March 31, 2015

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 1 

U.S. Allies Split with Washington, Bank with China

Sabrina Snell, Research Fellow, Economics and Trade

Key Findings

 China has created a regional bank among its Asian neighbors, in a move opposed by the Obama 

Administration.

 U.S. allies have sided with China despite Washington’s concerns that China might be using the bank 

to circumvent more established international banks, such as the World Bank and the International 

Monetary Fund, long dominated by the United States and Europe.

 China’s supporters in the effort contend that their participation in the new bank will ensure greater 

transparency while avoiding China’s tendency to loan money without protecting the environment, local 

populations, and clean governance. 

Do the Asian nations surrounding China need a new regional bank to fund their development? Or do existing 

international lenders, such as the World Bank, suffice? Would a regional bank founded and run by the Chinese 

government seek to curry influence in the region by foregoing sound banking principles in order to advance China’s

policy goals? The United States and China have arrived at two different answers to these questions. Meanwhile, in 

a rare rebuke to the Obama Administration, U.S. allies have come down firmly on China’s side of the issue.

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October 2013, 

the Obama Administration has voiced misgivings regarding the bank’s transparency, governance, and potential 

conflicts with existing institutions, including the 48-year-old, Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB). 

Nevertheless, on March 12, 2015, the United Kingdom became the first Western nation to announce its intention to 

join the China-initiated AIIB. Days later, the United Kingdom was followed by France, Germany, Italy, and 

Switzerland, bringing the bank’s total prospective membership to 33 countries. Absent from this list of supporters 

are Japan, South Korea, and Australia—although the latter two are expected to announce their approval soon (see 

AIIB timeline in Box 1). Even banking rivals of the AIIB have welcomed the addition.

From Beijing to Britain: The AIIB Gains Momentum 

In a 2013 meeting with Indonesia’s then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President Xi proposed the creation 

of a multilateral investment bank that could finance infrastructure projects in developing countries across Asia.1

The proposed regional bank would channel experience and funding into the improvement of railroads, highways, 

airports, seaports, telecommunication networks, electricity, waterworks, and urban development. Soon after, 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2 

China’s Ministry of Finance formed a working group for the AIIB and chose as its head Jin Liqun, the former vice 

minister of finance and a former top official at the ADB (see brief biography in Box 2). 

Meeting a year later in Beijing, 21 countries signed an agreement to become founding members of Asia’s newest 

multilateral regional development institution.* They agreed to locate the bank’s headquarters in Beijing, and they

fixed the target authorized capital at $100 billion, with initial subscribed capital at $50 billion.† The application 

deadline for any additional countries to become founding members was set for March 31, 2015.‡ By February 2015, 

New Zealand, Indonesia, the Republic of Maldives, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan announced they would 

join the AIIB.

Throughout their campaign for the AIIB, China’s leaders underscored two key reasons why Asia needed a new 

development bank: the region severely lacked 1) infrastructure finance, and 2) alternatives to the traditional 

multilateral development banks (MDBs).

§

The ADB was the first existing bank to assert that the region lacked infrastructure funding. In a 2009 report, it 

estimated that to achieve stable growth over the next decade, Asia would require $8 trillion in infrastructure; yet, 

the ADB only expected to provide about $13 billion annually in new loans, suggesting a massive gap in financing.2

Meanwhile, traditional MDBs shifted their funding away from infrastructure toward the “softer” realms of social 

development and poverty alleviation. 

Five years later, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), closely associated with the World Bank, cited the ADB’s 

original $8 trillion estimate and noted that “shallow financial systems” and limited private sector participation had 

left many Asian economies without adequate infrastructure, impeding their growth.** Concerned that national and 

local public expenditure might not prove sufficient, the IMF working paper suggested tapping “aging savers in 

industrialized Asia to finance infrastructure investment in emerging Asia.”3

China proposed to fill this gap in infrastructure finance and promote regional economic development with the AIIB. 

Moreover, it aimed to use the AIIB as a platform for sharing knowledge acquired during its own domestic 

development and rapid infrastructure-led growth. In his July 2014 keynote speech at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia, Jin 

Liqun explained: 

Since 1978 when China implemented the policy of reform and opening-up, the government has invested 

much in infrastructure construction. Thanks to the sustained infrastructure improvement, China has grown 

at a fast rate for more than three decades, and become one of the world’s most competitive economies....

China’s Experience can be transplanted to any other country. If China can make it, there is no reason why 

another country cannot.4

 

* The 21 countries were Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Burma (Myanmar), 

Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Xinhua (English edition), “21 

Asian Countries Sign MOU on Establishing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” October 24, 2014. 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2014-10/24/c_133740149.htm.

