### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 17

- 1061 J OSHUA V ASQUEZ and M IGUEL C ARDONA , Plaintiff s

- Appellant s ,

v.

K IMBERLY M. F OXX , in her official capacity as the State’s Attorney of Cook County, and C ITY OF C HICAGO , Defendant s

- Appellee s

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division. No. 16

- cv

- 8854

— Amy J. St. Eve , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED N OVEMBER 28, 2017

— D ECIDED J ULY 11, 2018

____________________

Before B AUER , R OVNER , and S YKES , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Circuit Judge

. Joshua Vasquez and Miguel Cardona are convicted child sex offenders who live in Chicago and are required to register as sex of fenders and comply with
state restricti ons on where they may live

. For example, a child sex offender may not knowingly liv e within 500 feet of2 No. 17

- 1061

a school, playground, or ch ild

- care center

. 720 I LL

. C OMP

. S TAT

. 5 /11

- 9.3(b

- 5), (b

- 10). A few years after Vasquez and Cardona w ere convicted, Illinois add ed child da y

- care homes and group day

- care homes to the list of places included in the 500

- foot residential buffer zone

. § 5/ 11

- 9.3(b

10). When Vasquez and Cardona update d their sex

- offen der registrations in August 2016 , the Chicago Police Department told them they had to move because child day

- care homes had opened up within 500 feet of their residences . The Department gave them 30 days to come into compliance with the statute

. Vasquez and Cardona sued the City of Chicago and Kimberly M. Foxx , the Cook County State’s Attorney, 1 seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on four alleged constitutional violations

. First, the y claimed that the amend ment to the residency statute imposes retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause . Next, they alleged that applying the amended statute to them
amount ed to an unconstitutional tak ing of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment ’s Takings C lause

. Finally , they asserted two due

- process claims , one procedural and

one substantive: they complained that the statute is enforced without a hearing for an individualized risk assessment and is not rational ly related to a legitimate state interest.
The district judge rejected each claim at the pleadings stage and w e affirm. Under Supreme Court and circuit precedent, t h e amended statu t e is neither impermissibly

1 Anita Alvarez was the Cook County State’s Attorney when the suit was filed. Foxx replaced her in that office on December 1, 2016, and was substituted as a defendant. See F ED

. R. C IV . P. 25(d)

.No. 17

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retroactive nor punitive , so it raises no ex post facto co ncerns

. The plaintiffs’ claim under the Takings Clause fails for
two independent reasons: it is unexhausted and the amendment was adopted before the y acquired their homes , so it did not alter their property

- rights expectations. The procedural due

- process claim is a nonstarter for the straigh tforward reason that there is no right to a hearing to establish a fact not material to the statute . And the law is not unconstitutional in substance: it easily satisfies rational

- basis review. I. Background
Illinois first adopted residency re strictions for child sex offenders in 2000. Act of July 7, 2000, Pub. Act No. 91

- 911, 2000 Ill. Laws 2051

. As originally enacted the law prohibited child sex offenders from knowingly residing within 500 feetof a “playground or a facility providing programs or servic es exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age.” Id. In subsequent years t he Illinois legislature amended the statute to add other places to the list

. At issue here is a 2008 amendment prohibit ing child sex offender s from knowingly residing w ithin 500 feet of a “ day care home” or

“ group day care home .” Act of Aug. 14, 2008, Pub. Act No. 95

- 821, 2008 Ill. Laws 1383

. Noncompliance is a Class 4 felony punishable by up to three years in p rison . 720 I LL

. C OMP

. S TAT

. 5/11

- 9.3(f); 730 I LL

. C OMP

. S TAT

. 5/5

- 4.5

- 45(a).
Plaintiff Joshua Vasquez was convicted of child

pornography possession in 2001 and must register as a sex offender for the rest of his life . His conviction also makes him a child sex offender within the meaning of the residency
statute

. 720 I LL

. C OMP

. S TAT

. § 5 /11

- 9.3(d) (1)

