Reversed and Remanded and Opinion filed April 22, 2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-20-00254-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

DMITRIY YAKUSHKIN, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00256-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

CESAR MORA-ORTIZ, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00320-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

ISAI CESPEDES-JUAREZ, Appellee
2

NO. 14-20-00321-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

ALBERTO CRUZ PONCE, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00322-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

DON EDWARD LONG, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00323-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

IVERY VERONN MYERS, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00324-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

BRANDON SILVA, Appellee
3

NO. 14-20-00325-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

BERNARDINO AMBUNDIZ, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00326-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

DARNELL THIBODEAUX, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00327-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

OSCAR LEDET III, Appellee

NO. 14-20-00328-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

ADRIANA DELEON IBARRA, Appellee
4

On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 8

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 2214656, 2252333, 2300032, 2278514, 2292998, 

2293155, 2296769, 2294900, 2295063, 2297333, 2299436

O P I N I O N

The common issues presented in these criminal appeals are whether the

Harris County District Attorney has statutory authority to file an appeal on the 

State’s behalf from county-level criminal courts of Harris County, and if so

whether the judge of County Criminal Court at Law No. 8 erred in quashing the 

informations filed against appellees on the ground that the complaint supporting 

each information is invalid. 

For the reasons explained, we hold that the Legislature has authorized the

Harris County District Attorney to represent the State in appeals from county-level 

criminal courts of Harris County. Because the district attorney filed a timely 

notice of appeal in each of these cases, we have jurisdiction over them, and we 

deny appellees’ requests to dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdiction. 

Reaching the merits of the State’s challenge to the orders, we conclude that 

the trial court erred in quashing the informations on the ground that the supporting 

complaints are invalid. The complaints satisfy all statutory requirements and 

therefore are valid. We sustain the State’s issue in each appeal, reverse the trial 

court’s orders quashing the informations, and remand the cases for further 

proceedings.
5

Due to common dispositive questions, the court has consolidated these 

appeals on its own motion for submission purposes.1 A justice of this court 

requested a vote on whether to consider the issues en banc. A majority of the en 

banc court has voted against en banc consideration.2 A panel of the court will 

consider the cases. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.1(a), 41.2(c).

Background

The State charged each appellee by information with various offenses. Each

information was supported by a sworn complaint. 

Appellees moved to quash and set aside the informations and dismiss the 

cases against them.

3

 In their motions, each appellee sought dismissal largely for 

the same reason, namely, that the complaints or affidavits accompanying each 

information were defective or invalid. Appellee Yakushkin argued that the 

information against him was not supported by an affidavit made by a credible 

person, contrary to Code of Criminal Procedure article 21.22. The other appellees

argued that “[t]he complaint in this case does not meet the basic essential 

requirements provided by Texas statute, the Texas Constitution, or the U.S. 

Constitution.” Their motions did not specify precisely in which particulars the 

complaints were deficient, but at the hearing appellees argued that the complaints 

1 Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise, Jewell, Zimmerer, and Wilson voted in 

favor of consolidation; Justices Bourliot, Spain, Hassan, and Poissant voted against 

consolidation. We have excluded one similar appeal from consolidation because a panel of the 

court has already submitted that case on oral argument. Appeal No. 14-20-00255-CR; State v. 

Martinez. Several appeals involving identical issues were docketed in the First Court of Appeals

and decided recently. See State v. Santillana, 612 S.W.3d 582, 584 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

2 Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise, Jewell, Zimmerer, and Wilson voted 

against en banc consideration; Justices Bourliot, Spain, Hassan, and Poissant voted for en banc 

consideration. 

3 We note one possible exception: the clerk’s record in appeal No. 14-20-00256-CR,

State v. Mora-Ortiz, does not contain a motion to quash the information. 
6

in each case did not allege sufficient facts to establish probable cause.4 In 

opposition to the motions, the State argued that the complaints are valid because 

they satisfied the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure article 15.05. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.05. 