† The World Bank maintains $280 billion in authorized capital, the Inter-American Development Bank $171 billion, the ADB $164 billion, 

the African Development Bank $103 billion, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development $39 billion.

‡ Following the March deadline, the founding member countries would ratify the Articles of Agreement, and by the end of 2015, formally 

establish the AIIB. Xinhua (English edition), “21 Asian Countries Sign MOU on Establishing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” 

October 24, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2014-10/24/c_133740149.htm.

§ For more discussion of China’s motivations for establishing the AIIB, see the USCC’s Chinese Media Digest, Volume 2, Issue 4, March 

27, 2015.

** The IMF working paper pointed to electricity generation as the largest infrastructure gap, calculating Asia’s median electricitygenerating capacity to be 90 percent of that in Latin America. Ding Ding, Raphael Lam, and Shanaka Peiris, “Future of Asia’s Finance: 

How Can It Meet Challenges of Demographic Change and Infrastructure Needs?” International Monetary Fund, July 2014, 2–4.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 3 

To the concern of the Obama Administration, China envisioned the AIIB playing a key role in the establishment of 

a “new international financial order” that offered alternatives to U.S. and Japan-led institutions.5 While the World 

Bank is headquartered in Washington, DC, and since its founding has been led by a U.S. citizen, the Philippineslocated ADB is led by a Japanese citizen; within the former, the United States holds the dominant voting share, and 

in the latter, Japan.* The IMF, also in Washington, DC, historically has been headed by a European. In each of these 

institutions, China and other emerging countries have attempted to rebalance the distribution of voting shares in 

accordance with their growing economic strength. They have been unsuccessful in these reforms—often as a result 

of U.S. opposition or inaction—and thus have begun to push for alternatives outside of the traditional institutions. 

As U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew told Reuters, “It’s not an accident that emerging economies are looking at 

other places because they are frustrated that, frankly, the United States has stalled a very mild and reasonable set of 

reforms in the IMF.”6 Legislation to approve giving developing nations more say within the IMF and to provide 

China with voting power commensurate with its contributions has not passed Congress for four years. “Congress 

can abdicate its international responsibilities. What it can’t do is stop China from playing a bigger role in managing 

the global economy,” said David Loevinger, former U.S. Treasury Department senior coordinator for China affairs 

in the Obama Administration.7

For their part, World Bank, IMF, and ADB leadership have all issued statements welcoming the establishment of 

the AIIB and expressing interest in future cooperation.8 According to Bloomberg, ADB President Takehiko Nakao 

commented, “I understand the reason behind these banks, so they should be welcomed.”9 China has likewise 

maintained the AIIB would work with the existing MDBs. At the IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in October 

2014, China’s Alternate Governor of the Fund, Yi Gang,

†

called the AIIB “a necessary complement to current 

institutions.”10 He explained, “It will help develop joint forces to increase the overall capacity of international 

multilateral development aid.”11

Other experts have suggested that by spearheading a multilateral, high-standards institution, China hopes to prove 

itself as a responsible global player. At the same time, in this capacity, China also could further its own strategic 

agenda—such as spreading its influence through the soft power of economic development among its neighbors. 

According to Erica Downs, a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, the multilateral AIIB could 

serve as a “less threatening” alternative to bilateral mechanisms such as China Development Bank and the ExportImport Bank of China. “China could use AIIB to legitimize its economic expansion,” Downs said.12

While the White House has not publicly criticized the AIIB, it reportedly has pressured U.S. allies to abstain from 

joining the new bank.13 According to the Wall Street Journal, the U.S. Administration regards the AIIB as “China’s 

vehicle for creating a rival to the U.S.-led World Bank.”14 In the New York Times, the U.S. Treasury Department 

expressed concerns about the AIIB’s ability to meet environmental and labor standards as well as to guarantee other 

international safeguards for vulnerable populations. Others have warned that China might use the bank as a 

mechanism for achieving regional political and territorial objectives.15

Some of the Administration’s concern might arise from China’s habit of direct lending to African nations over the 

past decade. Unlike the World Bank, IMF, and other regional lending institutions, China placed few restrictions on 

infrastructure, mining, and oil and gas exploration projects to protect the environment, worker safety, or indigenous 

 

* Established in 1966, the ADB currently consists of 67 member states, with 48 from the Asia and Pacific regions. Within the ADB’s World 

Bank-like voting share system, Japan has maintained a dominant position with 15.67 percent of the voting share, followed by the U.S., 

China, India, and Australia, with 15.56, 6.47, 6.36, and 5.81 percent, respectively. As such, a Japanese citizen has consistently occupied 

the position of ADB president. Asian Development Bank, “ADB Financial Profile 2014,” 1, 7. 

http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/42746/adb-financial-profile-2014.pdf. 

