alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 51.2953 Variety or type specifications. The variety or type of any lot, of walnuts in the shell may be specified in accordance with the facts as follows: ( a ) If the lot is of one named variety, that variety name may be specified, *Provided,* That not over 10 percent, by count, of the walnuts in the lot are of another variety or type than that specified; and,
( b ) If the lot is a mixture of two or more distinct varieties or types it may be specified as “Mixed Varieties”.
#### In the Matter of Imani J., a Child Alleged to be Permanently Neglected. Monique J., Appellant; Children’s Aid Society et al., Respondents.

[817 NYS2d 6]

Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Sara E Schechter, J.), entered on or about May 13, 2004, which revoked a suspended judgment for noncompliance and terminated respondent mother’s parental rights to the subject child upon her admission of permanent neglect, committing the child’s custody and guardianship to petitioner agency and the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York for the purpose of adoption, and order, same court and Judge, entered on or about April 7, 2005, which denied respondent’s CPLR 5015 motion, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

A preponderance of the evidence supports Family Court’s finding that respondent did not adhere to the conditions upon which an earlier judgment, finding her to have permanently neglected the subject child, had been suspended *(see Matter of Vanessa R.,*249 AD2d 27 [1998]). Respondent’s unwillingness to seek psychotherapy, as well as her instability and immaturity with respect to the discharge of her parental obligations, amply support the conclusion that the interests of the child, who has *468spent virtually her entire life in foster care, would best be served by the termination of respondent’s parental rights.

Even assuming respondent’s subject-matter jurisdiction and constitutional claims were properly preserved by her CPLR 5015 motion, they are without merit. The Family Court is vested with exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear proceedings commenced by petitions alleging neglect (Family Ct Act § 115 [a] [i]) and seeking termination of custody by reason of permanent neglect (§ 115 [a] [iv]; *see e.g. Matter of Jocolyn Marie A.,*189 AD2d 702 [1993], *Iv denied*81 NY2d 708 [1993]). Nor was respondent denied due process in this instance. The record shows that she was ably represented by a court-appointed attorney and a guardian ad litem until she reached the age of majority. Furthermore, respondent’s argument predicated on the Eighth Amendment ignores the reality that proceedings brought pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b (1) are not punitive in nature, but rather are designed to address the needs and welfare of children. Concur—Sullivan, J.P., Williams, Gonzalez, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.
#### Jeanne L. Lobo, Respondent, v. Evart Lobo, Appellant.

Order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated June 4, 1968, modified, on the law and the facts, by amending the date for commencement of temporary alimony payments from April 1, 1968 to May 7, 1968. As so modified, order affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs. The order improperly antedated the payment of temporary alimony to a date prior to the service of the notice of motion *(Miceli*v. *Miceli,*285 App. Div. 1187). The action should proceed to trial promptly. Christ, Acting P. J., Brennan, Rabin, Hopkins and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.
#### § 51.1562 Freezing.

*Freezing* means that the potato is frozen or shows evidence of having been frozen.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2648 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2648

     To suspend temporarily the duty on certain acrylic fiber tow.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 25, 2006

 Mr. Thomas (for himself and Mr. Enzi) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To suspend temporarily the duty on certain acrylic fiber tow.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN ACRYLIC FIBER TOW.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.11.11       Acrylic fiber tow  Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         (polyacrylonitril                                                  31/2009
                         e tow) containing
                         by weight a
                         minimum of 92
                         percent
                         acrylonitrile,
                         not more than 0.1
                         percent zinc and
                         from 4 to 8
                         percent water,
                         imported in the
                         form of from 1 to
                         12 sub-bundles
                         crimped together,
                         each containing
                         24,000 filaments
                         (plus or minus
                         0.06 percent) and
                         with average
                         filament denier
                         of 1.5 decitex
                         (plus or minus
                         0.08 percent)
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         5501.30.00)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

ERNEST R. GIBSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:20cv473-TKW-MAF

OFFICER HINES,

Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER

This case is before the Court based on the magistrate judge’s Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 4). No objections were filed. Upon due consideration of 

the Report and Recommendation and the case file, I agree with the magistrate 

judge’s determination that this case should be dismissed pursuant to the “three 

strikes” statute, 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation is adopted and incorporated by 

reference in this Order.

2. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

2. This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), and the 

Clerk shall close the file.

Case 4:20-cv-00473-TKW-MAF Document 5 Filed 10/23/20 Page 1 of 2
2

DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 2020.

T. Kent Wetherell, II 

T. KENT WETHERELL, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:20-cv-00473-TKW-MAF Document 5 Filed 10/23/20 Page 2 of 2
§ 51.304 Combination grades. ( a ) Combinations of the above grades may be used as follows: ( 1 ) Combination U.S. Extra Fancy and U.S. Fancy;
( 2 ) Combination U.S. Fancy and U.S. No. 1; and
( 3 ) Combination U.S. No. 1 and U.S. Utility.
( b ) Combinations other than these are not permitted in connection with the U.S. apple grades. When Combination grades are packed, at least 50 percent of the apples in any lot shall meet the requirements of the higher grade in the combination. (*See* § 51.306.)
#### § 51.2083 Clean.

*Clean* means that the shell is practically free from dirt and other adhering foreign material.
Exhibit
      32.1




CERTIFICATION




PURSUANT
      TO




SECTION
      1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE




I,
      John
      M. Kelly, the President and principal executive officer of Man Investments
      (USA)
      Corp., the Managing Member of Man-AHL 130, LLC (“Man-AHL 130”), certify that (i)
      the Quarterly Report of Man-AHL 130 on Form 10-Q for the period ending June
      30,
      2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in such
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
      results of operations of Man-AHL 130.




Date:  August 14,
      2007


By:
            /s/ John
              M. KellyJohn
              M. KellyPresident
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Albert Heitzer, Appellant, v New York State Board of Parole et al., Respondents.

In a habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated May 18, 1976, as, upon reargument, adhered to its original determination dismissing the proceeding. The respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was conditionally released on June 1, 1979. Motion granted and appeal dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements (see, e.g., *People ex rel. Kurz v Deegan,*26 NY2d 966). Mollen, P. J., Damiani, Lazer and Margett, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 4.10.4



 Exhibit 4.10.4 
 CERTIFICATE OF TRUST 
 OF 
 CAPITAL ONE CAPITAL VI 
 THIS Certificate of Trust of Capital One Capital VI
(the “Trust”), dated as of May 6, 2009, is being duly executed and filed on behalf of the Trust by the undersigned, as trustees, to form a statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (12 Del. C. § 3801 et
seq.) (the “Act”). 
 1. Name. The name of the statutory trust formed by this Certificate of Trust is Capital One
Capital VI. 
 2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of the Trust with its principal place of business in
the State of Delaware are BNY Mellon Trust of Delaware, White Clay Center, Route 273, Newark, Delaware 19711. 
 3. Effective Date.
This Certificate of Trust shall be effective upon filing with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware. 
 [Signature pages follow]








 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have duly executed this Certificate of Trust in accordance with
Section 3811(a)(1) of the Act. 
  

			
	THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., not in its individual capacity, but solely as Institutional Trustee
		
	By:	 	 /s/ D.G. Donovan

	Name:	 	D.G. Donovan
	Title:	 	Vice President
	
	BNY MELLON TRUST OF DELAWARE, not in its individual capacity, but solely as Delaware Trustee
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Kristine K. Gullo

	Name:	 	Kristine K. Gullo
	Title:	 	Vice President
	
	 /s/ Thomas A. Feil

	Thomas A. Feil, as Administrative Trustee
	
	 /s/ Stephen Linehan

	Stephen Linehan, as Administrative Trustee
158 So.2d 612

#### The STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Wesley Joseph SONNIER v. Charles H. DAMERON, Assistant District Attorney.

No. 47014.

Dec. 4, 1963.

In re: Wesley Joseph Sonnier applying for writ of mandamus.