Over three successive days, the trial court signed orders quashing the 

informations in all eleven cases. On February 17 and 18, 2020, the court quashed 

the informations as to appellees Yakushkin and Mora-Ortiz, finding in each case 

that the affidavits supporting the informations failed to state sufficient facts to 

support probable cause. On February 19, 2020, the court signed orders quashing 

the informations as to all other appellees. Those orders do not state grounds, but at 

the conclusion of the February 19, 2020 hearing, the court stated it was granting

appellees’ motions to set aside the informations “on the ground they are not based 

on a valid complaint and so the informations are ordered set aside.” 

The Harris County District Attorney, on behalf of the State, filed a timely 

notice of appeal in each case pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 

44.01(a)(1).

Issues Presented

In its sole issue, the State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the 

information against each appellee because, in prosecutions like these under Code 

of Criminal Procedure article 21.22, Texas law does not require that a complaint 

include sufficient facts to establish probable cause. In their response briefs, 

4 With the exception of appellees Yakushkin and Mora-Ortiz, the trial count held a single 

hearing on February 19, 2020, to consider all appellees’ motions, which were filed by the same 

counsel and were, as the court noted, “identical” or “virtually identical.” The court held a

hearing on appellee Yakushkin’s motion two days earlier, February 17, 2020. We have no 

record of a hearing regarding appellee Mora-Ortiz. 
7

appellees acknowledge the State is correct and thus concede error on that particular 

point.

On appeal, however, appellees raise an additional reason why each

complaint is invalid and moreover challenge our jurisdiction over the State’s 

appeals. Regarding the jurisdictional question, appellees argue that we must 

dismiss these cases because the Harris County District Attorney has no authority to 

file a notice of appeal on the State’s behalf in cases from the Harris County 

criminal courts at law. If, as appellees contend, the Harris County District 

Attorney has no authority to file a notice of appeal in cases originating in the 

county criminal courts at law, then the notices of appeal she filed on the State’s 

behalf here were insufficient to invoke this court’s jurisdiction. 

Concerning the merits, appellees assert for the first time on appeal that the 

trial court properly dismissed the complaints because they did not comply with 

Code of Criminal Procedure article 2.04. 

Because appellees’ first argument concerns this court’s jurisdiction, we 

address it first. See, e.g., Galliford v. State, 101 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d).

Jurisdiction

Appellees argue that “[t]he Harris County District Attorney is not statutorily 

authorized to represent the State of Texas in criminal appeals from county-level 

courts.” Appellees insist that “[o]nly the State Prosecuting Attorney” has the 

statutory authority to do so, and, because the State Prosecuting Attorney did not 

file a notice of appeal in these cases, we have no jurisdiction to consider the 

appeals. In support, appellees point to several statutes, which they say do not grant 

the Harris County District Attorney the authority to file a notice of appeal for the 
8

State in appeals from a county-level court. In the absence of any statutory 

authority granting the Harris County District Attorney authority to file the appeal,

appellees continue, we must conclude that she does not. 

A. Relevant Law

We briefly summarize the authority on which appellees rely.

1. Texas Constitution article V, section 21

Appellees first direct us to the provision of the Texas Constitution that 

empowers the Legislature to establish the duties of district attorneys. The Texas 

Constitution provides in relevant part:

A County Attorney, for counties in which there is not a resident 

Criminal District Attorney, shall be elected by the qualified voters of

each county. . . . The County Attorneys shall represent the State in all 

cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties; 

but if any county shall be included in a district in which there shall be 

a District Attorney, the respective duties of District Attorneys and 

County Attorneys shall in such counties be regulated by the 

Legislature.

Tex. Const. art. V, § 21 (emphasis added). This constitutional provision speaks 

only to representation in the district and inferior courts, not appellate courts, and 

provides that in districts, like Harris County, that have both a district attorney and a 

county attorney, the Legislature will determine their “respective duties.” Id.

2. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 2.01 

One statute that addresses district attorneys’ duties pertaining specifically to 

appeals is Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 2.01. That article provides in 

relevant part: “Each district attorney shall represent the State in all criminal cases 

in the district courts of his district and in appeals therefrom.” Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. art. 2.01. This statute gives district attorneys authority to represent the State
9

in appeals from cases in “the district courts of his district.” However, as appellees

observe, the statute does not specify who has authority to file appeals for the State

when, as here, the Harris County District Attorney’s statutory authority to 

prosecute criminal cases on the State’s behalf extends not only to district courts but 

also county criminal courts at law.

