NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT

PB2001-916202

NTSB/HAR-01/02

COLLISION BETWEEN METROLINK TRAIN 901 AND

MERCURY TRANSPORTATION, INC., TRACTOR-COMBINATION

VEHICLE AT HIGHWAY-RAILROAD GRADE CROSSING

IN GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA

ON JANUARY 28, 2000

7410

Highway Accident Report

Collision Between Metrolink Train 901 and Mercury 

Transportation, Inc., Tractor-Combination Vehicle 

at Highway-Railroad Grade Crossing

in Glendale, California

January 28, 2000

NTSB/HAR-01/02

PB2001-916202 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7410 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted November 27, 2001 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2001. Collision Between Metrolink Train 901 and Mercury

Transportation, Inc., Tractor-Combination Vehicle at Highway-Railroad Grade Crossing in Glendale,

California, on January 28, 2000. Highway Accident Report. NTSB/HAR-01/02. Washington, DC.

Abstract: About 5:56 a.m. on January 28, 2000, in Glendale, California, a tractor-combination vehicle was

transporting an oil refinery condenser unit. The vehicle was attempting to traverse a highway-railroad

grade crossing when it became lodged on the railroad tracks. A northbound commuter train collided with

the vehicle. The engineer, conductor, and four passengers received minor injuries. Total damages were

estimated to be over $2 million.

The major safety issues discussed in this report were the appropriateness of the actions of the truckdriver,

pilot car drivers, and police escorts; the weaknesses in the planning, coordination, and execution of this

oversize/overweight movement; pilot car driver and truckdriver fatigue; and the lack of low-clearance

warning signs.

As a result of this accident investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued

recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration;

city of Glendale, California; American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials;

American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators; Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance;

International Association of Chiefs of Police; National Sheriffsí Association; Specialized Carriers and

Rigging Association; California Professional Escort Car Association; Texas Pilot Car Association; and

United Safety Car Association. 

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2001-916202 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Truck Events Preceding the Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Train Events Preceding the Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Truck Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Train Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Truckdriver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Pilot Car Driversí Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Motor Carrier Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Train Crew Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Railroad Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Accident Site Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Roadway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Grade Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Toxicological Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Accident Crossing Warning Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Other Grade Crossings on Permitted Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Heavy Hauling Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Permit Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

California Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Permit Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Pilot Car Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Pilot Car Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Pilot Car Driver Certification Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Pilot Car and Police Escort Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

California Highway Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Other Accidents Involving Permitted Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Accident Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

The Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Preparation and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

Grade Crossing Hazard Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Low-Clearance Warning Grade Crossing Sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Oversize/Overweight Vehicle Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Truckdriver Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Pilot Car Driver Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Police Escort Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Permitting Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

B: Terms Relating to Oversize/Overweight Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

C: California Department of Transportation Office of Truck Services

Summary of Major Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

D: California Highway Patrol Teams 1 and 2 Escort Officersí

On-Duty Time for the 3 Days Prior to the Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO -- American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

Caltrans -- California Department of Transportation

CDL -- commercial driverís license

CDLIS -- Commercial Driverís License Information System

CFR -- Code of Federal Regulations

CHP -- California Highway Patrol

DPS -- Department of Public Safety

FHWA -- Federal Highway Administration

Mercury -- Mercury Transportation, Inc. 

WASHTO -- Western Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
vi Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On January 28, 2000, about 5:56 a.m. in Glendale, California, a tractorcombination vehicle, operated by Mercury Transportation, Inc., was transporting an oil

refinery condenser unit. The vehicle missed a turn in its planned route, traversed a

highway-railroad grade crossing, turned around, and was attempting to retraverse the

crossing when it became lodged on the railroad tracks. About 90 seconds later, northbound

Metrolink commuter train 901, operated by the Southern California Regional Rail

Authority, collided with the vehicle. The engineer, conductor, and four passengers

received minor injuries. Total damages were estimated to be over $2 million.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the collision of the Metrolink passenger train with the tractor-combination vehicle was (1)

inadequate preparation and route planning for the movement; (2) poor coordination of the

movement among the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, police escort, and permitting

authorities; and (3) a lack of recognition of the potential hazard caused by the accident

vehicle at the grade crossing. Contributing to the accident was the fatigue of the pilot car

drivers and the truckdriver. 

The following major safety issues were identified in this accident: the

appropriateness of the actions of the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, and police escorts; the

weaknesses in the planning, coordination, and execution of this oversize/overweight

movement; pilot car driver and truckdriver fatigue; and the lack of low-clearance warning

signs.

As a result of this accident investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board

makes recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration; Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration; city of Glendale, California; American Association of State

Highway and Transportation Officials; American Association of Motor Vehicle

Administrators; Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance; International Association of Chiefs

of Police; National Sheriffsí Association; Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association;

California Professional Escort Car Association; Texas Pilot Car Association; and United

Safety Car Association. 
1 Highway Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

On January 28, 2000, about 5:56 a.m. (Pacific standard time) in Glendale,

California, a tractor-combination vehicle, operated by Mercury Transportation, Inc.,

(Mercury) was transporting an oil refinery condenser unit, manufactured by Toromont

Process Systems. The vehicle missed a turn in its planned route, traversed a highwayrailroad grade crossing, turned around, and was attempting to retraverse the crossing when

it became lodged on the railroad tracks. About 90 seconds later, westbound Metrolink

commuter train 901, operated by the Southern California Regional Rail Authority, collided

with the vehicle. (See figure 1.) The Metrolink train had been traveling about 70 mph at

the time of the collision. The engineer, conductor, and four passengers received minor

injuries.

The tractor-combination vehicle measured 135 feet long, 15 feet wide, and 18 feet

6 inches high with a ground clearance of approximately 6 inches (see figure 2); the gross

vehicle weight was 226,000 pounds.1

 (See appendix B for terms relating to

oversize/overweight loads.) The load, valued at $1.5 million, was being transported from

Figure 1. Final rest positions of train and vehicle. (Photograph source: Glendale, 

California, Police Department.)

1 A typical tractor-semitrailer is made up of a tractor (18 to 20 feet long) and a semitrailer (40 to 53

feet long), both 8 feet wide, which together weigh 80,000 pounds.
Factual Information 2 Highway Accident Report

Houston, Texas, to El Segundo, California, and possessed specialized moving permits

requiring escort vehicles. At the time of the accident, two private pilot vehicles and three

California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers were escorting the tractor-combination vehicle.

The Metrolink train had been bound from Los Angeles to Burbank, California.

Truck Events Preceding the Accident 

The transportation of this oversize/overweight load covered over 2,100 miles

through 4 States (see figure 3); involved 5 pilot car companies, 2 permit companies, the

permit issuing offices of 4 States, and in California, 12 local jurisdictions; and had been

under way for 22 days at the time of the accident. The following description of the trip is

segmented by State.

Texas (January 6 to 14, 2000)

According to Toromont Process Systems officials, the load was scheduled to begin

moving from Houston on January 6 with a verbal agreement between the company and

Mercury that the load was to be delivered as rapidly as possible.

On January 6 about 8:45 a.m., the truckdriver arrived to transport the load. He

stated that a tree had to be cut down before the vehicle could exit the Toromont Process

Systems facility. The convoy of vehicles consisted of two police units;2

 two private pilot

Figure 2. Photograph of the tractor-combination vehicle before the 

accident. (Photograph source: Mercury Transportation, Inc.)
Factual Information 3 Highway Accident Report

cars (one leading and one trailing) from different companies, Happyís Pilot Car Service

and L.P. Flag Car Company; and the transport vehicle. The convoy traveled about 51 miles

to Sealy, Texas, where the truckdriver determined that the load was unstable and parked

the vehicle. He then notified Townsend Transportation, the owner of the tractorcombination vehicle,3

 that the vehicle needed a set of outrigger wheels to make the load

more stable. The outrigger wheels were installed, and the Texas segment of the trip

resumed on January 10.

The truckdriver indicated that the convoy encountered subsequent problems with

delays on seven other occasions in Texas (see figure 4):

Sealy The load knocked down city hazard warning lights on a sign.

Wallis The convoy encountered a raised railroad grade crossing that

the truck could not traverse. They stopped for 3 hours until they

received approved rerouting.

2 The truckdriver and pilot car driver indicated that police in Houston and Las Cruces, New Mexico,

escorted the load; however, this information was not noted on the permits, and the National Transportation

Safety Board was not able to verify which police departments conducted the escorts.

Figure 3. Map indicating convoy route from Houston, Texas, to El Segundo, California.

3 Mercury leased the vehicle.

El Segundo
Factual Information 4 Highway Accident Report

San Antonio The convoy encountered a bridge with a height clearance lower

than the load height and required rerouting.

Castroville The load struck an overhead telephone line.

Clint The load struck a traffic light.

El Paso The convoy encountered overhead street signs with height

clearances lower than the load height. A bucket truck had to be

used to lift power lines to allow the load to pass through.

Unknown location4 The convoy encountered a right turn that the truck could not

negotiate and had to detour around.

New Mexico (January 14 to 24, 2000)

On January 14, the convoy entered New Mexico at Carlsbad, where the Port of

Entry officials checked the New Mexico State permit and found that it had expired and

had to be renewed.5

 The renewal required contacting the New Mexico Department of

4 The driver was unable to recall the exact location.

Figure 4. Map indicating convoy route through Texas. 

El Paso TEXAS

Carlsbad

Clint

NEW 

MEXICO

Castroville

San Antonio

Sealy Houston

Wallis
Factual Information 5 Highway Accident Report

Public Safety and Public Utilities to gain approval for another permit. The convoy also

had to arrange for a bucket truck to raise power and telephone lines along the trip route.

The convoy drove to El Paso, Texas, and waited for the new permit. 

On January 21, the convoy resumed the trip, leaving El Paso and entering New

Mexico near Las Cruces. The trip through New Mexico was along a southern route,

roughly parallel to Interstate Highway 10 through Deming and Lordsburg, New Mexico,

into Arizona. In Lordsburg, a pilot car from Billyís Pilot Car Company replaced the pilot

car from Happyís Pilot Car Service, and the truckdriver parked the truck at 4:15 p.m. on

January 22 until 9:45 a.m. on January 24. According to the truckdriver and pilot car

drivers, the trip through New Mexico was uneventful. (See figure 5.) 

Arizona (January 24 to 27, 2000)

On January 24, the vehicle entered the State on State Route 80 near Douglas,

Arizona, and traveled to the Sierra Vista (Arizona) Port of Entry, where it met officials

from the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS). The Arizona permit specified a DPS

5 New Mexico has a fixed Port of Entry system, under which commercial vehicles entering the State,

including special moving permitted vehicles, are checked for required licensing, equipment, and fuel tax

documents.

Figure 5. Map indicating convoy route through New Mexico. 

N E W M E X I C O

Lordsburg

Deming Las Cruces

Carlsbad

TEXAS

El Paso
Factual Information 6 Highway Accident Report

escort from Sierra Vista through Nogales and to Tucson, Arizona, but not through the

remainder of the State. The trip route took the convoy on Interstate Highway 8 from Sierra

Vista to Tucson to Yuma, Arizona, and north on U.S. 95 to Quartzsite, Arizona.

At 1:30 p.m. on January 26, the convoy arrived in Quartzsite, where they

encountered DPS officers who told them that a recreational vehicle festival was occurring

in Quartzsite and that they would have to be escorted through the city because of the

traffic conditions. The DPS officers added that another load was ahead of them and that

they would have to wait.6 They parked on the shoulder of the two-lane roadway until

about 5:00 p.m. when the officers returned. The officers told the truckdriver that they

would be unable to escort the load through Quartzsite that day; the load remained parked

on the side of the road all night. The truckdriver said he went to a truck stop in Quartzsite

to obtain faxed copies of the California permits.

The truckdriver and the rear pilot car driver said they awoke about 7:30 a.m. on

January 27. The public safety officers did not come back, and the convoy drove through

Quartzsite without them. About 9:00 a.m., the convoy arrived at the California-Arizona

border, where the truckdriver acquired the last of the faxed California permits from

Mercury at a nearby truck stop. (See figure 6.) 

6 The vehicle and load ahead of them required an Arizona DPS escort per the conditions of the permit.

Figure 6. Map indicating convoy route through Arizona. 

Blythe

Quartsite

Yuma

Phoenix

Tucson

Sierra Vista

Douglas

A R I Z O N A

Nogales
Factual Information 7 Highway Accident Report

California (January 27 to 28, 2000)

A driver from Dickís Pilot Car Service (the lead pilot car driver) had driven from

San Bernardino to Blythe, California, during the night7

 and met with CHP officers at the

California-Arizona border at 6:00 a.m. (Pacific standard time) on January 27.8

 About 8:00

a.m., they met the truck and the rear pilot car at the Arizona truck scale facility about 1

mile from the border. While the truckdriver obtained the permits, the CHP officers

examined the vehicle and load for proper securement and lighting. This check was a walkaround inspection and did not include matters such as brake adjustment, driverís logbook

(record-of-duty status), or measurement of the load to ensure compliance with the permit.

The CHP officers explained that they used their experience in estimating the dimensions

of the load for compliance and did not check the driverís logbook because they believed

that he had rested the day before in Quartzsite and had received the required 8 hours of

rest before beginning this trip.

The CHP officers had a copy of the California Department of Transportation

(Caltrans) permit and the lead pilot car driver had copies of the permits supplied by West

Coast Services,9

 which included permit applications for Glendale and Hawthorne,

California. The CHP officers examined the permits for routing only. They did not notice

that the Glendale paperwork was not a permit but an application only. The Hawthorne

paperwork read ìAnnual on Fileî in the permit number box, and they believed it to be a

valid permit. The lead pilot car driver told investigators that the night before the trip he

had created a master list of the designated routes in California by transcribing them from

the various permits onto a handwritten sheet of paper.

The movement of the convoy began about 8:30 a.m., and the convoy traveled

several secondary routes from Blythe to Adelanto, California, through mostly desert area

that was sparsely populated. Communication between vehicles was accomplished using

CB and car-to-car CHP radios. Near Victorville, California, the convoy drove past a

roadway10 onto which it should have turned. After driving one block, the convoy realized

the error and turned around. The convoy arrived in Adelanto about 5:00 p.m., and the CHP

officers from Blythe11 departed. (See figure 7.)

The truckdriver went to a truck stop, where he fueled the truck, ate, showered, and

contacted the company. He returned to the load about 8:30 p.m. and was rigging the

vehicle with lights for the nighttime move when, about 9:00 p.m., three CHP officers from

the Inland Division12 arrived. (Neither the truckdriver nor the pilot car drivers received

any sleep during this stop.) The Inland Division CHP officers examined the permits.

Again the examination was for routing and not for permit verification. None of the CHP

7 The pilot car driver said that he slept at home for 7 to 8 hours before the trip.

8 The time to drive from San Bernardino to Blythe is between 3 and 3 1⁄2 hours.

9 A private permit company hired by Mercury to obtain the California permits.

10 The name of the roadway had been changed from Air Base Road, which was the name on the permit,

to Air Express Way.

11 The CHP officers from Blythe are referred to as CHP team 1.

12 The CHP officers from the Inland Division are referred to as CHP team 2.
Factual Information 8 Highway Accident Report

officers had copies of the moving permits; however, they indicated that they were familiar

with the routes taken by oversized loads in their area. The officer-in-charge said that he

relied on the lead pilot car driver to ensure that the convoy stayed on the correct routes.

The truckdriver, who had been driving nearly 10 hours when he arrived at

Adelanto, said that he talked with the CHP officer-in-charge about his hours of service; he

told the officer-in-charge that he was almost out of hours13 and that they could not travel

very far. The truckdriver said the officer-in-charge told him, ìI guess we will not get very

far.î The truckdriver also indicated that his hours of service were not discussed further

throughout the remainder of the trip. According to the officer-in-charge and another

officer who was standing nearby while the two conversed, the truckdriverís hours of

Figure 7. Map indicating convoy route through California.

13 The current hours-of-service rules permit a commercial driver to drive 10 hours before resting 8

hours.

CALIFORNIA

Victorville

Blythe

Adelanto

Glendale El Segundo
Factual Information 9 Highway Accident Report

service were not discussed. According to the officer-in-charge, he was unaware of the time

the vehicle arrived in Adelanto, and he assumed the truckdriver had received sufficient

rest. The CHP officers conducted a walk-around inspection of the vehicle and load, and

the convoy departed Adelanto about 9:30 p.m.

From Adelanto, the Caltrans permit routed the convoy southbound on Interstate

Highway 15 to westbound Highway 138 to westbound Highway 18. Two weeks earlier the

officer-in-charge had escorted another permit load through this area. The earlier permit

had routed that load out of Adelanto westbound on Highway 18 to Highway 138 into Los

Angeles County. The officer-in-charge indicated that when he read the route approved by

Caltrans for the accident load, he thought it strange but relied on the Caltrans approval

process. The convoy traveled the designated route and as it made the turn from

southbound Interstate Highway 15 onto Highway 138, the bottom of the semitrailer

scraped the roadway. On Highway 138, approximately 1/3 mile west of Interstate

Highway 15, about 11:00 p.m., it approached a railroad bridge that had inadequate

clearance.

The CHP officer-in-charge ordered the vehicle to turn around and return to

Adelanto. He went to the CHP Cajon Pass scale facility, about 2 miles away, and phoned

the Caltrans 24-hour emergency number for permit routing to obtain a route variance.

After business hours, the 24-hour number connects to a pager for an on-call official. The

officer-in-charge said that a page response in these circumstances usually came within

5 minutes. He waited about 10 minutes and instructed the CHP scale officers to notify him

via radio if the Caltrans official called. (CHP reported that Caltrans returned the page at

2:30 a.m., after the convoy was well within Los Angeles County.) The CHP officer-incharge then authorized the convoy move from Adelanto west on Highway 18. The route

led the convoy west on Highway 18 to Highway 138, to Pearblossom Highway, and to

Sierra Highway near Palmdale, California, in Los Angeles County. En route the lead pilot

car driver missed a turn around a bridge and another turn down a dirt roadway.

The Los Angeles County permit required a Los Angeles County Department of

Public Works escort, which was to meet the vehicle at the county line. The escort expected

the vehicle to arrive about 11:30 p.m., but it did not arrive until about 1:30 a.m. on January

28. (While traveling southbound on Sierra Highway, the lead pilot car driver had missed a

bypass around a low bridge, and the convoy had to turn around.) The county escort and the

CHP discussed the county and Los Angeles city permit curfew of 5:00 a.m., which meant

the load would be prohibited from further movement after 5:00 a.m. The county escort

said he stayed with the vehicle until about 3:45 a.m. when the convoy arrived at the Los

Angeles city limit. According to the CHP officer-in-charge, the convoy reached the Los

Angeles city limit about 4:20 a.m. Upon reaching the Los Angeles city limit, the county

escort said, ìyouíre clear nowî; the CHP officer-in-charge understood this statement to

mean that he was clear to continue all the way to El Segundo.14

The Los Angeles city permit required a city department of public works escort.

The city escort indicated that he had anticipated the vehicle to arrive about 1:00 a.m. at the

14 The CHP officer-in-charge said he was not familiar with the curfews imposed by any jurisdiction.
Factual Information 10 Highway Accident Report

city limits near the intersection of Sierra Highway and Foothill Boulevard. The city escort

said that he waited from 12:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m., and when the load did not arrive, he went

home. A city escort was required as a condition of the city permit, and when the vehicle

continued into the city without the escort, it was in violation of the terms and conditions of

the permit. The CHP officer-in-charge indicated that he was unaware of this requirement.

The vehicle continued south on several major streets through Los Angeles and

entered Burbank traveling east on Glenoaks Boulevard. The Burbank permit did not

require a city escort. The vehicle continued east on Glenoaks Boulevard into Glendale.

Although West Coast Services had applied for a permit from Glendale, one had not been

issued because of missing insurance information from the carrier.

The CHP officer-in-charge said that he was fairly familiar with the route taken

until the convoy entered Glendale. He said he was less familiar with these streets and

relied on the lead pilot car driver to take the correct route, although he was suspicious of

the pilot car driverís abilities since he had made several previous routing errors. The route

on the permit application to Glendale specified travel east on Glenoaks Boulevard, south

on Grandview Avenue, east on San Fernando Road, and south on Fletcher Drive. (See

figure 8.) When the lead pilot car reached the intersection of Glenoaks Boulevard and

Grandview Avenue, he continued east on Glenoaks Boulevard, failing to make the correct

turn. The lead CHP officers notified him that he had missed the turn, and he went to the

next intersection and turned around. By this time, the first CHP units and the truck had

made the correct turn. The pilot car driver returned and drove ahead of the other vehicles

on Grandview Avenue as they approached San Fernando Road.

The pilot car driver had transcribed the route incorrectly on his handwritten sheet

and had not recorded the turn from Grandview Avenue onto San Fernando Road. As a

result, he told the CHP officers and the truckdriver that they were looking for Fletcher

Drive as the next turn.

The CHP officers entered the intersection of San Fernando Road and Grandview

Avenue and stopped westbound and eastbound traffic to allow the truck to go safely

through the intersection. The lead pilot car driver told the investigating police15 that he

heard the truck making a sound like it had ìbottomed outî when it first went over San

Fernando Road.

Grandview Avenue continued over a set of two Metrolink railroad tracks at an

active highway-railroad grade crossing. The traffic control at the grade crossing consisted

of pavement markings, signs, lights, bells, and gates. As the vehicle crossed over the

tracks, the CHP officer-in-charge noticed that the vehicle scraped the surface of the grade

crossing. He said he believed that this was not an unusual occurrence for a load of this size

and ground clearance. The truckdriver said he did not feel the vehicle scrape when it went

across the grade crossing. The time was approximately 5:15 a.m.

15 During a January 28, 2000, interview conducted by the Glendale Police Department.
Factual Information 11 Highway Accident Report

After crossing the railroad tracks, the lead pilot car driver saw that the street came

to a dead end 2 blocks from the grade crossing. He stated that he realized then that he had

made a mistake and stopped. The three CHP officers, both pilot car drivers, and the

truckdriver stopped and exited their vehicles; together they examined a map to determine

the best route of egress and return to the permit route. They found that the best route was

to go around the block, eastbound on Flower Street (curved to the north), to westbound on

Airway Street, and back to Grandview Avenue; the convoy could then turn east on San

Fernando Road. After the lead pilot car and one CHP officer drove the route to assess its

safety, the convoy returned to northbound Grandview Avenue. (See figure 8.) Upon

reaching Grandview Avenue, the convoy encountered an eastbound Metrolink commuter

train at the grade crossing and waited for the train to pass. The lead pilot car and two lead

CHP escort units then entered the intersection. The lead pilot car turned east on San

Fernando Road, while one CHP unit blocked westbound traffic and the other CHP unit

blocked eastbound traffic.

The truck began to cross the railroad tracks, and the rear section of the vehicle

became lodged on the tracks. At this point, no one except the truckdriver realized the

vehicle was stuck. The truckdriver exited the tractor and went to the hydraulic controls on

the left side of the vehicle to raise it off the tracks. The rear pilot car driver moved up to

the right rear of the vehicle to determine why the truck was not moving. The CHP officerFigure 8. Map indicating convoy route through section of Glendale.

Thompson Ave

Raymond Ave

Western Ave

Justin Ave

Grover Ave

Sonora Ave

Davis Ave

Rosedale Ave

Newby St

Willard Ave

San Fernando Rd

5th St

Air Way

Flower St

Lake St

Fairfield St

Randall St

Garden St

Blossom St

Aristo St

Truftt St

Grand Central Ave

Hazel St

Circle Seven Dr

Grendview Ave

Sepulveda

Bruce Ave

Highland Ave

Virginia Ave

Hillcrest Ave

Cleveland Rd

Idlewood Rd

Graynold Ave

Norton Ave

Alma St

Tononi St

Olmsted Dr

N. Kenneth Rd

Glenwood Rd

South St

Palm Dr

W Dryden St

W Glenoaks Blvd

Arden Ave

Kellogg Ave

Patterson A

Omar St

ve

Burchett St

Faircourt Ln

Fairmont Ave

Gr

Fairmont Ave ange St

Cutter St

Sperry St West Glendale

Salem St

San Fernando Rd

Concord St State St

Chester St

N Zoo Dr

Grendview

Memorial Park

Pelanconi Park

Grandview Ave

W. Glenoaks Blvd

Ruberta Ave

Zoo Dr

Riverside Dr

Zoo Dr 134

Doran St

Western Heriatage Dr

W Doran St W Doran St

134

5

0 300m

900ft
Factual Information 12 Highway Accident Report

in-charge, who was the rear CHP unit at the time, began calling out for the truckdriver to

move the truck off the tracks, not realizing the vehicle was lodged on the crossing.

The railroad warning devices started to activate. Witnesses estimated that from the

time the vehicle was initially stuck (stopped) on the tracks to the activation of the warning

devices was less than 60 seconds. When the warning devices activated, several events

happened at once. One CHP officer began to call on the CB radio for the truckdriver to get

the truck off the tracks, believing the driver was still in the tractor. She did this several

times until she saw the truckdriver running back toward the tractor from somewhere on

the left side of the vehicle. The CHP officer-in-charge began to yell for the truckdriver to

move the truck off the tracks. The rear pilot car driver began to call for the truckdriver to

get the vehicle off the tracks. (See figure 9.)

The truckdriver, seeing the approaching westbound train, ran back to the tractor

and began to drive forward. He was able to move the tractor forward a few inches when

the train struck the load. Two CHP officers said they saw the truck moving forward before

the collision. The truckdriver said he was just starting to move off the tracks when the

train hit the vehicle. The impact broke the semitrailer and rear ìjeepî16 off the leading

jeep. The train propelled the rear jeep about 101 feet west of the crossing where it came to

rest along the south side of the tracks. The train carried the load about 1,100 feet west on

Figure 9. Diagram of accident site.

16 The term jeep denotes various configurations of long-frame and short-frame dollies when they are

combined to accommodate the weight of a load. A jeep dolly unit is usually positioned at each end of the

cargo bed.

North RAIL

CROSSING ROAD

RAIL

CROSSING ROAD

RR R R

STOPSTOPSTOP

R R R R RR

Scalein Feet

0 40 80

20 60 100

Source: California Highway Patrol

Air Way

GrandviewAvenue

SanFernando Road

Grandview Avenue
Factual Information 13 Highway Accident Report

the tracks before coming to a stop on the tracks. (See figure 10.) Witnesses estimated the

total time from the truck stopping on the tracks to impact was less than 90 seconds.

Train Events Preceding the Accident17

The train operating crew, consisting of the locomotive engineer and the conductor,

went on duty at Taylor Yard in Glendale at 4:25 a.m. They operated the commuter train

without passengers to Los Angeles Union Station. Once the train arrived at the station, the

crew changed operating ends of the train, loaded passengers, and prepared for departure.

At 5:42 a.m., the engineer informed the train dispatcher that train 901 was ready to depart

Figure 10. Aerial view of accident site. (Photograph source: Glendale, California, 

Police Department.)

17 A Safety Board railroad accident investigator interviewed both the engineer and the conductor on

April 3, 2000.
Factual Information 14 Highway Accident Report

on time; it left the station at 5:43 a.m. During the departure from the station, the engineer

performed a running air brake test. The engineer stated that the test did not reveal any

problems with the braking system. Further, she stated that the brakes worked properly

during the trip from Los Angeles Union Station to Glendale, the first passenger stop.

At the Glendale station, about 10 passengers exited, and no one boarded train 901.

Moments after departing the station, train 901 passed an opposing train on the opposite

track. Before the Grandview Avenue crossing, the train passed a wayside detector at

milepost 7.8 that announced no defect was detected on the train and that the train speed

was 76 mph. As the train rounded a slight left-hand curve, the engineer said that the

crossing became fully visible and she saw a large object on the tracks. She sounded the

train whistle as a warning. As the train approached the crossing, the engineer determined

that the train was going to strike the object. About 1,000 feet18 before the crossing, the

engineer applied the emergency brakes on the train.

The engineer said that she ìthrew herself to the floorî to avoid possible personal

injury during the inevitable collision. Once the train had stopped, the engineer radioed an

emergency message to southbound commuter Metrolink train 100 on the opposing track.

She recalled that she normally passed train 100 daily at this location on the adjacent track.

As the trailer was shoved in front of her locomotive, she knew that it was obstructing the

adjacent southbound track. She told the train 100 engineer ìto stop his train immediately.î

The other engineer heard this instruction and stopped his train 50 feet from the

obstruction.

Emergency Response

Immediately after the collision, the CHP officer-in-charge radioed his dispatch

officer about the accident. One of two Glendale police officers who were in the area and

witnessed the collision immediately radioed the Glendale dispatcher about the collision.

The Glendale Fire Department records19 indicate that a citizen notified the fire

department of the accident at 5:57 a.m. The department dispatched 3 fire engines, 2

emergency medical ambulances, 2 pump trucks, 2 other rescue vehicles, and 21

firefighters. At 6:02 a. m., the first fire department vehicle, engine 27B, arrived on scene.

Upon arrival, the firefighters advised responding units that the accident site was located

1/4 mile north of where it had been initially reported. Initial radio reports from the scene to

the communications center indicated that ìthe front of the train was wrapped in a large

metal structure that did not appear to be a semi [tractor trailer].î (See figure 11.)

18 Sand was applied when the brakes were placed in emergency; signs of sand were noted on the rail

955 feet before the crossing.

19 The Glendale Fire Department Field Incident Report No. 00-1149 provided information regarding the

emergency response, as well as the hazard assessment, multiagency and emergency medical responses, and

establishment of a safe area. The report of the management of the incident by emergency response agencies

indicates the response was timely and adequate to meet the emergency situation.
Factual Information 15 Highway Accident Report

Engine 27B initially had difficulty reaching the accident site because two chain

link fences blocked the access route; these were later cut through by fire department

personnel. After making their way to the train, firefighters found several local industry

personnel assisting passengers away from the train. During the search of the train and

immediate area, truck 21 firefighters found exposed wires from the rail crossing gate,

notified Metrolink, and requested the power be turned off; Metrolink responded to the

request immediately.

The firefighters found the train engineer still in the locomotive and checked her for

injuries. They then asked whether she had ìshut down the engineî and notified the railroad

of the accident; she replied she had. The engine access door was jammed, and the engineer

was extricated from the engine by firefighters from truck 21. Firefighters from engine 27B

and truck 26 searched the train cars for injured passengers; about 10 minutes later, they

repeated the search to insure that all the injured had been located.

The emergency responders established a triage area for treating the passengers in a

parking lot adjacent to the railroad tracks at San Fernando Road. The two ambulances

were assigned to transport injured passengers to local medical facilities, and a third rescue

vehicle was based at the triage area to care for the injured. No passengers, train

crewmembers, or emergency response personnel required medical attention.

By 8:50 a.m., the emergency medical personnel and ambulances were released

from the scene. Engine 22 was assigned to remain on scene to provide fire protection

Figure 11. Postcollision view of condenser and train. (Photograph source: Glendale, California, 

Police Department.)
Factual Information 16 Highway Accident Report

during the wreckage removal and site restoration process. The fire department officially

completed its duties at 9:52 p.m.

