alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order entered May 18, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01079-CR

HENRY ANDRE WINZER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court

Kaufman County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 14-00334-422-F

ORDER

The State’s motion to extend the time in which to file its brief is GRANTED. The brief 

is deemed timely filed as of May 18, 2015.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

PRESIDING JUSTICE
52.209-12 Certification Regarding Tax Matters.       As prescribed in 9.104-7(e), insert the following provision:          Certification Regarding Tax Matters (Oct 2020)                                       (a) 						             This provision implements section 523 of Division B of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub. L. 113-235), and similar provisions, if contained in subsequent appropriations acts.                                          (b) 						             If the Offeror is proposing a total contract price that will exceed  							$5.5 million 						 (including options), the Offeror shall certify that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, it                                                         (1) 								                 Has □ filed all Federal tax returns required during the three years preceding the certification;                                                            (2) 								                 Has not □ been convicted of a criminal offense under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and                                                            (3) 								                 Has not □, more than 90 days prior to certification, been notified of any unpaid Federal tax assessment for which the liability remains unsatisfied, unless the assessment is the subject of an installment agreement or offer in compromise that has been approved by the Internal Revenue Service and is not in default, or the assessment is the subject of a non-frivolous administrative or judicial proceeding.                                                                    (End of provision)    **Parent topic:** 52.209 [Reserved]
#### BIRKETT MILLS, Respondent, v. FENNER, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

May 27, 1914.)

Action by the Birkett Mills against William B. Fenner.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs, and certified copies of order approving trustee's bond and of adjudication of bankruptcy received in support of the judgment. See. Whitwell v. Wright, 136 App. Div. 246, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1065. See, also, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1045.
#### §§ 3570.278-3570.280 [Reserved]
§ 201.53 Source of seeds for germination. ( a ) When both purity and germination tests are required, seeds for germination shall be taken from the separation of the kind, variety, or type considered pure seed and shall be counted without discrimination as to size or appearance.
( b ) When only a germination test is required and the pure seed is estimated or determined to be at least 98 percent, the pure seed for the germination test may be taken indiscriminately from a representative portion of the bulk.
( c ) When only a germination test is required and the pure seed is found to be less than 98 percent, the seed for the test shall be obtained by separating the sample into two components as follows: ( 1 ) Pure seed and
( 2 ) other crop seed, weed seed, and inert matter. In making this separation at least 1 ⁄ 4 of the quantity required for a regular purity analysis shall be used. The whole sample must be well mixed and divided in such a manner as to get a completely representative subsample.
[10 FR 9952, Aug. 11, 1945, as amended at 20 FR 7931, Oct. 21, 1955]
#### In the Matter of Charles M. Young, as Surviving Trustee under Agreement Made by David V. Shaw-Kennedy, for Benefit of David V. Shaw-Kennedy, III, and Others, Appellant. David V. Shaw-Kennedy, III, Respondent.

Interlocutory judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered May 2, 1979, modified, in the exercise of discretion, to strike therefrom the provisions that the trustee return to this jurisdiction the assets transferred to the beneficiary’s Nevada guardians, that the trustee be suspended as such and forfeit commissions for one year, and that he should be personally held responsible for fees, costs and disbursements of this proceeding; and to remand the proceeding to Special Term, New York County, for the imposition of such sanctions, if any, as are deemed appropriate in the circumstances, without costs. While Special Term had the authority in this accounting proceeding to direct the return of assets and to impose the stated sanctions (EPTL 7-2.6), it does not appear that the trustee’s actions in removing the assets to other fiduciaries appointed pursuant to the laws of another jurisdiction under court supervision actually worked any injury to the beneficiary or to the trust estate. This is not to say that this action, taken without application to the courts of this State, was proper or seemly or other than an affront to orderly judicial process. Actually, all that can be said in its favor is that it was seemingly without improper motive and did no harm. However, while the act may be deserving of sanction, we deem those imposed to be more severe than dictated by the circumstances. *732Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of this aspect of the interlocutory judgment. Concur—Sandler, J. P., Markewich, Silverman and Carro, JJ.
§ 46.17 Inspection of records. ( a ) Each licensee shall, during ordinary business hours, promptly upon request, permit any duly authorized representative of USDA to enter its place of business and inspect such accounts, records, and memoranda as may be material: ( 1 ) In the investigation of complaints under the Act, including any petition, written notification, or complaint under section 6 of the Act,
( 2 ) To the determination of ownership, control, packer, or State, country, or region of origin in connection with commodity inspections,
( 3 ) To ascertain whether there is compliance with section 9 of the Act,
( 4 ) In administering the licensing and bonding provisions of the Act,
( 5 ) If the licensee has been determined in a formal disciplinary proceeding to have violated the prompt payment provision of section 2(4) of the Act, to determine whether, at the time of the inspection, there is compliance with that section.
( b ) Any necessary facilities for such inspection shall be extended to such representative by the licensee, its agents, and employees.
[62 FR 15087, Mar. 31, 1997]
#### § 6.9 Information.

Persons desiring information from the Department of Agriculture regarding section 22 or section 8(a), or any action with respect thereto, should address such inquiries to the Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington 25, DC.
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<NET-INCOME>                                 1,457,553
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    55.98
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JOHN HAMILTON, aka JOHN WAYNE 

HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:20-cv-422-AW-MAF

STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., 

Defendants.

_______________________________/

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

John Hamilton sued the State of Florida, one of its judges (in her individual 

capacity), state agencies, and others, seeking to overturn a state court judgment from 

more than a decade ago. The relief he seeks is that “all cases that concerns the 

Hamilton Estate, Family should be overturn[ed] from 2006 through 2009 Because 

of my death in a case concerning Judge Patricia Thomas violation of civil rights.”

ECF No. 1 at 13.

The magistrate judge recommends dismissal. ECF No. 6. I have carefully 

considered the Report and Recommendation, and I have considered de novo the 

issues raised in Hamilton’s objection. ECF No. 8. I agree that dismissal is 

appropriate.

As the magistrate judge correctly notes, at the heart of this case is Hamilton’s 

effort to overturn state court judgments. This court does not have jurisdiction to 

Case 4:20-cv-00422-AW-MAF Document 9 Filed 10/01/20 Page 1 of 2
2

review state court judgments. In addition, to the extent Hamilton sues the judge, the 

judge has judicial immunity. Numerous other defendants are not subject to suit 

because they are not “persons” under § 1983 (and most do not have facts alleged 

involving them). At bottom, Hamilton cannot succeed.

The Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated into this order. 

The clerk will enter a judgment that says, “The claims against Judge Thomas in her 

individual capacity are dismissed on the merits. The remainder of the case is 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it seeks review of one or more state court 

judgments.” The clerk will then close the file.

SO ORDERED on October 1, 2020. 

s/ Allen Winsor

United States District Judge

Case 4:20-cv-00422-AW-MAF Document 9 Filed 10/01/20 Page 2 of 2
#### § 58.342 General identification.

Commercial bulk shipping containers shall be legibly marked with the name of the product, net weight, name and address of manufacturer, processor or distributor or other assigned plant identification (manufacturer's lot number, churn number, etc.) and any other identification that may be required. Packages of plastic or frozen cream shall be marked with the percent of milkfat.
(December 12, 1979)

#### In the Matter of Roy A. Pappas, Attorney, Respondent. Committee on Professional Standards, Third Judicial Department, Petitioner.

Respondent was admitted to the Bar by this court on July 16, 1968. By decision dated March 4, 1977, he was suspended for a period of six months and until further order of the court *(Matter of Pappas,*56 AD2d 947). In the present disciplinary proceeding, petitioner moves to confirm in part and to disaffirm in part the report of the Judge to whom the issues were referred. The petition contains 13 charges of professional misconduct. The Hearing Judge sustained seven of the charges in full and six in part, finding that respondent neglected clients’ matters; failed, in two instances, to notify clients of his suspension from practice; deceived clients as to the status of their matters; and failed to return unearned fees to clients and, in one instance, to repay funds due a client as promised. The record supports and we confirm the findings with respect to the above. The Hearing Judge refused to sustain the allegations that respondent (1) deceived a client as to the use of certain funds furnished to him; (2) neglected a divorce proceeding; (3) deceived a client as to the status of a bankruptcy matter and failed to furnish status reports to her; (4) failed to respond to clients’ letters; (5) deceived clients as to the status of their personal injury claim; and (6) neglected a real estate transaction. We agree with the Hearing Judge as to (2) and (3). However, we disagree as to the remainder and find that the evidence in the record supports and, therefore, we sustain the allegations of misconduct set forth therein. In determining the sanction to be imposed for respondent’s misconduct, we note that the charges sustained in the first proceeding were serious, as are these. And while it appears that, in all cases in the present proceeding except one, respondent has either returned unearned fees and moneys due to his clients or deposited the unearned fees with his attorney with instructions to pay the same to his former clients upon learning their whereabouts, the fact remains that this was not done until *after*respondent was served with the petition in this matter. Accordingly, under all the circumstances, we conclude that respondent should be suspended for an additional period of one year. Respondent suspended for a period of one year effective from the date of this decision and thereafter until the further order of the court. Sweeney, J. P., Kane, Staley, Jr., Main and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1996
<CASH>                                          932578
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  1596448
<ALLOWANCES>                                    411317
<INVENTORY>                                      21258
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               2824842
<PP&E>                                        10411511
<DEPRECIATION>                                 4490074
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 9185608
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2657362
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           816
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     4301191
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   9185608
<SALES>                                        2622024
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               2762474
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  2528415
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              103372
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 130687
<INCOME-TAX>                                     57685
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              73002
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     73002
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .04
        

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Unassociated Document


    Exhibit
10.1

     

    AMENDMENT
TO

     

    EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT

     

    This
Amendment to Employment Agreement (this “Amendment”), dated and effective as of
April 1, 2009, is made by and among Harbin Electric, Inc., a Nevada corporation
(the “Company”), and Christy Young Shue, an individual residing at 20 Ramblewood
Road, Shoreham, New York 11786 (the “Executive”).  Any capitalized
term not defined herein shall have the meaning for such term specified in the
Employment Agreement (as defined below).

