In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-1061

JOSHUA VASQUEZ and

MIGUEL CARDONA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

KIMBERLY M. FOXX, in her official 

capacity as the State’s Attorney of 

Cook County, and CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 16-cv-8854 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 11, 2018

____________________

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Joshua Vasquez and Miguel Cardona 

are convicted child sex offenders who live in Chicago and 

are required to register as sex offenders and comply with 

state restrictions on where they may live. For example, a 

child sex offender may not knowingly live within 500 feet of 
2 No. 17-1061

a school, playground, or child-care center. 720 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5), (b-10). A few years after Vasquez and 

Cardona were convicted, Illinois added child day-care 

homes and group day-care homes to the list of places included in the 500-foot residential buffer zone. § 5/11-9.3(b10). When Vasquez and Cardona updated their sex-offender 

registrations in August 2016, the Chicago Police Department 

told them they had to move because child day-care homes

had opened up within 500 feet of their residences. The

Department gave them 30 days to come into compliance 

with the statute. 

Vasquez and Cardona sued the City of Chicago and 

Kimberly M. Foxx, the Cook County State’s Attorney,1

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on four alleged

constitutional violations. First, they claimed that the 

amendment to the residency statute imposes retroactive 

punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Next, 

they alleged that applying the amended statute to them 

amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their property in 

violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Finally, 

they asserted two due-process claims, one procedural and 

one substantive: they complained that the statute is enforced 

without a hearing for an individualized risk assessment

and is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

The district judge rejected each claim at the pleadings 

stage and we affirm. Under Supreme Court and circuit 

precedent, the amended statute is neither impermissibly 

 

1 Anita Alvarez was the Cook County State’s Attorney when the suit was 

filed. Foxx replaced her in that office on December 1, 2016, and was 

substituted as a defendant. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
No. 17-1061 3

retroactive nor punitive, so it raises no ex post facto concerns. The plaintiffs’ claim under the Takings Clause fails for 

two independent reasons: it is unexhausted and the amendment was adopted before they acquired their homes, so it 

did not alter their property-rights expectations. The procedural due-process claim is a nonstarter for the straightforward reason that there is no right to a hearing to establish a 

fact not material to the statute. And the law is not unconstitutional in substance: it easily satisfies rational-basis review. 

I. Background

Illinois first adopted residency restrictions for child sex 

offenders in 2000. Act of July 7, 2000, Pub. Act No. 91-911, 

2000 Ill. Laws 2051. As originally enacted the law prohibited 

child sex offenders from knowingly residing within 500 feet 

of a “playground or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of 

age.” Id. In subsequent years the Illinois legislature amended 

the statute to add other places to the list. At issue here is a

2008 amendment prohibiting child sex offenders from 

knowingly residing within 500 feet of a “day care home” or

“group day care home.” Act of Aug. 14, 2008, Pub. Act 

No. 95-821, 2008 Ill. Laws 1383. Noncompliance is a Class 4 

felony punishable by up to three years in prison. 720 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(f); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45(a).

Plaintiff Joshua Vasquez was convicted of childpornography possession in 2001 and must register as a sex 

offender for the rest of his life. His conviction also makes 

him a child sex offender within the meaning of the residency 

statute. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.3(d)(1). On August 25, 

2016, Vasquez visited the Chicago Police Department headquarters to complete his annual sex-offender registration. As 
4 No. 17-1061

of that date, he had lived in his Chicago apartment for three 

years with his wife and daughter, and his lease continued

through August 19, 2017. The Department notified him that

a child day-care home had opened 480 feet from his apartment and told him he had to move within 30 days. Vasquez 

alleges that he has been unable to find suitable and affordable housing that complies with the residency requirements. 

He also alleges that his daughter’s schooling will be disrupted if the family has to move outside the school district. 

Plaintiff Miguel Cardona was convicted of indecent solicitation of a child in 2004.2 Like Vasquez, Cardona’s conviction makes him a child sex offender subject to the 

requirements of the residency statute. Id. Cardona has lived 

in his Chicago home for roughly 25 years, but he did not 

purchase it until 2010 so he cannot claim an exemption for 

offenders who owned their homes prior to the enactment of 

the 2008 amendment. § 5/11-9.3(b-10). When Cardona completed his annual sex-offender registration on August 17,

2016, the Chicago Police Department notified him that a 

child day-care home had opened 475 feet from his residence.

Like Vasquez, he was given 30 days to move. Cardona 

alleges that he cannot afford to move into compliant housing. He also alleges that the day-care home in question has 

been open since 2014 and his proximity to it has caused no 

problems. 

Vasquez and Cardona challenge the 2008 amendment facially and as applied to them. They sued the City of Chicago 

 

2 The complaint alleges that Cardona’s conviction requires him to 

register as a sex offender through 2017. Although his registration duty 

has expired, he remains subject to the residency restrictions.
No. 17-1061 5

and State’s Attorney Foxx seeking declaratory and injunctive 

relief under § 1983 for violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, 

the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Cause, and the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The judge entered an 

order enjoining the defendants from forcing the plaintiffs to 

vacate their homes or otherwise enforcing the amended 

statute against them while the case was pending.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the judge granted 

the motion. She held that the 2008 amendment created only 

prospective legal obligations and thus raised no concerns 

under the Ex Post Facto Clause. On the takings claim she 

concluded that the plaintiffs had not suffered an unconstitutional taking of their property under the test announced in 

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 

104 (1978). Finally, the judge ruled that the complaint failed 

to state a procedural or substantive due-process claim

because there is no right to a hearing to establish a fact not 

material under the statute and the challenged residency 

restriction is a rational means of protecting children from

convicted child sex offenders.

Vasquez and Cardona appealed, and the judge granted 

their motion to extend her order maintaining the status quo 

through the pendency of the appeal. In the meantime

Vasquez renewed his lease, and Cardona lives in the same 

home. 

II. Discussion 

We review the judge’s dismissal order de novo. Roberts v. 

City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). Before taking 

up the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, we note 
6 No. 17-1061

that the City is not a proper defendant on any of them, at 

least not as the claims were pleaded. A municipality is 

subject to § 1983 liability only if one of its policies caused the 

constitutional injury. Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d 577, 

582 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 

436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The “official policy” analysis isolates

ultimate responsibility for a claimed constitutional violation, 

distinguishing the acts of a municipality from the acts of its

employees. Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. County of Bureau, 

506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007). A municipality’s enforcement of a state law does not constitute an actionable official 

policy. See Surplus Store & Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 

928 F.2d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 1991) (“It is difficult to imagine a 

municipal policy more innocuous and constitutionally 

permissible, and whose causal connection to the alleged 

violation is more attenuated, than the ‘policy’ of enforcing 

state law.”). 

The City’s police department did not enforce a Chicago 

ordinance or other municipal policy; rather, this suit challenges a state law. The City can be held liable only if it has 

“as a matter [of] policy or custom, enforce[d] the law in a 

manner or method that caused the constitutional violation.” 

Id. Vasquez and Cardona contend that the City exercises 

discretion in enforcing the residency statute—for example, 

by checking for compliance annually when sex offenders 

register and by giving sex offenders 30 days’ notice to move. 

But the complaint does not allege a causal connection between the City’s compliance monitoring and the plaintiffs’

constitutional injury. Id. at 790. The plaintiffs do face a 

continuing threat of prosecution if they fail to comply with

the 2008 amendment, but the State’s Attorney is the proper 

defendant to sue for redress of that injury. For this inde-
No. 17-1061 7

pendent reason, which the City preserved below but the 

judge did not need to address, the plaintiffs failed to state a 

claim against the City.

A. Ex Post Facto Clause

The Ex Post Facto Clause3 forbids retroactive punishment—that is, “the imposition of punishment more severe 

than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be 

punished occurred.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981).

So a statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law unless 

it is both retroactive and penal. United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 

769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011).

Our decision in Leach is conclusive on the retroactivity 

question. There we considered an ex post facto challenge to 

the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”). Id. at 770–71. Enacted in 2006, SORNA requires 

all convicted sex offenders—including those who were 

convicted before the Act was adopted—to register in each 

jurisdiction where they live, work, or attend school; the Act 

also imposes criminal penalties for failure to register or 

update a registration following interstate travel. Id. at 771 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)). Donald 

Leach was convicted of child molestation in 1990, long 

before SORNA came into being, and he was charged with 

failing to update his registration when he moved to another 

state. He argued that SORNA could not be applied to him 

because it retroactively increased his punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

 

3 “No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
8 No. 17-1061

We rejected that argument and affirmed Leach’s conviction. We began by noting that SORNA’s registration duty 

and the criminal penalty for failure to comply are plainly

prospective in operation. In other words, the new regulatory 

scheme applies only to conduct occurring after the law’s

enactment—that is, a sex offender’s failure to register or 

update his registration following interstate travel. Accordingly, we held that SORNA “merely creates new, prospective 

legal obligations based on the person’s prior history.” Id. at 

773.

So too here. Although the 2008 amendment to the Illinois 

residency statute applies to Vasquez, Cardona, and others 

like them who were convicted of child sex offenses before 

the amendment was adopted, its requirements and any 

criminal penalty apply only to conduct occurring after its 

enactment—i.e., knowingly maintaining a residence within 

500 feet of a child day-care home or group day-care home.

We also held in Leach that under Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 

(2003), SORNA’s registration regime for sex offenders is not 

penal in nature. Id. Smith upheld Alaska’s sex-offender

registration statute against an ex post facto challenge. The 

Court found that the Alaska registration regime was a 

nonpunitive civil regulatory scheme and thus raised no ex 

post facto concerns. 538 U.S. at 105–06. Because SORNA is 

indistinguishable from the Alaska statute upheld in Smith, 

we concluded in Leach that the federal law is likewise a civil

regulatory scheme and not a penal statute. 639 F.3d at 773.

Again, the same is true here. The Illinois residency statute is similar enough to the sex-offender registration statutes

at issue in Smith and Leach that it’s safe to apply those holdings and reject the plaintiffs’ challenge without further ado. 
No. 17-1061 9

If more is needed, we briefly address the two-step framework the Court used in Smith and explain why the Illinois 

residency statute is not punitive under that test.

The Court’s framework asks if the legislature intended to 

impose punishment, and if not, whether the civil regulatory 

scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 

negate” the legislature’s nonpunitive intent. Smith, 538 U.S. 

at 92 (quotation marks omitted). Vasquez and Cardona do 

not argue that the Illinois legislature intended to impose 

additional punishment, so we skip directly to the second 

step. To determine if Alaska’s registration law was punitive 

in effect, the Court examined several factors: whether the 

regulatory regime “in its necessary operation ... [would be] 

regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment[,]

imposes an affirmative disability or restraint[,] promotes the 

traditional aims of punishment[,] has a rational connection 

to a nonpunitive purpose[,] or is excessive with respect to 

this purpose.” Id. at 97. The Court assigned no particular 

priority or weight to any of these factors: they are “neither 

exhaustive nor dispositive” but merely “relevant.” Id.

As for the first factor, Vasquez and Cardona compare the 

Illinois residency restrictions to the historical punishments of 

shaming and banishment. As the Court noted in Smith, 

however, early shaming punishments “inflict[ed] public 

disgrace,” and “[t]he aim was to make these offenders suffer 

permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the 

community.” Id. at 97–98 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Alaska registration requirement did not shame child sex 

offenders in this way, id., and neither do the Illinois residency restrictions. Nor do the residency restrictions resemble 

banishment. Under that early form of punishment, “[t]he 
10 No. 17-1061

most serious offenders ... could neither return to their 

original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted 

easily into a new one.” Id. (citing THOMAS G. BLOMBERG &

KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF 

CONTROL 30–31 (2000)). The Illinois residency statute merely 

keeps child sex offenders from living in very close proximity 

to places where children are likely to congregate; it does not 

force them to leave their communities.

Vasquez and Cardona also compare the residency restrictions to criminal punishments such as probation and 

supervised release. The comparison is inapt; the Court 

rejected it in Smith, noting that “offenders subject to the 

Alaska statute are free to move where they wish and to live 

and work as other citizens[] with no supervision.” Id. at 101.

Although the Illinois residency restrictions limit where sex 

offenders may live, the statute does not control any other 

aspect of their lives and thus does not resemble the comprehensive control of probation and supervised release.

The Court also examined the extent to which the Alaska 

law imposed an affirmative disability or restraint on sex 

offenders, observing that “[i]f the disability or restraint is 

minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.” Id.

at 100. We accept for present purposes that Vasquez and 

Cardona have had difficulty finding suitable compliant 

housing in their neighborhoods. We also recognize that 

including child day-care homes within the 500-foot buffer 

zone creates some unpredictability: schools and playgrounds 

are typically known and fixed, but a private residential 

property can become a day-care home without anyone in the 

neighborhood noticing. However, like the registration 

scheme at issue in Smith, the residency law “imposes no 
No. 17-1061 11

physical restraint[] and so does not resemble the punishment 

of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative 

disability or restraint.” Id.

Another relevant factor in the Smith framework is whether the statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment, 

but the Court strictly limited the scope of this inquiry, asking 

only whether the law is retributive. 538 U.S. at 102. Vasquez 

and Cardona do not develop an argument on this point, 

perhaps because the residency restrictions are so clearly not

retributive. As in Smith, the obvious aim of the statute is to 

protect children from the danger of recidivism by convicted 

child sex offenders. Id.

The last two factors in the Smith framework are related: 

the Court asked whether the Alaska statute was rationally

connected to a nonpunitive purpose and whether its requirements were excessive with respect to that purpose. Id. 

at 103. At this step of the analysis, the challenger is required 

to show that the statute’s “nonpunitive purpose is a sham or 

mere pretext.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Vasquez and Cardona maintain that sex offenders do not 

reoffend more than other criminals. Even if we accept that 

assertion, similar recidivism rates across different categories 

of crime would not establish that the nonpunitive aim of this

statute—protecting children—is a sham. Indeed, Smith holds 

that states may make “reasonable categorical judgments ... 

without any corresponding risk assessment.” Id. at 103–04. 

In short, under Smith and Leach, the 2008 amendment to 

the sex-offender residency statute is neither retroactive nor 
12 No. 17-1061

punitive and thus raises no ex post facto concerns.4 The 

judge was right to dismiss this claim.

B. Takings Clause 

Next, Vasquez and Cardona argue that the judge wrongly dismissed their claim that the 2008 amendment effectively

“takes” their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. But neither 

plaintiff pursued state remedies prior to filing this suit, and 

current law requires exhaustion of state mechanisms for 

obtaining compensation before a takings claim can be 

brought in federal court. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning 

Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 

(1985).5

 4 Vasquez and Cardona rely heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 

Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016), but that case is easily 

distinguishable. The plaintiffs there challenged a series of amendments 

to the Michigan sex-offender registration law, which the court characterized as imposing “a byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives 

of the state’s sex offenders.” Id. at 697. The challenged provisions 

included a residency restriction prohibiting sex offenders from “living, 

working, or ‘loitering’ within 1,000 feet of a school.” Id. at 698. The 

plaintiffs also challenged a provision publicly classifying registrants

“into three tiers, which ostensibly correlate to current dangerousness, 

but which are based[] not on individual assessments, but solely on the 

crime of conviction.” Id. Finally, the plaintiffs challenged a provision 

requiring registrants to “appear in person ‘immediately’ to update 

information such as new vehicles or ‘internet identifiers.’” Id. The court 

considered these provisions collectively and concluded that this package 

of civil regulatory restrictions were punitive in effect. Id. at 702–06. The 

single 2008 amendment at issue in this case does not remotely compare.

5 Williamson County has been criticized, and the Supreme Court may 

revisit and overrule it next term. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 
No. 17-1061 13

To exhaust a takings claim, the plaintiff must seek relief 

in state court unless doing so would be “futile.” Peters v. 

Village of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2007). Relying on

Callahan v. City of Chicago, 813 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016), the

judge assumed that the Illinois state courts could not provide relief for this claim. In Callahan, however, we accepted

Chicago’s concession that a suit for relief on a takings claim 

in an Illinois state court would be futile. Id. at 660. Foxx has 

not made a similar concession here. And as we explained in 

Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), the 

Illinois Court of Claims can provide damages for a regulatory taking. By failing to seek damages in state court, the 

plaintiffs have not exhausted their challenge to the residency 

requirements.6

Even if we looked past this procedural barrier, the takings claim would fail on the merits. Under the Supreme 

Court’s Penn Central test, we’re instructed to examine “(1) the 

nature of the government action, (2) the severity of [its] 

economic impact on the [property] owner, and (3) the degree 

 

(3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (Mem.) (2018). For now it 

remains good law.

6 Vasquez and Cardona argue that if they cannot proceed on an asapplied takings claim, they should be permitted to raise a facial takings

claim. This argument is based on a line of caselaw holding that a facial 

takings challenge need not meet the Williamson County exhaustion 

requirement. Peters v. Village of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2007).

But Vasquez and Cardona did not develop an argument that the 2008 

amendment is facially unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. The 

issue is therefore waived. See Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 

2010).
14 No. 17-1061

of interference with the owner’s reasonable investmentbacked expectations.” Bettendorf v. St. Croix County, 631 F.3d 

421, 430 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On the first of these factors, a taking “may more readily be 

found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the 

benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted). 

Although the Illinois law restricts a child sex offender’s use

of his property, it cannot be characterized as a physical 

invasion. The law merely adjusts the benefits and burdens of 

economic life.

Moving on to the economic impact of the 2008 amendment, we keep in mind that a regulation does not amount to 

a taking simply because the property owner can no longer

make the “most beneficial use of the property.” Id. at 125. 

Even the denial of a traditional property right does not 

necessarily amount to a taking. For example, in Andrus v. 

Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979), the Supreme Court held that 

a law preventing the sale of certain artifacts did not amount 

to a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth 

Amendment. The Court emphasized that the regulation did 

not compel the surrender of the artifacts and that the owners 

could still derive some economic benefit by “exhibit[ing] the 

artifacts for an admissions charge.” Id. at 66. The economic 

impact of the 2008 amendment to the Illinois residency 

statute is minimal in comparison to Andrus. Although 

Vasquez and Cardona cannot reside within the 500-foot 

buffer zone, there is no question that many others can, 

leaving open a broad market to sell or sublease their residences at full market value.
No. 17-1061 15

The third factor in the Penn Central analysis seals the fate 

of the plaintiffs’ takings claims. We’re instructed to look at

their “expectation concerning the use of the parcel” and 

whether they can obtain a “reasonable return” on their

investment. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. Vasquez and 

Cardona assert that they had no reasonable expectation they 

would have to move. They rely on Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections, 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007), which held that 

a sex-offender residency statute “positively precludes appellant from having any reasonable investment-backed expectation in any property purchased as his private residence.” Id.

at 744. But Penn Central simply does not support this expansive understanding of a property owner’s investment-backed 

expectations.

A properly focused inquiry looks to the effect of the

2008 amendment on the plaintiffs’ property-rights expectations. And because the amendment was on the books when 

Cardona purchased his home and Vasquez leased his apartment, its terms were necessarily part of any property-rights 

expectations they could have held. That’s enough to doom 

this takings claim on the merits. See, e.g., Goodpaster v. City of 

Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060, 1074 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that 

the bar owners’ reasonable expectations included the expansion of the smoking ban); Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga, 800 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]hose who buy 

into a regulated field ... cannot object when regulation is 

later imposed.”).

C. Procedural Due Process

The procedural aspect of the due-process claim rests on 

the plaintiffs’ allegation that the 2008 amendment is unconstitutionally enforced against them without a hearing or 
16 No. 17-1061

other procedure to determine whether they actually pose a 

continued threat to children. This claim is squarely foreclosed by Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 

538 U.S. 1 (2003). There the Supreme Court considered 

whether a sex-offender registration statute required a determination that the offender was currently dangerous. Id. at 

4. The answer was “no.” The Court reasoned that “due 

process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that 

is not material to the State’s statutory scheme.” Id.; see also id. 

at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] validly enacted statute 

suffices to provide all the process that is ‘due ... .’”); BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 

(1915) (“General statutes within the state power are passed 

that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes 

to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be 

heard.”). The Illinois statute places residency restrictions on 

all child sex offenders regardless of their individual risk of 

recidivism. Vasquez and Cardona are not entitled to a 

hearing for an individualized risk assessment. 

D. Substantive Due Process

Finally, Vasquez and Cardona argue that the 

2008 amendment to the residency statute is substantively 

unconstitutional. They urge us to apply heightened scrutiny, 

claiming that the residency requirements were enacted out 

of pure animus toward child sex offenders, a politically 

unpopular group. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 

744, 770 (2013); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 

556–58 (1973). Heightened scrutiny does not apply. The

residency statute is facially neutral and advances a compelling governmental interest: protecting children from recidivism by child sex offenders. The plaintiffs also press for 
No. 17-1061 17

heightened scrutiny because the statute infringes their 

fundamental right to “establish a home.” See Washington v. 

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997). This argument is meritless. A law limiting where sex offenders may live does not 

prevent them from establishing a home; it just constrains 

where they can do so. 

This law triggers only rational-basis review, so we ask 

whether its intrusion upon liberty is rationally related to a 

legitimate governmental interest. Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. 

Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014). 

No one questions that protecting children from child sex 

offenders is a legitimate governmental interest; indeed, it is a 

compelling interest. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 

773 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the City’s interest in protecting minors from child sex offenders is “not merely legitimate, it is compelling”). The plaintiffs thus “have the burden 

to negate every conceivable basis [that] might support [the 

statute].” Goodpaster, 736 F.3d at 1071 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

It’s self-evident that creating a buffer between a child 

day-care home and the home of a child sex offender may

protect at least some children from harm. Indeed, as the 

Supreme Court explained in Smith, a state legislature “could 

conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism.” 538 U.S. at 103. 

Vasquez and Cardona insist that “scant evidence” supports 

the public-safety rationale of this statute; they also argue that 

the harsh burdens placed on sex offenders are highly disproportionate to any benefit. But our role is not to secondguess the legislative policy judgment by parsing the latest 

academic studies on sex-offender recidivism. See Goodpaster, 
18 No. 17-1061

736 F.3d at 1071 (“Under rational basis review, a state law is 

constitutional even if it is unwise, improvident, or out of 

harmony with a particular school of thought.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). This residency restriction on child 

sex offenders cannot be called irrational.

AFFIRMED.