According to the Glendale Office of Emergency Services coordinator, the

California and the Federal Emergency Management Agency guidelines form the basis for

Glendaleís Emergency Response Plan, which is updated annually. Glendale employs the

incident command system for all public safety and utility agencies, and the incident

command system specifically addresses mass casualty transportation accidents. In

addition, the response plan for ìall hazardsî provides guidelines for mass casualty

incidents. The coordinator indicated that the responding fire and police department

personnel used the emergency response plan at the accident scene and that the

management of the accident scene was routine for the type of accident occurrence.

Injuries

The two train crewmembers and four passengers received minor injuries. (See

table 1.)

Table 1. Injuries.

Damages

The collision resulted in severe damage to the locomotive (see figure 12) and

minor exterior sheet metal damage to two coaches. The signal mast, lights, bells, and gate

on the north side of the crossing were removed in the collision. No significant track

damage occurred. The tractor was not damaged. The vehicle separated into three parts,

and the oil refinery condenser was destroyed. (See table 2.) 

Injuries Truckdriver Train crew Train passengers Total

Minor 02 4 6

None 10 6 7

Total 1 2 10 13
Factual Information 17 Highway Accident Report

Truck Information

The truck consisted of a 1997 Peterbilt tractor and a 1992 Aspen semitrailer

configured with a two-axle jeep, a three-axle low-boy semitrailer, and another two-axle

jeep. (See figure 13.) The semitrailer was equipped with a hydraulic lift with a

13-horsepower motor. The tractor-combination vehicle was leased from Townsend

Transportation in Buda, Texas.

Figure 12. Postcollision view of locomotive. (Photograph source: Glendale, California, Police Department.)

Table 2. Damages.

Equipment Amount

Locomotive and cars $610,000

Signal and crossing warning devices 13,950

Vehicle 150,000 - 200,000

Condenser 1,500,000

Total $2,273,950+
Factual Information 18 Highway Accident Report

The tractorís most recent Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance inspection sticker

was from the first quarter (January through March) 1997.

Train Information

The Metrolink train 901 consisted of a 1992 3,000 horsepower General Motors,

Inc., locomotive 861 (F59PH) and Bombardier Transportation coach cars 160 and 155 and

coach/cab car20 611.

Truckdriver Information

The 30-year-old truckdriver held a valid Class A Texas commercial driverís

license (CDL) with endorsements21 for double/triple trailers, tank vehicles, and hazardous

materials and had no restrictions. His valid medical certificate was to expire May 5, 2001.

The motor carrierís driving history records of the driver indicated no traffic violations and

one noninjury traffic collision in the previous 5 years. A check of the Commercial

Driverís License Information System (CDLIS)22 indicated a traffic violation in November

1986 and a traffic accident in April 1995 involving a commercial vehicle.

According to the truckdriverís driver qualification file, he was employed as a

truckdriver in January 1994 by DADís Trucking in Baytown, Texas. He left DADís

Figure 13. Schematic of truck.

20 A coach/cab car is a passenger coach equipped with an operating cab at one end. The train can be

operated from this car for movement with the car at the front of the train. The power and braking for the car

is controlled through wiring and piping running through the train back to the locomotive.

21 Under 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 383.93, the endorsements for a CDL include (1)

double/triple trailers, (2) passenger vehicles, (3) tank vehicles, or (4) vehicles required to be placarded for

hazardous materials.

22 The CDLIS is a computer pointer system that records traffic violations and collisions for people

holding CDLs. The CDLIS is operated by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators,

which is a State and federally funded organization.
Factual Information 19 Highway Accident Report

Trucking in April 1994, when the company had insufficient business to employ him. The

truckdriver worked for Mercury from May 1994 until November 1996, when he returned

to DADís Trucking until April 1997, after which he was reemployed by Mercury. The

truckdriver had been subject to several random drug and alcohol tests while employed by

Mercury. All test results were negative.

A review of the truckdriverís logbook for November and December 1999 indicated

no violations of the hours-of-service rules. The truckdriver logged off duty on January 4

and 5, 2000, the 2 days before the accident trip began. He reported to work at 8:45 a.m. on

January 6 in Houston. The truckdriverís log did not indicate any invalid entries until

January 26, when he logged off duty from 1:30 p.m. until 8:00 a.m. on January 27 in

Quartzsite. A receipt for a repair on the tractor from Ramsey International (truck dealer

and repair service) in Blythe was found in the tractor during the postaccident vehicle

inspection. The receipt was stamped with the date ì01/26/2000î and the time 10:58 p.m.

Ramsey International was contacted to determine the time it would take to complete the

repair: based on the labor charge ($105) and the time necessary to process in and out

(assuming the truck was accepted immediately for repair), it would have taken from 2 to

2.5 hours. The distance from Quartzsite to Blythe is about 24 miles or between 20 and 25

minutesí driving time. Calculations based on this information indicate that the truckdriver

needed a minimum of 3 to 3.5 hours to accomplish the vehicle repair. Based on the timeout stamp of 10:58 p.m. on the repair receipt, the truckdriver should have logged time for

the repair from about 8:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. This time was not recorded in the

truckdriverís logbook.

According to the Mercury driverís manual,23 drivers are to log ìrest and meal stops

as off duty since you are on duty just prior to the rest period and are required to properly

secure your vehicle prior to your rest period,î which is permitted under Federal rules if the

company provides written instructions to do so. Under 49 Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR) 395.2, driving to a repair facility and waiting for the repair work is considered

driving and on-duty time and should be recorded as such.

No times were recorded in the truckdriverís logbook after the 8:00 a.m. entry on

January 27. The truckdriver should have recorded 10 hours of driving time when he

arrived in Adelanto, logged off duty for 4 hours, and recorded an additional 9 hours of

driving time from Adelanto to Glendale. At the time of the accident, the driver was at least

9 hours beyond his allotted 10-hour driving time24 and was in violation of the 15-hour

rule25 by at least 4 hours, not including the fueling time in Adelanto.

The truckdriver said that he had informed the new CHP escort of his hours-ofservice status in Adelanto, but they directed him to drive anyway. He indicated that he

believed that CHP was in charge of the trip (determining the correct routes and allowing

23 Mercury Transportation, Inc., Driverís Manual, revised September 27, 1998.

24 Title 49 CFR 395.3 (a)(1).

25 Title 49 CFR 395.3 (a)(2).
Factual Information 20 Highway Accident Report

him to continue to drive). He said that he had relied on CHP and the lead pilot car driver

for directions because he was unfamiliar with the route.

Pilot Car Driversí Information

The lead pilot car driver at the time of the accident held a valid California Class C

driverís license (noncommercial) scheduled to expire on June 5, 2003, with a restriction

for wearing corrective lenses. His driving history showed one moving traffic violation in

March 1998 for following too closely. 

He told a Safety Board investigator26 that he owned Dickís Pilot Car Service and

had been in business since 1992. The lead pilot car driver had received Utah pilot car

driver certification in 1998. He indicated he was a member of the California Professional

Escort Car Association; California does not require pilot car driver certification.

West Coast Services contacted him for this job when the pilot car driver from

Dougís Pilot Car Service, who had conducted the route survey, was unable to escort the

load. He said that he was unfamiliar with the route. He indicated that he had received the

California permits from West Coast Services on January 26, 2000, but did not receive any

of the permit attachments, which contained the rules and regulations relating to that load

movement. He did not check the permits for validity, but he reviewed them and created a

master route list from the routes indicated on the permits. After the collision, he checked

his notes and discovered that he had failed to record the turn from Grandview Avenue to

San Fernando Road.

He stated that he had been in contact with the truckdriver and the CHP officers via

CB radio. He said that he thought the Los Angeles County curfew was 5:00 a.m. and the

Los Angeles city curfew was 6:00 a.m. In addition, immediately after the accident, he told

the Glendale police that he did not know of any requirement to notify the railroad when

about to traverse a grade crossing. His Utah pilot car certification curriculum did not

include railroad notification of low-clearance vehicle27 track crossings. California does not

require railroad notification.28

The rear pilot car driver from L. P. Flag Car Company held a Commonwealth of

Virginia escort vehicle operator certificate scheduled to expire on November 25, 2001. He

escorted the vehicle from Houston into California.

26 A Safety Board investigator interviewed the pilot car driver on February 8, 2000.

27 Defined by the Uniform Vehicle Code as a vehicle with a vertical body or load clearance of less than

1⁄2-inch-per-foot of the distance between any two axles or less than 9 inches, measured above the level

surface of the roadway.

28 Some States require notification of the railroad for permitted loads under certain conditions, such as

low clearance. The Safety Board will discuss this issue at length in its forthcoming report on the November

17, 2000, Intercession City, Florida, highway-railroad accident investigation.
Factual Information 21 Highway Accident Report

Motor Carrier Information

Mercury was a for-hire interstate carrier specializing in hauling oversized

equipment. The Houston company began operations in 1971 hauling oil field pipes and

equipment. In 1982, it expanded to the carrying of oversized loads requiring specialized

moving permits. It also hauls small amounts of class 3 (flammable) and class 8 (corrosive)

hazardous materials. The owner estimated that about 60 percent of the company business

is interstate and 40 percent intrastate commerce.

The company operates 35 tractors, of which 10 are owned by the company and 25

are leased from owner-operators. Truckdrivers are assigned the same tractor daily. The

company operates 36 semitrailers of different makes and models: 20 flatbed semitrailers,

ranging in length from 42 to 53 feet; 5 double-drop semitrailers; 7 single trailers; and

4 heavy-haul trailers.

All Mercury vehicles are subject to the Federal and State of Texas annual vehicle

inspection requirements. Olympic International, Inc., in Houston conducts the annual

inspection on the vehicles. This company employs one full-time mechanic, who has

12 years of truck mechanic experience and holds a CDL. All Mercury vehicles are

serviced every 10,000 miles, which includes changing the oil and filters and inspecting the

brakes and lights.

Before the accident, the motor carrierís most recent safety review by the Federal

Motor Carrier Safety Administration took place on April 6, 1982, when the carrier

received a satisfactory rating.

Mercury employed 35 full-time truckdrivers, 10 contracted from National

Personnel, Inc., of Dallas, Texas, and 25 long-term lease owner-operators. Due to the high

cost of purchasing insurance and workmanís compensation and operating a full-time

personnel office, according to the Mercury owner, the company contracts the truckdrivers.

Mercury pays National Personnel, Inc., a fee-for-services company, which, in turn, pays

the truckdrivers.

Truckdrivers are interviewed and approved for hiring by Mercury. The Mercury

driverís manual includes the following hiring criteria: (1) be 25 years of age or older, (2)

have at least 2 years of truck driving experience, (3) have personal transportation, (4) be

physically able to handle pipe and other physically demanding loads, (5) live in the greater

Houston area, and (6) be able to pass a U.S. Department of Transportation physical

examination and drug screen. The hiring criteria do not include having had training in

moving oversize/overweight loads.

Mercury has no formal training program; the company provides truckdrivers with

an employee safety handbook that was prepared by National Personnel, Inc. Mercury also

provides truckdrivers with its driverís manual detailing various driver responsibilities such

as customer service, loading vehicles, measuring load and vehicle combinations, required

trip and vehicle documentation, and other company policies. Truckdrivers are required to
Factual Information 22 Highway Accident Report

attend safety training meetings and may receive with their paychecks safety memos that

relate the experiences of Mercury truckdrivers and other company issues.

The Mercury owner said that new truckdrivers are assigned to local deliveries with

a driver-trainer for evaluation purposes. After completing an unspecified evaluation

period, truckdrivers are placed on regular pickup and delivery routes. They are assigned to

larger and heavier vehicles as their skill and experience increases. Currently, only two or

three truckdrivers are permitted to operate the super loads, which the owner defined as

those loads requiring pilot cars per the issuing agencyís specialized moving permit.

Train Crew Information

The engineer worked as a clerk for a freight railroad from 1979 to 1986, when she

went to work for Amtrak in the clerical department. She transferred to the operating

department as an assistant conductor in 1988, was promoted to conductor between 1988

and 1990, and transferred to engine service in 1990. For 2 years, she worked as a

fireman/engineer trainee and since 1992 has operated trains as a locomotive engineer.

The conductor worked as a brakeman/conductor for a freight railroad between

1973 and 1990. He has been employed by Amtrak as a conductor since 1991.

Railroad Information

The Southern California Regional Rail Authority is a rail commuter agency

established by five counties in the Los Angeles basin: Los Angeles, Ventura, San

Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange. It is controlled by a board composed of

representatives from each county. The single agency was created to design, develop, and

operate a commuter railroad that would service these counties. The Southern California

Regional Rail Authority subcontracted railroad functions with Amtrak to provide

qualified operating crews to operate the Metrolink commuter trains. This contract contains

requirements to supervise these employees, as well as to maintain compliance with

Federal regulations.29

The Metrolink train dispatching center in Glendale monitored the train

movements. The train dispatcher controlled the territory through signal indications and

switch positions known as centralized traffic control. Additional instructions were

contained within the timetable, operating rules, general orders, track warrants, and special

instructions.

29 Including Engineer Licensing, 49 CFR Part 240; Drug and Alcohol, 49 CFR Part 219; and Accident

Reporting, 49 CFR Part 225.
Factual Information 23 Highway Accident Report

The third edition of the General Code of Operating Rules, dated April 10, 1994,

comprised the operating rules. Rule modifications or revisions to the General Code of

Operating Rules were included in the Metrolink timetable, which had two applicable

parts: the ìSystem Special Instructionsî provided general revisions, and the ìValley

Subdivisionî contained information specific to trains operating through the territory in

which this accident occurred. Permanent track speeds for the trains were designated in the

timetable, and temporary speed restrictions were issued in track bulletins30 by the train

dispatcher.

Accident Site Information

Roadway

Grandview Avenue is a five-lane, divided urban roadway. A 4-foot-wide concrete

median island divides the northbound and southbound traffic lanes. The roadway surface

is asphalt concrete. Postaccident inspection of the pavement markings revealed no

irregularities, and the markings were in conformance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic

Control Devices.

31 The posted speed limit on Grandview Avenue is 25 mph.

Glendale Police Department records indicate that from 1993 through 2000,

12 accidents occurred in the area bounded by Grandview Avenue and San Fernando Road

and Grandview Avenue and Airway Street. These accidents resulted in 1 fatality and

10 injuries. The fatality occurred at the grade crossing on Grandview Avenue in 1998 and

involved a pedestrian struck by a Metrolink train.

Grade Crossing

The grade crossing is designated as U.S. Department of Transportation 746796L. It

consists of two parallel tracks 20 feet apart. The pavement at the grade crossing is

concrete. The profile grade from the centerline of the grade crossing to the south edge of

San Fernando Road and to the north edge of Airway Street is 3.26 percent and 3.02

percent, respectively.

The last Federal Railroad Administration statistical report on the crossing before

the accident was dated February 20, 1997, and indicated the average daily traffic count on

Grandview Avenue was 5,900 vehicles, of which 15 percent were trucks. The daily train

frequency was approximately 34 trains in both directions on both tracks. The area

surrounding the crossing is light industrial.

30 Track bulletins are addressed to trains that operate through the dispatcherís assigned territories. The

track bulletins contain temporary speed restrictions, locations of men and equipment working, and safety

hazards that may exist.

31 The manual is approved by the Federal Highway Administration as the standard for all streets and

highways in accordance with 23 U.S. Code sections 109 (b), 109 (d), and 402 (a) and 23 CFR 1204.4.
Factual Information 24 Highway Accident Report

The grade crossing was built sometime before 1929, when the city of Glendale

acquired it from Los Angeles County, and was widened in 1962. At this time the

applicable standards were in the American Association of State Highway Officials 1954 A

Policy on Geometric Design of Street and Highways. The guidelines on railroad grade

crossing alignments were 3 percent minimum (desirable) to 6 percent maximum. In 1990,

the American Railroad Engineering Association guideline and the American Association

of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) standard for roadway vertical

profiles at highway-railroad grade crossings changed to reflect the following:

Acceptable geometrics necessary to prevent drivers of low-clearance vehicles

from becoming caught on the tracks would provide the crossing surface at the

same plane as the top of the rails for a distance of 2 ft. outside the rails. The

surface of the highway should also not be more than 3 in. higher nor 6 in. lower

than the top of the nearest rail at a point 30 ft. from the rail unless track

superelevation dictates otherwise.32

In April 2001, the AASHTO revised its guidelines33 for roadway vertical profiles

at railroad grade crossings, which state:

In some instances, the roadway alignment may not meet acceptable geometrics for

a given design speed because of restrictive topography or limitations of right-ofway. To prevent drivers of low-clearance vehicles from becoming caught on the

tracks, the crossing surface should be at the same plane as the top of the rails for a

distance of 0.6 meter (2 feet) outside the rails. The surface of the highway should

also not be more than 75 millimeters (3 inches) higher or lower than the top of

nearest rail at a point 9 meters (30 feet) from the rail unless track superelevation

makes a different level appropriateÖ. Vertical curves should be used to traverse

from the highway grade to a level plane at the elevation of the rails. Rails that are

superelevated, or a roadway approach section that is not level, will necessitate a

site-specific analysis for rail clearances.

In addition, section 8B.14 of the 2000 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic

Control Devices includes a new low-ground clearance warning highway-railroad grade

crossing sign (W10-5), shown in figure 14, and provides the following guidance for its

use:

If the highway profile conditions are sufficiently abrupt to create a hang-up

situation for long wheelbase vehicles or for trailers with low ground clearance, the

Low-Ground Clearance Highway-Rail Grade Crossing (W10-5) sign should be

installed in advance of the highway-rail grade crossing.

Signals

The grade crossing was equipped with a Safetran Systems Corporation grade

crossing predictor model 3000D2 with two warning devices. In October 1997, the system

was upgraded with grade crossing predictor 3000 ìFî level software. Maintenance records

32 A Policy on Geometric Design of Streets and Highways, AASHTO, 1990, adopted as a Federal

Highway Administration standard in April 1993 at 23 CFR 625.4.

33 A Policy on Geometric Design of Highway and Streets, Fourth Edition, AASHTO, 2001.
Factual Information 25 Highway Accident Report

indicated that the signal equipment had been inspected once each calendar month as

required by regulation.34 The records also indicated that no exceptions were taken to the

operation of the crossing warning devices. The event recorder recorded the operation of

the devices controlling the gates and lights at the time of the accident and noted no

abnormalities. 

Track

Both tracks, with an ascending grade of about 1 percent, were maintained to meet

or exceed the standards for a class 5 track as described by the Federal Railroad

Administration in 49 CFR Part 213. Although class 5 track allows freight trains to operate

at 80 mph and passenger trains at 90 mph, other criteria in the signal regulations limited

the maximum speed for passenger trains to 79 mph. The accident train speed was

calculated from the time recorded by the recording device at the crossing, as passing at an

average speed of 77 mph. Metrolink maintenance records indicate that the tracks were

inspected twice weekly with at least 1 calendar day interval between inspections as

required under 49 CFR 213.

Toxicological Tests

After the collision, the truckdriver voluntarily submitted to a drug and alcohol test

administered by the Glendale Police Department. His test results were negative for drugs

and alcohol. Under 49 CFR 219.201 (B), the train crew was not required to be tested, and

they were not.

Figure 14. Low-ground clearance warning highway-railroad grade crossing sign.

34 Title 49 CFR Part 234, ìGrade Crossing Signal System Safety.î

W10-5
Factual Information 26 Highway Accident Report

Tests and Research

Accident Crossing Warning Devices

After the accident, the Safety Board conducted operational tests on the active

crossing traffic control devices (signals, bells, lights, and gates) and found no

abnormalities.35 The warning devices gave 20 seconds of warning before the train arrived.

In addition, the railroad notification telephone number posted on the signal housing in the

southwest corner of the crossing was dialed, and the notification party answered

immediately.

Other Grade Crossings on Permitted Route

On June 13, 2001, Safety Board investigators drove the permitted route from the

California-Arizona border to the accident site. On this route the convoy had traversed

seven grade crossings,36 including the accident crossing. Investigators measured the

percent grade for the approach and departure lanes at these crossings. (See table 3.)

35 The operating standards are found at 49 CFR 234.223, ìGate Arm,î and 49 CFR 234.22, ìActivation

of Warning System.î

36 Six of these grade crossings were active crossings with signals and gates.

Table 3. Grade crossing information.

Location and direction 

of travel

U.S. Department of 

Transportation no. 

Grade percent on 

approach lane

Grade percent on 

departure lane

U.S. 95 northbound

near Old Parker Road

N/A +1.3 -0.5

State Route 62 

westbound

027 031-C +0.33 -0.16

Double-track State 

Route 62 westbound

 first track 

 second track

027 050-G

+0.58

 0.0

 0.0

-0.5

San Fernando Road

closed crossing (formerly 

an active crossing with 

gates)

746 033-A +0.17 -0.75

Polk Street from San 

Fernando Road, 12 

miles from Grandview 

Avenue crossing

VY 22.64

903 132-F

+1.04 0.0

Grandview Avenue 

crossing (accident site), 

first time across

746 796-L +3.26 -3.02
Factual Information 27 Highway Accident Report

Other Information

Heavy Hauling Industry

In the United States, heavy hauling vehicles, defined as having a gross vehicle

weight greater than 80,000 pounds, represent less than 1 percent of the truck fleet.37

According to the U.S. Department of Commerce 1997 Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey,

the heavy hauling fleet comprises more than 70,100 vehicles (45,200 tractor single-trailer

combinations) that operate over 3.8 billion miles each year. Since 1992, the number of

vehicles and miles traveled has increased by 40 and 52 percent, respectively. According to

the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association, 600 of its 1,100 members are in the

business of heavy hauling.

Permit Information

Accident Trip. Mercury was required to obtain permits from four States to

transport the load from the Toromont Process Systems plant in Houston to the Chevron

refinery in El Segundo because the dimensions of the truck exceeded State size and weight

limitations. Mercury arranged for the moving permits in Texas and New Mexico and hired

Central Arizona Escort Service of Phoenix, Arizona, to obtain the permits in Arizona and

West Coast Services of Monrovia, California, to obtain the permits in California. The

issuing State agency and special requirements of the obtained permits are shown in table

4. The permits required from the 12 local government entities in California are shown in

table 5.

37 Economic Benefits of Uniformity in Oversize/Overweight Permitting. A study conducted for the

Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association Foundation by Cambridge Systematics, Inc., Cambridge,

Massachusetts, January 2000.

Table 4. Accident trip State permits.

State Issuing agency Special requirements Fee

Texas

Permit No. 10649002P

Department of 

Transportation, Motor 

Carrier Division in 

Austin.

Required two pilot cars and a 

route survey. Mercury had to 

certify, in writing, that the route 

was safe. Daylight only. 

$190

New Mexico

Permit No. PSFO-3143

Department of Public 

Safety, Permit Office.

Daylight only. $ 15

Arizona

Permit No. 001-000126455

Department of 

Transportation, 

Maintenance Permits 

Service in Phoenix 

and Motor Vehicle 

Division in Goodyear. 

Required Arizona Highway 

Patrol escort in the Sierra Vista 

area. Daylight only.

$100

California

Permit No. 665503

Department of 

Transportation.

Required two pilot cars and a 

route survey. Required CHP 

escort on all routes in California.

$ 16
Factual Information 28 Highway Accident Report

General Permit Requirements. More than 3 million permits per year, on

average, are issued for oversize/overweight loads in the United States.38 California issued

181,000 permits for oversize/overweight loads in 2000.39 The Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA) estimated annual super load40 movements to be 300 coast-tocoast and 700 to 1,100 regionally.

A permit is a variance, granted by a State, county, or city agency having

jurisdiction over a roadway, to a company that transports loads on those highways and

Table 5. Accident trip local government permits in California.

Local government Permit no. Restriction Fee

San Bernardino County M19651 2:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. $ 16

Victorville 00-0032 $ 25

Adelanto TP 235 $ 30

Los Angeles County 6107202 Sunrise to sunset.a $316

Santa Clarita 064676 $200

Los Angeles OP.000656 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. $303

Burbank 3404 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. $ 16

Glendale No permit issued.b

Huntington Park 4430 $ 15

Compton 00-23 $ 15

Hawthorne No permit issued.c

El Segundo 7482 $ 15

a Sunset on January 27, 2000, was 5:19 p.m.; sunrise on January 28, 2000, was 6:54 a.m. Source: U.S. Naval 

Observatory Astronomical Applications Department Web site <http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/docs/rs-oneday.html>. b

 Glendale requires that proof of insurance be on file with the city before issuing a moving permit. In addition, the city 

requires that a company representative come to the permit section and process the application. According to West 

Coast Services, proof of insurance was never sent by Mercury to the city, despite several notifications by West Coast 

Services to Mercury that one was needed. Glendale permit officials stated that proof of insurance was never received 

from Mercury.

c

 Mercury had previously obtained an annual permit for other loads transported in Hawthorne; however, the size limits 

for the accident load exceeded those recorded on the annual permit. Therefore, the annual permit could not be used 

for the accident load. As a result, Mercury was required to apply for another permit. West Coast Services submitted a 

request for a permit; but, Hawthorne does not issue moving permits for loads in excess of 18 feet high and, therefore, 

did not issue a permit for the accident load.

38 Source: FHWA Web site <http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/>, February 12, 2001.

39 Source: telephone conversation with the Chief, Office of Truck Services, Division of Traffic

Operations, California Department of Transportation, June 27, 2001.

40 Definition of super load varies among the States; in California, a vehicle with dimensions greater

than 15 feet wide, 17 feet high, and 135 feet long is considered a super load.
Factual Information 29 Highway Accident Report

roadways where the load or the vehicle exceeds State size or weight limitations or both.

National guidance is found in the 1991 AASHTO Subcommittee on Highway Transportís

Guide for Maximum Dimensions and Weights of Motor Vehicles and for the Operation of

Nondivisible Load Oversize and Overweight Vehicles. This document discusses the

issuance of truck permits and restrictions and national defense. 

Permits can be issued either annually or for multiple or single trips. An annual

permit is issued when the vehicle, load dimensions, or weight remain constant, as in the

case of a mobile crane or vehicles and transported loads that do not exceed certain

limitations. Vehicles or loads in this category receive permits without specified routes but

are limited to those roadways designated as truck routes. Multiple- and single-trip permits

are issued when a single load or a number of loads require permitting but are only in use

for a limited time.

A fee is commonly charged to issue the permit.41 The fee structure is different in

each State, and the cost of a permit varies among jurisdictions. Mercury paid $15 to $316

for the permits involved in this accident load. (See tables 4 and 5.)

Part of the permitting process is route selection. Either the company transporting

the load or a private permit company selects the route(s) for permitted loads. Routes are

selected by determining the size and weight of the vehicle or load, then reviewing

highway maps, and finally calling on the companyís corporate knowledge of an area.

Some State departments of transportation publish maps with bridge weight and clearance

limitations; if they do not, the company consults with the State departments of

transportation and local departments of public works or road departments.

A number of Web sites provide routing and other permit information. The Texas

Department of Transportation Web site42 has a list of roadway and time restrictions, escort

vehicle requirements, and other permit conditions for several Western States.43 In

addition, the Western Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

(WASHTO) publishes the Guide for Uniform Laws and Regulations Governing Truck

Size and Weight Among the WASHTO States, which provides guidance to companies

transporting extralegal44 loads among the Western States.

To obtain certain permits, a route survey also may be required to observe potential

safety problems along the proposed route, as was the case for the movement of the load

involved in this accident. Route surveys, often required for super loads, are conducted by

pilot car drivers in passenger vehicles (usually specially equipped pickup trucks) to

determine the compatibility of the route with the size or weight of the vehicle and load and

to identify potential hazards that should be avoided.45 Flexible poles projecting from the

41 The usual practice is to charge a flat fee for services regardless of the size or weight of the vehicle or

load.

42 <http://www.dot.state.tx.us/insdtdot/orgchart/mcd/permit/AppenC.htm>.

43 Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Texas, and Washington.

44 Vehicle or load that is larger or heavier than State size and weight regulations.
Factual Information 30 Highway Accident Report

top and sides of the survey vehicle are used to determine height and width limitations

along the proposed routes.

Once selected, a route is submitted to the jurisdiction in which the load will be

traveling for review, approval, and permit issuance. Some jurisdictions require a signed

certification that the selected route is suited and safe for the vehicle and load. Each

governmental agency is to review the selected route that traverses its jurisdiction for

compatibility with roadway geometry, bridge weight tolerances, and construction zones.

Agency reviews vary: a smaller jurisdiction may have only one approved route, calling for

minimal review; another jurisdiction may conduct a manual review, using printed maps

and determining where current roadway work projects are being conducted; and a larger

jurisdiction may have a computer database with designated oversize/overweight routes

and roadway environment information. Load heights in excess of 15 feet generally require

an agency to contact public utility and TV cable companies to ensure the load can clear

lights, electrical wires, and phone lines and to determine the presence of work projects.

The permit process requires sufficient lead time for an agency to complete its review,

which may take as long as several weeks prior to the move. In addition to routing, proof of

insurance is sometimes required by the issuing jurisdiction.

A vehicle is required to remain on the approved roadway(s) unless it encounters an

obstacle that would prohibit further movement, such as a low-clearance bridge. If alternate

routes are necessary, approval must be obtained from the issuing agency before further

vehicle movement.46 If the movement cannot be accomplished within the permitting dates,

the permit expires, the movement must stop, and a new permit or extension must be

issued.

Violations of the terms and conditions of the permit, including routing violations,

can result in fines. In some States, such as California, the department of motor vehicles

and the department of transportation track permit violations. Accumulation of violations

can result in the State refusing to issue special moving permits to the violating company.

California Department of Transportation

Permits are processed in the Caltrans Office of Truck Services, which has

56 employees, including managers. In the year 2000, the Office of Truck Services

processed 181,000 permits (672 permits daily).

In 1999, after two accidents involving permitted loads (see ìOther Accidentsî

section of this report for further information) and State legislative hearings, Caltrans

instituted changes to its permitting process. The Office of Truck Services hired additional

permit writers and district truck service managers and is in the process of acquiring an

automated permitting system, Transportation Permits Management System, which it

45 A general practice is that the person conducting the route survey will be the lead pilot car driver

during the movement of the load.

46 Exceptions are made for emergent circumstances such as a traffic accident on the route resulting in

law enforcement directing the vehicle to take a temporary alternate route or detour. In such cases, the vehicle

must return to the approved route as soon as possible.
Factual Information 31 Highway Accident Report

expects to be on line by October 2002. It began the process of verification of vertical

clearances in December 1999 and in July 2000 completed measuring 6,500 State highway

bridges. By June 2001, it had updated 94 percent of the bridge clearances in the State

route-clearing database. (See appendix C for the Office of Truck Services summary of

major improvements.)

As part of its evaluation of the permitting process, the Caltrans Office of Truck

Services studied 45 incidents of oversize/overweight loads striking bridge structures that

occurred from January 2000 through May 2001. Caltrans found the primary cause of 15

(33 percent) of these incidents was the hauler being off route, the primary cause of 9

(20 percent) of these incidents was the load being higher than permitted, and the primary

cause of 6 (13 percent) of these incidents was permit errors. 

Permit Companies

In this accident, the process of obtaining permits to transport the

oversize/overweight loads involved 4 State and 12 local jurisdictions. Permit companies,

such as West Coast Services, the company employed by Mercury to obtain the California

permits, provide this service. Some companies also provide computerized routing and

mapping services for the transportation of oversize/overweight loads. These companies

offer detailed maps of the routes best suited for the load transported, including roadway

height and width clearance conditions, bridge weight tolerances, axle weight limits, speed

limits, and estimated travel times.

Pilot Car Information

Five pilot car companies were involved in the movement of this oversize load:

ï Happyís Pilot Car Service provided one escort vehicle in Texas only.

ï L. P. Flag Car Company escorted the vehicle from Houston into California and

was the trailing pilot car at the time of the collision.

ï Billyís Pilot Car Company provided one escort vehicle with two drivers from

the New Mexico-Arizona border to the Arizona-California border. One driver

traveled part of the route and was relieved by another driver, who escorted the

load to the California border.

ï Dougís Pilot Car Service (hired by West Coast Services) conducted the route

survey for the California permits but did not escort the load en route. 

ï Dickís Pilot Car Service (hired by West Coast Services) escorted the vehicle

from the Arizona-California border to the accident site. 

Pilot Car Industry

According to the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Associationís

Oversize/Overweight Permit Manual, all States require pilot cars for loads of a certain size

and have equipment requirements for pilot cars, such as the type of lights, size and color

of signs and flags, type of two-way communication between pilot car and transport
Factual Information 32 Highway Accident Report

vehicle, and height and type of pole.47 The requirement parameters vary from State to

State.

The pilot car industry estimates that there are between 2,000 and 3,000 pilot car

(escort vehicle) operators in the United States.48 Three regional professional organizations

represent the pilot car industry: the California Professional Escort Car Association, the

Texas Pilot Car Association, and the United Safety Car Association (includes

Washington, Oregon, and Idaho). These three associations represent about 200

independent pilot car owner/operators. WASHTO publishes a model policy for pilot car

drivers and equipment in its Guide for Uniform Laws and Regulations Governing Truck

Size and Weight Among the WASHTO States. No national standards, policies, or

professional organizations exist that cover pilot car driver training, qualification, or

equipment issues.

State equipment requirements are not consistent among States, for example:

ï One State permits the use of a flashing yellow strobe light; another State has

made the use of this type of light illegal.

ï One State requires the presence of a single 10-pound BC fire extinguisher;

another State requires two 5-pound BC fire extinguishers.49

ï One State requires that an OVERSIZE sign be on the vehicle bumper; another

State has made the use of such a sign illegal because it covers the vehicle

license plate.

ï Some States require that a pilot car driver possess a handheld STOP and

SLOW sign, but prohibit its use for traffic control.

Pilot Car Driver Certification Programs

Nine States (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, New Mexico, New York,

Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and Washington) require pilot car certification.50 Arizona and

New Mexico do not have certification programs. Pilot car operators domiciled in New

Mexico must register with the Public Regulatory Commission. Indiana and North Carolina

are considering establishing pilot car driver certification programs.

47 Oversize/Overweight Permit Manual, Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association, Fairfax,

Virginia, September 2000.

48 Safety Board investigators interviewed representatives of the pilot car industry at the WASHTO 13th

Annual Oversize/Overweight Transportation Symposium, San Antonio, Texas, March 10 and 11, 2000.

49 The A, B, and C ratings were established by the Underwriters Laboratories and the National Fire

Protection Agency. The letters refer to the type of fire the extinguisher is designed to extinguish:

A = trash, paper, and wood;

B = liquids and grease (petroleum products such as gasoline); and

C = electrical.

50 Certification in this context means completion of a course or passing a test or both. Certification

programs include courses and test administration.
Factual Information 33 Highway Accident Report

Drivers who meet the certification requirements are issued a certification card and

entered into a registry. (See table 6 for the certification requirements of the existing eight

programs.) In those States that have a certification program, no one may operate a pilot car

without having first been certified, including pilot car drivers from other States. The States

that have a certification program usually grant reciprocity to other State certifications.

The Colorado, New York, Virginia, and Utah pilot car certification manuals 51 and

the WASHTO policy manual52 include material on the following topics: vehicle and

Table 6. Requirements of States with pilot car driver certification programs.

State Requirements Test administration

Colorado Test and evidence of completing 

defensive driving course or valid CDL, 

certificate of commercial insurance, and 

5-year driving record. Colorado honors 

Virginia, Florida, and Utah certification.

Test administered by Colorado Department 

of Transportation Transport Permit Office 

for $5 fee; certification good for 5 years. 

Florida Completion of 8-hour defensive driving 

class and 8-hour pilot/escort driving class.

Test administered by University of Florida 

Transportation Safety Transfer Center.

Kansas Evidence of completing a National Safety 

Council-approved defensive driving 

course or valid CDL.

Not available.

New York Test of State manual. Test administered by Department of Motor 

Vehicles for $40 fee.

Oklahoma Completion of 8-hour course on State 

manual.

Test administered by Oklahoma State 

University; cost to applicant $90. State 

currently in final negotiations with 

university for record maintenance and 

access.

Utah Completion of 8-hour course on escort 

driver manual and test.

Test administered by Utah Valley 

Community College; cost to applicant 

$120. College maintains records and 

issues certification cards.

Virginia Test of State escort driver manual. Test administered by Virginia 

Commonwealth University. No cost to 

in-State applicant; cost to out-of-State 

applicant $30. Renewals free.

Washington Completion of 8-hour course and test 

based on WASHTO guidelines.

Test administered by Evergreen Safety 

Council for $145 fee.

51 Rules and Regulations of the State of Colorado Department of Transportation Pertaining to

Transport Permits for the Movement of Extra-Legal Loads, amended July 30, 1999; New York State Certified

Escort Manual; Virginia Escort Driverís Manual, ìHauling Permitî section, Department of Transportation,

Commonwealth of Virginia; and Pilot/Escort Driver Training Manual, Utah Valley State College, Orem,

Utah, 1996.

52 Guide for Uniform Laws and Regulations Governing Truck Size & Weight Among the WASHTO

States, adopted by WASHTO Policy Committee July 30, 1997.
Factual Information 34 Highway Accident Report

personal equipment requirements; pretrip preparation, including route reviews and testing

of car-to-car communications; proper use of lights; flagging procedures; traffic flow and

control; reducing traffic buildup behind the load; driving on narrow roadways and bridges;

passing other vehicles; driving maneuvering and techniques; railroad crossings; legal

limitations and responsibilities; reporting traffic accidents; escort vehicle placement; and

evaluation of roadway hazards. The training curriculums do not include procedures for

conducting a route survey or for notifying railroads of low-clearance vehicle crossings.

The Utah manual cites several advantages of a certification program: uniformity

among pilot car vehicles and drivers, safer pilot vehicle operations, consistency in

enforcement, accountability, permanent records of pilot car services, trained pilot car

drivers for traffic control, reciprocity with other certifying States, better communication

between pilot vehicles and transport vehicles, licensing standards for pilot vehicle

operators, and reduction of traffic accidents.

Virginia started its certification program in the late 1970s and has certified

approximately 6,000 pilot car drivers, of which about 80 percent have been out-of-State.

The program began after the Virginia Highway and Transportation Research Council

conducted a study on the movement of 14-foot-wide manufactured housing units. The

study found that ìsubstandard escort vehicle operations were commonplace . . . especially

on two-lane highways.î It also noted:

A wide variation in their [escort] operations was observed. Some of the escorts

stayed in constant communications with the load, warning the driver of the load of

oncoming traffic and obstructions, and working effectively to enhance safety

during lane changes and turns made by the load. These escorts were in the

minority, as most of the escorts performed no function other than to display a

warning sign. At the other extreme, the driver of an escort vehicle was observed to

be so intent on protecting the load that often he would encroach into the opposing

traffic lane and force vehicles off the road to ensure the safety of the load.

Pilot Car and Police Escort Responsibilities

In Safety Board interviews with pilot car organization representatives,53 a concern

was raised about truckdriver and police reliance on the pilot car driver to ensure that the

correct route is followed. In the Glendale accident, the CHP officers escorting the

vehicle/load indicated they were not familiar with the routing in the Los Angeles

metropolitan area and relied on the lead pilot car driver for directions. The organization

representatives stated that the primary purpose of the pilot car operator is not to ensure

that the vehicle/load is on the correct route, although being on the correct route is factored

into the operation, but to provide advance warning whenever route hazards, such as a

bridge with inadequate clearance or a raised grade crossing that the load cannot traverse,

are present. This concept is stated in the training material provided by States that have

pilot car driver certification programs.

53 WASHTO 13th Annual Oversize/Overweight Transportation Symposium, San Antonio, Texas,

March 10 and 11, 2000.
Factual Information 35 Highway Accident Report

California Highway Patrol

Due to the size of the condenser unit, especially its height, the Caltrans permit

office contacted CHP team leader 1 to arrange a CHP escort. CHP team leader 1 contacted

Mercury directly and negotiated a contract, dated January 21, 2000, for CHP services. The

contract called for two CHP officers from the Blythe office, working overtime on their

scheduled days off, to escort the vehicle from the California-Arizona border to Adelanto

and for three CHP officers, including CHP team leader 2, from the Inland Division, to

escort the vehicle from Adelanto to El Segundo. CHP team leader 1 coordinated his efforts

with CHP team leader 2.

Team leader 1 said that he arranged between 35 and 40 escort contracts per year in

the Blythe area. Team leader 2 indicated that he arranged between 120 and 150 escort

contracts per year in the Inland Division area. According to the team leaders, the number

of escorts per vehicle is determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the size of the

load, designated route, anticipated traffic conditions, estimated average speed, and

permitted times for movement. Escort officers are drawn from a pool of officers who have

signed up for the overtime work. (See appendix D for CHP teams 1 and 2 escort officersí

on-duty time for the 3 days before the accident.) The officers involved with the Glendale

accident load had previous experience in escorting permit loads.

At the time of the Glendale accident, the CHP had no specific policies or training

for escorting oversized and super loads. According to the CHP, the traffic control activities

involved in escorting these types of loads are covered in the officerís basic and on-the-job

training.

CHP officers told Safety Board investigators54 that the general procedure was for

the two leading CHP units to go before the load into intersections and other places where

traffic control was required and ensure that the vehicle could continue safely, by stopping

traffic if necessary. The placement of vehicles in the convoy for the California segment of

the trip was (1) the lead pilot car (Dickís Pilot Car Service), (2) two CHP units, (3) the

truck with the load, (4) one CHP unit, and (5) the trailing pilot car (L.P. Pilot Car Service).

In its Management Memorandum (96-145), dated September 3, 1996, the CHP

published a chart of size, weight, and speeds for vehicles and loads that require Caltrans to

notify the CHP. The CHP has guidelines for the movement of oversize loads and vehicles

and for determining when and how many CHP escorts are required. The appropriate CHP

area permit coordinator is responsible for contracting with the transporting company for

any CHP escorts that may be necessary. Included in the Management Memorandum are

requirements for the CHP to inspect the vehicle and load before its movement in

California. The policy reads as follows:

As a general rule, a NAS [North American Standard] Level 1 inspection 55 will be

required on the transporting vehicle(s) of each load escorted by CHP personnel.

An exception to this policy should be vehicle(s) displaying a current Commercial

Vehicle Safety Alliance sticker(s). However, all unstickered vehicles within the

54 Interviews conducted on February 29, 2000.
Factual Information 36 Highway Accident Report

combination and any stickered vehicles displaying obvious violations shall be

inspected. Inspected vehicle(s) that qualify shall be issued a sticker(s).

The CHP officers in team 1 did not conduct a level 1 inspection of the vehicle or

measure the vehicle and load for compliance with the terms and conditions of the permit at

the California-Arizona border. The CHP officers in team 2 escorting the load from

Adelanto did not review the truckdriverís logbook for hours of service or measure the

vehicle and load for compliance. 

The CHP Commercial Enforcement Manual 82.6 provides the departmentís

policies and guidelines ìto personnel involved in the commercial enforcement program

and to serve as a repository for Department interpretations relating to commercial vehicle

enforcement.î56 Chapter 8 of the manual covers size and weight and, under the

ìTransportation Permitsî section, states: 

Operation of a vehicle on city or county roadways without a required permit is a

violation of size and weight statute limitations. A vehicle shall not be permitted to

proceed if it is in violation of the conditions of the permit, is not on the route

specified in the permit, and/or the size or weight of the vehicle and/or load

exceeds the limitations prescribed on the permit by the amounts indicated below.

The manual also covers the following topics: procedures for contracting for CHP

escort services, equipment and placement of pilot cars, and permit documentation. One

provision of the manual is that a commercial vehicle enforcement officer may be included

in the escort team. The CHP officers involved in the accident indicated that this provision

was normal practice and that most of the CHP officers escorting the accident load were in

commercial vehicle enforcement.

CHP officers are authorized to direct the vehicle and load to alter the permitted

route if the officers have knowledge that the route, or a structure on the route, will not

accommodate the vehicle and load. When such circumstances occur, CHP officers are

required to notify Caltrans by department report form. CHP team leaders 1 and 2 told

Safety Board investigators that ìwhen they are escorting a permit vehicle and load, they

are the person-in-charge of the overall safety of the movement.î

In March 2001, chapter 8 of the manual was revised, changing the policy

concerning escorting variance (oversize/overweight) loads. The policy now obliges the

variance load57 coordinator to ìobtain a copy of the proposed route survey and compare it

55 An inspection that includes the examination of the driverís license and medical examinerís certificate and

waiver, if applicable; alcohol and drugs; the driverís record-of-duty status, as required, and hours of service; the seat

belt; the vehicle inspection report; the brake system; the coupling devices; the exhaust system; the frame fuel system; the

turn signals; the brake, tail, and head lamps; the lamps on projecting loads; safe loading; the steering mechanism; the

suspension; the tires; the van and open-top trailer bodies; the wheels and rims; the windshield wipers; the emergency

exits for buses; and hazardous materials requirements, as applicable. Hazardous materials-required inspection items will

be inspected by certified hazardous materials inspectors.

56 Forward to the California Highway Patrol Commercial Enforcement Manual 82.6.

57 Another term for super load.
Factual Information 37 Highway Accident Report

with the permits and review all permits for accuracy.î The policy also requires that a

safety briefing be conducted with all escort drivers, in which ìall parties shall be informed

that the CHP is in charge of the escort.î In addition, the policy states:

If a route listed on a permit cannot be traversed or the escort gets off route for any

reason, the OIC [officer-in-charge] shall stop the variance load escort at a safe

location to park the variance load. The load shall not proceed until an alternate

route can be obtained from the appropriate permitting agency.

Other Accidents Involving Permitted Loads

The Safety Board has investigated 6 accidents and is aware of 12 others since

March 1999 involving oversize/overweight loads.58 (See table 7.) In addition, the Safety

Board has investigated four accidents involving a low-clearance vehicle lodged on a

railroad crossing, in which the truckdriver was trying to raise the semitrailer with

hydraulic lifts, when the vehicle was struck by a train. (See table 8.)

 

58 Pilot cars were escorting the loads in five accidents, two of which had police escorts.

Table 7. Oversize/overweight load accidents. 

Date Location Description Injuries and damages

March 16, 1999 Ellisville, 

Florida

Excavator hit overpass. $70,000 to overpass.

June 8, 1999a Arbutus, 

Maryland

Improperly loaded excavator hit 

pedestrian bridge.

One fatality and three 

serious injuries. Bridge 

collapse.

June 1999 Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania

Oversize rock screener hit railroad 

bridge.

One fatality.

September 1999b Virginia On two-lane road, cement truck met 

two mobile homes escorted by three 

pilot cars in 1,500-foot-long convoy. 

Truck lost control and hit passenger 

car that was following convoy. 

Rear pilot car of three-vehicle convoy 

was stopped in right travel lane 

watching an overheight load travel 

under bridge when pilot car was struck 

by another vehicle traveling in right 

lane.

One fatality.

One fatality.

September 28, 1999 Wissahickon, 

Pennsylvania 

Unknown overheight load hit 

overpass.

Overpass structural 

damage.

July 16, 1999c Los Angeles, 

California

Overheight vehicle hit freeway bridge. 

Permit was for 15 feet; permitted route 

under 14-foot 10-inch bridge.

One fatality.

November 11, 1999 Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania

Oversize container hit overpass. $1 million to overpass.

December 14, 1999 Cherry Hill, 

New Jersey

Raised dump truck body hit pedestrian 

overpass.

Bridge collapse.
Factual Information 38 Highway Accident Report

February 1, 2000d San Diego, 

California

First of two overheight loads escorted 

by four pilot cars and four CHP units 

hit bridge. Convoy was off route; 

truckdriver did not hear warning from 

pilot car with height pole.

Concrete support beam 

damage on overpass 

substructure.

April 10, 2000 Iowa Two separate collisions with railroad 

bridge.

$100,000 to bridge.

June 8, 2000e Lexington, 

North Carolina

Oversized 14-foot 4-inch combuster 

on permitted route hit 14-foot 2-inch 

clearance bridge.

$75,000 to bridge.

July 17, 2000 Newport, 

Delaware

Overheight super load hit overpass. $229,339 to bridge.

September 28, 2000 Miami, 

Oklahoma

Steel boat mold hit railroad bridge, 

was knocked off semitrailer, and 

landed on passenger car.

One fatality.

November 17, 2000f Intercession 

City, Florida

Truck and semitrailer, carrying 82-ton 

condenser tube slowly crossing 

private railroad grade crossing, was 

struck by Amtrak train. Florida 

requires permit from railroad before 

traversing grade crossing. No permit 

was obtained. Load escorted by three 

pilot cars. The Florida-certified pilot 

car driver did not know that railroad 

was required to be notified before 

crossing.

$150,000 to truck and 

train.

December 23, 2000g Sumner, 

Washington

Truck towing house stopped on tracks 

to adjust tow dollies when struck by 

Amtrak train. Washington requires that 

permit be obtained from railroad to 

cross tracks. No permit was obtained. 

(Driver blood alcohol was 0.04 

percent.) Load escorted by pilot car 

and three uniformed, off-duty county 

police officers. 

House destroyed.

July 11, 2001h Farmington, 

Maine

Oversized 14-foot 17-inch load hit 14-

foot 2-inch clearance bridge. Truck 

had no permit required for loads over 

13 feet 6 inches.

$50,000 to overpass.

October 15, 2001i Durham, 

North Carolina

Tractor-semitrailer transporting crane 

struck overpass and caused leak in 

gas pipeline.

$100,000 to overpass.

$100,000 to pipeline.

$200,000 to truck and 

crane.

a

 NTSB Docket No. HWY-99-FH022.

b

 Two oversize load crash case studies, Virginia Crash Investigation Team, Virginia Commonwealth University, Report 

No. 186, September 1999.

c

 California Highway Patrol Collision Report No. 9907-302. d

 California Highway Patrol Collision Report No. unknown. e

 NTSB Docket No. HWY-00-IH040.

f

 NTSB Docket No. HWY-01-FH007.

g

 NTSB Docket No. HWY-01-IH013.

h

 NTSB Docket No. HWY-01-IH031.

i

 NTSB Docket No. HWY-02-IH005.

Table 7. Oversize/overweight load accidents. (Continued)
Factual Information 39 Highway Accident Report

Accident Statistics

Because most State accident reporting systems do not require permitting

information, the frequency of accidents nationwide involving permitted loads cannot be

determined. The Maine Department of Transportation (Maine is one of the few States that

has a permitted oversize load accident database59) reports that from 1995 through 2000,

232 accidents involved permitted vehicles. During that period, 8,257 accidents occurred

that involved commercial vehicles.

The Safety Board also examined data from the Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents

Database.60 From 1991 to 1997, an estimated 32,593 trucks were involved in fatal

accidents. Of those trucks, 2.86 percent weighed between 80,001 and 120,000 pounds and

less than 1 percent weighed more than 120,000 pounds; 13 percent and less than 1 percent

of the trucks, respectively, were more than 65 feet long and 14 feet wide.

In addition, the Safety Board examined the Federal Railroad Administration

Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Accident/Incident Database. In the year 2000, 3,502

highway-rail grade crossing incidents occurred, resulting in 425 fatalities and 1,219

injuries to highway vehicle occupants and railroad employees and passengers.61

Approximately 24 percent of the highway-railroad grade crossing incidents involved

trucks or truck tractors. About 73 percent of the trucks and truck tractors were moving

over the crossing at the time of the accident; the other trucks and truck tractors were

stalled, stopped, or trapped on the tracks.

Table 8. Safety Board investigations involving low-clearance vehicles lodged on railroad 

tracks.

Date and location Description

August 25, 1983

Rowland, North Carolina

Lowboy with 7-inch clearance. Driver tried to raise semitrailer for

5 to 10 minutes before arrival of train.

November 30, 1983

Citra, Florida

Lowboy with 9 1/2-inch clearance. Driver tried to raise semitrailer

for 15 minutes before arrival of train. 

November 30, 1993

Intercession City, Florida

Cargo bed with 6- to 8-inch clearance; 184-foot long transport

vehicle. Driver trying to raise semitrailer when train arrived.

October 3, 1995

Milford, Connecticut

Vehicle clearance not available. Driver tried to raise semitrailer for

3 to 4 minutes before train arrived.

59 Maine Department of Transportation, Bureau of Planning, Safety Management.

60 Maintained by the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute.

61 Any impact between a railroad and highway user (both motor vehicles and other users of the crossing

as a designated crossing site, including walkways and sidewalks associated with the crossing). Reported on

form FRA F 6180.57.
Factual Information 40 Highway Accident Report

The Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Accident/Incident Database does not contain

information on the weight, length, or width of the truck involved in the Glendale accident.

The Safety Board examined the 1991 through 1997 data in the Trucks Involved in Fatal

Accidents Database to identify the number of oversized trucks involved in fatal highwayrailroad grade crossing accidents. Of the trucks involved in accidents at railroad crossings,

5 percent had a gross combination weight of more than 80,000 pounds, about 6 percent

were longer than 65 feet, and none were wider than 14 feet.
41 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

General

Although the oversize/overweight or heavy-haul trucking fleet is growing, it is a

small segment of the trucking industry. Vehicles that haul oversize/overweight or

permitted loads constitute less than 1 percent of the Nationís trucking fleet. The limited

accident data indicate that vehicles hauling permitted loads are not over represented in

accident statistics. However, even though accidents involving oversize/overweight

vehicles and loads are infrequent, this accident and others investigated by the Safety

Board demonstrate that when they occur, such accidents can cause extensive damage to

the infrastructure and, particularly at railroad-highway grade crossings, have the potential

for catastrophic consequences.

In the following analysis, the Safety Board will exclude those factors that did not

cause or contribute to the accident, identify those factors that led to the accident scenario,

and determine which factors were contributory. Discussion will focus specifically on the

actions of the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, and police escorts and on weaknesses in the

planning, coordination, and execution of this oversize/overweight movement. Finally, the

analysis will consider measures that can be taken to prevent similar accidents in the future.

Exclusions

The highway-railroad grade crossing pavement markings, signs, signals, and gates

operated as they were intended. Postaccident mechanical inspections of the train revealed

no defects or deficiencies. 

The truckdriverís postaccident toxicological tests were negative for alcohol and

drugs.

The Glendale police witnessed the accident and radioed the dispatcher, and the fire

department responded within 5 minutes of notification. Although the initial radio dispatch

location was 1/4 mile north of the actual accident site and the initial responders had

difficulty gaining access to the accident site, these problems did not significantly impact

the timeliness or effectiveness of the emergency response.

The Safety Board concludes that neither the design nor the operation of the active

railroad grade crossing warning devices nor the mechanical condition of the train

contributed to the cause of the accident; the emergency response was adequate and timely.

The Metrolink commuter train 901 engineer applied the brakes when she

determined the truck was not moving. Following the collision, the engineer realized that
Analysis 42 Highway Accident Report

the truckís trailer was obstructing the adjacent southbound track and radioed an

emergency message for the approaching southbound commuter train 100 to stop. The

other engineer received the instruction and stopped his train 50 feet from the obstruction.

The Safety Board concludes that the alert actions of the train engineer in warning the

southbound commuter train engineer of the track obstruction prevented a second collision.

The Accident

Preparation and Planning

The accident scenario began when the oversize/overweight permitted load,

escorted by two pilot cars and three CHP escorts, missed a turn from Grandview Avenue

onto San Fernando Road. As a result of this mistake, the convoy continued straight on

Grandview Avenue and across the grade crossing. The mistake occurred because the lead

pilot car driver failed to include the San Fernando Road turn when transcribing route

directions onto a notepad. The convoy drivers did not discover the error until they realized

that Grandview Avenue ended beyond the crossing.

The lead pilot car driver was contracted to escort the accident load and received

the permits 1 day before he met the convoy at the California-Arizona border. He did not

have a copy of the route survey, had not previously driven the intended route, and had not

met with the CHP, the truckdriver, or the rear pilot car driver prior to the morning of the

movement. The lead pilot car driver had been given 1 State and 12 different local

California permits, but not their attachments, which contained some rules and regulations

relating to the load. From these permits, he had to transcribe route directions to create a

master route plan for the move, which he did on his notepad. Although he discussed the

route with the truckdriver, CHP escorts, and rear pilot car driver, he did not provide them

with a copy of the master route plan.

Because a master route plan had not been prepared in advance, because the driver

had not driven the intended route prior to the movement, and because a master route plan

had not been provided to the others in the convoy, they missed the opportunity both to

identify the transcription error at the onset of the movement and to recognize the error

once on Grandview Avenue. The Safety Board concludes that poor preparation and

planning for the movement of the oversize/overweight load resulted in the convoy

crossing the Grandview Avenue highway-railroad grade crossing instead of turning onto

San Fernando Road.

Grade Crossing Hazard Awareness

After the convoy had failed to make the correct turn onto San Fernando Road and

the truck had traversed the railroad tracks at the accident site, both the CHP officer-incharge and the trailing pilot car driver heard the truck bottom out but did not tell the

truckdriver. When the convoy drivers realized they were off route after crossing the tracks,

they consulted a map to determine how to get back on route, but did not discuss the safety
Analysis 43 Highway Accident Report

of going back across the tracks. When attempting to cross the tracks the second time, the

convoy had to wait for an eastbound Metrolink train to pass before it could proceed, but no

one thought, or apparently knew, to call the railroad to determine the train schedule or to

notify the railroad that the load was crossing the tracks.

The truckdriver attempted to raise the semitrailer only after it became lodged on

the tracks. Even without becoming ìhung upî on the tracks, the truck posed a significant

risk at any highway-railroad grade crossing. Regulations at 49 CFR 234.225 require that

warning systems at active crossings provide a minimum of 20 secondsí warning.

However, according to Safety Board calculations, after the eastbound Metrolink train

passed, the accident truck, because of its size, would have needed more than 26 seconds

to completely clear the tracks.

Following the accident, the convoy participants did not indicate that they

considered the potential hazards of crossing the tracks with the oversize/overweight

accident vehicle, even though it was during the morning commuter train rush. Nor did

they consider that the accident vehicle might become stuck on the crossing. Yet the

convoy was given two cues about the potential hazard before the accidentóthe scraping

of the truck the first time over the tracks and the passing eastbound Metrolink train.

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that had the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, or police

escorts recognized the potential hazard created by the oversize/overweight vehicle

crossing the tracks, they could have taken appropriate action and avoided this accident.

Low-Clearance Warning Grade Crossing Sign

According to the 2001 AASHTO guidelines, the roadway surface should not be

more than 3 inches higher or lower than the top of the nearest rail at a point 30 feet from

the rail. Three inches higher or lower at a point 30 feet from the rail translates to a positive

or negative 0.83 percent grade. The approach and departure grades at the Grandview

Avenue crossing were 3.26 and -3.02 percent, respectively. (See figure 15.) Therefore, in

accordance with the current American Railroad Engineering Association guidelines and

the AASHTO guidelines for roadway vertical profiles at highway-railroad grade

crossings, the Grandview Avenue grade crossing was a high-profile or humped crossing. 

The Safety Board identified the hazards created by the combination of high-profile

grade crossing and low-ground clearance vehicles during its investigation of the highwayrailroad grade crossing collision near Sycamore, South Carolina, on May 2, 1995.62 As a

result of its investigation, the Safety Board recommended that the Federal Highway

Administration:

H-96-05

Adopt the proposed changes that are published in the notice of proposed

amendments to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices regarding

warning signs for substandard vertical profiles at railroad grade crossings.

62 National Transportation Safety Board, Highway/Rail Grade Crossing Collision Near Sycamore,

South Carolina, May 2, 1995, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-96/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB,

1996).
Analysis 44 Highway Accident Report

On September 5, 1997, the FHWA advised the Safety Board that it had adopted the

low-ground clearance warning highway-railroad grade crossing sign (W10-5). This sign,

which has been incorporated into the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, is

specifically designed to warn drivers of highway profile conditions sufficiently abrupt to

create a ìhang-upî situation for long wheelbase vehicles or low-ground clearance trailers.

Subsequently, on January 2, 1998, the Board classified Safety Recommendation H-96-05

ìClosedóAcceptable Action.î

The evidence does not indicate that before the Glendale accident, the truckdriver,

pilot car drivers, or police escorts considered or were aware of the potential hazard created

by the combination of the accident truck and the crossing profile. Not until after the

accident truck was stuck did the truckdriver make any effort to raise the ground clearance

of the vehicle, and by then it was too late. The situation that occurred in this accident is

exactly what the low-ground clearance warning sign is intended to prevent. Therefore, the

Safety Board concludes that had low-ground clearance warning signs been present at the

Glendale crossing, the information conveyed by the signs may have alerted the

truckdriver, pilot car drivers, or police escorts to the low-clearance hazard and may have

prevented the accident.

Although overall traffic volume on Grandview Avenue is comparatively low

(5,900 vehicles), a high proportion of that volume (15 percent) is truck traffic.63 The area

surrounding the crossing is light industrial, and, therefore, the potential for other lowground clearance trucks to travel over the Grandview Avenue crossing remains. The

Figure 15. Diagram of Grandview Avenue grade crossing alignment.

63 Federal Railroad Administration statistical report of February 1997.

Airway Street San Fernando Road

20 feet

30 feet 30 feet

Existing 

Alignment

3.26%

AASHTO 

0.83%

AASHTO 

0.83%

Tracks

2 2

3.02%
Analysis 45 Highway Accident Report

Safety Board believes that the city of Glendale should install low-clearance highwayrailroad grade crossing signs (W10-5s) at the Grandview Avenue crossing and evaluate

other crossings to determine whether the signs are warranted and, if so, install them.

Fatigue

The errors by the pilot car drivers and truckdriver discussed above may have been

errors of judgment or flawed decision-making that were possibly caused or aggravated by

fatigue. The lead pilot car driver had been driving and on duty for 24, and awake for 27,

consecutive hours; the truckdriver and second pilot car driver had been driving and on

duty for 19, and awake for 22, consecutive hours. Research has shown that performance

becomes impaired with extended periods of sleep loss and can result in slowed reaction

times, reduced vigilance, cognitive slowing, and memory problems, among other

performance effects. As little as 2 hours of sleep loss on just one night can impair

performance and levels of alertness.64 Furthermore, this accident occurred at 5:56 a.m.

Performance impairments are greatest during the ìtroughî or low point, generally from

3:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m., of the circadian rhythm,65 and some functions decrease from

12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the judgment and

vigilance of the pilot car drivers and the truckdriver may have been affected by a lack of

sleep.