     

    WHEREAS, the Executive and the
Company entered into an Employment Agreement dated November 27, 2007, (the
“Employment Agreement”); and

     

    WHEREAS, the Company and the
Executive wish to amend the Employment Agreement on the terms and subject to the
conditions set forth herein.

     

    NOW THEREFORE, in
consideration of the foregoing and for other consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, intending to be
legally bound, hereby agree as follows:

     

    1.            
The first sentence of Article I, Section 1.2 of the Employment Agreement
is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:

     

    “The Executive shall serve the Company
as Executive Vice President of Finance and Investor Relations ("EVP") and as
Corporate Secretary of the Company.”

     

    2.            
Article I, Section 1.5(a) of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended
by deleting the phrase “a base salary of not less than $100,000 per year” and
replacing it with “a base salary of not less than $110,000 per
year”.

     

    3.            
Except as specifically amended hereby, the Employment Agreement shall
continue in full force and effect unmodified and the parties hereby reaffirm the
same.

     

    4.            
This Amendment shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the
laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to the conflict of laws
principles thereof.

     

    5.            
This Amendment may be signed in any number of counterparts, each of which
shall be an original and all of which shall be deemed to be one and the same
instrument, with the same effect as if the signatures thereto and hereto were
upon the same instrument.  A facsimile signature shall be deemed to be
an original signature for purposes of this Amendment.

     

    [Remainder
of page intentionally left blank]

     

    
      
        
        

      

      
        
        

        
          

        

      

      
        
        

      

    

     

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
parties hereto have duly executed this Amendment as of the day and year first
above written.

     

     

    
      
        	 	HARBIN ELECTRIC,
      INC.	 
	 	 	 	 
	
                 

              	
                By:
      

              	 	 
	 	 	Name: Tianfu
      Yang	 
	 	 	Title:
      Chairman and Chief Executive Officer	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	EXECUTIVE:	 
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	Christy
      Young Shue
2005-2443.

#### Ullmann v. Duffus.

Franklin App. No. 05AP-299, 2005-Ohio-6060. Reported at 109 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2006-Ohio-1703, 845 N.E.2d 523. On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.

O’Donnell, J., dissents.
#### § 51.1155 Well colored.

*Well colored* as applied to common oranges and tangelos means that the fruit has characteristic color for the variety with practically no trace of green color.
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. CASE NO. 1:94-cr-01036-MP

JAMES R YOUNG,

Defendant. 

___________________________/

O R D E R 

This matter is before the Court on Mr. Young’s Notice of Appeal, which the Court

construes as including a Motion for Certificate of Appealability ("COA"). The COA

requirement is a result of amendments made to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. All

appeals of habeas petitions which are filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA,

require that a habeas petitioner first receive a COA before a circuit court can hear the petitioner's

appeal. See Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1573 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.

denied, 117 S.Ct. 1695, 137 L.Ed.2d 822 (1997). Pursuant to the statute, "[a] certificate of

appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of

a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (emphasis added). Section 2253(c)(3) requires

the district court to indicate which specific issues, if any, a habeas petitioner is entitled to raise.

In order to make the requisite "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"

[28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)], "a petitioner who has been denied relief in a district court 'must

demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the

issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to

Case 1:94-cr-01036-MW-GRJ Document 140 Filed 06/19/08 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Case No: 1:94-cr-01036-MP

proceed further.'" Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 432, 111 S.Ct. 860, 862, 112 L.Ed.2d 956

(1991) (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, n.4,

103 S.Ct. 3383, 3394, n.4, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983)) If a petitioner fails to make such a showing,

his or her request for a COA must be denied. See, e.g., United States v. Riddick, 104 F.3d 1239,

1241 (10th Cir. 1997); Hohn v. United States, 99 F.3d 892, 893 (8th Cir. 1996), petition for cert.

filed (May 12, 1997) (No. 96-8986).

Here, as described in the Order denying in forma pauperis status on appeal, doc. 133, Mr.

Young is attempting to bring a successive § 2255 motion without first having received

permission from the Eleventh Circuit. Accordingly, no reasonable jurists would debate the fact

that petitioner's habeas corpus petition was properly dismissed. Therefore, Petitioner cannot

make a substantial showing of the violation of a constitutional right and the Application for

Certificate of Appealability is denied. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of June, 2008

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge

Case 1:94-cr-01036-MW-GRJ Document 140 Filed 06/19/08 Page 2 of 2