NTSB/HAB-01/01 

E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA S PORTAT OI N

BOARD

SAFE T Y

N

 National Transportation Safety Board 

 Washington, D.C. 20594

 Highway Accident Brief 

Accident No.: HWY-99-FH012 

Accident Type: Motorcoach loss of control and overturn 

Location: New Mexico State Route 475 

9 miles west of the Santa Fe Ski Basin 

Date and Time: March 2, 1999, about 4:30 p.m. 

Owner/Operator: Shuttle Jack, Inc. 

Vehicle: 1979 Motor Coach Industries MC-9 

Fatalities: Two 

Injuries: Thirty-five 

Accident Description 

On March 2, 1999, a 1979 Motor Coach Industries MC-9, 47-passenger charter 

motorcoach, owned and operated by Shuttle Jack, Inc., (Shuttle Jack) of Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

departed the Santa Fe Ski Basin, carrying the driver, 2 adult chaperons, and 34 middle school-age 

children. The bus began to descend a 14-mile mountainous roadway. About halfway down the 

grade, the driver discovered that the vehicle’s air brakes were no longer capable of slowing or 

stopping the bus. He noted that the brake air-pressure-gauge reading was between 90 and 120 

pounds per square inch, which was the normal system operating pressure for this vehicle. During 

the next 3.5 miles, the driver made several unsuccessful attempts to bring the bus under control 

by pumping the air brakes, downshifting the automatic transmission, pulling on the 

emergency/parking brake valve, and shutting off the engine. Eventually, the driver lost control of 

the bus while rounding a left-hand curve. The bus departed the right side of the roadway, crashed 

into a rock embankment, and then rolled onto its left side back onto the roadway. (See figure 1.) 

The calculated speed of the bus was 60 to 65 mph at the time of the collision. Two passengers 

were fatally injured, and the 35 other occupants received varying degrees of injuries. 

A postaccident mechanical inspection of the bus by National Transportation Safety Board 

investigators revealed that the steering axle brakes were out of adjustment and the brake drums 

had dark spots, typically seen on overheated drums. The drive axle brakes were also out of 
 NTSB/HAB-01/01 

2 

R/P

0 15' 30' 60'

35

LIMIT

SPEED

Rock

Formation

N

Approximate

Chevron

Alignment Sign

Chevron

Alignment Sign

Chevron

Alignment Sign

Speed

Limit Sign

Motorcoach

Tire Mark

Number - 3

Motorcoach

Tire Furrows

Contact

Damage to

Rock Formation

Motorcoach

Tire Mark

Motorcoach Number - 1

Tire Mark

Number - 2

Motorcoach

at Final Rest

Ejected

Motorcoach

Occupant at

Final Rest

Figure 1. Diagram of motorcoach loss of control and overturn. 
 NTSB/HAB-01/01 

3 

adjustment to the extent that they were incapable of providing any braking force. The brakes on 

the auxiliary weight-bearing axle, commonly referred to as a “tag axle,” were not operational 

because they were “cammed over.”1 Both tag axle drums were worn beyond the manufacturer’s 

accepted limits. 

Motor Carrier Operations 

From 1977 to 1998, Shuttle Jack was a for-hire passenger carrier, with both intrastate and 

interstate authority.2 The carrier operated an airport shuttle from Santa Fe to Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, consisting of a door-to-door van service and a regularly scheduled motorcoach route 

with pick-up points at several hotels. The company was also engaged in charter operations, which 

transported tour groups within New Mexico and to other States. The shuttle operation and the 

charter service accounted for 60 and 40 percent, respectively, of its business. 

In October 1998, the owner of Shuttle Jack was awarded a $2.731 million contract from 

the New Mexico State Highway and Transportation Department, under a Federal Transit 

Administration grant, to provide a “park-and-ride” service from Santa Fe to Los Alamos, 

Espanola, and Pojoaque, New Mexico. The Northern New Mexico Park and Ride/Express Bus 

Company was created to operate, with intrastate authority only, under the contract, which 

provided funding for the lease of 6 vehicles equipped for use by disabled people and 26 

motorcoaches3

 and for the hiring of 26 new drivers. The park-and-ride operation began on 

November 2, 1998. The owner commingled the facilities and operations of Northern New 

Mexico Park and Ride/Express Bus and Shuttle Jack. 

As required by the contract, the new vehicles were scheduled to undergo Commercial 

Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Level I inspections4

 by the New Mexico Motor Transport 

Division (MTD)5

 on March 6, 1999. (The accident occurred on March 2.) Level I is an inspection 

that includes an examination of the driver’s license, medical certificate, and duty status record; a 

complete vehicle inspection; and hazardous material requirements, as applicable. Inspections 

took place on March 6, as scheduled, and again on March 13. All but two of the inspected 

park-and-ride and Shuttle Jack motorcoaches were placed out of service due to various 

mechanical defects, most related to the brake system. Because of the circumstances surrounding 

this motorcoach accident and the results of the vehicle inspections, the New Mexico State 

Highway and Transportation Department subsequently canceled the park-and-ride contract. 

 1

 A condition in which the s-cam rotates beyond the foundation brake cam rollers and remains lodged in this 

position. The cause is generally a combination of out-of-adjustment brakes, worn brake shoes, and an excessively 

worn drum. 

2

 Shuttle Jack began operations in 1973 and is currently out of business; the owner at the time of the 

accident purchased the company in 1977. 

3

 1979 through 1983 Motor Coach Industries model MC-9 buses. 

4

 The CVSA has six inspection protocols. 

5

 The MTD is responsible for commercial vehicle inspection enforcement within the State. 
 NTSB/HAB-01/01 

4 

Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance 

Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 396.11 and 396.13 requires that commercial 

vehicles be inspected on a daily basis before beginning each trip and upon concluding each trip.

The carrier is required to keep records of these inspections for 3 months. New Mexico had 

adopted these regulations as part of its participation in the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance 

Program. 

According to company mechanics, they did not routinely see the driver pretrip or posttrip 

inspection forms and did not know whether company drivers completed these inspections. The 

mechanics stated that the only vehicle inspection forms that were submitted to them were those 

that noted a defect. According to the accident driver, who had worked for Shuttle Jack since May 

1998, he had never completed a pretrip or posttrip vehicle inspection. Although the company had 

a written policy for periodic vehicle inspection and maintenance, Safety Board investigators 

found no evidence that this policy had been implemented. A review of the company maintenance 

records and their dates revealed that vehicle inspection reports were being completed 

sporadically by some drivers. No records indicated evidence of routine vehicle maintenance. 

Shuttle Jack did not keep brake mechanic qualification records as required under 

49 CFR 396.25. Safety Board investigators interviewed three of the company’s mechanics, and 

none was able to adequately describe how to conduct a vehicle brake inspection, how to adjust 

brakes, or what were the maximum brake adjustment levels for the type of brakes on the buses. 

Federal and State Oversight 

The interstate operation of Shuttle Jack was subject to Federal oversight and the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs); its intrastate operation was subject to State 

oversight and the New Mexico Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. 

The New Mexico Motor Carrier Act6

 (Act) is substantially similar to the FMCSRs. The 

Act applies to, among other vehicles, buses designed to transport 16 or more passengers and 

grants the New Mexico Secretary of Transportation the authority to apply necessary safety rules 

provided they are “not inconsistent with nor more stringent than applicable Federal safety 

standards.”7

 The safety rules include provisions for the inspection of vehicles and records at a 

motor carrier’s place of business. Unlike the FMCSRs, the Act only allows the Secretary to 

assess a fine not to exceed $500 or 30 days in jail or both for violations of the safety rules. The 

FMCSRs allow for penalties that include fines and placing the motor carrier out of service. 

Shuttle Jack received Federal compliance reviews in 1989, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 

1998. The company was given “satisfactory” ratings for all reviews except 1996, when it 

received a “conditional” rating because it lacked an adequate drug and alcohol program. These 

reviews were conducted by Federal and State officials, who examined the carrier’s activities 

 6

 New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978, Chapter 65, Article 2. 

7

 Ibid., Article 3. 
 NTSB/HAB-01/01 

5 

related to its interstate operation only. Before the accident, Shuttle Jack had not received a review 

of its intrastate operation only. 

The New Mexico MTD conducted three random CVSA Level II inspections8 on the 

accident bus in 1996, 1997, and 1998. A Level II inspection is a roadside walk-around, driver and 

vehicle inspection, which does not require an inspector to go underneath the vehicle to inspect its 

brake system or undercarriage components; therefore, no brake inspections were conducted on 

the accident bus. 

Although the New Mexico State Highway and Transportation Department did not 

perform daily or routine carrier oversight, in terms of vehicle safety, it did monitor and take 

action on complaints registered by passengers about the operation of the park-and-ride service. 

After this accident, the New Mexico Public Regulatory Commission, which has limited 

vehicle safety oversight responsibilities and relies solely on MTD assistance, asked the MTD to 

inspect the park-and-ride and Shuttle Jack vehicles that did not fall under the FMCSRs, such as 

vans designed to transport fewer than 15 passengers. As a result of that inspection, numerous 

safety violations were found. 

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this 

accident was the poor condition of the motorcoach brakes due to the lack of an effective motor 

carrier vehicle maintenance and inspection program. Contributing to the accident was the lack of 

State oversight of the motor carrier’s intrastate operations. 

Adopted: September 17, 2001 

 8

 Level II inspections are the most common motorcoach inspections nationwide.