NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

File Name: 18a0216n.06 

No. 17-5636 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

TERRY FARRIS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 

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BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, GIBBONS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges. 

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Terry Farris on seven 

counts relating to his involvement in a series of five robberies in Memphis, Tennessee, in 

January 2016. He timely appeals, raising three challenges: (1) that the government failed to 

present sufficient evidence regarding his use of a firearm during the robberies; (2) that the 

district court erred in excluding the Department of Justice (DOJ) reports he proffered, and 

(3) that the district court erred in refusing to hold attorney-conducted voir dire. Because there 

was sufficient evidence and the district court did not commit reversible error, we affirm.

I. 

 In January 2016, Farris committed a series of armed robberies in Memphis, Tennessee. 

Together with Eugene Cox and Squantavia Patterson, Farris first robbed a Shoney’s restaurant 

and then a Circle K convenience store on January 13 and 14. That second day, Farris, on his 
No. 17-5636, United States v. Farris 

2 

own, also robbed a Krystal’s restaurant and a Family Dollar store. Then two days later, Farris 

robbed a Church’s Chicken restaurant. 

Farris, Cox, and Patterson were all indicted on August 25, 2016. Counts 1 and 2 charged 

all three defendants with aiding and abetting the Shoney’s and Circle K robberies, respectively, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951. Counts 7, 8, and 10 charged Farris with the Krystal’s, 

Family Dollar, and Church’s Chicken robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Counts 3 and 9 charged 

Farris with using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the Circle K and 

Family Dollar robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

Cox and Patterson both pled guilty, and Farris proceeded to trial alone. On January 31, 

2017, Farris filed a motion for attorney-conducted voir dir which the district court denied. At 

trial, five witnesses testified that they identified Farris as the perpetrator in a photographic line 

up. Additionally, co-defendant Patterson testified that the firearm used during the Shoney’s and 

Circle K robberies, a black 9mm handgun, belonged to him and that Farris had carried the gun in 

the Shoney’s robbery. Corroborating this testimony, the manager at the Shoney’s restaurant 

testified that during the robbery, Farris gestured in a way that indicated that he possessed a gun. 

Testimony also revealed that the 9mm handgun was involved in the Circle K robbery where 

Farris acted as the lookout. The cashier at the Circle K convenience store testified that Cox 

pointed a gun at him during the robbery. Similarly, testimony from employees at the robbed 

Family Dollar, Krystal’s, and Church’s Chicken locations, all indicated that Farris had shown 

them the gun during each respective robbery. Patterson corroborated this testimony by testifying 

that after their joint robberies, Farris took the gun with him. 
No. 17-5636, United States v. Farris 

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For his defense, Farris sought to introduce two reports from the United States Department 

of Justice concerning eyewitness identification. But the district court excluded both, concluding 

that even if the documents met the hearsay exception under Rule 803(8), their prejudicial effect 

substantially outweighed their probative value. 

The jury convicted Farris on all seven applicable counts and the district court imposed a 

sentence of 484 months’ imprisonment and a special assessment of $700. 

II. 

A. 

Farris first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his firearm convictions. The 

standard of review for a claim of insufficient evidence is “whether, taking the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, 1100 

(6th Cir. 1996). 

Farris argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence showing that the 

referenced 9mm qualified as a “firearm” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) because the gun was 

neither admitted into evidence nor examined by an ATF expert. Although § 924(c) requires that 

the gun used be real, this circuit has held that “lay opinion testimony can be sufficient” proof. 

United States v. Willis, 232 F. App’x 527, 537 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 

Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2006)). See also United States v. Crowe, 291 F.3d 884, 887 

(6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he mere possibility that the object seen by witnesses may have been a 

sophisticated toy or other facsimile does not necessarily create a reasonable doubt, nor is the 

government required to disprove that theoretical possibility”) (quoting United States v. Jones, 

16 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1994)). In fact, in Willis, this circuit affirmed a conviction under 
No. 17-5636, United States v. Farris 

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§ 924(c) based solely on a store employee’s testimony that the defendant brandished a firearm 

during the robberies; the government did not introduce the firearm into evidence nor offer any 

photographic or video evidence. Id. Here also, there was sufficient evidence based on witness 

testimony for a rational juror to determine that the 9mm was a firearm. An employee at Family 

Dollar testified that he was familiar with guns and that Farris brandished a firearm during the 

robbery. Patterson also testified that the firearm used during the Shoney’s and Circle K 

robberies was functional and belonged to him and that Farris took that same firearm from him 

after the Circle K robbery. Furthermore, there is even stronger evidence in this case than that 

presented in Willis because here, there was also video evidence showing the firearm used during 

the Circle K and Family Dollar robberies. Accordingly, this evidence is more than sufficient for 

a reasonable juror to find that the 9mm used by Farris was a real firearm. 

