UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4429

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

JAMES WEBSTER MORROW, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, 

Chief District Judge. (5:07-cr-00336–FL-1) 

Submitted: March 18, 2009 Decided: April 27, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne 

M. Hayes, Banumathi Rangarajan, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 James Webster Morrow pled guilty to one count of being 

a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006). In sentencing Morrow, the district 

court overruled his objection to a two-level enhancement for 

obstruction of justice and adopted the presentence report 

without change. The district court sentenced Morrow to seventy 

months’ imprisonment, which fell within Morrow’s advisory 

guidelines range. Morrow timely noted his appeal and argues 

that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence for 

obstruction of justice. After considering the record and the 

arguments of the parties, we reject Morrow’s arguments and 

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

 The sentencing guidelines provide for a two-level 

enhancement if a “defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice 

with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of 

the instant offense of conviction, and . . . the obstructive 

conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of 

conviction[.]” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 

(2007). 

 Obstructive conduct that occurs prior to the start of 

the investigation of the offense may be covered “if the conduct 

was purposefully calculated, and likely, to thwart the 

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investigation or prosecution of the offense of conviction.” 

USSG § 3C1.1, comment (n.1). Obstructive conduct within the 

meaning of § 3C1.1 includes, but is not limited to, 

“threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing 

a co-defendant, witness, or juror” and “threatening the victim 

of the offense in an attempt to prevent the victim from 

reporting the conduct constituting the offense of conviction.” 

USSG § 3C1.1, comment (n.4(a), (k)). 

 Morrow argues that Application Note 1 to § 3C1.1 

required the district court to find that his conduct both “was 

purposefully calculated” and “likely” to thwart the 

investigation or prosecution of his offense of conviction in 

order to enhance his sentence for obstruction of justice, and 

that the district court misapplied § 3C1.1 by failing to 

explicitly state these findings. Morrow argues that this 

failure by the district court was an error of law requiring de 

novo review by this court as opposed to review for clear error. 

See United States v. Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 2004); 

United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 1998). 

 Morrow never challenged the findings in the 

presentence report that he threatened to kill a witness and the 

witness’ girlfriend if they reported to the police that Morrow 

had a firearm. Rather, Morrow simply claimed that he did not 

intentionally threaten the witness and that the witness 

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misunderstood his behavior. In the presentence report, the 

probation officer, in response to Morrow’s objection, referenced 

the examples of obstructive conduct in Application Notes 4(a) 

and 4(k) to § 3C1.1 and reiterated the facts from Morrow’s 

offense that fell within these examples. By overruling Morrow’s 

objection to the presentence report based on the probation 

officer’s recommendation, the district court implicitly adopted 

the findings in the presentence report responsive to the 

objection. Williams, 152 F.3d at 301. The court need not 

reference the text of an Application Note in making those 

findings, and Morrow’s first claim, therefore, is without merit. 

 Morrow next argues that the record contains 

insufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that he purposefully calculated any threat in order to 

thwart the investigation of the instant offense. Morrow 

essentially claims that because all of his conduct was not 

obstructive, none of his conduct was. Our review of the record 

leads us to conclude that this claim is without merit. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED