NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. ROBERT WILLIAM KNOPPING,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 50322
D.C. No. 3:18

- cr - 04451

- LAB

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 18, 2021 * *
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges

. Robert William Knopping appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 90

- month sentence and several conditions of supervised release imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction for importation of methamphetamine , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 952, 960 . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 24 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 50322

§ 1291 . W e affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand

. Knopping first contends that , when calculating his Guidelines range, the district court erred by declining to reduce his offense level by a third point for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)

. We revi ew the district
court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Herrera , 974 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2020)

. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Knopping’s failure to appear at the initial sentencing and subsequent decision to abscond for sever al months were
inconsistent with complete acceptance of responsibility

. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6 (“The timeliness of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is a
consideration under both subsections [of the Guideline] , and is context specific. ” );
United States v. Tuan Ngoc Luong , 965 F.3d 973, 991 (9th Cir. 2020) ( acceptance of responsibility adjustment turns on whether defendant expressed “personal contrition” and “a genuine acceptance of responsibility for his actions” (internal quotation mark s o mitted))

. 1 Though not necessary to our analysis, we also note that the district court granted a substantial downward variance of 172 months from the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range and fully explained why a greater

1 Thoug h the district court did not impose it, the government recommended at sentencing that , because Knopping absconded, he should receive a two

- level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice. Conduct resulting in an obstruction of justice enhancement “ordi narily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4.3 19

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variance was not warranted.
K nopping also contends that the written judgment’s inclusion of the mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release conflicts with the district
court’s oral pronouncement o f sentence, which did not include these conditions

. However, i mposition of mandatory and standard conditions is “implicit in an oral sentence imposing supervised release.” United States v. Napier , 463 F.3d 1040,
1043 (9th Cir. 2006)

. Contrary to Knopping’s argument, nothing in Napier requires the district court to state at sentencing that it will be imposing the standard
conditions. See id. Finally, Knopping contends that four of the special conditions in the written judgment contain additional restrictions that must be stricken because they were not included in th e oral pronouncement. We agree as to three of the conditions. Specifically, the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence did not include: (1) the requirement in Special Condition 1 that Knopping “ co mply with both United States and Mexican immigra tion law s; ” (2) the requirements in Special Condition 2 that Knopping “ [ a ] llow for reciprocal release of information between the probation officer and the treatment provider , ” and “[m] ay be required to
contribute to the costs of servi ces rendered in an amount to be determined by the probation officer, based on ability to pay ; ” and ( 3) the requirement in Special Condition 5 that Knopping “warn any other residents that the premises may be4 19

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subject to searches pursuant to this condition

. ” We therefore vacate t he judgment
and remand so the district court can enter a corrected written jud gment that does not contain the foregoing clauses

. See United States v. Jones , 696 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2012 ). We disagree that the language of Special Condition 3 in the written judgment conflicts with the court’s oral pronouncement. Rather, t he phrase “ or in which you have an interest ” clarifies what it means for Knopping to ow n a vehicle for the purposes of reporting it to his probation officer

. See Napie r , 463 F.3d at 1043 (later written sentence controls when it “merely clarifies an ambiguity in the oral pronouncement”). AFFIRMED in part , VACATED in part, and REMANDED.