alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NotesFAQContact Us

Collection

Thesaurus
AdvancedSearch Tips

Collection

Thesaurus
BrowseThesaurus

 Download full text

**ERIC Number:**

**Record Type:**

**Publication Date:**

**Pages:**

**Abstractor:**

**ISBN:**

**ISSN:**

**EISSN:**

Compliance (Legal)Educational PolicyEducational PracticesEmployment PracticesFederal LegislationGrievance ProceduresPublic PolicySexual HarassmentSupervisory TrainingTraining Methods

**Publication Type:**

**Education Level:**

**Audience:**

**Language:**

**Sponsor:**

**Authoring Institution:**

**Grant or Contract Numbers:**

PrivacyCopyrightContact UsSelection PolicyAPI
JournalsNon-JournalsDownloadSubmitMultimediaWidget
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal

revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108

- 1750; (617) 557

- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC

- 13 404

EMMETT S. MULDOON vs

. COMMONWEALTH

.

May 28 , 2024.

Supreme Judicial C ourt , Superintendence of inferior courts.

The petitioner, Emmett S. Muldoon, appeals from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, his petition for
relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. The petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated rape and other offenses in 1996. In 2014, he

moved for a new trial. A judge of the Superior Court denied that motion; the Appeals Court affirmed in an unpublished decision, Commonwealth v. Muldoon , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2018); and we denied further appellate review
, 480 Mass. 1108 (2018). He thereafter fi led motions in this court seeking reconsideration of the denial of further appellate review or
leave to file a second application for further appellate review.
We denied those motions

. 1 The petitioner's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought relief from tho se rulings . By the plain language of G. L. c. 211, § 3, however, this court's extraordinary superintendence power extends only to "courts of

1 To the extent the petitioner suggested in his petition that the court was required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S. C. § § 12131 et seq., to consider his request to file a second or successive application for further appellate review as an accommodation for certain disabilities, we disagree

. Here, the petitioner did not seek an equal opportunity to argue for further appellat e review; rather, he sought greater opportunit ies than are available to

others. Such an accommodation is not required.2

inferior jurisdiction" ( e mphasis added ) . The single justice

thus had no authority to rev iew a decision of the full court. Moreover, the power conferred by G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not "provide an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process has run its course." Votta v. Police Dep't of
Billerica , 444 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2005). T he petitioner has had
all the review to which he is entitled as to the denial of his
motion for a new trial. The single justice neither abused his
discretion nor committed other error of law by denying extraordinary relief.

Judgment affirmed

.

The ca se was submitted on briefs.

Emmett S. Muldoon , pro se.
Exhibit
10.11


 


AMENDMENT
NO.  2 TO CONSULTING AGREEMENT


 


This Amendment No. 2
to Consulting Agreement is entered into as of April 21, 2009 by and between
International Rectifier Corporation (“Company”), having a principal place of
business at 233 Kansas Street, El Segundo, California 90245, and Pahl
Consulting, Inc., with a place of business at 703 Pier Avenue, Suite B712,
Hermosa Beach, California 90254 (“Consultant”).


 


R E C I T A L S


 


WHEREAS, Company and
Consultant have previously entered into a certain Consulting Agreement
effective as of April 16, 2008 (“Consulting Agreement”), pursuant to which
the Company retained Consultant as an independent contractor consultant, and
Consultant acted in such capacity, to provide the Company certain consulting
services, all on the terms and conditions set forth therein;


 


WHEREAS, Company and
Consultant have previously entered into a certain Amendment No. 1 to
Consulting Agreement entered into as of October 16, 2008, pursuant to
which the Company and Consultant extended the term of the Consulting  Agreement;


 


WHEREAS, Company and
Consultant wish to further amend the term of the Consulting Agreement.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, the
parties hereto agree as follows:


 


The first sentence of Section 4
is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:  “The term of this
Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and terminate on December 31,
2009 (“Term”).”


 


Except as expressly set
forth herein, the Consulting agreement remains unmodified and in full force and
effect.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
undersigned have executed this Agreement as of the date set forth above.


 


	
  International Rectifier
  Corporation

  	
   

  	
  Pahl
  Consulting, Inc.

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
   

  
	
  Name:

  	
  Ilan Daskal

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Linda J. Pahl

  
	
  Title:

  	
  Chief Financial Officer
#### Tomasello Bros. Inc., Appellant, v. Jacob W. Friedman et al., Respondents.

Order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated July 16, 1968, which resettled a prior order dated May 28, 1968, affirmed. No opinion. Appeal from order of said court dated May 28, 1968 dismissed as academic. That order was superseded by the order of resettlement, dated July 16, 1968. One bill of $10 costs and disbursements is allowed to respondents to cover both appeals. Rabin, Acting P. J., Benjamin, Munder, Martuseello and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur. [57 Misc 2d 817.]
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 9-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             Nov-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                  August-31-1996
<CASH>                        1,229,307
<SECURITIES>                  000
<RECEIVABLES>                 107,747
<ALLOWANCES>                  000
<INVENTORY>                   000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              000
<PP&E>                        20,100,713
<DEPRECIATION>                (8,097,207)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                15,183,156
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         362,793
<BONDS>                       2,686,062
<COMMON>                      000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         000
<PREFERRED>                   000
<OTHER-SE>                    8,206,601
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  15,183,156
<SALES>                       2,009,917
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              2,071,403
<CGS>                         000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 961,668
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              944,176
<LOSS-PROVISION>              000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            309,797
<INCOME-PRETAX>               (144,238)
<INCOME-TAX>                  000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           (144,238)
<DISCONTINUED>                000
<EXTRAORDINARY>               000
<CHANGES>                     000
<NET-INCOME>                  (144,238)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 (2.64)
<EPS-DILUTED>                 (2.64)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 31.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, William Tay, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Highlander Acquisition
Corp. for the fiscal period ended December 31, 2006;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
we have:

      (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the small business issuer, including its
consolidated subsidiary, is made known to us by others within that entity,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

      (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting;

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation, to the small business issuer's auditors and
the audit committee of small business issuer's board of directors:

      (a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the
internal controls which could adversely affect the small business issuer's
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
identified for the small business issuer's auditors any material weaknesses in
internal controls; and

      (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
controls.

Date: February 9, 2007


/s/ William Tay
------------------------------------
Signature:
Title: William Tay, President
       Principal Executive Officer & Principal Accounting Officer
§ 3560.657 Processing and closing incentive offers. ( a ) *Borrower responsibilities.* If a borrower accepts the Agency's offer of incentives, the borrower must complete the following actions: ( 1 ) Subject to the Agency's approval, the borrower must legally restrict the use of the project in accordance with and for the number of years stated in § 3560.662.
( 2 ) If the incentive offer accepted includes an equity loan, the borrower must complete an application for the equity loan, and the borrower must continue to qualify as an eligible borrower or transferee in accordance with subpart B of this part.
( 3 ) If the incentive offer accepted includes rent increases, the borrower must follow the rent increase requirements established in subpart E of this part.
( b ) *Waiting lists.* If funds for components of incentive offers are limited, the Agency will establish a waiting list of accepted incentive offers for funding in the date order that the complete prepayment request was received.
( c ) *Unfunded incentive offers.* If the borrower accepts the incentive offer but the Agency is unable to fund the incentive within 15 months, the borrower may choose one of the following actions: ( 1 ) The borrower may offer to sell the housing project in accordance with § 3650.659. In this case the borrower will be removed from the list of borrowers awaiting incentives.
( 2 ) The borrower may stay on the list of borrowers awaiting incentives until the borrower's incentive offer is funded. The Agency will not negotiate the incentive offer; but, at a borrower's request, may adjust the incentive amount to reflect an updated appraisal, loan balance, and terms of third party financing.
( 3 ) The borrower may withdraw the prepayment request and be removed from the list of borrowers awaiting incentives and either continue operating the housing project for program purposes and in accordance with Agency requirements or continue processing their prepayment process in accordance with § 3560.658. If the borrower chooses to withdraw their request, the borrower may resubmit an updated prepayment request, at any time, and repeat the prepayment process in accordance with this subpart.
( 4 ) The borrower may elect to obtain a third-party equity loan provided rents will not exceed comparable rents in the market area.
#### Debra A. Duffett, Respondent, v Robert B. Duffett, Defendant. (Action No. 1.) Gary Duffett, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of James Duffett, an Infant, et al., Plaintiffs, v Carolyn Duffett et al., Respondents. (Action No. 2.) Jack B. Solerwitz, Appellant.

