alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(March 28, 1967)

#### Christopher J. Sheridan, as Administrator of the Estate of Sarah T. Sheridan, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. City of New York et al., Defendants. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. New York Telephone Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. (And Three Other Actions.)

Order entered on October 31, 1966, in the several actions denying motion of third-party defendant to dismiss third-party complaints, unanimously affirmed, without costs and disbursements and without prejudice to a renewal of the motion on substantial completion of pretrial proceedings. The courts should be “reluctant to dismiss third-party complaints at the pleading stage, particularly in eases involving the *‘*passive ’ *‘*active ’ dichotomy. A claim over ' charging the third person with active negligence will be allowed if the original complaint can reasonably be interpreted as including an allegation of passive negligence on the part of the defendant.’ At the pleading stage, the ‘ pleader (prime plaintiff) is hardly concerned with the problem among the defendants, inter se, and no effort is made to categorize the allegations to assist in the solution of the problem of liability among them.’ But even if plaintiff’s pleadings are fairly clear, the ease of amendment on trial may mean that recovery will be allowed on a slightly different theory. See CPLR 3025(cc).” (2 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 1010.02.) In view of the fact that the allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaints here are very general and the cause of the accident is not spelled out, it may not be said with certainty that a recovery, if had by the plaintiffs against the third-party plaintiff, will be based upon its “active” rather than “passive” negligence. It may very well be that, as the ease develops within the scope of the pleadings, a right of recovery over will depend upon the resolving of issues by a trier of the facts. Concur — Botein, P. J., Stevens, Eager, Capozzoli and McNally, JJ.
§ 500.11 Vehicular and pedestrian traffic. ( a ) Drivers of all vehicles in or on USNA property shall drive only on established roads, shall drive in a careful and safe manner at all times, and shall comply with the signals and directions of the Security Staff and all posted traffic signs.
( b ) The blocking of entrances, driveways, walks, loading platforms, or fire hydrants, and parking in designated no parking areas in or on USNA property is prohibited.
( c ) Except in emergencies, parking in or on USNA property in other than designated areas is not allowed without a permit. Parking without authority, parking in unauthorized locations or in locations reserved for other persons, or contrary to the direction of posted signs, is prohibited.
( d ) USNA approval is required for all vehicles needed for access setup and breakdown activities relating to special events, ceremonies, or related activities. Off-road routes will be determined by the USNA.
( e ) In addition to the penalties provided in § 500.15, vehicles parked in violation of this section are subject to being towed and the cost of such towing being assessed to the owner of such vehicle.
( f ) This section may be supplemented from time to time, by the issuance and posting of specific traffic directives as may be required, and when so issued and posted such directives shall have the same force and effect as if incorporated in this subpart.
#### KEOUGH, Respondent, v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

May 23, 1906.)

Action by Harry J. Keough against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:96-cr-00020-MP-AK-4

JOHN CALVIN EVERETT,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on Doc. 559, Defendant's Motion for Leave to

Amend Doc. 556, his Motion for Reconsideration of the order at Doc. 555. That motion

for reconsideration has already been denied as without merit, and nothing in the motion

at Doc. 559 justifies revisiting the issues raised. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

The Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 559) is denied.

DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of October, 2011. 

áBZtÜç eA ]ÉÇxá 

GARY R. JONES

United States Magistrate Judge
Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

BRYAN F. JENNINGS,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 5:02cv174-RH

JAMES V. CROSBY,

Respondent.

______________________________/

ORDER GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Final judgment has been entered denying this petition for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Petitioner has filed a notice of appeal and an

application for a certificate of appealability. 

Unless a certificate of appealability is issued, petitioner may not appeal. See

28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1). A certificate of appealability may be issued only if

petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039-40

(2003) (explaining meaning of this term); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-

84, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000) (same); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.

880, 893 n.4, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1983); see also Williams v.

Case 5:02-cv-00174-RH Document 39 Filed 12/12/05 Page 1 of 3
Page 2 of 3

Case No: 5:02cv174-RH

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-13, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000) (setting

forth standards applicable to §2254 petitions on the merits). As the Court said in

Slack:

 To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner must make a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a

demonstration that, under Barefoot, includes showing that reasonable

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the

petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the

issues presented were "'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.'"

 

Slack, 529 U.S. at 483-84, quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n.4. Further, in order

to obtain a certificate of appealability when dismissal is based on procedural

grounds, a petitioner must show, "at least, that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional

right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. 

Upon consideration of petitioner’s application in light of these standards, 

IT IS ORDERED:

 Petitioner’s application for a certificate of appealability (document 32) is

GRANTED, limited to the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to relief based

upon the giving of constitutionally flawed instructions on death penalty

Case 5:02-cv-00174-RH Document 39 Filed 12/12/05 Page 2 of 3
Page 3 of 3

Case No: 5:02cv174-RH

aggravators as addressed in claims VII and IX. 

SO ORDERED this 12th day of December, 2005.

s/Robert L. Hinkle 

Chief United States District Judge 

Case 5:02-cv-00174-RH Document 39 Filed 12/12/05 Page 3 of 3
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andrew King, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County, rendered on August 7, 1978, unanimously affirmed. Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. (See Anders *v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no meritorious points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Fein, J. P., Sandler, Ross, Markewich and Lupiano, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Nathan Lemler, Appellant, v Stephen Dalsheim, as Warden of the Ossining Correctional Facility, Respondent.

In a habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in Westchester County on June 11, 1979, which dismissed the petition. Appeal dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements. Petitioner has been released on parole. Accordingly, the appeal is moot. We note that were we not dismissing the appeal we would affirm the judgment appealed from. Hopkins, J. P., Damiani, O’Connor, Lazer and Mangano, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
      33 f)




REGULUS




Report
      on
      Assessment of Compliance with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria




1.  Pursuant
        to Subpart 229.1100 — Asset Backed Securities, l7 C.F.R. §§229.1100-229.1123 (“
Regulation AB ”), Regulus Group LLC, is responsible for assessing its compliance
        with the servicing criteria applicable to the remittance processing services
        it
        provides to customers who are issuers or servicers of asset backed securities
        transactions and who have requested confirmation of Regulus’ compliance in
        connection with loan and/or receivables portfolios that include pool assets
        for
        asset backed securities transactions (the “ Platform ”). Remittance processing
        is a service whereby check payments that are remitted by mail to a post office
        box are collected, processed through a highly automated data capture system,
        and
        prepared for deposit to a bank account held by the beneficiary of the
        payment.




2.  The
      servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB were used in
      Regulus’ assessment of compliance. Regulus has concluded that the servicing
      criteria set forth in Items 1122(d)(2)(i) and 1122(d)(4)(iv) of Regulation
      AB
      are applicable to the servicing activities it performs with respect to the
      Platform (such criteria the “ Applicable Servicing Criteria ”). Regulus has
      concluded that the remainder of the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d)
      of Regulation AB are inapplicable to the activities it performs with respect
      to
      the Platform because Regulus does not participate in the servicing activities
      referenced by such servicing criteria.




3.  As
      of and
      for the year ending December 3l, 2006, Regulus has complied in all material
      respects with the Applicable Servicing Criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of
      Regulation AB.




4.  KPMG
      LLP,
      a registered public accounting firm, has issued an attestation report on
      Regulus’ assessment of compliance with the Applicable Servicing Criteria as of
      and for the year ending December 31, 2006. A copy of that attestation report
      is
      attached hereto as Exhibit A .









By:
      /s/
      Kimberlee Clark


Kimberlee
      Clark


Chief
      Financial Officer




July
        17,
        2007




860
      LATOUR COURT


NAPA,
      CA
      94558


TEL:
      707.254.4000


FAX:
      707.254.4070


REGULUSGROUP.COM
Exhibit 32.1


                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, Jeffrey A. Leddy, Chief Executive Officer and President of SkyTerra
Communications, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)  The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June
     30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
     date hereof (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of
     Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                               By:  /s/ JEFFREY A. LEDDY
                                    ---------------------------------------
                                    Name:  Jeffrey A. Leddy
                                    Title: Chief Executive Officer and President
                                           (Principal Executive Officer and
                                           Principal Financial Officer)
                                    Date:  August 16, 2004


     This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
Third Amendment to 2005 Nonqualified Retirement Plan.



 Exhibit 10.1 
 THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE 
 GENTIVA HEALTH SERVICES, INC. 
 2005 NONQUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN 
 WHEREAS, Gentiva Health Services, Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the Gentiva Health Services, Inc. 2005 Nonqualified Retirement Plan (the “Plan”); and 
 WHEREAS, Section 10.3 provides that the Benefits Committee may amend the Plan from time to time, to the extent that the amendment does not result in
increased costs to the Company; and 
 WHEREAS, the Benefits Committee wishes to amend the Plan to expressly provide that a Participant must
be employed on the date a profit sharing contribution under the Plan is actually credited to the Accounts of otherwise eligible Participants in order to receive such a contribution; 
 NOW THEREFORE, the Plan is amended as follows: 
 FIRST 
 Section 4.2(b)(1) is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows: 
 (1) The Participating Employer may also choose to make a profit sharing contribution, in addition to, or in lieu of a matching contribution. If the
Participating Employer makes a profit sharing contribution with respect to a particular Plan Year, only Participants who have completed one thousand (1,000) Hours of Service during such Plan Year and who are employed by the Participating
Employer on the date the profit sharing contribution for such Plan Year is credited to the Accounts of the otherwise eligible Participants shall be eligible to receive an allocation of such profit sharing contribution. 
 SECOND 
 The effective date of
this Third Amendment shall be January 1, 2008. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Benefits Committee hereby adopts this Third Amendment to the Gentiva Health
Services, Inc. 2005 Nonqualified Retirement Plan. 
  

	
	BENEFITS COMMITTEE
	
	/s/ John R. Potapchuk
	John Potapchuk
	
	/s/ Douglas Dahlgard
	Doug Dahlgard
	
	/s/ Kevin Marrazzo
	Kevin Marrazzo
	
	/s/ Brian Silva
	Brian Silva


 Dated: As of March 5, 2009 
  

 2
#### § 42.123 Flow diagram for skip lot sampling and inspection.

[![](https://img.federalregister.gov/EC02SE91.000/EC02SE91.000_large.png)](https://img.federalregister.gov/EC02SE91.000/EC02SE91.000_original_size.png)

Notes:

1. Only normal inspection is permitted.

2. All lot selections for the one-half and one-fourth sampling rates must be strictly random (for example, not every other lot or every fourth lot).

3. Two exceptions to the procedures shown above are as follows:

(a) The skip lot sampling and inspection rate of one-half can be instituted immediately if the lots from the producer are currently on, or eligible to be on, reduced inspection and all other conditions in [§ 42.120](/on/2024-09-16/title-7/section-42.120) are met. When skip lot inspection begins, however, only normal inspection is permitted.

(b) While inspecting every lot consecutively as offered for inspection, i.e., while not on the one-half or one-fourth rate, if requirements for switching from normal to tightened inspection are met as specified in [§ 42.108](/on/2024-09-16/title-7/section-42.108) then skip lot procedures terminate, tightened inspection is initiated, and stationary lot sampling and inspection procedures in Subpart B are instituted. Skip lot procedures may be instituted again only when all conditions of [§ 42.120](/on/2024-09-16/title-7/section-42.120) are met.
23.1005 Contract clause.

(a) Insert the clause at 52.223-5, Pollution Prevention and Right-to-Know Information, in solicitations

and contracts that provide for performance, in whole or in part, on a Federal facility.

(b) Use the clause with its Alternate I if the contract provides for contractor-

(1) Operation or maintenance of a Federal facility at which the agency has implemented or plans to

implement an EMS; or

(2) Activities and operations-

(i) To be performed at a Government-operated Federal facility that has implemented or plans to

implement an EMS; and

(ii) That the agency has determined are covered within the EMS.

(c) Use the clause with its Alternate II if-

(1) The contract provides for contractor activities on a Federal facility; and

(2) The agency has determined that the contractor activities should be included within the FCA or an

environmental management system audit.

Parent topic: Subpart 23.10 - Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution

Prevention Requirements
Exhibit
10.1.2


 


AMENDMENT TO THE


 EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT WITH WILLIAM A. SANGER


 


THIS AMENDMENT (“Amendment”),
effective on the 12th day of March, 2009, is made by and between Emergency
Medical Services Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“EMSC”),
and William A. Sanger (“Executive”),
in order to amend the Employment Agreement heretofore entered into between
Emergency Medical Services, L.P. (“EMS L.P.”)
and Executive, as assigned by EMS L.P. to EMSC on February 10, 2005, and
as amended on June 18, 2007 and on January 1, 2009 (the “Employment Agreement”).


