United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to the Chairman and

Ranking Minority Member, Committee

on International Relations, House of

Representatives

February 1996 CAMBODIA

Limited Progress on

Free Elections, Human

Rights, and Mine

Clearing

GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270716 

February 29, 1996

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman

Chairman

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The signing of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991 ended years of

devastating civil war and started Cambodia on the road to building a

democratic civil society. The United Nations Transitional Authority in

Cambodia (UNTAC), established to implement the accords, supervised the

withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, repatriated over 360,000

refugees, improved human rights conditions, and conducted free and fair

national elections in 1993. UNTAC concluded its mandate in late 1993 with

the formation of a duly elected government in Cambodia. This report,

which builds on our prior work on UNTAC and Cambodia (see a list of

related GAO products at the end of this report), provides information about

Cambodia’s progress since 1993. Specifically, we report on (1) Cambodia’s

prospects for holding free and fair national elections by 1998; (2) its

progress in meeting international human and political rights standards;

and (3) its progress in clearing millions of land mines1

 left over from

decades of war, which is crucial for economic development and public

safety. We briefed members of your staff about these issues on

November 7 and December 19, 1995. This report summarizes and updates

the information we provided at those briefings.

Background By signing the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and various international

conventions in 1992, Cambodia’s leaders agreed to support a democratic

resolution to the country’s long-standing civil war, to protect and advance

human and political rights and fundamental freedoms for all Cambodians,

and to begin rebuilding the country’s shattered economy and civil

institutions. Cambodia’s constitution, adopted in September 1993,

established a multiparty democracy guaranteeing human rights and the

rule of law and seeking economic development and prosperity. It commits

the government to (1) holding new national elections by 1998;

(2) recognizing and respecting human rights as defined in the United

Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and all

1

Land mines include antipersonnel and antitank mines, unexpended and unexploded ordnance, and

booby traps. We reported on mine clearing and related issues in Unexploded Ordnance: A Coordinated

Approach to Detection and Clearance Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-95-197, Sept. 20, 1995).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
B-270716 

treaties and conventions concerning human rights, women’s rights, and

children’s rights; and (3) promoting economic development. Achieving

sustained progress in the areas of democratic governance, the protection

of human rights, and economic development (1) is a primary objective of

U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and (2) was a major factor underlying

international support for the Paris Peace Accords and UNTAC, which cost

an estimated $2.8 billion. Since the mid-1980s, U.S. assistance to

Cambodia, including peacekeeping, has totaled nearly $1 billion.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had planned to

provide Cambodia about $111 million over 3 years: $29 million in fiscal

year 1994; $42 million in fiscal year 1995; and $40 million in fiscal year

1996. The USAID Mission in Phnom Penh planned to spend about $8 million

to help the Cambodian government plan and prepare for holding national

elections. USAID also funds efforts to improve the functioning of the

National Assembly, the legal system, and the press and to protect human

rights. USAID now says that its planned level of assistance for fiscal 

year 1996 will be lower than the $40 million in the executive branch’s

initial budget request, and that assistance levels for Cambodia will be

related to congressionally approved levels of assistance globally.

Results in Brief Since UNTAC ended its mandate in late 1993, Cambodia has made limited

progress (1) toward establishing a framework for holding constitutionally

required national elections by 1998, creating uncertainty about the

prospects for a peaceful, democratic transition of power; (2) meeting

international human and political rights standards; and (3) clearing mines

for economic development and public safety. Progress toward those three

objectives is key to sustaining momentum toward democratic governance,

the protection of human rights, and economic development, according to a

variety of U.S., other foreign government, and Cambodian officials, and

nongovernmental organizations. Sustaining momentum in these areas also

is key to maintaining domestic and international support for the

Cambodian government.

Cambodia faces several obstacles to holding constitutionally required

national elections by 1998. The country currently lacks an electoral

framework and the necessary human and financial resources to support

the election process. U.S. and other foreign officials estimate that creating

such a framework will take considerable time and involve many difficult

political decisions, but the Cambodian government has done little to

prepare for national elections at this time and is falling behind schedule

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
B-270716 

for holding elections by mid-1998. Some U.S. and other foreign officials

doubt whether the Cambodian government can ensure that elections will

be held in a neutral environment where parties can campaign without

violent intimidation and voters will feel secure against retaliation.

Recognizing concerns that the police and armed forces would interfere

with the elections, Cambodia’s First Prime Minister has proposed putting

them under the control of an independent, neutral commission during the

elections. Other obstacles to free and fair elections include opposition

parties’ lack of fair access to the media and disparity in the relative

strengths of the political parties.

