a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2004 MILITARY 

TRANSFORMATION

Clear Leadership, 

Accountability, and 

Management Tools Are 

Needed to Enhance 

DOD’s Efforts to 

Transform Military 

Capabilities

GAO-05-70
What GAO Found

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Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

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Highlights of GAO-05-70, a report to 

congressional committees 

December 2004

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 

Clear Leadership, Accountability, and 

Management Tools Are Needed to 

Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform 

Military Capabilities 

DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy to 

transform U.S. military capabilities, but it has not established clear 

leadership and accountability or fully adopted results-oriented management 

tools to help guide and successfully implement this approach. The 

responsibility for transforming military capabilities is currently spread 

among various DOD organizations, with no one person or entity having the 

overarching and ongoing leadership responsibilities or the accountability for 

achieving transformation results. In addition, although DOD established an 

informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to discuss 

transformation issues, this group has no charter, formal responsibilities, or 

authority to direct changes. GAO has previously reported that key practices 

for successful transformation include leadership that sets the direction of 

transformation and assigns accountability for results, and the use of 

crosscutting implementation teams, which can provide the day-to-day 

management needed for success. In recent testimony on DOD’s business 

transformation, we underscored the importance of these elements and 

stated that DOD has not routinely assigned accountability for performance 

to specific organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to 

accomplish goals. DOD officials believe that a single organization 

accountable for transformation results and a formal implementation team 

are not necessary because existing informal mechanisms involve key 

organizations that can individually implement needed changes, and an 

annual assessment of transformation roadmaps is prepared for the Secretary 

of Defense, who can direct the transformation efforts of each organization. 

However, in the absence of clear leadership, accountability, and a formal 

implementation mechanism, DOD may have difficulty resolving differences 

among competing priorities, directing resources to the highest priorities, and 

ensuring progress should changes in senior personnel occur. In addition, 

informal mechanisms are not sufficient to provide transparency to the 

process or assurance to Congress that DOD is allocating resources to 

address needed improvements rather than desired improvements. 

While DOD’s strategy to transform military capabilities is a good first step, 

DOD has not fully developed results-oriented management tools that can 

help managers effectively implement and manage major efforts, and focus on 

achieving results. Specifically, DOD has not revised its initial transformation 

goals, set in 2001, to reflect new joint concepts—thus, DOD lacks a 

foundation for developing other tools such as performance goals and 

measures and linking specific resources needed to achieve each goal. DOD 

faces challenges in developing these tools because the joint concepts are 

being developed concurrently with its plans to acquire new capabilities. But 

without these results-oriented tools, it will be difficult for DOD to determine 

the extent to which its transformation efforts are achieving desired results, 

to measure its overall progress, or to provide transparency for how billions 

of dollars in planned investments are being applied. 

Because future threats the nation 

may face are uncertain, and with 

many competing demands on its 

resources, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has begun to 

transform its military capabilities, 

which will involve not only the 

acquisition of new weapon systems 

but also how the armed forces 

think, train, and fight. In 2003, 

DOD estimated $263 billion would 

be allocated from fiscal year 2004 

through 2009 for transformation 

efforts. In this report GAO (1) 

describes DOD’s strategy to 

transform joint military 

capabilities; (2) assesses the extent 

to which DOD has established clear 

leadership, accountability, and a 

mechanism to integrate 

transformation efforts; and 

(3) assesses the extent to which 

DOD’s framework incorporates 

results-oriented management tools 

to guide transformation efforts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO makes recommendations 

designed to establish clear 

leadership, accountability, and a 

more results-oriented management 

framework to guide DOD’s 

transformation of military 

capabilities. In oral comments, the 

Office of Force Transformation 

disagreed with these 

recommendations but did not 

address the weaknesses described 

in this report or provide convincing 

evidence to show the 

recommendations are not 

warranted. Therefore, GAO 

continues to believe the 

recommendations are appropriate. 
Page i GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 5 

DOD’s Transformation Strategy Is Evolving and Involves Complex 

and Concurrent Components 7 

Overall Transformation Leadership, Accountability, and Integrating 

Mechanism Have Not Been Established 15 

Approach to Transform Military Capabilities Lacks Important 

Management Tools 23 

Conclusions 30 

Recommendations for Executive Action 31 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39 

Related GAO Products 40 

Tables 

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices 19 

Table 2: Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis 24 

Table 3: DOD Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense 

Guidance Documents 25 

Figures 

Figure 1: Components of DOD’s Strategy for Transforming Military 

Capabilities 8 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

OUSD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

TPG Transformation Planning Guidance

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Page 1 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

December 17, 2004 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Martin T. Meehan 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

 Unconventional Threats and Capabilities 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Because of the uncertainties associated with the future threats the nation 

may face, and with many competing demands on its resources, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked on a major effort to 

transform its business processes, human capital, and military capabilities. 

The transformation of military capabilities, which is the focus of this 

report, will involve not only the acquisition of new weapon systems, but 

also how the armed forces think, train, and fight. Transformation is also 

seen as a process intended to provide continuous improvements to 

military capabilities. In the words of the Secretary of Defense “...DOD is 

building a culture of continual transformation, so that our armed forces 

are always several steps ahead of any potential adversaries.” One of the 

fundamental objectives of transformation is to enhance joint operations—

the coordinated use of all military forces that share information across 

traditional service boundaries and levels of command. 

This transformation effort will require a significant investment of 

resources at a time when the nation faces a serious fiscal imbalance and 

many competing demands. In 2003, DOD reported that it planned to spend 

about $263 billion for transformation from fiscal year 2004 through 2009. 

Concurrently, DOD must also balance resource demands for ongoing 

military operations around the world and maintain existing weapon 

systems. 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Because of the importance of successfully adapting U.S. military 

capabilities to address changing threats and the significant investments 

that this will require, we assessed the management framework DOD has 

established to guide its transformation efforts. Specifically, in this report 

we (1) describe DOD’s strategy to transform joint military capabilities; 

(2) assess the extent to which DOD has clearly established leadership, 

accountability for achieving transformation results, and a mechanism to 

integrate transformation efforts; and (3) assess the extent to which DOD is 

using results-oriented management tools to guide implementation of its 

transformation strategy. We prepared this report at our own initiative, and 

are providing a copy to you because of your oversight of defense issues. 

To describe DOD’s strategy to transform military capabilities, we reviewed 

the department’s Transformation Planning Guidance and plans for 

implementing major parts of the strategy. We corroborated and clarified 

our understanding of how DOD intends to implement its strategy with 

appropriate DOD officials. To assess the extent to which DOD has clearly 

established leadership, accountability for achieving transformation results, 

and a mechanism to integrate transformation efforts, we examined DOD 

instructions governing the roles and responsibilities of various defense 

organizations and reviewed relevant policy guidance and documents. We 

also identified similar crosscutting initiatives within DOD and examined 

how it established the authority and accountability for those initiatives. 

We compared this information to selected key practices consistently found 

to be at the center of successful mergers and organizational 

transformations and discussed the results with relevant DOD officials. To 

assess the extent to which DOD is using results-oriented management 

tools to guide transformation efforts, we compared DOD’s current 

management framework with management principles embodied by the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and discussed our 

results with appropriate DOD officials. We assessed the reliability of the 

cost data we obtained from DOD reports by corroborating the data with 

knowledgeable agency officials and determined that it was sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes. See appendix I for a more complete description 

of our scope and methodology. We conducted our work between May 2003 

and October 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy 

to transform U.S. military capabilities. The foundation of the strategy is 

joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S. military forces will 

be integrated to conduct future operations. For example, DOD is 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

developing a joint concept called force application that will describe how 

the Joint Force Commander will integrate and rapidly maneuver forces 

across the range of military operations. DOD plans to develop and refine 

these concepts through experimentation efforts led by the Joint Forces 

Command. These concepts are intended to evolve as DOD’s 

transformation efforts progress. As DOD defines and develops these joint 

concepts, it has also required each military department and the Joint 

Forces Command to prepare individual plans (called roadmaps) to acquire 

the capabilities to implement these new joint concepts. The roadmaps are 

prepared annually and reflect ongoing initiatives, such as the Army’s 

Future Combat System, and also recognize that science and technology 

are expected to yield new capabilities in the future. The strategy also calls 

for an annual assessment of the progress made in implementing 

transformation of military capabilities, the results of which are intended to 

influence future defense guidance and, ultimately, investment decisions. 