Writs refused. In view of the nolle prosequi entered by the District Attorney in the cause complained of the issues raised in the application have become moot.
1:20-cv-00224-AW-GRJ

9/4/2020 s/ KELLI MALU, Deputy Clerk

JESSICA J LYUBLANOVITS

Case 1:20-cv-00224-AW-GRJ Document 2 Filed 09/04/20 Page 1 of 2
1:20-cv-00224-AW-GRJ SQUEAKY KLEAN SERVICES INC

Case 1:20-cv-00224-AW-GRJ Document 2 Filed 09/04/20 Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 251 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 251

 To authorize the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau 
 of Reclamation, to conduct a water resource feasibility study for the 
              Little Butte/Bear Creek Subbasins in Oregon.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            February 1, 2005

 Mr. Smith (for himself and Mr. Wyden) introduced the following bill; 
   which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau 
 of Reclamation, to conduct a water resource feasibility study for the 
              Little Butte/Bear Creek Subbasins in Oregon.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LITTLE BUTTE/BEAR CREEK SUBBASINS, OREGON, WATER RESOURCE 
              STUDY.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Little Butte/
Bear Creek Subbasins Water Feasibility Act''.
    (b) Authorization.--The Secretary of the Interior, acting through 
the Bureau of Reclamation, may conduct the Water for Irrigation, 
Streams and the Economy Project water management feasibility study and 
environmental impact statement in accordance with the ``Memorandum of 
Agreement Between City of Medford and Bureau of Reclamation for the 
Water for Irrigation, Streams, and the Economy Project'', dated July 2, 
2004.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $500,000 to carry out this section.
                                 <all>
```
§ 4288.110 Applicant eligibility. Sections 4288.110 through 4288.119 present the requirements associated with advanced biofuel producer eligibility, biofuel eligibility, eligibility notifications, and payment record requirements. To be eligible for this Program, the applicant must meet the requirements specified in paragraph (a) of this section and must provide additional information as may be requested by the Agency under paragraph (b) of this section. Public bodies and educational institutions are not eligible for this Program. ( a ) *Eligible producer.* The applicant must be an advanced biofuel producer, as defined in this subpart.
( b ) *Eligibility determination.* The Agency will determine an applicant's eligibility for participation in this Program. If an applicant's original submittal is not sufficient to verify an applicant's eligibility, the Agency will notify the applicant, in writing, as soon as practicable after receipt of the application. This notification will identify, at a minimum, the additional information being requested to enable the Agency to determine the applicant's eligibility and a timeframe in which to supply the information. ( 1 ) If the applicant provides the requested information to the Agency within the specified timeframe, the Agency will determine the applicant's eligibility for the upcoming fiscal year.
( 2 ) If the applicant does not provide the requested information to the Agency within the specified timeframe, the Agency will not consider the applicant any further for participation in the upcoming fiscal year. Such applicants may elect to enroll during the next sign-up period.
( c ) *Ineligibility determination.* An otherwise eligible producer will be determined to be ineligible if the producer: ( 1 ) Refuses to allow the Agency to verify any information provided by the producer under this subpart, including information for determining applicant eligibility, advanced biofuel eligibility, and application payments;
( 2 ) Fails to meet any of the conditions set out in this subpart, in the contract, or in other Program documents; or
( 3 ) Fails to comply with all applicable Federal, State, or local laws.
[76 FR 7967, Feb. 11, 2011, as amended at 84 FR 71302, Dec. 27, 2019]
###### Editorial Note on Part 4290

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 4290 appear at 85 FR 16522, Mar. 24, 2020.

#### § 4290.1930 Effect of changes in this part 4290 on transactions previously consummated.

The legality of a transaction covered by the regulations in this part is governed by the regulations in this part in effect at the time the transaction was consummated, regardless of later changes. Nothing in this part bars enforcement action with respect to any transaction consummated in violation of provisions applicable at the time, but no longer in effect.
EXHIBIT 35.3
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                           HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC
              RFMSI SERIES 2006-S8 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of Homecomings  Financial,  LLC, as
servicer (the "Servicer") pursuant to the applicable  servicing agreement,  does
hereby certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under  the   applicable   servicing   agreement  has  been  made  under  my
     supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable  servicing  agreement
     in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:      /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title:    Managing Director
Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

RHONDA FLEMING,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:20-cv-545-WS/MJF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and 

WARDEN ERICA STRONG,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

On May 31, 2022, Defendants filed supplemental briefing for their motion to 

dismiss. Doc. 99. Pursuant to this court’s order of May 10, 2022, Plaintiff’s 

obligation to respond is reinstated. Doc. 88. Before this court rules on Defendants’ 

motion, Plaintiff shall be afforded an opportunity to respond to Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss and supplemental briefing.

If Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss, she must file a response in 

opposition. N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(E) (“A party who opposes the motion must file a 

memorandum in opposition.”). Any such response must address the legal 

arguments relevant to Defendants’ motion to dismiss and supplemental 

briefing.

Case 4:20-cv-00545-WS-MJF Document 100 Filed 06/01/22 Page 1 of 3
Page 2 of 3

Failure to respond in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss will cause 

this court to presume that Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion and consents 

to a dismissal of this action. See Stenlund v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 874, 

887 (D. Md. 2016); Kissi v. Panzer, 664 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123 (D.D.C. 2009). If, 

after Plaintiff reviews Defendants’ motion and supplemental briefing, Plaintiff

consents to dismissal of this action, she shall file a notice of dismissal under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. On or before June 22, 2022, Plaintiff shall:

a. file a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion, if Plaintiff

opposes Defendants’ motion; or

b. file a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), if Plaintiff

does not oppose Defendants’ motion.

2. Failure to file a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

will cause this court to presume that Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion,

does not dispute the merits of Defendants’ motion, and consents to a dismissal of 

this action.

3. Any response must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Florida.

Case 4:20-cv-00545-WS-MJF Document 100 Filed 06/01/22 Page 2 of 3
Page 3 of 3

SO ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2022.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:20-cv-00545-WS-MJF Document 100 Filed 06/01/22 Page 3 of 3
#### Geraldine TRICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-15149.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 13, 2007.*

Filed Aug. 22, 2007.

*440Geraldine Trice, Las Vegas, NV, pro se.

S. Scott Greenberg, Esq., Clark County School District, C.W. Hoffman, Jr., Esq., Clark County School District Legal Department, Las Vegas, NV, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before: KLEINFELD, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Geraldine Trice appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment dismissing her Title VII action alleging discrimination and retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After de novo review, *Gregory v. Widnall,*153 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam), we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Trice’s Title VII hostile workplace claim because she failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. *See id.*at 1074-75. To the degree that Trice makes a hostile workplace claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the claim fails for the same reason. *See Manatt v. Bank of Am.,*339 F.3d 792, 797-98 (9th Cir.2003).

The district court also properly concluded that Trice failed to establish a prima facie case for any of her other Title VII claims. *See Leong v. Potter,*347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir.2003) (stating elements of prima facie case of wrongful discharge); *Brooks v. City of San Mateo,*229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.2000) (stating elements of prima facie case of retaliation). Even if Trice’s request for a further extension of time to oppose summary judgment is construed as a motion for additional discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), it did not “show how additional discovery would preclude summary judgment and why the party cannot immediately provide ‘specific facts’ demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.” *Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank,*867 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir.1989).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Trice’s motion for a further extension, because Trice was fully notified of her duty to respond to a motion for summary judgment, *see Klingele v. Eikenberry,*849 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1988), and she had already been granted a substantial extension following the withdrawal of her counsel. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in concluding that Trice did not demonstrate circumstances that would warrant appointment of counsel. *See Johnson v. United States*
      *441
      *Treasury Dep’t,*27 F.3d 415, 416-17 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (listing factors to be considered in appointment of counsel).

Trice’s remaining contentions lack merit.

We deny all pending motions.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.