3. Texas Government Code sections 25.1033 and 43.180

Section 25.1033 of the Government Code pertains directly to Harris 

County’s statutory criminal courts at law. That section provides that “[t]he Harris 

County district attorney serves as prosecutor for the county criminal courts at law 

as provided by Section 43.180.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 25.1033(k). This statute

clearly provides that the Harris County District Attorney is to be the prosecutor in 

the county criminal courts at law, but it does not specifically address whether, as 

prosecutor, the Harris County District Attorney has authority to file appeals on 

behalf of the State in cases arising from those courts. Because it references section 

43.180, however, we consider that section as well.

Section 43.180 authorizes the office of Harris County District Attorney. It 

provides in relevant part:

(a) The voters of Harris County elect a district attorney.

(b) The district attorney shall attend each term and session of the 

district courts of Harris County. The district attorney shall represent 

the state in criminal cases pending in the district and inferior courts 

of the county. The district attorney has control of any case heard on 

habeas corpus before any civil district court or criminal court of the

county.

(c) The district attorney has all the powers, duties, and privileges in 

Harris County relating to criminal matters for and in behalf of the 

state that are conferred on district attorneys in the various counties 

and districts.
10

Id. § 43.180(a), (b), (c) (emphasis added). Notably, this statute specifically 

empowers the Harris County District Attorney to litigate criminal cases “in the 

district and inferior courts of the county,” see id. § 43.108(b) (emphasis added),

and bestows on the Harris County District Attorney “all the powers” “relating to 

criminal matters” “that are conferred on district attorneys in the various counties 

and districts.” See id. § 43.180(c). Neither section 43.180 nor section 25.1033 

specifically addresses appeals.

4. Texas Government Code section 42.001

According to appellees, only the State Prosecuting Attorney is authorized to 

represent the State in appeals from Harris County criminal courts at law. They

direct us to Government Code section 42.001, which provides:

The court of criminal appeals shall appoint a state prosecuting 

attorney to represent the state in all proceedings before the court. The 

state prosecuting attorney may also represent the state in any stage of 

a criminal case before a state court of appeals if he considers it 

necessary for the interest of the state.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 42.001(a) (emphasis added). As appellees point out, the State 

Prosecuting Attorney is not required to represent the State in appeals from Harris 

County’s criminal courts at law but “may” do so “if he [or she] considers it 

necessary for the interest of the state.” Based on this section, appellees state that 

the State Prosecuting Attorney is the “only entity capable of representing the State 

of Texas in an appeal from a county criminal court at law in Harris County.”

B. Discussion

Appellees contend that none of the statutes referenced above specifically 

grants the Harris County District Attorney power to appeal judgments from Harris 

County criminal courts at law. Because no statute authorizes the Harris County 

District Attorney to appeal cases from the county criminal courts at law, appellees
11

say that only the State Prosecuting Attorney had the discretionary authority to file 

the notice of appeal in these cases. Because the State Prosecuting Attorney did not 

choose to file an appeal, and the Harris County District Attorney had no power to 

do so, appellees argue that the appeals were never perfected and must be dismissed 

for lack of jurisdiction.

In its reply brief, the State contends that the Harris County District 

Attorney’s authorizing statute—section 43.180 of the Government Code—is 

ambiguous because neither subsection (b) nor subsection (c) explicitly empowers 

the Harris County District Attorney to represent the State on appeal in criminal 

cases from the county criminal courts at law. The State also asserts that appellees’

interpretation of the statute would lead to the absurd result of requiring the State

Prosecuting Attorney, a three-person office based in Austin, to handle all of the 

appeals from Harris County’s statutory county criminal courts at law, as well as 

those from several other counties in similar situations. In light of its claim that 

section 43.180 is ambiguous, the State urges this court to consider extratextual 

sources such as legislative history to determine whether the Harris County District 

Attorney had the authority to file and prosecute these appeals.

We need not do so. We conclude that the Harris County District Attorney’s 

statutory authority to represent the State in appeals from county-level courts at law 

in Harris County is evident from the plain language of the statutes appellees cite,

read in conjunction with the statute authorizing state’s appeals.