Oversize/Overweight Vehicle Movements

To determine how and why this accident happened, the Safety Board also

examined the events preceding the accident. This examination revealed that the same

types of problems that culminated in the Glendale collision were prevalent throughout the

movement preceding it. Among them were numerous errors, planning and coordination

difficulties, and subsequent delays due to actions by various participants in the

transportation of this oversized load. The following sections will discuss issues pertaining

to the training and guidance provided to the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, and police

escorts; the permitting process; and the coordination among these individuals and

activities. The 22-day move over 2,100 miles involved 5 pilot car companies, 2 permit

companies, the permit issuing offices of 4 States, and, in California, 12 local jurisdictions.

Many of the permit routing errors were detected and corrected without mishap, but

they resulted in delays. Delays put the convoy behind schedule and on the last day of the

movement, used up the truckdriverís available on-duty time. Other oversights, which also

resulted in delays, could have been foreseen and avoided, starting with the removal of the

tree at the Toromont Process Systems yard on the 1st day of the trip.

64 D.F. Dinges and N.B. Kribbs, ìPerforming While Sleepy: Effects of Experimentally Induced

Sleepiness,î Sleep, Sleepiness and Performance (Chichester: Wiley, 1991).

65 Physiological phenomena and consequently individualsí performance fluctuate in a rhythmic pattern

over a 24- to 25-hour period. This early morning period is typically associated with the most seriously

impaired performance of most individuals, particularly those who are accustomed to a normal dayawake/night-asleep schedule.
Analysis 46 Highway Accident Report

The Texas permit required a route survey, yet the permitted route included a

railroad grade crossing that the truck could not go over, a bridge and power lines that it

could not go under, and an intersection that it could not negotiate. By the time the truck

arrived at the Texas-New Mexico border, the New Mexico permit had expired. No one

associated with the movement of this load checked the date on the permit and called ahead

to renew it after the various delays in Texas, so the convoy was delayed further.

In California, the first team of CHP officers did not check the permits, the vehicle,

or the truckdriverís logbook. In Adelanto, had the second team of CHP officers checked

the truckdriverís logbook, they could have determined that he was near the end of his

hours of service. The name of a road along the route had been changed, but neither the

original route survey nor the Caltrans permit reflected the change. The permitís route had

a turn that the truck could not make and had it pass under a railroad bridge without

adequate clearance. The lead pilot car driver made an error transcribing the routes from

the permits to a handwritten list. He missed four turns in addition to the one that lead the

convoy off route and over the railroad grade crossing where the accident occurred.

Truckdriver Training

At the time of the accident, the truckdriver had a double/triple trailers CDL

endorsement and may have attended some company safety training meetings. But the

evidence does not indicate that he had received any specialized training in transporting

oversize/overweight loads, particularly over railroad grade crossings.

During the California segment of this trip, the convoy encountered five active

grade crossings that were on the permitted route. The first four were in the desert, had

relativity flat profiles, and were traversed in the daylight. The fifth crossing, at Polk Street

over the Metrolink tracks, was similar in appearance to the grade crossing where the

accident occurred and was traversed at night successfully. Although similar in appearance

to the accident crossing, the Polk Street crossing had a relatively flat profile.

When the truckdriver realized he was stuck on the grade crossing at the accident

site, he exited the vehicle and attempted to raise the semitrailer but could not do so before

the collision. The Safety Board has investigated four other accidents involving lowclearance vehicles hung up on crossings that were impacted by trains as the drivers were

trying to raise the semitrailers equipped with hydraulic lifts (see table 8). At least one

trailer manufacturer has indicated that there are no mechanical reasons why, when

approaching a grade crossing, a trailer could not be lifted and then lowered after traversing

the crossing. 

Investigators found no indication that the truckdriver evaluated the potential

hazards of crossing the tracks at the accident site or over any of the other crossings

encountered during the move. Nor did he or anyone else in the convoy notify the railroads

of each crossing that they traversed. Furthermore, although the driver believed that he

could raise the load sufficiently to clear the Grandview Avenue tracks, he did not consider

this strategy until his vehicle became stuck. This situation was also apparent in similar

accidents investigated by the Safety Board. Training drivers of low-clearance or
Analysis 47 Highway Accident Report

oversize/overweight vehicles should make them aware of the hazards of grade crossings.

The Safety Board concludes that had the truckdriver received training that emphasized the

hazards of railroad grade crossings for oversize/overweight vehicles, he might have

recognized the potential hazard and notified the railroad that he was about to traverse the

tracks and may have raised the height of the semitrailer before crossing the tracks.

The Safety Board has previously addressed the issue of training truckdrivers on the

hazards of low-clearance vehicles on hump crossings. As a result of the May 2, 1995,

Amtrak train collision with a tractor-low-bed semitrailer combination on a high-verticalprofile (hump) crossing in Sycamore, South Carolina, the Safety Board recommended that

the American Trucking Associations, Inc.:

H-96-08

Advise your membership of the circumstances of this accident and during inservice training for all drivers, highlight the potential hazards associated with

moving low-bed trailers over hump grade crossings. Include specific instructions

for notifying authorities when emergencies or hazardous conditions exist at grade

crossings. 

The American Trucking Associations, Inc., indicated in its response that

information regarding the accident has been published in its weekly newspaper Transport

Topics and that it developed the video Physics 101, which highlights general training on

grade crossing safety and specifically training on the hazards of low-bed vehicles over

grade crossings. The Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation H-96-08 ìClosedñ

Acceptable Actionî on September 6, 1996.

Also as a result of the Sycamore accident, the Safety Board recommended that the

American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:

H-96-06

Revise the Commercial Driverís License Manual to include specific information

on hump crossings and ensure that truckdrivers are tested on their knowledge of

grade crossing safety, with special emphasis on hump crossings.

In March 1996, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

indicated that the recommendation had been referred to its Test Maintenance

Subcommittee and would be placed on the agenda for the next meeting. In May 1996, the

Safety Board asked for progress reports on the subcommitteeís efforts to meet the intent of

the recommendation. In February 1998, the Safety Board inquired about the status of the

subcommitteeís actions and, having received no response from the American Association

of Motor Vehicle Administrators, in July 1998, classified Safety Recommendation

H-96-06 ìClosedñUnacceptable ActionñNo Response Received.î
Analysis 48 Highway Accident Report

In addition, the Safety Board has addressed the issue of operators of low-clearance

vehicles notifying the railroad before crossing the grade crossing. On November 30, 1993,

a 184-foot-long vehicle loaded with an 82-ton turbine was stopped on a private crossing

near Intercession City, Florida, while the crew was raising the height of the cargo deck,

when an Amtrak train carrying 89 passengers struck the side of the cargo deck and the

turbine.66 Six people sustained serious injuries and 53 people suffered minor injuries. As a

result of the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board recommended that AASHTO:

H-95-07

Inform your members of the facts and circumstances of the Intercession City,

Florida, accident and urge that they require operators of low-clearance,

overdimension/overweight vehicles to provide railroads with advance notification

of travel over grade crossings. Further, recommend that these members revise

their permit document to state that compliance with this notification requirement

is a condition of permitting. 

On April 30, 1996, after learning that AASHTO distributed copies of the accident

report to its members urging them to review their permit procedures and take corrective

action, as necessary, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation H-95-07

ìClosedóAcceptable Action.î

Also, as a result of the November 30, 1993, Intercession City accident

investigation, the Safety Board recommended that the Association of American Railroads:

R-95-24

Inform your members of the facts and circumstances of the Intercession City,

Florida, accident and recommend that they review their procedures for

coordinating the transit of over-dimensional, low-clearance highway vehicles

across their right-of-way.

On October 2, 1995, the Association of American Railroads informed the Safety

Board that it had informed its membership of the accident and asked that they review their

procedures for coordinating the transit of over-dimensional, low-clearance vehicles across

their right-of-way. On January 23, 1996, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendation R-95-24 ìClosedñAcceptable Action.î

Although the Safety Board has previously addressed the issue of low-clearance

vehicles at high-profile grade crossings, the movement of oversize/overweight vehicles

over grade crossings presents a unique problem within the trucking industry. Because of

the sheer size of these vehicles, they pose a hazard at any grade crossing, and this accident,

as well as others investigated by the Safety Board, demonstrates that truckdrivers

operating oversize/overweight vehicles may be unaware of the hazard. Therefore, the

66 National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Amtrak Train No. 88 with Roundtree Transport

and Rigging, Inc., Vehicle on CSX Transportation, Inc., Railroad Near Intercession City, Florida, November

30, 1993, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-95/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1995).
Analysis 49 Highway Accident Report

Safety Board believes that the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association should notify

its members of the circumstances of the Glendale, California, accident and during inservice training for heavy-haul drivers, (1) highlight the potential hazards associated with

moving low-clearance trailers over grade crossings and (2) emphasize the need to notify

the railroads before an oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad

grade crossing.

Pilot Car Driver Training

At the time of the accident, the lead pilot car driver had 8 years of experience and

was certified in Utah. However, the Utah pilot car certification curriculum does not

include railroad notification for crossing tracks. In this accident, the truckdriver and the

CHP officers depended on the lead pilot car driver for guidance through California,

particularly metropolitan Los Angeles.

Knowledge of the problems of low-clearance vehicles at railroad grade crossings

and how to evaluate the safety of each crossing would be valuable for pilot car drivers, as

well as for truckdrivers. The Safety Board concludes that had the pilot car drivers received

training that emphasized the hazards of railroad grade crossings for oversize/overweight

vehicles, the pilot car drivers might have recognized the potential hazard and notified the

railroad that the accident vehicle was about to traverse the tracks. 

In the November 17, 2000, Intercession City, Florida, accident, the Floridacertified pilot car driver who was involved did not know of the Florida requirement for

railroad notification; the Florida pilot car driver certification curriculum did not include

course information for railroad notification.

Pilot car drivers are not subject to hours-of-service rules. In the Glendale accident,

the lead pilot car driverís day started 5 hours before the trip began. He had driven from

San Bernardino to meet the load and waited with the CHP officers in Adelanto for the load

to arrive. Most often a pilot car driver adheres to the schedule of the truckdriver, who is

subject to hours-of-service rules. However, since pilot car drivers are not subject to the

hours-of-service rules, truckdrivers will often park the truck, and then the pilot car will

take them to eat or on short errands, as the rear pilot car driver did at several stops on the

accident trip. As this accident demonstrates, pilot car drivers can also be subject to the

effects of lack of sleep and need to be aware of the deleterious effects of fatigue.

All States require pilot cars for certain size loads; the Safety Board is aware of only

eight States that provide oversight in the form of certification of the pilot car drivers (see

table 6). Currently, the certification process ranges from reading a manual to classroom

instruction, and then passing a test. The existing manuals indicate that pilot car driver

responsibilities include ensuring that oversized/overweight loads are transported safely

through designated routes. This responsibility requires skill and knowledge. However, in

42 States, pilot car drivers are not required to have any specific training, pass any skills

tests, or demonstrate their knowledge regarding the movement of oversize/overweight

vehicles. Furthermore, pilot car drivers are not required to have CDLs.
Analysis 50 Highway Accident Report

Pilot cars and escort vehicles help protect the traveling public, the infrastructure,

and the oversized load itself. Pilot car drivers perform a safety-sensitive function and are

an integral component of many oversize/overweight vehicle movements; consequently, it

is important that they be trained and qualified. Yet, only eight States have methods or

oversight procedures in place to ensure that pilot car drivers are trained or qualified. As

this accident demonstrates, an untrained, inexperienced, or fatigued pilot car driver can

create hazardous situations during the movement of an oversized load.

The Safety Board considers pilot car driver training critical to ensuring that

oversize/overweight loads are transported safely. Such training should include instruction

in the effects of fatigue on performance, the need to assess the dangers of railroad

crossings, the requirement in some States to notify the railroads, route surveys, and the

maneuvering limitations of heavy-haul vehicles.

The Office of Freight Management and Operations in the FHWA provides limited

Federal oversight on the transportation of oversize/overweight loads. Three pilot car

associations represent the pilot car industry. The heavy hauling, or oversize/overweight

load, industry is represented by the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association. The

licensing organizations within the States are represented by the American Association of

Motor Vehicle Administrators, which currently administers the CDL program. The

American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, through its committees, has the

structure in place to administer uniform testing processes. Therefore, the Safety Board

believes that the FHWA should develop a model pilot car driver training program in

cooperation and consultation with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,

AASHTO, American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Commercial Vehicle

Safety Alliance, Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association, California Professional

Escort Car Association, Texas Pilot Car Association, and United Safety Car Association.

The training program should address, at a minimum, issues such as (1) how to conduct

route surveys; (2) the maneuvering limitations of heavy-haul vehicles; (3) the effects of

fatigue on performance; (4) the need to assess the dangers at railroad crossings,

particularly for low-clearance vehicles; and (5) the need and requirements to notify the

railroads before an oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad

grade crossing. 

Police Escort Training 

At the time of the accident, the CHP had policies in place governing the movement

of oversize/overweight vehicles but did not provide specific training for officers escorting

these vehicles. The policies addressed topics such as the condition of the

oversize/overweight vehicle, the truckdriverís duty status, placement of pilot cars, and

permit documentation. Although the CHP policy was to do so, neither of the CHP teams

involved in this accident examined the truckdriverís logbooks. The first team said they

assumed the truckdriver had gotten enough rest during the previous night near the Arizona

border before the California segment of the convoy movement began. Although the

truckdriver said that he told the second CHP team in Adelanto ìhe was near the end of his

available hours of service,î they deny that hours of service were discussed. If the second

CHP team had examined the truckdriverís logbooks, they could have known his duty
Analysis 51 Highway Accident Report

status and could have stopped the move at a safe place before the truckdriver was out of

available hours and fatigued due to lack of sleep.

In addition, at the beginning of both segments of the move in California, the CHP

officers performed a cursory examination of the permits to check the routes. However, the

CHP officers did not examine all permits, including the local permits, to determine their

validity, the special conditions including the department of public works escorts and local

curfews, and the routes. Had they examined the local permits, they would have realized

that the truck should not have entered the city of Los Angeles without the department of

public works escort and that the convoy only had permit applications for Glendale and

Hawthorne. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the CHP officers missed the

opportunity to identify and prevent the subsequent fatigued condition of the truckdriver

and the two pilot car drivers and the opportunity to identify inconsistencies between the

proposed movement and the permits. 

After the accident, the CHP made changes to its policy involving the movement of

oversize/overweight loads (variance or superloads). The CHP now requires its officers to:

(1) compare the route survey and permitted routes, (2) hold safety briefings to discuss

routing and special conditions of the permits before the move begins, and (3) park the load

if it becomes off route. The Safety Board supports these actions. Nonetheless, as in the

case of the truckdriver and pilot car drivers, the Safety Board concludes that had the CHP

officers received training that emphasized the hazards of railroad grade crossings for

oversize/overweight vehicles, the officers may have recognized the potential hazard and

notified the railroad that the accident vehicle was about to traverse the tracks. 

The Safety Board believes that the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the

International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Sheriffsí Association

should notify their members of the circumstances of the Glendale, California, accident and

encourage them to train their officers to make sure (1) that documentation regarding

permits is reviewed and verified; (2) that safety briefings to discuss routings and special

conditions, including the hazards associated with moving oversize/overweight vehicles

over grade crossings, are conducted; (3) that provisions for handling off-route loads are in

place; and (4) that necessary notification to the railroads is made before an

oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad grade crossing. 

Permitting Process

The movement of this load from Houston to El Segundo required 4 State and 12

local government permits. Obtaining a permit to move an oversize/overweight load

through the various State and local jurisdictions in the United States can be a very

complex operation. The permit errors made in the Glendale accident illustrate several

weaknesses in the process that led to difficulties during the movement.

