[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-12098

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cr-60143-JIC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALCI BONANNEE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(July 17, 2014)

Before CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Alci Bonannee appeals her convictions for one count of conspiracy to 

defraud the United States government, nine counts of making false claims to the 

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Internal Revenue Service, 14 counts of wire fraud, and nine counts of aggravated 

identity theft. She also challenges her total sentence of 317 months imprisonment. 

Bonannee raises three issues on appeal. She contends that: (1) the district court 

abused its discretion by refusing to accept her guilty plea; (2) the accumulation of 

errors at trial deprived her of a fair trial; and (3) her sentence is procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. 

I.

We review a district court’s decision to reject a guilty plea for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 822 F.2d 1008, 1010 (11th Cir. 1987). 

“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or (with the court’s consent) nolo 

contendere.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(1). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district 

court “must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the 

plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than 

promises in a plea agreement).” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). A defendant does not 

have an “absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted,” and “[a] court may reject a 

plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.” United States v. Santobello, 404 

U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498 (1971). “[U]nless the [court’s] refusal is without 

justification and the court is thereby shown to have abused its discretion, the ruling 

will not be disturbed on appeal.” United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1544 

(11th Cir. 1984). “It is far better for a court to err on the side of rejecting a valid 

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guilty plea than to violate a defendant’s constitutional rights by entering judgment 

on a defective plea.” Gomez-Gomez, 822 F.2d at 1011. 

At Bonannee’s initial appearance before the district court, six months before 

her trial, she entered a plea of not guilty. In the months leading up to the trial, she 

continued to insist on going to trial. The night before the trial began, however, the 

government informed her that Betty Cole, a nurse at South Miami Hospital who 

had sold her the names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers of patients at 

the hospital, would testify as a government witness. When the trial began the next 

day, Bonannee said for the first time that she wanted to plead guilty, as her 

codefendants, Sonyini Clay and Chante Mozley, had done. Of the 33 counts with 

which she was charged, she indicated that she would plead guilty to three of them. 

Before completing the plea colloquy, she changed her mind and told the district 

court that she “want[ed] to proceed with the trial.” The trial proceeded and that 

day the government presented testimony from two IRS investigators showing that 

Bonannee and her codefendants had filed more than 2,000 fraudulent tax returns.

At the start of the second day of trial, Bonannee again announced that she 

wanted to plead guilty. The district court tried to conduct another plea colloquy, 

but Bonannee’s behavior raised concerns about whether her plea was voluntary.

When asked whether she wanted to give up her right to a trial, she said “no.” The 

district court responded, “If that is not what you want to do, we need to proceed 

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with this trial.” Bonannee asked for a minute to think about her plea and talk to 

her family, which the court granted. During the pause, the district court reminded 

her that the court is “required under our Rules of Criminal Procedure to make a 

finding that your plea is knowing and voluntary, and if I sense any equivocation at 

all, I can’t accept your plea. . . . I can’t help but, at this point, sense there 

is [] equivocation here.” 

Bonannee’s attorney chimed in to say that he had explained to her that 

pleading guilty was in her best interest. But unpersuaded, the district court said: “I 

can’t accept her plea at this point. It is obvious to the Court that she is not sure this 

is what she wants to do.” Turning to Bonannee, the court said: “ma’am, as I told 

you on several occasions, you have a constitutional right to a trial by jury, and I am 

here to accord you that right.” She responded: “Judge, I feel it is in my best 

interest.” The district court asked if she had any reservations about entering a 

guilty plea, and she said, “Yes, I do have reservations, but I was told it is in my 

best interest for me to go ahead.” The district court pressed and asked Bonannee 

whether she really felt that pleading guilty was in her best interest, and she replied, 

“I can’t honestly say yes, but, yes.” The court said it was having “grave difficulty” 

finding her plea to be voluntary. Defense counsel chimed in once more to ask 

Bonannee if she was pleading guilty voluntarily, to which she responded “yes,” but 

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the district court said that even if “[s]he is uttering the word yes . . . the expression 

on her face belies that determination.” 

After a brief recess, the district court said that “based upon the colloquy 

conducted by the Court, I find there is a great reluctance on the part of [Bonannee] 

to enter a guilty plea, and, accordingly, it is impossible for me to make a finding 

that the plea is voluntary. Accordingly, I can’t accept it.” At that point Bonannee 

told the court yet again that she wanted to plead guilty. And the court gave her 

another chance to do so. But as before, she was unable to complete the colloquy. 

That time, when the district court asked if she agreed with the factual basis offered 

by the government for her plea, she hesitated before saying she agreed. And when 

the court asked her how she pleaded to the wire fraud count, she hesitated again, 

never giving an answer. Breaking the silence, the court said: “The record will 

reflect there is a long pause and I cannot — as much as I want to find that the plea 

is freely and voluntarily given, it is apparent to this Court that it is not free and 

voluntary. I am sorry, but under these circumstances — I have never found a plea 

to be involuntary, but this one, that is the only conclusion I can make under these 

circumstances.” The trial then continued.

Later that same day, Bonannee again raised the prospect of pleading guilty. 

Through defense counsel, she passed a note to the court which read: “You know 

what, I’ll plea[d] and I want to speak to [the government] now.” But after 

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Bonannee’s earlier failed attempts to plead guilty, the court expressed serious 

concerns and said that it didn’t “feel comfortable proceeding with the plea in light 

of the history of this case.” Defense counsel raised the issue of a guilty plea once 

more that afternoon. Counsel asserted that if given one more chance Bonannee 

could satisfy the court that her plea is voluntary. But doubtful that the outcome 

would be any different, the court said: “My problem is simple. I have no 

confidence that tomorrow or the next day or the following day she is not going to 

come in and move to withdraw that guilty plea . . . . And that is based on the 

history of this case.” After further discussion with defense counsel, the court 

concluded that: “Under these circumstances, I am just not going to accept the plea.

I am sorry.”

Bonannee asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing

her to plead guilty. We disagree. Before accepting a guilty plea, a district court is

required to ensure that it is voluntary. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). And the 

district court had ample reason to conclude that Bonannee’s guilty plea was not

voluntary. As the dialogue between Bonannee and the court shows, she was 

undeniably reluctant to go through with the plea, repeatedly failing to complete the

plea colloquy. It was that “history” that led the district court to conclude that any 

plea Bonannee offered would not be voluntary. That conclusion was justified. We 

will not disturb it on appeal. See Crosby, 739 F.2d at 1544 (“[U]nless the [court’s] 

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refusal is without justification and the court is thereby shown to have abused its 

discretion, the [refusal to accept a guilty plea] will not be disturbed on appeal.”). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Bonannee’s guilty plea.1

 

II.

Bonannee asserts that a series of errors, when considered cumulatively,

deprived her of a fair trial. First, the district court did not adequately cure one

witness’ statement which, according to Bonannee, violated her Fifth Amendment 

right to silence.2 Second, the district court did not adequately cure another

witness’ statement which, according to Bonannee, constituted improper opinion 

evidence.

3

 Third, the government made improper remarks during its closing 

arguments.4

 

 1 Bonannee asserts that the district court’s decision to reject her guilty plea also violates 

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970). That assertion lacks merit. In 

Alford, the Supreme Court held that “[a]n individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, 

knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is 

unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at 37, 91 

S.Ct. at 167. But “[e]ven an Alford plea requires that the defendant’s legal admission of guilt be 

entered voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly.” United States v. Brown, 117 F.3d 471, 

478 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). Bonannee’s plea was not voluntary. Alford

is off point.

2 This first statement was made by Special Agent Aileen Martinez, a criminal investigator 

with the IRS. When defense counsel asked her on cross-examination where the money from the 

tax fraud had gone, she responded by saying: “You are going to have to ask your client [where 

the money went], I apologize.” To cure any prejudice caused by that statement, the district court 

told the jury: “Folks, let me, once again, remind you that [Bonannee] is not required to prove 

anything. She is presumed innocent and the burden of proof is on the Government.” 

3 This second statement was made by Robin Nicorvo, one of Bank of America’s senior 

investigators. Nicorvo said that surveillance videos of Bonannee and codefendant Mozley 

making withdrawals from the bank showed that Bonannee was the “dominant force” in the 

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The cumulative error doctrine provides that an aggregation of non-reversible 

errors can result in denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial. United States v. 

Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). In 

deciding whether a defendant was denied her constitutional right to a fair trial, 

“[we] look to see whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected” by the 

total effect of the errors. Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Errors . . . affect a 

substantial right of a party if they have a substantial influence on the outcome of a 

case or leave grave doubt as to whether they affected the outcome of a case.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted). “We determine whether an error had substantial 

 

conspiracy. The district court sustained Bonannee’s objection to that testimony on the ground 

that it was improper opinion testimony. The court asked Nicorvo to instead describe what she 

personally observed in the surveillance video. She responded: “Right, Bonannee would come in 

as the dominant force, [Mozley] to the side. It would be like a show, clip board and purse, 

drama, hair flip and look like I am busy, busy, busy. I am an important person, you should pay 

attention to me. That was my observation.” Bonannee again objected. To cure any prejudice 

caused by Nicorvo’s testimony, the court said: “I think part of the response did contain opinion 

testimony. So, with respect to any opinions rendered, that is, testimony other than what the 

witness actually observed with respect to the actions of the parties, [the jury is] hereby instructed 

to disregard those opinions.”

4 During its initial closing argument, the government said it was “aggravating” and 

“insulting” that even patients at South Miami Hospital, which was the source of many of 

Bonannee’s victims, were not safe from identity theft. The government talked generally about 

the impact that identify theft has on its victims. And it said that tax and identity fraud “strikes 

[at] the heart of our system, our financial system. Not IRS money, not just Government money, 

it is our money. . . . When you steal from the IRS, you are stealing from all of us.” Bonannee 

did not object to any of those remarks. During its rebuttal closing argument, the government 

added that defense counsel, in his own closing argument, had not tried to explain why Bonannee 

had the personal information for patients at South Miami Hospital. The government said that 

while citizens should be helping their country, Bonannee was stealing from it. And it said that

Bonannee’s many victims deserved justice. As before, Bonannee did not object to any of those 

remarks. 

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influence on the outcome by weighing the record as a whole, examining the facts, 

the trial context of the error, and the prejudice created thereby as juxtaposed 

against the strength of the evidence of defendant’s guilt.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, the evidence of Bonannee’s guilt was insurmountable. Even if we 

assume that the alleged errors were actually errors, they had no effect on the 

outcome of her trial. Over the course of the trial, the government showed that,

from 2010 to 2012, Bonannee conspired with codefendants Mozley and Clay, and 

others, to file more than 2,000 false federal income tax returns claiming over $11

million in tax refunds. IRS investigators testified that the tax returns were filed

without the knowledge or consent of the victims, many of whom were deceased, 

from Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that were linked to Bonannee and Clay.

5

 

Those same investigators testified that in response to those tax returns, the IRS 

paid out more than $4.4 million, nearly all of which was deposited into bank 

accounts controlled by Bonannee and her codefendants. Video surveillance and 

bank records showed that Bonannee personally withdrew more than $1.3 million 

 5 “IP addresses identify computers on the Internet, enabling data packets transmitted from

other computers to reach them.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 

545 U.S. 967, 987 n.1, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2703 n.1 (2005). Like a physical address, an IP address 

can be used to determine where a particular computer is located. In this case, nearly 500 of the 

fraudulent 2011 tax returns were filed from a computer using an IP address associated with 

Bonannee’s home. Fifty or sixty more of the fraudulent 2011 tax returns were filed from a 

computer using an IP address associated with a hotel room rented to Bonannee.

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from those accounts before they were frozen by the banks due to fraud concerns. 

Corporate filings showed that Bonannee set up the two corporate entities used to 

lend an appearance of legitimacy to the fraudulent tax filings. The government 

offered testimony showing that Bonannee bought lists with the names, dates of 

birth, and Social Security numbers of more than 1,000 patients at South Miami 

Hospital. Those lists were found in her home when the government searched it. 

Many of those patients were victims of Bonannee’s fraud and testified for the 

government at trial. 

When weighed against that evidence, the errors alleged by Bonannee had no 

impact on the outcome of the trial and thus did not affect her substantial rights. 

See Baker, 432 F.3d at 1223. At sentencing, even defense counsel admitted as 

much: “I don’t think anybody had any doubt after hearing the evidence, I know I 

didn’t have any, that there is only one verdict that could be reached. The evidence 

was overwhelming.” Bonannee was not deprived of a fair trial.

III.

Bonannee asserts that her guidelines sentence of 317 months imprisonment

is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We review a sentence’s 

procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007).

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In reviewing the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we ensure that the 

district court properly calculated the guidelines range, treated the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines as advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,6

did not select a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and adequately 

explained the chosen sentence. Id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. The fact that a district 

court does not explicitly address or analyze a § 3553(a) factor does not necessarily 

mean that the court failed to consider it. See United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 

1329 (11th Cir. 2005). It is sufficient if a district court states that it considered the 

parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 

1160, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Bonannee asserts that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors 

like (1) her personal history and characteristics, (2) her claim that she did not 

financially benefit from her crime, and (3) her last-minute desire to assist the 

government. We disagree. The district court stated that it considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors, the statements of the parties, and the presentence investigation 

report. The court adequately explained the reasons for the sentence imposed, and

 6 The district court is required to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary, to comply with the purposes” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including the need for a 

sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just 

punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s 

future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court 

must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of 

the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent 

policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).

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Bonannee has failed to show that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable. See

id.; Scott, 426 F.3d at 1329. 

As for substantive unreasonableness, we will find a sentence substantively 

unreasonable only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

district court committed a clear error in judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors 

by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated 

by the facts of the case. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. The party challenging the 

sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable in light of the record 

and the factors in § 3553(a). United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th 

Cir. 2010). 

The only ground Bonannee asserts to support her contention that her

guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable is that her codefendants, Mozley 

and Clay, received more lenient sentences. We disagree. Mozley and Clay 

pleaded guilty; Bonannee did not. Mozley also cooperated with the government 

during its investigation, which prompted the government to ask the district court to 

reduce her sentence. Bonannee did not cooperate with the government. She is not 

similarly situated to Mozley and Clay. See United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 

1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[D]efendants who cooperate with the government 

and enter a written plea agreement are not similarly situated to a defendant who 

provides no assistance to the government and proceeds to trial. There is no 

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unwarranted disparity even when the sentence the cooperating defendant receives 

is substantially shorter.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Also unlike 

Mozley and Clay, Bonannee was the organizer and leader of the conspiracy, a role 

for which she received a four-level role enhancement. Her argument that her 

sentence is substantively unreasonable fails. 

AFFIRMED.

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