NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT L., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.L., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0090 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015JD201904065 

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Law Offices of Michael and Casey, Phoenix

By Robert Ian Casey, Sarah J. Michael 

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer Blum

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

FILED 9-14-2021
ROBERT L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

2

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Father, Robert L., appeals the superior court’s denial of his 

motion to continue his termination hearing. Because the superior court did 

not abuse its discretion by denying father’s motion, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 DCS removed A.L. from mother’s care and placed A.L. with 

maternal grandparents. Father had no parental relationship with A.L. up to 

that point. DCS later located father to determine whether he was capable of 

parenting A.L. and established a case plan of family reunification. When 

father did not complete court-mandated services, the case plan changed to

severance and adoption. DCS ultimately moved to terminate father’s 

parental rights. The superior court set an initial termination hearing for July 

2, 2020, and then reset the hearing for September 3, 2020. 

¶3 At mother’s request, the superior court again continued the 

initial termination hearing to October 1, 2020. Father, through his courtappointed counsel, agreed to continue because he had concerns about a 

DCS report and whether it correctly reflected his compliance. At the 

October hearing, the superior court set trial for December 3, 2020, with a 

pretrial conference set for November 5, 2020. 

¶4 At the November pretrial conference, father requested new 

counsel. The superior court denied father’s request. Father later asked to 

continue the December trial, which the superior court granted, moving 

father’s trial date to February 12, 2021.

¶5 The day before the February trial, father again moved to 

continue. Father’s reason for the second request was his “decision to retain 

counsel.” To give new counsel time to prepare, father asked for sixty days.

¶6 On February 12—the date set for trial—the superior court 

heard arguments on father’s motion to continue. Father’s counsel said 

father was not “being . . . helpful” and father “certainly [didn’t] have faith 

in [counsel’s] ability to adequately represent him.” Father’s counsel asked 

to withdraw and to allow a new firm to substitute because “presumably 

they’ll have a much better relationship with” father. Father’s purported

new counsel made no appearance.

¶7 The child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) voiced concerns about a 

continuance, noting father might not come back with new and prepared 
ROBERT L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

3

counsel. The GAL took no further position because he did not know the full 

details of the alleged breakdown of the attorney-client relationship.

¶8 The State’s counsel acknowledged contact from a law firm 

purporting to represent father. The last contact was January 20, 2021—three 

weeks before trial. The State’s counsel argued the motion was a delay tactic. 

The State’s counsel also noted the difficulty in re-assembling the witnesses 

for a later trial.

¶9 After hearing the arguments, the superior court denied the 

motion. The superior court noted the need to resolve cases timely, 

especially when the “best interests of the child are at play.” The superior 

court recognized only good cause can overcome the child’s best interests

and father’s belated desire to hire new counsel did not meet the standard, 

especially given father had “known for almost 9 months that this day was

coming.”

¶10 The superior court also opined on the alleged breakdown of 

the attorney-client relationship. The superior court acknowledged father’s 

right to counsel, but said it was “really up to that litigant as far as how [to] 

utilize the tools that are provided,” and no one can “force a client to 

cooperate necessarily.”

¶11 In denying father’s motion, the superior court concluded:

So, when I hear about difficulties, I think that’s at [father’s] 

peril in this case. I know he moved for a new attorney back in 

November, and that was denied, and he still had an obligation 

to work with [his appointed counsel] between that point and 

trial today.

¶12 Father’s counsel asked the court to reconsider, saying father 

hampered the representation by not disclosing something father claimed he 

had in his possession. The superior court denied the request. After a fifteenminute recess, father’s counsel told the superior court she was ready to 

proceed. 

¶13 After the termination hearing, the superior court granted the 

State’s motion to terminate father’s parental rights to A.L., concluding 

father “substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances that cause[d] the child to be in an out-of-home placement.” 

See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(a).
ROBERT L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

4

¶14 Father timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under 

article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 12-

120.21.A.1, and 12-2101.A.1.

ANALYSIS

I. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

father’s requested continuance.

¶15 In juvenile proceedings, “[a]ny motion to continue shall be 

made in good faith and shall state with specificity the reasons for the 

continuance” and requires a showing of good cause. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 46.F.

Motions to continue are left to the superior court’s sound discretion, and 

this court will affirm “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Yavapai Cnty. Juv. 

Action No. J-9365, 157 Ariz. 497, 499 (App. 1988). An abuse of discretion is 

“an exercise of discretion which is manifestly unreasonable, exercised on 

untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” Williams v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 

260, 265 (App. 1990). This court does not re-weigh the evidence, deferring 

to the superior court. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246,

250, ¶ 20 (2000).

¶16 Parental rights are fundamental liberty interests, but they are 

not the same as a criminal defendant’s liberty interests in a criminal 

proceeding. See John M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 320, 324, ¶ 15 

(App. 2007). “Unlike a criminal proceeding, which implicates the personal 

liberty interest of a criminal defendant, a termination proceeding involves 

more than a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and 

control of [a] child.” Id. This court, therefore, interprets Rule 46.F “in a 

manner designed to protect the best interests of the child, giving paramount 

consideration to the health and safety of the child.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 36. 

To that end, “prompt finality . . . protects the child’s interests.” Pima Cnty. 

Juv. Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97 (1994). Indeed, “[t]he law favors

rapid placement so that the child can bond with those who will be the legal 

parents and not with those from whom the child may be taken.” Id.

¶17 Here, the superior court considered the child’s best interests, 

explaining the need for a timely trial. At the same time, it weighed other 

factors, including father’s desire to hire presumably more compatible 

counsel. The superior court, however, did not find good cause to grant 

father’s motion. The superior court also considered father’s alleged failure 

to disclose something favorable to father but considered the non-disclosure 

something within father’s control, not necessarily the fault of his attorney.
ROBERT L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

5

¶18 We conclude nothing in the record to establish the superior 

court acted unreasonably or based on untenable grounds. Accordingly, we 

affirm the superior court’s order denying father’s motion to continue.

II. Father’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument, if it is a viable

argument, is both insufficient and undeveloped.

¶19 Father alludes to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but 

fails to develop a cognizable argument. See In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 

64–65, ¶ 6 (2013) (“arguments not supported by adequate explanation, 

citations to the record, or authority” are waived). Even in the absence of 

waiver, no Arizona law establishes an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim in juvenile cases. See John M., 217 Ariz. at 323–25, ¶¶ 12–17. And this 

court will not create one. See Emily B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 

19-0150, 2020 WL 2846523, at *17, ¶ 37 (Ariz. App. June 2, 2020) (mem. 

decision) (noting juvenile ineffective assistance of counsel “questions will 

remain unless or until the legislature enacts legislation or the Arizona 

Supreme Court rules on the issue”).

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm.