,., ,I.’ 

,^ ’ ‘, ,! / “’ ,(._ ^, 

‘_ 

The 

IOlst Airborne 

Division’s Defense 

of Bastogne 

bY 

Colonel Ralph M. Mitchell 

September 1986 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
Library of Congrees Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Mitchell, Ralph M. (Ralph Molyneux), 1942. 

The 1Olst Airborne Division’s defense of Bastogne. 

“September 1986.” 

Bibliography: p. 

1. Ardennes, Battle of the, 1944-1945. 2. United 

States. Army. Airborne Division, lOlst-History. 

3. World War, 1939-1945-Regimental histories-United 

States, I. Title. 

D756.5.A7M58 1987 940.54’21 86-28316 
CONTENTS 

Maps . . . . . . ..l.~....1...........1........................I... v 

Chapter 

I. 

II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

Bastogne: The Context of the Battle , . 

Organization and Deployment of Units 

Saving Bastogne: A Chronology . . . . , . 

Applications of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 

Combat Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusions , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 

* . r . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

I . * . I . 

Notes ....................................................... 45 

Bibliography ................................................ 49 

e.9 

111 
1. Troop dispositions before the German advance . , . . . . 2 

2. The road and rail configuration, Bastogne area . , . . .3 

3. The German plan for the Ardennes offensive, 

December 1944 . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . , . , . , . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . .4 

4. Situation, 19 December 1944 . . , , . . . . . , . . . , . . . . . . , . :. . 18-19 

5. Situation, 20 December 1944 . , . , . . . , . , . . , . . . , . . , . , . . .20-21 

6. Situation, 21 December 1944 . , . . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 22-23 

7. Situation, 22 December 1944 . , , . . . . . . , . , . , . . . . . . , . , . .24-25 

8. Situation, 23 December 1944 , , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . 26-27 

9. Situation, 24 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28-29 

10. Situation, 25 December 1944 . . . . , _. . . . , . . , . . . %. . , . , . I 30-31 

11. Situation, 26 December 1944 . . , . . . . . . , s , . , . . . . . . , . ~ , .32-33 
I, BASTOGNE: THE CONTEXT 

OF THE BATTLE 

By October 1944, the rapid Allied advance into Germany 

that followed the breakout from the Normandy beaches had 

slowed to a crawl. Stiffening German resistance and Allied 

logistical and communications problems exerted a significant 

influence on the Allied advance. In the American sector, Lt. 

Gen. Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group occupied an extended 

front, with the First and Third Armies along the Siegfried Line 

and the Ninth Army facing the Roer River. There would be 

little change in these positions in October and November-1 (see 

map 1). 

The First Army had an extensive line of defense near 

Aachen, Germany. Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton’s VIII Corps 

occupied that army’s southern sector. Its 88mile front extended 

from Losheim, Germany, north through eastern Belgium and 

Luxembourg to where the Our River crosses the France-German 

border. The corps’ mission was to defend in place in a relatively 

quiet sector. There, new divisions could receive a safe indoctrination, and battle-weary ones could rest and reconstitute for future 

operations. Headquarters, VIII Corps, was located in the small 

Belgian town of Bastogne. The area around Bastogne was 

characterized by rugged hills, high plateaus, deep-cut valleys, 

and restricted road nets. Bastogne itself was the hub for seven 

roads and a railroad.2 Both sides understood the significance of 

that fact (see map 2). 

Alarmed by the continuing grave situation in the east, 

Adolph Hitler saw an opportunity for a decisive offensive in 

the west as the Allied offensive stalled there. Without complete 

support from his closest advisers, he directed the launching of 

a winter offensive against the western Allies through the Aisne 

Ardennes sector of the front. The purpose was to recapture the 

important port of Antwerp while encircling and destroying the 

21st Army Group. In so doing, Hitler would turn the fate of the 

war in Germany’s favor. 3 Middleton’s VIII Corps, however, was 

directly astride the main avenue of advance of the Fifth Panzer 

Army. 

Few German officers were privy to the plans for this offensive, called Watch on Rhine. Most Germans thought preparations were for defensive measures until a few days before the 

attack began. 4 Operating with little insight as to the ultimate 

-.---._-___---___, -_n~-._-.--- 

BELGIUM 

objectives of their own units, many commanders had insufficient 

opportunity for reconnaissance and failed to consider the numerous contingencies that might soon arise. They remained 

unaware of the tactical implications of their situations, while 

Hitler’s intuition was allowed to prevail.5 

The Germans, however, had identified Bastogne as a possible 

point of major difficulty and had considered the control of the 

vital crossroads through that town to be absolutely necessary 

to maintain their rear area lines of communication. Hitler had 

expressly ordered Bastogne’s capture, and that mission had been 

passed through Army Group (Heeresgruppe) and Fifth Army to 

XLVII Panzer Corps, which would be attacking through the 

Bastogne sector. Specifically, the corps was to cross the Our 

River on a wide front, bypass the Clerf sector, take Bastogne, 

and move to and cross the Meuse River south of Namur6 (see 

map 3). The corps’ commander, General Baron Heinrich von 

Luettwitz, had specifically asked about Bastogne at a conference 

in Kyllburg prior to the offensive. In the presence of General 

von Manteuffel, the Fifth Army commander, von Luettwitz was 

told that Bastogne would definitely have to be taken. Aecordingly, in instructions to his subordinates, he stated: “Bastogne 

must be captured, if necessary from the rear. Otherwise it will 

be an abscess in the route of advance and tie up too many 

forces. Bastogne is to be mopped up first, then the bulk of the 

corps continues its advance.“7 

__..--- -__lll - 

5 

In light of such specific guidance prior to the operation, it 

is curious that the Fifth Panzer Army staff did not interpret 

those instructions the same way. Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Carl 

Wagener, stated, “Bastogne would not necessarily have to be 

taken but merely encircled. This would avoid any loss of time 

east of the Maas [Meuse].” The Germans expected that the 

advance to the Meuse would not be delayed by any attack on 

Bastogne because both would be accomplished simultaneously.8 

Luettwitz also differed with Fifth Panzer Army about the 

amount of time it would take his men to reach the Meuse. The 

Fifth Panzer’s staff expected the attack to take four days; the 

commander of XLVII Panzer Corps thought it would take six 

days and had doubts about taking Bastogne by the end of the 

second day as Fifth Army had projected.9 Luettwitz had good 

reason to be pessimistic. 

In the midst of general confusion about the forthcoming 

operation, pessimism seemed the order of the day, and vital 

planning went awry. Luettwitz himself doubted whether the 

offensive would succeed. The Germans had to achieve surprise, 

and the Allied air forces somehow had to be neutralized.- Hitler 

would have to deliver both a sufficient quantity of fuel and the 

3,000 German aircraft he had promised on 11 December 1944. 

Perhaps the attacking German columns could reach the Meuae, 

but without divisions to cover their extended flanks and without 

adequate bridging equipment, there was little hope that they 

could push farther-l0 
II. ORGANIZATION 

AND 

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS _ 

With the attack scheduled for 16 December 1944, there was 

good reason for German concern. The number of their soldiers 

available had steadily decreased, most units had not been rested, 

and all units encountered significant shortages of organic weapons, tanks, trucks, spare parts, ammunition, and fuel. Moreover, there were no plans to capture enemy supplies, and the 

success of the operation did not hinge on that possibility. 

German general staffs at all echelons also believed that the 

enemy had no strategic reserves available on the Continent and 

that there would be little Allied resistance in ‘the Baatogne 

area.11 Both assumptions proved fatally incorrect. 

The XLVII Panzer Corps consisted of the 2d Panzer Division, Panzer Lehr Division, and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, all reinforced by one oolks mortar brigade, one uolks 

artillery corps, and the 600th Army Engineer Battalion for 

bridging purposes. None was at full strength. The 2d Panzer 

Division had been in the rear area for four weeks to rest and 

refit. It had only 80 percent of its authorized personnel and 

equipment, but its commanders were seasoned veterans. One 

panzergrenadier battalion was on bicycles to save fuel and 

vehicles. It would be totally unfit for combat in the hilly roads 

of the rugged Ardennes and ultimately would have to be used 

only for replacement troops. 

The Panzer Lehr Division had just returned from the Saar 

area. It had 60 percent of its troops, 40 percent of its tanks 

and tank destroyera, 60 percent of its guns, and 40 percent of 

its other types of weapons. One tank battalion had no tanks 

and, thus, was unavailable for the attack. In its place, the 

division received the 539th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion 

equipped with 30 percent of its authorized Panther tank destroyers. Due to previous battle losses, the 26th Volksgrenadier 

Division was without one regiment. But the remainder of the 

division was at full strength and had several seasoned senior 

commanders. Many subordinate commanders, however, were 

without previous combat experience, and the division had not 

been trained in offensive operations. Organizations later assigned 

to the XLVII Panzer Corps in operations around Bastogne would 

arrive in poor condition, with strengths ranging from 50 to 70 

7 

__ .- -. - 
8 

percent. These included the 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions, the 

3d and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions, and the Fiihrer Begleit 

(Escort) Brigade.12 

Following a heavy artillery bombardment at 0500 on 16 

December 1944, the Germans launched their offensive, gaining 

surprise and immediate Iocal successes in all sectors. In the 

American VIII Corps sector alone, twenty-five German divisions 

were attacking. They struck and advanced through the veteran, 

but weary, 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions as well as the green 

106th Infantry Division and the equally inexperienced 14th 

Cavalry Group. Only in the 4th Division sector was action light. 

The only U.S. corps reserve consisted of an armored combat 

command and four battalions of combat engineers.13 Amid much 

confusion and disorganization in the American units, the Germans advanced steadily, but not as rapidly as they had hoped. 

Poor roads became overcrowded, and small pockets of determined resistance waged by American infantry and armored 

units slowed, but did not stop, the German advance. The Allied 

high command realized that Bastogne was threatened and reserves were needed immediately. Accordingly, on 17 December 

1944, the 1Olst Airborne Division, then in Camp Mourmelon, 

France, resting and refitting after operations in Holland, was 

alerted to move to the vicinity of Bastogne. Bastogne, if held, 

could interrupt lines of communication as the Germans continued their attack westward. But, meanwhile, VIII Corps’ 

defenses were crumbling, and the Germans, who averaged four 

to eight miles advance on the first day, were within eleven miles 

of Bastogne. Time had become a critical factor.‘* The race was 

On! 

The 1Olst Airborne Division, the unit chosen to stem the 

advance, was a well-trained, veteran outfit. Prior to and during 

its deployment in Europe, the unit had placed special training 

emphasis on decentralizing and massing artillery, the repair and 

operation of enemy equipment, air-ground liaison, signal security, 

night operations, and defense against mechanized, aerial, and 

infantry infiltration.15 Its strength at the time of the alert was 

805 officers and 11,035 enlisted men. Included in its organization 

were four infantry regiments and all supporting arms, though 

there were shortages of personnel and equipment. Its commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, was in the United States. 

His deputy, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, was in England with 

five senior and sixteen junior officers. Command of the division 

for operations around Bastogne, therefore, fell to Brig. Gen. 
Traops with the 1Olst Airborne Division near Bastogne 

Anthony 6. McAuliffe, the division’s artillery commmander.16 

In record time, he got the division on the road moving toward 

the town of Werbomont, twenty-five miles north of Bastogne, 

where he was originally ordered to report. In an oversight that 

could have led to catastrophe, however, no one had informed 

the division that it was now attached to VIII Corps. The 

advance party that reached Werbomont on the night of 18 

December only then discovered they were meant to report to 

Bastogne. 

General McAuliffe’s fortuitous stop in Bastogne to confer 

with Middleton in late afternoon that day saved the rest of the 

division the same fate. Learning of his attachment to VIII Corps 

and receiving orders from Middleton to defend Bastogne, 

McAuliffe made immediate preparations to reroute and receive 

the division. This was accomplished superbly by a few staff 

officers without the help of any advance party. As McAuliffe’s 

columns moved through heavy traffic toward Bastogne, forty 

tanks from Combat Command B (CCB), the 10th Armored Division, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion (with 76-mm self- 
10 

propelled guns), and two battalions of 155.mm artillery were 

ordered to Bastogne to be attached to the 10lst. These organizations and a makeshift replacement pool af stragglers-Team 

Snafu-from U.S. elements withdrawing near Bastogne, would 

bolster the defense of the 1Olst Airborne Division throughout 

the critical period in the battle for Bastogne.17 

The 35th Tank Battalion, 4th Armored Division, near Bastogne 

Even’ as the 1Olst and its attachments were moving into 

Bastogne during the night of 18 December, the German advance 

had moved rapidly down the Wiltz-Bastogne road to a point 

just three kilometers from the town. There they collided with 

the first elements of the 10lst. With VIII Corps evacuating the 

area, the defense of Bastogne became the division’s task.18 The 

paratroopers had barely won the race for the town; now the 

problem was to hold it. 