B. 

Farris next contests the district court’s decision to exclude his proffered DOJ reports. 

Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Doe v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 

956 F.2d 545, 559 (6th Cir. 1992). “A court will find an abuse of discretion where it has a 

‘definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the 

conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’” Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 

228 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157, 1160 (6th Cir. 1982)) overruled on 

other grounds by Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004). Furthermore, “reversal is 

appropriate only if the abuse of discretion was not harmless error, that is, only if the erroneous 

evidentiary ruling affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Morales, 687 F.3d 697, 

702 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Marrero, 651 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 2011)).
No. 17-5636, United States v. Farris 

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Farris challenges the district court’s decision to exclude the DOJ reports, which discuss 

the potential unreliability of eyewitness identifications and effective techniques for preparing a 

witness to make an identification. Farris argues that he should have been allowed to introduce 

these reports to show that the government did not follow all the suggested techniques when 

obtaining identifications against him. 

However, both reports also state that an identification not done in accordance with their 

suggestions does not imply that the identification is unreliable or inadmissible in court and that 

the reports are the consensus of the authors and not the official position of the DOJ. Given these 

disclaimers, the probative value of the reports on whether the identifications of Farris were 

reliable is low. In contrast, because Farris intended to “read into the record certain portions of 

the document for purposes of the record” without any further foundation, (DE 136, Trial Tr., 

Page ID 807.), the district court was legitimately concerned that “without a witness to explain 

what [the reports] mean, to put them in the context of the work that’s [been] done on these 

issues,” the reports might confuse the jury. (DE 136, Trial Tr., Page ID 816). On balance, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the documents. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 

(“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 

danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 

jury. . . .”). 

Furthermore, even if the reports should have been admitted, the error would have been 

harmless. The government presented a plethora of evidence against Farris beyond witness 

identifications: both co-defendants, Patterson and Cox, testified against Farris, Farris’s prints 

were lifted from the checkout counter at the Family Dollar store, and surveillance footage 

showed Farris’s robberies at both the Circle K and Family Dollar stores. Additionally, Farris 
No. 17-5636, United States v. Farris 

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challenged the procedures through which law enforcement officers obtained the identifications 

during cross-examination of the witnesses, giving the jury adequate opportunity to assess the 

reliability of the identifications. Given all the evidence against Farris and his ability to challenge 

the identification procedures used, the exclusion of the reports did not affect the verdict and, 

thus, any error was harmless. See United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 

1984) (finding exclusion of proffered expert’s testimony harmless where the government 

presented evidence of the defendant’s palm print at the bank and three eyewitnesses who 

identified defendant as bank robber). 

C. 

Lastly, Farris’s voir dire argument is also without merit. A district court’s conduct of the 

voir dire is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Middleton, 

246 F.3d 825, 834 (6th Cir. 2001). “Only in the absence of a fair trial is reversal warranted.” Id.

at 835. However, because Farris did not raise his objection in the district court, Farris concedes 

that the standard of review is plain error. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008). 

“To establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) that an error occurred in the district court; 

(2) that the error was plain, i.e., obvious or clear; (3) that the error affected defendant’s 

substantial rights; and (4) that this adverse impact seriously affected the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 583 (6th 

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Farris does not raise any 

specific challenges to the way that the district court conducted voir dire. Instead, his only 

objection is that his motion for attorney-conducted voir dire was rejected without any 

explanation. However, a district court judge is not required to provide any explanation or allow 

attorneys to conduct voir dire. Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 24, the district 
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court judge has discretion to examine prospective jurors herself, and she is required only to ask 

questions suggested by the attorneys when she believes they are proper. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24. 

In fact, the majority of judges choose to conduct voir dire themselves, see 9 Moore’s Federal 

Practice § 47.10[3][e][i] (3d ed. 2006), and “[f]ederal trial judges have broad discretion in 

determining what questions to ask during voir dire,” United States v. Aloi, 9 F.3d 438, 441 (6th 

Cir. 1993). 

At voir dire, Farris requested that the district court ask questions regarding the jurors 

understanding of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

district court declined to ask these specific questions, stating that these concepts would be further 

explained in the jury instructions. But the district court did tell the prospective jurors that the 

reasonable doubt standard is higher than the burden of proof required in a civil case and that a 

defendant is presumed innocent unless the government proves him to be guilty. Additionally, it 

asked: “[I]f I were to ask you right now to vote on whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, 

how would you vote?” to which the jury panel responded, “Not guilty.” (DE 140, Corrected 

Trial Tr., Page ID 1303.) Because there is no showing that the district court improperly 

conducted voir dire or that Farris is entitled to attorney-conducted voir dire, we find that the 

district court did not commit reversible error in denying Farris’s motion.

III. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.