The State has no right of appeal in criminal cases unless it is authorized by

statute. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 26 (West 1987) (“The State is entitled to appeal 

in criminal cases, as authorized by general law.”); see also Todd v. State, 661 

S.W.2d 116, 117 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (addressing pre-1987 version of 

article V, section 26, which provided: “The State shall have no right of appeal in 
12

criminal cases.”). The State is granted the right of appeal by Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure article 44.01. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01. Because 

the State’s ability to appeal in a criminal case is statutorily created, the terms of the 

statute must be followed. State v. Janssen, 592 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing State v. Sellers, 790 S.W.2d 316, 316 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1990)); see also State v. Wachtendorf, 475 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015) (“The State has not always enjoyed a right to appeal in Texas, and that right 

is a statutorily created one.”) (internal quotation omitted). Article 44.01 provides,

among other things, the circumstances under which the State may file an appeal,

the time for filing such an appeal, and who may file the appeal on behalf of the 

State. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a), (b), (c), (d), (i).

Regarding the filing of the appeal, article 44.01 provides:

The prosecuting attorney may not make an appeal under Subsection 

(a) or (b) of this article later than the 20th day after the date on which 

the order, ruling, or sentence to be appealed is entered by the court.

Id. art. 44.01(d) (emphasis added). The statute then defines “prosecuting 

attorney”:

In this article, “prosecuting attorney” means the county attorney,

district attorney, or criminal district attorney who has the primary 

responsibility of prosecuting cases in the court hearing the case and 

does not include an assistant prosecuting attorney.

Id. art. 44.01(i) (emphasis added).

It is undisputed that “[t]he [Harris County] district attorney shall represent 

the state in criminal cases pending in the district and inferior courts of the county” 

and “serves as prosecutor for the county criminal courts at law.” Tex. Gov’t Code 

§§ 43.180(b), 25.1033(k). Under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(i), 

moreover, the “prosecuting attorney” for the county-level courts of Harris County 
13

is the Harris County District Attorney because she “has the primary responsibility 

of prosecuting cases” in County Criminal Court at Law No. 8 of Harris County. 

As the “prosecuting attorney,” it is her responsibility to “make an appeal” within

twenty days of the date of the trial court’s order. In the present cases, the Harris 

County District Attorney filed timely notices of appeal. Accordingly, she properly 

invoked our appellate jurisdiction, and we deny appellees’ requests that we dismiss 

these cases for want of jurisdiction. 

Our disposition on this issue aligns with that of our sister court in Houston, 

which recently rejected an identical argument, raised by the same public defender,

in State v. Santillana, 612 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. 

ref’d). Based on the plain text of the various statutes cited above, the Santillana

court concluded that a timely notice of appeal filed by the Harris County District 

Attorney from Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 8 properly invoked the 

appellate court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 587. We agree with the First Court of Appeals

on this issue. See id.

The State’s Issue on Appeal

In its issue on appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in 

dismissing the charges because the affidavits supporting each information are

statutorily compliant and because the court was incorrect to rule that an affidavit or 

complaint supporting an information must articulate sufficient facts to establish 

probable cause. The trial court also expressed concern during the hearing that the 

affiants’ signatures on each affidavit are illegible. The State notes, however, that

article 15.05 imposes no legibility requirement,

5

and that an affiant may attest to

5

Smith v. State, 811 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d)

(stating “[t]here is no requirement in the statute that the signatures be legible”).
14

the statements in an affidavit or complaint merely by “affixing his mark.” See Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.05. 

In response, appellees urge us to affirm the trial court’s orders because the 

complaints upon which each information was based are invalid. Appellees argue

that the complaints are invalid for one reason, albeit a different reason from those 

presented in the motions below, discussed during the hearings, or identified in the 

trial court orders. Specifically, appellees contend that the affiant on a written 

complaint must be the person who made the original complaint to the district 

attorney. They base their argument on article 2.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, which provides:

Upon complaint being made before a district or county attorney that 

an offense has been committed in his district or county, he shall 

reduce the complaint to writing and cause the same to be signed and 

sworn to by the complainant, and it shall be duly attested by said 

attorney.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2.04.