Although the Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility for 

managing key aspects of transformation, DOD has not established clear 

leadership and accountability for achieving transformation results, nor has 

it established a formal mechanism to coordinate and integrate the various 

transformation efforts within the department. As we have previously 

reported, key practices for successful transformation include leadership 

that sets the direction of transformation, assigns accountability for results, 

and is supported by crosscutting implementation teams, which, in turn, 

can provide the focused, day-to-day management needed for success.1

 In 

recent testimony on DOD’s business transformation, we underscored the 

importance of these elements and stated that DOD has not routinely 

assigned accountability for performance to specific organizations or 

individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish goals.2

 Although 

the Secretary of Defense has provided the vision for transformation and 

set the tone for accomplishing it, the responsibility for various parts of the 

transformation strategy for military capabilities is spread among several 

organizations, including the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint 

Staff, each of the services, and the Joint Forces Command; and no single 

individual or organization has been given the overarching leadership 

 1

 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

2

 GAO, Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and Implement a 

Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management Transformation,

GAO-04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004). 
Page 4 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

responsibilities, authority, or the accountability for achieving 

transformation results. In addition, although DOD has established an 

informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to discuss 

transformation issues, this group has no formal charter, meets on an 

irregular basis, and has no directive authority. DOD officials stated that 

they believe that the current assignment of responsibilities among various 

department organizations is adequate and that a formal crosscutting group 

is not needed because existing informal mechanisms involve key 

organizations that can implement needed changes, and the annual 

assessment of the progress made in transformation efforts is prepared for 

the Secretary of Defense, who can direct the transformation efforts of 

each military department. However, in the absence of clear leadership, 

accountability, and a formal implementation mechanism, DOD may have 

difficulty in resolving differences among competing priorities, directing 

resources to the highest priorities, and ensuring progress if changes in 

senior personnel occur. In addition, informal mechanisms are not 

sufficient to provide transparency to the process or provide Congress with 

assurance that DOD is allocating resources to address needed 

improvements rather than desired improvements. 

While the strategy designed by DOD to transform military capabilities is a 

good first step toward establishing a framework to guide and monitor the 

results of its transformation efforts, DOD has not fully developed resultsoriented management tools that provide a means to set clear and specific 

goals and measure progress in achieving them. For example, DOD initially 

established six long-term goals for transformation in the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review, and it subsequently articulated additional 

transformation goals in other department documents. DOD has not, 

however, revised these goals to reflect the new joint concepts, which, as 

previously discussed, are now intended to be the foundation of the 

transformation strategy. Without clear and consistent long-term goals 

grounded in the joint concepts, DOD lacks a foundation for developing 

other important tools such as performance goals and measures, and it is 

limited in its ability to link resource needs to specific goals. DOD faces 

challenges in developing these management tools because of the 

inherently concurrent nature of the transformation process—the joint 

concepts are being defined and developed at the same time the services 

and the Joint Forces Command are developing their plans to acquire new 

capabilities. But without tools such as clear long-term goals, performance 

goals and measures, and specific resource requirements that are linked to 

these goals, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which its 

transformation efforts are achieving desired results, measure its overall 
Page 5 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

progress, or provide transparency for how billions of dollars in planned 

investments are being applied. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense establish clear 

leadership and accountability for achieving the transformation of military 

capabilities, establish a formal group to integrate departmentwide efforts, 

and direct this group and the Joint Forces Command to more fully 

incorporate results-oriented management tools to help DOD guide the 

transformation efforts and report on results achieved. In official oral 

comments on a draft of this report provided by the Office of Force 

Transformation, DOD officials generally disagreed with our 

recommendations. In general, their comments indicated that they believe 

the current transformation leadership, organizational structures, strategy, 

and oversight mechanisms are adequate and appropriate; therefore the 

recommendations we make in this report are unwarranted. DOD’s 

comments did not, however, address the weaknesses we describe in the 

report, and the additional points they raised did not provide convincing 

evidence that our recommendations were unnecessary. Accordingly, we 

continue to believe our recommendations, if implemented, could enhance 

the department’s efforts to transform military capabilities and provide 

Congress with greater visibility over how billions of dollars are being 

applied to achieve this goal. DOD’s comments and our evaluation are 

discussed in detail at the end of this report. 

DOD defines transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature 

of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of 

concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s 

advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities.”3

 It 

describes the outcome of transformation as “fundamentally joint, networkcentric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and 

massed effects across the battlespace”—that is, transformation should 

result in maximum collaboration among the services and between levels of 

command, all of them having access to the same, integrated computer 

network, geographically dispersed but effectively interconnected, to 

enable quick, real-time decision making and achieve widespread effects. 

DOD’s transformation efforts are not limited to military capabilities; DOD 

is also undertaking efforts to transform its business practices, human 

 3 Transformation Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C.: April 2003. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

capital,4 and its relationships with interagency and multinational partners. 

The focus of this report is on DOD’s efforts to transform military 

capabilities to meet the changing and uncertain nature of future threats. 

The transformation of joint military capabilities began with DOD’s 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated but DOD-led 

study, which concluded that transformation of U.S. forces is needed to 

extend America’s military advantages into the future. DOD published its 

strategy for transforming military capabilities in the April 2003 

Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG). The TPG stated that new 

joint concepts are needed to describe how U.S. forces will conduct 

operations in the next 15 to 20 years and that changes in new weapons 

systems, organizations, doctrine, training, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities will be needed to provide these capabilities. 

According to a recent DOD report,5

 the performance of U.S. forces in the 

successful conduct of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom 

has provided a glimpse of the future potential of emerging concepts, such 

as sharing information among dispersed forces and using existing weapon 

systems in new ways. In fact, the Deputy Commander, Joint Forces 

Command, testified in February 2004 that these operations sharpened 

DOD’s transformation focus by showing the effectiveness of integrating 

forces, such as merging special operations and conventional forces. 

Implementations of large-scale changes, such as transformations, are not 

simple endeavors and require concentrated efforts to accomplish goals. 

Experience shows that successful changes can take years to accomplish 

and, in the federal government, can be difficult to sustain given frequent 

turnover in leadership. We have reported that DOD’s force transformation 

will also require cultural changes and business process reengineering that 

will take years to accomplish.6

In our past work, we have reported on the advantages of using resultsoriented management tools to help organizations successfully manage 

major efforts such as transformation. Our work on transforming 

organizations highlighted the need for leadership to drive the 

 4

 GAO, Human Capital: Building on DOD’s Reform Effort to Foster Governmentwide 

Improvements, GAO-03-851T (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2003). 

5 Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Office of Force Transformation, 

(Washington, D.C.: 2003). 

6 GAO-03-669. 
Page 7 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

transformation with integrated strategic goals, dedicating a crosscutting 

team to implement the strategy, and the use of performance management 

principles to assign responsibility and ensure accountability for the 

change.7

 Similarly, we have reported that management principles (or tools) 

embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 

provide agencies with a framework to effectively implement and manage 

programs and shift the management focus from measuring the program 

activities and processes to measuring outcomes.8

 Such a shift in focus is 

especially important for efforts such as the transformation of military 

capabilities, which will involve billions of dollars in spending. 

DOD has designed a complex strategy focused on developing and fielding 

improved joint military capabilities and, in fiscal year 2003, it began to 

implement this strategy for the first time. The foundation of DOD’s 

strategy is the joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S. 

military forces will be integrated to conduct future operations. The 

strategy also requires the Joint Forces Command and each military 

department to prepare roadmaps—that is, implementation plans—for 

developing and acquiring the capabilities needed to implement the joint 

concepts. The roadmaps reflect some programs that are ongoing, such as 

the Army’s Future Combat System, and also recognize that science and 

technology are expected to yield new capabilities in the future. DOD also 

performs an annual assessment of the roadmaps, the results of which are 

intended to influence future defense guidance and, ultimately, investment 

decisions. 

 7 GAO-03-669. 

8

 Congress enacted this legislation to provide for, among other things, the establishment of 

strategic planning and performance measurement in the federal government. See 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

DOD’s Transformation 

Strategy Is Evolving 

and Involves Complex 

and Concurrent 

Components 
Page 8 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

DOD has developed a complex strategy to transform joint military 

capabilities that involves several complex components. Figure 1 provides 

a general portrayal of the relationship between these components. Fiscal 

year 2003 was the first year that DOD implemented this overall strategy. 

