India and Pakistan 

Engagement 

Prospects for Breakthrough or Breakdown?

Summary

• Over the past year, India and Pakistan have been taking tentative steps toward 

improving their bilateral relations. The foreign ministers of both countries met in 

early September to review the progress made on the Indo-Pakistani “roadmap to 

peace,” which the two sides agreed on in mid-February. While still deeply divided 

over the issue of Kashmir and in agreement that the tangible outcomes have been 

minimal to date, both reaffirmed their commitment to the ongoing process. Despite 

changes in India’s leadership, this process is still lumbering forward. 

• This emerging détente is worthy of attention for several reasons. First, South Asia is 

the only region in the world where two nuclear-armed neighbors are in active conflict; the most recent crisis came during 2001–2002, when close to a million troops 

faced off for nearly a year along the Indo-Pakistani border. Second, Pakistan is a 

critical—if imperfect—partner in the global War on Terror. The United States wants 

to ensure Pakistan’s active support in counterterrorism activities along the PakistanAfghanistan border and within Pakistan. Third, one of the few means that Pakistan 

has developed to coerce concessions from India has been the use of militants—

generations of which Islamabad has nurtured to secure Pakistan’s interests in Kashmir 

and Afghanistan. These so-called mujahideen threaten the security of South Asia and 

beyond.

• Given the complexities and challenges facing both states, what motivated both to 

undertake this process? Observers generally agree that both India and Pakistan were 

confronting several internal political changes during this initial period of rapprochement, and that the commencement of this process reflected both countries’ internal 

political dynamics. For India’s part, the past two years of sustained dissonance with 

Islamabad has strained its ability to continue an internal dialogue with the various 

groups in Kashmir. Further, the ongoing discord with Islamabad has frustrated India’s 

efforts to improve its economic growth and expand its political influence beyond 

South Asia. India understands that the resolution of this conflict will be necessary to 

achieve its ultimate goal of becoming an important global power. 

www.usip.org

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SPECIAL REPORT 129 JANUARY 2005

ABOUT THE REPORT

While much depends upon the nascent 

peace process between India and Pakistan, 

there are many reasons to believe that the prospects 

for a breakdown are greater than those for a 

breakthrough. To assess such prospects, the United 

States Institute of Peace convened a roundtable of 

South Asia experts. This Special Report, written by 

program officer Christine Fair of the Institute’s Research 

and Studies Program, draws upon the roundtable 

discussions, as well as interviews with other regional 

analysts—particularly Shahid Javed Burki, Stephen 

Cohen, Husain Haqqani, Dennis Kux, Polly Nayak, 

Terasita Schaffer, Ashley Tellis, and Marvin Weinbaum. 

This Special Report considers means by which 

the India-Pakistan peace process can be sustained in at 

least a minimally positive way. In particular, the report 

explores the utility of the United States in ensuring 

the momentum of this opening; it also considers the 

role for other key players in the area, such as 

Russia and China.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

SPECIAL REPORT

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect 

those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does 

not advocate specific policy positions.

CONTENTS

Introduction 3

Background: A Bitter Past of Failure 3

Reasons to Be Hopeful? 7

Even More Reasons to Be Doubtful 8

Making the Most out of a Stalemate 11
• Regarding Pakistan’s motives, some analysts suggested that this initiative would 

give both Pakistan’s armed forces and the militants a much-needed respite from 

the last two years of persistent confrontation. Although Pakistan has endured its 

standoff with India, it has also confronted numerous threats along its border with 

Afghanistan, and its own internal security environment continues to deteriorate. 

Sectarian violence and organized criminal activity have racked Pakistan’s commercial 

and financial hub, Karachi, for decades with no relief in sight. Domestically, May 2004 

was Pakistan’s bloodiest month since Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999. 

• Both India and Pakistan were also believed to have undertaken this peace offensive 

with the United States and other international actors as the main intended audience. 

The 2001–02 crisis rattled nerves in Washington and beyond as the two nucleararmed enemies wavered on the brink of war. Following the 1998 nuclear tests and 

the 1999 Kargil crisis, the confrontation of 2001-02 left the United States and others weary of playing referee in these recurrent conflicts. In addition to both states’ 

incentives for normalization of relations, there is an increasing tendency within U.S. 

and international circles to press for a resolution of the conflict rather than just 

its management. More active mediation or facilitation by the United States would 

be welcomed in Pakistan, which has long sought international intervention in this 

dispute. India would likely resist such overtures, maintaining that this is a strictly 

bilateral issue, as enshrined in the 1972 Shimla Accord. 

• Although the grounds for optimism are tangible, there are equally compelling reasons 

to be doubtful about a settlement of the Indo-Pakistani dispute in the near future, 

the most fundamental of which is the inherent asymmetry of desired objectives with 

respect to the disposition of Kashmir: India seeks to engage Pakistan to legitimize 

the territorial status quo by finding some means to formalize the Line of Control 

(LOC) in Kashmir as the legal international border. Pakistan seeks to engage India to 

find some means of altering, in various ways, the status quo and publicly rejects the 

possibility of transforming the LOC into the international border as a viable means of 

dispute resolution. 

• Both countries’ internal constraints also do not bode well for a fundamentally new 

approach to resolving their conflict. On balance, the political and security dynamic 

in Pakistan is not comforting, suggesting that even if India is able to accommodate 

Pakistan’s demand on process, it is far from obvious that Islamabad would be capable 

of packaging this and marketing it to its citizens and other stakeholders (the army, 

for example) as a form of “progress” on Pakistan’s core concerns. This factor is a central element in keeping Pakistan engaged in the process and creating a public demand 

for a just peace. In addition, a resolution of the Kashmir issue means that Pakistan’s 

extensive and formidable militant infrastructure would have to be dismantled.

• India also has a number of domestic compulsions of its own: it is a rich and 

vibrant—if imperfect—democracy, and reaching consensus on contentious issues 

such as relations with Pakistan can be perhaps even more of a challenge in its diverse 

and active polity. Since the Kargil crisis and the ongoing attacks within Indianadministered Kashmir and within India proper, many Indians have grown weary of 

Pakistan’s tactics. Hard-liners feel that they should not have to reward Pakistan for 

ceasing activities that Islamabad should not have started in the first place. The 

results of India’s April-May 2004 general elections have also added an additional 

layer of uncertainty to this analysis: the electorate dismissed the Bharitya Janata 

Party (BJP)—the party that spearheaded the recent peace overture. Although the 

new Congress Party government affirmed its commitment to the peace process, it is 

far from certain that it has the domestic clout to continue the engagement.

• If history is any guide, the likelihood that this process will break down is high, 

and the probability of a meaningful breakthrough is quite slim. USIP roundtable 

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution 

created by Congress to promote the prevention, 

management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute 

meets its congressional mandate through an array 

of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs 

from high school through graduate school, 

conferences and workshops, library services, and 

publications. The Institute’s Board of Directors is 

appointed by the President of the United States 

and confirmed by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, 

ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, 

Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, 

D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker,

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School 

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S. 

Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, 

D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart 

Professor of International Relations, Stanford University • 

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, 

George Mason University • Mora L. McLean, President, 

Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. 

Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant 

Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration • Michael M. Dunn,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National 

Defense University • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

2
participants agreed that the outcome of this round of engagement ultimately will 

turn on the understanding held by New Delhi and by Islamabad on the core issues 

of the engagement and the concomitant progress made on each. Many participants 

felt that while breakthrough is certainly not likely, neither is a breakdown of the kind 

witnessed after the 1999 Lahore Declaration, whose resulting engagement suffered 

many onslaughts, the ultimate of which was the Kargil offensive in the spring of 1999. 

In light of these considerations, the roundtable participants generally concurred that 

stalemate is the most likely outcome of the current engagement process. 

Introduction

Over the past year, India and Pakistan have been taking tentative steps toward improving 

their bilateral relations. The foreign ministers of both countries met in early September 

2004 to review the progress that has been made thus far. While still deeply divided over 

the issue of Kashmir and in agreement that the tangible outcomes have been minimal to 

date, both reaffirmed their commitment to the ongoing process. This opening began when 

India’s then–prime minister Atal Vajpayee met with Pakistan’s president Pervez Musharraf 

on the sidelines of a January 2004 regional summit. Later, in mid-February, India and 

Pakistan agreed on a six-month “roadmap to peace,” which ostensibly would address all 

outstanding bilateral concerns. Despite changes in India’s leadership, this process is still 

lumbering forward. 

This emerging détente is worthy of attention for several reasons. First, South Asia is 

the only region in the world where two nuclear armed-neighbors are in active conflict. 

Their most recent crisis was in 2001–2002, when the two wavered on the brink of war for 

nearly a year, with more than one million troops lined up across the Indo-Pakistan border. 

Finding some means to resolve—rather than manage—their bilateral dispute is crucial to 

minimizing the likelihood of conventional conflict between the two and the possibility of 

either country’s resorting to “the nuclear option.” 

Second, Pakistan is a critical—if imperfect—partner in the global War on Terror. The 

United States wants to ensure Pakistan’s active support in counterterrorism activities 

along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and within Pakistan. Consequently, the United 

States was disconcerted by the strategic distraction posed by the near war of 2001–02 

as Islamabad swung some of its forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to defensive 

positions along the border with India. 

Third, one of the few means that Pakistan has developed to coerce concessions from 

India has been the use of militants—generations of which Islamabad has nurtured to 

fight Pakistan’s proxy wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan has established an expansive infrastructure to recruit, train, and deploy militants organized under 

various Islamist rubrics. These so-called mujahideen threaten the security of South Asia 

and beyond. Once trained, these militants ostensibly could operate anywhere in the world 

given adequate logistical support. Therefore, Pakistan’s militants are not simply a regional 

problem, but potentially a threat with global reach—members of one of Kashmir’s main 

militant groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba, were recently arrested in Basra, Iraq.

Background: A Bitter Past of Failure

Since their overt nuclearization in 1998, India and Pakistan attempted to make peace 

three times—including this most recent effort. In 1998 and 1999, optimism soared as 

the two adversaries embarked upon a much-lauded “bus diplomacy” campaign, culminating in the historic visit of Indian prime minister Vajpayee to Pakistan and the penning of 

an important agreement with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif. Speaking beneath 

3
4

A brief history of Kashmir

As British India was partitioned into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India in 1947 

as part of the independence process, Britain allowed the nominal rulers of the 

subcontinent’s “princely states” (essentially tax collectors for the British Crown) to 

decide their allegiance to either of the new, independent countries. The Hindu ruler 

of Kashmir did not decide until the following year, when he acceded to India’s rule 

in exchange for an Indian force that halted an invasion by Pakistani “tribesmen” 

and established a de facto partition, known as the Line of Control, dividing the 

geostrategically important region into Pakistani-controlled and Indian-controlled 

portions. 

India then took the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council, which passed a 

resolution in 1948 requesting Pakistan to withdraw its “tribesmen” from the area 

and that a plebiscite be conducted to determine Kashmiris’ desires for rule. Neither 

action has been taken to date.

In the 1962 Indo-Chinese border war, the People’s Republic of China occupied 

the northwestern Ladakh region of Kashmir. Three years later, India and Pakistan 

fought another border war, which stretched to the Line of Control. A UN-brokered 

cease-fire agreement was affirmed by India and Pakistan at a 1966 summit.
the Minar-e-Pakistan, a monument in Lahore commemorating the founding of Pakistan, 

Vajpayee signaled to many Pakistanis that India finally recognizes the legitimacy of the 

Pakistani state. The statement was doubly important because Vajpayee’s base of support 

was among Hindu nationalists, who historically espoused the goal of “Akand Bharat,” 

or a “greater India” that includes Pakistan. Such rhetoric naturally has fueled Pakistan’s 

persistent belief that India desires the collapse of the state.

Despite the promise of progress signaled by the Lahore engagement, all hopes were 

dashed upon the Himalayan peaks of Kargil in the spring of 1999: Pakistan launched a 

limited territorial war in the Kargil-Dras sectors of Kashmir under the military leadership 

of Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf. Many believe that the planning for this operation 

was concurrent with the Lahore Peace Process, confirming many Indians’ conviction that 

Pakistan is inherently duplicitous and an unworthy negotiation partner. This belief in 

Pakistani perfidy was exacerbated when the chief advocate of the Kargil offensive, General 

Musharraf, executed a bloodless coup and deposed Prime Minister Sharif.

Despite tremendous Indian misgivings and mistrust, both sides again tried to make 

peace in July 2001 in the Indian city of Agra. Few were optimistic about the prospects 

for that effort as neither side could even agree on how to describe the central issues of 

their dispute. In the run-up to the summit, the Indian government expressed concern 

about how Indian protocol would handle a visit by a Pakistani chief executive, which was 

unprecedented. Musharraf rendered this concern moot by declaring himself president. 

The Agra summit broke down amid mutual recriminations and disappointment without so 

much as a joint statement or a commitment to reconvene discussions at a later time. 

5

Following the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971, India’s Indira Gandhi and 

Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signed the 1972 Shimla Accord, agreeing “to settle 

their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other 

peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.” They affirmed that neither 

will try to unilaterally alter the Line of Control.

In the late 1980s, militancy increased in Kashmir, as the Soviet Union withdrew 

from Afghanistan and many mujahideen relocated to Kashmir with support from 

the Pakistani government. The territorial conflict was increasingly infused with 

religious ideology, as mujahideen in Kashmir viewed the conflict as a “jihad.” At the 

same time, Hindu nationalism continued to gain strength in the Indian heartland.

Violence rose in Kashmir during the 1990s, as Pakistani-supported Islamic militants launched sporadic assaults on non-Muslims, who fled mainly to the southern 

Jammu region. India responded with repression. Both sides were accused of mass 

human rights abuses. In 1998, the Hindu fundamentalist Bharitya Janata Party 

came to power; both India and Pakistan declared themselves nuclear powers after 

conducting overt weapons tests. The following year, Indian prime minister Atal 

Behari Vajpayee met with his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore; three 

months later, Pakistan-based militants invaded Kargil in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir. President Clinton convinced Sharif to withdraw Pakistani forces 

from Kargil; Sharif was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf, the chief advocate 

of the Kargil offensive, shortly thereafter. 

On October 1, 2001, a terrorist attack on the Kashmir legislature in Srinagar 

left 38 dead. Two months later, 14 were killed in a terrorist attack on the Indian 

parliament on December 13; India responded by massing hundreds of thousands of 

troops on the Pakistani border, including along the Line of Control.

More than 30 people were killed in another terrorist attack on the families of 

Indian troops in Kashmir on May 14, 2002. In response to India’s announcement of 

retaliation, Pakistan hinted at the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. diplomats managed 

to defuse the crisis, and Pakistan pledged to stop cross-border infiltration. 
With two recent disappointing failures under their belts, both states again are attempting to forge peace. This current round began in early January 2004, when Vajpayee traveled to Pakistan to participate in a summit convened by the South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation (SAARC). While speculation was rife that Vajpayee would meet with 

Musharraf on the sidelines, neither confirmed or denied the rumors until a meeting was 

imminent. On January 5, the two heads of state met in what the Indian Foreign Office 

deemed a “courtesy call. ” This was the first formal encounter between the two leaders 

since the failed Agra Summit of 2001.

The event was significant because it signaled a formal end of a ten-month crisis that 

unfolded following the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament and 

another terrorist attack on family members of Indian troops in Kashmir’s Kaluchak in May 

2002. New Delhi alleged that the perpetrators were militant groups backed by Islamabad 

and responded with a massive mobilization of forces along India’s border with Pakistan. 

In turn, Pakistani troops were amassed to check the Indian deployments. With more than 

a million soldiers confronting each other along their shared border, India and Pakistan 

were in a near state of war that persisted through October 2002. 

Given the level of bitterness and distrust that permeated Indo-Pakistani relations, this 

meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf has generated considerable optimism among 

international observers. Yet many questions loom about the durability of this nascent 

process and its prospects for even limited degrees of success. 

Many South Asia analysts are doubtful that substantive progress is likely in large part 

because the desired outcomes of India and Pakistan are fundamentally at odds: Pakistan 

seeks a means to engage India to alter the status quo with regard to the disputed disposition of Kashmir. In other words, Pakistan does not accept the current de facto border (the 

Line of Control, or LOC) that divides the disputed territory of Kashmir into distinct portions administered by Pakistan and India. India, conversely, seeks a negotiation process 

that will eventually ratify the status quo in Kashmir, principally through transforming the 

LOC into the international border. In the absence of significant change in these tightly 

held positions, it is difficult to envision meaningful progress being made toward sustainable settlement. These conflicting objectives are discussed in greater length below.

Motives for Moving Toward Peace Now

Given the complexities and challenges facing both states, what motivated both to undertake this process? Several prominent analysts believe India had the initiative throughout: 

Prime Minister Vajpayee consented to participate in the SAARC summit in Islamabad, but 

he provided no assurances that either discussions with Musharraf or renewed bilateral 

talks with Pakistan were on the table. Brajesh Mishra, Vajpayee’s trusted national security 

adviser, laid the groundwork for a potential meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee. 

The SAARC summit was well underway before the Indian side announced its consent to a 

bilateral meeting. Many believe that the Indians were responding to the noticeably different tone used by Pakistani prime minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali at the summit, where 

he refrained from criticizing India. This likely reflected a conscious decision on behalf of 

Islamabad to signal to New Delhi its willingness to engage India constructively.

Observers generally agree that both India and Pakistan were confronting several 

internal political changes during this initial period of rapprochement, and that the commencement of this process reflected both countries’ internal political dynamics. For India’s 

part, the past two years of sustained dissonance with Islamabad has strained its ability 

to continue an internal dialogue with the various groups in Kashmir. Such normalizing 

of relations between Srinagar (the political epicenter of Kashmir) and New Delhi is fundamental to bringing about some degree of peace to the embattled valley. Further, the 

ongoing discord with Islamabad has frustrated India’s efforts to improve its economic 

growth and expand its political influence beyond South Asia. India understands that the 

6

Given the level of bitterness and 

distrust that permeated IndoPakistani relations, this meeting 

between Vajpayee and Musharraf has generated considerable 

optimism among international 

observers. Yet many questions loom about the durability of this nascent process and 

its prospects for even limited 

degrees of success. 
resolution of this conflict will be necessary to achieve its ultimate goal of becoming an 

important global power. 

Some observers were cynical about India’s opening to Islamabad and dismissed it 

as a mere tactical move to woo the country’s Muslim electorate and ensure a victory 

for Vajpayee’s Bharitya Janata Party (BJP) in spring 2004. Others, more optimistically, 

believed that Prime Minister Vajpayee was truly a man of peace who genuinely sought to 

end his career with a major breakthrough with India’s long-standing nemesis. 

Pakistan’s motives are even more shrouded in uncertainty. Some analysts suggested 

that this initiative would give both Pakistan’s armed forces and the militants a muchneeded respite from the past two years of persistent confrontation. Although Pakistan has 

endured its standoff with India, it has also confronted numerous threats along its border 

with Afghanistan, and its own internal security environment continues to deteriorate. 

Sectarian violence and organized criminal activity have racked Pakistan’s commercial and 

financial hub, Karachi, for decades with no relief in sight. Domestically, May 2004 was 

Pakistan’s bloodiest month since Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999. 

Both India and Pakistan were also believed to have undertaken this peace offensive 

with the United States and other international actors as the main intended audience. 

The 2001–02 crisis rattled nerves in Washington and beyond as the two nuclear-armed 

enemies wavered on the brink of war. Following the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 Kargil 

crisis, the confrontation of 2001-02 left the United States and others weary of playing 

referee in these recurrent conflicts.

Reasons to Be Hopeful?

The confluence of motives for Indo-Pakistan détente suggests there is room for guarded 

optimism. Both countries have a stake in normalization. Commentators within Pakistan 

maintain that since coming to power in 1999, Musharraf has come to appreciate the toll 

Pakistan’s policies have taken on its social, political, and economic development. They 

argue moreover that Pakistan’s reliance on Islamist militant proxies poses greater risks to 

the integrity of the Pakistani state than it does to the Indian state; this argument has 

become more salient in the post–9/11 world. Many observers recognize that without a 

workable settlement with India, Pakistan will be unlikely to abandon its strategic reliance 

on proxy elements. Finding ways of dismantling militancy in Pakistan is beginning to gain 

traction among some circles, creating constituencies for conflict resolution.

India also would prefer to redirect the energy and resources it invests in the confrontation with Pakistan and use them to pursue its long-sought-after quest for great-power 

status. Because achieving these objectives requires resolution of Kashmir and all other 

significant outstanding concerns with Pakistan, India is motivated to find some means of 

putting these issues in the past as a prerequisite for a more promising future.

In addition to both states’ incentives for normalization of relations, there is an increasing tendency within U.S. and international circles to press for a resolution of the conflict 

rather than just its management. Many policymakers and analysts openly question how 

long the United States and the international community are willing and able to play “crisis 

manager,” suggesting a requirement for resolution rather than management. 

More active mediation or facilitation by the United States would be welcomed in Pakistan, which has long sought international intervention in this dispute. India would likely 

resist such overtures, maintaining that this is a strictly bilateral issue, as enshrined in the 

1972 Shimla Accord. Yet India’s position has not prevented it from using the United States 

to coerce desired behavior from Islamabad. Many note that this use is tantamount to a 

form of intervention and exposes the contradiction between what India says and what it 

does. Further, this reliance may represent some degree of willingness to permit some form 

of “facilitation”—a term that India prefers to mediation.

7

Many policymakers and analysts 

openly question how long the 

United States and the international community are willing and able to play “crisis 

manager,” suggesting a requirement for resolution rather 

than management.

Although Pakistan has endured 

its standoff with India, it 

has also confronted numerous 

threats along its border with 

Afghanistan, and its own internal security environment 

continues to deteriorate.
Despite Indian opposition, advocates of the conflict’s resolution rightly point out 

that even if the nature of the dispute is bilateral, the consequences of any major conflict between the two states undoubtedly will be far reaching. In the event of a nuclear 

exchange (whether by accident or by design) the region will be severely affected and the 

international community will have to mobilize and deploy vast resources to address the 

humanitarian crisis following what would be the postwar era’s first nuclear war. Thus a 

resolution of the conflict is of concern to the international community at large and merits 

third-party facilitation (or some other substitute form of mediation). 

Even More Reasons to Be Doubtful

Although the grounds for optimism are tangible, there are equally compelling reasons to 

be doubtful about a settlement of the Indo-Pakistani dispute in the near future, the most 

fundamental of which is the inherent asymmetry of desired objectives with respect to the 

disposition of Kashmir. In addition to this basic barrier to a breakthrough, both states 

have their own internal constraints and problems that may well frustrate the prospects 

for a fundamentally new approach to resolving their conflict. Each of these concerns will 

be discussed below.

Objectives of Engagement Are Structurally in Conflict

India and Pakistan disagree over the centrality of the Kashmir dispute in their historically 

bitter relations. For Pakistan, Kashmir is a pivotal dispute that precludes normalization 

with India. New Delhi is loath to concede that there is even a valid dispute over Kashmir, claiming that the 1947 accession of the Princely State of Kashmir to India during 

Partition is as an indisputable fact; thus it prefers to place the Kashmir-related tensions 

within a basket of several other issues—the so-called “composite dialogue.” Indeed, one 

of the central problems that has undermined past Indo-Pakistani détente efforts has been 

the simple fact that both states approach the issue for reasons that are in fundamental 

conflict: 

• India seeks to engage Pakistan to legitimize the territorial status quo by finding 

some means to formalize the LOC as the legal international border. Thus for India, 

the status quo is a basis for a solution to the ongoing dispute over the disposition 

of Kashmir.

• Pakistan seeks to engage India to find some means of altering, in various ways, the 

status quo and publicly rejects the possibility of transforming the LOC into the international border as a viable means of dispute resolution. For Pakistan the status quo 

is the problem, not the solution to the problem. 

These diametrically opposed objectives are typically reflected in the ways in which both 

states engage each other. For example, Pakistan historically has sought to place the 

Kashmir issue at the top of the bilateral agenda. As the weaker state, Pakistan cannot 

surrender the primacy of the Kashmir issue because it fears that it may never be resolved. 

Or, worse yet, Pakistan fears that the dispute over Kashmir may be permanently deferred 

while India seeks a separate peace with the Kashmiris; such an accord between New Delhi 

and Srinagar could be presented to Islamabad as a fait accompli, with the expectation 

that Islamabad simply acquiesces. Both of these options disconcert Pakistan because they 

disregard any acknowledgment of Pakistan’s interests in the final disposition of Kashmir. 

Pakistan has been supporting militant elements operating within Indian-administered 

Kashmir and, in recent years, in the Indian hinterland to compel India to acquiesce on the 

disputed territory. Consequently, Pakistan has resisted (and in all likelihood will continue 

to resist) Indian demands that it end its support for militants in Kashmir as a prerequisite 

for engagement. From Islamabad’s perspective, there are few benefits to be had from 

8
shutting down the militancy, as Pakistan believes that this is the only card it can play 

against its much larger adversary. Yet if Pakistan remains unwilling or unable to seriously 

address its own internal security concerns and permanently abandon militancy as a tool 

of foreign policy, it may well find itself diplomatically and politically isolated.

Conversely, India has moved substantially from its Cold War preference for economic 

isolationism and political nonalignment. Since the mid-1990s, India has pursued a sophisticated foreign policy that includes comprehensive “Look East” and “Look West” initiatives. Currently, New Delhi enjoys better relations with Pakistan’s immediate neighbors 

and regional allies (for example, Iran, Afghanistan, the Central Asian states, and Israel) 

than does Islamabad. Ominously, Pakistan’s sense of insecurity will only deepen as India 

continues to develop into a global—rather than just a regional—power.

India for its part has no compunction about walking away from a process that prefigures Kashmir as the primary focus of negotiation; in the near and long term, it principally 

seeks an end to Pakistan-supported militancy. Although India has paid a high price for 

fighting the insurgency there, it is confident that it can sustain the status quo indefinitely. It also believes that Pakistan may not be able to continue in the same manner ad 

infinitum; in a war of attrition, New Delhi is confident that it will prevail over its reckless 

adversary.

With these conflicting objectives and strategies, it is easy to understand why previous efforts at rapprochement between the two countries have failed and why the current 

initiative merits a great deal of skepticism. Pessimists point out that the objectives held 

by India and Pakistan have not changed substantially, and that this elemental asymmetry 

is likely to persist as a structural barrier to substantive engagement even if procedural 

engagement continues. In other words, although New Delhi will episodically engage in 

“talks” with Islamabad on a variety of issues (perhaps including Kashmir), it will continue 

to seek internal solutions to the Kashmir problem.

Pakistan’s Internal Constraints and Challenges

Pakistan faces several immediate challenges that jeopardize the viability of this emerging 

peace process. Musharraf has survived numerous attempts on his life, and future attempts 

cannot be dismissed. He rebuffed the various pressures to step down as Army chief of 

staff in December 2004 and has announced that he would remain both president and 

Army chief. Furthermore, Musharraf’s moves to oust Pakistani premier Jamali exposed the 

fiction that power lies anywhere but within Army headquarters in Rawalpindi. This revelation raises a few questions. First, to what extent is the peace process dependent upon 

the interests of President Musharraf and his ability to keep control of the levers of power? 

Second, what are Musharraf’s interests in pursuing peace with India? Third, what would 

compel him to abandon the peace process?

Since the December 2001 and May 2002 attacks, the United States has tried periodically to persuade Islamabad to cease and desist from its reliance on proxy elements to 

prosecute its foreign policy objectives toward Kashmir and to refrain from trying to redraw 

maps with force. However, Islamabad has consistently maintained that it can go only so 

far in dissociating itself from the militant elements based in Pakistan. The recent attempts 

on Musharraf’s life have legitimized claims that additional concessions will further jeopardize him. Instead, Pakistan has chosen to calibrate the activities of the insurgents under 

its control with the fluctuating intensity of U.S. pressure. This carefully balanced strategy 

has allowed Pakistan to retain U.S. support while preserving the use of militants as an 

instrument of state power.

Because of the attempts on his life, Musharraf has been motivated to take aspects

of Pakistan’s internal security much more seriously while remaining unwilling to systematically and permanently dismantle the militant infrastructure in the country. Instead, 

Musharraf’s regime has attempted to disaggregate Pakistan’s militants into two groups: 

9

Because of the attempts on 

his life, Musharraf has been 

motivated to take aspects of 

Pakistan’s internal security 

much more seriously while 

remaining unwilling to 

systematically and permanently 

dismantle the militant infrastructure in the country.

India for its part has no compunction about walking away 

from a process that prefigures 

Kashmir as the primary focus 

of negotiation; in the near and 

long term, it principally seeks 

an end to Pakistan-supported 

militancy.
10

the good jihadis (freedom fighters in Kashmir) and the bad (for example, sectarian 

groups, al Qaeda, and Taliban remnants). While the latter have become targets of state 

elimination campaigns, the former have been given considerable leeway. The fact that 

Pakistan’s militant groups are still operating, recruiting, and publishing—despite various 

bans—suggests that there is more bark than bite to some of Pakistan’s policies. 

The Pakistani Army is also a serious impediment to movement away from militancy 

in Kashmir. For all intents and purposes, the army dictates Pakistan’s foreign policy and 

is the single most important institution domestically. The centrality of the army in the 

Pakistani state casts doubt on the sincerity of Islamabad’s intent to abandon its strategic 

use of proxy warfare in the near or distant future. The Pakistani Army gains legitimacy to 

interfere in the country’s domestic affairs in part from the ongoing security competition 

with India over Kashmir, so the army has little incentive to resolve outstanding concerns 

with its principal adversary to the east. 

Clearly, Islamabad’s approach contains several contradictory elements. First, its tenacious support of militancy in Kashmir stands in opposition to Musharraf’s own recognition that militancy is a diminishing asset in the post–9/11 world. Few countries now are 

willing to distinguish between “freedom fighters” and “terrorists” and between “terrorist 

movements” and “insurgencies.” Second, given the ongoing morphing of groups that operate in Kashmir and the sectarian groups that target Shi’a individuals and organizations 

in Pakistan, pretending that such distinctions really exist continues to pose innumerable 

internal security challenges. Third, in light of the various attempts on Musharraf’s life, 

there can be little doubt that he appreciates the reality that continued support of this 

militancy poses a greater danger to himself than to India. Fourth, Pakistan is experiencing 

an Islamicization of criminal activity and a criminalization of some Islamist activities. All 

of this bodes ill for Pakistan’s ability to make the transition into a robust state with a 

stable civil society for its citizens.

One recurrent theme in Pakistan’s various offers to temper its militant elements is 

the insistence that India “create space” for Musharraf to do more to counter them. The 

term “create space” sometimes implies specific action to be undertaken by New Delhi, 

such as a partial troop demobilization. More often it suggests that India take a hiatus 

from publicly criticizing Pakistan or placing demands on it as criterion for engagement. 

Islamabad argues that it has gone about as far as it can go with respect to containing 

jihadist groups, and that it needs such space—however defined—in order to contain 

them further. Cynics suggest that this is just another tactic with which Musharraf justifies 

keeping the militancy option open. 

While Islamabad’s intentions with respect to the jihadists are uncertain, so is its ability 

to meaningfully contend with them. Even if Islamabad were wholeheartedly devoted to 

tackling these internal security challenges, it is doubtful it has the resources to do so: 

Pakistan’s police are corrupt, ill equipped, poorly paid, infiltrated by a variety of nefarious 

elements, and incapable of performing the most elementary aspects of criminal investigation and evidence gathering. In addition, Pakistan’s judicial system has suffered because 

of the swift reprisals of militant groups targeting judges who convict their cadres or leaders. As a result, Pakistan’s entire internal security apparatus remains largely ineffectual.

Pakistan’s domestic political environment provides further sources of pessimism for 

the likely outcome of Indo-Pakistani engagement. Musharraf’s credibility has suffered 

in recent years. Musharraf has weathered all pressures to step down as Army chief and 

has announced that he will remain in that position. Further, Pakistan recently has had a 

change in the patina of its domestic leadership. In the waning days of June 2004, Prime 

Minster Jamali “resigned,” amid all-too-adamant assertions that he had not been pressured to do so by the Musharraf regime. Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain became 

the interim premier to warm the bench for Shaukat Aziz to take the helm of the soon-tobe reconstituted civilian institutions.

Pakistan’s internal dynamics could have significant implications for its foreign policy 

initiatives toward India. In the event that Pakistan’s domestic security situation conOne recurrent theme in Pakistan’s various offers to temper 

its militant elements is the 

insistence that India “create 

space” for Musharraf to do 

more to counter them.
11

tinues to degrade, Musharraf may find himself in even greater peril. His ability to exert 

influence on Islamist elements may wane, putting himself and his corps commanders at 

risk. In the event of future attacks on his life, Musharraf may choose to let rapprochement with India slide. Should he not survive such an attack, his successor would also 

likely desist from pursuing an opening with India. The attempted assassination of Corps 

Commander Lieutenant General Ahsan Azeem in June 2004, suggests that Musharraf is not 

the only target in the sites of the militants. Such attempts to target Musharraf’s principal 

bastion of support may soften the resolve of the army to support Musharraf’s policies writ 

large—particularly those toward New Delhi and Kashmir.

On balance, the political and security dynamic in Pakistan is not comforting, suggesting that even if India is able to accommodate Pakistan’s demand on process, it is far from 

obvious that Islamabad would be capable of packaging this and marketing it to its citizens and other stakeholders (the army, for example) as a form of “progress” on Pakistan’s 

core concerns. This factor is a central element in keeping Pakistan engaged in the process 

and creating a public demand for a just peace.

India’s Internal Sources of Resistance to Engaging Islamabad

Ironically, although Islamabad demands understanding of its deeply complex and convoluted domestic situation and its fundamental constraints on policy innovation, India also 

has a number of domestic compulsions of its own: it is a rich and vibrant—if imperfect—democracy, and reaching consensus on contentious issues such as relations with 

Pakistan can be perhaps even more of a challenge in its diverse and active polity. Since 

the Kargil crisis and the ongoing attacks within Indian-administered Kashmir and within 

India proper, many Indians have grown weary of Pakistan’s tactics. Hard-liners feel that 

they should not have to reward Pakistan for ceasing activities that Islamabad should not 

have started in the first place. Such hardened positions likely will dictate how far New 

Delhi can go in creating the kind of “space” Islamabad demands. 

The results of India’s April–May 2004 general elections have also added an additional 

layer of uncertainty to this analysis: the electorate dismissed the BJP—the party that 

spearheaded this peace overture. To the astonishment of most onlookers, the Indian voters returned the Congress Party to power (along with several allies) after a long hiatus 

in opposition to the BJP. Although the new Congress government affirmed its commitment to the process, it is far from certain that it has the domestic clout to continue the 

engagement. 

In the several days following the May 2004 Congress Party victory, many observers on 

the subcontinent and beyond wondered about the fate of the nascent engagement process. Some of these apprehensions, however, may have been misplaced: the Congress government is perhaps even more eager to explore the possibilities of détente with Pakistan. 

Despite its best intentions, concerns persist that the Congress Party has no “hard-line” 

constituencies, which may render it vulnerable to domestic critics. Will the Congress Party 

have the heft and credentials to carry the complex and fissiparous Indian populace along 

the process of engagement? With such burdens of credibility, will India be able to provide 

Pakistan’s minimal expectations to keep the process alive under a Congress government? 

Making the Most out of a Stalemate

If history is any guide, the likelihood that this process will break down is high, and the 

probability of a meaningful breakthrough is quite slim. USIP roundtable participants 

agreed that the outcome of this round of engagement ultimately will turn on the understanding held by New Delhi and by Islamabad on the core issues of the engagement and 

the concomitant progress made on each. Many participants felt that while breakthrough 

is certainly not likely, neither is a breakdown of the kind witnessed after the 1999 Lahore 

The results of India’s April–May 

2004 general elections have 

also added an additional layer 

of uncertainty to this analysis: 

the electorate dismissed the 

BJP—the party that spearheaded this peace overture.
12

Declaration, whose resulting engagement suffered many onslaughts, the ultimate of 

which was the Kargil offensive in the spring of 1999. In light of these considerations, 

participants generally concurred that stalemate is the most likely outcome of the current 

engagement process. 

India’s domestic compulsions regarding Pakistan and the intractable Kashmir problem 

will preclude it from satisfying Islamabad’s basic requirements for “progress” in order to 

permit the engagement to continue. Absent such progress, Pakistan has very little reason for strategically abandoning militancy. For its part, Islamabad’s fixations on its own 

domestic constraints without a realistic appraisal of India’s will encourage it to have unrealistic demands of New Delhi. Few of the USIP roundtable participants saw any prospects 

for breaking out of this pernicious—if predictable—circle. 

More than his Indian counterpart, Musharraf faces incentives that predispose him to 

prefer stalemate to any other outcome. Certainly, he has every reason to want to avoid 

another damaging episode on his watch: not only will such an episode aggravate tensions 

with India, it will also distract Pakistan from its problems with Afghanistan and its efforts 

to sustain its relationship with the United States. Yet Musharraf has no reason to truly 

solve the Kashmir issue, even if it were his to solve. Such an overture would be perilous for 

him personally and disastrous for the institution of the army, which is thoroughly vested 

in conflict with India. It is important to appreciate that it is the institution of the army, 

perhaps more than any of its senior leaders, that many army officers seek to protect: the 

army is seen as one of the only functioning and competent institutions in Pakistan, a 

status that the military will act to cultivate and protect over the long term. On balance, 

Musharraf likely seeks a series of small steps towards normalization, each with its own 

opportunity for reneging. 

Several roundtable participants believed that if New Delhi could reach some sort of 

resolution with the Kashmiris, Islamabad could be presented with a fait accompli; many 

other participants rejected this scenario out of hand: any solution without Pakistan’s 

fingerprints would not be palatable to Islamabad and would have no takers among Pakistan’s elites. Rather, New Delhi needs to work out a package that would give Islamabad 

something to sell to its general public, which has been fed a steady diet of propaganda 

about attaining Kashmir for the past fifty years. If meaningful steps could be made on 

addressing Kashmiris’ welfare and full enfranchisement, Islamabad could claim movement 

on these issues as victories of sorts. In other words, Islamabad could claim, with varying degrees of legitimacy, that these various improvements for the lives of the Kashmiris 

would not have happened without Pakistan’s insistence. 

Keeping the Momentum Going

If stalemate is the best likely outcome of the current Indo-Pakistani engagement process, 

what can be done to make the best of this less-than-optimal situation? What can be done 

to prevent any backsliding while simultaneously creating a climate that could enable 

forward movement in the future? To achieve these modest objectives, all relevant parties 

must creatively devise several tactical means by which both India and Pakistan can be 

persuaded to stay at the bargaining table, even if meaningful progress is not being made 

on their respective core strategic issues. As one prominent South Asia analyst explained, 

for this to succeed, essentially two minimal conditions must be met simultaneously: 

• Pakistan must suspend its conclusion that no meaningful progress is happening on 

Kashmir and that the only resort at Pakistan’s disposal is the continued calibration of 

the intensity of the insurgency.

• India must also suspend its conclusion that it is not seeing a meaningful decrease 

in terrorism, that there is little positive utility from engaging Pakistan, and that it 

should kill militants while seeking to deal with the Kashmiris independently.

Clearly, success in keeping this engagement alive will require both sides to be much 

more invested in the peace process than they are at present. Both states need to begin 

If meaningful steps could be 

made on addressing Kashmiris’ 

welfare and full enfranchisement, Islamabad could claim 

movement on these issues as 

victories of sorts.
13

an internal dialogue process whereby their respective peoples can begin to appreciate the 

benefits of peace. In Pakistan, this process may mean authoring and promulgating new 

national narratives that do not singularly rely on the acquisition of Kashmir as a prerequisite to completing the Pakistani state. India must seriously engage the dilemma of how it 

treats Kashmiris: How can the state deny them basic rights while simultaneously claiming 

them as citizens? Both countries must do more to create constituencies for peace.

Roundtable participants offered more concrete means by which the process may be 

encouraged, even if movement is not being made on core issues. Many of these means 

could constitute a tactical form of engagement that could, in principle, satisfy the two 

above-noted constraints. Key proposals are discussed below.

• Expanding the contacts of Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control. One of the 

ways of doing this is establishing bus service linking Muzaffarabad in Pakistanadministered Kashmir to Srinagar in Indian-administered Kashmir; another “bus 

option” would link Suchetgar in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Jammu in Indianadministered Kashmir. Many families on both sides of the LOC have been separated 

for decades. Provision of such a service may make movement within the disputed 

territory more feasible, facilitate the reunion of families, and even encourage marital 

and other family alliances across the LOC. Kashmiri proponents also maintain that this 

service would permit Kashmiri political leaders to forge contacts across the divided 

territory. While USIP roundtable participants acknowledged that there are technical 

challenges in this proposal (for example, required paperwork, security issues, and so 

forth), all agreed that these concerns could be resolved if the political leaders made 

this proposal a priority.

• Expand population contacts within India and Pakistan. Although the MuzaffarabadSrinagar bus idea has captured the attention of many, some participants cautioned 

that this is not the only area worthy of attention. Rather, population contacts should 

be expanded and reunions of families scattered across India and Pakistan should be 

encouraged. To increase the ease of obtaining visas and facilitate travel between 

the two states, consulates could be established in Karachi and in Bombay. Another 

means of expanding people-to-people contacts is the development of educational 

exchanges. Currently, many Pakistanis must go abroad to receive quality highereducation opportunities. India’s excellent postsecondary institutions may be a costeffective alternative for Pakistanis seeking high-quality education while encouraging 

interpersonal contacts among Pakistani and Indian citizens. 

• Pipelines for peace. Several roundtable participants were hopeful about the benefits 

of a natural gas pipeline through Iran, Pakistan, and India in fostering confidence 

between the two states. Some believed that cooperation could be worked out through 

the auspices of the World Bank, whose role in negotiating the Indus Water Treaty was 

raised as a potential template. However, the involvement of Iran in the project would 

likely complicate such an initiative, given the antipathy that exists between Tehran 

and Washington. 

• Expanding markets to build confidence. Despite the gravity and importance of the 

pipeline scheme, the option poses many significant conundrums. For this reason, the 

pipeline proposal should not singularly focus the attention of policymakers. Arguably, 

bilateral efforts could be more profitably spent legalizing and regularizing the trade 

that already exists between the two countries. Currently much of the movement of 

products between India and Pakistan is facilitated through the black market and 

includes food products, engineering equipment, tires, entertainment media, and so 

forth. Legalizing this trade would do much for both states’ coffers.

• Integrating Kashmir into extant South Asia trade agreements. Former World Bank vice 

president Shahid Javed Burki has proposed that Kashmir be thoroughly integrated 

into the South Asia Free Trade Agreement, bringing economic benefits to all three 

Clearly, success in keeping this 

engagement alive will require 

both sides to be much more 

invested in the peace process 

than they are at present. Both 

states need to begin an internal 

dialogue process whereby their 

respective peoples can begin to 

appreciate the benefits of peace.
14

parties, while leaving the status quo intact. Such economic integration would require 

massive infrastructure projects (for example, roads, lines of communication, fuel 

transport), integration of electrical grids, and possibly even a reworking of the Indus 

Water Treaty, which governs bilateral water sharing from the waters of the Indus River 

Basin. Burki believes that this project could create constituencies for normalization 

while deferring the nettlesome question of Kashmir’s ultimate disposition.

What Role for the United States and the International Community?

Roundtable participants discussed the manifold costs and benefits of various forms of U.S. 

involvement in the Indo-Pakistani engagement process. Some contended that a fundamental long-term component of peace in South Asia will be determined substantially by 

the character that Pakistan assumes over the next several years, and the United States, 

they noted, has a highly debated, but nonetheless important role in shaping the country’s 

future. To this end, many suggested that efforts must be directed toward encouraging 

Pakistan to democratize and develop functioning and accountable civilian institutions. 

However, participants contested the role of the United States in facilitating a bilateral 

rapprochement. A small but vocal minority countered that the United States has no positive role to play. Opponents of such a role contended that the status of the United States 

has diminished in India because of flagging attention to the Indo-U.S. security relationship and because of the renaissance in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Despite robust intergovernmental relations between the United States and Pakistan, anti-U.S. sentiment is rife 

among Pakistan’s general public, with no visible signs of waning in any policy-relevant 

Pressler Amendment sanctions against Pakistan

The 1985 Pressler Amendment (after former U.S. senator Larry Pressler, R-SD) 

to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, bans most economic and military assistance 

to Pakistan unless annual U.S. presidential certification finds that the country 

does not possess a nuclear device and that U.S. aid would reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a device. During the 1980s, ample evidence suggested that 

Pakistan was enriching uranium for a nuclear device and that the country could 

assemble a weapon; however, Pressler Amendment sanctions were not invoked 

until 1990. 

The Pressler Amendment joined the earlier Symington Amendment and Glenn 

Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which invoked sanctions against 

countries that elude International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on nuclear 

materials and technology, or against non-nuclear countries that conduct nuclear 

tests. Although India conducted a “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974, and Pakistan was accelerating its nuclear program, the Symington and Glenn amendments 

did not apply retroactively to India or Pakistan.

Since the mid-1990s the Pressler Amendment sanctions have found many exemptions and waivers—most notably under the Brown Amendment and especially the 

two Brownback Amendments, the latter of which give the U.S. president permanent 

authority to waive the sanctions under the Symington and Pressler Amendments 

that banned all military and economic assistance to Pakistan since 1990.

Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, President Bush 

signed an executive order that lifted economic and military sanctions against India 

and Pakistan for their nuclear tests, in advance of enlisting Pakistan’s assistance for 

Operation Enduring Freedom and the routing of the Taliban and al Qaeda redoubts 

in Afghanistan.

Roundtable participants 

discussed the manifold costs and 

benefits of various forms of U.S. 

involvement in the IndoPakistani engagement process.
15

future. This dual trend of antagonizing both Islamabad and New Delhi has compromised 

the utility of the United States in facilitating any movement toward normalization, opponents contend.

Proponents of a positive U.S. role countered with alternative views, pointing out 

that the United States now enjoys better relations with both governments than it has in 

decades. As a consequence of the U.S. position on the 1999 Kargil crisis that came down 

in favor of the status quo, India no longer reflexively rejects any role for the United States. 

Moreover, since December 2001, India has implicitly relied upon the United States to exert 

its influence over Pakistan in order to gain concessions from Islamabad. Pakistan, for its 

part, is enjoying renewed relations with the United States, which it has not enjoyed since 

1990, when Pressler Amendment sanctions were invoked.

If a primary role for the United States is questionable, is there any space for key states 

in the international community to keep India and Pakistan productively engaged? China, 

Russia, and the United States have all played significant roles of crisis manager throughout the past five decades of security competition between India and Pakistan, and all 

three states, for their own various reasons and with varying intensity, have an interest in 

South Asian deterrence stability. Perhaps the time has come for these and other states to 

seriously ponder how they may help ensure that this process moves, even if only procedurally. Rather than undertake action unilaterally, perhaps the key crisis managers in the past 

can act in concert, devising collective security guarantees that will permit both India and 

Pakistan to continue talking at the tactical level, even if strategic issues are deferred.

As the foregoing discussion suggests, without creativity and commitment to dispute 

resolution, it is difficult to imagine normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations in the policyrelevant future. However, the stakes have never been higher. Not only do the peoples 

of India and Pakistan deserve a livable peace with minimized risk of conventional or 

nuclear exchanges, the South Asian region—indeed, the international community as a 

whole—also deserves some respite from this ongoing conflict. 

China, Russia, and the United 

States have all played significant roles of crisis manager 

throughout the past five decades 

of security competition between 

India and Pakistan, and all three 

states, for their own various reasons and with varying intensity, 

have an interest in South Asian 

deterrence stability.
Of Related Interest

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues that 

relate directly to Central and South Asian security. Note: Most of our reports can be 

downloaded from our web site at www.usip.org/pubs.html.

Recent Institute reports include:

The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict (Special Report, June 2004)

Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan (Special Report, March 2004)

Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony 

(Special Report, April 2003)

Lethal Ethnic Riots: Lessons from India and Beyond (Special Report, February 2003)

Islamic Extremists: How Do They Mobilize Support? (Special Report, July 2002)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), please visit our web site at 

www.usip.org/pubs.html. Or you can write United States Institute of Peace, 1200 17th 

Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832; fax (202) 429-

6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Recent books from USIP Press include:

Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker, 

Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (January 2005)

Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases, by Chester A. Crocker, Fen 

Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (July 2004)

Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World,

revised edition, by Raymond Cohen (1997)

For book sales and order information, call 800-868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or 703-661-

1590, or fax 703-661-1501.

An online edition of this report can be 

found at our website (www.usip.org), 

together with additional information 

on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org