DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

KAREEM DANIEL FARRELL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D13-2589 

[May 13, 2015]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. 

Lucie County; Gary L. Sweet, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562010CF002086A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allen R. Geesey, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

LEVINE, J.

Appellant appeals his conviction for aggravated child abuse and 

sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. Appellant raises multiple issues 

on appeal, the majority of which we find are without merit. The only issue 

we address is that regarding the state’s cross-examination of one of 

appellant’s expert witnesses. Because we find the cross-examination did 

not constitute reversible error, we affirm. 

The state charged appellant with aggravated child abuse under section 

827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2010), alleging that he shook his eight-month-old 

nephew, causing the child to suffer severe retinal bleeding and brain 

injuries. 

At trial, the child’s mother testified that her brother, appellant, was 

living with her and her two children at the time of the incident. The mother 

stated that the victim had been acting normally until the day prior to the 

incident, when she noticed he was not eating his whole bottle and cried 

more than usual. On the day of the incident, the child was more active, 

but still not eating normally. 
2

At some point during the day, the mother left appellant to watch the 

children while she did laundry in another part of the home. She checked 

on them and noticed the child was sitting on the floor and “it looked like 

he was falling asleep and he kinda like limped over to his side.” When the 

mother picked up the child, she noticed he had a small amount of blood 

on his mouth, which she washed off. She tasked appellant with putting 

the child down for a nap. 

Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, the mother went to go check 

on the child and was met in the hallway by appellant, who was holding the 

child and stated that the child was not breathing properly. Appellant 

called 911 while the mother gave the child CPR until an ambulance 

arrived. 

The mother testified that the child now can no longer eat normally and 

is fed via a tube. She also testified that she thinks he can see her, but

cannot walk or talk. 

The state called Dr. Lee Friedman, a pediatric ophthalmologist, who 

testified that he examined the child on the day after the incident. The 

doctor stated the child had “multiple, multilayer deep hemorrhages in the

back of the right eye – massive throughout the retina from the optic nerve 

to the macula all the way to the periphery of the eye.” The doctor testified 

there were less severe hemorrhages scattered throughout the left eye as 

well. 

He testified that the eye injuries, when combined with the appearance 

of bruises on the body and bleeding in the brain, are commonly seen in 

cases of Shaken Baby Syndrome or “non-accidental head trauma.” The 

doctor stated that the eye hemorrhages are thought to be caused by 

“shearing forces from the gel in the eye” and were “extremely unlikely” to 

be caused by a short distance fall. He testified that injuries as extensive 

as the ones seen in this case were unlikely to be caused by more 

substantial head traumas, such as falling from a jungle gym or a car 

accident, and were not of the sort caused by increased intracranial 

pressure. The doctor also testified that the injury definitely occurred 

“within the past couple of days,” based on the presence of active blood and 

no sign of healing.

A detective from the Port St. Lucie Police Department interrogated 

appellant a few days after the child’s injuries. The detective identified an 

apology letter that appellant wrote to the mother at the end of his 
3

interview. An audio/video recording of appellant’s interrogation was 

played for the jury. 

In the recording, appellant told the detective that the child was not

sleeping well and may have had an ear infection, but was otherwise fine. 

Appellant later stated that the child had been “acting strange” all week. 

On the day of the incident, appellant walked into the room, and the child 

“just flopped over” from where he was propped up next to his mattress.

Appellant stated he alerted the mother and they “sat him on the sofa and 

he took a breath and stopped breathing just like that.” 

Later in the same interview, the detective began to ask appellant if what 

happened was “intentional” or “unintentional.” Appellant stated that he 

was worried about the mother losing her children. He denied that 

anything could have been intentional. The detective told appellant this 

was a “fixable” mistake. Appellant eventually stated, “I did it – I did it – I 

did it, ma’am.” When asked what happened, appellant stated, “I shook

him.” The detective continued questioning appellant:

Q: I don’t want – I don’t want to worry about whether or not 

[the mother] is going to lose her kids. What I want to know 

is what happened to this little boy to cause this and I want 

the truth.

A: He was shaken.

Q: Who shook him?

A: I did.

Q: What happened?

A: I did it, ma’am.

Q: What happened?

A: Just – I’m – I’m telling a lie. I can’t do it ma’am, I can’t lie. 

I can’t. . . . [The mother] is only 26-years-old. . . .

. . . .

A: I shook him. I just walk up to him and shake – [the child] 

had his meltdown, I was so scared. I ain’t know if he was 

alive, I ain’t know what to do. . . . [H]e wouldn’t come back.

Appellant reiterated that he shook the child “to bring him back” and 

that he “wasn’t shaking the life out of him.” He also stated this was

unintentional and he never meant to hurt his nephew. Appellant later 

clarified that he shook the child “two hours – or a hour before – 30 minutes 

at least” before appellant walked into the child’s room to find him “flopped 

over” near his mattress. 
4

The state called Dr. Randall Alexander, a professor of pediatrics who 

serves as a statewide medical director for all of Florida’s Child Protection 

Teams. The professor reviewed the child’s medical records and noted that 

the child had skin irritation marks on his body and bruising on his chest 

that was not typical of CPR. The medical records also showed the child 

had internal injuries, including bruising on the lungs, fluid in the 

abdomen, and swelling in the brain. The professor testified that the 

victim’s brain injury would have been fatal without medical intervention. 

The injury could not have occurred a week prior, because there was brand 

new blood in the head and the injury had not yet started to heal. The

professor further testified that the injuries in this case were not consistent 

with a short fall or intracranial pressure. The child’s brain showed 

substantial damage and he would probably suffer from cerebral palsy of 

his left side, vision problems, and developmental delays. The professor 

also testified that Shaken Baby Syndrome was globally recognized by 

major medical organizations. 

Appellant’s first expert witness was Dr. Willey, a pathologist and former

medical examiner. The pathologist testified that he, as well as a number 

of other people in the medical community, deny the validity of Shaken 

Baby Syndrome, although he recognized this viewpoint is in the minority. 

He also testified that he believed the alleged bruises on the victim’s lungs 

were actually fluid in the chest caused by medical care, and that the

shaking described by appellant would be insufficient to cause the damage 

seen in the victim. 

Appellant next called Dr. Lloyd, a biomechanist with the Department of

Veterans’ Affairs. Appellant asked Dr. Lloyd generally about his education, 

scientific studies, publication history, and professional experience. Dr. 

Lloyd testified that a fall would be more likely to cause these injuries than 

shaking, because the neck ligaments would absorb some of the 

momentum in a shaking motion. He stated that he conducted a study 

which determined the average adult was incapable of generating sufficient 

acceleration to cause brain injury by shaking. He also stated that shaking 

was incapable of causing retinal bleeding, but instead blamed increased 

pressure in the brain. 

On cross-examination and over defense objection, the state questioned 

Dr. Lloyd about inconsistencies in prior versions of his curriculum vitae. 

Specifically, his C.V. from October 2012 stated that he was a professor of

medicine at University of South Florida (“USF”). By January 2013, this 

C.V. entry now stated that his status as professor was “in process.” By 
5

March 2013, any reference to being a professor at USF was removed 

entirely. 

Dr. Lloyd explained that these C.V. changes were due to a

misunderstanding with the university. He initially believed he had 

received a “courtesy appointment” as a professor of medicine at USF, but 

when the department chairman was replaced, he learned his application 

had not been completed. The state also asked about a cease and desist 

letter sent to Dr. Lloyd by the university asking him to take the alleged

position off his website. He explained that different positions and titles 

help in the grant application process and in securing funding. 

In closing argument, the state referenced this line of questioning by 

telling the jury, “Again, is this someone who is overstating his credentials, 

who has an interest in making money from this case?” 

The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged of aggravated child 

abuse. Appellant timely appeals. 

On appeal, appellant argues the state should not have been allowed to 

question Dr. Lloyd about inconsistencies in his C.V., as such questioning 

was an impermissible attack on his character and improper impeachment, 

as evidence of particular bad conduct.1 The state responds that these 

questions were proper impeachment of Dr. Lloyd through demonstration 

of “bias, corruption, or lack of competency.” The state argues that 

appellant’s questioning of Dr. Lloyd regarding his credentials and 

experience opened the door for the state to question him about these 

inconsistencies. The state also argues the questions were germane to his 

credibility and the matters addressed on direct examination.

“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed by

utilizing the abuse of discretion standard of review. However, this 

discretion is limited by the rules of evidence.” Alexander v. State, 103 So. 

3d 953, 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation omitted). Likewise, the scope 

and limitation of cross-examination in a criminal trial “lies within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and is not subject to review except for a 

clear abuse of discretion.” Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 

1986).

 

1 Because appellant did not object when the state asked Dr. Lloyd about the cease 

and desist letter from USF, he waived his objection to this line of questioning. 

Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432, 445 (Fla. 2002).
6

Cross-examination serves two purposes: “(1) to weaken, test, or 

demonstrate the impossibility of the testimony of the witness on direct 

examination and, (2) to impeach the credibility of the witness, which may 

involve, among other things, showing his possible interest in the outcome 

of the case.” Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982). 

“Therefore it is held that questions on cross-examination must either 

relate to credibility or be germane to the matters brought out on direct 

examination.” Id.

Further, 

[w]henever an expert testifies, counsel may cross-examine the 

expert regarding any matter about which the expert testifies 

in establishing his or her qualifications, both as a basis of 

arguing that the witness is not qualified as an expert and to 

argue that even if he or she is qualified, the jury should not 

give the opinion testimony great weight. 

Flores v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 787 So. 2d 955, 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)

(quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 702.5, at 601-03 (2001)). 

See also Cheshire v. State, 568 So. 2d 908, 913 (Fla. 1990) (“Any 

deficiencies in an expert’s qualifications, experience and testimony may be 

aired on cross-examination . . . .”). 

Any attack on an expert witness’s credibility is subject to a section 

90.403 balancing analysis. See Grau v. Branham, 761 So. 2d 375, 378 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that once the trial court determined that 

allowing the appellee to ask about the appellant’s expert witness’s drug 

abuse “was more prejudicial than probative,” “its decision to then admit 

same was an abuse of discretion,” but amounted to harmless error 

because it “pertained only to a collateral matter”). 

In the instant case, the state cross-examined Dr. Lloyd about prior 

versions of his C.V. listing job titles he never officially held. Such 

questioning was “germane to the matters brought out on direct 

examination,” because appellant’s counsel asked Dr. Lloyd about his

professional experience and credentials for testifying as an expert. 

Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 337. The state was entitled to cross-examine Dr. 

Lloyd regarding his qualifications as they related to his credibility as an 

expert. Flores, 787 So. 2d at 957; Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 337. Thus, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state’s 

questioning. 
7

Even assuming arguendo that the cross-examination was erroneous, 

we would still affirm on the basis that the alleged error was harmless. Any

error regarding improper cross-examination of a witness is subject to 

harmless error analysis. See Tormey v. Trout, 748 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 

4th DCA 1999). An error is harmless where the state, as the beneficiary 

of the error, can “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 

complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that 

there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 

conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). The 

“application of [the harmless error] test requires an examination of the 

entire record by the appellate court including a close examination of the 

permissible evidence on which the jury could have legitimately relied, and 

in addition an even closer examination of the impermissible evidence 

which might have possibly influenced the jury verdict.” Id.

We believe that the state met its burden and any error resulting from 

the state’s cross-examination was harmless. The cross-examination of Dr. 

Lloyd about his C.V.s was brief and isolated, constituting an insignificant 

portion of the trial and of Dr. Lloyd’s testimony. The state’s questioning 

“was not so pervasive as to require the granting of a mistrial or new trial 

especially in light of the other abundant evidence upon which the jury 

could have weighed this doctor’s testimony.” Tormey, 748 So. 2d at 306. 

In fact, Dr. Lloyd was able to explain the discrepancies within his C.V.s. 

Furthermore, the state did not repeatedly reference Dr. Lloyd’s overstated 

credentials during the remainder of the cross-examination, which focused 

specifically on his research, scientific studies, and opinion in this case. 

Finally, the state made only a single brief, isolated reference to the crossexamination during closing argument. Therefore, we conclude that there 

is no reasonable possibility that the error, if any, contributed to the verdict. 

In summary, we find that the cross-examination of appellant’s expert 

witness in the accuracy of his C.V. was not error, and even assuming it 

was error, it was clearly harmless and would not be grounds for reversal. 

Thus, we affirm.

 

Affirmed. 

GERBER, J., concurs. 

FORST, J., concurring specially with opinion.

FORST, J., concurring specially.

I write separately solely on the issue of improper impeachment of 

Appellant Kareem Daniel Farrell’s expert witness. Dr. Lloyd, a 
8

biomechanist with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, was called at trial 

to refute the State’s theory that the injuries to the victim were indicative 

of the child being shaken. In my view, the State’s questions about 

inconsistencies in prior versions of Dr. Lloyd’s curriculum vitae (CV) were 

improper. However, I join the majority opinion’s harmless error analysis 

and conclusion that any error resulting from the state’s cross-examination 

was harmless.

Improper Questioning

Dr. Lloyd is part of a growing minority in the biomedical field who 

dispute the traditional acceptance of Shaken Baby Syndrome.2 At trial, he 

testified that his experiments showed an adult human is physically 

incapable of shaking a child hard enough to create the acceleration 

necessary to damage the child’s brain. In addition to properly crossexamining Dr. Lloyd on the contents of his testimony, the State chose to 

go beyond the bounds of proper impeachment (see below) and questioned 

him about a position that appeared on prior versions of his CV, but was 

not listed in the most recent version. Specifically, Dr. Lloyd’s CV from 

October 2012 stated that he was a professor of medicine at the University 

of South Florida (USF). By January 2013, this CV entry now stated that 

his status as professor was “in process.” By March, any reference to being 

a professor at USF was removed entirely. Neither of the prior versions of 

the CV were offered into evidence or discussed during direct examination 

of Dr. Lloyd.

While Dr. Lloyd had a reasonable explanation for the changes in his 

CV, the questions were nonetheless improper. Under section 90.608, 

Florida Statutes (2013), parties can impeach a witness by: “1) introducing 

statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness’s 

present testimony; 2) showing that the witness is biased; [or] 3) attacking 

the character of the witness in accordance with the provisions of sections 

90.609 or 90.610.” If a party chooses to impeach by attacking the 

character of a witness, it must do so by admitting evidence in the form of 

reputation (under section 90.609) or conviction of certain crimes (under 

section 90.610). Therefore, “evidence of particular acts of ethical 

 

2 This minority view has recently been used to overturn convictions in shaken 

baby cases around the country. For more information on the science for and 

against the diagnosis of Shaken Baby Syndrome, see Debbie Cenziper, A Disputed 

Diagnosis Imprisons Parents, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2015, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/shaken-babysyndrome/. 
9

misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness.” 

Pantoja v. State, 59 So. 3d 1092, 1096 (Fla. 2011). These questions were 

impermissible attacks on Dr. Lloyd’s credibility or character. See also

Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425, 429 (Fla. 1990) (holding that questioning 

expert witness about specific allegations of misconduct was improper 

impeachment); Roosevelt v. State, 42 So. 3d 293, 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). 

(holding that the State could not impeach an expert witness with evidence 

concerning past issues with the payment of taxes).

“The proper purposes of cross-examination are: (1) to weaken, test, or 

demonstrate the impossibility of the testimony of the witness on direct 

examination and, (2) to impeach the credibility of the witness, which may 

involve, among other things, showing his possible interest in the outcome 

of the case.” Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982). We have 

stated that “included in the types of matters that demonstrate bias are 

prejudice, interest in the outcome of a case, and any motivation for a 

witness to testify untruthfully.” Becker v. State, 110 So. 3d 473, 476 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2013) (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1996)). Dr. Lloyd stated that having the honorary title of professor of 

medicine helped him gain grants and funding for his research. However, 

while this shows that he may have had a reason to misstate his job title 

on his CV, it does not show any bias in his testimony in the case at hand. 

Dr. Lloyd had no interest in the outcome of this case and his position (or 

lack thereof) as a professor of medicine was collateral to his testimony, as 

he did not mention this position during direct examination or state he had 

medical training. Therefore, these questions should have been excluded 

and the trial court erred by allowing these questions.

The Error was “Harmless”

An error is harmless where the State, as the beneficiary of the error, 

can “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 

contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no 

reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” State 

v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). In a case with competing 

expert testimony, the credibility of the experts is of paramount importance. 

Here, the defense was able to, essentially, “rehabilitate” Dr. Lloyd’s

credibility, by eliciting testimony that explained the discrepancies within 

his C.V.s. The state’s questioning was over the line and, accordingly, I do 

not join the majority opinion in concluding that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing the state’s questioning. However, I agree 

with the majority that the harm to defendant’s case was too tangential or 

collateral as to necessitate reversal. Grau v. Branham, 761 So. 2d 375, 

378 (Fla. 4th DCA DCA 2000); Caruso v. State, 645 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 
10

1994).

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.