Figure 1: Components of DOD’s Strategy for Transforming Military Capabilities

Joint Transformation 

Strategy Includes Several 

Complex Components 

Top-Level DOD Guidance

Functional Concepts

 • Battlespace Awareness

 • Joint Command and Control

 • Force Application

 • Force Protection

 • Focused Logistics

 • Net-Centric Warfare

 • Force Management

 • Joint Training

Joint Operating Concepts

 • Major Combat Operations

 • Stability Operations

 • Strategic Deterrence

 • Homeland Security

Joint Integrating Concepts

 • Joint Forcible Entry Operations

 • Joint Logistics

 • Joint Command and Control

 • Integrating Air and Missile 

 Defense

 • Global Strike

 • Seabasing

 • Undersea Superiortiy

Air Force

Roadmap

Naval

Roadmap

Army

Roadmap

Joint

Roadmap

Experimentation

Strategic Appraisal

Budget Development

Joint Operations Concepts

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

Revise Defense Guidance
Page 9 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

As illustrated in figure 1, the strategy is based on general defense guidance 

reflected in documents such as the National Military Strategy and the 

Quadrennial Defense Review. From this general guidance, DOD is 

developing a “family” of joint operating, functional, and integrating 

concepts, which collectively depict how transformed forces will operate in 

the future. DOD intends to continually develop and evolve each of these 

joint concepts over the next several years through experimentation 

conducted by each service and the Joint Forces Command. Each military 

department and the Joint Forces Command also prepare annual roadmaps, 

which are intended to provide more specific information on plans to 

acquire the capabilities to achieve the joint concepts. The strategy also 

calls for the Director, Office of Force Transformation,9

 to conduct an 

annual evaluation of the progress made in achieving transformation goals 

(called a strategic assessment) by reviewing the annual roadmaps. DOD 

officials stated that the results of the strategic assessment are 

incorporated into defense guidance that provides direction for budget 

development. We discuss each of these components in more detail below. 

DOD has reported that the key to its transformation strategy is a family of 

joint concepts, which includes an overarching vision (articulated in the 

Joint Operations Concepts) and interrelated operating, functional, and 

integrating concepts. DOD created the Joint Operations Concepts to 

articulate the overarching description of how the military will conduct all 

types of joint operations in the next 15 to 20 years. It focuses more on how 

the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any 

adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they 

may engage U.S. forces or interests. The Secretary of Defense signed the 

Joint Operations Concepts in November 2003. 

The Joint Operations Concepts calls for the creation of subordinate Joint 

Operating Concepts (hereinafter called operating concepts) that 

collectively describe how the military will operate across the range of 

military operations. According to a Joint Staff official, although DOD has 

drafted the four operating concepts, as of October 2004, the Secretary of 

Defense had not approved them. These four Joint Operating Concepts and 

a general description of each are as follows: 

 9

 The Director, Office of Force Transformation, advises the Secretary of Defense on 

transformation issues. 

Joint Concepts Are 

Intended to Provide a 

Foundation for 

Transformation 
Page 10 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

• Major Combat Operations – conduct large-scale military actions. 

• Stability Operations – conducted before, during, and after major 

combat operations to provide security, initial humanitarian assistance, 

limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other 

reconstruction assistance. 

• Strategic Deterrence – discourage aggression or any form of 

coercion against the United States or its interests and alter a nation’s or 

group’s will and ability to attack the homeland, U.S. allies, or 

development of democracies throughout the world. 

• Homeland Security – detect, deter, prevent, and defeat attacks 

against the homeland to provide military forces in support of civilian 

authority, and plan for emergencies. 

Complementing the four operating concepts are eight functional concepts. 

These functional concepts as described in DOD documents are: 

• Command and Control – describes how joint forces will collaborate, 

communicate, and implement commanders’ decisions while conducting 

operations as described in the operating concepts. 

• Force Application – describes how the Joint Force Commander will 

integrate and rapidly maneuver forces to engage adversaries and defeat 

them across the range of military operations outlined collectively in the 

operating concepts. 

• Battlespace Awareness – describes the information about an 

operational environment—including status of friendly, adversary, and 

nonaligned forces and the impacts of physical, cultural, social, political, 

and economic factors on military operations—and how the Joint Force 

Commander can use this information to plan operations. 

• Force Protection – describes how the joint force will use active and 

passive capabilities to protect personnel, physical assets, and 

information to prevent adversaries from restricting or preventing U.S. 

forces from conducting operations as described in the operating 

concepts. 

• Focused Logistics – describes how DOD will provide the Joint Force 

Commander with equipment and other support on time for 

simultaneous operations conducted over geographically dispersed 

areas. 
Page 11 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

• Network-Centric Warfare – currently in development. 

• Force Management – currently in development. 

• Joint Training – currently in development. 

Functional concepts are intended, collectively, to describe the capabilities 

and attributes that will be needed to implement the operating concepts. As 

forces shift from one type of operation to another, such as from stability 

operations to major combat operations, the functional capabilities they 

need may change as well. For example, a stability operation may require 

nonlethal force application capabilities, but if the operation shifts to major 

combat, then lethal capabilities may be emphasized. DOD approved the 

battlespace awareness, joint command and control, force application, 

force protection, and focused logistics concepts in February 2004. 

According to a Joint Staff official, as of October 2004, the other three were 

in development. 

The integrating concepts, which crosscut through the operating and 

functional concepts, have the narrowest focus of all the concepts. As of 

October 2004, DOD had begun drafting seven integrating concepts, 

although none were completed and more may be added. The seven 

concepts being drafted are 

• Joint Command and Control, 

• Joint Logistics, 

• Joint Forcible Entry Operations, 

• Integrating Air and Missile Defense, 

• Global Strike, 

• Seabasing, and 

• Undersea Superiority. 

The integrating concepts describe how the capabilities derived from the 

joint and functional concepts are meant to work together. For example, 

according to Office of Force Transformation and Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereafter referred to as OUSD Policy) 

officials, the seabasing concept may describe how the capabilities derived 

from the focused logistics functional concept would be applied in a major 

combat operation. The March 2004 defense guidance directed that the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive, prioritized list 

of integrating concepts required to support the operating concepts before 

fiscal year 2005 and assign them to specific DOD components for 

development. This guidance also directs that undersea superiority 
Page 12 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

operations, seabasing operations, and global strike operations be 

developed prior to the next Quadrennial Defense Review. We did not 

evaluate the status of these concepts during our review. 

DOD plans to use experimentation10 to help define and develop each 

concept and identify the specific capabilities needed to implement them. 

The Joint Forces Command is responsible for joint experimentation on the 

concepts and integrating results from other combatant commanders’ 

experiments. Based on the results, the Joint Forces Command will 

recommend modifications to existing joint concepts as well as recommend 

changes needed in doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, 

personnel, and facilities to achieve the capabilities needed to implement 

the joint concepts. According to the Joint Forces Command’s 

experimentation plan, these recommendations should help DOD senior 

leadership make informed decisions about future investments. 

Experimentation is ongoing—the Joint Forces Command’s 

experimentation plan outlines the Command’s approach from fiscal year 

2004 through 2011, and it presents in detail events scheduled throughout 

fiscal years 2004 and 2005. 

The Office of Force Transformation is responsible for managing the 

roadmap process. The 2003 transformation roadmaps were the first ones 

to be prepared under DOD’s transformation strategy, and they were 

submitted in November 2003 to the Office of Force Transformation for 

review. They are intended to be implementation plans outlining the 

concrete steps DOD must take to develop and acquire the capabilities 

necessary for implementing the joint concepts. Specifically, the 

Transformation Planning Guidance requires the roadmaps to include 

information such as 

• when and how desired capabilities will be fielded; 

• which critical capabilities from other services and agencies are 

required for success; 

• changes to the organizational structure, operating concepts, doctrine, 

and skill sets of personnel; 

• initiatives intended to improve interoperability; 

 10 Experimentation uses various types of assessments to develop, refine, and validate joint 

concepts and their associated capabilities. These activities vary in scale but are designed to 

identify areas to explore (that is, develop hypotheses) and then use simulated or live 

experiments to confirm, refute, or modify the ideas. 

Roadmaps Are 

Implementation Plans to 

Develop and Acquire 

Capabilities for Joint 

Concepts 
Page 13 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

• measures intended to assess DOD’s six transformational goals 

identified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and joint operating 

concepts; and 

• funding information that includes appropriation breakouts through the 

Future Years Defense Program11 for the desired capabilities. 

The military department roadmaps (Army, Naval,12 and Air Force) are 

developed by the services. They provide a broad overview of the service 

capabilities under development to support the joint concepts. As the 

concepts develop over time and specify more precisely what capabilities 

are required, the roadmaps can, in turn, specify more precisely how those 

capabilities will be acquired. The roadmaps also reflect some ongoing 

programs, such as the Army’s Future Combat System and the Air Force’s 

Space-Based Radar, and recognize that science and technology 

investments are expected to yield new capabilities. The Joint Forces 

Command is responsible for developing the joint roadmap using input 

from the combat support defense agencies.13 The purpose of the joint 

roadmap is to document planned activities to achieve transformational 

improvements in joint capabilities, such as joint command and control and 

joint intelligence, and to facilitate the coordination of transformational 

activities across DOD. 

The TPG requires the Office of Force Transformation to conduct an annual 

strategic appraisal to assist the Secretary of Defense in evaluating progress 

in implementing transformation. The TPG requires that the strategic 

appraisal process include an evaluation of transformation progress using 

specific measures; that barriers to transformation be identified; and that 

recommendations are developed to improve transformation for the next 

TPG or other defense guidance. That guidance, in turn, is intended to 

provide the services with instructions for budget development. 

 11 The Future Years Defense Program is a DOD centralized report that provides 

information on DOD’s current and planned outyear budget requests. 

12 The Naval Transformation Roadmap represents the Navy and Marine Corps plan. 

13 Defense Agencies that are assigned wartime support missions are designated as Combat 

Support Agencies and include agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 

Defense Information Systems Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the National 

Security Agency. 

Strategic Appraisal 

Designed to Assess 

Transformation Progress 
Page 14 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, 

the Office of Force Transformation conducted its first strategic appraisal 

of the roadmaps between December 2003 and February 2004, the results of 

which were briefed to the Secretary of Defense in April 2004. According to 

Office of Force Transformation officials, information provided from the 

strategic appraisal was incorporated into 2004 defense guidance issued by 

the Secretary of Defense. For example, the 2004 defense guidance required 

the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, to prepare a roadmap for 

the development of directed-energy capabilities through 2020. Other 

results, according to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy 

officials, were incorporated into informal guidance that the Office of Force 

Transformation provided to the services and the Joint Forces Command 

for updating the roadmaps that were due to be submitted in July 2004. 

Neither the strategic appraisal’s results nor the defense guidance is 

published outside DOD. According to these officials, the 2004 roadmaps 

were submitted for review in July 2004, and the second strategic appraisal 

process is now under way. 

According to the TPG, the strategic appraisal process should include input 

from the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, which evaluates the 

transformational value of the service budget requests in light of the 

services’ roadmaps. Although this evaluation was not completed in the 

first strategic appraisal, officials from this office said that they intend to 

require the services to show how their proposed budgets support their 

roadmaps, and the services’ input will become the basis for the evaluation. 

Furthermore, officials said that in cases where the services’ budget 

requests deviate from resource requirements articulated in each roadmap, 

the services are required to show how any increases in funding for one 

program will be offset by decreases in other areas. 

The transformation strategy is designed to link with the acquisition 

process through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System. This system is DOD’s capabilities-based process intended to 

identify, evaluate, and prioritize capabilities needed to implement the joint 

concepts. According to a Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction,14

this process is complex but includes the following basic steps. In the first 

step, a variety of defense organizations, including the military services and 

 14 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01D: Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System. March 12, 2004. 

DOD’s Transformation 

Strategy Is Intended to 

Link to the Acquisition 

Process 
Page 15 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

the combatant commands, identifies, analyzes, and prioritizes the gaps 

between current capabilities and those needed to implement the joint 

concepts. Second, these same organizations develop solutions to address 

these gaps through a combination of materiel changes (that is, developing 

and buying new weapon systems) and nonmateriel changes (that is, 

changes in doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel, and 

facilities). Finally, several review boards within the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council15 review the recommended solutions. Approved 

solutions are then funded as part of DOD’s budget process. For example, 

the approved solution to providing capability X for implementing the force 

application functional concept may be to develop and buy a new weapon 

system. This new weapon system then becomes an acquisition 

requirement that is funded as part of DOD’s budget process. 

Although the Secretary of Defense has taken some positive steps to begin 

the transformation of military capabilities and assigned responsibility for 

various components of this effort, DOD has not established clear 

leadership and accountability for achieving transformation results, nor has 

it established a formal mechanism to coordinate and integrate the various 

transformation efforts within the department. As we have reported, key 

practices and implementation steps for a successful transformation 

include leadership that sets the direction of transformation, assigns 

accountability for results, and is supported by crosscutting 

implementation teams, which, in turn, can provide the focused, day-to-day 

management needed for success.16 According to OUSD Policy and Office of 

Force Transformation officials, an informal group consisting of 

representatives from key organizations meets periodically to discuss 

transformation issues. But this group has no official charter designating 

specific responsibilities; it prepares no minutes of its proceedings, and it 

has no directive authority to implement the decisions it makes. Without 

formally designating responsibility and accountability for results, 

sustaining transformation over the long term, choosing among competing 

demands for scarce resources, and resolving differences in priorities 

 15 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council to assist the Chariman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military 

capabilities to meet the national military and defense strategies. Chariman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01B: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

April 15, 2004. 

16 GAO-03-669. 

Overall 

Transformation 

Leadership, 

Accountability, 

and Integrating 

Mechanism Have Not 

Been Established 
Page 16 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

between various DOD organizations may be difficult and could impede 

DOD’s ability to transform in an efficient and timely manner. 

We reported in 2003 that key practices and implementation steps for 

successful transformations include clear leadership and accountability, 

and that a dedicated implementation team should be responsible for the 

transformation’s day-to-day management, which is important to ensuring 

that various initiatives are integrated.17 Such an implementation team, 

vested with the necessary authority, would ensure that transformation 

receives the focused, full-time attention necessary to be sustained and 

effective by establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities, helping 

to reach agreement on work priorities, and keeping efforts coordinated. 

We recently emphasized the importance of these elements in our March 

2004 testimony on DOD’s business transformation efforts before the 

Senate Committee on Armed Services. 18 In that testimony, the Comptroller 

General stated that, given the importance of DOD’s business 

transformation effort, it is imperative that it receives the sustained 

leadership needed to improve DOD’s business operations over a number 

of years and various administrations. Our testimony highlighted that DOD 

has not routinely assigned accountability for performance to specific 

organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish 

goals. While DOD’s leadership has demonstrated the commitment to 

reforming the department, the day-to-day demands placed on the 

Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and others make it difficult for these 

leaders to maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed to resolve 

the weaknesses in DOD’s business operations. The lack of adequate 

transparency and appropriate accountability across all of DOD’s major 

business areas results in billions of dollars in annual wasted resources in a 

time of increasing fiscal constraint. As a result, DOD does not have timely, 

reliable information for management to use in making informed decisions. 

The Comptroller General also stated that one way to ensure sustained 

leadership over DOD’s business transformation efforts would be to create 

a position for a chief operating officer or chief management official who 

would serve as the Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management. 

In some cases, DOD has taken steps to establish clear accountability and 

authority for other significant transformation efforts. For example, DOD 

 17 GAO-03-669. 

18 GAO-04-551T. 

Key Practices for 

Successful Transformation 

Include Clear Leadership, 

Accountability, and 

Crosscutting 

Implementation Team 
Page 17 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

has designated the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness with overall responsibility for training transformation and 

named the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness as Executive 

Agent.19 Supporting the Executive Agent are oversight and implementation 

groups whose members crosscut DOD, that is, the Joint Staff, the military 

services, and representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

that include Program Analysis and Evaluation; Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics; Comptroller; and Policy. The implementation group is 

responsible for providing overall daily management, while the oversight 

groups are to resolve issues, manage funding, and ensure collaboration 

across DOD. 

For efforts related to the transformation of military capabilities, the Joint 

Forces Command has recognized the importance of using crosscutting 

groups and assigning overall responsibility and accountability for results. 

First, the Command developed an Integrated Interoperability Plan that 

recommends a crosscutting governance group be established to implement 

and monitor the achievement of interoperability objectives, which are key 

to transformation. According to the plan, the purpose of the crosscutting 

group would be to provide oversight and coordination of capability 

development, synchronizing all key DOD processes, and ensuring 

“holistic” implementation of the requirements/acquisition process, from 

conception to fielding. The plan recommended that this group be led by a 

senior DOD official and include participation from the Joint Staff, Joint 

Forces Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, 

services, and defense agencies to serve as the senior resolution body for 

capability and interoperability issues cutting across DOD components, and 

to approve joint capability and interoperability measures. According to 

OUSD Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, however, this 

group has not been established because it was believed to be a layer of 

bureaucracy that was not needed. Second, the Joint Roadmap20 prepared 

by the Joint Forces Command concluded that “[f]ailure to successfully 

integrate the emerging ... systems will imperil the transformation of DOD 

military capabilities.” The roadmap recommended that a coordination 

 19 DOD defines “Executive Agent” as the Head of a DOD Component to whom the Secretary 

of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, 

functions and authorities to provide support...for designated activities that involve two or 

more DOD Components. DOD Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, Sec. 3.1, 

September 3, 2002. 

20 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Transformation Roadmap (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 21, 2004). 
Page 18 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

group be established to help identify synergies between activities and to 

direct limited resources where they would be the most beneficial. The 

roadmap also recommended that four DOD organizations work together to 

ensure that science and technology efforts will be linked to developing the 

new joint concepts. The Joint Forces Command official we spoke with 

indicated that they were unaware of any actions taken to respond to these 

recommendations. 

As table 1 shows, there are many DOD organizations tasked with specific 

responsibilities for implementing parts of the transformation strategy, but 

none of these organizations have been given the leadership responsibilities 

or the overarching authority and accountability for achieving 

transformation results. According to Office of Force Transformation and 

OUSD Policy officials, the Secretary of Defense is ultimately responsible 

and accountable for all DOD activities, and therefore is inherently 

responsible and accountable for the successful transformation of military 

capabilities. We believe that while DOD leadership has demonstrated the 

commitment to transforming military capabilities, as previously stated, the 

day-to-day demands placed on the Secretary make it difficult for him to 

personally maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed to 

sustain transformation efforts. 