. On Augu st 25, 2016, Vasquez visited the Chicago Police Department headquarters to complete his annual sex

- offender registration

. A s4 No. 17

- 1061

of that date , he had lived in his Chicago apartment for three years with his wife a nd daughter, and his lease continued through August 19, 2017. T he Department notified him that

a child day

- care home had opened 480 feet from his apartment and told him he had to move within 30 days

. Vasquez alleges that he has been unable to find suitable and affordable housing that complies with the residency requirements. He also a lleges that his daughter’s schooling will be disrupted if the family has to move outside the school district.
Plaintiff Miguel Cardona was convicted of indecent solicitati on o f a child in 2004

. 2 Like Vasquez, Cardona’s conviction makes him a child sex offender s ubject to the requirements of the residency statute

. Id. C ardona has lived in his Chicago home fo r roughly 25 years , but he did not purchase it until 2010 so he cannot claim an ex emption for offenders who owned their home s prior to the enactment of the 2008 amendment

. § 5/11

- 9.3(b

- 10 )

. When Cardona completed his annual sex

- offender registration on A ugust 17, 2016 , the Chicago Police Department notified him that a child day

- care home had opened 475 feet from his residence

. Like Vasquez, h e was given 30 days to move

. Cardonaalleges that he cannot afford to move into compliant housing. He also alleges that the day

- care home in question has been open since 2014 and his proximity to it has caused no problems

.Vasquez and Cardona challenge the 2008 amendment facially and as applied to them. They sued the City of Chicago

2 The complaint alleges that Cardona’s conviction requires him to register as a sex offender through 2017. Although his registration duty has expired, he remains subject to the residency restrictions.No. 17

- 1061 5

and State’s Attorney Foxx seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 for violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause , the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Cause , and the Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process Clause

. T he judge entered an order enjoin ing the d efendants from forcing the plaintiffs to vacate their home s or otherwise enforcing the amended
statute against them while the case was pending

. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e, and t he judge granted the motion

. She held that the 2008 amendment created only prospective legal obligations and thus raised no concerns under the Ex Post Facto Clause. On the takings claim sheconcluded that the plaintiffs had not suffered an unconstitutional taking of their property under the test announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York , 43 8 U.S. 104 (1978) . Finally, the judge ruled that the compla int failed
to state a procedural or substantive due

- process claim because the re is no right to a hearing to establish a fact not material under the statute and the challenged residency restriction is a rational means of protect ing children from convicted child sex offenders. Vasquez and Cardona appeal ed, and t he judge granted their motion to extend her order maintaining the status quo through the pendency of t he appeal. In the meantime Vasquez renewed his lease, and Cardona live s in the same home.
II. Discussion
We review the judge’s dis missal order de novo

. Roberts v. City of Chicago , 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). Before taking up the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim s , we note6 No. 17

- 1061

that the City is not a proper defendant on any of them , at least not as the claims were pleaded

. A municipality is subject to § 1983 liability only if one of its policies caused the constitutional injury. Swanigan v. City of Chicago , 881 F.3d 577, 5 82 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v. Dep ’ t of Soc. Servs. of N .Y. , 436 U.S. 658 (1978) )

. The “official policy” analysis isolate s ultimate responsib ility for a claimed constitutional violation, distinguish ing the acts of a municipality from the acts of its

em ployees. Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. County of Bureau , 506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007) . A municipality’s enforcement of a state law does not constitute an actionable official policy. See Surplus Store & Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi , 928 F.2d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 1991) (“It is difficult to imagine a municipal policy more innocuous and constitutionally permissible, and whose causal connection to the alleged violation is more attenuated, than the ‘policy’ of enforcing state law.”). The City’s police de partment did not enforce a Chicago ordinance or other municipal policy ; rather, this suit challenges a state law. T he City can be held liable only if it has “as a matt er [of] policy or custom, enforce[d] the law in a manner or method that caused the constitutional violation.” Id. Vasquez and Cardona contend that the City exercises discretion in enforcing the residency statute

