UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Matthew R. ADAMS Jr., Specialist 

U.S. Army, Appellant 

No. 14-0495 

Crim. App. No. 20110503 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 

Argued January 14, 2015 

Decided April 27, 2015 

ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which STUCKY 

and OHLSON, JJ., joined. BAKER, C.J., filed a separate 

dissenting opinion, in which RYAN, J., joined. 

Counsel

For Appellant: Captain Nicholas J. Larson (argued); Lieutenant 

Colonel Jonathan F. Potter (on brief); Colonel Kevin Boyle, 

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kageleiry Jr., Major Aaron R. 

Inkenbrandt, Major Vincent T. Shuler, and Captain Brian D. 

Andes. 

For Appellee: Captain Jaclyn E. Shea (argued); Colonel John P. 

Carrell, Major John Choike, Major Daniel D. Derner, and Captain 

Timothy C. Erickson (on brief). 

Military Judge: Andrew J. Glass 

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

2

Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court. 

Specialist (SPC) Matthew R. Adams Jr. was charged with 

numerous offenses, including robbery, in violation of Article 

122, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 921 

(2006). Consistent with his plea, Adams was acquitted of all 

charges but was found guilty of larceny, as a lesser included 

offense of robbery, in violation of Article 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 

§ 921 (2006). This Court granted review to determine whether 

the confession admitted by the military judge was properly 

corroborated.1

 Finding insufficient corroboration for a number 

of essential facts admitted in the confession, we hold the 

military judge abused his discretion and therefore reverse the 

decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals 

(CCA). 

Background

SPC DT implicated himself and Adams in a robbery of cocaine 

from a local drug dealer and also alleged that Adams had a 

weapon and cocaine in his house. Based on this information, 

Special Agents (SA) McKinney and Villegas of the Army’s Criminal 

 

1

 We granted review of the following issue: 

Whether the Army Court of Criminal Appeals erred in 

finding that the military judge did not abuse his 

discretion in admitting the portion of Appellant’s 

sworn statement regarding the [theft] of cocaine 

because the government failed to corroborate, in 

accordance with Military Rule of Evidence 304(g), the 

essential fact that Appellant took cocaine. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

3

Investigation Division (CID) obtained a search authorization for 

Adams’ house. While searching the house, the agents found a 

Smith & Wesson “Sigma” .40 caliber handgun. No cocaine was 

found. 

After the search, Adams was brought in for questioning. 

Adams provided a sworn statement in which he confessed to 

stealing cocaine from a drug dealer named Ootz2 with DT and 

another co-conspirator. In his statement, Adams provided his 

motive for the larceny, the general location of the offense, 

admitted that he brandished a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson “Sigma” 

handgun, and that his co-conspirator grabbed the cocaine from 

Ootz. 

 At trial, the government did not call Ootz or the two 

accomplices, but relied on Adams’ confession and corroboration 

testimony from the two CID agents. SA McKinney testified that 

she knew of a “Timothy” Ootz and that he was “a previous 

soldier.” She did not testify how or when she learned of Ootz 

or that she knew him to be a drug dealer. SA McKinney testified 

that, during her interview of Adams, he told her that the 

larceny “started at the Walmart, and then it moved to another 

location,” but she did not remember where. SA McKinney 

testified there was a Walmart located in Calcium, New York, 

 

2

 There was no consensus at trial as to either Ootz’ first name 

or the spelling of his last name. SA McKinney identified him as 

Timothy while SA Villegas identified him as Matthew. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

4

“right outside the north gate,” but did not testify about a 

Microtel at all. SA McKinney also confirmed that CID did not 

find any cocaine at Adams’ house. 

 Special Agent Villegas testified that she was not aware of 

Ootz until March 4, the day CID interviewed both DT and Adams. 

She further testified that Ootz “was a former [s]oldier, 

reported to be a drug dealer in the local area.” Villegas 

indicated that she had obtained this information from her 

“research running through cases that we have had at CID.” 

Villegas testified there was a Walmart in Evans Mills, New York, 

but did not believe there was one in Calcium, as stated by 

McKinney. Villegas also testified that the Walmart in Evans 

Mills was located near a Microtel. 

During McKinney’s testimony, the government sought to admit 

Adams’ written statement. The defense objected to the admission 

on the grounds it lacked corroboration. Following additional 

testimony and arguments, the military judge granted the defense 

motion in part and denied it in part. After excising a portion

of the confession for lack of corroboration, the military judge 

admitted the following portions:3

[Adams:] . . . [DT] told me who the person was Ootz 

[sic], who had ripped me off previously & gave me the 

idea to rob him. We met him [Ootz] at Walmart and had 

him drive over to the Microtel where we got in his 

car. [DT] looked at the stuff began talking shit & I 

 

3

 Following a short narrative, the statement continued in 

question and answer format. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

5

pulled my gun out and [DT] grabbed the coke & we got 

out of Ootz [sic] car & got in mine and returned to 

base. 

. . . . 

Q: What day did this take place? 

A: 28 Feb 2011[.] 

. . . . 

Q: What was [the] deal agreed upon by [DT] and Ootz? 

A: A ball for $220[.] 

Q: Did you have the $220 on you? 

A: No only $80 cause we were gonna rob him[.] 

. . . . 

Q: What happened after you all got in Ootz [sic] 

vehicle? 

A: [DT] asked for the stuff and an argument began and 

I pulled out my gun[.] 

Q: Did you say anything to Ootz? 

A: I told him not to do that shit again & then we got 

out[.] 

Q: What did you mean by that? 

A: About ripping [me] off[.] 

Q: Did Ootz say anything? 

A: No[.] 

Q: Did Ootz see the gun in your hand? 

A: Yes I waived [sic] it around quick[.] 

Q: What kind of gun did you have? 

A: S&W 40 cal sigma[.] 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

6

Q: Where did you get the gun? 

A: Bought in PA/ April 2010[.] 

Q: When did you bring the gun to FDNY?4

A: Christmas leave 2010[.] 

Q: What happened after you, [DT] and [the other coconspirator] got back in your vehicle? 

A: Nothing we drove back to post[.] 

Q: Where was the gun when you were driving back on 

post? 

A: On me in my pants[.] 

The military judge held that the evidence which 

corroborated these essential facts in Adams’ confession 

consisted of: 

The description of the handgun the accused admitted to 

“waiving [sic] around quick” is a “S&W .40 cal.” This 

matches the description of [the weapon found in the 

search]. . . . [T]he Court finds that these items 

found in the accused’s home four days after the 

alleged crimes coupled with the testimony regarding 

the location of a Walmart and Microtel in Evans Mills, 

New York to be sufficient to meet the standard of the 

slight corroboration required by the rule and case 

law. 

On appeal, the CCA affirmed Adams’ conviction. United 

States v. Adams, No. ARMY 20110503, 2014 CCA LEXIS 61, at *9, 

2014 WL 448415, at *3 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2014). The 

CCA held the military judge did not abuse his discretion in 

admitting the confession, agreeing that it was corroborated by 

the handgun and the testimony as to the proximity of a Walmart 

 

4

 Fort Drum, New York. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

7

and a Microtel. 2014 CCA LEXIS 61, at *6-9, 2014 WL 448415, at 

*2-3. The CCA went on to hold that the confession was also 

corroborated by SA Villegas’ testimony of a known drug dealer in 

the local area named Ootz. 

Discussion

We review a military judge’s admission of evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 

335 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 

 Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 304(c) reads, in 

pertinent part:5

An admission or a confession of the accused may be 

considered as evidence against the accused . . . only 

if independent evidence . . . has been introduced that 

corroborates the essential facts admitted to justify 

sufficiently an inference of their truth. . . . If the 

independent evidence raises an inference of the truth 

of some but not all of the essential facts admitted, 

then the confession or admission may be considered as 

evidence against the accused only with respect to 

those essential facts stated in the confession or 

admission that are corroborated by the independent 

evidence. 

Emphasis added. The current iteration of M.R.E. 304(c)6 was 

established in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

(MCM) in 1969 and was based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 

Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), and Smith v. United 

 

5

 At the time of Adams’ trial, M.R.E. 304(c) was M.R.E. 304(g). 

6

 Originally para. 140a, then M.R.E. 304(g), now M.R.E. 304(c). 

While there have been changes in word order, M.R.E. 304(c) 

remains substantively the same as the original para. 140a. MCM, 

ch. XXVII, para. 140a, at 27-15 (1969 rev. ed.). 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

8

States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954). See Dep’t of the Army Pam. 27-2, 

Analysis of Contents Manual for Courts-Marital, United States 

1969 Rev. Ed. ch. 27, para. 140a(5) (July 1970); see also

Article 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2012); Exec. Order No. 11430, 

33 Fed. Reg. 13,502 (Sept. 11, 1968). While in Opper the 

Supreme Court held that it “is necessary . . . to require the 

Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which 

would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement,” 

348 U.S. at 164, the “substantial” corroboration language was 

not incorporated into M.R.E. 304(c). Instead, M.R.E. 304(c) 

requires an amount of independent evidence sufficient to justify 

an inference of truth of the essential facts admitted from the 

confession.7

 While we have previously noted that a sufficient 

amount of evidence can be slight, the evidence must nevertheless 

be sufficient in quantity and quality to meet the plain language 

of the rule. United States v. McClain, 71 M.J. 80, 82 (C.A.A.F. 