Clear Leadership and 

Accountability for 

Transformation of Military 

Capabilities Have Not 

Been Established 
Page 19 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices 

Organization Responsibilities 

Secretary of Defense Sets transformation policies and objectives 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Oversees joint concept development and 

validates joint requirements 

Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Policy 

Prepares Transformation Planning

Guidance and other defense guidance 

Office of Force Transformation Monitors and evaluates implementation of 

the transformation strategy; advises the 

Secretary of Defense; assesses the 

roadmaps during the strategic appraisal 

process 

Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Program Analysis and Evaluation 

Analyzes service budgets to see that 

initiatives in transformation roadmaps are 

funded in budget requests 

Joint Forces Command (and other 

combatant commands) 

Conduct joint concept development and 

experimentation 

Military services Build plans (called roadmaps) and budgets 

to achieve transformational capabilities 

needed to implement the joint concepts 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD guidance. 

Two organizations (Office of Force Transformation and the Joint Forces 

Command) have central roles in the transformation strategy but no 

overarching authority or accountability for achieving transformation 

results. First, the Director, Office of Force Transformation, is to advise the 

Secretary of Defense, monitor and evaluate the transformation strategy, 

and assess the roadmaps during the strategic appraisal process. The 

Director does not have the overall authority, responsibility, and 

accountability for implementing DOD’s transformation strategy. In fact, 

the Director testified before Congress that he “is a catalyst for” and 

“encourages” but does not “direct” transformation.21 Although the Office of 

Force Transformation was created in November 2001, its charter, as of 

September 2004, had not been approved. Second, as previously discussed, 

the Joint Forces Command is responsible for annually preparing the joint 

roadmap. However, Joint Forces Command officials told us the Command 

does not have the overall authority and responsibility to implement the 

 21 Hearings on Defense Transformation Before the House Committee on Armed Services: 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 108th Cong. 5,33 

(2004) (statement of Arthur Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense). 
Page 20 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

roadmap because the Command does not have the authority to direct the 

services’ and defense agencies’ programs described in the roadmap. 

According to OUSD Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, 

DOD established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally 

to discuss transformation issues. But, according to these officials, it has no 

charter designating specific responsibilities for achieving transformation 

goals, assessing transformation performance measures, or linking 

resources to goals. In addition, the group has no specified authority to 

direct changes across various DOD offices, and no minutes are kept of its 

meetings. Therefore, we were unable to determine what specific topics 

were discussed by the group, or the frequency, nature, or results of its 

efforts. Participants in this group are invited as needed, but the group 

generally includes representatives from the Office of Force 

Transformation and others from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Policy; Program Analysis and Evaluation; Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics; and Office of Net Assessment), the Joint Staff (Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment Directorate), and the Joint Forces Command. 

Concerns have been raised in several forums about the lack of adequate 

authority to coordinate transformation efforts. For example, the House 

Committee on Armed Services report on the National Defense 

Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 stated that while the services have 

embraced transformation as an objective, the committee remained 

concerned that each military service has embarked on its own 

transformational campaign without an enforceable, integrated joint 

roadmap to ensure that service plans are mutually supportive and overlap 

where necessary.22 For example, in discussing a proposed joint program 

office to improve interoperability among systems, the report notes that the 

services and the defense agencies acquire systems to meet their own 

requirements, not necessarily joint concepts.23

 22 H.R. Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.355 (2004). 

23 H.R. Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.302 (2004). 

Formal Implementation 

Team Has Not Been 

Established to Integrate 

Transformation Efforts 

Lack of Coordinating 

Authority Can Hinder 

Development of Joint 

Capabilities 
Page 21 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

In addition, a June 2004 DOD Inspector General report24 recommended 

that DOD formalize roles, responsibilities, and processes for the overall 

development, coordination, and oversight of DOD network-centric warfare 

efforts.25 The report found that the lack of formalized roles and 

responsibilities resulted in confusion on who had decision-making 

authority. Further, the report states that the absence of formalized roles 

and processes for the overall development, coordination, and oversight of 

network-centric warfare efforts does not ensure that ongoing or planned 

initiatives are properly focused and complement each other. According to 

the report, DOD management agreed with the need for leadership 

improvements. 

Likewise, we have issued several reports dealing with the challenges DOD 

faces in fielding joint capabilities: 

• We reported in July 2004 that no single office is in charge of the Global 

Information Grid (a key transformation initiative intended to be the 

foundation for implementing all joint concepts), making it more 

difficult to make and enforce trade-off decisions. 26 Previous DOD 

efforts to foster interoperability have had limited success because 

management tools and leadership attention were not strong enough to 

provide sufficient oversight and overcome resistance by the military 

services to forgo their unique requirements in favor of requirements 

that would benefit DOD. 

• We reported in June 2004 that one of the key factors undermining 

DOD’s progress in implementing its capabilities-based strategy is the 

lack of standardized, interoperable equipment and systems in joint 

operations. 27 The report noted that although DOD recognizes improved 

interoperability is central to transformation, resolving this problem is 

difficult because military acquisition has traditionally focused on 

 24 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Joint Warfighting and 

Readiness: Management of Network Centric Warfare Within the Department of Defense, 

D-2004-091 (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004). 

25 Network-centric warfare is collaborative information sharing linking sensors, decision 

makers, and shooters, which is intended to result in increased mission effectiveness. 

26 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing Its 

Implementation, GAO-04-858 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2004). 

27 GAO, Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved 

Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain, 

GAO-04-547 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004). 
Page 22 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

service-specific platforms, not joint operations with interoperable 

equipment. 

• In a March 2004 report, we recommended that DOD establish an 

appropriate organization to implement a strategic plan for unmanned 

aerial vehicles, ensuring that sufficient authority is provided to enforce 

the plan’s direction, promote joint operations, and expend funds 

efficiently. 28

• We reported in December 2002 that the military services and the 

defense agencies have been reluctant to fund acquisition of advanced 

concept technology-proven technologies, especially those focusing on 

joint requirements, because of their competing priorities.29

Likewise, a Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004 study 

stated that DOD continues to struggle with insufficient jointness.30

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom underscore 

interoperability shortcomings in equipment fielded by the services. 

Managing resources along service lines has not achieved real 

interoperability in joint command and control. The study team believes 

that true interoperability in joint command and control will not be 

achieved until it is bought jointly. 

A 2003 study chartered by the Secretary of Defense stated that current 

processes do not optimize investment in joint capabilities to meet current 

and future security challenges because the services and the defense 

agencies define their needs at the component level and joint needs are 

forced into the process after each service has developed its program.31 The 

report further states that improving interoperability is key, which requires 

greater coordination at the department level. 

 28 GAO, Force Structure: Enhanced Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s UAV Efforts,

GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004). 

29 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstrations, GAO-03-52 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2002). 

30 C.A. Murdock et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic 

Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Mar. 2004). 

31 Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Final Report 

(Washington, D.C.: December, 2003). 
Page 23 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

DOD officials stated that they believe that the Director, Office of Force 

Transformation, has the authority he needs to be effective. The Director 

can persuade others to take action and influence defense guidance using 

results of the strategic appraisal. These officials stated that the only 

benefit to having directive authority is some things may happen faster than 

they would without this authority. DOD officials also stated that DOD has 

not formally established a crosscutting group responsible for 

implementing the transformation strategy because, in their opinion, setting 

up a bureaucratic layer to administer DOD’s transformation strategy is not 

needed. 

This reasoning, however, is contradictory to the advice and experiences of 

other organizations involved in major transformation efforts that 

considered clearly defined accountability and crosscutting implementation 

teams essential for successful transformations. It is also inconsistent with 

the approach taken by DOD in other cases. Without formally designating 

responsibility and accountability for results, choosing among competing 

demands for scarce resources and resolving differences in priorities 

between various DOD organizations may be difficult and could impede 

DOD’s ability to transform in an efficient manner. In addition, it may be 

particularly difficult for DOD to sustain transformation progress when key 

personnel changes occur. As we discussed these points and the results of 

our analysis with DOD officials, they recognized that leadership and 

accountability for transformation results may not be clearly identified and 

DOD is considering what, if any, actions need to be taken to address this 

issue. 

DOD has not fully developed critical components of a management 

framework to guide and monitor the results of its transformation efforts. 

