______________ THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

County of Florence and Florence County Council, Respondents,

v.

West Florence Fire District, purported to have been created by S.C. Act No. 183 of 2014, the West Florence Fire District Commission, purported to have been created by S. C. Act. No. 183 of 2014, David Brown, Dustin Fails, Linda Lang Gipco, R ichard Hewitt and C. Allen Matthews, each in his or her purported official capacity

as a member of the West Florence Fire District

Commission and the State of S outh Carolina, Defendants, of whom West Florence Fire District, purported to have been created by S.C. Act No. 183 of 2014, the West Florence Fire District Commission, purported to have been created by S. C. Act . No. 183 of 2014, David Brown, Dustin Fails, Linda Lang Gipco, Richard Hewitt and C. Allen Matthews, each in his or her purported official capacity as a member of the West Florence Fire District Commission are Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000693

Appeal from Florence County J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27776

Heard Decem ber 13, 2017 – Filed March 7, 2018AFFIRMED

Blake A. Hewitt, of Bluestein Thompson Sullivan LLC,

of Columbia and Wallace H. J ordan, Jr., of Florence, for Appellants.

Steve A. Matthews, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of Columbia and D. Malloy McEachin, Jr., of McEachin & McEachin, P.A., of Flor ence, for Respondents.

Attorney General Alan W ilson and Deputy Solicitor General J. Emory Smith, Jr., for Defendant, State of

South Carolina.

JUSTICE HEARN: In this declaratory judgment action, Florence County challenges the validity of the We st Florence Fire District, arg uing that it violates this

Court's decision in Wagener v. Smith , 221 S.C. 438, 71 S.E.2d 1 (1952) and conflicts

with the state's constitutional provisions concerning special l egislation and home

rule. See S.C. Const. art. III, § 34, and S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 7. The circuit court

held in favor of Florence Count y on all three grounds, and the West Florence Fire District appealed. We affirm on Article VIII, section 7 grounds

.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 2014, Florence County (t he County) opera ted several s pecial tax

districts to fund fire protection services provided by not-for- profit fire departments. Each district implemented its own capital expense programs and bore responsibility for its own expenditures. To fund these services, the County as sessed a millage rate based on ad valorem property taxe s within each district, result ing in different millage rates between districts. For example, shortly before the County restructured the districts, residents in West Florence were taxed at a rate of 8 mills while Johnsonville

residents were taxed at a rate of 40 mills.

In 2014, in an effort to reform the method for financing fire p rotection services, the County hired a firm to analyze and recommend impr ovements to the existing scheme, one of which was to consolidate the districts into one district to

achieve a more equitable millage rate scheme and to ensure adeq uate funding. Underthe consolidated district, the County planned to assess a unifi ed rate and provide more administrative oversight in an effort to lower millage rat es for many residents, cut the insurance premiums for the district, and enact a more equitable funding scheme. However, while the propos al expected to curtail the hig h millage rates for many residents, the rate in West Florence would nearly triple.

The County conducted public hearings and, over the course of a few months, garnered enough public support for the consolidation proposal. However, residents of West Florence, upset about their increased millage rate, loo ked to their representatives in the General Assembly for help. In response, the General Assembly passed Act No. 183 in the spring of 2014 (the Act), creating th e West Florence Fire District which encompassed part of Florence County—mainly West Florence—and a negligible portion of Darlingt on County that consisted of the right-of-way along a one-mile stretch of Interstate 95 and three small parcels of la nd adjacent to the

interstate.

The General Assembly explained the purpose of the Act, stating:

[T]hat a certain portion of Darlington County primarily consist ing of

Interstate 95 from the Florence County line northward to Exit 1 69 in Darlington County is presently served by fire departments in Fl orence County because no fire department in Darlington County provides service to this area. This therefore presents concerns for the safety and well-being of citizens residing and traveling in this area in addition to placing additional burdens on fire personnel in Florence County which are called on to provide fire service in this area. The General Assembly

has therefore determined to create a joint county fire district in the same manner other joint county fire districts have been established pursuant to this chapter, consisting of areas in two counties , to solve this problem, and to provide fire service to all areas of the distri ct on the most economically feasib le basis possible.

S.C. Code Ann. § 4-23-1000 (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). When the County challenged the constitutionality of the Act, the General Assemb ly reacted by passing an amendment (Amended Act) that: (1) clarified the precise boun dary of the district; (2) added part of a neighborhood in Darlington County 1 to the district; (3) transferred property from the prior district to the West Florence District; and (4) included a

The neighborhood consists of a bout 100 lots and straddles the D arlington and Florence County lines. 1sunset provision whereby the amendment would expire five years after its effective

date.

In response, the County filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing both the

Act and the Amended Act were unconstitutional under Article VII I, section 7, Article III, section 34, and Wagener . The West Florence District countered that statutes are presumed constituti onal and the County had failed to meet its burden in demonstrating otherwise. The circuit court ruled in favor of th e County on all three grounds. First, the court held Wagener prohibited the General Assembly from establishing an entity that provided the same service in an area served by Florence County, noting that the rule was applied to a special tax distr ict in North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation. v. White , 301 S.C. 274, 391 S.E.2d 571 (1990) (holding that a city council could not create a special tax dis trict to perform water and sewage services in the same area where the General Assembly had previously

created a special purpose distri ct). Second, the circuit court found the Act violated the rule against special legis lation under Article III, section 34. Lastly, the circuit court held Article VIII, section 7's prohibition against laws for a specific county rendered the legislation uncon stitutional, even though three pa rcels of Darlington County were included.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party challenging the constitu tionality of a statute has a h igh hurdle to

overcome because all statutes are presumed constitutional. Curtis v. State , 345 S.C. 557, 569, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001). Furthermore, "[A] legislative enactment will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears s o clearly as to leave

no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the constitution." Westvaco Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue , 321 S.C. 59, 62–63, 467 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1995).

DISCUSSION

The West Florence District contends the Act does not violate Ar ticle VIII,

section 7 because the district encompasses more than one county . Moreover, it argues the circuit court improperly weighed the wisdom of the l egislation, thereby encroaching on the prerogative of the General Assembly. On the other hand, the County asserts the negligible portion of Darlington County does not transform what is essentially a special purpose d istrict for West Florence int o a multicounty district. Additionally, the County claims the circuit court did not imper missibly weigh the wisdom of the legislation; inst ead, the court merely inquired i nto the territorialcomposition of the West Florence District to determine whether there was sufficient regional impact to constitutionally justify its creation.

We begin by recognizing the Genera l Assembly's plenary power to enact legislation. Hampton v. Haley , 403 S.C. 395, 403, 743 S.E. 2d 258, 262 (2013) (citing

Clarke v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. , 177 S.C. 427, 438–39, 181 S.E. 481, 486 (1935) ("[T]he General Assembly has ple nary power over all legislative matters unless

limited by some constitutional provision.")). One constitutiona l limitation is commonly referred to as "home rule," which this Court has recog nized as a means to determine how power is allocat ed between the General Assembl y and local

governments. See Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island , 311 S.C. 417, 422, 429 S.E.2d 802, 804–05 (1993) (citing Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company

v. City of Aiken , 279 S.C. 269, 271, 306 S.E.2d 220, 221 (1983) ("Article VIII of the South Carolina Constitution was completely revised for the purp ose of accomplishing home rule; thus granting renewed autonomy to loca l government.")). Prior to the 1970s, "Columbia [wa s] the seat of county governme nt," as the General Assembly had the power to control local functions. Knight v. Salisbury , 262 S.C. 565, 571, 206 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1974). However, the state consti tution was amended to reverse this allocation of power, 2 and under Article VIII, s ection 7, the General Assembly cannot enact legislation "relating to a specific count y which relates to those powers, duties, functions and responsibilities, which und er the mandated

2 Addressing special purpose districts within a county, the Cour t in Knight warned:

There is a sound reason for curtailing the power of the General Assembly to create special purpose districts within a county. I f, despite the prohibition of laws for a specific county, the General Asse mbly may continue to carve a given county into special purpose districts , a frightful conflict would exist be tween the power of the General Assembly and the power of the county government. Each county co uld be carved into enumerable special districts. Commission[s] or o ther agencies might be established for each, with each given the pow er to perform a function intended to have been vested in the county government. Such a result could well be chaotic and home rule i ntended by Section 7 would be frustrated in whole or in part since the result could well be that the governi ng body in each county contemplat ed by the draftsmen of Section 7 would have little or no power left. To point out the potential results of such a theory compels its rejectio n.

Knight , 262 S.C. at 572–73, 2 06 S.E.2d at 878.systems of government, are set aside for counties." Kleckley v. Pulliam , 265 S.C. 177, 183, 217 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1975) . This transfer of power "r eflects a serious effort upon the part of the electorate and the General Assembly to restore local government to the county level." Knight , 262 S.C. at 569, 206 S.E.2d at 876. While Article VIII, section 7 did not dissolve pre-home rule special purpose districts, it does apply to legislation enacted post-home rule that concerns a special purpose district created prior to the rule. Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. City of Spartanburg , 283 S.C. 67, 80, 321 S.E.2d 258, 265 (1984).

South Carolina jurisprudence is c lear that a special purpose di strict limited to one county violates home rule. In Knight , the Court held that a special purpose district established by the General Assembly and limited to pro viding recreational facilities in a portion of Dorche ster County was unconstitution al because it violated Article VIII, section 7. Knight

, 262 S.C. at 572, 206 S.E.2d at 878. In discussing home rule, the Court noted, "It is clear that Section 7 sought to put an end to this practice, at least insofar as it relates to special purpose dis tricts within a given county." Id. However, the Court expressly left open the question of whethe r Article VIII, section 7 prevents multicounty special purpose districts. Id. at 573, 206 S.E.2d

at 878.

The Court again addressed the limits of home rule in Kleckley , which involved a pre-home rule special purpose district funded in part by legi slation enacted after home rule. In that case, the Court denied an Article VIII, sect ion 7 challenge to legislation that funded improvements to airport facilities with in the RichlandLexington Airport District. Kleckley , 265 S.C. at 180, 217 S.E.2d at 218. In order to fund the improvements, the General Assembly imposed an annual a d valorem tax on property within the district. Id. In response to a taxpayer lawsuit claiming the legislation violated Article VI II, section 7, the Court upheld the provision because it

concerned two counties, and more significantly, because the dis trict's purpose triggered a state-wide interest rather than a purely local conc ern limited to one

county. Id. at 185, 217 S.E.2d at 221. Emphasizing the importance of the a irport district as a state interest, the Court ultimately held the leg islation was "not a county function within the meaning of Article VIII, Section 7, but one of stat e concern." Id. at 187, 217 S.E.2d at 222 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court wei ghed the function of the district more heavily t han the territorial boundary.

Just one year after Kleckley , the Court reached a different conclusion in Torgerson v. Craver , 267 S.C. 558, 563, 230 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1976), which also involved funding for facilities within an airport district. Thi s time the Court relied heavily on the fact that the Ch arleston County Airport District was solely within Charleston County. Id. at 563, 230 S.E.2d at 230. Additionally, the Court stated thatalthough the airport served travelers from across the region, the county was capable of solving any problems within the district, unlike in Kleckley

, where neither Richland nor Lexington County alone could regulate the district

. Id. While the physical boundary of the district was important, the Court clar ified its holding in Kleckley , noting that the bond legislation in Kleckley was not for a specific county

but rather for a region

.

Kleckley and Torgerson demonstrate the conjunctiv e nature of the analysis— in determining whether legislation violates home rule, a distri ct's physical

boundaries and function must be taken into account. In this case, the West Fl orence District relies in part on a 2011 South Carolina Attorney General's opinion that focuses almost entirely on the district's physical boundary. S. C. Att'y Gen. Op. dated Apr. 25, 2011 (2011 WL 1740746). A ddressing the South Lynches F ire District, the 2011 opinion reversed an earlier opinion which concluded that d istrict was probably

unconstitutional. Id. (reversing S.C. Att'y Gen. Op. dated June 16, 1983 (1983 WL 181917)).

The 2011 opinion acknowledged earlier attorney general opinion s that suggested the Court's decisions in Kleckley and Torgerson stood for the proposition

that the nature of the service— whether regional in scope or pur ely local— and physical territory are both important in the analysis. Id. However, the 2011 opinion

articulated the principle that only physical territory is relev ant in determining whether Article VIII, section 7 is violated. Nevertheless, the 2011 opinion addressed a fire district split approximately 60% in Florence County and 40% in Williamsburg County. We find that scenario readily distinguishable from the instant case, where the vast majority of the challenged district is located in one county and only a comparatively small portion is l ocated in an adjacent county. 3

Moreover, the Court noted in Kleckley that since the General Assembly could not legally pass a special act to curtail the governing body's county-wide powers, it was likewise impermissible for the General Assembly to achieve the same result indirectly. Kleckley , 265 S.C. at 184, 217 S.E.2d at 220. Here, home rule preclude s legislation of fire protection services specific to West Floren ce. See S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-30(5) (1986 & Supp. 2017) ( stating fire protection services are part of a county government's enumerated powers) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 4-19-10 (1986 & Supp. 2017) (enacting the Fire Protection Se rvices Act). Therefore, it foll ows the General Assembly cannot indirectly accomp lish the same goal merely by a dding a small

3 It appears from the record that the three parcels in Darlington County total onetenth of a square mile and represent less than 1% of the distri ct.amount of acreage of another county; to do so would render Arti cle VIII, section 7 meaningless. Kleckley and Torgerson demonstrate that where the legislation's

function is local and within a county, home rule mandates the C ounty is the proper body to address the matter rather t han the General Assembly.

Accordingly, we find the Act creating the West Florence Distric t violates home rule. Because our analysis of Article VIII, section 7 is dispositive, we decline

to reach the district's remaining two grounds for reversal. Young v. Charleston Cty.

Sch. Dist. , 397 S.C. 311, 310, 725 S.E.2d 107, 111 (2012) (declining to a ddress additional grounds after reaching a dispositive issue).

CONCLUSION

In summary, we affirm the circuit court and hold the creation of the West

Florence District violates Artic le VIII, section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution

because the district is not truly a multicounty district. To ho ld that including three parcels—totaling one-tenth of a square mile—is sufficient to re move the legislation

from the purview of section 7 would eviscerate home rule.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM and REMAND the matter to the circuit court for its approval of a plan to transition the district to county con trol.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.