— for example , by checking for compliance annually when sex offenders register and by giving sex offenders 30 days’ notice to move

. B ut the complaint does not allege a causal connection between the City’s compliance monitoring and the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury

. Id. at 790. T he plaintiffs do face a continuing t hreat of prosecutio n if they fail to comply with the 2008 amendment , but t he State’s Attorney is the proper defendant to sue for redress of that injury. For this inde-No. 17

- 1061 7

pendent reason, which the City preserved below but the judge did not need to address, the plaintiffs failed t o state a claim against the City.
A. Ex Post Facto Clause

T he Ex Post Facto C lause 3 forbid s retroactive punishment

— that is, “the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred.” Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981). So a statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law unless it is both retroactive and penal. United States v. Leach, 63 9 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011).
Our decision in Leach is conclusive on the retroactivity question. Th ere we considered an ex post facto challenge to
t he federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)

. Id. at 770

– 71. E nacted in 2006 , SORNA requires all convicted sex offender s

— including those who were convicted before the Act was adopted

— to register in each jurisdiction where t he y live, work, or attend school ; the Act also imposes criminal penalt ies for failure to register or update a registration following interstate travel. Id. at 771 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a))

. Donald Leach was convicted of child molestation in 1990 , long before SORNA came into being , and he was charged with failing to update his registration when he moved to another
state . He argued that SORNA could not be applied to him because it retroactive ly increased his punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

3 “No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 9, cl. 3.8 No. 17

- 1061

W e rejected t hat argument and affirmed Leach’s conviction. We began by noting that SORNA’s registration duty and the criminal penalty for failure to comply are plainly prospective in ope ration . In other words, the new regulatory scheme applies only to conduct occurring after the law’s
enactment

— that is, a sex offender’s failure to register or update his registration following interstate travel. Accordingly, we held that SORNA “merely creates new, prospective legal obligations based on the person’s prior history.” Id. at 773.
So too here

. Alt hough the 2008 amendment to the Illinois residency statute applie s to Vasquez, Cardona, and others like them who were convicted of child sex offenses before the amen dment was adopted, its requirements and any criminal penalty apply only to conduct occurring after its enactment

— i.e., knowingly maintaining a residence wit hin 500 feet of a child day

- care home or group day

- care home.
We also held in Leach t hat under Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 (2003), SORNA’s registration regime for sex offenders is not penal in nature

. Id

. Smith upheld Alaska’s sex

- offender registration statu te against a n ex post facto challenge . The Court found that the Alaska registration regime w as a nonpunit ive civil regulatory scheme and thus raised no ex post facto concerns

. 538 U.S. at 105

– 06. Because SORNA is indistinguishable from the Alaska statute upheld in Smith , we concluded in Leach that the federal law is likewise a civil regulatory scheme and not a penal statute

. 639 F.3d at 773.Again, the same is true here. The Illinois residency statute is similar enough to the sex

- offender registration statutes at issue in Smith and Leach that it’s safe to apply th ose holdings and reject the plaintiffs’ challenge without furth er ado.No. 17

- 1061 9

I f more is needed, we briefly address t he two

- step framework the Court use d in Smith and explain why the Illinois residency statute is not punitive under that test.

T he Court’s framework as ks if the legislature intended to impose punishment , and if not, whether the civil regulatory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate” the legislature ’ s nonpunitive intent. Smith , 538 U.S.
at 92 (quotation marks omitted)

. Vasquez and Cardona do not argue that the Illinois legislature intended to impose additional punishment , so we skip directly to the seco nd step

. To determine if Alaska ’s registration law was punitive in effect, the Co urt examined several factors: whether the regulatory regime “in its necessary operation ... [would be] regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment [,] imposes an affir mative disability or restraint [,] promotes the traditional aims of punishment [,] has a rational connection
to a nonpunitive purpose [,] or i s excessive with respect to this purpose.” Id. at 97

. The Court assigned no particular priority or weight to any of t hese factors : they are “ neither exhaustive nor dispositive” but merely “relevant.” Id