In two actions, one for divorce and the other to recover damages for defamation and abuse of process, Jack Solerwitz (former counsel for the plaintiff in the first action and for the defendants in the second action) appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered November 2, 1979, which upon respondents’ motion to have returned to them the legal fees collected by the appellant, awarded judgment to respondent Julia Rubino against appellant in the principal sum of $10,000 and declared certain promissory notes made payable to appellant to be null and void. Judgment modified by deleting therefrom the provisions which declared null and void (1) a promissory note executed by respondent Carolyn Duffett on or about March 9, 1978 in the principal amount of $5,000 and (2) the unpaid balance of a second promissory note executed by respondent Carolyn Duffett on or about April 18, 1977 in the principal amount of $2,500. As so modified, judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and without prejudice to *863the institution of a plenary action by Carolyn Duffett against the appellant with respect to the notes in question. Neither the underlying captioned actions nor the motion for the return of attorney fees paid by respondents Debra Duffett and Julia Rubino in connection with the underlying captioned actions related to the promissory notes executed by respondent Carolyn Duffett, which were delivered to the appellant in payment for legal services rendered by him in connection with Carolyn Duffett’s independent matrimonial action. That action terminated prior to the inception of the instant motion and indeed was not even mentioned therein. Accordingly, there was no jurisdictional basis in the context of the present motion, for the cancellation of the promissory notes executed by Carolyn Duffett and representing allegedly excessive legal fees paid by her in connection with that matrimonial action. Such relief may be sought only in a plenary action. We have examined appellant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (see *Schell v Mayor of New York,*128 NY 67; cf. *Matter of Secrest,*129 Mise 793). Mollen, P. J., Hopkins, Mangano and Gulotta, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>


SELECTED QUARTERLY FINANCIAL DATA


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               1995                                          1994
------------------------    ------------------------------------------    ------------------------------------------
Unaudited (In thousands,      FIRST     SECOND      THIRD       FOURTH      FIRST     SECOND      THIRD       FOURTH
except per-share data)      QUARTER    QUARTER    QUARTER      QUARTER    QUARTER    QUARTER    QUARTER      QUARTER
------------------------    -------    -------    -------      -------    -------    -------    -------      -------
<S>                        <C>        <C>        <C>          <C>         <C>        <C>        <C>          <C>
Revenues                   $151,102   $170,987   $175,861     $200,512    $121,340   $115,525   $118,922     $136,501
Operating income           $ 35,969   $ 40,724   $ 41,063     $ 43,954    $ 29,365   $ 27,925   $ 28,655     $ 30,034
Income before income
   tax expense             $ 27,277   $ 29,317   $ 28,803     $ 32,293    $ 26,148   $ 25,017   $ 25,752     $ 26,289
Net income                 $ 15,605   $ 16,769   $ 16,475     $ 18,468    $ 14,904   $ 14,294   $ 14,756     $ 15,058
------------------------    -------    -------    -------      -------     -------    -------    -------      -------
------------------------    -------    -------    -------      -------     -------    -------    -------      -------
Primary and fully
  diluted  earnings per
  share*                       $.51       $.53       $.53         $.59        $.50       $.49       $.50         $.51
------------------------    -------    -------    -------      -------     -------    -------    -------      -------
Operating Cash Flow**      $ 37,252   $ 42,504   $ 43,165     $ 45,434    $ 29,623   $ 28,907   $ 29,776     $ 31,680
------------------------    -------    -------    -------      -------     -------    -------    -------      -------
------------------------    -------    -------    -------      -------     -------    -------    -------      -------


