IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JACK D. DENTON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AMY HECHT, Vice President for 

Student Affairs at Florida State 

University, in her official and 

individual capacities; BRANDON 

BOWDEN, Interim Director of the 

Department of Student 

Government & Advocacy at 

Florida State University, in his 

official and individual capacities; 

AHMAD O. DARALDIK, Former 

President of the Student Senate of 

Florida State University, in his 

individual capacity. 

 Defendant(s). 

Civil Case No 4:20-cv-00425-AWMAF 

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT DARALDIK’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities .................................................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD ........................................................ 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 3

I. The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Daraldik’s 

actions were state action. ........................................................................ 3

A. The Amended Complaint alleges specific acts Daraldik 

undertook as a state actor. ................................................................... 3

B. The Amended Complaint alleges facts to show that 

Daraldik’s actions were state action. ................................................... 7

II. The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges facts to state 

a claim against Daraldik. ...................................................................... 10

III. Daraldik is not entitled to qualified immunity. ........................... 12

A. Denton alleges that Daraldik’s acts presiding over, 

furthering, and enforcing Denton’s removal violated clearly 

established law. .................................................................................. 13

B. Denton alleges that Daraldik’s acts after this Court 

preliminarily enjoined University officials violated clearly 

established law. .................................................................................. 16

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases 

Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association of 

the University of Alabama, 

867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1989) ........................................................ 7, 14 

Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................... 2, 3, 12 

Bennett v. Hendrix, 

423 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) ............................................................ 13 

Bond v. Floyd, 

385 U.S. 116 (1966) .............................................................................. 10 

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 

508 U.S. 520 (1993) .............................................................................. 14 

Dharod v. Los Angeles City College, 

2011 WL 3555622 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2011) ...................................... 7, 8 

Edwards v. Prime Inc., 

602 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010) .......................................................... 2, 3 

Flint v. Dennison, 

488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................................. 7 

Florida A & M University Board of Trustees v. Bruno, 

198 So.3d 1040 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2016) ............................................ 10 

Gay & Lesbian Students Association v. Gohn, 

850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) .............................................................. 7, 8 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800 (1982) .......................................................................... 3, 12 

Holloman v. Harland, 

370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004) ............................................................ 13 

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Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730 (2002) .............................................................................. 13 

Husain v. Springer, 

494 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2007) ............................................................... 8, 9 

Keating v. City of Miami, 

598 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 2010) .............................................................. 13 

Koala v. Khosla, 

931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019) .............................................................. 7, 9 

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 

138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) .......................................................................... 14 

Powell v. McCormack, 

395 U.S. 486 (1969) ................................................................................ 9 

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 

515 U.S. 819 (1995) .............................................................................. 14 

Shephard v. Davis, 

300 F. App’x 832 (11th Cir. 2008) ....................................................... 13

Siddique v. Lailiberte, 

972 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2020) ................................................................ 15 

Watts v. Florida International University,

95 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) .......................................................... 2, 12 

Wilson v. Houston Community College System, 

955 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2020) ................................................................ 14 

Zatler v. Wainwright, 

802 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1986) ...................................................... 4, 6, 12 

Statute 

Fla. Stat. § 1004.26(1) ............................................................................ 7, 9 

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INTRODUCTION 

The Student Senate of Florida State University (“the University” or 

“FSU”) removed Jack Denton from his position as Student Senate 

President in retaliation for his constitutionally-protected speech. 

Defendant Ahmad Daraldik presided over Denton’s removal and brought 

the motion to remove Denton to the floor for a vote, breaching his duty to 

find that the motion was out of order because it violated Student Senate 

rules and the Constitution of the United States. 

This Court held that Denton was likely to succeed on his free speech 

retaliation claim since “Denton’s removal was because of his speech” and 

“those participating in the political process do not forfeit their First 

Amendment freedoms.” Doc. 55 at 15–16. Denton subsequently won an 

order of reinstatement to his position from the FSU Student Supreme 

Court. See Doc. 59-1 at 19. Defying the holdings of this Court and the 

Student Supreme Court, Daraldik took additional acts enforcing the 

Student Senate’s original, unconstitutional removal of Denton. See

Amended Complaint, Doc. 69 at ¶¶210–215, 228. Denton filed an 

Amended Complaint detailing these additional violations. See id. 

Daraldik filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint urging 

that Denton has failed to allege enough facts to show that Daraldik was 

a state actor and that he was responsible for the unconstitutional acts. 

But Daraldik relies on inapposite, out-of-circuit caselaw and fails to 

mention this Court’s opinion finding that the Student Senate is a state 

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actor. Compare Doc. 55 at 9–10 (finding state action by the student 

government and the administration) with Doc. 75 at 3–5 (claiming no 

state action by Daraldik without addressing the Court’s opinion). 

Daraldik also contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. But his 

unlawful acts enforcing Denton’s removal occurred after this Court had 

already found that Denton was likely to succeed on his claim that the 

removal was unconstitutional. In other words, Daraldik claims he 

violated no “clearly established” law when he enforced the same 

unconstitutional act that this Court already had enjoined the University 

from enforcing. 

Denton alleges enough facts that, taken as true, establish 

Daraldik’s liability. Therefore, the Court should deny Defendant’s 

motion. 

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD 

On a motion to dismiss, this Court must take the “factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most 

favorable to [Denton].” Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th 

Cir. 2010). The Court must construe the Amended Complaint “broadly,” 

because a complaint is sufficient when it contains “‘enough factual matter 

. . . to suggest’ the required element.” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ. 495 F.3d 

1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 

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The Court may only dismiss the Amended Complaint if “the facts 

as pled do not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1291 (citations omitted). “Plausible” means 

“plausible grounds to infer,” not a “probability requirement.” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556. A complaint need only allege “enough fact to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” liability. 

Id. Denton’s Amended Complaint easily satisfies this standard. 

ARGUMENT 

The Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to show that 

Daraldik was a state actor and that he personally violated Denton’s 

rights. In addition, Daraldik is not entitled to qualified immunity because 

the rights he violated were “clearly established” at the time he violated 

them. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

I. The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Daraldik’s 

actions were state action. 

Daraldik contends that the Amended Complaint fails to allege state 

action by Daraldik. See Doc. 75 at 3–5. That argument ignores Denton’s 

allegations, relies on out-of-circuit precedent, ignores Eleventh Circuit 

precedent, and fails to engage this Court’s opinion that addressed the 

state action issue. 

A. The Amended Complaint alleges specific acts Daraldik 

undertook as a state actor.

Daraldik claims that “Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to impose § 1983 

liability on Daraldik not due to any affirmative acts he individually took 

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. . . but, rather, for the sole fact that this individual is a figure-head of the 

Student Senate . . . .” Doc. 75 at 3. 

Not so. Denton’s claims against Daraldik all arise from Daraldik’s 

personal acts in violation of his legal duties. Denton’s allegations satisfy 

the standard for liability under § 1983, which “requires proof of an 

affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and 

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 

397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). “A causal connection may be established by 

proving that the official was personally involved in the acts that resulted 

in the constitutional deprivation.” Id. All of Denton’s claims against 

Daraldik are for acts which Daraldik directly committed and in which he 

“was personally involved.” Id. 

Denton identified many specific acts that Daraldik undertook 

before this Court granted in part Denton’s motion for preliminary 

injunction. In particular, Denton alleges the following: 

 When Daraldik presided over the Student Senate, he had a 

duty to find unlawful or improper motions out of order and not 

allow them to go to the floor. Doc. 69 at ¶¶41, 113. 

 Daraldik had used that power to find motions out of order on 

other occasions. Id. at ¶114. 

 Daraldik had a duty to find the discriminatory motion of noconfidence against Denton out of order and that he breached 

this duty. Id. at ¶¶116–117. 

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 Daraldik enforced a de facto religious test for office in the 

Student Senate against Denton. Id. at ¶¶117–18. 

 Daraldik acted unlawfully by continuing to exercise the office 

of Student Senate President and maintaining records relating 

to Denton’s unconstitutional removal. Id. at ¶124. 

 Daraldik unlawfully obstructed the confirmation of justices to 

prevent Denton from appealing his unconstitutional removal 

by referring nominations to the Student Senate Judiciary 

Committee in breach of Student Body Statutes. Id. at ¶150. 

Denton also alleges that all Defendants took additional unlawful 

acts to enforce Denton’s unconstitutional removal, even after this Court 

found Denton was likely to succeed on his claims. Respecting Daraldik, 

the Amended Complaint alleges in particular: 

 Daraldik continued to enforce Denton’s unconstitutional 

removal by maintaining that he was the Student Senate 

President even after the Student Supreme Court ordered him 

to reinstate Denton. Id. at ¶¶211–12, 276, 280, 292, 296, 307, 

311. 

 Daraldik unlawfully continued to maintain that he was the 

Student Senate President by invoking Student Senate Rule of 

Procedure 2.2 which allows “any senator to assume the chair 

temporarily,” when he allowed Denton to preside over the 

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Student Senate after the Student Supreme Court ordered 

Denton’s reinstatement. Id. at ¶213, n.13. 

 Denton objected at the time that Daraldik unlawfully 

maintained that he was still the Student Senate President, 

but Daraldik ignored his objection. Id. at ¶214. 

 Daraldik unlawfully maintained that he was the Student 

Senate President until the expiration of his term. Id. at ¶228. 

 Daraldik had knowledge at the time of all these acts that 

Denton’s original removal was unconstitutional. Id. at ¶239. 

 Daraldik knew at the time that additional acts to enforce 

Denton’s unconstitutional removal would contravene this 

Court’s Order granting in part Denton’s motion for 

preliminary injunction. Id. at ¶240. 

 By obstructing Denton’s full, effective reinstatement, 

Daraldik “prevent[ed] him from vindicating his rights before 

the expiration of his rightful term.” Id. at ¶238. 

Denton’s claims do not target Daraldik as a “figure-head of the Student 

Senate.” Doc. 75 at 3. Rather, they identify specific acts that Daraldik 

undertook through his power as presiding officer in breach of his official 

duties and in deprivation of Denton’s legal rights. These allegations 

establish the personal liability of a state actor under § 1983. See Zatler, 

802 F.2d at 401. 

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B. The Amended Complaint alleges facts to show that 

Daraldik’s actions were state action.

Daraldik claims his acts were not state action because “‘student 

members of a student government organization are not state actors in 

the absence of allegations that college officials “coerced or encouraged” 

the alleged acts of the students.’” Doc. 75 at 3 (quoting Dharod v. Los 

Angeles City Coll., 2011 WL 3555622, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2011)). That 

rule is inapplicable for two reasons. 

First, the rule is not Eleventh Circuit or Florida law. Daraldik 

never cites Eleventh Circuit precedent or this Court’s analysis in its 

October 8 Order addressing state action. As this Court noted, the 

Eleventh Circuit “affirm[ed a] judgment that noted student government 

‘was a state actor subject to the same constitutional restrictions as the 

University itself.’” Doc. 55 at 9 (quoting Ala. Student Party v. Student 

Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

Florida law and many other cases surveyed by this Court also show that 

the Student Senate at Florida State engages in state action and is subject 

to constitutional restrictions. “The student senate—like all of FSU’s 

student government—is a creature of state statute.” Doc. 55 at 9. As a 

matter of law, the “student government is a part of the university at 

which it is established.” Fla. Stat. § 1004.26(1). Other courts have found 

that student governments are state actors. See Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 

887, 894 & n.1, 904 (9th Cir. 2019); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 

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(9th Cir. 2007); Gay & Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 

365–66 (8th Cir. 1988). 

