No. 87-74 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

ROBERT S. and BETTY J. TURNER, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

ARTHUR P. TRANAKOS, and other 

John Doe, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Liberty, 

The Honorable Chan Ettien, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Flaherty, Lord & Winner; Patrick Flaherty, Great Falls, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Arthur P. Tranakos, pro set Atlanta, Georgia 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 19, 1987 

Decided: ~ovember 3, 1987 

I 

Yk?, - / 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered! the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Robert and Betty Turner appeal a judgment of dismissal 

made by the District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District. 

The District Court found that it lacked in personam 

jurisdiction over the defendant, Arthur Tranakos. We reverse 

the decision of the District Court and remand for further 

proceedings. 

On December 8, 1986, Robert and Betty Turner instituted 

this action against Arthur Tranakos in Liberty County 

alleging legal malpractice, bad faith, breach of fiduciary 

duty and fraud. The Turners made the following allegations 

in their complaint: 

1.0 Robert and Betty Turner are farmers 

who live near Chester, Montana in Liberty 

County, State of Montana and are second 

and third generation farmers from 

Montana. 

1.1 Arthur P. Tranakos is an attorney at 

law admitted to practice in the Courts of 

Georgia, and who has actively solicited 

business in the State of Montana. 

Tranakos has traveled into the State of 

Montana to solicit business and he has 

also appeared as an attorney at law 

before various Montana Courts although he 

is not an admitted attorney in Montana. 

2.0 Arthur Tranakos came to Montana on 

his own and also under the sponsorship of 

various life insurance companies in order 

to solicit business for tax sheltered 

investments and through estate planning. 

2.1 It was in this capacity that he met 

the Plaintiffs and represented that he 

was well qualified to assist the Turners 

in planning their estate and managing 

their financial affairs. The Defendant 

Arthur P. Tranakos specifically 
represented that the highest confidence 

in trust could be reposed in him and that 

he would take care of the Plaintiff's 

every financial need. 

2.2 Acting in direct reliance upon the 

representations and advice of Arthur P. 

Tranakos, the Plaintiffs did put all of 

their trust and faith in him as an 

attorney, as an investment counselor, and 

acting on his advice they transferred 

their entire interest in their family 

farm (which was worth in excess of 

$500,000) to a corporation known as 

SOLACO, INC., a Nevada Corporation, which 

was owned entirely by Arthur P. Tranakos 

as the sole shareholder of record. 

2.3 Thereafter, the crisis hit the farm 

economy through low prices and drought 

and the major creditor of the Turners 

commenced a foreclosure action in Liberty 

County District Court, Cause No. 3010 in 

which the Federal Land Bank of Spokane 

sought to foreclose its security interest 

in the family farm which was operated by 

the Turners. 

2.4 Arthur P. Tranakos, although not 

admitted to practice in Montana, entered 

an appearance as attorney of record for 

the Turners in that matter and proceeded 

to [mislrepresent the Turners. Arthur P. 

Tranakos had a duty to obtain local 

counsel to assist in the representation 

of the Plaintiffs which duty is breached. 

Arthur P. Tranakos had an additional duty 

to render a competent and vigorous 

defense including pleading of affirmative 

defenses, filing compulsory counterclaims 

and to appear at all court hearings. 

2.5 Tranakos violated all of the 

foregoing duties by not associating local 

counsel, by not being sponsored in by 

local counsel, by failing to raise the 

proper affirmative defenses, file 

compulsory counterclaims and finally by 

not appearing at a summary judgment 
hearing in which the Federal Land Bank 

won its motion to foreclose by the 

default of Arthur P. Tranakos and the 

Turners are in immediate danger of losing 

the family farm. 

. . . [Addition theirs.] 

A summons was issued on December 9, 1986, and Tranakos was 

personally served in Atlanta, Georgia on December 16, 1986. 

On January 8, 1987, the Turners moved for entry of default 

judgment based on Tranakos' failure to file a response to the 

complaint within twenty days. The Liberty County Clerk of 

Court entered default judgment against Tranakos on January 

12, 1987. 

At the Turners' request, the District Court scheduled a 

hearing for January 26, 1987, to determine damages due under 

the default judgment. On January 20, 1987, Tranakos filed an 

answer to the Turners' complaint wherein he alleged, among 

other things, that the District Court lacked personal 

jurisdiction over him. Tranakos' answer goes on to admit 

that he "did appear on behalf of [the Turners] in their case 

adverse the Federal Land Bank of Spokane, Case No. 3010, in 

this Court." 

The District Court refused to entertain any discussion 

of damages at the January 26, 1987, hearing. Instead, the 

District Court dismissed the case on the grounds that it 

lacked personal jurisdiction over Tranakos. The District 

Court also took judicial notice of Liberty County District 

Court Cause No. 3010, entitled "The Federal Land Bank of 

Spokane v. Robert S. and Betty J. Turner et al. " The 

Turners appeal the District Court's dismissal of this action 

and raise the following issues: 

(1) Did the District Court err in dismissing Turners' 

action for lack of personal jurisdiction when Turners' 
complaint alleged that Tranakos acted and failed to act 

within Montana in a manner constituting professional 

malpractice? 

(2) Did the District Court err in dismissing Turners' 

action for lack of personal jurisdiction after that co~rt 

took judicial notice of Tranakos' appearance in the Federal 

Land Bank's action to foreclose its mortgage on the Turners' 

Montana property? 

(3) Did the District Court err in dismissing Turners' 

action for lack of personal jurisdiction when Turners' 

verified complaint alleged that Tranakos conducted business 

within the state? 

Respondent Tranakos raises the following additional 

issue: 

(4) Is the record before this Court complete and 

adequate for this Court's review of the District Court's 

decision? 

