a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2005 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Air Force Still Needs 

Business Case to 

Support F/A-22 

Quantities and 

Increased Capabilities

GAO-05-304
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-304.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-304, a report to

congressional committees 

March 2005

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Air Force Still Needs Business Case to 

Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased 

Capabilities 

The Air Force has yet to produce a business case for the next-generation 

F/A-22. Much has changed in the years since the F/A-22 program began 

nearly 2 decades ago—adversarial threats against U.S. aircraft have evolved, 

and a plan to modernize the F/A-22 significantly different than the original 

aircraft is in progress. A DOD cost estimate in 2003 projected the Air Force’s 

modernization plan to cost $11.7 billion through 2018. A December 2004 

budget decision reduced procurement funding and quantities but did not cut 

funding for modernization. The decision to terminate procurement after 

fiscal year 2008 places the current modernization plan in doubt as key 

ground attack and intelligence-gathering enhancements had been slated for 

aircraft now eliminated from the program. Without a new business case for 

adding a more robust ground attack capability and for new intelligence 

missions, the Air Force may be at a disadvantage when the time comes to 

justify the modernization plan in the face of future budget constraints. The 

following table shows the current plan for integrating new capabilities: 

Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program 

 2007 2011 2013 2015 

Examples of 

capabilities to be 

added 

Air-to-air plus 

limited air-toground: 

Improved 

capability to 

launch Joint 

Direct Attack 

Munition at faster 

speeds; upgrade 

air-to-air 

capabilities 

Air-to-ground: 

Add improved 

radar to seek and 

destroy advanced 

surface-to-air 

missile systems; 

integrate 

additional air-toground weapons 

Additional airto-ground: 

Increase 

capability to 

suppress or 

destroy full range 

of air defenses 

and improve 

speed and 

accuracy of 

targeting 

Enhanced 

intelligence data 

gathering: Add 

integrated 

intelligence, 

surveillance, and 

reconnaissance 

capabilities. 

Sources: Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

DOD is set to conduct the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review to weigh the 

merits of transformational priorities and investments to determine if the best 

choices are being made to meet military needs within available funding 

levels. This may further influence an F/A-22 business case. 

The F/A-22 program recently underwent initial operational testing, but 

testing did not include the air-to-ground missions that the Air Force 

envisions for the aircraft. The Air Force does not expect to conduct testing 

of these capabilities until after a decision is made to enter full-rate 

production. Although a final test report was not available for our review, Air 

Force officials told us that the F/A-22 was extremely effective in performing 

its air-to-air missions. Evaluation results of capabilities needed to sustain 

combat operations and maintain aircraft were not as favorable. Additional 

testing will be required to assess corrective actions for deficiencies 

identified and to evaluate new ground attack and intelligence-gathering 

capabilities added by the modernization program. 

The Air Force is preparing a 

modernization plan that expands 

the capabilities of the F/A-22, 

which was first designed to serve 

as an air-to-air fighter aircraft with 

very limited ability to strike targets 

on the ground. The Air Force now 

intends to transform it by adding 

robust air-to-ground capabilities to 

attack enemy ground threats and 

by adding onboard intelligence data

gathering capabilities. After the 

recent budget cut, DOD estimates 

F/A-22 cost at $63.8 billion for 178 

aircraft. It has been in development 

for more than 19 years, a decade 

longer than originally envisioned. 

In the face of significant cost and 

schedule overruns, Congress 

mandates that GAO annually assess 

the F/A-22 program. In this report, 

GAO addresses (1) the Air Force’s 

business case for the F/A-22 

modernization plan and (2) the 

recently completed initial 

operational test and evaluation. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is reiterating and expanding 

upon a 2004 recommendation that 

DOD complete a new and 

comprehensive business case that 

reflects the current budget 

environment and justifies future 

investments and specific quantities 

needed to meet mission 

requirements. DOD concurred and 

expects to build a business case 

through such actions as the 2005 

Quadrennial Defense Review and 

analysis required to support future 

modernization efforts as a separate 

program. 
Page i GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 4 

F/A-22 Modernization Program Lacks Business Case and May Not 

Be Executable as Planned 7 

Operational Testing Considered Successful by Air Force, but 

Ground Attack Role Has Not Yet Been Tested 13 

Conclusions 16 

Recommendations for Executive Action 17 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 21 

Appendix II F/A-22 Program Cost, Quantity, and Schedule 

Changes 22 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 23 

Related GAO Products 26 

Tables 

Table 1: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 

Program 9 

Figures 

Figure 1: Quantity and Program Acquisition Unit Cost of F/A-22s 6 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Abbreviations 

CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

DOD Department of Defense 

IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page 1 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

March 15, 2005 

Congressional Committees: 

The F/A-22 aircraft program is acquiring the Air Force’s next-generation, 

multi-mission fighter for about $63.8 billion. The need for the F/A-22, its 

increasing costs, and the quantities required to perform its mission have 

been the subject of a continuing debate within the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and Congress. Supporters cite its advanced features—stealth, 

supercruise speed, maneuverability, and integrated avionics—as integral 

to the Air Force’s Global Strike initiative1

 and for maintaining air 

superiority over potential future adversaries for years to come. Critics, 

however, argue that the Soviet threat it was originally designed to counter 

no longer exists and that its large budget could better be invested in 

enhancing current air assets and acquiring new and more transformational 

capabilities that will allow it to meet the evolving threat. The debate 

continues as a December 2004 budget decision by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) reduced F/A-22 funding and the number of 

aircraft to be acquired. Meanwhile, the upcoming 2005 Quadrennial 

Defense Review is girding up for a review of force structure, mission 

requirements, and modernization plans. 