Appellees argue that this statute “contains an additional requirement for a 

complaint,” beyond the four statutory requisites applicable to “complaints” listed

in article 15.05, and that the Harris County District Attorney’s admitted

compliance with article 15.05 therefore is insufficient. According to appellees, the

complaints or affidavits are invalid because they do not comply with article 2.04.6

6 Appellees acknowledge on appeal that an affidavit or complaint supporting an 

information need not include sufficient facts to establish probable cause. Thus, they do not seek 

to defend the orders on that ground. Additionally, while noting that the affiants’ signatures are 

illegible, appellees do not argue that the complaints are invalid solely because the signatures are 

illegible, see Smith, 811 S.W.2d at 668; rather, they contend that illegible signatures or marks 

prevent them from determining whether each affiant is “the person who first notified the district 

attorney” of the alleged violations. 
15

Articles 15.04 and 15.05 describe “complaints” and their requirements. A 

“complaint,” as referenced by article 15.04, refers to the “affidavit made before the

magistrate or district or county attorney” that alleges the commission of an offense.

Id. art. 15.04. Article 15.05 lists a complaint’s necessary requisites:

The complaint shall be sufficient, without regard to form, if it 

have these substantial requisites:

1. It must state the name of the accused, if known, and if not 

known, must give some reasonably definite description of him.

2. It must show that the accused has committed some offense 

against the laws of the State, either directly or that the affiant has 

good reason to believe, and does believe, that the accused has 

committed such offense.

3. It must state the time and place of the commission of the 

offense, as definitely as can be done by the affiant.

4. It must be signed by the affiant by writing his name or 

affixing his mark.

Id. art. 15.05.7

Article 21.20, entitled “Information,” defines an information as “a written 

statement filed and presented in behalf of the State by the district or county 

attorney, charging the defendant with an offense which may by law be so 

prosecuted.” Id. art. 21.20. No information shall be presented until an “affidavit”

7 Article 15.05 appears in chapter fifteen of the Code, entitled “Arrest Under Warrant.”

The “affidavit” or “complaint” referenced in article 15.04 refers to an affidavit supporting a 

warrant or summons by a magistrate. See id. art. 15.03(a)(2). The affidavit required by article

15.05 to support a warrant of arrest is not to be confused with the affidavit required by article

21.22 to support an information; they have separate purposes. See Jernigan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 

936, 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983). In today’s cases, the parties 

do not dispute that article 15.05’s requirements applicable to complaints supporting warrants or 

summonses also apply to an “affidavit” or “complaint” supporting a misdemeanor information. 

Our court and others have stated or implied as much. See, e.g., Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, 

664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Caves, 496 S.W.3d 153, 156 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2016, pet. ref’d); Gholson v. State, 667 S.W.2d 168, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, 

pet. ref’d).
16

has been made by “some credible person” charging the defendant with an offense.

Id. art. 21.22. The “affidavit” shall be filed with the information. The affidavit

may be sworn to before the district or county attorney, or it may be made before 

any officer authorized by law to administer oaths. Id.

Here, as to each appellee, the State filed an “information” together with a

signed affidavit, described on its face as a “complaint.” According to appellees, 

article 2.04 requires that the affiant for a “complaint” be the same person who 

originally complained about the alleged offense to the district attorney. Thus, 

appellees are contending that the “affidavit” required to be attached to the 

information under article 21.22 must be sworn to by the person who “made the 

original complaint to the district attorney,” which, according to appellees, usually

is a “law enforcement officer.” Appellees continue that the State in the present 

case did not prove that the affiant on the affidavit attached to each information is in 

fact the officer who first complained to the district attorney. Appellees generally 

believe or suspect that the affiants are instead administrative employees of the 

Harris County District Attorney’s office. For this reason, appellees contend that 

the affidavits or “complaints” filed with each information violate article 2.04.

Appellees did not cite or discuss article 2.04 in their motions or during the 

hearings. Defects in complaints must be raised before trial, and a defendant who

fails to object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an 

information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences waives the 

right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity on appeal. See Ramirez v. State, 

105 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.14.

Here, trial on the merits had not commenced. The court quashed each information

before trial. Because the State does not argue waiver but instead addresses the 

substance of appellees’ article 2.04 argument, we will as well, presuming without 
17

deciding that we may do so despite appellees’ failure to assert the argument they

raise on appeal in the trial court before the court dismissed the charges. Cf. 

