IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KIMBERLY GRIPPA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No.: 4:20cv457-MW/MAF 

RONALD RUBIN, 

Defendant. 

______________________________/

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction................................................................................................................1

Statement of Facts......................................................................................................4

Summary Judgment Standard ....................................................................................7

Argument....................................................................................................................7

I. Grippa’s claim is based entirely on privileged statements from Rubin’s 

Complaint. .......................................................................................................7

II. Grippa’s claim depends upon vicarious liability, which Grippa failed to 

plead and is contradicted by the evidence. ......................................................9

III. Alternatively, Tein’s letters are protected by the qualified privilege that 

Grippa cannot overcome by a demonstration of express malice...................11

A. The Qualified Privilege Applies..........................................................11

B. Grippa Cannot Demonstrate Express Malice......................................13

IV. Grippa has no evidence of proximate causation............................................15

V. Grippa has no actual damages.......................................................................16

VI. Conclusion .....................................................................................................17

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Ball v. D'Lites Enterprises, Inc.,

65 So.3d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).......................................................................8

Cape Publications, Inc. v. Reakes,

840 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)...................................................................15

Celotex Corp.v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986)..............................................................................................7

Chestnut Assoc., Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America,

17 F.Supp.3d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2014)..................................................................10

Debose v. University of South Fla.,

178 F.Supp.3d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2016)..................................................................9

General Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Bob's Barricades, Inc.,

22 So.3d 697 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009).......................................................................9

Goldschmidt v. Holman,

571 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1990) ..................................................................................10

Jarzynka v. St. Thomas Univ. of Law,

310 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2004)...........................................................2, 13

Larreal v. Telemundo of Florida, LLC,

489 F. Supp. 3d 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2020).................................................................7

Nodar v. Galbreath,

462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984) .................................................................................12

Pomfret v. Atkinson,

137 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)..........................................................13, 14

Regions Bank v. Kaplan,

8:12-CV-1837-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 1193831 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 

2013) .............................................................................................................11, 12

Case 4:20-cv-00457-MW-MAF Document 110 Filed 02/14/22 Page 3 of 22
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Stanfill v. State,

384 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1980) ....................................................................................8

Stewart v. Sun Sentinel Co.,

695 So.2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).................................................................8, 9

Turner v. Wells,

879 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................16

Wilson v. Jacks,

310 So.3d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)...................................................................10

Statutes

Fla. Stat. §14.32(2)...................................................................................................12

Fla. Stat. §775.082(4)(a)..........................................................................................11

Fla. Stat. §836.01 .....................................................................................................11

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)...................................................................................................7

Rule 4-1.2(d) Regulating the Florida Bar................................................................11

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INTRODUCTION

This case involves a single count of defamation based on two letters that 

Defendant Ronald Rubin’s (“Rubin”) former counsel, Michael Tein (“Tein”) sent to 

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis (“DeSantis”) and Inspector General Miranda 

Miguel (“Miguel”) via e-mail.

1 The letters requested an investigation into a potential 

misuse of public office by CFO Jimmy Patronis (“Patronis”) and refer to an unnamed 

group of people as part of Patronis’ “inner circle” and “his enterprise.” 

To determine whether Plaintiff Kimberly Grippa (“Grippa”) is part of the

group, the reader must review Rubin’s Complaint against Paul Mitchell, which was

filed in Leon County Circuit Court at Case Number 2019-CA-002535 and

hyperlinked in Tein’s letters. The Complaint was filed on the same day that the 

letters requesting an investigation were sent to DeSantis and Miguel. The Court has 

already ruled that the statements in Rubin’s Complaint are privileged and cannot be 

used as a basis for Grippa’s defamation claim. ECF No. 22 at 9.

Tein’s e-mailing of the letters with hyperlinks to the Complaint are no 

different from an attorney sending a copy of a filed Complaint to a reporter, which 

does not create defamation liability under Florida law. Notwithstanding the litigation 

1 Both the Plaintiff’s Complaint and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, mistakenly state 

that Tein sent the letters after the investigation concluded and Rubin was dismissed. See Compl. 

¶¶11-12, ECF No. 6 at 10. Not so. The letters were sent on June 21, 2019, during the pendency of 

the investigation, which remained open until July 25, 2019, when the cabinet removed Rubin as 

Commissioner of the Office of Financial Regulation (“OFR”). ECF 4-2. 