In the early stages of the German advance, supply difficulties had not been a particularly critical issue. While, some 

German division commanders had hoped to capture American 

supplies, none relied on that possibility for a primary source of 

resupply. Fuel, however, was immediately in short supply be 
11 

cause only half the promised initial issue was delivered. Furthermore, unusually heavy consumption rates, brought about by 

rough terrain and poor weather near Bastogne, further drained 

the meager fuel supplies. Throughout the operation, the fuel 

situation would onIy worsen for the Germans.19 But until 18 

December, the XLVII Corps heading for Bastogne was still in 

Devastation in Bastegne, Belgium 

good fighting shape: there was good cooperation throughout the 

corps; reports were timely; communications were good; troop 

morale was reasonably high; the attack had begun on time on 

the 16th; and the U.S. 28th Infantry Division’s first line of 

defense had been broken. 

Even so, there had been some serious problems that threw 

the XLVII Corns off its timetable. Unanticipated high water 

across the Our River caused delays while engineers extended 

and bolstered bridges for tanks to cross. Elimination of abatis 

(constructed by both Americans and Germans while on the defensive) and the filling in of craters caused additional delays. 

Because of poor roads and few bridges, two assault divisions 

were involved in a bottleneck at one vital bridge. These hin- 

-- 
12 

drances, combined with a stiffening American resistance that 

was in greater depth than the Germans expected, prevented the 

Panzer Lehr Division from arriving in Bastogne at the appointed 

time--1800, 18 December 1944. Had the Germans arrived on 

schedule, the 1Olst would have been five kilometers west of the 

town. After the Germans intercepted an alert message by the 

1Olst an 17 December and discovered the paratroopers” projected 

18 December arrival time in Bastogne, greater pressure was 

placed on the XLVII Corps for a more rapid advance. However, 

there was no advice on how the corps should overcome the 

obstacles it faced nor was there any offer of assistance.20 

As the 1Olst and its attachments, practically on the run, 

formed a perimeter in the villages around Bastogne on the night 

of 18 December, the tide of events had begun to turn. German 

troops, pressed by their commanders for a faster.rate of advance, 

were near exhaustion. Previous losses of men and equipment 

and the prospects for more of the same sapped their will to 

fight.21 The, American units they now faced were fresh, motivated, and in control of Bastogne. But Bastogne would be hotly 

contested in the week ahead. 

By any comparison, the Americans, with a light infantry 

(paratroop) division, some additional artillery, forty tanks, and 

a tank destroyer battalion, should not have been a match for 

the superior German forces, which consisted of two panzer divisions and a uobksgtermdier division; yet they were. Their ability 

to resist the Germans at Bastogne was enhanced by their timely 

occupation of the town. Low German morale also strengthened 

U.S. resolve. The Germans of Army Group West and the Fifth 

Panzer Army had no choice but to sustain the momentum of 

the offensive at all costs in accordance with Hitler’s demands. 

Ultimately, German commanders who were too far removed from 

the action would make fateful decisions that would allow the 

lightly equipped defenders of Bastogne to survive. 
III. SAVING BASTOGNE: 

ACHRONOLOGY 

The first steps to save Bastogne were taken on 18 December, 

when Middleton dispatched the recently arrived Combat Command B to the northeast, east, and southeast of the town with 

orders to hold their positions at all cost.22 Such action indicated 

to the Germans that Bastogne would not be surrendered. In the 

week that followed, the Germans squeezed the perimeter around 

Bastogne tighter and tighter, but it did not break. 

Throughout the defensive sector, Mekuliffe organized the 

1Olst and its attachments into regimental task forces. Each had 

its proportional share of artillery, tanks, antitank, and antiair 

forces. Thus, light infantry received supplemental firepower in 

their defense. With the exception of artillery, the Germans were 

similarly organized. Their artillery was kept primarily in general 

support. 

On 19 December (see map 4*), small German infantry-armor 

forces, both with and without artillery support, infiltrated under 

cover of bad weather. German action also included night 

fighting with tanks. The Americans resisted strongly in all 

sectors, defending outlying villages and road intersections. By 

nightfall, XLVII Corps had been contained along the line 

Noville-Bizory-Neffe. The inadequate road network; old, brokendown and overloaded German vehicles; and the American artillery around Bastagne were slowing the German advance. With 

pressure from Heeresgruppe to push beyond Bastogne, Fifth 

Panzer Army and XLVII Corps decided that the Panzer Lehr 

Division should take Bastogne on the twentieth while the other 

forces continued their westward advance.23 

On 20 and 21 December (see maps 5 and C;), the same 

pattern of small-unit infiltration continued, with some gains 

accruing to the Germans. The villages of Noville and Bizory 

were finally taken, but an attack against Marvie was repulsed. 

Bastogne continued to be a matter of concern to XLVII Corps. 

But it was believed on the twentieth that, with advances continuing north and south of the town, Bastogne would soon be 

encircled and that the 26th Volksgrenadier Division following 

‘the panzer divisions could capture it. Indeed, the town was 

*Maps 4 through 11 are at the end of chapter III, pp, 17-33. 

13 
14 

surrounded on the twenty-first, but the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was not strong enough to take it. Though surrounded, the 

lOlst was not cut off. The division still maintained communication with VIII Corps and knew an American relief column was 

pushing toward them as German advances along the entire 

Western Front were diminishing. The Fifth Panzer Army refused 

to authorize sufficient additional forces to take Bastogne and to 

keep the faltering offensive alive. But the 26th Volksgrenadier 

Division still had the mission, with some help from the Panzer 

Lehr Division. On the evening of 21 December, Manteuffel and 

Luettwitz composed the now famous surrender note that, after 

being delivered to the 1Olst on 22 December, received McAuliffe’s 

more famous reply: “Nuts.“24 

Pvt. Jesse Kenner, Headquarters Company, 501 st Paratroop infantry, 10Ist 

Airborne Division, Eastogne 

In addition to the note on 22 December, there were continuous probes along the entire perimeter (see map 7). Only two 

German attacks of any significance occurred, however, and both 

were no larger than company size. On 23 December (see map 

B), probes continued to the west and southeast, but the weather 

had cleared and American airpower was beginning to take its 

toll of German forces and equipment. Aerial resupply also began 

that day, bringing the 1Olst badly needed supplies and sending 

American morale soaring. 
15 

The Germans were becoming desperate. The XLVII Corps 

was informed that the 9th Panzer Division and 15th Panzergrenadier Division would come under corps control on 24 

December, and the 3d Panzergrenadier Division would arrive 

later. Heeresgruppe still insisted on Bastogne being taken in 

conjunction with the advance to the Meuse, but with Fifth 

Panzer Army now on the defensive almost everywhere and the 

possibility of advancing to the Meuse River becoming slimmer 

each day, Army Chief of Staff General Wagener felt “the initiative seemed to have passed to the enemy.“25 

The situation on 24 and 25 December (see maps 9 and 10) 

revived Luettwitz’ hope that his corps could take Bastogne. 

Reinforcements now promised by Fifth Panzer Army were esC-47 transport planes carrying supplies to surrounded airborne troops in 

Bastogne, Belgium. 

sential for this success. During the night of 24 December, 

German combined arms and infantry attacks by pessimistic 

commanders and uninspired soldiers were uncoordinated and 

failed. On the twenty-fifth, the ring around Bastogne was 

tightened as a result of regimental-size attacks, but again, they 

were uncoordinated. The American advantage of interior lines 

clearly served to complicate German attempts to coordinate their 

efforts. That evening, XLVII Corps, apprehensive about the 

American relief column pushing through, requested reinforce- 
16 

ments and wanted to call off the attacks. The German Fifth 

Army, appreciating the situation but powerless to act, could only 

offer sympathy and a promise to Iook for more reinforcements.26 

On 26 December (see map ll), German forces again attacked 

with battalion-size infantry and armor teams. Striking American 

combined arms teams arrayed in depth, the Germans were again 

unsuccessful. Other units, forming for attack in assembly areas, 

were attacked by American artillery and dispersed. At 1600 that 

afternoon, American tanks broke through the 2d Panzer and 

26th Volksgrenadier Divisions and linked up with the 101st. All 

hope for German success had died. The XLVII Corps had no 

forces available to eliminate this penetration, and the Fifth 

Panzer Army’s offer of the Fiihrer Begleit Brigade was too little 

and too late.27 Light German probing attacks continued on the 

27th and 2&h, but the XLVII Panzer Corps’ defensive inclinations were more predominant. The 1Olst had held Bastogne and 

seriously retarded the German Ardennes offensive.28 In action 

from 18 through ‘27 December, the 1Olst and its attachments 

had suffered 115 officer and 1,933 enlisted casualties. They had 

killed 7,000 Germans, captured 697 prisoners, and destroyed 

approximately 200 armored vehicles.29 
17 

Maps 4 Through 11 
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33 
IV. APPLICATIONS 

OF FORCE 

Though fighting in the villages around Bastogne pitted a 

multidivision force against a reinforced light division, combat 

for the most part was characterized by small-unit actions. Fate, 

as it always does, played a significant role in the outcome, but 

a more detailed look at how the 1Olst was organized and 

equipped to fight also provides insight into its success. Firepower for the light division was far greater than would have 

ordinarily been the case. In addition to its own artillery of four 

battalions, the division had at its disposal a field artillery group 

consisting of two 155-mm gun battalions and a 4.5~inch howitzer 

battalion. It also had one 155-mm gun and two 105-mm howitzer 

battalions (which had fallen back after initial German assaults 

on 16 December). In all, that meant that as many as ten field 

artillery battalions could have supported the division at any one 

time. Two battalions of the attached group were overrun and 

lost on 20 December after the group commander moved them 

without permission. For his actions, he was summarily relieved 

that day by General McAuliffe.3O But even with that loss, the 

American artillery in Bastogne was still a potent force, especially 

when compared to the weaker German artillery. 

When alerted for movement to the Bastogne area, the 1Olst 

Division’s artillery was still reconstituting from operations in 

Holland. Many of the howitzers were in poor condition but were 

repaired or replaced before the road march. Anticipating a 

departure from their traditional airborne role, the artillerymen 

reconfigured for land movement and consequently carried with 

them far more ammunition than they would, or could, otherwise 

have taken via aircraft.31 Without the additional loads, they 

would have run out of ammunition ‘before aerial resupply was 

possible. 

Upon arrival at Bastogne, all battalions task organized for 

a static defense. Personnel shortages, especially in forward observer and liaison teams to supported infantry, quickly became 

acute. Headquarters and firing units were stripped to fill the 

void. Command, control, and cammuaications problems, as well 

as general supply shortages, occasionally detracted from the 

effectiveness of the defense but werelnever insurmountable. The 

biggest problem remained a shortage of ammunition. As the 

intensity of the fighting increased and overland supply lines 

were cut, ammunition conservation became critical.32 

35 
36 

Sgt. Clarence Pfeifer [with gun) and Pvt. Sherman Maness bring in two 

German prisoners, Longchamps, Belgium 

The majority of all rounds fired were directed against enemy 

armor. Firing in the direct and indirect mode, artillery was 

effective against German tanks, while unsupported infantry 

rarely stopped the German armor. But had it not been for the 

timely aerial resupply of 23 December and subsequent drops on 

succeeding days, the guns would have fallen silent and been 

easy prey for attacking German forces. By that day, some units 

were down to less than three high-explosive rounds per howitzer 

and had no remaining rations.33 

As it was, the Germans had much to be concerned with 

when in the vicinity of American artillery. The cold, hungry, 

and exhausted artillerymen manning the guns repeatedly stated 

their willingness to endure any deprivation if only they could 

get some more ammunition, American morale was excellent, and 

no German tank within range of American artillery was safe. 

The encirclement and the widely disseminated 22 December surrender note were considered amusing incidents rather than aweinspiring threats. On Christmas Eve, an entry in one battalion 

journal read, “Christmas Eve, and all personnel here wish for 

plenty of ammunition and one good supply route.” On Christmas 

day, the entry read, “Three cooks in C Battery took a little 

time from their regular chores to kill two Germans in a tank 
37 

with a grenade, and captured six others.“34 That same day, 

another artillery battalion, under attack by seven tanks and 

accompanying infantry, employed its howitzers as antitank guns 

and destroyed two tanks, captured one intact, killed a number 

of infantrymen, and captured twenty-four others. Similar actions 

occurred throughout the operation. On 20 December alone, no 

less than seven battalions fired 2’,6OO rounds solely at enemy 

armor.35 The incomprehensible German failure to attempt to 

destroy or neutralize American artillery only served to bolster 

the cannoneers’ confidence and determination. In his after-action 

report, one direct-support battalion commander wrote, “After 

arriving at Bastogne and going into position, we found ourselves 

in exactly the situation we had been trained to handle.“36 Perhaps that was ultimately why they acquitted themselves so 

well. 

A prime example of task organizing can be seen in the case 

of the division’s 81st Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion. Entering 

combat with three antiaircraft and three 57.mm antitank batteries, that unit found its role quickly changed to meet the 

German armor threat. Initially, the antiaircraft batteries supScene of destruction, Houffalize, Belgium 
38 

ported the division’s artillery, but they were shifted to the main 

line of resistance (MLR) to strengthen the defensive perimeter. 

While that action caused division headquarters and the division 

artillery to be more vulnerable to German air strikes, it provided 

firepower where it was most needed-in ground support in the 

secondary line of defense. 

The antitank batteries were also positioned on the MLR, 

where, in conjunction with the larger vehicles of the tank de 

stroyer battalion, they formed a defense in depth that the 

Germans could not penetrate without unacceptable losses. The 

81st’s weapons would engage German tanks at maximum range, 

slow the German tanks, and thus give the more mobile tank 

and tank destroyer units time to move to the point of the 

German attack and defeat the enemy’s armor. Time and again, 

this technique was used to counter uncoordinated enemy thrusts 

that came from all directions.37 

Other effective antitank measures included active infantry 

patrolling to give early warning of German assembly or attack, 

preparation of tank barriers and obstacles, and aggressive 

hand-to-hand fighting to separate German infantry and tanks 

after penetrations had occurred. Most tanks were destroyed after 

they had penetrated the defenses and had been separated from 

their infantry. That task was most frequently accomplished by 

direct-fire artillery, antitank weapons, and bazooka fire at close 

range. 

Typical of the close-in violence of the battles was an incident on 23 December in the town of Marvie. There, Pfc. Narman 

Osterberg, a member of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 

exposed himself to intense enemy fire and, using his bazooka, 

repeatedly drove attacking tanks away even though they came 

within ten yards of his position. Wounded in the process, he 

continued his stand for three hours, thus stopping the attack in 

his sector. Such bravery and esprit were common throughout 

the elite division. Fighting against tanks, soldiers quickly discovered that digging in around a town was far preferable and 

more effective than occupying its buildings and being crushed 

in the rubble.38 Teamwork, cooperation, effective combined arms 

attacks on targets, and stubborn and brave resistance gave the 

paratroopers a fighting edge they never relinquished. 
‘- 

V. COMBAT SUPPORT 

The successful defensive activities at Bastogne were made 

possible in good measure through the efforts of the 1Olst Signal 

Company, which provided outstanding communications support 

and ensured exeellent command and control. From the beginning, the signal company was hard pressed to keep communications operational in an encircled town subject to intense enemy 

fire. Their task began when the division was first alerted. Signal 

loads had to be configured for ground, rather than airborne, 

operations. Their deployment was excellent, and by 0600, 19 

December, all elements were in radio and wire contact with division headquarters. Secure and nonsecure communications with 

VIII Corps were also established and never lost throughout the 

operation, Indeed, these were the only links with the outside 

after Bastogne was surrounded. 

Batteries for radios posed a problem. With only a three-day 

supply, the division had to rely on strict supply economy and 

conservation. Even with such conservation measures, many 

divisional units ran out of essential batteries on the 23d; but 

that was the day they were resupplied by air. Wire was also 

constantly being broken by shelling, bombing, and heavy equipment passing over it. Teams serviced the lines constantly, often 

under fire. From the first day, signal personnel continuously 

expanded the net, establishing alternate routes, laterals, and 

additional circuits. 

Communication among units was rarely lost. Radios were 

in poor condition from the Holland operation, but they were 

sufficient to meet all divisional requirements. The nets established allowed for real-time dissemination of intelligence information from all sources, even down to local patrols. Frequent 

German jamming was overcome, as was the problem of friendly 

elements nearby operating on division frequencies. Contact was 

established with the 4th Armored Division two days before that 

element broke through to the IOlst, and it was maintained 

continuously from that point until no longer needed. Wire communication was established as soon as the Iinkup occurred.39 

With such signal efficiency, it is no wonder that the Americans 

enjoyed communications superiority. 

Flexibility and adaptability also characterized the 101&s 

operations in and around Bastogne. The most serious problem 

occurred during the night of 19 December, when the Division 

39 
The debris of war during Bastogne’s siege 

Clearing Station, operated by the 326th Medical Company, was 

overrun by six German vehicles (half-tracks and tanks) supported by 100 infantrymen. In that action, the Germans captured 

18 American officers and 124 enlisted men, as well as most of 

the unit’s medical equipment and supplies. Until a surgical team 

arrived by glider on 26 December, only two medical and two 

dental officers, four medical administration officers, and 113 

enlisted men remained to handle all of the divisian’s medical 

needs. A makeshift casualty collection station had to suffice 

because there were no means to evacuate the wounded after 20 

December. The station quickly became overcpowded. Medical 

supply shortages soon plagued the operation, and the overworked staffs primary focus became the survival of the wounded 

by any means available. Over 1,000 American and German 

wounded eventually were treated at the collection center.40 

Another major problem for the division was the constant 

shortage of supply and maintenance troops, The 801st Ordnance 

Company started for Bastogne on 19 December. Five miles from 

the town, the Germans ambushed them. The Allied command 

then diverted the unit and placed it under VIII Corps’ control 
41 

until 29 December.41 Therefore, the division had no direct sup 

port maintenance or evacuation capability until after the Allies 

broke the German encirclement. 

More serious was the supply situation. Convoying*supplies 

to Bastogne on 19 December, the 426th Quartermaster Company 

was ambushed and subsequently diverted to VIII Corps’ control 

until 27 December.42 The division was, in effect, without normal 

supply operations during the entire period. Further complicating 

matters was the loss of the division’s reconnaissance platoon 

on 22 December. The platoon had been used to establish an 

antitank warning net and had called for and directed field artillery fne ta destroy German tanks. But on leading a cut-off artillery battalion to safety at Neufchateau, the platoon was isolated 

and would not return until 23 December.43 

According to its commander, the 326th Engineer Battalion 

might as well have been among the missing. Its deployment 

around Bastogne was a classic case of misuse through ignorance, Although the men set up a few roadblocks and prepared 

several bridges for demolition, they were committed piecemeal 

as infantry early in the battle rather than in their engineersupport role with the different regiments. When promised inTroops of the 101% Airbarne Division leaving Bastogne to pursue the 

retreating Germans 
42 

fantry protection to accomplish engineer tasks, the engineers 

frequently found themselves alone, unprotected, and exposed. 

Fighting as infantry, they had no responsive, designated artillery 

support.44 Strangely, no one used them in any way to prepare 

antitank obstacles. 

Resupply was the most serious problem, which was exacerbated further by the absence of the 426th Quartermaster Company. Soldiers could fight only as long as supplies of food, 

ammunition, fuel, and equipment were available. Some food and 

medical supplies were found in abandoned dumps in Bastogne, 

but most of the critical items had to be brought in from the 

outside. After the German encirclement on the twenty-first, aerial 

resupply was the only way to accomplish this. The first request 

for aerial resupply was sent by the division on 20 December. 

The G4 maintained strict supply control and accountability and 

required and received daily status reports from all units. Redistribution was accomplished as needed. Despite all possible 

supply economy, the division could not hold out without 

resupply. On 23 December, the weather finaIly cleared, and 241 

cargo planes dropped supply bundles that gave the division new 

life. They contained ammunition, rations, medical supplies, 

signal items, and gasoline. 

Bolstered by this resupply and the knowledge that an American relief column was fighting its way through to Bastogne, 

the soldiers of the 1Olst had reason to feel optimistic. Succeeding 

resupply drops on the 24th, 26th, and 27th eased the supply 

difficulties considerably.45 With the Iinkup of attacking American troops and a more stable supply situation, the 1Olst could 

predict success. But the battle was not over. Weeks of hard 

fighting lay ahead. Nevertheless, a light infantry division, 

complemented by key attachments, especially artillery and antitank support, had stopped an armor-heavy German corps. At 

the outset, no one would have dared expect such success-no 

one, that is, but the men and their leaders who were given the 

mission. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 

Assessing their actions at Bastogne, German generals concluded that they had failed for a number of reasons. Poor terrain 

and a restrictive road net had caused them to have disastrous 

traffic jams that disrupted their timetable from the start. More 

over, they had no forces available for traffic regulation. Poor 

weather favored a German advance until 23 December but 

created a thaw which kept German tanks bound to the roads. 

After 23 December, Allied air superiority made any German 

advance difficult and interdicted lines of communication, causing 

all logistical activities to be slow and cumbersome. Supply depots 

could not be moved forward with the advance, nor could fuel 

depots remain operational for long.46 Fighting under such circumstances was an army whose leaders and soldiers were weary 

from six years of war. Commanders doubted the feasibility of 

their mission, and after a small surge of morale as the offensive 

kicked off, the already tired soldiers soon lost the will to fight. 

Units were understrength in personnel and equipment, and there 

were significant shortages in the officer and NC0 ranks. 

Replacements for the ground forces were not well trained, many 

having come from the naval and air forces. Combined arms 

tactics were either nonexistent or uncoordinated. 

The piecemeal German attacks at Bastogne illustrated the 

deficiencies. American forces were allowed time to react at each 

decisive sector where the Germans attacked, thus preventing any 

serious breakthroughs. Continued refusal by Heeresgruppe and 

Fifth Panzer Army Headquarters to permit XLVII Panzer Corps 

to concentrate all of its forces against Bastogne (obviously 

influenced by Hitler’s insistence that the offensive continue) 

clearly saved its gallant defenders from a horrible defeat. Sheer 

weight of forces would have given the Germans control of 

Bastogne, if they were willing to pay the price in casualties. 

But the German’s overall timetable was considered more important.47 German generals also expressed grudging admiration for 

the Americans who rapidly met the German offensive with strategic forces. The American tactic of delaying through the use 

of successive positions was highlighted as was the continuous 

artillery support made available to the infantry. The continuing 

ability of American artillery units to fight was also cited. Proper 

credit was given American leadership, which “played a very 

essential role by making the proper tactical resolution with great 

flexibility and with equal rapidity adopting all countermeasures 

43 
44 

and performing them with great energy and skill.” Repeatedly 

cited was the brave determination of the men of the 1Olst Airborne Division.48 

An in-depth analysis of the Battle of Bastogne, focusing on 

the ability of a light division to defeat heavier ones, leads to 

predictable conclusions. At Bastogne, well-coordinated combined 

arms teams defeated uncoordinated armored and infantry forces 

committed to an unrealistic plan. Results of isolated cases in 

which American infantry fought German armored forces point 

out how important the attached package of tanks and tank destroyers was to the 10lst. Without them, even the bravest of 

infantry actions would have been no match for the tanks. The 

infantry, fighting alone, would have lost Bastogne early in the 

battle. Coordinated German attacks in mass, rather than the 

small-unit attacks they employed, might also have resulted in a 

decisive German victory over the lOlst and its attachments. 

In the final equation, moral strength, luck, and the “fog of 

war” must also be considered. The Americans had advantages 

in all three of these categories. The right combination of events 

and situations-conditions unfavorable to the Germans and 

favorable to the Americans-produced the American victory at 

Bastogne. At Bastogne, a light infantry division, properly aug 

mented by good artillery and armor support, was able to defeat 

a numerically superior and heavier opponent. But the conditions 

of that victory were particular, not universal in application. 
NOTES 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

la. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

1s. 

16. 

Leonard Rapport and Arthur Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny: A 

History of the 1Olst Airborne Division (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal 

Press, 1948), 423. 

Ibid. 

Carl Wagener, “Fifth Panzer Army (2 Nov 1944-16 Jan 1945),” Foreign 

Military Studies no. MS B-235 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 

1945), l-2, hereafter cited as MS B-235. 

Percy Ernst Schramm, “The Course of Events of the German Offensive in 

the Ardennes (16 Dee 44-14 Jan 45),” Foreign Military Studies no. MS 

A-858 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1945), 2, hereafter cited as 

MS A-858. Schramm kept the war diary of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. 

MS B-235, 9-10, 12. 

MS A-858, 10. See also MS B-235, 5-6; and Heinrich von Luettwitz, “XLVII 

Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive,‘” Foreign Military Studies no. MS 

A-940 {Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 27 February 1946), 1, 

hereafter cited as MS A-940. 

Heinrich von Luettwitz, “The Commitment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in 

the Ardennes, 1944-45,” Foreign Military Studies no. MS A-939 (Historical 

Division, U.S. Army, Europe, n.d.), hereafter cited as MS A-939. 

MS B-235, 4. 

MS A-940, 6. See also MS B-235, 7. 

MS A-940, 3-4. 

MS B-235, 7-11. See also Heinrich von Luettwitz, “XLVII Panzer CorpsArdennes,” Foreign Military Studies no. MS A-938 (Historical Division, 

U.S. Army, Europe, 19451, hereafter cited as MS A-938; and F. Bayerlein, 

“Panzer Lehr Division (1 Dee 1944-26 Jan 1945),” Foreign Military Studies 

no. MS A-941 (Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 19451, hereafter cited 

as MS A-941. 

MS A-940, 2-3. See also MS A-941, 5-6 and MS A-938, 2. 

Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous, 423-25. 

Ibid., 425, 429-30. 

U.S. Army Ground Forces, Airborne Command, “1Olst Abn Div Training 

Directive and Bulletin, 4 Nov 42” (Fort Bragg, NC, 1942), 74-82, Record 

Group 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, U.S. Army, National 

Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC. The AGO record 

group will hereafter be cited as RG 407. 

U.S. Army, 1Olst Airborne Division, “After Action Report, Belgium and 

France, December 1944,” Chief of Staff Annex, “After Action Report, Chief 

of Staff, 1Olst Abn Div., 17-27 Ret 44,” 6, Box 14378, Report Files, 

1941-54, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olst Abn CS Annex. Author entries 

for the 1Olst Airborne Division will be cited hereafter as 1Olst Abn. Many 

45 
46 

other annexes of the basic after-action report (AAR) cited here exist as 

separate documents in RG 407 and are used in this paper. The basic AAR 

hereafter will be cited as 1Olst Abn AAR. See also 1Olst Abn, “History of 

the lOlet Airborne Division, 1942-64” (Fort Campbell, KY, 1964, mimeographed), 47-48, hereafter cited as 1Olst History; and Rapport and 

Northwood, 429-30. 

17. Rapport and Northwood, Rendtmous, 429-30. See also 1Olst History, 47-48. 

18. Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous, 427-28. 

19. MS A-941, 6-7. 

20. MS A-940, 4-8. See also MS B-235, 13-14, 16, 18; and MS A-939, 6. 

21. MS B-235, 19-20. 

22. Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous, 432. 

23. 1Olst Abn Div, “1018t Abn Div G-2 Periodic Reports 19-31 Dee 44,” 

Periodic Report for 19 Dee 44, hereafter cited as 101st G-2 Periodic Reports 

See also MS A-939, 7-8; and MS B-235, 21. 

24. 101st G-2 Periodic Reports, 20-21 December 1944. See also MS A-939, 

8-10; MS B-235, 28; and MS A-941, 10. 

25. 1Olst G-2 Periodic Reports, 22-23 December 1944. See also MS A-939, 

10-12; and MS B-235, 34. 

26. 1Olst G-2 Periodic Reports, 24-25 December 1944. See also MS A-939, 

13-16; and MS A-940, 9. 

27. lOlet G-2 Periodic Reports, 26 December 1944. See also MS A-939, 16-17. 

28. 1Olst G-2 Periodic Reports, 27-28 December 1944. See also MS B-235, 29. 

29. 1Olst Abn CS Annex, 6. See also 1Olst History, 60. 

30. 1Olst Abn AAR, Artillery Annex, “After Action Report, Belgium, France 

and Germany, 1 Jan 45, Ardennea Campaign,” 1, RG 407, hereafter cited 

as 1Olst Abn Arty Annex. See also “Unit Journal 1023-1550, 20 Dee 44,” 

attached to lOlet Abn Arty Annex. 

31. 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 11, “377th Parachute FA Battalion,” 9 March 1945, 

cover letter, Box 14409, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olst Abn Annex 11. 

See also 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 10, “321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion,” 

15 March 1945, cover letter, Box 14403, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olst 

Abn Annex 10; 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 5, “Headquarters, and Headquarters 

Battery, 1Olst Airborne Division ArtiIlery,‘” 2, Box 14389, RG 407, hereafter 

cited as 1Olst Abn Annex 5; and 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 13, “907th Glider 

F.A. Bn.,” 7 March 1945, 1, Box 14419, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olst 

Abn Annex 13. 

32. 1Olst Abn Arty Annex, 2. See also 1Olst Abn Annex 16, cover letter and 

page 1; and 1Olst Abn Annex 11, cover letter. 

33. 1Olst Abn Arty Annex, 1. See also 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 6, “327th Glider 

Infantry,” 68, Box 14773, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olst Abn Annex 6; 
47 

lOlet Abn AAR, Annex 12, “463d Parachute F.A. Bn.,” 9 March 1945, cover 

letter and page 1, Box 14414, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olst Abn Annex 

12. 

34. 1Olst Abn Annex 11, cover letter and 24. See also 1Olst Abn Annex 13, 

cover letter and 1, 3. 

35. lOlet Abn Annex 12, l-2. See also 1Olst Abn Annex 11, 27. 

36. 1Olst Abn Annex 12, cover letter. 

37. 1Olst Abn AAR, Unnumbered Annex, “After Action Report, 81et Abn AA 

Bn,” cover letter and page 1, Box 14379, RG 407. See also U.S. Army, 81st 

Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion, “The Slat Airborne Antiaircraft Battahon 

of the 1Olst Airborne Division Campaign History, 4 Sept 42-11 Sept 45,” 

l-10, 24, Box 14379, RG 407; and U.S. Army, 506th Parachute Infantry 

Regiment, “S-3 Journal, 566th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1Olst Airborne 

Division, 17 Dee 44-26 Feb 45,” 21-22 December 1944, Box 14445, 

RG 407. 

38. U.S. Army, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, “Unit History-327th Glider 

Infantry Regiment, 1942-1945, Battle Summary,” unnumbered citation 

section. See also 1Olst Abn Annex 6, Letter of Transmittal, 12 March 1945; 

and 1Olst Abn, “G-3 Operational Memorandum [no.] 23-Engagement of 

Enemy Armor, 22 May 1944,” 1, Box 14376, RG 407. 

39. 10&t Abn AAR, Annex 16, “1Olat Airborne Signal Company,” cover letter, 

Box 14448, RG 407; 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 3A, “Signal Officer After 

Action Report,” l-4, Box 14378, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olat Abn 

Annex 3A; lOlet Abn Annex 13, cover letter; and 1Olst Abn Annex 11, 

cover letter. 