Daraldik addresses none of these cases, which this Court cited 

favorably. Compare Doc. 55 at 9–10 (citing all these cases) with Doc. 75 

at 3–5 (claiming no state action but citing none of these cases or this 

Court’s Order). The Amended Complaint alleges facts showing that 

Daraldik was a state actor under these precedents. See Doc. 69 at ¶¶22–

25 (SGA part of University Department and acts subject to review), 31 

(SGA operated by University as an educational benefit), 35–39 (SGA 

created by Florida state law and required to comply with the United 

States Constitution), 40–41 (Daraldik required to follow all applicable 

law as presiding officer of the Student Senate). 

Second, the cases Daraldik cites do not apply. Dharod addressed a 

community college in Los Angeles. The Plaintiff in that case failed to 

“allege any facts that plausibly suggest that the Student Defendants 

were acting under color of state law or that the contested actions of the 

Student Defendants were fairly attributable to the government.” 2011 

WL 3555622, at *6. 

The test the Dharod court applied, and attributed to the Second 

Circuit, is that “student members of a student government organization 

are not state actors in the absence of allegations that college officials 

‘coerced or encouraged’ the alleged acts of the students.” Id. (quoting 

Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2007)). But the test the 

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Husain court articulated was to determine whether a “private individual

may be treated as a state actor for purposes of a constitutional 

challenge . . . .” Id. at 134 (emphasis added). 

In a more recent case which Daraldik’s motion does not address, the 

Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff sufficiently pled that the defendant 

student government and its officers were state actors. See Koala, 931 

F.3d at 894 n.1 (stating that plaintiff “pleads the requisite state action 

for each of The Koala's First Amendment claims”). The court agreed that 

the student government was a state actor because “the Associated 

Students are official units of the University,” and did not mention Dharod

or apply the “coerced or encouraged” test from Husain. Id. (quotation 

omitted). 

Here, as in Koala, the Student Senate is a state actor by virtue of 

its creation in state law and its status as a “part” of the University. Fla. 

Stat. § 1004.26(1). When Daraldik presided over the Student Senate, he 

was a state actor too. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 504 (1969) 

(the “legislative [officials] who participate[] in the unconstitutional 

activity are responsible for their acts”). Therefore, Daraldik’s reliance on 

Dharod—which was not followed by later Ninth Circuit precedent and 

applied a test for determining when private actors may be deemed state 

actors—is inapplicable to this case, where Daraldik was an officer of a 

body that is a de jure state actor.

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Daraldik also relies on Fla. A & M Univ. Bd. of Trustees v. Bruno, 

198 So.3d 1040, 1044–45 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2016) which observed that 

“student government is an extracurricular activity—not real 

government—and it is well-settled that students have no constitutionally 

protected right to participate in extracurricular activities.” See Doc. 75 at 

4. Bruno had nothing to do with determining whether a student 

government engages in state action. In any event, even though a student 

has no freestanding right to participate in the activity, just as no citizen 

has a right to be elected to a “real government,” a student does have a 

right to be free from unconstitutional retaliation once he is elected, just 

as an elected representative may not be expelled from a state house of 

representatives for his exercise of constitutional rights. See Doc. 55 at 16 

(citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 (1966)). 

Denton properly alleges that the Student Senate is a state actor and 

that Daraldik took specific actions as a state actor that violated Denton’s 

rights.

II. The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges facts to state a 

claim against Daraldik. 

Daraldik also claims that Denton fails to state a claim generally. 

See Doc. 75 at 15–17. Daraldik complains about the number of times that 

he was mentioned by name in the Amended Complaint and asserts that 

the “Complaint does not successfully indicate, from a factual standpoint, 

what Daraldik did wrongfully.” Id. at 16–17. 

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The Amended Complaint details numerous specific acts by 

Daraldik in deprivation of Denton’s rights. See supra Part I.A. 

Notwithstanding those allegations, Daraldik points to the Amended 

Complaint’s “Allegations of Law” section, which, according to Daraldik, 

is “replete . . . with references as to how the ‘Student Senate’ allegedly 

wronged Plaintiff” but is light on allegations about Daraldik’s 

involvement in the Student Senate’s wrongs. Id. at 16. 

That ignores allegations about Daraldik’s leadership of the Student 

Senate, especially his power and duty respecting motions raised by 

senators. Denton alleges that Daraldik is personally responsible for the 

wrongs of the Student Senate because he used his power to allow 

unlawful and improper motions to go to the floor for a vote. Denton 

alleges that Daraldik had the power and duty to follow the Rules of the 

Senate and the United States Constitution. Doc. 69 at ¶41. Denton 

alleges that Daraldik exercised this power and duty on other occasions to 

prevent some motions which he deemed to be out of order from going to 

the floor for a vote. Id. at ¶114. Denton alleges that the “Student Senate’s 

rules expressly prohibit motions of no-confidence for any purpose that 

would result in a violation of the Senate Conduct Code.” Id. at ¶111. 

Denton alleges that the motion of no confidence against him contravened 

this rule. Id. at ¶115. Denton alleges that Daraldik therefore had the 

power and the duty to find the motion of no-confidence against him out 

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of order and to keep the motion from going to the floor for a vote. Id. at 

¶116. Denton alleges that Daraldik breached this duty. Id. at ¶117. 

In short, Denton alleges that Daraldik had the duty and the power 

to unilaterally prevent every harm that the Student Senate as a whole 

imposed upon Denton. Denton squarely alleges that Daraldik is 

responsible for these harms because, but for Daraldik’s decision to allow 

the motions to go to the floor for a vote, none of the motions against 

Denton could have been approved by the body. Denton squarely alleges 

“an affirmative causal connection” between particular acts taken by 

Daraldik as presiding officer of the Student Senate and the harms he 

suffered. Zatler, 802 F.2d at 401. These allegations, in addition to the acts 

described in detail in Part I.A above, contain more than “‘enough factual 

matter . . . to suggest’ the required element[s]” of Denton’s claims. Watts 

v. Fla. Int’l Univ. 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Therefore, Denton 

has plead sufficient facts to state a claim against Daraldik.

III. Daraldik is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

Daraldik is not entitled to qualified immunity because his acts 

breached Denton’s “clearly established” rights at the time he acted. See 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Denton’s rights to be free 

from retaliation for his speech and hostility toward his religious beliefs 

were clearly established in any event. But Daraldik went even further, 

continuing to enforce Denton’s unconstitutional removal even after this 

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Court put him on direct notice about the applicable, clearly established 

constitutional rights. 

A. Denton alleges that Daraldik’s acts presiding over, 

furthering, and enforcing Denton’s removal violated 

clearly established law. 

To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that 

defendant “violated a constitutional right” that “was clearly established 

at the time of the violation.” Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 

(11th Cir. 2004). The “clearly established” standard does not require 

defendant’s acts to be “materially similar to prior precedent” or already 

declared unconstitutional. Id. at 1277–78. Rather, when “in the light of 

preexisting law, the unlawfulness [is] apparent,” there is no qualified 

immunity. Shephard v. Davis, 300 F. App’x 832, 839 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Such preexisting law includes a “broader, clearly established principle” 

that, applied to the official’s conduct, demonstrates liability. Keating v. 

City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010). Consequently, “officials 

can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in 

novel factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 

Denton’s clearly established rights were violated because the direct 

application of well-settled precedent demonstrates the unlawfulness of 

Daraldik’s acts. This is true of Denton’s free speech retaliation claim. See

Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (“This Court and 

the Supreme Court have long held that state officials may not retaliate 

against private citizens because of the exercise of their First Amendment 

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rights.”). This is true of Denton’s content and viewpoint discrimination 

claim. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 

819, 828 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate 

speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”) And 

this is true of Denton’s free exercise hostility claim. See Masterpiece 

Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018) 

(government officials “cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon 

or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices”); 

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) 

(quotations omitted) (“The [Free Exercise] Clause forbids subtle 

departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular religious 

beliefs.”). 

These principles apply to student governments. Ala. Student Party, 

867 F.2d at 1345 (agreeing “that the SGA was a state actor subject to the 

same constitutional restrictions as the University itself”). And they apply 

to members of a legislature. Bond, 385 U.S. at 137; Wilson v. Houston 

Cmty. Coll. Sys., 955 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2020) (“elected officials are 

entitled to be free from retaliation for constitutionally protected speech”). 

As this Court stated (citing several of these cases), “[a]s these cases show, 

those participating in the political process do not forfeit their First 

Amendment freedoms (including the right to be free from First 

Amendment retaliation).” Doc. 55 at 16. 

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Daraldik relies on Siddique v. Lailiberte, 972 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 

2020) to claim that none of Denton’s rights were clearly established. See

Doc. 75 at 10–12. But Siddique addressed claims that Denton has not 

raised. The Plaintiff in Siddique sued because he did not receive an 

appointment to a temporary position in the student government. 972 F.3d 

at 900. The district court found qualified immunity because “it 

determined federal law had not clearly established the narrower right of 

a student to participate in student government under all circumstances.” 

Id. at 902. Only on appeal did Siddique “pursue a public-employment 

theory of his case.” Id. at 903. The court observed, “Siddique's reliance on 

a public-employment theory of retaliation in the clearly established 

portion of his briefing is puzzling in light of the fact that Siddique later 

disavows the idea that he was an employee of the University.” Id.

Denton has not raised a novel theory of entitlement to discretionary 

appointments in student government. Rather, he alleges, and this Court 

held that he was likely to succeed in showing, that “His claim is that he 

lost his job—his student government position—because he chose to 

exercise his First Amendment rights.” Doc. 55 at 16. “[I]t [is not] an 

answer to say, as [Defendant] does,” in his invocation of Siddique, “that 

nobody has a constitutional right to serve in student government. That 

may be true, but that is not the issue.” Id. at 17. Rather, the Amended 

Complaint alleges that “Denton was serving in student government, and 

he had a constitutional right not to have that taken away from him based 

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on his privately expressing his religious views.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). 

The principles prohibiting retaliation against speech and hostility 

toward free exercise of religion by the state against employees are clearly 

established. When Daraldik presided over discriminatory motions to 

remove Denton from his job because of his religious speech (prohibited by 

the rules of his own body), allowed them to proceed to the floor, and 

enforced those motions once they carried, he violated Denton’s clearly 

established rights. Daraldik is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

B. Denton alleges that Daraldik’s acts after this Court 

preliminarily enjoined University officials violated clearly 

established law. 

To make matters worse, Daraldik undertook additional acts to 

enforce Denton’s removal even after he was on notice that the specific 

acts in question—the Student Senate’s discriminatory removal of Denton 

and the subsequent enforcement of that removal—were unconstitutional. 

See supra Part I.A. Daraldik has claimed that “[t]o deny Daraldik 

qualified immunity, Plaintiff suggests a young student, participating in 

an extra-curricular activity, should be akin to a constitutional scholarthis position lacks merit.” Doc. 75 at 10. Quite the opposite is true: with 

a ruling from this Court in one hand and an order from the Student 

Supreme Court to reinstate Denton in the other, Daraldik continued 

violating Denton’s rights and enforcing the original unconstitutional 

removal. 

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Daraldik insisted that he was still the president even after he was 

ordered to reinstate Denton. Doc. 69 at ¶211. Daraldik cannot claim that 

the fact that he appealed the Student Supreme Court’s order to 

Defendant Hecht justifies his continued assertion of authority. As the 

Amended Complaint alleges, Chief Justice Ducey explained to Defendant 

Bowden that the Student Supreme Court’s order was effective 

immediately and not stayed pending appeal (just as Denton was removed 

immediately despite his own appeal to Hecht). Id. at ¶ 208. Yet Bowden 

agreed when Daraldik continued enforcing the original unconstitutional 

removal, over Denton’s contemporaneous objection, and endorsed 

Daraldik’s claim that he was still Student Senate President. Id. at 

¶¶211–14. 

Daraldik cannot claim that his decision to allow Denton to preside 

over some senate meetings absolves him of his unconstitutional attempt 

to maintain the presidency. While Denton did in fact preside over the 

meetings, Denton alleges that Daraldik claimed he was still the president 

and only allowed Denton to preside by virtue of his authority as president

to allow “any senator” to assume the chair. Id. at ¶213 & n.13. Daraldik 

effectively maintained that he was still Student Senate President but 

that Denton was presiding at his pleasure, undermining Denton’s ability 

to serve the remainder of the term to which he was entitled. Id. at ¶238. 

All of Daraldik’s acts violated Denton’s clearly established rights, 

but Daraldik enjoyed a degree of clarity that officials seldom do: an 

Case 4:20-cv-00425-AW-MAF Document 77 Filed 03/25/21 Page 21 of 24
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opinion by a court in an ongoing dispute stating Denton’s likely success 

on the merits on claims arising from the same facts. Yet Daraldik 

continued to enforce Denton’s unconstitutional removal in contradiction 

to this Court’s order, and obstructed Denton from exercising the 

remainder of his term as ordered by the Student Supreme Court. 

Daraldik is not entitled to qualified immunity for any of his unlawful 

acts. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons above, this Court should deny Daraldik’s Motion to 

Dismiss. 

Respectfully submitted on the 25th day of March, 2021. 

s/ Tyson Langhofer

Tyson Langhofer* 

ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM

20116 Ashbrook Place, Suite 250 

Ashburn, VA 20147 

Telephone: (571) 707-4655 

Facsimile: (571) 707-4656 

tlanghofer@ADFlegal.org 

David A. Cortman 

FLORIDA BAR NO. 18433 

Travis C. Barham* 

ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM

1000 Hurricane Shoals Road NE, 

Ste. D-1100 

Lawrenceville, GA 30043 

Telephone: (770) 339-0774 

Facsimile: (770) 339-6744 

dcortman@ADFlegal.org 

tbarham@ADFlegal.org 

Mark Welton 

Florida Bar No. 999202 

Case 4:20-cv-00425-AW-MAF Document 77 Filed 03/25/21 Page 22 of 24
19

WELTON LAW FIRM, LLC 

1020 S. Ferdon Blvd. 

Crestview, FL 32536 

Telephone: (850) 682-2120 

Facsimile: (850) 689-0706 

mark@weltonlawfirm.com 

* Admitted Pro Hac Vice. 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Case 4:20-cv-00425-AW-MAF Document 77 Filed 03/25/21 Page 23 of 24
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

1. This document complies with the length limits of N.D. Fla. 

Loc. R. 7.1(F) because this document contains 4,059 words according to 

the word count function of Microsoft Word 365. 

2. This document complies with the requirements of N.D. Fla. 

Loc. R. 5.1(C) because this document has been prepared in a 

proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 365 in 14-point 

Century Schoolbook font. 

Respectfully submitted on the 25th Day of March, 2021. 

s/ Tyson Langhofer

Tyson Langhofer* 

ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM

20116 Ashbrook Place, Suite 250 

Ashburn, VA 20147 

Telephone: (571) 707-4655 

Facsimile: (571) 707-4656 

tlanghofer@ADFlegal.org 

Case 4:20-cv-00425-AW-MAF Document 77 Filed 03/25/21 Page 24 of 24