Santillana, 612 S.W.3d at 587-88 (concluding that appellees failed to preserve 

argument by not advancing it before trial).

An information need only be based upon a sworn “affidavit” “by some 

credible person” other than the prosecutor. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 21.22; Wells 

v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Gholson v. State, 667 

S.W.2d 168, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d). A credible 

person is any person competent to testify. Halbadier v. State, 220 S.W. 85, 87

(Tex. Crim. App. 1920). Article 2.04 says that a district or county attorney is 

obligated to reduce to writing any complaint alleging an offense and to have the 

“complainant” sign the document. Article 21.22, however, does not require that 

the “affiant” who signs the affidavit upon which an information is based must be 

the person who first notified the district or county attorney of the offense. Nor 

does article 21.22 state that the affidavit filed with the information must be the 

“complaint” referenced in article 2.04. Under article 21.22, the “affidavit” 

supporting an information must be signed by a “credible person,” and courts have 

long held that this affiant can be a police officer, or someone else, including 

someone without personal knowledge of the facts supporting the offense. See

Wells, 516 S.W.2d at 664; Catchings v. State, 285 S.W.2d 233, 234 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1955) (complaint filed by secretary for Harris County District Attorney held 

to be complaint by a “credible person,” even though she did not have first-hand 

knowledge and based her affirmation on information from a police report and an 

instrument signed by a police officer); Santillana, 612 S.W.3d at 588; State v. 

Balandrano, No. 13-13-00536-CR, 2015 WL 5136453, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi Aug. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 
18

(affidavit in support of information not invalid because not signed by someone 

with first-hand knowledge of facts) (discussing Wells); Paulsen v. State, No. 01-

99-00271-CR, 2000 WL 1678444, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 9, 

2000, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that district 

attorney investigator may serve as affiant); Rose v. State, 799 S.W.2d 381, 384 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.); Pringle v. State, 732 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d). 

Nothing in the Code or any authority cited prevents the district attorney from

discharging her duty under article 2.04 by reducing to writing a “complaint” signed 

by a “complainant” and also filing an information accompanied by an affidavit 

signed by some credible person other than the person who signed the “complaint” 

referenced by article 2.04. The “complaint” in article 2.04 and the “affidavit”

referenced in article 21.22 need not be the same document or signed by the same 

person, although they may be. Typically, the affidavit filed with an information is 

in the form of a “complaint,”

8 but all article 21.22 requires is that an information 

be supported by an “affidavit . . . made by some credible person charging the 

defendant with an offense” and that it be sworn to before the district or county

attorney, or another person authorized to administer oaths. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

art. 21.22. Accordingly, we hold that article 21.22 imposes no requirement that the 

person signing the affidavit referenced in that article be the person who first 

reported the alleged offense to the district attorney. The affidavits accompanying 

the informations in the present cases do not violate article 2.04 for the reason

appellees assert.

8

See Mayo v. State, No. 09-13-00387-CR, 2014 WL 3387017, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont July 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“As a general rule, 

an information may not be presented until an affidavit, typically in the form of a complaint, has 

been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense.”).
19

Moreover, even indulging the premise that the affidavit filed with an 

information must be signed by the first person who reported the offense to the 

district attorney, appellees’ argument fails for an alternative reason. The defendant 

has the burden of proof on a motion to quash an indictment or complaint. Wheat v. 

State, 537 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Appellees’ response to the 

State’s appellate issue is premised on the notion that the State failed to show that 

the affidavit in each case was signed by the first person who complained. But it 

was not the State’s burden to do so; it was appellees’ burden to prove that the 

affidavits are invalid. Appellees presented no evidence at the hearings and failed 

in this burden.

We conclude appellees’ argument regarding the sufficiency of the 

complaints under article 2.04 lacks merit, and thus the trial court could not have

properly dismissed appellees’ charges on this basis. See Santillana, 612 S.W.3d at 

588.

Conclusion

Having concluded that we have jurisdiction over these appeals and having 

held that the trial court erred in quashing the information in each case, we reverse 

the trial court’s orders and remand the cases for further proceedings.

/s/ Kevin Jewell

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Poissant, and Wilson.

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).