40. 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 17, “326th Airborne Medical Company,” 3-5, Box 

14447, RG 407. See also 1Olst Abn Annex 3A, 5. 

41. 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 19, “SOlat Airborne Ordnance Maintenance 

Company,” cover letter, Box 14447, RG 407. 

42. 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 18, “426th Airborne Quartermaster Company,” 5, 

Box 14447, RG 407, hereafter cited as 1Olst Abn Annex 1%. 

43. 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 20, “1Olst Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon,” l-2, 

Box 14399, RG 407. 

44. 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 15, “326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 10 Mar 

45,” cover letter and pages 2-4, Box 14401, RG 407, hereafter cited as 

1Olst Abn Annex 15. 

45. 1Olst Abn AAR, Annex 4, “G-4 After Action Report, Admin Orders and 

Journal,” l-2, Box 14377, RG 407. See also Ibid., G-4 Letter, 11 January 

1945, “Report on Air Resupply to 1Olat Airborne Division at Bastogne.” 

This letter was forwarded through CG VII Corps to CG 3d U.S. Army. 

And see also 1Olst Abn Annex 15, 5; and 1Olst Abn Annex 18, cover letter. 

46. MS A-938, 3-7. See also MS B-235, 26. 

47. Ibid. See also Carl Wagener, “Main Reasons for the Failure of the Ardennea 

Offensive,” Foreign Military Studies no. MS A-963 (Historical Division, 
48 

U.S. Army, Europe, December 1945), 14-15, hereafter cited as MS A-963; 

MS A-940, 7; and MS A-941, 9, 12-14. 

48. MS A-963, 7. See also MS A-940, 6-7; and MS A-941, 16, 20. 

._ --- ---- _-- .-.- ~- ~ 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bayerlein, F. “Panzer Lehr Division (1 Dee 1944-26 Jan 1945)” Foreign Military Studies no. MS A-941. Historical Divieion, U.S. Army, Europe, 1945. 

Luettwitz, Heinrich von. “ XLVII Panzer Corps-Ardennes.” Foreign Military 

Studies no. MS A-938. Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1945. 

-. “XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive.‘” Foreign Military 

Studies no. MS A-940. Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 27 February 

1946. 

--. “The Commitment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes, 

1944-45.” Foreign Military Studies no. MS A-939. Historical Diviaion, U.S. 

Army, Europe, n.d. 

Rapport, Leonard, and Arthur Northwood. Rendezvous with Destiny: A History 

of the IOlst Airborne Division. Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 

1948. 

Schramm, Percy Ernst. “The Course of Events of the German Offensive in the 

Ardennes (16 Dee 44-14 Jan 45)” Foreign Military Studies no. MS A-858. 

Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1945. 

U.S. Army. 1Olst Airborne Division. “History of the IOlst Airborne Division, 

1942-1964.” Fort Campbell, KY, 1964. Mimeographed. 

Wagener, Carl. “Fifth Panzer Army (2 Nov 1944-16 Jan 1945)” Foreign Military Studies no. MS B-235. Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1945. 

-. “Main Reasons for the Failure of the Ardennes Offensive.” Foreign 

Military Studies no. MS A-963. Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 

December 1945. 

National Archives Documents 

Documents listed below are from 1Olst Airborne Division 

records in the Report Files, 1941-54, of the Records of the 

Adjutant General’s Office, 1917- , Record Group 407. File box 

numbers for documents are provided when available. 

Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood. “Interview Notes with General Patton 

Concerning Ardennes Campaign.” 

U.S. Army. 81st Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion. “The 81st Airborne Antiaircraft 

Battalion of the lOlet Airborne Division Campaign History, 4 Sept 42-11 

Sept 45.” Box 14379. 

U.S. Army. 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment. “S-3 Journal, 506th Parachute 

Infantry Regiment, 1Olst Airborne Division, 17 Dee 44-26 Feb 45.” Box 

14445. 

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Airborne Command. “1Olst Abn Div Training 

Directive and Bulletin, 4 Nov 42.” Fort Bragg, NC, 1942. 

U.S. Army. IOlst Airborne Division. “After Action Report, Belgium and France, 

December 1944.” 

49 
50 

The many annexes to this basic report exist as separate 

documents and are listed as follows: 

-. Artillery Annex. “After Action Report, Belgium, France and Germany, 

1 Jan 45, Ardennes Campaign.‘” 

__. Chief of Staff Annex. “After Action Report, Chief of Staff, 1Olst Abn 

Div., 17-27 December 44.” Box 1437%. 

-, Unnumbered Annex. “After Action Repart, 81st Abn AA Bn.” Box 14379. 

-. Annex 3A. “Signal Officer After Action Report.” Box 14378. 

-* Annex 4. “G-4 After Action Report, Admin Orders and Journal.” Box 

14377. 

-. Annex 5. “Headquarters, and Headquarters Battery, IOlst Airborne Division Artillery.” Box 14389. 

-. Annex 6. “327th Glider Infantry.” Box 14773. 

-. Annex 10. “321st Glider F.A. Battalion.“’ 15 March 1945. Box 14403. 

-. Annex 11.. “377th Parachute FA Battalion,” 9 March 1945. Box 14409. 

-* Annex 12. “463d Parachute F.A. Bn.” 9 March 1945. Box 14414. 

-. Annex 15. “326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 10 Mar 45.” Box 14401. 

-* Annex 16. “1Olst Airborne Signal Company.” Box 1444%. 

-. Annex 17. “326th Airborne Medical Company.” Box 14447. 

-. Annex 18. “426th Airborne Quartermaster Company.” Box 14447. 

-. Annex 19. “801st Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company.” Box 14447. 

-. Annex 20. “1Olst Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon.“’ Box 14399. 

U.S. Army. 1Olst Airborne Division. “G-3 Operational Memorandums [nos.] 10, 

23, 24, 27, [dated] 22 May 1944.” Box 14376. 

-a Miscellaneous journals and files, 18 December 1944-April 1945. Box 14388. 

-. “1Olst Abn Div G-2 Periodic Reports, 19-31 Dee 44.‘” 

-, “Report on Air Resupply to 1Qlst Airborne Division at Bastogne, 11 

January 1945.” 

U.S. Army. 327th Glider Infantry Regiment. “Unit History-327th Glider 

Infantry Regiment, 1942-1945. Battle Summary.“’ 

r