The Texas permit required a route survey, yet the permitted route included a

railroad grade crossing that the truck could not traverse, a bridge and power lines that it

could not go under, and an intersection that it could not negotiate. A permitting process

grounded in safety should preclude such occurrences.
Analysis 52 Highway Accident Report

Dougís Pilot Car Service conducted a route survey for West Coast Services that

was submitted to Caltrans with the permit application. Caltrans issued the permit, entirely

within its prerogative, with a route that deviated from the route survey. The Caltrans

permit route had a turn that the truck could not make and took the convoy under a railroad

bridge the load could not clear. Detouring around the bridge resulted in a delay of several

hours.

Coordination

As discussed previously, the movement of this oversize/overweight vehicle from

Houston to Los Angeles was plagued by errors, delays, and a general lack of coordination

among the participants. The permits obtained did not correspond to the actual route taken,

and the discrepancies caused delays. Moreover, the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, and

police escorts did not share information among themselves and also exhibited a lack of

safety awareness regarding the movement of oversize/overweight vehicles over grade

crossings. Planning for this movement appeared to be haphazard and uncoordinated as

well. For example, the convoy had not even left the plant in Houston before it encountered

its first predictable obstacle, a tree that had to be cut down.

During the movement of an oversize/overweight load, the truckdriver, pilot car

drivers, motor carrier, permitting officials, and police escorts must communicate

effectively to coordinate their efforts. In this accident, several missed opportunities for

communication occurred, as well as several occasions of miscommunication:

1. In Adelanto, when the Inland Division CHP officers met with the truckdriver, a

discussion of hours of service should have taken place. The truckdriver said he

informed the CHP officers that he was almost out of available hours (he had

driven 8 1⁄2 hours). The CHP officers said that the conversation did not occur.

2. When the truckdriver reached the 10th hour, he should have informed the CHP

officers that he was beyond his available hours to drive.

3. When the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works employee said,

ìyouíre clear now,î the CHP officer-in-charge thought that the convoy was

clear all the way to El Segundo, when in fact the county department of public

works employee had meant the convoy was clear of the county and his

jurisdiction. 

4. The Los Angeles City Department of Public Works escort was not informed

that the convoy was 4 to 5 hours late, and it left after waiting from 12:00 a.m.

until 4:00 a.m.

5. When the convoy participants realized that they were off the permitted route

and stopped to determine how to get back on route, the lead pilot car driver and

the CHP officer-in-charge did not tell the truckdriver that his load had

bottomed out.
Analysis 53 Highway Accident Report

The poor communication may have resulted for several reasons. One such reason

is the interaction of private citizens and uniformed police. Private citizens tend to defer to

the authority of police. The truckdriverís reticence in making sure the CHP officers were

aware of his duty status is an example. The truckdriver evidently deferred to the authority

of the CHP officers and failed to effectively communicate his hours-of-service status

before abdicating responsibility to the CHP officers. The perceived authority of the CHP

officers and the associated ìpower imbalanceî appears to have led the truckdriver to

proceed in violation of his hours of service, erroneously believing that was the CHP

officersí intention.

This accident and the movement that preceded the accident demonstrate how

fragmented the permitting and route planning process can be and how poor

communication among the participants can lead to catastrophe. Although the States,

through their permitting process, have some requirements for oversize/overweight vehicle

movements, and permitting guidance is available through AASHTO, no overall guidance

is available concerning how this type of movement should be made.

The Safety Board concludes that had the movement of the accident vehicle been

coordinated more effectively, many of the errors, delays, and failures of communication

that led to the accident could have been avoided. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that

the FHWA should develop model oversize/overweight vehicle movement guidelines in

cooperation and consultation with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,

AASHTO, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the Commercial

Vehicle Safety Alliance, the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association, the California

Professional Escort Car Association, the Texas Pilot Car Association, and the United

Safety Car Association. The guidelines should address, at a minimum, issues such as

(1) when pilot cars and police escorts are required; (2) the training, testing, and

certification of pilot car operators, police officers, and truckdrivers in the movement of

oversize/overweight loads; (3) the use of height poles and traffic controls; (4) how to

conduct route surveys; (5) the maneuvering limitations of heavy-haul vehicles; (6) the

effects of fatigue on performance; (7) the need to assess the dangers at railroad crossings,

particularly for low-clearance vehicles; and (8) the need and requirements to notify the

railroads before an oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad

grade crossing. 

The Safety Board considers that the States should adopt the model

oversize/overweight vehicle movement guidelines, once developed, and require that

oversize/overweight vehicle movements conform to the guidelines. Therefore, the Safety

Board believes that the FHWA and AASHTO should encourage the States to adopt the

model oversize/overweight vehicle movement guidelines, once developed, and to require

that oversize/overweight vehicle movements conform to the guidelines.
54 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. Neither the design nor the operation of the active railroad grade crossing warning

devices nor the mechanical condition of the train contributed to the cause of the

accident; the emergency response was adequate and timely. 

2. The alert actions of the train engineer in warning the southbound commuter train

engineer of the track obstruction prevented a second collision.

3. Poor preparation and planning for the movement of the oversize/overweight load

resulted in the convoy crossing the Grandview Avenue highway-railroad grade

crossing instead of turning onto San Fernando Road.

4. Had the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, or police escorts recognized the potential hazard

created by the oversize/overweight vehicle crossing the tracks, they could have taken

appropriate action and avoided this accident. 

5. Had low-ground clearance warning signs been present at the Glendale crossing, the

information conveyed by the signs may have alerted the truckdriver, pilot car drivers,

or police escorts to the low-clearance hazard and may have prevented the accident. 

6. The judgment and vigilance of the pilot car drivers and the truckdriver may have been

affected by a lack of sleep. 

7. Had the truckdriver received training that emphasized the hazards of railroad grade

crossings for oversize/overweight vehicles, he might have recognized the potential

hazard and notified the railroad that he was about to traverse the tracks and may have

raised the height of the semitrailer before crossing the tracks.

8. Had the pilot car drivers received training that emphasized the hazards of railroad

grade crossings for oversize/overweight vehicles, the pilot car drivers might have

recognized the potential hazard and notified the railroad that the accident vehicle was

about to traverse the tracks. 

9. The California Highway Patrol officers missed the opportunity to identify and prevent

the subsequent fatigued condition of the truckdriver and the two pilot car drivers and

the opportunity to identify inconsistencies between the proposed movement and the

permits.
Conclusions 55 Highway Accident Report

10. Had the California Highway Patrol officers received training that emphasized the

hazards of railroad grade crossings for oversize/overweight vehicles, the officers may

have recognized the potential hazard and notified the railroad that the accident vehicle

was about to traverse the tracks.

11. Had the movement of the accident vehicle been coordinated more effectively, many

of the errors, delays, and failures of communication that led to the accident could

have been avoided.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the collision of the Metrolink passenger train with the tractor-combination vehicle was (1)

inadequate preparation and route planning for the movement; (2) poor coordination of the

movement among the truckdriver, pilot car drivers, police escort, and permitting

authorities; and (3) a lack of recognition of the potential hazard caused by the accident

vehicle at the grade crossing. Contributing to the accident was the fatigue of the pilot car

drivers and the truckdriver. 
56 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the

following safety recommendations:

To the Federal Highway Administration, in cooperation and consultation with the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the American Association of State

Highway and Transportation Officials, the American Association of Motor Vehicle

Administrators, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the Specialized Carriers

and Rigging Association, the California Professional Escort Car Association, the

Texas Pilot Car Association, and the United Safety Car Association:

Develop a model pilot car driver training program. The training program

should address, at a minimum, issues such as (1) how to conduct route

surveys; (2) the maneuvering limitations of heavy-haul vehicles; (3) the

effects of fatigue on performance; (4) the need to assess the dangers at

railroad crossings, particularly for low-clearance vehicles; and (5) the need

and requirements to notify the railroads before an oversize/overweight

vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad grade crossing. (H-01-30)

Develop model oversize/overweight vehicle movement guidelines. The

guidelines should address, at a minimum, issues such as (1) when pilot cars

and police escorts are required; (2) the training, testing, and certification of

pilot car operators, police officers, and truckdrivers in the movement of

oversize/overweight loads; (3) the use of height poles and traffic controls;

(4) how to conduct route surveys; (5) the maneuvering limitations of

heavy-haul vehicles; (6) the effects of fatigue on performance; (7) the need

to assess the dangers at railroad crossings, particularly for low-clearance

vehicles; and (8) the need and requirements to notify the railroads before

an oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad grade

crossing. (H-01-31)

To the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials, the American Association of Motor

Vehicle Administrators, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the Specialized

Carriers and Rigging Association, the California Professional Escort Car

Association, the Texas Pilot Car Association, and the United Safety Car

Association:

Work with the Federal Highway Administration to develop a model pilot

car driver training program. The training program should address, at a

minimum, issues such as (1) how to conduct route surveys; (2) the

maneuvering limitations of heavy-haul vehicles; (3) the effects of fatigue

on performance; (4) the need to assess the dangers at railroad crossings,
Recommendations 57 Highway Accident Report

particularly for low-clearance vehicles; and (5) the need and requirements

to notify the railroads before an oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted

across a highway-railroad grade crossing. (H-01-32)

Work with the Federal Highway Administration to develop model

oversize/overweight vehicle movement guidelines. The guidelines should

address, at a minimum, issues such as (1) when pilot cars and police escorts

are required; (2) the training, testing, and certification of pilot car

operators, police officers, and truckdrivers in the movement of

oversize/overweight loads; (3) the use of height poles and traffic controls;

(4) how to conduct route surveys; (5) the maneuvering limitations of

heavy-haul vehicles; (6) the effects of fatigue on performance; (7) the need

to assess the dangers at railroad crossings, particularly for low-clearance

vehicles; and (8) the need and requirements to notify the railroads before

an oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad grade

crossing. (H-01-33)

To the Federal Highway Administration and the American Association of State

Highway and Transportation Officials:

Encourage the States to adopt the model oversize/overweight vehicle

movement guidelines, as addressed in Safety Recommendations H-01-31

and -33, and once developed, to require that oversize/overweight vehicle

movements conform to the guidelines. (H-01-34)

To the City of Glendale, California:

Install low-clearance highway-railroad grade crossing signs (W10-5s) at

the Grandview Avenue crossing and evaluate other crossings to determine

whether the signs are warranted and, if so, install them. (H-01-35)

To the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the International Association of Chiefs

of Police, and the National Sheriffsí Association:

Notify your members of the circumstances of the Glendale, California,

accident and encourage them to train their officers to make sure (1) that

documentation regarding permits is reviewed and verified; (2) that safety

briefings to discuss routings and special conditions, including the hazards

associated with moving oversize/overweight vehicles over grade crossings,

are conducted; (3) that provisions for handling off-route loads are in place;

and (4) that necessary notification to the railroads is made before an

oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad grade

crossing. (H-01-36)
Recommendations 58 Highway Accident Report

To the Specialized Carriers and Rigging Association:

Notify your members of the circumstances of the Glendale, California,

accident and during in-service training for heavy-haul drivers, (1) highlight

the potential hazards associated with moving low-clearance trailers over

grade crossings and (2) emphasize the need to notify the railroads before an

oversize/overweight vehicle is escorted across a highway-railroad grade

crossing. (H-01-37)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARION C. BLAKEY

Chairman

CAROL J. CARMODY

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member 

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

Adopted: November 27, 2001
59 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Glendale, California,

accident about 11:00 a.m. on January 29, 2000. An investigative team was dispatched with

members from the Gardena, California, office. Groups were established to investigate the

highway and railroad factors and the motor carrier operations.

No parties were designated; no public hearing was held; no depositions were

taken.
60 Highway Accident Report

Appendix B

Terms Relating to Oversize/Overweight Loads

Tractor-semitrailer Typically made up of tractor (18 to 20 feet long) and semitrailer

(40 to 53 feet long), both 8 feet wide, and together weighing not

more than 80,000 pounds.

Heavy haul Has gross vehicle weight greater than 80,000 pounds.

Extralegal Vehicle or load that is larger or heavier than State size or weight

regulations.

Super load Definition varies among the States; in California, vehicle with

dimensions greater than 15 feet wide, 17 feet high, and 135 feet

long.

Variance load Another term for super load.

Low clearance Vehicle with vertical body or load clearance of less than 1⁄2-inchper-foot of distance between any two axles or less than 9 inches,

measured above level surface of roadway.a

a. Source: Uniform Vehicle Code.

Permit Variance from oversize/overweight load restrictions issued by

State and local authorities.
61 Highway Accident Report

Appendix C

California Department of Transportation

Office of Truck Services

Summary of Major Improvements

Staffing

ï September 1999 - January 2000 ó Hired 15 additional permit writers to

double check all overheight (>14 feet) permits.

ï September 1999 ó Began formal training of new and current staff.

ï October 1999 ó Hired consultants to document, modify, enhance, and

maintain Transportation Permits Routing Database and provide computer and

network support. 

ï October 1999 ó Established Transportation Permits Steering Committee made

up of Caltransí upper management to direct efforts on improvements.

ï December 1999 - January 2000 ó Hired two additional managers for regional

Transportation Permits Offices.

ï July 2000 ó Procured services of consultant for oversight/quality assurance of

automated permitting system (Transportation Permits Management System).

ï December 2000 ó Hired full-time project manager to lead procurement and

implementation of automated transportation permits system.

ï March 2001 ó Developed plans to explore options for recruitment, retention,

and upward mobility of transportation permits staff.

ï May 2001 ó Completed hiring of 10 District Truck Services managers for 12

Caltrans districts, who are main link between various functional units in

Caltrans, CHP, trucking industry, and regional Transportation Permits Offices

(two of which are in Sacramento and San Bernardino).

ï Ongoing ó Employing formal and on-job training with specific emphasis on

safety.

Processes

ï November - December 1999 ó Began process of verification of vertical

clearances. 

ï July 2000 ó Completed measurements of 6,500 State highway bridges;

updated Caltrans Route-Clearing Database with this information.
Appendix C 62 Highway Accident Report

ï February - May 2000 ó Joint Legislative Audit Committee approved audit of

transportation permits program. Published final report on May 31, 2000.

Caltrans adopted recommendations.

ï June 2000 ó Issued policies on communication between various functions

within Caltrans and transportation permits program. Established within these

policies new and revised procedures on reporting of temporary and permanent

changes to highway system impacting routing of extralegal loads/vehicles.

ï June 2001 ó Input 94 percent of bridge measurements into Caltrans RouteClearing Database.

ï Ongoing ó Issuing weekly notification of State highway changes to permit

holders/customers.

Tools

ï July - August 2000 ó Procured fax services to notify permit holders of

changes to State highway system affecting routing of extralegal loads.

ï August - September 1999 ó Made several safety enhancements to current

routing system database.

ï September 1999 ó Transferred responsibilities of modifications and

improvements to and maintenance of routing database from regional

Transportation Permits Offices to Caltrans IT [information technology]

function, including preparation of user guide and software documentation of

all transportation permit databases and reference systems.

ï September 2001 ó Began work on Transportation Permits Management

System.

ï October 2002 ó Transportation Permits Management System in production.
63 Highway Accident Report

Appendix D

California Highway Patrol Teams 1 and 2 Escort Officersí

On-Duty Time for the 3 Days Prior to the Accident

Source: California Highway Patrol on October 19, 2001.

Officer Commercial training January 25 January 26

January 

27/28

#1 -- Team 1 Basic academy, commercial 

level 1

0500 - 1430 0500 - 1430 0530 - 2100*

#2 -- Team 1 Basic academy 2130 - 0600 2130 - 0600 0530 ñ 2100*

#3 -- Team 2

officer-in-charge

Basic academy, commercial 

level 1

0700 - 1530 0700 - 1530 0700 - 1530

2000 - 0600*

#4 -- Team 2 Basic academy, commercial 

level 1

2200 - 0630 2200 - 0630 2000 - 0600*

#5 -- Team 2 Basic academy 0700 - 1530 0700 - 1530 0700 - 1530

2030 - 0600*

 *Overtime hours worked escorting load