DOD has made progress in adopting some tools—specifically, establishing 

a transformation strategy based on joint concepts, using mechanisms to 

identify and mitigate external factors, and initiating a process for 

reviewing roadmaps. However, it has not (1) revised its 2001 

transformation goals to reflect the new joint concepts, (2) established 

performance goals and performance measures, (3) fully identified 

resources needed to achieve its goals, and (4) established a process to 

assess progress in achieving long-term and performance goals. Without 

fully utilizing these tools, it is difficult for DOD to determine the extent to 

which its transformation efforts are achieving the desired results, measure 

its overall progress, or provide transparency for how billions of dollars 

programmed for transformation are being applied. 

Approach to 

Transform Military 

Capabilities Lacks 

Important 

Management Tools 
Page 24 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Studies by several organizations, including us, have shown that successful 

organizations in both the public and private sectors use results-oriented 

management tools to help achieve desired program outcomes. These tools, 

or principles, embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act 

of 1993, provide agencies with a management framework for effectively 

implementing and managing programs and shift program management 

focus from measuring program activities and processes to measuring 

program outcomes. The framework can include various management 

tools, such as long-term goals, performance goals, and performance 

measures, which can assist agencies in measuring performance and 

reporting results. Table 2 lists the results-oriented management framework 

tools we used in our analysis. 

Table 2: Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis 

Long-term goals Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes 

and when to expect such results 

Strategies to be used General methods the agency plans to use to accomplish 

long-term goals 

External factors Factors beyond the agency’s control that could affect the 

agency’s ability to achieve desired results 

Performance goals Derived from long-term goals, should establish intended 

performance and focus on results required 

Performance measures Specific means of gauging performance 

Resources Identification of the resources needed to achieve each goal 

Evaluation plan An objective and formal assessment of results 

 Source: GAO guidelines. 

These management tools can provide DOD and Congress ways to measure 

progress and determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired 

results. The following is our assessment of the extent to which DOD is 

using these tools in implementing its strategy for transforming military 

capabilities: 

• Long-term goals: Long-term goals should identify expected results, 

should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way that 

allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. DOD initially 

established six long-term goals for transformation in the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review, and it subsequently articulated 

transformation goals in other department documents (see table 3). 

According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy 

officials, the differences in these goals reflect evolution in DOD’s vision 

for transformation outcomes. For example, some goals expressed in 
Page 25 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

the 2004 National Military Strategy are not reflected in the 2003 

Transformation Planning Guidance. Further, these goals have not 

been updated to reflect the joint concepts emerging from current 

transformation efforts. An Office of Force Transformation official said 

that DOD’s initial goals were a good start, but they do not cover the full 

range of military operations that the joint concepts will cover. Although 

the official agreed that these goals would and should change, DOD has 

not begun a process to revise them. 

Table 3: DOD Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense Guidance Documents 

Protect critical bases of operations

Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant 

anti-access or area-denial environments and 

defeat anti-access threats

Deny enemies sanctuary through persistent 

surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement 

with high-volume precision strikes

Operate from the commons: space, international 

waters and airspace, and cyberspace

Strengthen intelligence

Conduct network-centric operations

Improve proficiency for irregular warfare

Increase capabilities of partners-international

and domestic

Assure information systems in the face of attack 

and conducting effective and discriminate 

offensive information operations

Enhance the capability and survivability of 

space systems and supporting infrastructure

Leverage information technology and innovative

concepts to develop an interoperable, joint

communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture 

and capability that includes a tailorable joint 

operational picture

2001 Quadrennial Defense

Review and 2003 Transformation

Planning Guidance

2004 National

Military Strategy

Defense Guidance

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
Page 26 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

• Strategy: A strategy should describe the general methods an agency 

plans to use to accomplish long-term goals. As we described in the 

previous section of this report, DOD has made significant progress in 

developing its strategy to transform military capabilities. The strategy 

is linked to the overall defense guidance and is based on joint concepts, 

and many of the strategy’s components have been initiated. The 

strategy is also flexible and adaptable to new concepts as they are 

developed through experimentation. 

• External factors: Agencies should identify factors beyond their 

control that could affect their ability to achieve desired results and 

develop mitigation plans to address these factors. According to OUSD 

Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, DOD does have 

mechanisms for examining and mitigating factors beyond its control 

that could affect the achievement of desired results. One of these 

mechanisms is the strategic appraisal process discussed earlier in this 

report. Another is DOD’s Risk Management Framework, developed to 

ensure that current defense needs are balanced against future 

requirements and consider trade-offs among four risk areas—force 

management, operational, institutional, and future challenges (that is, 

transformation). According to Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, if resource needs in one risk 

area increase, then resources available for other areas may decrease. 

For example, if demands for current operations increase, then fewer 

resources may be available for transformation. 

• Performance goals: Performance goals should establish intended 

performance, should be results-oriented, and should be linked to longterm goals. Since the joint roadmap is DOD’s implementation plan for 

joint military capabilities, we looked for performance goals in the 2003 

joint roadmap. In some parts of the roadmap, goals are not included at 

all; in others, goals are unclear, and references are made to goals 

presented in other documents. For example, the roadmap includes 

several sets of goals for joint intelligence and refers to other goals in 

DOD’s Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capstone 

Strategic Plan. As a result, it is not clear whether or how these goals 

support each other, how they relate to the joint concepts, or how the 

various programs described in this section of the roadmap will support 

achievement of these goals. Clearly articulated, results-oriented 

performance goals would help DOD explain how the myriad of 

programs described in the roadmap will result in the improved joint 

capabilities necessary to implement each joint concept. 
Page 27 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

• Performance measures: Performance measures are the specific 

means of gauging performance and should include a baseline and 

target; should be objective, measurable, and quantifiable, and should 

include a time frame. DOD has not developed performance measures to 

assess progress in the following three areas: implementation of the 

transformation strategy across DOD; achievement of joint capabilities 

through the programs described in the joint roadmap; and assessment 

of the contribution of experimentation to transformation. 

First, DOD has not developed measures to assess transformation progress 

across DOD. DOD reports departmentwide performance measures in its 

Annual Defense Report, and defense guidance states that DOD must 

develop performance measures based on joint capabilities. The Program 

Analysis and Evaluation Office has begun developing performance 

measures for DOD’s balanced scorecard, which will be included in future 

Annual Defense Reports. DOD officials stated that, as part of this effort, 

they plan to develop measures to assess the progress of transformation 

DOD-wide. But to date, no such measures have been developed. Further, 

the few transformation measures included in the 2003 Annual Defense 

Report are process rather than results-oriented. For example, the 

measures for “experiment[ing] with new warfare concepts” are processoriented, such as providing a briefing and drafting an experimentation 

plan. 

Second, DOD has not developed measures to assess the achievement of 

joint capabilities through the programs described in the 2003 joint 

roadmap. The TPG requires the roadmaps to include performance 

measures to address the joint concepts, but the joint roadmap does not 

include performance measures and does not describe any ongoing efforts 

to develop them. Joint Forces Command officials stated that performance 

measures were not developed because the joint concepts were not drafted 

at the time the roadmap was prepared and that they do not expect to 

include performance measures until the July 2005 joint roadmap, at the 

earliest. 

Third, DOD has not developed measures to assess the contribution of 

experimentation to transformation. In 2002, we recommended that the 

Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, develop strategic planning tools 

to use in managing and periodically assessing the progress of joint 
Page 28 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

experimentation.32 At that time, a Joint Forces Command official stated 

that the Command was developing such measures. DOD agreed with this 

recommendation and stated that subsequent guidance would address this 

issue. Although the Joint Forces Command has drafted measures to assess 

the contribution of experimentation to transformation, as of September 

2004 it had not approved or implemented these measures. 

• Resources: Agencies should identify the resources needed to achieve 

each goal and should provide a rationale for how these resources will 

contribute to achieving the expected level of performance. The TPG 

also requires the roadmaps to include the funding necessary to develop 

the desired capabilities. However, we found that DOD has not clearly 

linked resources—either throughout the department or in the joint 

roadmap—with the development of capabilities needed to implement 

the joint concepts. 

For example, the 2003 Annual Defense Report stated that DOD is 

committed to making budget documents more transparent by clearly 

aligning dollars to specific programs so that senior-level decision 

makers can see directly how they support the defense strategy. This 

report showed $263 billion (for fiscal years 2004-2009) for 

transformation; however, it is difficult to independently verify how 

much DOD plans to spend on transformation—we reported in May 

2004 that DOD’s Future Years Defense Program does not clearly 

identify those programs DOD considers transformational. Further, the 

Annual Defense Report did not fully reflect all the programs planned to 

develop the capabilities needed for each joint concept. Likewise, the 

joint roadmap did not provide a complete description of the programs 

and resources needed to develop the desired capabilities. For example, 

the roadmap states that the Global Information Grid will require 

changes in doctrine, organizational processes, cultures, and behaviors, 

but it does not explain what changes are needed or the funding 

required for these changes. 