† Yi Gang is also the director of China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange and deputy governor of the People's Bank of China.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 4 

peoples.

* Some of the loans found their way into the pockets and Swiss bank accounts of African leaders, or paid 

for elaborate official residences. Construction projects were often carried out by Chinese contractors rather than 

local workers, and were sometimes aimed at securing access to natural resources. The Brookings Institution noted:

Beijing requires that infrastructure construction and other contracts favor Chinese service providers: 70 

percent of them go to ‘approved,’ mostly state-owned, Chinese companies, and the rest are open to local 

firms, many of which are also joint ventures with Chinese groups. In this sense, China’s financing to Africa, 

including aid, creates business for Chinese companies and employment opportunities for Chinese laborers, 

a critical goal of Beijing’s Going Out strategy.16

In a 2014 speech, AIIB’s Jin Liqun responded to U.S. concerns: “With zero-tolerance of corruption, we have every 

confidence to establish a high-standard bank, and tackle security and environmental issues.... We will dutifully 

follow every standard set for a project or a product. We will observe the international standards while assessing the 

effects of a project on the local environment, culture, sustainable development and standards of living.”17 China’s 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Hong Lei stated that the new bank would draw on the experiences 

of other global development finance actors. He explained, “The AIIB will design its governance structure and 

operation policy following the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, responsibility and fairness. It 

will learn from the good practices of the existing multilateral development banks, and meanwhile avoid the alike 

problems they have encountered to reduce the cost and operate more effectively.”18

Until February 2015, China and India were the only major economies among the AIIB’s prospective membership. 

On March 12, 2015, much to the surprise of the United States and the international press, the United Kingdom 

announced its intention to join the AIIB. According to an official statement released by the UK Treasury, Chancellor 

of the Exchequer George Osborne called the new bank “an unrivalled opportunity for the UK and Asia,” as it would 

“give our companies the best opportunity to work and invest in the world’s fastest growing markets.” 19 The 

statement also expressed that “as the first major Western country to apply ... the UK will play a key role in ensuring 

that the AIIB embodies the best standards in accountability, transparency and governance.” Five days later, France, 

Germany, and Italy issued similar announcements, leading Chinese MFA Spokesperson Lei to remark, “The wide 

participation of countries in and out of this region exemplifies the representativeness of the AIIB.”20,† As the Wall 

Street Journal would reveal in late March, China’s negotiations with European leaders reached a key turning point 

when China indicated it would not pursue veto power in the AIIB.21 The Chinese MFA has since refuted this report, 

stating that “there is no such proposition.”22

Critical Questions and Debate

The recent European announcements have generated debate regarding the U.S. stance toward the AIIB and the 

future of the new bank. According to the Wall Street Journal, former World Bank President Robert Zoellick‡

criticized the White House’s handling of the AIIB as “mistaken both on policy and on execution.”23 Instead, he 

insisted, the U.S. government should have sought multilateral engagement with China, or at a minimum, presented 

 

* The World Bank is currently revising its own environmental and social safeguards in an effort to increase lending for major infrastructure 

projects. The new draft regulation has been criticized for its “light touch” and lowering of standards related to the environment, labor, 

resettlement, and indigenous peoples. John Vidal, “World Bank Emails Reveal Internal Row over ‘Light Touch’ $50bn Loans,” 

Guardian, July 5, 2014.

† On March 19 and 20, 2015, Luxembourg and Switzerland respectively indicated their intention to join the AIIB. On March 23, 2015, the 

Australian federal cabinet voted to approve the country’s application to the AIIB. RT (Russia), “Switzerland, Luxembourg Apply for 

China-Led Infrastructure Bank,” March 21, 2015. http://rt.com/business/242897-switzerland-luxembourg-aiib-china/. Ross Buckley, 

“AIIB: Australia Does the Smart Thing, Finally,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 23, 2015. http://www.smh.com.au/comment/aiibaustralia-does-the-smart-thing-finally-20150323-1m5gpr.html.

‡ Robert Zoellick was also the former U.S. trade representative and deputy secretary of state under George W. Bush.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 

an “alternative solution.”24 Other experts and commentators have raised the following questions about the AIIB and 

the current U.S. position:

1. Should the United States seek to influence international rule-making from within China-led institutions or 

from the outside?25 Similarly, should it “sit out” and leave the AIIB to manage its own fate?*

2. How will China deal with global pressure to make the AIIB a high-standards institution? How will it behave 

within a multilateral institution? Can it prove itself an effective negotiator and a responsible global player? 

3. Will the inclusion of Europe’s four major economies in the AIIB tilt the bank’s power in their favor?† Will 

it prevent China from maintaining a dominant voice in bank operations, whether through governance 

structure, voting share, or veto power? 

4. How will the AIIB change China’s engagement with developing countries? Will other AIIB member 

countries be able to participate in the provision of goods and services funded by the bank? Or will Chinese 

companies dominate bank projects? 

5. How accurate is the assessment of infrastructure finance gaps in Asia? How many “bankable” infrastructure 

projects actually exist throughout the region?26 Does Asia really need another development bank?

6. Should the United States seek to contain China’s influence among its neighbors by opposing Chinese soft 

power, such as development aid, even if that harms other nations in the region?

 

* Elizabeth Economy presents this option as a viable alternative. Elizabeth Economy, “The AIIB Debacle: What Washington Should Do 

Now,” Asia Unbound (Council on Foreign Relations blog), March 16, 2015. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/03/16/the-aiib-debacle-whatwashington-should-do-now/. 

† This concern has also been expressed in the Chinese media. For more detail, see the USCC’s Chinese Media Digest, Volume 2, Issue 4, 

March 27, 2015.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 6 

Box 1: Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank – A Timeline

October 2, 2013: President Xi Jinping first proposed the AIIB in Jakarta, Indonesia 

October 24, 2014: 21 countries met in Beijing to become founding members of the AIIB** 

November 3, 2014: Indonesia pledged support of the AIIB 

January 2015: New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and the Republic of Maldives joined

February 2015: Jordan joined 

March 12, 2015: United Kingdom announced intention to join 

March 17, 2015: France, Germany, and Italy applied to join

March 19, 2015: Luxembourg announced intention to join 

March 20, 2015: Switzerland announced intention to join 

March 23, 2015: Australian federal cabinet approved the country’s membership in the AIIB 

March 29–31, 2015: Meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan to draft the AIIB Articles of Agreement

March 31, 2015: Application deadline for founding member countries 

** Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Burma 

(Myanmar), Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan,

and Vietnam.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 7 

Box 2: Jin Liqun – A Brief Biography

 M.A. in English, Beijing Foreign Studies University (1980)

 Vice Chief of the Foreign Affairs Division, Ministry of Finance (1984–1989) 

 Hubert Humphrey Fellow, Economics Graduate Program, Boston University (1987–1988) 

 Alternative Executive Director for China, World Bank Group (1988)

 Vice Director General of the World Bank Department, Ministry of Finance (1989–1994)

 Director General of the World Bank Department, Ministry of Finance (1994–1995)

 Assistant to the Minister, Ministry of Finance (1995–1998)

 Vice Minister of Finance (1998–2003) 

Concurrent positions: Alternate Governor for the People’s Republic of China at the ADB, World Bank 

Group, and Global Environment Facility; Member of the State Monetary Policy Committee of the People’s 

Bank of China

 Vice President, Asian Development Bank (August 2003–July 2008)

 Chairman of Supervisory Board, China Investment Corporation (2008–2013) 

 Chairman, China International Capital Corporation (May 2013–October 2014)

 Head of the Working Group for the Establishment of the AIIB (February–October 2014)

 Secretary-General, Multilateral Interim Secretariat for Establishing AIIB (October 2014–present)
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 8 

Disclaimer: The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was created by Congress to report on the 

national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the 

People’s Republic of China. For more information, visit www.uscc.gov or join the Commission on Facebook!

This report is the product of professional research performed by the staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to supports its deliberations. Posting of 

the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed 

by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. 

security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 109-7. However, it does not necessarily imply an 

endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of 

the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report.

Endnotes

1 Xinhua (English edition), “President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia,” October 2, 2013. 

http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceil/eng/zgxw/t1085022.htm.

2 Asian Development Bank, “Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia,” 2009, 4; Bloomberg, “China’s $50 Billion Asia Bank Snubs Japan, 

India,” May 11, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-11/china-s-50-billion-asia-bank-snubs-japan-india-in-powerpush. 

3 Ding Ding, Raphael Lam, and Shanaka Peiris, “Future of Asia’s Finance: How Can It Meet Challenges of Demographic Change and 

Infrastructure Needs?” International Monetary Fund, July 2014, 1.

4

Jin Liqun, “A Speech on the Establishment Progress of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” (Keynote Address at the Opening 

Ceremony of the Financing Challenge Seminar on Infrastructure Connectivity in Asia, Bo’ao Forum for Asia, Hainan, China, July 31, 

2014). http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxxwzxen/14301.jhtml.

5

Jane Cai and Laura Zhou, “China-Led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Reflects Mainland’s Rising Power,” South China Morning 

Post, March 25, 2015. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1746614/china-led-aiib-will-serve-its-ambitions-and-reflectsmainlands-rising. 

6 Reuters, “U.S. Urges Allies to Think Twice before Joining China-Led Bank,” March 17, 2015. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/17/us-europe-asia-bank-idUSKBN0MD0B320150317.

7 Kevin Hamlin, “China’s Influence Set to Climb as U.S. Thwarted on New Bank,” Bloomberg, March 24, 2015, 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-24/china-s-influence-poised-to-climb-in-revamp-of-postwar-order.

8 Donald Kirk, “China’s Asian Infrastructure Bank Upsets U.S., Lures U.S. Allies, Including Korea,” Forbes, March 23, 2015. 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2015/03/23/chinas-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-upsets-u-s-lures-u-s-allies-includingkorea/.

9 Bloomberg, “China’s $50 Billion Asia Bank Snubs Japan, India,” May 11, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-

11/china-s-50-billion-asia-bank-snubs-japan-india-in-power-push. 

10 Yi Gang, “Statement by the Honorable YI Gang, Alternate Governor of the International Monetary Fund for the People’s Republic of 

China” (Governor’s Statement at the 2014 Annual Meetings, International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 

October 10, 2014), 5.

11 Yi Gang, “Statement by the Honorable YI Gang, Alternate Governor of the International Monetary Fund for the People’s Republic of 

China” (Governor’s Statement at the 2014 Annual Meetings, International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 

October 10, 2014), 5.

12 Bloomberg, “China’s $50 Billion Asia Bank Snubs Japan, India,” May 11, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-

11/china-s-50-billion-asia-bank-snubs-japan-india-in-power-push. 

13 Jane Perlez, “U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank,” New York Times, October 9, 2014. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?_r=0. 

14 Ying Ma, “An Influential Voice Slams U.S. Handling of New China-Led Infrastructure Bank,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2015. 

http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/19/an-influential-voice-slams-u-s-handling-of-new-china-led-infrastructure-bank/. 

15 Jane Perlez, “U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank,” New York Times, October 9, 2014. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?_r=0. 

16 Yun Sun, “China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?” Brookings Institution, February 2014.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/07-china-aid-to-africa-sun.

17 Jin Liqun, “A Speech on the Establishment Progress of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” (Keynote Address at the Opening 

Ceremony of the Financing Challenge Seminar on Infrastructure Connectivity in Asia, Bo’ao Forum for Asia, Hainan, China, July 31, 

2014). http://english.boaoforum.org/mtzxxwzxen/14301.jhtml.

18 People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference, March 

17, 2015. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1246361.shtml.

 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 9 

 

19 HM Treasury and Rt Hon George Osborne MP, UK Intends to Become a Prospective Founding Member of the Asian Infrastructure 

Investment Bank, March 12, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-plans-to-join-asian-infrastructure-investmentbank.

20 People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference, March 

17, 2015. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1246361.shtml.

21 Lingling Wei and Bob Davis, “China Forgoes Veto Power at New Bank to Win Key European Nations’ Support,” Wall Street Journal, 

March 23, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-forgoes-veto-power-at-new-bank-to-win-key-european-nations-support1427131055.

22 China Radio International, “China Refutes Reports of Giving up Veto Right in AIIB,” March 25, 2015. 

http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/25/4083s871637.htm.

23 Ying Ma, “An Influential Voice Slams U.S. Handling of New China-Led Infrastructure Bank,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2015. 

http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/19/an-influential-voice-slams-u-s-handling-of-new-china-led-infrastructure-bank/.

24 Ying Ma, “An Influential Voice Slams U.S. Handling of New China-Led Infrastructure Bank,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2015. 

http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/19/an-influential-voice-slams-u-s-handling-of-new-china-led-infrastructure-bank/.

25 Jonathan Pollack, “Joining the Club: How Will the United States Respond to AIIB’s Expanding Membership?” Brookings Institution, 

March 17, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/17-joining-the-club-aiib-pollack.

26 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Looking West: China and Central Asia, testimony of Erica Downs, 

March 18, 2015.