DOD has been pushing to transform its military operations and capabilities 

to acquire revolutionary weapon systems and meet evolving post-Cold War 

threats. Undertaking this transformational effort requires significant 

funding and competes with other DOD and national priorities. When 

DOD’s weapon systems, such as the F/A-22, require more time and money 

than originally anticipated, the extra investment needed to solve problems 

takes funding away from other priorities, slows DOD’s overall 

modernization effort, delays capabilities for the warfighter, and forces 

unplanned—and possibly unnecessary—trade-offs among DOD’s many 

priorities. Our past work has shown that problems, such as cost overruns, 

arise when weapon programs do not have a sound business case2

 or 

 1

 Global Strike is one of six complementary concepts of operations laying out the Air 

Force’s ability to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration and extended attacks against 

targets. 

2

 The business case is defined as demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need exists 

and that it can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the concept can be developed 

and produced within existing resources—including design knowledge, demonstrated 

technologies, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product. 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

capture the knowledge needed to efficiently and effectively manage 

program risks. The end result is a reduction in quantities and ultimately in 

DOD’s overall buying power. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires GAO 

to report annually on the F/A-22 development program and cost, schedule, 

and performance issues.3

 The act also requires us to certify whether we 

had access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the 

matters contained in this report. This report addresses (1) Air Force 

business case, plans, and funding for the F/A-22 modernization program 

and (2) the recently completed initial operational test and evaluation 

(IOT&E). 

We performed our work from November 2004 to February 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 

analyzed modernization plans, funding, and impacts from recent budget 

changes. Our observations on operational testing are limited and largely 

based on summary comments and briefing materials provided by testing 

and program officials. We did not review Air Force and OSD reports on 

operational test results because the reports were not available to us at the 

time of our review. Notwithstanding, we believe DOD officials gave us 

access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the 

matters in this report. Appendix I further discusses this report’s scope and 

methodology. 

The F/A-22 program has changed substantially since it started in 1986, and 

Air Force leaders have not developed a new business case for investing 

billions more dollars to modernize the aircraft that reflects this change. A 

December 2004 budget decision places much of the modernization 

program in doubt and renders the current plan obsolete. DOD cut more 

than $10 billion from the procurement program, ending aircraft 

procurement after 2008. However, the decision did not cut budgeted funds 

planned for modernizing the F/A-22. In March 2003, OSD cost analysts had 

estimated the modernization may cost over $11 billion to add more robust 

ground attack capabilities and much enhanced intelligence, surveillance, 

 3

 P. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217(d). The act states that no report is required after 

Engineering and Manufacturing Development under the program has been completed. If 

the scheduled March 2005 full-rate production decision occurs, it means that the overall 

program has officially moved beyond the development phase into large-scale production. 

Accordingly, this would be the last GAO report under this mandate. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

and reconnaissance capabilities to give the F/A-22 more utility and to take 

on new missions. Many of the advanced ground attack and intelligencegathering modernization efforts were intended to be incorporated on 

aircraft procured after 2008, which have now been eliminated. Further, the 

budget decision and DOD studies to reappraise multi-service tactical air 

modernization programs and propose alternative investments call into 

question the F/A-22’s expected role and contributions in combination with 

other DOD assets, the numbers of aircraft needed in each of its planned 

configurations, and the affordability and feasibility of modernization plans. 

If the modernization plan were canceled, what is left of the F/A-22 

program is the original F-22, primarily a state-of-the-art fighter designed to 

counter large numbers of advanced Soviet fighter aircraft, a threat that 

never materialized. Nevertheless, the Air Force still has to decide how best 

to invest the remaining billions of dollars budgeted for the program, 

increasing the need for a new and executable business case unless the 

modernization program is also terminated. 

Reports detailing the results from IOT&E were not available for our 

review, but Air Force test officials told us that testing showed the F/A-22 

was “overwhelmingly effective” as an air superiority fighter and that its 

supporting systems were “potentially suitable.” Some deficiencies and lack 

of maturity were identified in aircraft reliability and maintainability 

(including maintaining low observable characteristics) and in the 

integrated diagnostic systems used to identify and direct maintenance 

actions. Air Force officials believe these deficiencies are readily 

correctible and should meet the needs of the warfighter by the scheduled 

initial operational capability date in December 2005. They also believe that 

test results support making the full-rate production decision planned in 

late March 2005. Testing to demonstrate the limited air-to-ground attack 

capability included in the current design was not done during initial 

operational testing but is scheduled to be done during follow-on testing 

planned to start in July 2005. Air-to-ground attack capabilities are 

increasingly emphasized by the Air Force and future enhancements are 

planned for 80 percent of the modernized F/A-22s. More robust ground 

attack and intelligence gathering capabilities will be tested in the future as 

they are developed. 

In March 2004,4

 GAO recommended the Secretary of Defense complete a 

new business case that determines the need for the F/A-22 (air and ground 

 4

 GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business 

Case, GAO-04-391 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2004). 
Page 4 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

missions) and the quantities required and affordable. DOD did not prepare 

a new business case as recommended, stating routine acquisition and 

budget processes provide elements of the business case. We do not believe 

the routine processes provide sufficient analysis to justify future 

investments in the new capabilities added by the modernization program, 

especially given the continued uncertainties still surrounding these 

program issues. Therefore, we again recommend the Secretary of Defense 

direct appropriate studies and analyses be completed in order to prepare a 

new business case that justifies the new capabilities and affordable 

quantities. DOD concurred with the recommendation this time and said it 

will provide business case elements through the 2005 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, modernization program documentation required by policy, and in 

other ways. 

The F/A-22 is the Air Force’s next-generation air superiority5

 fighter 

aircraft and incorporates a low observable (stealth) and highly 

maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a new engine 

capable of sustained supersonic flight without the use of afterburners. It 

was originally designed to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union and 

was intended to replace the F-15 fighter in the air-to-air combat role. Over 

the years, the Air Force decided to add a more robust air-to-ground 

capability not previously envisioned but now considered necessary to 

increase the utility of the aircraft. In 2002, the F-22 aircraft was 

redesignated the F/A-22, with the “A” representing the expanded ground 

attack capabilities. Officials initiated a modernization program to develop 

and integrate these new capabilities. 

The F-22 acquisition program started in 1986 with an intended 

development period of 9 years and an initial operational capability in 

March 1996. The Air Force’s plan at that time was to procure 750 aircraft. 

In the years since, the original business case has been severely weakened 

as threats, missions, and requirements have changed. Further, the program 

milestones have slipped, the development period lengthened to more than 

19 years, development costs more than doubled, and a modernization 

program was added. The initial operational capability date is now 

December 2005. 

 5

 Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct of operations by 

land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive interference by the enemy. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Amidst concerns about escalating costs and schedule, Congress placed 

cost limitations on both development and production budgets in 1997,6

later removing the development cost cap.7

 (The current production cost 

cap is $37.3 billion.) Concomitantly, the planned procurement quantity has 

steadily decreased due to affordability concerns and changes in missions 

and combat requirements. Two major reviews of defense force structure 

and acquisition plans, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 

Quadrennial Defense Review, both significantly reduced F/A-22 quantities. 

In addition, OSD’s “buy to budget” acquisition strategy, which essentially 

placed a ceiling on the total program costs, has resulted in further cuts to 

quantity as development cost increased. In December 2004, OSD issued 

Program Budget Decision 753, which reduced F/A-22 funding by $10.5 

billion and cut 96 aircraft from the planned procurement quantity. The 

decision ends procurement in 2008, instead of 2011, and would reduce 

total procurement quantity to 178 aircraft.8

Figure 1 illustrates the downward trend in procurement quantity over the 

years juxtaposed with a rise in program acquisition unit costs,9

 which has 

resulted in a significant loss in buying power. Program acquisition unit 

costs have increased largely due to (1) increased development and 

production costs; (2) decreased procurement quantities; and (3) increased 

costs to modernize and enhance capability. The current plan supporting 

the fiscal year 2006 defense budget request submitted in February 2005 is 

to acquire 178 aircraft for about $63.8 billion.10 Appendix II illustrates other 

changes in cost, quantity, and schedule experienced by the program since 

its commencement. 

 6

 P. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217. 

7

 P. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001), section 213. 

8

 Program Budget Decision nominally reduced procurement quantity to 179 aircraft. 

Subsequently, the Air Force transferred one production aircraft to be dedicated to testing, 

further reducing procurement quantity to 178. It should also be noted that the recent crash 

of an F/A-22 has reduced planned operational aircraft to 177. 

9

 Program acquisition unit cost includes funding for development, procurement, related 

military construction, and initial modernization costs divided by total procurement 

quantity. It does not include later modernization costs and certain support costs. 

10 The total amount consists of $61.3 billion currently budgeted for the basic program and 

the initial stages of the modernization efforts; $1.3 billion for future start-up costs of a 

separate acquisition program for the latter stages of modernization; and $1.2 billion in 

related costs to retrofit aircraft with enhanced capabilities and activate depot maintenance 

activities. 
Page 6 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Figure 1: Quantity and Program Acquisition Unit Cost of F/A-22s 

Our March 2004 report11 discussed the significant changes in cost, quantity, 

capabilities, and mission since F-22 development began in 1986. We 

reported continued problems and delays in the development and testing 

schedules. We recommended that DOD complete a new business case that 

justifies the continued need for the F/A-22 and the quantities needed to 

carry out the air-to-air versus air-to-ground missions. The business case 

was to also consider alternatives within the constraints of future defense 

spending. Later in testimony,12 we stated that there are competing 

priorities both internal and external to DOD’s budget that require a sound 

and sustainable business case for DOD’s acquisition programs based in 

clear priorities, comprehensive needs assessments, and a thorough 

analysis of available resources. DOD partially concurred with our report 

recommendation but did not prepare a new business case, stating that it 

 11 GAO-04-391. 

12 GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter Programs, 

GAO-04-597T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2004).

0

50

750

648

442

339 279

178

$149

$162

$187

$257

$345

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1986 1991 1993 1997 2003 2005

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Total cost per aircraft 

(dollars in millions)

Aircraft quantity

Quantity

Program acquisition unit cost

Source: U.S. Air Force (data); GAO (presentation).
Page 7 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

evaluates the F/A-22 business case elements as part of the routine 

acquisition and budget processes with the results reflected in the defense 

budget. We did not think these kinds of activities sufficiently analyzed and 

addressed the specific business case elements—analysis of need for 

original and new capabilities, assessment of alternatives, justification of 

needed quantities, and evidence that planned quantities were affordable. 

The Air Force, in the face of significant changes to the F/A-22, has not 

prepared a new business case to justify the resources needed to add a 

much more robust ground attack capability and to assume new missions. 

The requirements for the F/A-22 have changed significantly since its 

original business case and the available resources are in flux—both are 

key components of a business case needed to support further investments. 

A December 2004 budget decision reduced procurement funding and 

quantities but did not cut funding for modernization. This has made the 

current modernization plan obsolete as key ground attack and intelligence 

gathering enhancements had been slated for aircraft that have now been 

eliminated from the F/A-22 procurement program. While its total cost is 

not clear at this time and program content is subject to change, in 2003 

OSD cost analysts estimated the modernization program would cost about 

$11.7 billion. 

The Air Force embarked on the expensive and wide-ranging modernization 

program without a new business case to support investments of billions of 

dollars to develop and deliver new capabilities and missions. The 

modernized F/A-22 would differ so significantly from the original aircraft 

in capabilities and missions that it should have been developed in an 

entirely separate acquisition program. Instead, the Air Force opted to 

incorporate modernization efforts within the existing acquisition 

program.13 A business case should match requirements with resources—

proven technologies, sufficient engineering capabilities, time, and 

funding—when undertaking a new product development. First, the user’s 

needs must be accurately defined, alternative approaches to satisfying 

these needs properly analyzed, and quantities needed for the chosen 

 13 In November 2004, the acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics directed the Air Force to hold separate milestone reviews for the latter stages 

of the modernization program to be consistent with DOD acquisition policy. The Air Force 

now plans to manage these efforts as a separate acquisition program while continuing to 

manage the initial stages of modernization in the existing F/A-22 program. 

F/A-22 Modernization 

Program Lacks 

Business Case and 

May Not Be 

Executable as 

Planned 

Modernization Program 

Makes Significant Changes 

to F/A-22 Requirements 

without a New Business 

Case 
Page 8 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

system must be well understood. The developed product must be 

producible at a cost that matches the users’ expectations and budgetary 

resources. Finally, the developer must have the resources to design and 

deliver the product with the features that the customer wants and to 

deliver it when it is needed. If the financial, material, and intellectual 

resources to develop the product are not available, a program incurs 

substantial risk in moving forward. 

The original business case for the F/A-22 was made in 1986 to support 

acquiring large quantities of air superiority fighters to engage in 

conventional warfare and counter Cold War-era threats. These threats 

never materialized as expected. Because the program was in development 

for over 19 years, tactical fighter requirements, projected threats, and 

operational war plans changed. To enhance the utility of the F/A-22 for 

today and the future, the Air Force now plans to develop a robust air-toground attack capability to allow the aircraft to engage a greater variety of 

ground targets, such as surface-to-air missiles systems, that pose a 

significant threat to U.S. aircraft. It also plans to equip most of the F/A-22 

fleet with improved capabilities to satisfy expanded warfighter 

requirements and to take on new missions, including intelligence data 

gathering and the suppression of enemy air defenses and interdiction. 

The Air Force established a time-phased modernization program to 

develop and insert new capabilities required to implement the Air Force’s 

Global Strike concept of operations. Table 1 shows how the Air Force 

intended to integrate new capabilities incrementally before the December 

2004 budget decision reduced quantities by 96 aircraft. At the time of our 

review, officials were still determining the impacts of the budget decision 

on the modernization program content and quantities. 
Page 9 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Table 1: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program 

Fiscal year when enhancements are expected to be incorporated 

 2007 2011a 2013 2015 

Capabilities increment Global Strike Basic Global Strike Enhanced Global Strike Full Enhanced Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance 

Configurationb Block 20 Block 30 Block 40 Block 40 

Quantity of F/A-22s 56 91 128 -c

Examples of enhancements 

to be added 

Improve capability to 

launch Joint Direct 

Attack Munition at faster 

speeds and at longer 

distances; upgrade airto-air capabilities 

Enhance air-to-ground 

capability by adding 

improved radar 

capabilities to seek and 

destroy advanced 

surface-to-air missile 

systems; integrate 

additional air-to-ground 

weapons 

Increase capability to 

suppress or destroy the 

full range of air 

defenses and improve 

speed and accuracy of 

targeting 

Add capability for full 

intelligence, 

surveillance, and 

reconnaissance 

integration for increased 

target sets and lethality 

Sources: Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense. 

a

Global Strike Enhanced includes two increments of capability with the first increment incorporated in 

fiscal year 2009 and the second in 2011. 

b

The Air Force plans to have three configurations (called blocks) that include specific enhancements 

developed in the modernization program. 

c This quantity included in Global Strike Full amount. Total 128 aircraft planned for block 40. 

Initial development work on modernization enhancements started in 2003 

and is planned to extend over a 12-year period with the first set of new 

capabilities inserted into the production line in fiscal year 2007. By the end 

of development in 2015, the Air Force plans to have three different 

configurations (or blocks) of F/A-22s, each with distinct operational 

capabilities. Based on the current modernization road map, the Global 

Strike Basic configuration (block 20) will include 56 F/A-22s built 

primarily to perform air-to-air missions but with limited air-to-ground 

capability. The Global Strike Enhanced configuration (block 30) includes 

91 aircraft that will perform the bulk of air-to-ground and electronic attack 

missions using advanced radars to track targets and small diameter bombs 

to destroy them. Block 40 encompasses both the Global Strike Full and 

Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance increments. This 

configuration of 128 aircraft is expected to perform such missions as 

suppression of enemy air defenses and gathering up-to-date information 

on potential adversaries’ locations, resources, and personnel to improve 

target identification and increase kill capabilities. According to program 

officials, these latter two increments are still conceptual in nature and 

subject to revision. 
Page 10 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

The modernization program as currently planned is much in doubt 

because of the recent budget cut and the likely prospects for more 

changes. The instability in F/A-22 resources and upcoming DOD-wide 

reviews of capabilities and requirements may result in further revisions 

and cutbacks, further impacting modernization plans. Budget and 

programmatic decisions also cause ripple effects on other resource plans 

tied to the modernization, which may open up budgeted funds for other 

uses. 

In March 2003, OSD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)14

estimated that the Air Force would need $11.7 billion for the planned 

modernization programs through fiscal year 2018. The CAIG estimate 

included costs for development, procurement, and retrofit of modernized 

aircraft. The Air Force’s latest estimated cost for the modernization 

program is about $5.4 billion through 2011. Future modernization costs 

beyond 2011 have not been definitized and are subject to change. The 

modernization program manager projected annual funding of $700 million 

to $750 million would be needed for the currently planned modernization 

program after 2011. 

The December 2004 budget decision places much of the modernization 

program in doubt, particularly the latter stages. OSD substantially reduced 

the F/A-22 budget, which will require another strategy for the 

modernization program. It reduced F/A-22 funding by $10.5 billion, 

stopped procurement of aircraft after 2008, and reduced the quantity by 96 

aircraft. This and other events will reduce the Air Force’s expected buy to 

no more than 178 aircraft. While the OSD funding decision changed the 

baseline F/A-22 program, it did not change the planned funding for the 

modernization program to add advanced ground attack and intelligence 

gathering capabilities between 2007 and 2015. However, many of these 

new and advanced capabilities had been planned for aircraft that will not 

be built as the budget eliminates F/A-22 aircraft that had been planned for 

production after 2008. Air Force officials told us they hope to reverse 

these changes, but officials acknowledge that a major restructuring is 

likely if the proposed funding cuts are sustained. If the budget cut is 

sustained, the modernization program as currently planned is largely 

obsolete and funding for these advanced capabilities to be incorporated 

after 2008 would be available for other uses. This could include up to 

 14 The OSD CAIG acts as the principal advisory body to the milestone decision authority on 

acquisition program costs. 

Budget Decisions and 

Unstable Resources Place 

the F/A-22 Modernization 

Program in Doubt 
Page 11 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

$1.2 billion now budgeted for the start-up of the latter modernization 

increments. 

The Air Force’s desire to upgrade the F/A-22’s computer architecture and 

avionics processors in order to support the block 40 expanded 

capabilities15 may also be affected by the recent budget cut. Program 

officials do not expect the new architecture to be fully developed and 

ready for installation in the F/A-22 until fiscal year 2010. However, early 

indications show that the effort to upgrade the computer architecture—

expected to cost between $400 million and $500 million—already is 

experiencing schedule problems and increased risks. As a result, the 2010 

insertion date may not be achievable as planned for the F/A-22. 

Furthermore, DOD’s proposed termination of procurement after 2008 

raises questions about the need to proceed with the planned computer 

upgrade. The existing processors with some minor upgrades would 

support up to 155 aircraft and most Global Strike Enhanced capabilities. 

Additionally, since our March 2004 report the program office has identified 

new requirements needed to implement the modernization program. The 

F/A-22 program office has concluded that the F/A-22 infrastructure, 

including government laboratories, such as software avionics integration 

labs, flying test beds, and test ranges need to be upgraded to ensure a 

successful modernization program. According to program officials, the 

existing facilities have major resource/capacity limitations and are 

inadequate to support needed software integration activities and system 

performance and operational testing for most planned enhancements. The 

program office has budgeted about $1.8 billion through fiscal year 2009 for 

the infrastructure upgrades, including funds for engineering and 

maintenance personnel support. According to program officials, the 

current infrastructure limitations have caused some modernization efforts 

to be deferred to later blocks. If modernization plans are curtailed, some 

infrastructure improvements may not be needed. 

Even if funding were restored to the F/A-22 program and the abovementioned concerns were resolved, previous funding shortfalls and 

schedule slippages have already resulted in planned capabilities being 

deferred to later years. For example, block 20 enhancements required to 

conduct autonomous search and improve target recognition have been 

 15 GAO-04-391, p. 8 through 10, discusses Air Force needs, plans, and associated risks for a 

new computer architecture and avionics processor to support the modernization program. 
Page 12 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

deferred to block 30. Similarly, funding problems have caused the Air 

Force to scale back some efforts and delay development of block 30 

electronic attack and small diameter bomb enhancements. In November 

2004, the Defense Contract Management Agency reported that the 

contractor proposes to reduce the amount of planned tasks, defer 

development of software specifications, and incrementally develop a key 

communication component in order to meet an April 2005 system design 

review. 

DOD officials stated that they believe the budget cut has some 

diseconomies that may result in procuring even fewer than 178 aircraft. 

They said that stopping aircraft production early affects production 

economies and efficiencies that were expected from a multiyear 

procurement contract and from production line efficiencies. The multiyear 

contract was to begin in fiscal year 2008, the year procurement is now 

curtailed by the budget decision. Now that opportunity is gone. Officials 

also said that cutting production quantities from the final years of the 

program eliminate projected savings in annual unit procurement costs. 

Typical of many DOD acquisitions, Air Force program officials had 

projected future budgets assuming that the marginal costs for buying F/A22s would decrease with each passing year of production as a result of 

manufacturing efficiencies, productivity projects, and more economical 

buying quantities. This means that aircraft bought late in the production 

program usually cost less than those bought earlier in the program. For 

example, the average unit flyaway cost16 paid for F/A-22s was $212 million 

per aircraft bought in 2002 and $178 million in 2003. Before the budget 

decision, officials had projected average unit flyaway costs to decrease to 

$127 million, $111 million, and $108 million in fiscal years 2007, 2008 and 

2009, respectively. Now that the program has been truncated after 2008, 

the less expensive aircraft in 2009 and beyond will not be bought and unit 

costs are now projected at $135 million in 2007 and $149 million in 2008 

(increase associated with close-out of production). 