. A s for t he first factor, Vasquez and Cardona compare the Illinois residency restrictions to the historical punishments of shaming and banishment . As the Court noted in Smith , however, early shaming punishment s “inflict [ed] public disgrace, ” and “[t]he aim was to make these offenders suffer permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the community.” Id. at 97

– 98 (internal quotation marks omitted). Th e Alaska registration requirement d id not shame c hild sex offenders in this way , id

. , and neither do the Illinois residency restrictions

. Nor do the residency restrictions resemble banishment . Under that early form of punishment, “ [ t ] he10 No. 17

- 1061

most serious offenders ... co uld neither return to their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one.” Id. (citing T HOMAS G. B LOMBERG & K AROL L UCKEN , A MERICAN P ENOLOGY : A H ISTORY OF C ONTROL 30

– 31 (2000)). The Illinois residency statute merely keeps child sex offenders from living in very close proximity to places where children are likely to congregate ; it does not force them to leave their communit ies

. Vasquez and Cardona also compare the residency restrictions to criminal punishments such as p roba tion and supervised release. The comparison is inapt; the Court rejected it in Smith , noting that “offenders subject to the Alaska statute are free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens [] with no supervision.” Id

. at 101. Although the Illinois residency restrictions limit where sex offenders may live, the statute do es not control any other aspect of their lives and thus does not resemble the comprehensive control of probation and supervised release.
The Court also examined the exte nt to which the Alaska law imposed an affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders, observing that “[i] f the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.” Id. at 100. We accept for present purposes that Vasquez and Cardona have had difficulty finding suitable compliant housing in their neighborhoods. We also recognize that including child day

- care home s within the 500

- foot buffer

zone create s some unpredictability : scho ol s and playground s are typically known and fixed, but a private residential propert y can become a day

- care home without anyone in the neighborhood notic ing. However, like the registration scheme at issue in Smith , the residency law “ imposes noNo. 17

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physical re straint [] and so does not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint.” Id.
Another relevant factor in the Smith framework is whether the statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment , but t he Court strictly limited the scope of this inquiry , asking only whether the law is retributive. 538 U.S. at 102 . Vasquez and Cardona do not develop an argu ment on this point , perhaps because the residency restrictions are so clearly not retributive . A s in Smith , t he obvious aim of the statute is to protect children from the danger of recidivism by convicted child sex offenders

. Id.
The last two factors in the Smith framework are related: the Court asked whether the Alaska statute wa s rational ly

connec t ed to a nonpunitive purpose and whether its requirements were excessive with respect to that purpose. Id. at 103. At this step of the analysis, the challenger is required
to show that the statute’s “ nonpunitive purpose is a sham or mere pretext.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Vasquez and Cardona maintain that sex offenders do not reoffend more tha n other criminal s. Even if we accept that assertion , similar recidivism rates across different categories of crime would not establish that the non punitive aim of this
statute

— p rotectin g children

— is a sham. Indeed, Smith holds that s tates may make “reasonable categorical judgments ... without any corresponding risk assessment.” Id

. at 103

– 04.
In short , under Smith and Leach , the 2008 amendment to the sex

- offender residency statute is neither retroa ctive nor12 No. 17

- 1061

punitive and thus raises no ex post facto concerns. 4 The judge was right to dismiss t h is claim

. B. Takings Clause
Next, Vasquez and Cardona argue that the judge wrongly dism iss ed their claim that the 2008 amendment effectively

“ tak es” their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment ’s Takings Clause. But neither plaintiff pursued state remedies prior to filing this suit , a nd current law requires exhaust ion of state mechanisms for obtaining compensation before a takings claim can be brought in federal court

. Williamson C n ty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 5

4 Vasquez and Cardona rely heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Does #1

- 5 v. Snyder , 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016), but that case is easily distinguishable. The plaintiffs there challenged a series of amendments to the Michigan sex

- offender registration law, which the court characterized as imposing “a byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state’s sex offenders.” Id . at 697. The challenged provisions included a residency restriction prohibiting sex offenders from “living, working, or ‘loitering’ within 1,000 feet of a sch ool .” Id. at 698. The plaintiffs also challenged a provision publicly classifying regist rants “into three tiers, which ostensibly correlate to current dangerousness, but which are based [] not on individual assessments, but solely on the crime of conviction .” Id. Finally, the plaintiffs challenged a provision requiring registrants to “appear in person ‘immediately’ to update information such as new vehicles or ‘internet identifiers.’” Id. The court considered these provisions collectively and concluded that this package of civil regulatory restrictions were punitive in effect

. Id. at 702

– 06. The single 2008 amendment at issue in this case does not remotely compare.

5 Williamson County has been criticized, and the Supreme Court may revisit and overrule it next term. Knick v. Township of Scott , 862 F.3d 310No. 17

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To exhaust a takings claim, the plaintiff must seek relief in state court unless doing so would be “futile.” Peters v. Village of Clifton , 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2007). R elying on Callahan v. City of Chicago , 813 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016), the judge assumed that the Illinois state courts c ould not provide relief for this claim

. In Callahan , however, we accepted C hicago’s concession that a suit for relief on a takings claim in an Illinois state court would be futile

. Id. at 660. Foxx has not made a similar concession here. A nd a s we explained in Sorr entino v. Godinez , 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), the Illinois Court of Claims can provide damages for a regulatory taking. By failing to seek damages in state court, the plaintiffs have not exhausted their challenge to the residency requirements

. 6
Ev en if we looked past this procedural barrier , the t akings claim would fail on the merits

. Under the Supreme Court’s Penn Central test, we ’re instructed to examine “(1) the nature of the government action, (2) the sev erity of [its] economic impact on the [property] owner , and (3) the degree

(3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted , 138 S. Ct. 1262 (Mem.) (2018). For now it remains good law.

6 Vasquez and Cardona argue that if they cannot proceed on an as

applied takings claim, they should be permitted to r aise a facial takings claim . This argument is based on a line of caselaw holding that a facial takings challenge need not meet the Williamson County exhaustion requirement. Peters v. Village of Clifton , 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2007)

. But Vasquez and Ca rdona did not develop an argument that the 2008 amendment is facially unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. The issue is therefore waived. See Judge v. Quinn , 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010).14 No. 17

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of interference with the ow ner’s reasonable investment

back ed expectations.” Bettendorf v. St. Croix County , 631 F.3d 421, 430 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. On the first of these factor s , a taking “ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting thebenefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted)

. Al though the Illinois law restricts a child sex offender’s use of his property, it cannot be characterized as a physical invasion. The law merely adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life. Moving on to the e conomic impact of the 2008 amendment , we keep in mind that a regulation does not amount to a taking simply because the property owner can no longer make the “most beneficial use of the property.” Id. at 125. Even t he denial of a traditional property right does not

necess arily amount to a taking . For example, in Andrus v. Allard , 444 U.S. 51, 65

– 66 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a law preventing the sale of certain artifacts did not amount to a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment . The Court emphasized that the regulation did not compel the surrender of the artifacts and that the owners could still derive some economic benefit by “exhibit[ing] the artifacts for an admissions charge.” Id. at 66. The economic impact o f the 2008 amendment to the Illinois residency
statute is minimal in comparison to Andrus . Al though Vasquez and Cardona cannot reside within the 500

- foot buffer zone , there is no question that many others can, leaving open a broad market to sell or sub leas e the ir residences at full market value.No. 17

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The third factor in the Penn Central analysis seals the fate of th e plaintiffs’ takings claim s

. We ’re instructed to look at the ir “expectation concerning the use of the parcel” and whether the y can obtain a “reason able return” on their investment. Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 136. Vasquez and Cardona assert that they had no reasonable expectation they would have to move

. They rely on Mann v. Georgia Department of Corr ections , 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007), which held that

a sex

- offender residency statute “positively precludes appellant from having any reasonable investment

- backed expectation in any property purchased as his private residence.” Id. at 744. But Penn Central simply d oes no t support th is expansive understanding of a property owner’s investment

- backed expectations. A properly focused inquiry looks to the effect of t he 2008 amend ment on the plaintiffs’ property

- rights expectations. And because the amendment was on the b ooks when Cardona purchased his home and Vasquez leased his apartment, it s terms were necessarily part of any property

- rights expectations they could have held

. That ’s enough to doom this takings claim on the merits

. See, e.g. , Goodpaster v. City of Indian apolis , 736 F.3d 1060, 1074 (7th Cir. 2013) ( holding that the bar owners’ reasonable expectations included the expansion of the smoking ban); Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga , 800 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]hose who buy into a regulated field ... cannot object when regulation is later imposed.”).
C. Procedural Due Process The procedural aspect of the due

- process claim rests on the plaintiffs’ allegation t hat the 2008 amendment is unconstitutionally enforced against them without a h earing or16 No. 17

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other procedure to determine whethe r the y actually pose acontinued threat to children. This claim is squarely foreclosed by Connecticut Dep artment of Public Safety v. Doe , 538 U.S. 1 (2003). There the Supreme Court considered whether a sex

- offender reg istration statute required a determination that the offender was currently dangerous. Id. at 4. The answer was “ no

. ” T he Court reasoned that “due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme.” Id. ; see also id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“ [ A ] validly enacted statute suffices to provid e all the process th at is ‘due

... . ’ ” ); Bi

Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization , 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a cha nce to be heard.”)

. T he Illinois statute places residency restrictions on all child sex offenders regardless of their individual risk of recidivism . Vasquez and Cardona are not entitled to a hearing for an individualized risk assessment.
D. Substantive D ue Process Finally, Vasquez and Cardona argue that the 2008 amendment to the residency statute is substantive ly unconstitutional . T hey urge us to apply heightened scrutiny , claiming that the residency requirements were enacted out of pure animus toward child sex offenders , a politically unpopular group

. See, e.g. , United States v. Windsor , 570 U.S. 744 , 770 (2013) ; U .S. Dep ’ t of Agric

. v. Moreno , 413 U.S. 528, 556

– 58 (1973)

. Heightened scrutiny does not apply

. T h e residency statute is facially neutral a nd advance s a compelling governmental interest : protecting children fr om recidivism by child sex offenders. The plaintiffs also press forNo. 17

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heightened scrutiny because the statute infringes their fundamental right to “establish a home.” See Washington v. Glu cksberg , 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997). This argum ent is meritless . A law limiting where sex offenders may live does not prevent them from establishing a home; it just constrains where they can do so.
Th is law triggers only r ational

- basis review , so we ask whether its intrusion upon liberty is rationally re lated to a legitimate governmental interest. Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp. , 743 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014). No one questions that p rotectin g children from child sex offenders is a l egitimate gover nment al interest ; indeed, it is a compelling interest

. S ee Doe v. City of Lafayette , 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the C ity’s interest in protecting minors from child sex offenders is “not merely l egitimate, it is compellin g”). The plaintiffs thus “have the burden to negate every conceiva ble basis [that] might support [the statute] .” Goodpaster , 736 F.3d at 1071 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. It’s self

- evident that creating a buffer between a child day

- care home and the home of a child s ex offender may protect at least some children from harm

. Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in Smith , a state legislature “couldconclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism.” 538 U.S. at 103. Vasquez and Cardona insist that “scant evidence” supports the public

- safety rationale of this statute ; they also argue thatthe harsh burdens placed on sex offenders are highly disproportionate to any benefit

. But o ur role is not to second

guess the legislative policy judgment by parsing the latest academic studies on sex

- offender recidivism. See Goodpaster ,18 No. 17

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736 F.3 d at 1071 (“Under rational basis review, a state law is constitutional even if it is unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” ) (internal quotation marks omitted). This resid ency restriction on child sex offenders cannot be called irrational.
A FFIRMED

.