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privilege, the letters are subject to a qualified privilege as related to an ongoing state 

investigation, which may only be overcome by Grippa’s demonstration that the 

letters were sent with express malice by Rubin. 

Express malice is “ill will, hostility and evil intent” and “the gravamen of 

express malice is the abuse of the privilege occasion by improper motives on the 

part of the speaker.” Jarzynka v. St. Thomas Univ. of Law, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 

1268 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citations omitted). Grippa cannot meet her burden under 

Florida law, which is to show more than a mere possibility of express malice, but 

that the primary intent of the Tein letters was to defame Grippa.

Furthermore, Rubin did not author the letters, so the “speaker” was Tein. 

Therefore, Grippa’s claim depends upon attributing Tein’s statements to Rubin, but 

no legal theory is available to Grippa to support such an attribution. First, Florida 

law requires a tort based on vicarious liability to be specifically pleaded, and Grippa 

never specifically pleaded vicarious liability. Second, vicarious liability for a 

principal can only occur if the agent was acting within the scope of agency. Libel is 

a criminally punishable misdemeanor in Florida, and Florida Bar Rules do not allow 

an attorney to assist a client in committing a crime. Therefore, even if Tein’s letters

had been libelous, sending them could not have been within the scope of his agency 

as Rubin’s attorney.

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Moreover, Grippa cannot show that Rubin had an improper motive of ill will, 

hostility, and evil intent regarding Tein’s statements because Rubin was unaware of 

Tein’s letters before they were sent. Grippa’s burden is not a mere possibility of 

improper motive, but that the primary purpose was an intent to defame her. But the 

Tein’s letters on their face state a legitimate purpose, which was to ask the

Governor’s Inspector General to assume oversight of the government investigation, 

not to defame Grippa, who is not specifically mentioned in the letters. Also, Rubin 

reasonably relied upon Tein’s professional judgment in determining what actions to 

take in the course of his representation of Rubin. There is no evidence that Rubin 

either directed the letters, authored them, or caused them to be sent with the primary 

motive to defame Grippa.

Additionally, Grippa has no evidence that the letters proximately caused her 

damage. Tein privately sent the letters to DeSantis and Miguel on June 21, 2019, the 

same day Rubin’s Complaint was filed. Six days later, Grippa wrote Ryan West to 

decline the Department of Financial Services’ (“DFS”) offer of employment. 

Grippa’s e-mail did not mention Tein’s letters, but it did discuss media coverage of

Rubin’s Complaint. Grippa cannot connect her alleged damages to the Tein letters

and show proximate causation apart from any alleged harm caused by the press 

reporting on Rubin’s Complaint. 

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Lastly, Grippa has no actual damages. Prior to the complained defamation, 

Grippa secured an offer of employment with DFS as a deputy general counsel for 

the Office of the Insurance Consumer Advocate (“ICA”), but Grippa rejected the 

offer by e-mail on June 27, 2019. Grippa’s supervisor-to-be, Peter Penrod, testified 

that had Grippa not rejected the offer, she would have been welcomed to work at the 

ICA. Grippa voluntarily rejected the exact type of employment that she claims 

Tein’s letters prevented her from obtaining. Her self-inflicted unemployment 

undercuts her claim to actual damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On or about June 10, 2019, Rubin hired Tein to represent him in an 

ongoing DFS investigation concerning allegations against Rubin while he was 

Commissioner of the Florida Department of Financial Services (“DFS”). ECF No. 

109-1, Rubin Decl. ¶2. 

2. At the same time, Rubin also hired Tein to represent him in a potential 

civil claim against lobbyist R. Paul Mitchell (“Mitchell”). Id. 

3. Rubin hired Tein to replace his prior attorneys at Coffey Burlington. Id.

¶3.

4. Rubin relied upon Tein to take those actions necessary to his

representation. Id. ¶4. 

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5. On June 21, 2019, Tein filed a Complaint against Mitchell alleging an 

ongoing pay-to-play scheme in Patronis’ office and, on the same day, e-mailed 

letters to Governor DeSantis and Inspector Miguel requesting an investigation into 

the same (“Tein letters”). ECF No. 109-3, ECF No. 109-4. 

6. The letters recited the allegations in the Complaint and included

hyperlinks to the filed Complaint. Id.

7. Rubin was unaware of the letters sent by Tein prior to Tein sending 

them. ECF No. 109-1 ¶¶5-6. 

8. Rubin did not author, contribute, direct, or approve the contents of the 

letters prior to Tein e-mailing them. Id. ¶6. 

9. Grippa was offered employment with DFS as a deputy general counsel 

for ICA, with a special exception to increase her annual salary to $100,000. ECF No. 

109-5 and 109-6. 

10. Grippa was made an offer of employment by DFS on May 10, 2019. 

ECF No. 109-6. 

11. Grippa’s immediate supervisor was to be Peter Penrod. ECF No. 109-9

at 29:23-25. 

12. Prior to being offered the position, Grippa never interviewed with 

Penrod. Id. at 17:19-24. 

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13. Peter Penrod approved Grippa’s salary for the deputy general counsel 

as $100,000, above the minimum salary of $64,000. Id. at 23:9-19; ECF No. 109-5.

14. Grippa was to start on July 1, 2019, in the position of deputy general 

counsel. ECF No. 109-9 at 29:18-20; 109-6. 

15. On June 27, 2019, Grippa e-mailed DFS Chief of Staff Ryan West 

(“West”) declining the offer of employment from DFS. ECF No. 109-7. 

16. Grippa’s e-mail to West stated “Mr. Rubin has sent out numerous press 

releases through a professional PR firm to slander my good name” but did not 

mention the Tein letters. Id. 

17. Grippa testified that she thinks that she became aware of Tein’s letters

after she read news articles about them but could not identify the specific news 

articles she read or produce copies of the articles she read. ECF No. 109-8 at 241:11-

242:10.

18. Grippa could only say that she read news articles that reported Tein’s

statements with a link to Rubin’s Complaint. ECF No. 109-8 at 243:22-244:6.

19. Penrod testified that had Grippa not declined the DFS job, she would 

have been welcomed to start on July 1, 2019, despite any allegations from Rubin. 

ECF No. 109-9 at 43:11-22, 44:2-6.

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20. The Court’s Order on the Motion to Dismiss limited Grippa’s basis for 

the defamation claim to the two letters Tein sent to DeSantis and Miguel. ECF No. 

22. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no disputed issues of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp.v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “Because of the importance 

of free speech, summary judgment is the ‘rule,’ and not the exception, in defamation 

cases.” Larreal v. Telemundo of Florida, LLC, 489 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1318 (S.D. 

Fla. 2020).

ARGUMENT

I. Grippa’s claim is based entirely on privileged statements from Rubin’s 

Complaint.

Tein’s letters to DeSantis and Miguel allege “misuse of public office by CFO 

Patronis and his inner circle” and also state “[i]n a lawsuit filed today, Mr. Rubin 

details improper, unethical and perhaps unlawful conduct on the part of Mr. Patronis 

and his enterprise...” ECF No. 109-3 and 109-4. Tein’s letters do not identify Grippa 

by name or inuendo – they contain no statements (defamatory or otherwise) about 

Grippa. See id. One must read Rubin’s Complaint to see Grippa’s name, much less 

understand Tein’s use of the terms “inner circle” and “enterprise.” 

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Grippa’s theory is that the Tein letters’ reference to the Complaint with a 

hyperlink is a different type of communication that is not afforded immunity. But a 

Florida appellate court has viewed similar circumstances and determined that 

providing a copy of a pleading in a third-party communication is entitled to absolute 

immunity. See Stewart v. Sun Sentinel Co., 695 So.2d 360, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) 

(attorney who gave a copy of a notice of claim to a reporter “as the trial court 

correctly found, was entitled to absolute immunity afforded judicial statements made 

in the course of judicial proceedings...”)2 Further, the Florida 4th DCA, in 

interpreting Stewart, explained that “the publication of the complaint or those 

documents which would be public records when filed in the Court would be covered 

by the judicial absolute immunity, because these documents are part of the judicial 

proceeding.” Ball v. D'Lites Enterprises, Inc., 65 So.3d 637, 641 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2011). Once filed, the Complaint was a matter of public record and the publication 

of the Complaint by Tein through the letters is also afforded absolute immunity. 

The alleged defamatory statement in this case is that “Grippa is part of an 

enterprise and inner circle that acted improperly, unethically and possibly unlawfully 

against Rubin.” But the most important part of that statement – that Grippa is part of 

the enterprise/inner circle - can only be determined by reading the Complaint. 

2 Decisions by the Florida district courts of appeals represent the law of Florida unless and until 

they are overruled by the Florida Supreme Court. Stanfill v. State, 384 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980)

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DeSantis, Miguel, or any other reader of the Tein letters could have obtained a copy 

of the Complaint from the Clerk of the Court. Just as in Stewart, the Tein letters 

recited allegations from a Complaint that was already a matter of public record, and 

those statements are afforded absolute immunity.

The Court has already determined that any allegedly defamatory statements 

in the Complaint are absolutely privileged. ECF No. 6 at 9. Since Grippa’s name 

does not appear in Tein’s letters and the litigation privilege prevents statements in 

the Complaint from being the basis for a defamation claim, Grippa has not identified 

any statements by anyone that can be the basis for a defamation claim against Rubin, 

regardless of such statements’ truth or falsity.

II. Grippa’s claim depends upon vicarious liability, which Grippa failed to 

plead and is contradicted by the evidence.

Grippa’s allegations gloss over a key fact that Rubin did not author any of the 

statements in Tein’s letters - and that her defamation claim must be based on 

vicarious liability. “Florida law is clear that in order to pursue a vicarious liability 

claim, the claimant must specifically plead it as a separate cause of action.” General 

Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Bob's Barricades, Inc., 22 So.3d 697, 699 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009) 

(citing Goldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1990)); Debose v. University of 

South Fla., 178 F.Supp.3d 1258, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2016)(same). But Grippa did not 

bring a separate claim for vicarious liability in her complaint, never amended her 

complaint to add such a claim, and is precluded from avoiding final summary 

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judgment based on a theory of vicarious liability that was not specifically pleaded. 

See Wilson v. Jacks, 310 So.3d 545, 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (applying the principal 

in Goldschmidt that a claim of vicarious liability for tort claim must be specifically 

pled in Complaint to be considered in avoiding a summary final judgment). Rubin 

is entitled to summary judgment because Grippa never pleaded a separate claim of 

vicarious liability, upon which her theory of defamation depends. 

Should the pleading deficiency be overlooked, Grippa may argue that she 

pleaded that Rubin sent the letters through his attorney, and that there is an 

assumption of agency in the attorney-client relationship. Even if that were generally 

true, the precise allegation would be that Rubin is liable for an intentional tort 

committed by his attorney agent. Under Florida law, “[t]here is no liability where 

the agent has stepped aside from his employment to commit a tort which the 

principal neither directed in fact, nor could be supposed, from the nature of his 

employment, to have authorized or expected the agent to do...” Chestnut Assoc., Inc. 

v. Assurance Co. of America, 17 F.Supp.3d 1203, 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (citing 

Jones v. City of Hialeah, 368 So.2d 398, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)). 

Rubin did not author the letters, did not approve them, and did not see the 

letters until after Tein sent them. ECF No. 109-1 ¶¶5-6. Further, Rubin reasonably 

relied on Tein’s professional judgment as an attorney to represent him in a manner 

that would not generate civil liability. Id. ¶4. There is no contrary evidence that 

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Rubin directed Tein to send the letters, nor could it be reasonably foreseeable by 

Rubin that Tein would commit defamation on his behalf. 

In Florida, libel is a misdemeanor of the first degree (Fla. Stat. §836.01), 

punishable as a crime by up to one year imprisonment and fines. Fla. Stat. 

§775.082(4)(a). Rule 4-1.2(d) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar states “[a] 

lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 

lawyer knows or reasonable should know is criminal.” Grippa’s vicarious liability 

theory runs contrary to Tein’s professional responsibilities, and the scope of Tein’s 

agency must be within the scope allowed by Rule 4-1.2(d). Grippa’s theory of 

liability, on its face, is outside the scope of Tein’s representation of Rubin.

III. Alternatively, Tein’s letters are protected by the qualified privilege that 

Grippa cannot overcome by a demonstration of express malice. 

A. The Qualified Privilege Applies

If the Court determines that Tein’s letters are not absolutely privileged, they 

are at least subject to a qualified privilege. Florida law provides a qualified privilege 

negating a claim for defamation where the speaker “acts in good faith, with an 

interest to be upheld, through a statement limited in scope to a specific purpose and 

published on a proper occasion and manner.” Regions Bank v. Kaplan, 8:12-CV1837-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 1193831, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2013), on 

reconsideration in part, 8:14-CV-1837-T-17MAP, 2015 WL 1456697 (M.D. Fla. 

Mar. 30, 2015). A communication made in good faith on any subject matter by one 

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having an interest therein, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if 

made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains 

matter which would otherwise be actionable. Id. 

Here, Tein authored the letters requesting that DeSantis and Miguel take over 

the DFS/OFR Investigation into Rubin. Tein had a legitimate interest to uphold by 

requesting their intervention in an investigation process that he perceived may be 

unduly influenced, improperly motivated, and unfairly biased. Tein, like every other 

attorney who represents a client, was acting pursuant to his own professional 

judgment to protect his client.

Another recognized legal ground for holding that a defendant's statements (or 

here, an attorney’s statements) are privileged is that they are the statements of a 

citizen to a political authority regarding matters of public concern. Nodar v. 

Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 1984). The letters request an investigation 

which is statutorily authorized by Florida Statute Section 14.32(2). Section 14.32(2)

mandates that the Chief Inspector General “(a) [i]nitiate, supervise, and coordinate 

investigations ... to deter, detect, prevent, and eradicate ... abuse, mismanagement, 

and misconduct in government [and] (k) [c]onduct special investigations ... at the 

request of the Governor.” Removing potentially unfair bias from an ongoing state 

investigation is a matter of public concern. Therefore, Tein’s letters are also 

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protected by the qualified privilege as statements to DeSantis and Miguel regarding 

matters of public concern.

B. Grippa Cannot Demonstrate Express Malice

The qualified privilege can be overcome in a defamation claim by showing 

express malice, where the “gravamen of express malice is the abuse of privilege 

occasion[ed] by improper motives on the part of the speaker.” Jarzynka v. St. 

Thomas Univ. of Law, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Nodar v. 

Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 811 n.8 (Fla. 1984)). Express malice has been defined 

by Florida courts as “ill will, hostility and evil intention to defame and injure.” Id. 

(citing Lewis v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 489, 492 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981)).

The letters were authored, signed, and sent by Tein. The speaker for the 

statements in the letter was Tein. Under a theory of vicarious liability, which has its 

own problems on summary judgment as outlined above, Grippa must argue that 

Rubin stepped into Tein’s shoes as the speaker and directed the statements be made 

with an improper motive evidenced by ill will, hostility, and evil intent. But Rubin 

was not even aware of the letters and did not author the letters, direct Tein to send 

them, or discuss the letters’ contents with Tein. ECF No. 109-1 ¶¶5-6.

Grippa bears the burden to show that Rubin, through Tein, was “motivated 

primarily by a desire to harm” Grippa’s reputation. Pomfret v. Atkinson, 137 So. 3d 

1161, 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). In Pomfret the trial court granted a directed verdict 

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on a defamation counterclaim because it could not be said there was express malice 

where the speaker was motivated to protect a proper interest. Id. Further, whether 

the speaker also bore some ill will to the allegedly defamed party did not alone 

establish express malice because “a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the defamatory statements were false and uttered with common 

law express malice – i.e., that the defendant’s primary motive in making the 

statements was the intent to injury the reputation of plaintiff.” Id. (citing DelMonico 

v. Traynor, 116 So. 3d 1205, 1220 (Fla. 2013). 

The Florida appellate court affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that there 

was no evidence to show express malice and that “[t]he incidental gratification of 

personal feelings of indignation is not sufficient to defeat the privilege where the 

primary motivation is within the scope of the privilege.” Id. The appellate court 

reasoned that the speaker’s “statements bore some relation to or connection with the 

subject of inquiry in the underlying lawsuit [and] were therefore protected by a 

qualified privilege.” Id. 

Tein’s primary motivation is clear from the face of the letters themselves, 

where he tried to persuade DeSantis and Miguel to take over the ongoing DFS/OFR

investigation. Tein’s letters do not specifically mention Grippa and after the parties 

have conducted extensive discovery on Grippa’s claims, there is still no evidence 

that Tein’s primary motivation in sending the letters was to defame Grippa. Rubin 

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has testified that he was not even aware the letters were sent. ECF No. 109-1 ¶5. 

Grippa has no evidence to meet her burden to show express malice and summary 

judgment must be entered in Rubin’s favor. 

IV. Grippa has no evidence of proximate causation

Florida law requires that “[i]n order to recover for defamation, a plaintiff must 

show that the damages were proximately caused by the defamatory statements.” 

Cape Publications, Inc. v. Reakes, 840 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Grippa 

fails to show that Tein’s letters proximately caused her damages: (1) the timing of 

the letters, e-mailed on June 21, 2019, suggests no correlation to her purported 

damages; (2) there is no evidence that the letters were provided to reporters,

publicized, or distributed to anyone other than DeSantis and Miguel; (3) Grippa 

cannot identify how she became aware of the letters3

; and (4) there was no action 

taken towards Grippa by anyone (including either DeSantis or Miguel) as a result of 

the letters (neither of those individuals or their offices had any communication with 

her regarding the letters). 

On June 27, 2019, less than six days after Tein’s letters were sent, Grippa 

declined DFS’ job offer in an e-mail that made no mention of the letters sent to 

DeSantis or Miguel. ECF No. 109-7. In fact, not only is there a complete lack of 

3 The letters likely came to light via a public records request made by Grippa or during the state 

court litigation between the parties. 

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evidence to support proximate causation between the letters and Grippa’s e-mail, but 

the e-mail also itself suggests she did not even know about the letters when she 

declined the job offer.

Moreover, Grippa must show that the alleged tortious conduct (Tein’s letters) 

rather than conduct that is subject to absolute immunity (the filing of Rubin’s 

Complaint), caused her damage. However, she has offered no evidence that would 

suggest that her purported damages can be attributed to the letters, rather than the 

media coverage of Rubin’s Complaint. 

Since Grippa has not shown proximate causation, summary judgment must be 

awarded for Rubin on the defamation claim.

V. Grippa has no actual damages

Actual damages are a necessary element of Grippa’s defamation claim. Turner 

v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2018). Grippa sought employment with the 

State as counsel for DFS. Despite any alleged defamation, she was offered the 

position of deputy general counsel for the ICA, reporting to the general counsel of 

DFS, Peter Penrod. Grippa was even offered a higher salary, $100,000 annually, for 

the position which required approval. ECF No. 109-5, 109-6.

Grippa cannot demonstrate that Rubin caused any harm to her potential 

employment with DFS. Grippa, on her own, decided to reject the DFS job offer. 

Penrod stated that had Grippa not rejected the offer, she would have been welcomed 

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to work in the position for which she was hired. ECF No. 109-9 at 43:11-22, 44:2-

6. 

Grippa has no actual damages – because she did not lose a job, and was not 

reprimanded or demoted, because of anything Rubin (or Tein) did. Her lack of 

employment was self-inflicted, and she has not shown any actual damages that 

resulted from Rubin’s conduct. For this additional reason alone, Rubin is entitled to 

summary judgment on Grippa’s defamation claim.

VI. Conclusion

Rubin is entitled to final summary judgment on Grippa’s defamation claim.

Dated this 14th day of February 2022.

RONALD RUBIN,

Defendant,

By Counsel,

/s/ James K. Kauffman

James L. Kauffman (FL # 012915) 

Bailey & Glasser LLP

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW

Suite 540

Washington DC 20007

T: 202.463.2101

F: 202.463.2103

jkauffman@baileyglasser.com

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT AND FONT

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this document contains 3852 words and has been 

typed in 14-point font.

/s/ James K. Kauffman

James L. Kauffman 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 14, 2022, a copy of the foregoing 

document was filed and served via the Court’s CM/ECF system to all counsel of 

record.

/s/ James K. Kauffman

James L. Kauffman 

Case 4:20-cv-00457-MW-MAF Document 110 Filed 02/14/22 Page 22 of 22