J. S15040/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JOHN RAMOS, : No. 1016 EDA 2016

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, March 4, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-1001391-2005

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 16, 2018

John Ramos appeals from the March 4, 2016 order entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that dismissed, without a 

hearing, his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following:

On December 8, 2006, after a jury trial before 

Judge Renee Cardwell Hughes, [appellant] was found 

guilty of rape, aggravated indecent assault, 

corruption of the morals of a minor and unlawful 

contact with a minor.[

1] On July 27, 2007, following 

a Megan’s Law hearing, [appellant] was found to be 

a sexually violent predator. Also on July 27, 2007, 

Judge Hughes sentenced [appellant] to an aggregate 

term of twenty (20) to forty (40) years of 

imprisonment followed by fifteen (15) years of 

probation [Appellant] filed pro se a post-sentence 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121, 3125, 6301, and 6318, respectively.
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motion for reconsideration of sentence; it was denied 

on August 9, 2007. [Appellant] filed a notice of 

appeal, and on September 22, 2008, [appellant’s] 

judgments of sentence were affirmed by the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court. On February 27, 2009, 

[appellant’s] petition for allowance of appeal was 

denied by our Supreme Court.

On December 11, 2009, [appellant] timely filed a 

pro se PCRA petition. David Rudenstein, Esquire, 

was subsequently appointed to represent 

[appellant], and on May 30, 2012, counsel filed an 

Amended PCRA Petition on [appellant’s] behalf. On 

November 16, 2012, this court issued a notice of its 

intention to dismiss [appellant’s] Amended PCRA 

Petition without a hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On December 12, 2012, 

[appellant] filed a pro se response to this court’s 

907 notice, arguing, inter alia, that his PCRA 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise one of 

[appellant’s] claims in the Amended Petition. On 

December 27, 2012, after conducting a review of the 

record, this court dismissed [appellant’s] Amended 

Petition without a hearing.

On January 9, 2013, [appellant] timely filed a pro se

notice of appeal of this court’s dismissal of his PCRA 

Petition to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and on 

January 11, 2013, [appellant] filed pro se an 

unsolicited “1925(b) Statement of Matters 

Complained of Appeal.” On January 22, 2013, 

[appellant’s] PCRA counsel also filed an unsolicited 

“Statement of Matters Complained of Pursuant to 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b)”; counsel 

omitted from the statement a specific claim of

ineffectiveness of [appellant’s] trial counsel which 

[appellant] sought to pursue.[Footnote 4] On May 2, 

2014, the Superior Court remanded the matter to 

this court with an instruction to address [appellant’s]

claim that his PCRA counsel should have raised the 

issue of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing 

to object to the Commonwealth’s introduction of a

child services report [“CSR”] into evidence. The 

Superior Court also instructed this court to conduct a
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hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 

552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998), to determine if 

[appellant], in fact, sought to represent himself in 

pursuing his PCRA claim or desired appointment of 

counsel.

[Footnote 4] As noted by our Superior 

Court, although [appellant] raised the 

challenge properly in his pro se 1925(b) 

Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal, the claim was procedurally 

problematic “due to the obvious problem 

that PCRA counsel was still counsel of 

record.” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 

308 EDA 2013, [] (Pa.Super. May 2, 

2014).

On May 23, 2014, following a Grazier hearing, 

[appellant] elected to be represented by appointed

counsel on remand. J. Matthew Wolfe, Esquire, was 

thereafter appointed to represent [appellant]. On 

September 19, 2014, counsel filed an Amended 

PCRA Petition on [appellant’s] behalf.[Footnote 5]

On January 16, 2015, counsel filed a Second 

Amended PCRA Petition.[Footnote 6] On June 22,

2015, counsel filed [appellant’s] Third Amended 

PCRA Petition. On July 1, 2015, [appellant] filed

pro se an “Amended PCRA to Supplement First 

Timely Filed PCRA.” On August 19, 2015, counsel 

filed a Fourth Amended PCRA Petition on 

[appellant’s] behalf. On November 3, 2015, the 

Commonwealth filed a Motion to Dismiss.

[Footnote 5] On October 20, 2014, 

[appellant] filed a “Motion for 

Appointment of [a] New PCRA Counsel”

in which he argued that his 

newly-appointed PCRA counsel failed to 

include [appellant’s] alleged 

Confrontation Claim; [appellant] 

subsequently elected to proceed with his 

counsel.
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[Footnote 6] On March 6, 2015, 

[appellant] filed a Motion for the 

Appointment of Counsel Due to 

Irreconcilable Differences.

On March 4, 2016, following a review of the 

pleadings, record, evidence and argument of 

counsel, [appellant’s] Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief was dismissed as lacking merit.[Footnote 7] 

On March 30, 2016, [appellant], through his counsel, 

filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior 

Court.[Footnote 8]

[Footnote 7] The dismissal occurred 

more than twenty days after [appellant] 

was served with notice of the 

forthcoming dismissal of his PCRA 

petition. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

[Footnote 8] On May 10, 2016, our 

Superior Court issued an Order directing 

compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 3517 and filing 

the docketing statement with the 

Prothonotary of the Superior Court by 

May 20, 2016. On May 19, 2016, 

[appellan’ts] attorney timely complied 

with the Superior Court’s Order.

Trial court opinion, 1/11/17 at 1-4 (footnotes 1-3 omitted; some brackets in 

original).

Appellant’s counseled brief raises the following issue for our review: 

“Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to object to the court’s defective jury 

instruction on reasonable doubt?” (Appellant’s brief at 3; full capitalization 

omitted). Our review of the record, however, reveals that appellant failed to 
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raise this issue in his counseled Rule 1925(b) statement.2 Therefore, 

appellant waives this issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (issues 

not included in a petitioner’s Rule 1925(b) statement are waived); see also 

Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 211 (Pa. 2016); cert. 

denied, 138 S.Ct. 59 (2017) (reiterating that issues not raised in a 

petitioner’s Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived).

Order affirmed.

 

2 We note that in his pro se Rule 1925(b) statement, appellant raised three 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, appellant alleged that trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to “the 

Commonwealth’s inclusion of a DHS report in violation of [appellant’s] 6th 

and 14th amendment right [sic] to confront his accuser and due process of 

law.” Second, appellant alleged PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for amending 

appellant’s PCRA petition and failing to include a claim of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to object to the Commonwealth’s inclusion of the 

DHS report and “not objecting to the PCRA [c]ourt holding an incamera [sic] 

evidentiary hearing . . . to determine the merits of [PCRA counsel’s amended 

claims].” Third, appellant claimed that the PCRA court abused its discretion 

when it denied appellant an in camera evidentiary hearing and did not 

dispose of his pro se motion for appointment of new PCRA counsel when he 

raised a claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel. (Appellant’s 

“1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal,” 1/11/13.)

In his counseled Rule 1925(b) statement, appellant alleged that the PCRA 

court erred in dismissing his PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing 

when he “properly pled and could have proven several causes for relief 

including . . . ineffectiveness of trial counsel where counsel failed to object to 

a grossly improper instruction to the jury which discounted the importance 

and even the relevance of character testimony [and] where counsel failed to 

subpoena and produce known and available witnesses.” (Appellant’s 

“statement of matters complained of pursuant to Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b), 1/22/13 at 1.) In that statement, appellant also claimed 

his entitlement to a remand for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 2.)
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/16/18