House revoked and are

to be placed on leave without pay until they complete the paperwork.

Eleven individuals (not counting 22 contractors) did not meet the deadline

required by the Chief of Staff’s directive or White House guidelines. White

House officials said that in all of these cases, the situation was resolved

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

promptly after discovery and the SF-86 was then submitted in a timely

matter, with no one placed on leave without pay.

Three of 471 noncontractor employees who entered on duty prior to

March 1, 1994, did not complete the SF-86 by March 18, 1994, as required.

All 3 signed the SF-86 by March 30, 1994, but took 434 days, 432 days, and

35 days to do so from the date they entered on duty.

Employees who entered on duty between March 1, 1994, and March 14,

1994, were required to complete the SF-86 by March 31, 1994. Two of six

employees did not meet this requirement. Both signed the SF-86 by

April 25, 1994. These two individuals took an average of 43 days from the

date they entered on duty to complete the SF-86.

Employees who entered on duty after March 14, 1994, were required to

complete the SF-86 within 30 days of the date entered on duty. Six of 73

employees did not meet this requirement.

• Five of the six were from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and

according to White House officials, the five cases involved administrative

error. These five people signed their SF-86 an average of 60 days after

entering on duty.

• Another entered on duty on May 16, 1994, and signed the SF-86 on June 28,

1994, an interval of 43 days. According to White House officials, it was

known at the time of entry that this person was leaving White House

employment. The person separated on October 2, 1994.

With the passage of Public Law 103-329 in September 1994, Congress

required that employees of the Executive Office of the President complete

the SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty or by October 31, 1994,

whichever occurred later. None of the cases in our database are covered

by this provision of the law. White House officials told us that they have

complied with this provision.

Executive Office of

the President

Indicators

We analyzed two key event intervals that are the responsibility of the

Executive Office of the President: (1) the time between when an SF-86 is

signed and the Executive Office of the President forwards it to the FBI for a

background investigation and (2) the time between when the FBI

completes a background investigation and the Executive Office of the

President recommends that a staff member receive a permanent pass.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

Table III.4 shows that the average number of days needed for the

Executive Office of the President to review submitted SF-86s for

correctness and completeness before forwarding them to the FBI

decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.4: Average Days From the

Date an Individual Signed an SF-86 to

the Date the Executive Office of the

President Forwarded the SF-86 to the

FBI

Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 38 37

1994 18 18

Overall average 33 32

In 1993, the Executive Office of the President’s review of SF-86s took over

100 days in 34 of 434 cases, and in 1994, it took over 100 days in only 2 of

155 cases. White House officials stated that the unfamiliarity of staff and

reviewing officials with the information requirements of the SF-86 caused

reviewing officials to request additional data, thus delaying the requests

for FBI investigations.

Table III.5 shows that the average number of days for the Executive Office

of the President to recommend approval of a permanent pass after

receiving the FBI’s investigative report decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.5: Average Days From the

Date the FBI Concluded the

Background Investigation to the Date

the Executive Office of the President

Recommended Approval of a

Permanent Pass

Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 174 175

1994 46 48

Overall average 127 125

During 1993, the Executive Office of the President took over 100 days to

recommend the approval of a permanent pass in 202 of 294 cases, whereas

in 1994, it took over 100 days in only 26 of 217 cases. According to White

House officials, the longer times were attributable to waiting for

information other than the background investigation, such as tax checks,

and the decrease from 1993 to 1994 resulted from correcting procedural

inefficiencies.

FBI Indicators Table III.6 shows that the average number of days needed by the FBI to

conduct a background investigation increased from 1993 to 1994.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

Table III.6: Average Days From the

Date the FBI Initiated a Background

Investigation to the Date the FBI

Concluded the Investigation

Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 56 56

1994 70 71

Overall average 59 59

In 1993, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 17 (4 percent) of 402

investigations. In 1994, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 18

(11 percent) of 159 investigations. The FBI’s goal of completing

investigations within 45 days of initiation was not met 66 percent of the

time in 1993 and 87 percent of the time in 1994. According to an FBI

official, the goal was changed in late 1994 to 60 days. We did not assess the

impact of the goal change because there were no records of investigations

started and completed during the last quarter of 1994.

An FBI official said background investigations exceeded the FBI’s goal for

the following reasons:

• The FBI has a limited investigative and administrative staff in the

background investigative area, and their overall caseload in that area

increased.

• FBI field personnel who conduct background investigations also have

numerous other investigative and administrative responsibilities.

• Forms submitted early in the period of our review were sometimes

incomplete.

• Individuals and documents were not always readily available.