OSD has directed that the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review include an 

assessment of joint air dominance in future warfare and the contributions 

provided by all tactical aircraft, including the F/A-22. An announced 

defense goal is to redirect investment from areas of conventional warfare, 

 16 Average unit flyaway cost includes the costs associated with procuring one aircraft, 

including the airframe, engines, avionics, other mission equipment, and certain 

nonrecurring production costs. It does not include “sunk” costs, such as development and 

test, and other costs to the whole system including logistical support and construction. 
Page 13 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

where the United States enjoys a strong combat advantage, toward more 

transformational capabilities needed to counter “irregular” threats, such as 

the insurgency in Iraq and ongoing war on terror. DOD is also conducting 

a set of joint capability reviews to ensure acquisition decisions are based 

on providing integrated capabilities rather than focused on individual 

weapon systems. The study results, although still months away, could 

further impact the future of the F/A-22 program including the 

modernization plan. The F/A-22 will have to compete for funding, priority, 

and mission assignments with operational systems, such as the F-15 and 

F/A-18, and future systems, such as the Joint Strike Fighter and the Joint 

Unmanned Combat Air Systems. 

Air Force leadership and the Air Combat Command continue to support 

the multi-mission role for the F/A-22 and do not want to reduce or 

eliminate the new capabilities and missions. Therefore, if restructuring is 

required, program officials are considering other options to accommodate 

the program within reduced funding and fleet size. They are considering 

the possibility of moving forward with blocks 20 and 30 but curtailing 

block 40 because its enhancements are slated for those aircraft that have 

been cut by the budget decision (refer to table 1). Officials said that some 

of the enhancements planned for block 40 could be retrofitted into the 

block 20 and 30 aircraft. At the time of our review, Air Force officials were 

considering alternative strategies and plans for rephasing funds in order to 

execute the changes in the program enumerated above. It is paramount 

that these issues be settled before moving forward in the program. 

Reports detailing the results from IOT&E were not available for our 

review, but Air Force test officials told us that testing showed the F/A-22 

was “overwhelmingly effective” as an air superiority fighter and that its 

supporting systems were “potentially suitable.” Some deficiencies were 

noted, particularly in reliability and maintainability, but Air Force officials 

believe these deficiencies can be corrected in time to meet the warfighter’s 

needs by the scheduled initial operational capability date in December 

2005. They also believe test results support making the full-rate production 

decision. Testing to demonstrate the limited air-to-ground attack capability 

was not accomplished but is scheduled to be done as part of the follow-on 

operational test planned to start in July 2005. 

The F/A-22 initial operational test and evaluation was conducted by the Air 

Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center from April through 

December 2004 to support the full-rate production decision planned for 

March 2005. Its operational test plan was designed to assess the F/A-22’s 

Operational Testing 

Considered 

Successful by Air 

Force, but Ground 

Attack Role Has Not 

Yet Been Tested 
Page 14 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

combat effectiveness and suitability in an operationally representative 

environment. The warfighter had established five critical operational 

issues for evaluation during operational testing to demonstrate 

effectiveness and suitability: 

• effectiveness—demonstrate operational performance to effectively 

execute selected counter-air missions; 

• survivability—assess ability to evade and survive against air-to-air and 

surface-to-air threats; 

• deployability—evaluate the timely transportability and set up of F/A-22 

personnel and equipment into a theater of operations; 

• sortie generation—assess how well air crews can generate and launch 

sorties, including maintenance and supply support capabilities; and 

• ground attack—demonstrate limited air-to-ground attack with the Joint 

Direct Attack Munition. 

The first two issues assess combat effectiveness in completing selected 

counter air missions and in surviving against representative air and ground 

threats. The second two issues assess suitability of F/A-22 to support 

combat by transporting, deploying and sustaining forces and equipment. 

These four critical operational issues were addressed in IOT&E. The fifth 

critical operational issue—ground attack—was not addressed in IOT&E 

and will be assessed during follow-on operational test and evaluation, 

scheduled to start in July 2005. This follow-on testing is also planned to 

include demonstrations of corrective actions for some deficiencies 

identified during IOT&E and other testing needed to achieve initial 

operational capability in December 2005. Additional follow-on operational 

tests are planned in the future to test new, more robust attack capabilities 

and other enhancements added by the modernization program. 

Combat effectiveness and survivability testing included extensive flight 

tests to evaluate air-to-air capabilities including (1) offensive counter-air 

missions against aggressor aircraft and (2) defensive counter-air missions 

to accompany and protect friendly strike and high value support aircraft 

from attack by aggressor aircraft. These tests incorporated ground and air 

threats resident at the Air Force’s Nevada test range. Computer 

simulations and models were also used to evaluate performance against 

future threats and in other scenarios that cannot be replicated in open 

flight tests. 

Test officials told us that the F/A-22 performed all the air-to-air missions 

very satisfactorily, demonstrating “overwhelming effectiveness” in their 

words. Officials also said that, in direct comparability tests with the F-15C, 
Page 15 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

the F/A-22 demonstrated a clear advantage often many more times the 

effectiveness of the F-15C. Testing did reveal some areas needing 

improvement, including avionics reliability, defensive systems, and other 

corrective actions that will need to be addressed in follow-on testing. 

Test officials characterized F/A-22 suitability demonstrations for the 

aircraft and support systems as “potentially suitable.” The ability to 

transport and deploy F/A-22 personnel and equipment was adequately 

demonstrated and met the interim goal set by the warfighter regarding the 

number of airlift planes needed to transport forces and support equipment 

in the required amount of time. 

Of the four critical operational issues assessed, sortie generation 

experienced the most problems. Officials rated the sortie generation area 

as unsatisfactory. Problems were noted in aircraft reliability and 

maintainability, including maintenance of the aircraft’s critical low 

observable characteristics. Problems were also noted in the maturity of 

integrated diagnostic systems, key assets expected to greatly improve and 

accelerate field maintenance activities for meeting sortie rates with 

constrained personnel. Officials believe these and other deficiencies can 

be corrected in time to meet the warfighter’s needs. For example, officials 

said the mission capability rate demonstrated during testing has continued 

to improve and is close to achieving the warfighter’s desired rate, not 

required until December 2005. However, the testing and implementation of 

most corrective actions will not occur until after the full-rate production 

decision. 

Sortie generations and support activities also required the extensive 

involvement of contractor personnel for providing technical assistance, 

off-aircraft maintenance, and engineering, including trouble-shooting and 

use of special test equipment. Air Force officials said that extensive 

contractor involvement has long been planned for the F/A-22 system, 

particularly during initial fielding, and that reliance on contractor 

personnel and special test equipment should somewhat lessen as Air Force 

personnel gain experience. 

Before full-rate production can start, the Office of the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation must still review test results and report to 
Page 16 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Congress and defense leadership.17 In addition, the F/A-22 program must 

demonstrate it satisfies criteria established by the Defense Acquisition 

Board in November 2004. Among other things, that criteria includes 

delivering a fully-resourced plan for follow-on testing to correct 

deficiencies identified in IOT&E, achieving design stability of the avionics 

software, demonstrating mature manufacturing processes, and validating 

technical order data. 

The Air Force, in the face of significant changes to the F/A-22, has not 

prepared a new business case to justify the resources needed to add a 

much more robust ground attack capability and to assume new missions. 

Over the 19 years that the program has been in development, the world 

threat environment has changed and the capabilities the Air Force once 

needed and planned for in the F-22 may not satisfy the warfighter’s future 

needs. Additionally, cost growth over time and affordability concerns have 

driven down planned aircraft quantities from 750 to 178 aircraft. The Air 

Force is now planning a modernization program that will substantially 

change the role of the F/A-22. Because of budget cuts in the program that 

have eliminated F/A-22 procurement after 2008 the modernization program 

as planned is obsolete. Even if aircraft are restored to the procurement 

plan beyond 2008, this modernization is projected to occur over a 12-year 

period. Based on the program’s current knowledge, there is significant risk 

that the planned modernization would not move ahead and deliver 

capability to the warfighter on schedule. The original plan to develop and 

deliver an initial capability for the F-22 was 9 years—it has taken nearly 20 

years. Our body of work in best practices tells us one thing for certain, and 

that is that the chances of attaining successful outcomes are substantially 

increased when a business case is made that matches requirements and 

resources for developing a product. Right now both requirements and 

resources for the F/A-22 program are in a state of flux and it lacks a 

business case to move forward with billions of dollars in planned 

investments. 

 17 10 U.S.C. section 2399 provides that a major defense acquisition program may not 

proceed beyond low-rate initial production until initial operational test and evaluation is 

completed and the congressional defense committees have received the report of testing 

results from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. This report is to contain an 

opinion about test adequacy and whether the test results confirm that the system actually 

tested is operationally effective and suitable for combat. 

Conclusions 
Page 17 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Over the immediate horizon, planned studies present OSD with 

opportunities to answer questions about need and affordability of the F/A22. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review is expected to make a strategic 

assessment of available and planned tactical air capabilities to help 

determine where to target resources. Likewise, an ongoing series of joint 

capabilities reviews, to include the F/A-22, could help determine where the 

F/A-22 now fits in the force structure. These top-level studies would 

provide information needed for a specific F/A-22 business case that would 

place DOD leaders in a better position to decide on remaining F/A-22 

investments in concert with other tactical aircraft and DOD needs. The 

F/A-22 full rate production decision is currently planned for March 2005, 

before the results of these studies are available and production is already 

at near full rate quantities. 

Because of evolving threats against the United States; pending changes in 

U.S. defense plans; the lack of clarity regarding F/A-22 required 

capabilities, quantities, and resources; the recent budget decision; and 

upcoming reviews on joint air capabilities, we are reiterating and 

expanding upon the recommendation in our March 2004 report for a new 

and comprehensive business case to justify future investment in the F/A-22 

program. We recommend the Secretary of Defense complete a new 

business case that determines the continued need for the F/A-22 and that 

specifically: 

(a) justifies the F/A-22’s expanded air-to-ground capabilities based on an 

assessment of alternatives to include both operational assets and 

planned future weapon systems; 

(b) justifies the quantity of F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy requirements 

for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions; 

(c) provides evidence that the planned quantity and capabilities are 

affordable within current and projected budgets and the statutory 

funding limitation; 

(d) addresses impacts of the recent budget decision on the need for and 

cost of future developmental activities, long-term logistical support 

and basing decisions, and the ability to take advantage of cost 

reduction efforts, such as multiyear contracting and productivity 

improvement; and 

(e) justifies the need for investments for a new computer architecture and 

avionics processor, and F/A-22 infrastructure deficiencies. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 18 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation. They identified the following actions planned that would 

accomplish business case elements: (1) the 2005 Quadrennial Defense 

Review will address quantity of aircraft needed for air-to-air and air-toground missions; (2) Defense Acquisition Board reviews of the F/A-22 

program will ensure that initial modernization efforts have validated 

requirements and are tested; and (3) the plan to break out the latter stages 

of modernization as a separate acquisition program will require the Air 

Force to develop requirements, perform an analysis to substantiate those 

requirements, and justify investments in new capabilities. 