 


WHEREAS,
EMSC and the Executive desire to amend the Employment Agreement to extend
Executive’s term of employment and to provide a mechanism by which such term
can be further extended.


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, the Agreement is hereby amended as follows:


 


1.             Article 2, “Term of the Agreement” shall be amended and restated to read in its entirety as follows:
 
“This Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and shall continue for a period of five years (the “Initial Term”) unless earlier terminated in accordance with Article 6 hereof.  Immediately upon the expiration of the Initial Term, this Agreement shall continue for an additional period of three years (the “First Renewal Term”) unless earlier terminated in accordance with Article 6 hereof.  Immediately upon the expiration of the First Renewal Term, this Agreement shall continue for an additional period of three years (the “Second Renewal Term”) unless either EMSC or the Executive informs the other not less than ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of the Second Renewal Term that it does not wish to renew the Agreement, in which event this Agreement shall terminate on the last day of the First Renewal Term, or, if so extended, unless earlier terminated in accordance with Article 6 hereof.”
 


2.             Except as specifically set
forth herein, all of the terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement are
declared by the parties to be in full force and effect without change.


 


[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]


 

















 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, EMSC and Executive have executed this Agreement, in multiple
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, effective as of March 12,
2009.


 


 


EMERGENCY
MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION


 


 


	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Todd G. Zimmerman

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Name:

  	
   Todd G.
  Zimmerman

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Title:

  	
   Executive
  Vice President

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  EXECUTIVE

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  /s/
  William A. Sanger

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  William
  A. Sanger

  	
   

  



 


2
1 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 03-3355

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Aaron Gonzalez, also known as Aaron * Elizondo, also known as Aaron * [UNPUBLISHED] Martinez, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 6, 2004 Filed: April 12, 2004

___________ Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Aaron Gonzalez (Gonzalez) appeals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pled guilty to participating in a drug conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Gonzalez argues that the two felony convictions upon which the court relied to classify him as a career offender did not qualify as convictions under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), because the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services had issued2 Gonzalez’s reliance on United States v. Gallaher , 275 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2001), is misplaced. In Gallaher , the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Moreover, the holding was based on the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
-2- certificates for both convictions that showed he had been “discharged” and “restored all [his] civil rights as provided by law.” In support of this argument, Gonzalez analogizes his case to United States v. Gallaher , 275 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2001), where a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that (1) if a state had restored the defendant’s civil rights with respect to a prior conviction by issuance of a certificate, and (2) the certificate did not expressly contain a restriction pertaining to firearms, the prior conviction may not be used as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924. 2Here, even if this court were to agree with Gonzalez that Gallagher applies, Gonzalez’s argument fails because both certificates on Gonzalez included the following disclaimer: “The issuance of this Certificate of Discharge does not restore to the above captioned individual his/her right to bear arms.” We conclude that a state certificate which merely reinstates a former prisoner’s civil rights does not prevent the conviction from being counted under section 4B1.1(a). See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.2 n.3, 4A1.2 n.10. Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________
Page 1 of 2 

Case No.: 3:20cv5689/RV/EMT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

 PENSACOLA DIVISION 

DEB MAXWELL, CHARLENE 

COTHRAN, MARK C. SEVIER, 

and JOHN GUNTER, JR., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. Case No.: 3:20cv5689/RV/EMT 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., 

Defendants. 

 / 

ORDER

 The chief magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation on June 22, 

2021 (doc. 28). The parties were sent a copy of the Report and Recommendation 

to the addresses on file and afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to 

Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). No objections have been filed. 

 Having considered the Report and Recommendation, I have determined the 

Report and Recommendation should be adopted. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 

 1. The chief magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (doc. 28) is 

adopted and incorporated by reference in this order. 

Case 3:20-cv-05689-RV-EMT Document 32 Filed 07/23/21 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2 

Case No.: 3:20cv5689/RV/EMT

 2. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice for each Plaintiffs’ 

failure to comply with an order of the court and failure to keep the court apprised of 

his or her current address. Since the court is unable to reach Plaintiffs, issuance of 

any further orders would be futile. 

 3. The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this 

order and close the case. 

DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of July 2021. 

 /s/ Roger Vinson 

 ROGER VINSON 

 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:20-cv-05689-RV-EMT Document 32 Filed 07/23/21 Page 2 of 2