• Obtaining information from overseas sources slowed the collection of

information.

• Issues and/or additional information was identified that needed to be

addressed.

• Expediting some investigations slowed the progress of others.

Secret Service

Indicators

Table III.7 shows that the average number of days needed for the Secret

Service to approve a permanent pass after the Executive Office of the

President recommended that a pass be issued decreased from 1993 to

1994.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

Table III.7: Average Days From the

Date of Executive Office of the

President Recommendation to Secret

Service Approval of a Permanent Pass

Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 29 31

1994 7 7

Overall Average 12 12

During 1993, the Secret Service took over 30 days to approve 34 of 115

passes, whereas in 1994, this occurred in 15 of 388 cases.

The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in part to the Executive

Office of the President not promptly sending pass requests to the Secret

Service and the 1994 average to the time needed to address questions

related to protective interest issues. We analyzed information provided by

the Secret Service for 1994 showing that it took the Secret Service an

average of 3 days to approve a permanent pass after receiving the pass

recommendation from the Executive Office of the President. This

information was not sufficiently detailed to verify the reasons for delay,

and similar data for 1993 were not available.

Drug Test Indicators All 572 noncontract employees included in the unadjusted database

reported for drug tests. Contractors are responsible for conducting their

employees’ drug tests, and we did not separately request the dates for

these tests. Table III.8 shows that the average number of days between

when the person entered on duty to when the drug test was taken

decreased from 1993 to 1994.

Table III.8: Average Days From the

Date Entered on Duty to the Date the

Drug Test Was Takena Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 24 29

1994 –49 –12

Overall average 10 23

aA negative number indicates that individuals, on average, took the drug test prior to entering on

duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in

negative numbers.)

The Executive Office of the President Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as

amended in December 1992, states that due to the large number of new

employees at the beginning of a new administration, it is impractical to

test all of them prior to their appointments. According to White House

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III 

Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals

officials, this meant that applicants were not required to take drug tests

prior to their appointments throughout much of 1993.

Table III.9 shows that in 1993, individuals typically were issued a

temporary pass prior to taking a drug test. The adjusted database shows

that individuals taking the drug test in 1994 on average did so prior to

obtaining a temporary pass.

Table III.9: Average Days From the

Date the Drug Test Was Taken to the

Date a Temporary Pass Was Issueda Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 –5 –3

1994 –17 3

Overall average –6 –1

aA negative number indicates that individuals, on average, were issued a temporary pass prior to

taking a drug test. (See above and app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different

order, resulting in negative numbers.)

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV 

Observations on Controls

White House and congressional actions have established process changes

and controls to improve the access pass and security clearance processes.

For the time intervals and offices we reviewed, with few exceptions, the

time intervals declined, and the procedures were adhered to. However, our

observations indicate a potential for strengthening controls in several

selected areas, particularly at the start of a new administration. The areas

related to renewing temporary passes, revoking passes after separation,

and granting security clearances. The scope of our work did not address

whether problems occurred as a result of the potential control

weaknesses. While we did not identify specific problems, we believe it is

appropriate to consider improving these controls.

Temporary Pass

Issuance Data

Table IV.1 shows that the average number of days needed for an individual

to be issued a temporary pass after entering on duty decreased from 1993

to 1994.

Table IV.1: Average Days From the

Date Entered on Duty to the Date a

Temporary Pass Was Issued Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 19 26

1994 –26a 20

Overall average 10 25

aThe individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, received a temporary pass 26 days

prior to entering on duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different

order, resulting in negative numbers.)

Temporary passes allow individuals access to the White House complex

while waiting for a permanent pass. Although, since March 14, 1994,

individuals should have completed the SF-86 (and other tasks) prior to

obtaining a temporary pass, some did not. Temporary passes are initially

issued for a period of 90 days and can be extended. A number of

extensions were granted. Individuals held these passes for an average of

341 days in 1993 and 110 days in 1994 before being approved for a

permanent pass.

SF-86 Often Not

Completed Prior to

Temporary Pass Issuance

Since March 14, 1994, an individual has been expected to have an SF-86

completed before receiving a temporary pass. Of the 439 individuals who

signed their SF-86 in 1993, 310 (71 percent) received a temporary pass prior

to signing the SF-86. White House officials told us that in the early days of

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV 

Observations on Controls

the administration individuals were not required to complete an SF-86

before receiving a temporary pass.

Our analysis of the database indicates that two noncontractors were

issued temporary passes after March 14, 1994, even though they had not

yet submitted an SF-86. White House officials said that these individuals

had both been interns and had a prior SF-86 on file, which had not been

reflected in the database. Ten contractor employees were also issued

temporary passes after March 14, 1994, even though they had not yet

submitted an SF-86. White House officials said that Office of

Administration policy at that time was to not process the SF-86 for

contractors until after they had concluded a probationary period. The

officials stated that this is no longer the policy.