DOD also stated its concern that by only reporting total program 

acquisition unit cost (pp. 5 and 6 herein), the report does not provide a 

balanced picture. They asked us to also present information concerning 

the steady reduction in unit flyaway costs over the course of the program. 

Flyaway costs do not include “sunk” costs and fixed expenses for program 

start-up, development, test, construction, and support but focus on the 

procurement costs of buying additional systems, costs that generally 

decrease as a production program matures and manufacturing efficiency 

improves. In response, we provided additional information about flyway 

costs and potential diseconomies from truncating the procurement 

program (see p. 12). We also incorporated other technical comments from 

DOD where appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 19 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Please 

contact me or Michael J. Hazard at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has 

any questions concerning this report. Other contributors to this report 

were Robert Ackley, Michael W. Aiken, Lily J. Chin, Bruce D. Fairbairn, 

Steven M. Hunter, and Adam Vodraska. 

Michael J. Sullivan 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Page 20 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 21 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

To determine the Air Force’s F/A-22 modernization plans and funding 

requirements, we analyzed budget documents, cost reports, acquisition 

plans, and project listings to identify the purpose, scope, and cost of the 

modernization efforts. Officials from the Air Force and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) briefed us on program details, specific 

candidate projects, and program history. We compared current plans and 

project listings with previous time periods to determine changes in 

modernization projects and schedules. We also compared cost estimates 

prepared by the Air Force and OSD’s cost analysts in order to identify key 

differences in assumptions used, cost factors applied, and time periods 

and to reconcile how these differences impacted final results. 

To determine the results and implications of the initial operational test and 

evaluation on the F/A-22 program, we first reviewed test plans, laws and 

regulations governing operational tests, and management direction 

affecting the scope and schedule of testing. We then discussed summary 

results and program impacts, including schedule issues, with testing and 

evaluating officials from the Air Force and OSD. We also reviewed briefing 

materials used by testing officials to inform DOD management and 

congressional staffs on the results of initial operational test and evaluation 

(IOT&E). However, at the time of our review, the final reports on IOT&E 

results from the Air Force’s Operational Test and Evaluation Center and 

the OSD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation were not issued nor 

were drafts made available to us. Accordingly, our analysis of actual 

results and data was somewhat constrained and our reporting limited to 

providing summary level observations on test scope, results, and 

corrective actions identified. Notwithstanding, DOD officials gave us 

access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the 

matters covered in this report. 

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials 

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., including 

the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the 

Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Cost Analysis Improvement 

Group; Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; F/A-22 System Program 

Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Air Combat Command, 

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Air Force Operational Test and 

Evaluation Center, Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico; and the 

Combined Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California.. We 

performed our work from November 2004 through February 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: F/A-22 Program Cost, Quantity, 

and Schedule Changes 

Page 22 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Appendix II: F/A-22 Program Cost, Quantity, 

and Schedule Changes 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

Development start 1991

Current estimate 2005

Development start 1991

Current estimate 2005

Development costs and cycle times have increased

Dollars in billions

136 percent

cost increase

15-year cycle

time increase

Program start 1986 Current estimate 2005

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1984

1986

1988

19901992199419961998200020022004200620082010

Fiscal year

Number of aircraft 

Number of months

10

16

27

24

58

56

63

63

0

Critical design

review complete

First flight

Low rate

initial production

1st operational

aircraft delivered

Initial operational

capabilities delivered

73 percent 

decrease

132 percent 

increase

IOT&E complete

Full rate

production

20 30 40 50 60 70

Dollars in millions

0 100

178

648 149

345

200 300 400 500 600 700

Procurement quantities have decreased Program acquisition unit costs have increased

Events delayed since system development started in 1991

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 23 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 24 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 25 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 
Related GAO Products 

Page 26 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. GAO-04-

248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter 

Programs. GAO-04-597T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2004. 

Tactical Aircraft: Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 

Business Case. GAO-04-391. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2004. 

Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can 

Apply Lessons from F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-645T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 11, 2003. 

Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-603T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003. 

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase F/A-22 

Production Rates While Development Risks Continue. GAO-03-431. 

Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should 

Be Lower to Reduce Risks. GAO-02-298. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2002. 

Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs 

Within the Congressional Limitation. GAO-01-782. Washington, D.C.: July 

16, 2001. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need 

for Limit on Low-Rate Production. GAO-01-310. Washington, D.C.: March 

15, 2001. 

Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded 

Congressional Limitation. GAO/NSIAD-00-178. Washington, D.C.: August 

15, 2000. 

Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22 

Total Production Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 

2000. 

F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are 

Avoided. GAO/NSIAD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000. 

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products 

Page 27 GAO-05-304 F/A-22 Program 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999. 

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD’s Production and RDT&E Programs. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-233R. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999. 

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal 

Year 2000. GAO/OCG-99-26. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering 

and Manufacturing Development Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113. 

Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-55. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1999. 

F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 

1998. 

F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-98-67. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 1998. 

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program. 

GAO/NSIAD-97-156. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 1997. 

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on 

Optimistic Budget Projections. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103. Washington, D.C.: 

March 5, 1997. 

F-22 Restructuring. GAO/NSIAD-97-100R. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 

1997. 

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 

Aircraft Should Be Reduced. GAO/NSIAD-95-59. Washington, D.C.: April 

19, 1995. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176. 

Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1994. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned. 

GAO/NSIAD-94-118. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1994. 

(120380) 
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