• Evaluation and corrective action plan: An evaluation plan is an 

objective and formal assessment of the results of a major effort; a 

corrective action plan should describe how evaluation findings will be 

used to improve performance or revise unmet goals. As previously 

discussed, the strategic appraisal process is designed to provide DOD 

 32 GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD’s Joint 

Experimentation Program, GAO-02-856 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 2002). 
Page 29 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

with a mechanism for evaluating its transformation efforts and 

identifying corrective actions. It calls for the use of evaluation findings 

to improve performance and identify or implement needed actions. 

According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy 

officials, any shortfalls identified during the appraisal are corrected in 

one of two ways—either by incorporating required actions into 

directive defense guidance issued by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense or by providing informal guidance to the Joint Forces 

Command and the services regarding issues to be addressed in the next 

roadmap iterations. In fiscal year 2004, the first year a strategic 

appraisal was conducted, DOD reviewed each roadmap prepared by 

the military departments and the Joint Forces Command to determine 

if any significant gaps existed in the capabilities being acquired. The 

assessment did not evaluate the progress achieved in acquiring the 

capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts because the 

concepts were still undefined and under development. In lieu of the 

joint concepts, the first strategic appraisal used lessons learned from 

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Secretary of Defense’s Top Ten 

priorities as criteria to identify these capability gaps. In reviewing 

information on the strategic appraisal’s results, it was not clear what 

measures were used in evaluating how well the roadmaps were 

addressing these gaps. The strategic appraisal could attain more 

definitive results and more clearly identify actions that need to be 

taken if future assessments are based on clearly articulated goals and 

measures founded on the joint concepts. 

When we discussed the weaknesses in the current framework guiding the 

transformation effort, DOD officials explained that DOD’s transformation 

strategy is new and that many parts are being developed simultaneously 

and continuously evolving. For example, the transformation strategy calls 

for the joint roadmap to be based on the joint concepts, but both are being 

developed at the same time. As the concepts mature, DOD officials expect 

future versions of the roadmaps will explain in more detail how 

capabilities will be developed to implement the concepts. DOD officials 

also stated that the annual strategic appraisal is designed to identify 

capability gaps that future roadmaps or defense guidance will address. In 

their view, this process is equivalent to setting goals and measures. 

Regarding directly linking resource requirements to long-term and 

performance goals, the officials stated that the department allocates 

resources in its budget process and did not address how these resources 

link to long-term or performance goals. 

Although we agree that the concurrent nature of the transformation 

strategy has required many components to be developed simultaneously, 
Page 30 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

we do not believe that this precludes the development of results-oriented 

management tools that can help the department manage this effort and 

achieve the desired results. For example, DOD has made progress in 

developing the joint concepts, and although they all are not fully 

developed, they can still provide a basis for establishing long-term goals, 

performance goals, and performance measures. As the concepts mature 

through experimentation, DOD can periodically revise the management 

tools to reflect these changes, possibly as part of the annual strategic 

appraisal process. Without taking the steps to establish clear and 

consistent long-term goals that are grounded in the joint concepts, the 

department’s transformation efforts may not fully support the desired 

outcomes. Likewise, the absence of performance goals and performance 

measures limits the department’s ability to measure progress toward 

achieving its goals. Finally, without a clear link between resource 

requirements and transformation goals, it is unclear what resources will be 

required to achieve transformation, when the funds will be required, or 

how billions of dollars programmed for transformation are being applied. 

The complexity, magnitude, and importance of transforming military 

capabilities demand that an effective, results-oriented management 

framework be established to guide DOD-wide transformation efforts and 

monitor the billions of dollars that will be invested to achieve 

transformation goals. This framework should include clear leadership and 

accountability for achieving results, as well as management tools to guide 

activities and measure outcomes. As discussed in this report, DOD has 

taken significant, positive steps toward establishing this framework. The 

Secretary of Defense has provided a transformation vision and instituted 

some important elements of a results-oriented management framework. 

For example, the overall strategy provides flexibility to adapt to new joint 

operating concepts. Also, planned annual updates to each service’s 

roadmap are intended to detail how new capabilities may be acquired, and 

the annual strategic appraisal is a mechanism to primarily assess the 

transformation plans in the roadmaps. These positive steps were taken in a 

relatively short period of time and they reflect the dedication of 

department personnel to transform military capabilities and achieve the 

vision set by the Secretary of Defense. 

These steps also establish a foundation for DOD to take additional actions 

that can enhance its transformation strategy and develop a more 

comprehensive, results-oriented framework to guide its efforts and 

achieve intended results. Specifically, the overall accountability and 

authority for achieving transformation goals are unclear, and the existing 

Conclusions 
Page 31 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

working group created to help integrate the multitude of transformation 

efforts underway is informal, having no official charter and no directive 

authority, and meets on an irregular basis. These weaknesses can limit 

DOD’s ability to promote an integrated approach to transformation, 

choose between competing priorities, and institutionalize a transformation 

process that will endure over time. In addition, the lack of a 

comprehensive set of results-oriented management tools that reflect the 

joint concepts under development limits DOD’s ability to manage this 

complex process with a focus on results and clouds the visibility over the 

significant resources that have been expended and will be required to 

transform military capabilities. These factors may ultimately impede 

progress toward achieving the overarching transformation goal—

maintaining the preeminence of U.S. military capabilities and the ability of 

U.S. forces to defeat all future threats—and the department may have 

difficulty in garnering congressional support for transformation efforts 

unless it adopts a stronger and more result-oriented management 

approach. 

To clarify the accountability for achieving the transformation of military 

capabilities and to establish a mechanism to integrate the transformation 

efforts using results-oriented management tools, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: 

• Assign clear leadership and accountability for achieving the 

transformation of military capabilities. 

• Establish a formal crosscutting transformation group, assign it with the 

responsibility for overseeing and integrating DOD’s strategy, provide it 

with the necessary authority to perform their responsibilities 

effectively, and hold it accountable for results. The group should: 

• Include representatives from the key offices deemed necessary for 

successful implementation. 

• Have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. 

• Articulate and periodically revise long-term goals for the 

transformation of military capabilities that reflect the joint 

concepts. These long-term goals should identify what 

transformation results are to be expected and when to expect 

these results. 

• Clearly identify the resources that DOD estimates it will need to 

achieve each long-term goal. 

• Use the goals and measures as a foundation for the annual 

assessment of transformation progress. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 32 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

• Prepare an annual report to Congress on the progress in achieving 

transformation goals, including actions taken and outcomes 

achieved, resources expended and programmed, measures used to 

assess progress achieved, and actions planned to meet or revise 

unmet goals. 

To further develop results-oriented management tools that can guide 

DOD’s transformation of joint military capabilities, measure progress, and 

determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired results, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following action: 

• direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to direct the Commander, 

Joint Forces Command, to include in future updates to the Joint 

Transformation Roadmap: 

• a discussion of how the capabilities being developed will link with 

and support accomplishment of the long-term goals; 

• results-oriented performance goals linked to long-term goals, which 

also reflect the joint concepts and gaps in current capabilities, that 

establish intended performance, focus on outcomes or results 

expected or required, and establish target dates for the achievement 

of these results; 

• performance measures based on the performance goals to assess 

progress; and 

• resources required (for nonmateriel as well as materiel efforts) to 

obtain capabilities for each joint concept and linkage of resources 

with each performance goal. 

We requested DOD to provide written comments on a draft of this report. 

However, DOD’s Office of Force Transformation provided oral comments. 

In official oral comments, DOD officials generally disagreed with our 

recommendations. First, pertaining to our recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense assign clear leadership and accountability for 

achieving the transformation of military capabilities, DOD stated that the 

Secretary of Defense already provides clear leadership for transformation 

within DOD, the services play a key role in implementing the Secretary’s 

priorities, and their roles and responsibilities are clearly delineated in the 

Transformation Planning Guidance. DOD also stated that the 

transformation roadmaps and the strategic appraisal process are used to 

assess transformation progress and inform the Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Execution system. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 33 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

We agree that the Secretary of Defense has provided overall leadership 

and a vision for the transformation of military capabilities, and have 

highlighted this in our report, but as we also point out, the day-to-day 

demands placed on the Secretary make it difficult for him to personally 

maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed to sustain 

transformation efforts. In addition, currently no individual has clear 

accountability, such as the Deputy Secretary or another senior official, to 

achieve transformation results, and the strategic appraisal process has not 

provided an overall evaluation of the progress achieved in acquiring 

transformational capabilities. Rather, the appraisal process has primarily 

focused on identifying potential gaps in the capabilities being acquired by 

each service. Accordingly, we still believe the recommendation to assign 

clear leadership and accountability for transformation results is a critical 

step needed to achieve the transformation of military capabilities. 

Second, in commenting on our recommendation to establish a formal 

crosscutting transformation group, assign it the responsibility for 

overseeing and integrating DOD’s strategy, and hold it accountable for 

results, DOD stated that this recommendation would result in a parallel 

and overlapping structure that would compete with the Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system. DOD also stated that our 

recommended crosscutting group would represent another bureaucratic 

layer and lines of authority would not become clearer, but would rather 

compete for preeminence within DOD. In regard to our recommendation 

that this group also prepare an annual report to Congress on the progress 

made in achieving transformation goals, DOD pointed out that DOD’s 

Annual Defense Report includes the current progress of transformation. 

We disagree that the establishment of a formal crosscutting group would 

compete with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

system, or that it would confuse the lines of authority. Therefore, we 

believe our recommendation is still warranted. As highlighted in this 

report, DOD has chosen to appoint crosscutting implementation teams for 

other transformation efforts, the Joint Forces Command has recognized 

the need to better coordinate and integrate transformation efforts, and the 

advice and experience of other organizations in other government 

agencies and in the private sector argue that crosscutting integration 

teams are essential for successful transformation efforts. Moreover, in the 

absence of such a group, DOD has no routine vehicle for maintaining a 

continued focus on transformation goals set by the Secretary, nor a 

mechanism for resolving implementation issues that may arise. With 

regard to the Annual Defense Report serving as a vehicle to report on the 

results of transformation efforts, while we recognize that DOD has begun 
Page 34 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

to develop transformation performance measures that are intended to be 

included in future Annual Defense Reports, to date, these measures have 

not been fully developed, and the few measures included in the 2003 

Annual Defense Report are process, rather than results-oriented. 

Therefore, we continue to believe that an additional reporting mechanism 

that describes the resources devoted to transformation efforts and 

outcomes achieved is needed. Such a reporting mechanism could help 

Congress determine whether the billions of dollars being applied to 

transform military capabilities are providing an adequate return on 

investment in light of the significant long-term affordability challenges that 

DOD faces. 

Third, in commenting on our recommendation that future updates to the 

Joint Transformation Roadmap include specific results-oriented tools, 

DOD stated that a combination of the existing strategic appraisal process, 

joint concepts, service transformation roadmaps, Joint Transformation 

Roadmap, and service, combatant command, Joint Staff, and Office of the 

Secretary of Defense inputs to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution system provide the results-oriented management tools we 

recommended. We disagree with DOD’s comments on this point, because, 

as we discuss in this report, even when viewed collectively, these separate 

elements still lack clearly defined goals linked to the joint concepts, 

specific resource requirements to meet the goals, and performance 

measures to evaluate the outcomes of the initiatives. Moreover, DOD’s 

comments did not specifically address the need for improvements to the 

Joint Transformation Roadmap. We continue to believe our 

recommendation is needed because of the deficiencies in the joint 

roadmap we discuss in this report, which were also recognized by DOD 

officials as we conducted our review. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Office of 

Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), and the 

Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 35 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4402 or my Assistant Director, Robert L. Repasky, 

at (202) 512-9868. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Janet St. Laurent, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 36 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

To describe the Department of Defense’s (DOD) strategy to transform 

joint military capabilities, we reviewed the April 2003 Transformation 

Planning Guidance and discussed the tasks and time frames it established 

with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

(OUSD Policy), the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint Staff, and the 

Joint Forces Command. To describe the concept development process, we 

reviewed the July 2004 Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan

and discussed the process with Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command 

officials with responsibilities in that process. To determine how the joint 

experimentation process fits into the strategy, we reviewed the January 

2004 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan

and discussed its relationship to transformation with officials from the 

Office of Force Transformation, OUSD Policy, the Joint Forces Command, 

and the Joint Staff. We discussed the role of the joint and service 

transformation roadmaps in the transformation strategy with officials from 

the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command, and the Office of Force 

Transformation. We documented the strategic appraisal process and 

discussed it with officials from OUSD Policy and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and 

the Office of Force Transformation. To determine how the transformation 

strategy links to the acquisition process, we reviewed relevant DOD 

instructions governing these processes and discussed them with officials 

from the Office of Force Transformation, OUSD Policy, the Joint Staff, and 

the Joint Forces Command. 

To assess the extent to which DOD has clearly established leadership, 

accountability for achieving transformation results, and a mechanism to 

integrate transformation efforts, we examined DOD instructions governing 

the roles and responsibilities of the various defense organizations outlined 

in the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) and assessed 

whether the TPG clearly designated responsibility for implementing the 

transformation strategy or merely parts of the strategy. We also gathered 

and reviewed relevant policy guidance, instructions, and documents 

related to the transformation strategy, including the 2003 Joint 

Transformation Roadmap issued in January 2004, the July 2004 Joint 

Concept Development Revision Plan, the draft directive for the Director of 

Force Transformation, and the January 2004 Joint Concept Development 

and Experimentation Campaign Plan. We identified how DOD has 

implemented similar large, crosscutting efforts such as training 

transformation and studied DOD reports that recognized the importance 

of clearly designating an entity responsible and accountable for 

transformation efforts and that recommended that crosscutting groups be 

established to successfully implement these efforts. We also reviewed 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 37 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

various reports that raised concerns about the lack of adequate authority 

to coordinate programs DOD-wide issued by the House Committee on 

Armed Services, us, DOD, and the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. Next, we compared this information to selected key practices 

consistently found to be at the center of successful mergers and 

organizational transformations. These selected key practices were 

ensuring that top leadership drives the transformation and dedicating an 

implementation team to manage the transformation process. We discussed 

the results, with officials from OUSD Policy, the Office of Force 

Transformation, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Command 

responsible for implementing parts of the strategy. 

To assess the extent to which DOD is using results-oriented management 

tools in implementing its transformation strategy, we compared these 

tools with the management principles embodied in the Government 

Results and Performance Act of 1993 and further refined in the act’s user 

guides and our prior reports. After assessing the management tools and 

reviewing our related guidelines, we discussed with DOD officials the 

management tools that were relevant to the transformation strategy. To 

assess whether DOD was using each management tool, we used relevant 

questions derived from our guidelines in analyzing pertinent documents 

such as the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, the 2003 

Joint Transformation Roadmap issued in January 2004, and the January 

2004 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan. 

We did not assess the extent to which each service’s roadmap 

incorporated these management tools. We also discussed our results with 

appropriate DOD officials including the Office of Force Transformation, 

Joint Forces Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director for 

Program, Analysis and Evaluation, and OUSD Policy. Finally, to identify 

DOD estimates for transformation costs DOD-wide and costs for the joint 

capabilities described in the 2003 Joint Transformation Roadmap, we 

obtained cost estimates from official DOD reports. We assessed the 

reliability of the data by corroborating the data with knowledgeable 

agency officials and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. 

Organizations Visited for this Assignment: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

• Office of Force Transformation 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 38 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics 

• Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

• Joint Transformation Division, Operational Plans and Joint Force 

Development, J-7 

• Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8 

Joint Forces Command 

• Joint Experimentation Directorate, J-9 

• Joint Requirements and Integration and Division, J-8 

• Office of Prototype Oversight, Joint Training Directorate and 

Joint Warfighting Center, J-7 

• Strategy and Analysis Directorate, J-5 

We conducted our review from May 2003 through October 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 39 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868 

In addition to those named above, Brenda Waterfield, John Beauchamp, 

Dawn Godfrey, Mary Jo LaCasse, Sarah E. Veale, Elizabeth H. Curda, 

Cheryl A. Weissman, and David A. Mayfield made key contributions to this 

report. 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 40 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid 

Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: 

March 10, 2004. 

Military Transformation: Fielding of Army’s Stryker Vehicles Is Well 

Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 

Aircraft Need to Be Clarified. GAO-04-925. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 

2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges 

Facing Its Implementation. GAO-04-858. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2004. 

Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved 

Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress 

Remain. GAO-04-547. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004. 

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve 

Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. 

Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004. 

Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and 

Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business 

Management Transformation. GAO-04-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 

2004. 

Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 

17, 2004. 

Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative 

Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues 

Remain for Future Brigades. GAO-04-188. Washington, D.C.: December 

12, 2003. 

Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 

2003. 

Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for 

Army Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Defense. GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products 

Page 41 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 

Perspective. GAO-03-95. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain 

Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning. GAO-03-237. 

Washington, D.C.: December 5, 2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstrations. GAO-03-52. Washington, D.C.: December 2, 

2002. 

Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Can Benefit from Better 

Analysis and Changes in Timing and Scope. GAO-03-13. Washington, 

D.C.: November 4, 2002. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD’s Joint 

Experimentation Program. GAO-02-856. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 

2002. 

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation 

of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2002. 

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for 

Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. 

Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2001. 

Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and 

Focused. GAO-01-853. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001. 

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems 

Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001. 

The Results Act: An Evaluator’s Guide to Assessing Agency Annual 

Performance Plans. GAO/GGD-10.1.20. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1998. 

Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate 

Congressional Review (Version 1). GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, D.C.: 

May 1, 1997. 

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