</TABLE>



 *Under generally accepted accounting principles, when earnings per share are
  computed under the modified treasury stock method and when the market price
  of a company's common stock changes, the total of four quarters' earnings
  per share may not equal the earnings per share for the year.
**Net income plus amortization and depreciation.



                                      57
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

CRAIG CALDWELL,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 5:02-cv-00091-MP

MICHAEL W. MOORE,

Defendant.

________________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on Doc. 23, Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Plaintiff

Craig Caldwell. By prior order, the Defendant in this case was directed to file a response to

Plaintiff’s motion. As Plaintiff points out, Doc. 28, Defendant has failed to file a response

because he was never initially served in this case. Therefore, the Court will address Plaintiff’s

motion without further delay.

In his motion, Plaintiff Caldwell seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Order

adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and dismissing his complaint

for failure to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. In dismissing Plaintiff’s case, the

Court specifically cited Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998). Relying on the

recent Supreme Court case of Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007), Plaintiff argues that

exhaustion is not a pleading requirement, and that the order dismissing his case should be

reconsidered.

Plaintiff is correct that the Eleventh Circuit law cited by this Court in dismissing the

instant complaint was subsequently abrogated by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Bock. The

Court, however, finds that Jones does not retroactively apply to the final decision in this matter. 

Case 5:02-cv-00091-MP Document 29 Filed 02/01/08 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Case No: 5:02-cv-00091-MP

See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74

(1993). In Harper, the Supreme Court stated, “[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to

the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given

full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review.” Id. at 91 (emphasis added); see

also Harris v. Terrell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12513 (D.Kan. Feb. 21, 2007) (citing Harper in

holding Jones does not apply retroactively when case is not open or on direct review). The

present case was not open or on direct review at the time that Jones issued, as Plaintiff never

sought to appeal the order dismissing his case. Furthermore, “[i]ntervening developments in the

law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under

Rule 60(b)(6) .” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). 

Therefore, because Plaintiff’s case was not open or on direct review at the time that Jones issued,

the change in law cannot be retroactively applied to his case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration, Doc. 23, is denied. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of February, 2008

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge

Case 5:02-cv-00091-MP Document 29 Filed 02/01/08 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs. Case No. 5:20cr27/TKW

WILLIAM CHANDLER

_________________________________________________________________

ACCEPTANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY

Pursuant to the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate

Judge, to which there have been no timely objections, and subject to this Court’s

consideration of the Plea Agreement pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the plea of

guilty of the Defendant, WILLIAM CHANDLER, to Counts 1 through 18 of the

Indictment is hereby ACCEPTED. All parties shall appear before this Court for

sentencing as directed.

DONE and ORDERED this 2 day of October, 2020.

nd

T. Kent Wetherell, II 

T. KENT WETHERELL, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 5:20-cr-00027-TKW-MJF Document 24 Filed 10/02/20 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies that this Annual Report on Form 10-K fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of First
Capital Bancorp, Inc.



|                     |  |     |  |                                              
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------
|Date: March 31, 2009 |  | By: |  | /s/ John M. Presley                          
|                     |  |     |  | John M. Presley                              
|                     |  |     |  | Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer
|                     |  |    
|                     |  | By: |  | /s/ William W. Ranson                        
|                     |  |     |  | William W. Ranson                            
|                     |  |     |  | Senior Vice President and CFO                
|                     |  |     |  | (Principal Accounting and Financial Officer)