Although conditions have improved since the end of its civil war,

Cambodia has made limited progress in meeting basic international human

rights standards. According to human rights groups, military and police

forces remain ineffective and corrupt and continue to violate human rights

frequently. These groups and some U.S. and other foreign officials said

that few Cambodians had received due process or fair trials in the past 

2 years, in part because prosecutors and judges lacked basic training to

properly investigate, prepare, present, and decide cases. These same

sources reported that official corruption was widespread and growing,

undermining the rule of law. Several U.S. officials noted that low-level

corruption partly reflected the low pay for Cambodia’s bureaucracy,

including military, police, and other officials.

In the area of political rights, recent government actions suggest

increasing intolerance for dissenting opinion, both inside and outside the

government. One outspoken member was expelled from the National

Assembly for publicly attacking government corruption, and others said

they were threatened if they continued to criticize the government. During

the past year, the government prosecuted several members of the press for

criticizing government corruption, enacted press restrictions, and

tolerated violent attacks on some press members.

The presence of millions of land mines imposes a heavy economic and

social burden on Cambodia, already one of the poorest nations in the

world. According to several studies, mine-clearing experts, and U.S. and

foreign officials, these mines (1) deny access to vast tracts of farmland,

forests, and other natural resources, which represents a huge economic

loss, and (2) interfere with the resettlement and reintegration of refugees.

Nevertheless, the Cambodian government has cleared little land of mines

and devoted few resources to the task since 1993. The U.S. government

has provided some funds, training, equipment, and supplies for mine

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
B-270716 

clearing to the Cambodian Mine Action Center and the Cambodian armed

forces. Nonetheless, according to available reports, mine-clearing experts,

and U.S. and other foreign officials, the Cambodian government’s lack of

leadership, planning, and funding for mine clearing are among the most

important factors explaining the lack of progress in this area.

Further information about elections, human and political rights, and land

mines is provided in briefing sections I, II, and III, respectively.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Departments of Defense and State and USAID generally agreed with the

information presented in a draft of this report, but preferred to focus on

the progress Cambodia had made since the signing of the Paris Peace

Accords in 1991 rather than the more limited progress that has occurred

since UNTAC completed its mandate in late 1993. In addition, they said that

Cambodian society had been shattered by decades of civil war, but that

the country had the potential, with international assistance and support, to

make progress on many of the problems our report discusses, and noted

that Cambodian leaders had publicly promised to hold elections, respect

the rule of law, and protect human rights. For example, with regard to

human rights, the Department of State and USAID emphasized the

improvements that have occurred as compared with circumstances that

prevailed prior to 1991, and the Department of Defense said that it is

important to note the persistence of critics who are not intimidated by the

government’s return to autocratic methods. The Department of Defense

said that erecting a framework for conducting a fair election by 1998 is not

entirely outside the realm of possibility, and the Department of State said

that the important issue is to have free and fair elections, not that they be

held as scheduled in May 1998.

We recognize that decades of civil war and the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal

rule had a devastating effect on Cambodian society, and that the

Cambodian government faces serious problems of institution-building,

exacerbated by widespread corruption, a poorly staffed and trained

judicial system, and an ongoing Khmer Rouge insurgency. However, using

this past as a benchmark for measuring the current government’s progress

can be misleading because UNTAC was principally responsible for

improvements between 1991 and 1993. We believe that the standards of

behavior set out in the provisions of the Paris Accords implemented by

UNTAC, other international conventions that Cambodia has signed, and

Cambodia’s constitution are the appropriate standards for assessing the

current government’s progress toward democratic governance and

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
B-270716 

protecting human rights—not the conditions of genocide and civil war that

existed prior to 1991. In signing these documents, Cambodia’s leaders

promised to abide by their provisions in rebuilding Cambodia. However,

the evidence shows that since 1993 the Cambodian government has yet to

make much progress toward these goals, and some recent actions, such as

restricting press freedoms and declaring a new opposition party illegal, are

inconsistent with the government’s public commitment to free elections,

the rule of law, and the protection of human and political rights.

Underscoring our concerns are reports that government forces raided the

headquarters of a new opposition party in late January 1996 and held party

members at gun point.

Comments from the Departments of Defense and State and USAID are

reprinted in their entirety in appendixes I, II, and III, respectively, along

with our evaluation of them.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information for this report, we conducted fieldwork in

Cambodia and Thailand and at the Departments of Defense and State, the

U.S. Pacific Command, USAID, and the United Nations. At these locations,

we met with key U.S., Cambodian, other foreign government, and U.N.

officials and with representatives of a variety of nongovernmental

organizations. In Thailand, these included the U.S. Ambassador, political

officer, and military attache; Thai military officials; and representatives

from the United Nations and refugee assistance groups. In Cambodia,

these included the U.S. Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the

Acting USAID Mission Director, the USAID democracy programs officer, the

U.S. Pacific Command Representative, and the Humanitarian Assistance

Demining Coordinator; Cambodia’s Secretary of State and President of the

Council of Ministers, foreign advisors, and Members of the Cambodian

National Assembly, including the chairmen of the foreign affairs and

human rights commissions; diplomats at the Australian, British, French,

and Indonesian embassies; representatives of the United Nations

Development Program, the United Nations Center for Human Rights, the

Asia Foundation, several human rights groups, and two policy research

institutions; and foreign civilian and military advisors at the Cambodian

Mine Action Center. We also reviewed and analyzed many reports, studies,

and other documents about Cambodia, plus the Paris Peace Accords and

other international treaties to which the Cambodian government is a party.

We conducted our review from May to December 1995 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
B-270716 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional

committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the USAID Administrator,

and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others on

request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions

about this report. Major contributors to this report were Tetsuo Miyabara,

Michael Rohrback, and Michael Zola.

Harold J. Johnson

Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Holding Free and Fair

National Elections by

1998

10

Cambodia Faces Obstacles to Holding National Elections by 1998 10

Cambodia Faces Obstacles to Holding Free and Fair Elections 12

Briefing Section II 

Meeting Human and

Political Rights

Standards

16

Limited Progress in Meeting Basic Human Rights Standards 16

Recent Actions Indicate Increasing Official Intolerance for

Political Dissent

18

Briefing Section III 

Clearing Land Mines

20

Land Mines Impose a Heavy Economic and Social Burden 20

Limited Progress Made in Clearing Land Mines 22

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

26

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of State

30

Appendix III 

Comments From the

U.S. Agency for

International

Development

40

Related GAO Products 44

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Contents

Table Table I.1: National Election Timetable for Cambodia 11

Abbreviations

BLDP Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party

CMAC Cambodian Mine Action Center

CPP Cambodian People’s Party

FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,

Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia

NGO nongovernmental organization

RCAF Royal Cambodian Armed Forces

UNCHR United Nations Center for Human Rights

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section I 

Holding Free and Fair National Elections by

1998

GAO Cambodia Faces Obstacles to Holding 

National Elections by 1998

No election law or framework

Limited human and financial resources

International assistance uncertain

Proposed local elections in 1997 may 

divert funding, people, and attention

Cambodia’s constitution requires that the government hold national

elections by 1998. However, the country currently lacks the electoral

framework (laws, regulations, an independent commission) and resources

(both human and financial) needed to hold elections. Although U.S. and

other foreign officials estimate that creating such a framework will take

considerable time and involve many difficult political decisions, little has

been accomplished so far. In late 1995, the Cambodian government began

drafting an electoral law. Discussion at a late October 1995 seminar,

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section I 

Holding Free and Fair National Elections by

1998

sponsored partly by the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID), explored the relative advantages of different types of electoral

systems. By December 1995, the government still had not completed a

draft electoral law and was falling behind a proposed timetable for holding

elections in mid-1998 (see table I.1).

Table I.1: National Election Timetable

for Cambodia Event Timing

Draft national election law November 1995 (not met)

Interior Ministry reviews draft law December 1995 (not met)

Co-Prime Ministers review draft law January-February 1996

Draft law submitted to the National Assembly Spring 1996

National Assembly enacts law Summer 1996

Implement new law (create an election

committee, issue regulations, train workers,

educate voters)

1997

Hold national elections May 1998

Source: Pre-election technical assessment for Cambodia prepared by the International

Foundation for Electoral Systems, August 1995.

According to U.S. and other foreign officials, Cambodia lacks the human

and financial resources needed to hold an election on the scale of the one

held by the United Nations in 1993. The U.N. electoral assistance unit

could help plan and organize the elections, but this would require a

significant financial commitment from the international community.

Although some international assistance may be provided, such as election

monitors, some U.S. and other foreign officials doubt that the international

community will support a costly, large-scale operation to help conduct the

elections.

The Cambodian government currently appoints local officials but has

proposed holding local elections in 1996 or 1997. Some U.S., other foreign

government, and Cambodian officials support holding local elections

because they would introduce democratic practices at the local level.

Other such officials oppose holding local elections because they would

divert limited financial and human resources from the task of holding

national elections and/or because antidemocratic government officials

could use local elections as evidence of democratic progress and then

cancel national elections.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section I 

Holding Free and Fair National Elections by

1998

GAO Cambodia Faces Obstacles to Holding 

Free and Fair Elections

CPP-controlled Interior Ministry is 

drafting election law

drafting process is not open to public 

comment and participation

CPP used Ministry to intimidate 

opponents before 1993 elections

Fear of violence and intimidation by CPP 

is a key concern for other parties

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section I 

Holding Free and Fair National Elections by

1998

Even if the Cambodian government holds national elections by 1998, some

U.S. and other foreign officials and experts doubt they would be free and

fair. The Interior Ministry is drafting the election law and may be

responsible for organizing the elections. Ministry deliberations and work

are not open to public oversight and participation, and the Ministry played

a role in the violence and intimidation before the 1993 elections.

According to some U.S. and other foreign government officials,

nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and others, the Cambodian

government cannot ensure that parties could campaign without violent

intimidation and that voters would feel free from retaliation. The United

Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was unable to control

key government ministries before the 1993 elections, and the Cambodian

People’s Party (CPP) used some of them to sponsor violence against its

political opponents. Some foreign officials and reports point out that CPP

still controls the Interior Ministry and its internal security forces, plus the

armed forces. Several NGOs report that fear of politically motivated

violence is a key issue for members of the National United Front for an

Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)

and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) but not for CPP

members.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State noted that

Prime Minister Ranariddh has proposed establishing an independent,

neutral commission under the King to control the police and armed forces

during the elections to prevent them from intervening in the elections.

However, we question the effectiveness of such a commission in

controlling the police and armed forces when UNTAC, with over 20,000

personnel, was unable to control them before the 1993 elections.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section I 

Holding Free and Fair National Elections by

1998

GAO Cambodia Faces Obstacles to Holding 

Free and Fair Elections (cont'd)

Voters lack widely-available sources of 

accurate information about the elections, 

particularly radio

Political parties other than CPP are weak 

and lack the leadership, organization, 

and resources to campaign effectively

UNTAC officials knew that providing Cambodian voters with accurate

information was essential for free and fair elections. Consequently,

guaranteeing fair access to the media—especially radio, because most

Cambodians are illiterate and television stations have limited broadcast

areas—for all political parties was an essential element of UNTAC’s

pre-election strategy. Several studies conclude that the 1993 elections

probably could not have taken place or succeeded without the flow of

information provided largely by “Radio UNTAC.” Unfortunately, Cambodia

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section I 

Holding Free and Fair National Elections by

1998

currently lacks widely-available media sources of accurate information.

Although more than 30 newspapers operate in Cambodia, they have

limited nationwide distribution and the quality of their news reporting is

unreliable. Also, the government tightly controls broadcast media licenses,

limiting opposition parties’ access to radio and television. For example, a

BLDP official told us that the government had turned down the party’s

application for a radio station license. Moreover, as discussed later, the

government has grown increasingly intolerant of dissenting opinions.

USAID’s strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia recognizes the

media’s weaknesses; one of its objectives is to increase media access and

professionalism. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department

of Defense said that, despite restricted access to the media, outspoken

government critics still may be able to generate popular support and

influence the elections.

With the possible exception of CPP, Cambodian political parties lack the

leadership, organization, and financial resources to conduct effective

national campaigns, according to U.S. and other foreign officials and

reports and other documents we reviewed. Over a decade of single-party

rule has given CPP the opportunity to build a solid party structure (largely

indistinguishable from the government bureaucracy) at the provincial,

district, communal, and village levels. Meanwhile, U.S. officials and NGOs

indicate that FUNCINPEC and BLDP have weak party structures at these levels

and are further weakened by political infighting. Given their weak party

structure and disunity, several NGOs and others conclude that the parties

will be unable to compete effectively in future elections.

USAID plans to provide training to strengthen the capabilities of all political

parties to participate in the election. However, several observers

suggested that CPP, with its generally better organization and structure,

might benefit disproportionately from such training. Several U.S., other

foreign government, and NGO officials questioned the wisdom of providing

training to strengthen any of the existing parties because they are

undemocratic and authoritarian. USAID officials said that they plan to fund

training for grassroots civic organizations instead of established political

parties. The National Democratic Institute suspended political party

training in Cambodia in 1995 but plans to work with other NGOs to train

election monitors and educate voters.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section II 

Meeting Human and Political Rights

Standards

GAO Limited Progress in Meeting Basic 

Human Rights Standards

Military and police forces continue to 

violate human rights frequently

Few Cambodians receive due process or 

fair trials

Prisons remain overcrowded, and 

prisoners are mistreated

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section II 

Meeting Human and Political Rights

Standards

Cambodia has ratified and agreed to abide by all major international

agreements guaranteeing human and political rights, for example, the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Yet the current

government has made limited progress since late 1993 in meeting the basic

international human rights standards contained in these agreements.

Indeed, some U.S., other foreign government, and Cambodian officials and

NGOs conclude that Cambodia’s human rights situation worsened during

1995.

According to human rights NGOs, the United Nations Center for Human

Rights (UNCHR) office in Phnom Penh, and USAID documents, Cambodian

military and police forces continued to violate human rights frequently

during the past 2 years. These sources reported numerous cases of

extortion, beatings, robberies, and other violations by soldiers and police.

USAID and Cambodian officials and others noted that this problem touches

on the larger issue of desperately needed reforms of the Cambodian

bureaucracy, including the provision of adequate pay for police, military,

and other government officials to reduce or eliminate low-level corruption,

which currently is endemic.

According to human rights NGOs, UNCHR, some U.S. and Cambodian

officials, and USAID documents (1) few Cambodians had received due

process or fair trials in the past 2 years; (2) prosecutors and judges lacked

basic training and skills for properly investigating, preparing, presenting,

and deciding cases; and (3) trained public defenders remained scarce.

They also said that official corruption was widespread and growing,

undermining the rule of law, and that the government had resisted some

legislators’ attempts to introduce anti-corruption legislation in the

National Assembly.

Human rights NGOs and UNCHR told us that Cambodia’s prisons remain

overcrowded and still fall short of meeting basic international and

humanitarian standards for the treatment of prisoners. In late 1994, NGOs

reported that they found a secret government prison where prisoners were

tortured and denied basic human needs. According to the Department of

State, this prison was closed in 1994.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section II 

Meeting Human and Political Rights

Standards

GAO Recent Actions Indicate Increasing 

Official Intolerance for Political Dissent

Outspoken member was expelled from 

the National Assembly, and others have 

been intimidated

The government has prosecuted several 

editors, condoned violence against the 

press, and enacted press restrictions

Cambodia's co-Prime Ministers 

attempted to close the U.N. human rights 

office in Phnom Penh

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section II 

Meeting Human and Political Rights

Standards

In the area of political rights, recent government actions indicate

increasing official intolerance for dissenting opinion, both inside and

outside the government. This intolerance has had a chilling effect on

efforts to improve the Cambodian government’s effectiveness and reduce

corruption, according to USAID, several foreign government officials, NGOs,

and members of Cambodia’s National Assembly. Reported examples of

increasing intolerance include the following:

• One outspoken member was expelled from the National Assembly for

publicly attacking government corruption and other problems, and other

members have been threatened with expulsion if they speak out.

• The government closed some newspapers and prosecuted several

members of the press, enacted restrictions on press freedoms, and tightly

controlled broadcast licenses. Several members of the press were beaten

or killed and their attackers set free. The government attempted to silence

the free press by criticizing an existing journalists’ association and

pressuring journalists to join a competing association formed and

controlled by the government. Government officials justified press

restrictions by pointing to irresponsible reporting on the part of some

newspapers.

• Cambodia’s co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the UNCHR office in

Phnom Penh in response to its criticism of human rights abuses, but

backed down under international (including U.S. government) pressure.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section III 

Clearing Land Mines

GAO

Mines deny access to farmland, forests, 

and other natural resources

Mines hinder infrastructure 

reconstruction and development

Mines kill and disable able-bodied 

workers and overburden Cambodia's 

weak medical and social infrastructure

Land Mines Impose a Heavy Economic 

and Social Burden

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section III 

Clearing Land Mines

The presence of millions of land mines denies Cambodians access to vast

tracts of farmland, forests, and other natural resources. Prior to 1970,

Cambodia was a net exporter of food; it is now a net importer. Battambang

and Svey Rieng provinces were once the most productive areas,

respectively considered Cambodia’s “breadbasket” and “rice bowl.” Mines

now make substantial areas in these two provinces unusable. The lack of

mine-free farmland was one of several factors that forced UNTAC to cancel

plans to provide land to refugees returning to Cambodia from Thai border

camps and is a key factor in their present poverty and food insecurity.

Only about 20 square kilometers of land have been cleared of mines since

1992, enough to support only a few thousand refugees (thousands more

await resettlement).

Land mines also hinder infrastructure reconstruction and development,

which in turn hinders agricultural, industrial, and tourism development.

For example, before roads or bridges can be repaired, the surrounding

area must be cleared of mines.

According to some studies, the majority of land mine casualties are some

of Cambodia’s most able-bodied workers, young males aged 16 to 35. Land

mine casualties overburden Cambodia’s weak medical and social

infrastructure. Studies show that land mine injuries consume a

disproportionate share of Cambodia’s hospital resources. Cambodia has

the greatest proportion of amputees in the world, according to several

studies and reports.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section III 

Clearing Land Mines

GAO Limited Progress Made in Clearing 

Land Mines

Cambodia's land mine problem is 

extensive

Operational factors complicate land mine 

clearance

U.S.-trained RCAF units lack funding, 

leadership, and a clear mission

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section III 

Clearing Land Mines

Several factors explain Cambodia’s lack of progress in clearing mines. A

major factor is the sheer extent of the problem. An estimated 4 million to

10 million land mines are widely distributed throughout the country. One

minefield in southeast Cambodia is 54 kilometers long and contains an

estimated 360,000 mines. Another on Cambodia’s border with Thailand is

over 600 kilometers long and contains an estimated 2 million to 3 million

mines. The following operational factors compound the problem and make

clearing Cambodian minefields particularly difficult:

• Limited information exists about the exact location of the minefields.

• Cambodian minefields are extremely dense by western military standards

and display little order or pattern.

• Humanitarian mine-clearing operations are costly and time-consuming.

One estimate places the cost of clearing a single mine at $300 to $1,000.

• The manual mine-clearing techniques used are slow, and attempts to clear

mines mechanically have so far been unsuccessful.

• The ongoing Khmer Rouge insurgency limits access to some areas, and

Khmer Rouge forces continue to lay mines.

Since 1994, U.S. military forces have trained and equipped several Royal

Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) mine-clearing units as part of the U.S.

government’s nonlethal military assistance program to Cambodia. U.S.

military officials and others report that mine-clearing efforts by these units

have been hindered by limited operational funding from the Cambodian

government, poor senior leadership, and lack of a clear mission. U.S.

military officials in Cambodia estimated that these units had cleared less

than 1 square kilometer of land.

Some U.S. and other foreign officials have urged the Cambodian

government to reorganize, retrain, and reorient the RCAF for a dual security

and reconstruction role, including mine clearing. Senior Cambodian

government and military officials have proposed some helpful changes,

but their commitment to these proposals is uncertain. USAID officials

questioned the effectiveness of using the Cambodian military in a dual

role, based on their experience with dual role militaries elsewhere.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section III 

Clearing Land Mines

GAO Limited Progress Made in Clearing 

Land Mines (cont'd)

CMAC mine-clearing efforts hindered by 

inadequate funding

Cambodian government has promised 

CMAC $10 million through 2000, but 

additional international support needed

Cambodia lacks a strategic plan that 

integrates mine clearing with economic 

development

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Briefing Section III 

Clearing Land Mines

The Cambodian Mine Action Center’s (CMAC) mine-clearing efforts have

been hindered from its start by limited funding. CMAC was established in

June 1992 to create a Cambodian institution to continue mine-clearing and

related activities after the completion of UNTAC’s mandate. CMAC focuses on

mine clearing for humanitarian, rather than development, purposes. CMAC

reports progress in clearing mines and reducing mine-related casualties,

but experts estimate it will take decades to eliminate mines from

Cambodia, given current techniques and efforts.

CMAC was unable to secure sufficient funding from international donors to

complete its initial 30-month, $20 million operating program, scheduled to

end April 30, 1996. In June 1995, the U.N.-sponsored trust fund established

to finance the program contained only about $1.5 million, an amount

sufficient for about 3 more months of operations. At that time, there were

no plans or mechanisms in place for obtaining additional donor funding

after the trust fund expired at the end of April 1996, and the Cambodian

government had not budgeted funds to support CMAC once donor funding

ended. Foreign technical advisers and others said that CMAC could not

operate without the trust fund, additional donor support, and continued

foreign technical assistance. CMAC officials and its 1994 annual report

suggested that providing mine-clearing services on a reimbursable basis

might allow CMAC to generate sufficient revenues to become self-financing,

and noted that the contractor for a U.S.-funded road building project

employs CMAC-trained mine-clearing teams.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State said that

the United Nations Development Program had agreed to extend the trust

fund for a few years and that the Cambodian government had pledged to

provide $1 million to CMAC in 1996 and a total of $10 million through 2000.

The Department also noted that, given the size of Cambodia’s land mine

problem, continued international assistance will be necessary for some

time.

Cambodia’s national development strategy does not directly address

specific mine-clearing objectives, priorities, or requirements associated

with various development objectives. Also, it has yet to integrate RCAF,

CMAC, or NGO mine clearing, or assign them roles or tasks. CMAC has been

tasked to develop a national mine-clearing strategy, but it is not scheduled

to complete this task until July 1996.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

See comment 4.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 21.

See comment 5.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter

dated January 5, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. The obstacles to holding free and fair elections in Cambodia are not

insurmountable; however, the Cambodian government does not appear to

be drafting an election law in a manner that will allow reasonable time or

opportunity for public comment and participation and/or election

preparations. The Cambodian people were willing to express their political

will at the polls in 1993; however, lack of progress in overcoming these

obstacles may deny them an opportunity to express their will freely in

1998.

2. While some critics persist in speaking out against official corruption and

human rights violations, they express their opinions in an increasingly

hostile environment, which includes the threat of imprisonment or death.

That they continue to speak out may be more a tribute to their individual

courage than to the state of freedom of expression in Cambodia.

3. We have revised our report to reflect this information.

4. Whether the police are more loyal to a faction of the CPP than the party

itself does not alter concerns that they will be used to sponsor violence

against political opponents, as they were in 1993. In addition, although the

armed forces apparently remained neutral during two failed coup

attempts, nevertheless, some foreign officials remain concerned that CPP

will use the armed forces, or some of its elements, to sponsor violence

against political opponents. As the Department of State noted in its

comments, First Prime Minister Ranariddh has proposed establishing an

independent, neutral commission under the King to control the police and

the armed forces to avoid their “improper intervention” in the electoral

process.

5. We included an estimate of the amount of land cleared of mines by the

RCAF for humanitarian purposes in calculating the total area cleared. For

clarity, we note that 5 million square meters equals 5 square kilometers.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 3.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 10.

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

See comment 13.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 14.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 15.

See comment 11.

Now on p. 17.

See comment 11.

See comment 11.

Now on p. 19.

See comment 16.

See comment 17.

See comment 18.

See comment 11.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 19.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter

dated December 19, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. We recognize the devastating effects decades of civil war and the Khmer

Rouge’s genocidal rule had on Cambodian society. However, using this

past as a benchmark to measure the current Cambodian government’s

progress since UNTAC ended its mandate in 1993 can be misleading because

UNTAC was principally responsible for much of the improvement in

Cambodia between 1991 and 1993. We believe that the standards of

behavior set out in the Paris Peace Accords, the various international

conventions that Cambodia has signed, and the Cambodian constitution

are appropriate standards against which to measure the current

government’s progress—not the conditions of genocide and civil war that

existed prior to 1991.

2. Achieving sustained progress toward democratic governance, the

protection of human rights, and economic development in Cambodia were

key factors underlying international support for UNTAC (and the

formulation of the specific components of its mandate) and continue to be

key objectives of U.S. foreign policy. Continued progress on the three

specific issues our report addresses—holding free and fair elections by

1998, meeting international human and political rights standards, and

clearing land mines—is key to sustaining momentum in those three

broader areas, according to many officials and experts we interviewed.

Failure to successfully address the three specific issues discussed in this

report could undermine international support for Cambodia, according to

these same officials and experts.

3. Our report recognizes UNTAC’s contributions to improving conditions in

Cambodia.

4. While the Cambodian people are eager to express their political will in

national elections, the obstacles we cite regarding free and fair elections, if

unresolved, could deny the Cambodian people an opportunity to express

their will freely.

5. While the Cambodian government is officially committed to democracy

and human rights, some recent actions, such as declaring a newly formed

opposition political party illegal, appear inconsistent with the

government’s official policy. USAID’s 1995 strategy for promoting

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

democracy in Cambodia notes that some observers sensed a return to

“traditional authoritarian ways” in 1995.

6. Although domestic and international human rights groups work on

improving human rights in Cambodia, these organizations have reported

facing increasing intimidation from government authorities, as the

Department recognizes in its February 1995 human rights report. Human

rights groups also are concerned that no law authorizes them to operate in

Cambodia and that the government might use this lack of legal status to

curtail their future operations. As noted in our report, the co-Prime

Ministers attempted to close the UNCHR office in Phnom Penh because of

its criticism of human rights abuses. Recognizing such concerns, USAID’s

strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia targets resources toward

the adoption of a legal framework for the existence and operation of NGOs

in Cambodia.

7. Although over 50 print and electronic media operate in Cambodia, the

quality of their news reporting is unreliable and they operate in an

environment increasingly hostile to press freedoms. USAID’s 1995 strategy

for promoting democracy in Cambodia says that the country lacks an

aggressive media to hold the government accountable, and that the press,

although active, lacks the training to be articulate advocates for the

development of democratic institutions and is vulnerable to government

intimidation. Human Rights Watch reports that the Cambodian

government has engaged in a series of actions to curtail freedom of the

press and stifle the right to hold and express opinions. For example, the

group reported that after a September 1995 grenade attack on an

opposition party congress, government officials ordered broadcast

stations to limit their coverage to a government-provided script.

8. We recognize that Cambodia faces serious problems in building a

democratic society, and that it would be unrealistic to expect the

government to become a model democracy in the 2 years since UNTAC

departed. However, it is realistic—given UNTAC’s costly intervention and

Cambodian leaders’ pledges to support democracy, human rights, and the

rule of law—to expect the government to make sustained progress toward

the specific goals this report discusses. However, evidence suggests that

the Cambodian government has made limited progress toward these goals

over the past 2 years, and instead may be returning to traditional

authoritarian methods. For example, government forces reportedly raided

the headquarters of a new opposition party in late January 1996 and held

party members at gun point. Also, USAID’s 1995 strategy for promoting

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

democracy in Cambodia notes that some observers sensed a return to

“traditional authoritarian ways” in 1995.

9. We did not say that the Cambodian government could not hold free and

fair elections by 1998 or protect human and political rights. However,

evidence indicates that to date the government has not made much

progress toward these goals. Regarding mine-clearing efforts, our point is

that funding for such efforts remains an issue and the Cambodian

government currently lacks an integrated strategic plan.

10. Where appropriate, we have modified our report to say “some U.S.

officials” or to specify their titles.

