1 14-764 Gachette v. Metro North-High Bridge


## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JA NUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMITTED AND IS GOVERNE D BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 2 New York, on the 30 th day of March, two thousand fifteen. 3 4 PRESENT: 5 RALPH K. WINTER, 6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 7 DENNY CHIN, 8 Circuit Judges. 9

_____________________________________ 10 11 Louis Gachette, 12 13 Plaintiff-Appellant , 14 15 v. 14-764 16 17 Metro North-High Bridge, et al., 18 19 Defendants-Appellees . 20 21

_____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Louis Gachette, pro se , Brooklyn, NY. 24 25 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Joshua Robert Fay, James B. Henly, Metro-North 26 Commuter Rail road Company, New York, NY. 27 282 Appeal from a judgment of the United States Di strict Court for the Southern District of 1 New York (Torres, J .). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 2 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the 3 matter is REMANDED for further proceedings. 4
Plaintiff-Appellant Louis Gachette, proceeding pro se , appeals the district court = s summary 5 judgment dismissal of his employment discrimina tion and retaliation compla int. We assume the 6 parties = familiarity with the underlying facts, the pro cedural history of the case, and the issues on 7 appeal. 8 “We review the district cour t’s grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same 9 standards that govern the district co urt’s consideration of the motion.” Summa v. Hofstra Univ. , 10 708 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2013) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is 11 appropriate where there are no ge nuine disputes concerning any material facts, and where the 12 moving party is entitled to j udgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 “We resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 14 non-moving party.” Id. 15 Here, the district court’ s order granting summary judg ment stated only that: (1) 16 Gachette’s failure to f ile a Rule 56.1 counterstatement resulted in the facts alleged in Defendants’ 17 Rule 56.1 statement being deemed admitted; and (2) “Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence 18 demonstrating that there are triable issues of fact with respect to his discrimination and retaliation 19 claims . . . . Moreover, this Cour t shall not consider causes of action not pleaded in the complaint.” 20 App. at 7. We find the district court’s analysis insufficient. 213 In Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co. , we held that, even where a summary 1 judgment motion is wholly unopposed, “the district court may not grant the motion without first 2 examining the moving party’s submission to determ ine if it has met its burden of demonstrating 3 that no material issue of fact remains fo r trial.” 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004). “[I]n 4 determining whether the moving party has met this bur den . . . the district court may not rely solely 5 on the statement of undisputed facts contained in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement. It must 6 be satisfied that the citation to evidence in the record supports the assertion.” Id. “If the 7 evidence submitted in support of the summary judgment motion does not meet the movant’s 8 burden of production, then summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary 9 matter is presented.” Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). “An unopposed 10 summary judgment motion may also fail where the undisputed facts fail to show that the moving 11 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where 12 the order granting summary judgment is insuffici ently clear to permit this Court to determine 13 whether the grounds for granting the motion are valid, remand is appropriate.” Id. 14 In this case, the district court’s order di d not reference review of the statement of 15 undisputed facts submitted by Defendants or its c itations to the evidence , shifted the burden to 16 Gachette to produce evidence establishing triable issues of fact, and di d not state whether the 17 evidence established that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This was 18

error. See Jackson v. Fed. Express , 766 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Giannullo v. City 19 of New York , 322 F.3d 139, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 200 3) (noting that failure to verify a party’s factual 20 assertions “derogate[s] the trut h-finding functions of the judici al process by substituting 21 convenience for facts”). The court’s failu re to follow the principles outlined in Vermont Teddy 224 Bear , moreover, are especially problematic because Gachette was proceeding pro se . See 1 Jackson , 766 F.3d at 196 (e xplaining that “ Vermont Teddy Bear involved a motion totally 2 unopposed by a pro se party, and the district court’s failure to analyze any of the complex legal and 3 factual issues” made remand appropriate). Even though “we do not require dist rict courts to write 4 elaborate essays using talismanic phrases,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does require that a 5 grant of summary judgment be accompanied by an explanation. Id. at 196-97; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 56(a). Here, the district court’ s order gives no indication of it s reasoning for granting summary 7 judgment, and therefore is insufficient to allow an informed appellate review. See Jackson , 766 8 F.3d at 197-98. 9 Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and remand for th e district court to issue a 10 decision that complies with Vermont Teddy Bear and provides sufficient e xplanation to permit this 11 Court to conduct an informed appellate review. 12
FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 14