2012); United States v. Grant, 56 M.J. 410, 416 (C.A.A.F. 2002); 

United States v. Rounds, 30 M.J. 76, 83 (C.M.A. 1990) (Everett, 

C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

 

7

 The dissent would change the standard in M.R.E. 304(c) to a 

“trustworthiness” standard, where, if one part of the confession 

is found to be “trustworthy,” that “trustworthiness” can be 

extrapolated to those portions of the confession which are not 

supported by independent evidence, thereby allowing the entire 

confession to be admitted into evidence. However, M.R.E. 304(c) 

expressly rejects the concept of extrapolating “trustworthiness” 

by requiring independent evidence of each essential fact to be 

corroborated. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

9

In United States v. Cottrill, 45 M.J. 485 (C.A.A.F. 1997), 

we explained: 

The corroboration requirement for admission of a 

confession at court-martial does not necessitate 

independent evidence of all the elements of an offense 

or even the corpus delicti of the confessed offense. 

Rather, the corroborating evidence must raise only an 

inference of truth as to the essential facts admitted. 

 

Id. at 489 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the evidence 

corroborating the essential facts of the confession must be 

independent. Grant, 56 M.J. at 416. 

What constitutes an essential fact of an admission or 

confession necessarily varies by case. Essential facts we have 

previously considered include the time, place, persons involved, 

access, opportunity, method, and motive of the crime. See,

e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 54 M.J. 464, 465-66 (C.A.A.F. 

2001); Rounds, 30 M.J. at 77-78; United States v. Melvin, 26 

M.J. 145, 147 (C.M.A. 1988). 

When independent evidence which is sufficient to 

corroborate an essential fact is provided, that essential fact 

is admissible. M.R.E. 304(c). If sufficient corroborating 

evidence of an essential fact is not provided, then the 

uncorroborated fact is not admissible and the military judge 

must excise it from the confession. See id. The essential 

facts which are corroborated may be used against the accused 

alongside any other properly admitted evidence. See, e.g., 

Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 (“Those facts plus the other evidence 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

10

besides the admission must, of course, be sufficient to find 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 

There is no “tipping point” of corroboration which would 

allow admission of the entire confession if a certain percentage 

of essential facts are found to be corroborated. For instance, 

if four of five essential facts were corroborated, the entire 

confession is not admissible. Only the four corroborated facts

are admissible and the military judge is required to excise the 

uncorroborated essential fact. M.R.E. 304(c). This analysis is 

completed by the military judge examining the potential 

corroboration for each essential fact the government wishes to 

admit. Id.8 

In the present case, three facts were found to have 

corroborated Adams’ confession: the possession of a handgun; 

testimony concerning the existence of a drug dealer named Ootz;

and testimony regarding the location of a Walmart and a 

Microtel. The portion of Adams’ confession admitting that he 

possessed a handgun was sufficiently corroborated by the 

matching handgun found by CID during the search of his house. 

 

8

 In United States v. Seay, 60 M.J. 73, 80 (C.A.A.F. 2004), while 

interpreting the corroboration requirements under M.R.E. 304(g), 

the court stated: “The issue is whether the facts justify the 

inference as to the truth of the confession.” While that 

statement could be interpreted to mean that the proper analysis 

is whether an appellant’s confession is admissible in its 

entirety, it must be read in conjunction with the Seay court’s 

earlier reference to the plain language of the rule referencing 

the need for corroboration of the essential facts. Id. at 79. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

11

While questions arise as to whether the location evidence 

sufficiently corroborated the place of the crime and whether the 

identification of Ootz was sufficiently reliable and independent 

of Adams’ confession, we need not decide those issues. 

In a case where the only direct evidence of the crime was 

the confession, it is important to determine what was not 

corroborated. Here, there is no evidence which corroborates 

Adams’ opportunity or motive to commit the crime, his access, 

his intent, the accomplices involved, the subject of the larceny 

(i.e., cocaine), the time of the crime, or the act of the 

larceny itself (waving the handgun while [DT] grabbed the 

cocaine). In short, virtually none of the facts we have 

previously articulated as essential were corroborated. Even if 

we were to assume that the evidence relied upon below properly 

corroborated the location of the larceny and the identity of the 

victim, those facts, combined with the ownership of the handgun, 

are legally insufficient to support the larceny conviction 

absent any additional direct evidence of a crime. We therefore 

conclude that the military judge abused his discretion when he 

admitted numerous uncorroborated essential facts from Adams’ 

confession. Because the confession was “the government’s key 

piece of evidence” Adams, 2014 CCA LEXIS 61, at *3, 2014 WL 

448415 at *1; the admission of the uncorroborated essential 

facts was prejudicial to Adams. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR 

12

Decision

 The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal 

Appeals is reversed and the findings and sentence are set aside. 

The record is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the 

Army. A rehearing may be authorized. 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

BAKER, Chief Judge, with whom RYAN, Judge, joins

(dissenting):

This Court is riding a pendulum back and forth when it 

comes to the law on corroborating confessions. In eleven years, 

we have moved from one extreme in United States v. Seay, 60 M.J. 

73 (C.A.A.F. 2004), to the other extreme in United States v. 

Adams, __ M.J. __ (C.A.A.F. 2015). In Seay, the Court found the 

appellant’s confession to stealing a wallet was corroborated by 

the fact -- or more precisely the absence of the fact -- that no 

wallet was found on the victim’s body. 60 M.J. at 80. From the 

absence of this fact, the Court made an inference that because 

no wallet was found on the victim, the appellant must have taken 

it. Id. Thus, his confession to stealing the wallet was 

corroborated. Id.

Today, the Court swings the law back to the opposite 

extreme. In the view of the majority, “[w]hen independent 

evidence which is sufficient to corroborate an essential fact is 

provided, that essential fact is admissible.” Adams, __ M.J. at 

__ (9). However, they go on to say, “if sufficient 

corroborating evidence of an essential fact is not provided, 

then the uncorroborated fact is not admissible and the military 

judge must excise it from the confession.” Id. The majority 

thus requires that every essential fact identified in a 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

2

confession must be individually corroborated on a one-for-one 

basis. 

The majority’s approach precludes the drawing of 

appropriate inferences from an otherwise trustworthy statement. 

Moreover, because the only essential fact in Appellant’s 

statement that is not demonstrated by independent evidence is 

the actual theft of the cocaine, the Court’s decision 

effectively returns the law to a corpus delecti test. 

The majority is trying to have it both ways. It purports 

to adhere to United States v. Cottrill, 45 M.J. 485 (C.A.A.F. 

1997), disavowing the corpus delecti test or a requirement to 

prove all the elements of the offense, but then rejects 

Appellant’s statement for lack of independent evidence, where 

the only independent evidence of an essential fact that is 

lacking is of the crime itself: “[DT] grabbed the coke.” It is 

difficult to imagine, however, that a drug dealer would ever 

report the theft of cocaine to the police. All the other facts 

in Appellant’s statement are corroborated: the weapon used, the 

place of the crime, Appellant’s participation in drug culture, 

and most importantly, the unique name of the “victim.” The last 

point is particularly noteworthy because of the unlikelihood 

that Appellant could make up the name “Ootz,” which then also 

happened to be the name of a known drug dealer in the area.
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

3

I did not join Seay and I do not join the Court today. I 

believe the law is and should be in a different place between 

the extremes presented in Seay and in Adams. 

I would start with two principles. The purpose of the law 

as stated in Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954)

(citing Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 345 (1941)),

is to protect against false confessions. More specifically, 

Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 304(g) and case law seek to 

protect against three possibilities: the risk that 

interrogation might produce a false confession; the risk that 

for psychological reasons or attention gathering purposes a 

person might choose to falsely confess; and, in the military 

context, there is the additional risk that grade and command 

differentials might result in false confessions. See United 

States v. Yeoman, 25 M.J. 1, 4 (C.M.A. 1987) (stating that the 

purpose of the corroboration rule is to prevent “errors in 

convictions based upon untrue confessions alone” or confessions 

“based upon words which might reflect the strain and confusion 

caused by the pressure of a police investigation”) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). To this end, the law 

requires “the Government to introduce substantial independent 

evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of 

the statement.” Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

4

The first principle, therefore, is that the purpose of the 

law is to establish the trustworthiness of the statement. In 

other words, not every element or fact contained in the 

confession must be independently proved. The goal is 

trustworthiness. Thus, if substantial independent evidence 

indicates the statement is trustworthy, then appropriate 

inferences may be drawn from the statement beyond those for 

which there is independent evidence including the fact that a 

crime has been committed. 

The second principle is that where a conviction is based 

exclusively on a confession, a court’s inquiry should, as 

always, be rigorous and searching. But the test is one of 

corroboration. The purpose is to establish the trustworthiness 

of the statement, not to have a mini-trial to establish the 

elements of the confession and thus the crime, so that one can 

then introduce the confession in order to prove the crime. 

If the government were required to have independent 

evidence of every essential fact in the confession as the 

majority now concludes, then the confession is no longer 

independent evidence, it is a redundant supplement to the 

government’s other evidence. Moreover, the government would be 

barred from using the confession to fill in essential facts that 

might not otherwise be known to the government. As Cottrill

recognized, the “quantum” of evidence required to corroborate 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

5

need only be slight. 45 M.J. at 489. That is why, consistent 

with our approach to Article 31, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012), this Court has not 

adopted a literal reading of M.R.E. 304(g), because the result 

would be unworkable in practice. Rather, this Court has 

recognized that M.R.E. 304(g) was intended to implement Opper. 

See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States ch. xxvii, para. 

140.a.(5) (1968 ed.) (MCM) (the corroboration rule was updated 

in the 1968 MCM to say, in part, “the independent evidence need 

only raise an inference of the truth of the essential facts 

admitted,” thus reflecting the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Opper); United States v. Rounds, 30 M.J. 76, 80-82 (C.A.A.F. 

1990). Thus, the Court has heretofore applied a purpose-based 

reading of the rule that tests for trustworthiness through 

independent evidence of those essential facts necessary to 

validate the trustworthiness of the confession. United States 

v. Maio, 34 M.J. 215, 218 (C.M.A. 1992); Cottrill, 45 M.J. at 

489; Seay, 60 M.J. at 79-80.

In this case, the military judge admitted Appellant’s 

statement that: 

After my friend Beirl move [sic] me, [DT] & Anderson where 

[sic] at my house and [DT] was trying to get drugs. He 

told me who the person was Ootz [sic], who had ripped me 

off previously & gave me the idea to rob him. We met him 

at a Walmart and had him drive over to the Microtel where 

we got in his car. [DT] looked at the stuff began talking 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

6

shit & I pulled my gun out and [DT] grabbed the coke & we 

got out of Ootz car & got in mine and returned to base. 

Q: What day did this take place? 

A: 28 Feb 2011[.]

. . . .

Q: What was deal agreed upon by [DT] and Ootz? 

A: A ball for $220[.]

Q: Did you have the $220 on you? 

A: No only $80 cause we were gonna rob him[.]

. . . .

Q: What happened after you all got in Ootz [sic] vehicle? 

A: [DT] asked for the stuff and an argument began and I 

pulled out my gun[.]

Q: Did you say anything to Ootz? 

A: I told him not to do that shit again & then we got 

out[.]

Q: What did you mean by that? 

A: About ripping [people] off[.]

Q: Did Ootz say anything? 

A: No[.]

Q: Did Ootz see the gun in your hand? 

A: Yes I waived it around quick[.]

Q: What kind of gun did you have? 

A: S&W 40 cal sigma[.]

Q: Where did you get the gun? 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

7

A: Bought in PA/ April 2010[.]

Q: When did you bring the gun to FDNY? 

A: Christmas leave 2010[.]

Q: What happened after you, [DT] and Anderson got back in 

your vehicle? 

A: Nothing we drove back to post[.]

Q: Where was the gun when you were driving back on post? 

A: On me in my pants[.]

The military judge and CCA concluded this statement was 

corroborated. I agree and concur in the lower court’s 

assessment of the corroborating facts. The evidence of 

corroboration is strong. First, Ootz was a former soldier and 

known drug dealer, with an uncommon if not unique last name that 

matched the name of the drug dealer Appellant confessed to 

robbing. CID knew this based on its independent search of its 

files. Second, the same type of weapon -- a .40 mm Smith &

Wesson -- Appellant stated he used in the crime was found in his 

residence four days later. Third, bags of synthetic marijuana, 

smoking devices, and a syringe were also found in Appellant’s 

house. While cocaine is a perishable item, this evidence 

demonstrated Appellant’s knowledge and connection to drug 

culture. Less important is the fact that the locations where 

Appellant stated the events took place, in fact, exist in the 

actual area of the base. What is missing is independent 
United States v. Adams Jr., No. 14-0495/AR

8

evidence of the robbery itself, i.e., that “[DT] grabbed the 

coke.” But requiring evidence of this fact leaves us with the 

corpus delecti test. What we have instead is corroboration of 

the means, the place, the drug connection, and the unique name 

of the “victim” all of which indicate the statement is 

trustworthy. Therefore, I would affirm the military judge, the 

CCA, and the conviction, and respectfully dissent.