This Court must first address Tranakos' procedural 

issue before addressing the merits of this appeal. Tranakos 

asserts that under Rule 9, M.R.App.P., the Turners have not 

properly perfected this appeal and, therefore, the appeal 

must be dismissed. Tranakos' argument in this regard is that 

the record on appeal must include the records of the Federal 

Land Bank foreclosure action, Liberty County District Court 

Cause No. 3010. However, the District Court took judicial 

notice of the above-referenced action and this Court may do 

the same. 

Tranakos' appellate procedure argument is without 

merit. Rule 202(c), M.R.Evid., provides the following: 

A court may take judicial notice of the 

law listed in parts 2-10 of Rule 202 (b) 

or other law, whether requested or not. 

The court may inform itself of any law in 

such a manner as it may deem proper and 
the court may call upon counsel to aid it 

in obtaining such information. 

Rule 202(b)(6), M.R.Evid., allows judicial notice to be taken 

of the "[rlecords of any court of this state or of any court 

of record of the United States or any court of record of any 

state in the United States . . . " Accordingly, this Court 

takes judicial notice of Liberty County District Court Cause 

No. 3010, and al-1 matters of record therein. This Court has 

reviewed the record of Cause No. 3010, and finds that 

Tranakos did appear as the Turners' attorney of record on at 

least two occasions by filing an answer to the complaint and 

by filing answers to interrogatories and requests for 

admissions. 

In an appeal of a motion to dismiss such as this, we 

must take all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as 

being admitted and construe the complaint in a light most 

favorable to the Turners. Willson v. Taylor (Mont. 1981), 

634 P.2d 1180, 1182, 38 St.Rep. 1606, 1608. Tranakos does 

not refute the facts alleged in the Turners' complaint and, 

in his answer, he admits making appearances on the Turners' 

behalf. Tranakos' defenses are that the District Court lacks 

jurisdiction and the complaint fails to state a viable claim 

for relief. 

The Turners contend that Rule 4B (1) (a), (b) and (e) , 

M.R.Civ.P., apply to Tranakos' actions to subject him to the 

jurisdiction of Montana courts. Rule 4B, in pertinent part, 

provides as follows: 

(1) Subject to jurisdiction. All 

persons found within the state of Montana 

are subject to the jurisdiction of the 

courts of this state. In addition, any 

person is subject to the jurisdiction of 

the courts of this state as to any claim 

for relief arising from the doing 

personally, through an employee, or 
through an agent, of any of the following 

acts: 

(a) the transaction of business within 

this state; 

(b) the commission of any act which 

results in accrual within this state of a 

tort action; 

(e) entering into a contract for 

services to be rendered or for materials 

to be furnished in this state by such 

person . . . 

Tranakos is not "within the state of Montana" for general 

jurisdictional purposes, but the Turners have alleged a tort 

action which confers jurisdiction under subsection (b) of the 

above statute. A claim for legal malpractice falls within 

the definition of a "tort action" as set forth in subsection 

(b) above. Yates v. Muir (Ill. 1985), 474 N.E.2d 934, 937. 

Accordingly, we find the Turners' first issue with regard to 

jurisdiction based on 1-egal malpractice to be dispositive of 

this appeal. 

This Court applies a three part test for determining if 

a Montana court may exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a 

defendant whose activities are neither "substantial" nor 

sufficiently "continuous and systematic" to invoke general 

jurisdiction. Simmons v. State of Montana (Mont. 1983), 670 

P.2d 1372, 1376, 40 St.Rep. 1650, 1652. These tests, as 

articulated in Simmons, are as follows: 

1. The non-resident defendant must do 

some act or consummate some transaction 

within the forum or perform some act by 

which he purposefully avails himself of 

the privilege of conducting activities in 

the forum, thereby invoking its laws. 
2. The claim must be one which arises 

out of or results from the defendant's 

forum-related activities. 

3. Exercise of jurisdiction must be 

reasonable. 

Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1378, 40 St.Rep. at 1656 (citing Data 

Disk, Inc. v. Systems Tech Assoc., Inc. (9th Cir. 19771, 557 

F.2d 1280, 1287.) Applying the above-mentioned tests, we 

first find that Tranakos "purposefully availed himself of the 

privilege of" practicing law in the state of Montana by 

representing the Turners in Liberty County District Court 

Cause No. 3010. We further find that it is exactly those 

acts of representing the Turners that are the basis of the 

Turners' claims for relief in this matter. Taking the 

Turners' allegations as true, as we must in a motion to 

dismiss, sufficient grounds have been pled for a legal 

malpractice action resulting from Tranakos' representation of 

the Turners in Cause No. 3010. 

Finally, our review of the record leads us to a 

determination that the exercise of jurisdiction over Tranakos 

is reasonable under the circumstances. Foremost in this 

determination is Montana's interest in regulating the 

practice of law within the state. It is imperative in this 

case that an attorney, whether or not licensed to practice 

law in Montana, not be allowed to escape the consequences of 

in-state representation by residing in some other state. We 

also note that only Tranakos is situated outside of Montana. 

The Turners, their farm and Liberty County District Court 

Cause No. 3010 all are situated in Montana. The burden and 

inequities of requiring the Turners to prosecute this action 

in Georgia would be greater than the burden of requiring 

Tranakos to defend himself in Montana. 
We find that Arthur P. Tranakos is personally subject 

to the jurisdiction of the Montana courts for his alleged 

legal malpractice and all reasonably related actions thereto. 

Because of this finding we need not address the Turners' 

remaining two issues. The decision of the District Court is 

reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. 

Reversed. r' 

,)f 

We concur: