United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

March 1996 ARMY NATIONAL

GUARD

Validate Requirements

for Combat Forces and

Size Those Forces

Accordingly

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-63

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270577 

March 14, 1996

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan

Chairman

The Honorable Owen Pickett

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD), in its bottom-up review of the nation’s

defense needs in the post-Cold War era, identified the number of both

active and reserve component combat forces needed to accomplish the

national military strategy. The Army combat forces in the reserve

components are in the Army National Guard. As you requested, we

reviewed the roles and missions of the Guard’s combat units and efforts by

DOD and the Army to redesign the Guard’s combat divisions.

Background The Army’s reserve components are the Army Reserve and Army National

Guard. The Army Reserve is comprised of units that support combat

forces and is restricted to federal missions. The Guard has both combat

and support units and federal and state responsibilities. The Guard is to be

organized and resourced for federal wartime missions, according to Guard

policy. Federal missions range from participating in full-scale military

conflicts to operations other than war, backfilling active forces deployed

on operational missions, providing training support to the active

component, supporting domestic disaster relief and emergency operations

under federal control, and providing strategic reserve forces to meet

unknown contingencies. The Guard’s state missions typically involve

support for state officials and organizations during domestic civil

emergencies and natural or man-made disasters.

The size of DOD’s forces and budgets has declined with the end of the Cold

War and pressures to reduce the deficit. In 1989 the Guard had about

457,000 personnel. By the end of fiscal year 1996, the Guard plans to have

373,000 personnel in 54 separate state and territorial military commands in

the 50 states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and

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B-270577 

Guam. About 161,000 Guard personnel are to be in 42 combat brigades,

including 67,000 in 15 enhanced brigades. The remaining 212,000

personnel are in headquarters units and units that support combat. By the

end of fiscal year 1999, the Guard plans to be down to 367,000 personnel,

with about 187,000 personnel in the combat units, including the 67,000 in

the enhanced brigades.

The Guard’s 42 combat brigades are organized as follows: 8 divisions

comprised of 3 brigades each, 15 enhanced brigades, and 3 separate

combat units, consisting of 2 separate brigades and a scout group. In

addition to the combat units, the Guard has elements that support combat

units, such as engineers, military police, military intelligence, and

transportation.

The enhanced brigade concept, described in DOD’s 1993 Report on the

Bottom-Up Review, became effective on October 1, 1995. The concept

provides for 15 separate brigades that are not part of a divisional structure

during peacetime and that are required to be ready to deploy at the Army’s

highest readiness level within 90 days of mobilization. The enhancements,

according to the bottom-up review, are training and resources above those

provided to the Guard’s other combat forces. The enhancements are to

enable the 15 brigades to achieve peacetime readiness goals so that they

can meet their deployment criteria by the end of fiscal year 1998.

The President’s budget request for fiscal year 1996 included $5.5 billion for

the Guard, which represents about 2.2 percent of DOD’s budget request and

9.3 percent of the Army’s request. About $1.7 billion of the $5.5 billion

request is for the Guard combat units. The remaining $3.8 billion is for

such organizations as headquarters units and elements that support

combat. These other organizations receive most of the funds because they

include support elements that are the first to deploy. For fiscal year 2001,

the Guard’s budget is projected to be about $6 billion, with about

$1.8 billion for combat units. Table 1 further breaks down these budgets.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

Table 1: Projected Budgets for Guard

Organizational Elements

Fiscal years

Dollars in millions

Element 1996 1999 2001

Divisionsa $956 $782 $816

Enhanced brigades 730 919 956

Otherb 3,854 4,104 4,305

Total $5,540 $5,805 $6,077

aIncludes the three separate combat units that are not in divisions.

bIncludes organizations such as Army National Guard Headquarters and units that support

combat.

Results in Brief Although the Guard has come down in size, our analysis shows that the

combat forces may still be too large for projected war requirements. The

Guard’s combat structure, with 42 combat brigades, exceeds projected

requirements for two major regional conflicts, according to war planners

and DOD and Army studies. According to DOD documents and Army

officials, the excess forces are a strategic reserve that could be assigned

missions such as occupational forces once an enemy has been deterred

and as rotational forces. However, we could find no analytical basis for

this level of strategic reserve.

State and federal laws generally authorize the Guard to provide military

support to state authorities for certain missions, such as disaster relief.1

Support skills and equipment such as engineering and military police are

most often needed for state missions. The Guard primarily supplements

other state resources for these missions. Moreover, according to a recent

study by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute,2

 the Guard over the

last decade has used only a small percent of its total personnel to meet

state requirements.

The Army is studying alternatives to redesign the Guard’s combat

structure to meet critical shortages that the Army has identified in its

support capabilities. DOD’s Commission on Roles and Missions concluded

in its report that reserve component forces with lower priority tasks

should be eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority

areas. It specifically cited the Guard’s eight combat divisions. The

1

Our reference to state support and missions will encompass assistance to the Governors of Guam, the

U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico and the President of the United States in the District of Columbia.

2

Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, RAND, (Santa Monica, CA: 1995).

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

Commission also reported that, even after filling the shortfalls, the total

Army would still have more combat spaces than required and

recommended these should be eliminated from the active or reserve

components.

Guard Combat

Structure Far Exceeds

War Requirements

In March 1993, DOD initiated a comprehensive bottom-up review to assess

the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, and budgets to counter

regional aggression in the post-Cold War environment. DOD judged it

prudent to maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts. To execute the two-conflict

strategy, DOD determined that the Army must maintain 10 divisions in the

active forces augmented by 15 reserve enhanced brigades and associated

support forces.

The bottom-up review report stated that the reserve component must

adapt to meet new challenges. Accordingly, this means making smarter

use of reserve component forces by adapting them to new requirements,

assigning them missions that properly use their strengths, and funding

them at a level consistent with their expected missions during a crisis or

war.

The bottom-up review concluded that the Army’s reserve components

should be reduced to 575,000 personnel by 1999—a 201,000 decrease since

fiscal year 1989. The review specified that the reserve components’

combat structure would be about 37 brigades, 15 of which would be

enhanced. A group of senior officers of the Army, its reserve components,

and organizations that represent Army component issues was tasked with

providing a recommendation to the Secretary of the Army on the

allocation of the 575,000 personnel between the Guard and the Army

Reserve. The group allocated 367,000 personnel to the Guard and 208,000

to the Army Reserve. In addition to the 15 enhanced brigades specified in

the bottom-up review, the Guard, in concert with the Army, determined

that it would retain 8 combat divisions, 3 separate combat units, and

numerous support units.

The Guard’s eight combat divisions and three separate combat units are

not required to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, according to Army

war planners and war planning documents that we reviewed. The Army’s

war planners at headquarters and at U.S. Forces Command stated that

these forces are not needed during or after hostilities cease for one or

more major regional conflicts. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

assigned the eight combat divisions or the three separate combat units for

use in any major regional conflict currently envisioned in DOD planning

scenarios. The missions for these divisions and units, according to the

bottom-up review, include (1) providing the basis for rotation when forces

are required to remain in place over an extended period after the enemy

invasion has been deterred, (2) serving as a deterrent hedge to future

adversarial regimes, and (3) supporting civil authorities at home.

According to Army officials involved in the review, there was no analysis

to determine the appropriate number of forces required to perform these

missions.

The Guard’s 15 enhanced brigades are the principal reserve component

ground combat forces. The bottom-up review report states that one

important role for these brigades is to supplement active component

divisions, should more ground combat power be needed to deter or fight a

second major regional conflict. Although the bottom-up review specified a

need for 15 enhanced brigades and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made all

15 brigades available for war planning purposes, the planners have

identified requirements for less than 10 brigades to achieve mission

success in the war fight.3

 However, these plans are evolving and the

number of brigades required may change. This lesser number of brigades

is generally consistent with the required reserve combat forces included in

the Army’s current Total Army Analysis process. That process projects the

Army’s future support needs based on the future combat force.

According to U.S. Forces Command planners, the enhanced brigades that

are not required to achieve mission success in the war fight are considered

to be strategic reserve that can either be used for occupational forces once

the enemy has been defeated or for other missions. Other roles would be

to replace active forces stationed overseas or engaged in peacekeeping

operations should the replaced forces be needed for a regional conflict.

Guard Combat and

Support Structure

Exceeds State Mission

Needs

The Guard has a wide range of state missions. These missions include the

defense of states or other entities from disorder, rebellion, or invasion;

emergency and disaster relief; humanitarian assistance; and community

support activities.

In crisis situations, the governors primarily use the Guard to supplement

civil agencies after those agencies have exhausted their resources.

According to Guard officials at the state level, the state expects the local

3

The specific number is classified.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

authorities to respond first, followed by county, and then state resources.

If the crisis exceeds the state’s civil capabilities, the Guard can be called

on for added support. For example, needs far exceeded the state’s civil

agencies’ capabilities after Hurricane Andrew devastated south Florida.

Therefore, the Governor called up almost 50 percent of Florida’s Army and

Air Guard personnel for such tasks as providing temporary shelters,

removing debris, distributing food and water, and providing security.

For situations beyond a state’s capabilities, the Governor can ask the

President to declare a federal emergency. When this declaration is made,

the Federal Emergency Management Agency becomes the coordinating

agency between state and federal agencies. For example, Florida’s

immediate assistance needs after Hurricane Andrew exceeded the

capacity of the state’s resources, including its Guard forces. As a result,

the Governor requested and received a presidential disaster declaration

that entitled the state to obtain federal funding and assistance from federal

agencies and the active military.

The federal government has added several domestic initiatives to the

Guard’s federally funded state missions. For example, newly acquired

initiatives include drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, drug

demand reduction programs, medical assistance in underserved areas, and

the Civilian Youth Opportunities program. Although federally funded, the

state governors authorize missions like these under the control of

authorized Guard officials.

Given the concerns for potential hardships to Guard members, their

families, and their employers, most state Guard leaders plan to rotate

Guard members used in state missions lasting longer than 7 days. For

example, in both the Midwest floods of 1993 and Hurricane Andrew in

1992, Guard personnel were rotated, which resulted in the use of a greater

number of personnel, but for shorter durations.

Guard officials at the state level said that general soldier skills, such as

discipline and following a chain of command, are often all that are needed

to satisfy state missions. In the specialized skills areas, they said that

support skills and equipment such as engineering, transportation, medical

support, aviation, and military police are most often needed. In the states

we visited, we were told that Guard members were asked to perform a

variety of tasks on state active duty. For example, in California, the Guard

provided homeless shelters for people displaced by major earthquakes,

patrolled the streets of Los Angeles during a riot, and provided support to

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

firefighters during wild fires. In Kansas and Utah, Guard members filled

sandbags to fight flooding.

In the previously mentioned study, which was required by the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, RAND reported that the

Army and Air Guard in fiscal year 1993 experienced the highest number of

state active duty days in over 10 years. The 54 state and territorial Guard

entities reported spending over 460,000 duty days on state missions,

involving over 34,000 members of the total Guard. This equated to about

6 percent of the total available Army and Air Guard personnel. Almost

50 percent of the Guard’s use that year was due to the Midwest floods.

As might be expected, Guard usage for state missions varies from state to

state and year to year. For example, RAND reported that the Florida Army

and Air Guard were on state active duty in 1992 for Hurricane Andrew for

over 80 days, with a peak personnel commitment of some 6,200 out of a

total strength of about 13,500, or about 46 percent. RAND also reported

that New York, with an Army and Air Guard strength of about 20,000, had

its highest Guard usage in 6 years in 1994. During that year, the state used

about 6,000 Guard workdays, which amounts to about 1 state active duty

day per year for about 30 percent of the state’s total Army and Air Guard

strength. This latter experience is typical of many states during the same

period.

RAND reported that, nationally, state demands on the Army and Air Guard

are not significant. Moreover, the Guard’s own data do not show sizable

demands on its personnel and resources for state missions. As such,

RAND concluded that, even in a peak use year, state missions would not

require a large portion of the Guard and should not be used as a basis for

sizing the Guard force. It also concluded that the Guard is large enough to

handle both state and federal missions, even in the unlikely, but possible,

event of simultaneous peak demands.

Study of Guard

Combat Structure

The Army is studying the redesign of the Guard’s combat structure to meet

critical shortages in support capabilities. In May 1995, the Army’s Vice

Chief of Staff chartered a work group to develop alternatives and make

recommendations for using the Guard’s combat structure to meet critical

shortages in support forces. According to the group’s charter, the Army

has undertaken this effort because it is critically short support forces, but

continues to maintain Guard combat units that are excess to war-fighting

requirements.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

The group is to

• review the Army’s future unresourced support requirements,

• review the structure and missions of the Guard combat elements and

develop options for changing the structure to meet future Army

requirements,

• conduct a resource feasibility assessment of the options to determine

whether the Army possesses or is able to program the resources needed to

equip and maintain the redesigned structure, and

• refine and prioritize the options for presentation to the Army leadership by

March 1996.

The group’s charter established certain parameters such as (1) the Guard’s

planned end strength will not change, (2) the redesign efforts will consider

the Guard’s need to remain responsive to state missions, and (3) the

redesign effort is not intended to reduce the number of Guard division

headquarters.

Previous Studies

Recognize Need for

Change

Previous studies have also recognized the need for changes to the Guard’s

combat structure. In December 1992, we reported that opportunities

existed to break up some Guard divisions and convert some combat units

to support units.4

 In March 1995, we reported that the Army would be

challenged to provide sufficient numbers of certain types of support units

for two major regional conflicts because it had difficulty providing such

units in the single conflict Persian Gulf War.5

 We suggested that an option

for augmenting the Army’s support capability is to use existing support

capability in the eight Guard divisions that DOD did not include in the

combat force for executing the two-conflict strategy. We recommended

that the Secretary of the Army (1) identify the specific unresourced

support requirements that could be met using Guard divisional support

units and the personnel and equipment in these units and (2) work with

the Guard to develop a plan for employing this capability. The work group

is considering this recommendation as one of the options.

In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1994, DOD established a Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, which looked at, among other things, the better use of reserve

4

Army Force Structure: Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf

War (GAO/NSIAD-93-80, Dec. 15, 1992).

5

Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability

(GAO/NSIAD-95-80, Mar. 2, 1995).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

forces. The Commission determined that the Army’s combat structure

exceeds the requirements for a two major regional conflict scenario and

concluded that reserve component forces with lower priority tasks should

be eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority areas. In its

report, the Commission cited the example of the Army’s eight Guard

divisions that were required for possible war with the former Soviet

Union, but are not needed for the current national security strategy.6

 The

report noted that the bottom-up review did assign the eight Guard

divisions secondary missions such as serving as a deterrent hedge to

future adversarial regimes; however, it also said that eight divisions is too

large a force for these secondary missions. The Commission’s report also

noted that at the same time, the Army estimated that it is short 60,000

support troops for a two regional conflict strategy. The Army’s most recent

Total Army Analysis process also projects a shortage of 60,000 support

troops, primarily in transportation and quartermaster units. The

Commission report also stated that, even after the support shortfalls were

filled, there would still be excess combat spaces in the total Army and

recommended eliminating these spaces from the active or reserve

components.

Recommendations The end of the Cold War and budgetary pressures have provided both the

opportunity and the incentive to reassess defense needs. Because the

Guard’s combat forces exceed projected war requirements and the Army’s

analysis indicates a shortage of support forces, we believe it is appropriate

for the Army to study the conversion of some Guard combat forces to

support roles. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in

conjunction with the Secretary of the Army and the Director, Army

National Guard, validate the size and structure of all of the Guard’s combat

forces and that the Secretary of the Army prepare and execute a plan to

bring the size and structure of those combat forces in line with validated

requirements. If the Army study suggests that some Guard combat forces

should be converted to support roles, we recommend that the Secretary of

the Army follow through with the conversion because it would satisfy

shortages in its support forces and further provide the types of forces that

state governors have traditionally needed. Moreover, to the extent that

there are Guard forces that exceed validated requirements, the Secretary

of Defense should consider eliminating them.

6

Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Department of Defense

(Arlington, Va.: 1995).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
B-270577 

Agency Comments DOD agreed with our findings and recommendations. It stated that before

its review is finalized, all shortfalls will be validated against requirements

set forth in the national military strategy. It also stated that until ongoing

studies are completed, it is premature to restructure or eliminate Army

National Guard units. DOD’s comments are shown in appendix I.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine the federal and state roles and missions of the Guard’s

combat units, we interviewed cognizant officials and obtained and

analyzed documents from DOD, the Army, the Army National Guard, and

RAND in Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson,

Georgia; and State Area Commands and combat units in Alabama,

California, Kansas, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.

To determine the efforts by DOD and the Army to redesign the Guard

combat divisions, we interviewed cognizant officials and obtained and

analyzed documents from DOD, the Army, the Army National Guard, 

U.S. Army Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command’s Force Development Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

We conducted this review from February to November 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are providing copies of this report to appropriate House and Senate

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; the Director of the

Army National Guard; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

We will also provide copies to other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report were Robert

Pelletier, Leo Sullivan, Lee Purdy, and Ann Borseth.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 9.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 9.

Now on p. 9.

(701052) Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-63 Army National Guard
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