11. We have revised our report to reflect this information.

12. Although the most important consideration is that Cambodia hold free

and fair national elections, several factors highlight the significance of

holding them by May 1998. First, the maximum term of the current

National Assembly expires in early September 1998, and elections must be

held within 60 days, or no later than early November 1998. U.S., other

foreign government, and Cambodian officials emphasized the importance

of holding elections within these constitutional time frames. Second,

holding elections after May 1998 would be difficult because of logistical

problems associated with Cambodia’s monsoon season. UNTAC’s decision

to hold elections by May 1993 in part reflected such logistical concerns.

13. We agree that it is more important that the election law is drafted

thoughtfully, after a thorough, public exchange of views. General

adherence to the proposed timetable is important precisely because it

allows time for a thorough, public exchange of views before the need to

enact a law and begin election preparations becomes pressing. Also, much

remains to be done before elections can be held, including completing a

draft law, allowing for public comment and debate on the draft law,

debating and enacting the law in the National Assembly, creating an

election committee, issuing election regulations, developing an election

budget, training election workers, educating and registering voters,

registering political parties, and mobilizing international support. Because

additional delays are likely, we are concerned that the Cambodian

government is falling behind schedule at the very start of the process.

14. We have revised our report to clarify the sources of our information.

While the Department may consider comments regarding resource

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of State

constraints speculative, USAID’s 1995 strategy for promoting democracy in

Cambodia notes that the agency has neither the staff or resources

necessary to support both national and local elections.

15. Although there have been a few exceptions, new laws and policies

generally are finalized in secret by the Council of Ministers, and there is

limited opportunity for National Assembly debate and public participation

once draft legislation emerges from this closed forum, according to USAID’s

1995 strategy for promoting democracy in Cambodia.

16. The new press law allows for continued criminal prosecution of the

media when material “affects national security and political stability” and

allows the government to confiscate or temporarily suspend publications

without court approval. Human Rights Watch and other groups are

concerned that these provisions undermine the law’s positive features.

Regarding the government’s promise to define national security and public

stability in the future, we cannot assess the potential impact of such

uncertain legislation. However, some U.S. and foreign officials,

Cambodians, members of the press, and others say that the absence of a

definition creates uncertainty that has a chilling effect on press freedoms.

17. We have revised our report to say that the Cambodian government has

“pressured” journalists to join a government-controlled association. We

base this statement on information provided by officials at the U.S.

embassy in Phnom Penh, the Asia Foundation, the UNCHR office in Phnom

Penh, and an NGO newsletter.

18. We included the 15.4 square kilometers of land CMAC has cleared of

mines in the total estimate we report. Using the requirement established

by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of 2 hectares of

farmland to support a typical refugee family, 15.4 square kilometers of

land would support less than 800 refugee families—not the 13,000 the

Department cites.

19. Our report notes that the U.S. government has supported mine-clearing

efforts in Cambodia by providing funds, training, equipment, and supplies.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

See comment 2.

Now on p. 17.

See comment 3.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
Appendix III 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated February 1, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. We have revised our report to reflect this information.

2. General adherence to the proposed timetable is important precisely

because it allows time for a thorough, public exchange of views before the

need to enact a law and begin election preparations becomes pressing.

Much remains to be done before elections can be held, including

completing a draft law, allowing for public comment and debate on the

draft law, debating and enacting the law in the National Assembly, creating

an election committee, issuing election regulations, developing an election

budget, training election workers, educating and registering voters,

registering political parties, and mobilizing international support. Because

additional delays are likely—given the inexperience of Cambodian

officials, the need for technical assistance, and competing priorities—we

are concerned that the Cambodian government is falling behind schedule

at the very start of the process.

3. Although human rights conditions have improved over what existed

prior to UNTAC, we believe that the standards of behavior set out in the

Paris Peace Accords, the various international treaties that Cambodia has

pledged to uphold, and the Cambodian constitution are the appropriate

standards for assessing the current government’s progress in meeting

international human rights standards since 1993—not the conditions of

genocide and civil war that existed prior to 1991. Moreover, some

individuals and groups report that human rights conditions in Cambodia

have worsened since UNTAC left. For example, in its 1996 annual report,

Human Rights Watch concludes that Cambodia’s human rights situation

deteriorated markedly during 1995.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
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Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities

(GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, Feb. 13, 1995).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions

(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability

(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).

Cambodia: AID’s Management of Humanitarian Assistance Programs

(GAO/NSIAD-91-260, Aug. 28, 1991).

Cambodia: Multilateral Relief Efforts in Border Camps (GAO/NSIAD-91-99FS,

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Cambodia: U.S. Non-lethal Assistance and Status of the Cambodian Seat at

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Problems in Processing Vietnamese Refugees from the Dong Rek Camp in

Cambodia (GAO/NSIAD-85-132, Aug. 16, 1985).

(711138) Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR Cambodia
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