Temporary Passes Were

Often Extended

Temporary passes are usually issued for 90 days but can be extended.

Table IV.2 shows the average time between issuance of the temporary pass

and approval for the permanent pass.

Table IV.2: Average Days From the

Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued to

the Date a Permanent Pass Was

Approved by the Secret Service

Year

Average number of

days—unadjusted data

Average number of

days—adjusted data

1993 341 343

1994 110 114

Overall average 293 294

In 1993, 361 of 398 individuals took 200 days or more to be approved for a

permanent pass, whereas in 1994, only 5 of 104 individuals receiving

temporary passes took 200 days or more to be approved for a permanent

pass. White House officials attributed the decrease from 1993 to 1994 to

changes in the processing procedures.

Our discussions with Secret Service officials and our analyses indicated

that during the longer processing times in 1993, the Service routinely

granted eight or more extensions to individuals for temporary passes as

requested by the Executive Office of the President. In commenting on a

draft of this report, Secret Service officials stated that during the initial

transitions of administrations it was normal to have more frequent

extensions.

In addition, as of December 13, 1994, the cutoff date for our analysis, 

22 individuals, including 10 contractors, were employed but had not been

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV 

Observations on Controls

approved for a permanent pass. Two had not received a temporary pass,

and the other 20 held a temporary pass an average of 132 days, as of the

cutoff date. Of 15 who held temporary passes more than 90 days,

• 3 had permanent passes recommended by the Executive Office of the

President but not yet approved by the Secret Service and had waited 

37 days on average since the Executive Office of the President

recommendation;

• 3 had background investigations completed for an average of 58 days since

the completion; and

• 9 were still undergoing their background investigations for an average of

57 days.

Given the potential for repeated temporary pass extensions, consideration

should be given to strengthening controls in this area.

Data Related to Staff

Separations

Out of the database of 638 records, 188 (29 percent) indicate that the

individuals have separated from the office or contractor position shown in

the database. The individuals left at various stages in the process of

obtaining a permanent pass or security clearance. Once an individual

leaves Executive Office of the President employment, according to White

House officials, there are procedures to ensure that the individual turns in

the pass. However, the Secret Service has no means of verifying an

individual’s employment status and continued need for a permanent pass.

Attention to stengthening controls in this area would be appropriate. We

examined documents related to these procedures, but did not

independently verify whether permanent passes were voided or returned

in these cases.

Individuals Have Left at

Various Stages of the

Access Pass and Security

Clearance Process

Of the 188 records that indicate separation, 7 individuals moved from one

office within the Executive Office of the President to another office. Four

additional records concern two individuals who moved from one office

within the Executive Office of the President to another office, and then left

the second office. Thus, both individuals show two departure dates in the

database. The other 177 records are for people who left the Executive

Office of the President.

All seven individuals who are now with a second office within the

Executive Office of the President were approved for a permanent pass

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV 

Observations on Controls

either with the first office or the second office. All received a temporary

pass.

Of the two individuals who worked for and separated from two offices,

one was approved for a permanent pass while with the second office. The

other individual had a background investigation conducted while at the

second office and left this position 13 days after the background

investigation was completed. A permanent pass has not been

recommended or approved. Both individuals received a temporary pass.

Of the other 177 people who separated from the Executive Office of the

President,

• 67 were approved by the Secret Service for a permanent pass;

• 17 were recommended by the Executive Office of the President for a

permanent pass, which was never approved by the Secret Service;

• 43 had a completed background investigation, but were never

recommended for a permanent pass;

• 21 had a background investigation initiated, but never completed; and

• 29 separated without the FBI initiating a background investigation.

Concerning this data, White House officials said that in the overwhelming

majority of instances, the departure was unrelated to the pass process.

The officials also said that, for example, the fact that an individual left

after the background investigation was completed, but before a

recommendation for a pass was made does not suggest that something in

the background investigation precipitated the departure. The officials said

that similarly, the fact that an individual departed after the Executive

Office of the President recommended issuance of a pass, but before the

Secret Service approved the pass does not imply that the individual left

because the Secret Service declined to approve the pass. The officials

concluded by saying that as a general proposition, a detailed exposition of

the relationship between departure dates and various steps in the pass

process suggests a correlation that bears no relationship with reality.

Sixty-seven people were approved for a permanent pass.

• Seven were approved an average of 186 days after they had departed. In

five of these cases, according to White House officials, the person went to

another government agency but continued to need access to the White

House. Another case involves a person who came back to the White House

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV 

Observations on Controls

as a detailee from another agency. We do not have information on the

seventh person.

• Sixty left an average of 125 days after a permanent pass had been

approved by the Secret Service. We do not have information on how many

returned the pass after departure.

Seventeen people had a permanent pass recommended but never

approved.

• Six had a permanent pass recommended after they left. One person,

according to White House officials, left the Office of Policy Development

but was expected to return in some capacity. We do not have information

on the other five individuals. These six individuals separated an average of

44 days before the permanent pass was recommended.

• Eleven left an average of 93 days after a permanent pass had been

recommended.

The FBI completed the background investigation for 43 people who never

had a permanent pass recommended.

• Five had an FBI background investigation initiated and completed after

they departed. White House officials told us that the background

investigation was done in three cases because the individuals needed a

pass in some other capacity—one as a White House detailee, one as a

White House volunteer, and one as an employee of another government

agency. We do not have information on the other two individuals. These

five individuals left an average of 164 days before the background

investigation had been completed.

• Thirty-three departed an average of 106 days after a background

investigation had been completed.

• Five had a background investigation initiated before they departed and

completed after they departed. These individuals left an average of 23 days

before the completion of the background investigation.

Out of the 177 who separated, 171 had temporary passes at the time of

separation and had held the temporary pass for an average of 266 days

prior to departure. Four individuals received temporary passes an average

of 36 days after their separation, and two never received a temporary pass.

Permanent Pass

Revocation Procedure

According to a Secret Service official, the agency depends on each office

of the Executive Office of the President to notify the Service if an

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV 

Observations on Controls

individual is no longer employed and thus no longer needs a permanent

pass. Without this notification, the Secret Service has no way of knowing

who continues to need access.

White House officials stated that they maintain a checkout procedure for

employees who leave Executive Office of the President employment, and

unless the White House allows continued access, the employee must

surrender his or her access pass upon separation. The White House

provided us with a document supporting these procedures. According to a

White House official, this process is checked by regular reviews of

attrition and accession lists of White House pass holders. The official also

said that White House pass holder lists are frequently updated.

Access to Classified

Security Information

The White House allows employees with permanent White House passes

and a need-to-know to have access to classified information up to the top

secret level. Generally, executive branch agencies are required by

executive order to follow uniform governmentwide procedures and apply

specific criteria when granting security clearances to individuals.

Executive branch agencies grant security clearances under Executive

Order 10450, as amended, and at the time of our review, handled classified

data under Executive Order 12356, which was revoked and replaced by

Executive Order 12958 on April 17, 1995.1

 According to White House

officials, the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, and the

Office of Policy Development are not subject to the requirements of

Executive Order 10450 but nevertheless use the same procedures and

criteria to issue the passes that give employees access to classified

information on a need-to-know basis.

As of December 1994, 381 of 638 records in the database indicate that the

person had been authorized access to classified information. These

included 359 staff assigned to the White House Office, the Office of the

Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development who have access to

classified information on a need-to-know basis by holding a permanent

White House pass. An additional 22 records indicate staff assigned to the

Office of Administration and the Office of National Drug Control Policy

who have security clearances granted under governmentwide procedures.

The first of the permanent White House passes was not approved until

September 30, 1993, and the first of the 22 Office of Administration and

1

These orders establish uniform requirements for personnel security programs in the federal

government. A security clearance is a certification that an individual who requires access to

information classified at a certain level has been found eligible and may be permitted access to

classified information.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV 

Observations on Controls

Office of National Drug Control Policy security clearances was not granted

until June 22, 1993.2

 We requested data on how the offices conducted

business during these 8- and 5-month periods before security clearances

were granted. White House officials stated that interim clearances were

provided to about two dozen senior staff during this time. The officials

further stated that, for reasons of confidentiality, data on the specific

cases was not provided to us. They also said that the overwhelming

majority of the classified work done in the Executive Office of the

President is done by staff of the National Security Council, which is not

one of the offices represented in the data we analyzed.

Given that future administrations may face similar circumstances during

the first few months in office, consideration should be given to

strengthening controls in this area.

2

In addition, one individual had a clearance at the time entered on duty.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix V 

Comments From the Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Now on p. 25.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

James F. Wiggins, Associate Director

Uldis Adamsons, Assistant Director

David J. Hand, Evaluator-in-Charge

R. Bruce Brown, Senior Evaluator

Elizabeth G. Mead, Senior Evaluator

Office of the General

Counsel

Mark C. Speight, Senior Attorney

(709077) Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
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