United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

November 1995 BATTLEFIELD

AUTOMATION

Army’s Digital

Battlefield Plan Lacks

Specific Measurable

Goals

GAO/NSIAD-96-25

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-261753 

November 29, 1995

Congressional Committees

One of the Army’s top priorities is a program to digitize the battlefield by

creating a vast network of computers, sensors, and communications

systems that would provide a common picture of the battlefield from

soldier to commander simultaneously. Because of the importance and

estimated $4 billion cost of this program, we reviewed the “Army

Digitization Master Plan” to evaluate the Army’s efforts to digitize the

battlefield, including the Marine Corps’ participation. We conducted this

review under our basic legislative responsibilities and are addressing this

report to you because we believe it will be of interest to your committees.

Results in Brief The Army’s plan to digitize the battlefield is expensive, contains many

risks, and lacks specific, measurable goals for the series of large-scale

experiments that are to be conducted. The Army is planning to conduct a

series of experiments from 1995 to 1997, including a brigade-level

experiment in 1997 at a cost of $258 million,1

 without having had a

successful battalion-level experiment. In fact, a battalion-level experiment

in 1994 failed to meet Army expectations. Specific, measurable goals are

needed to evaluate the achievements of each experiment, and they should

be met before proceeding to the next experiment. Otherwise, the Army is

unnecessarily risking additional investments amounting to $397 million for

digital systems needed to conduct increasingly larger scale experiments to

fiscal year 1999. Based on Army estimates, the investment required to

digitize a 10 division Army could be as high as $4 billion. Also, because

Congress has directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in its plan,

the Department of Defense (DOD) funding for the Marine Corps needs to be

identified and assured to solidify its participation and success.

Background Automation of the battlefield has been a long-term goal of the Army

because of its promise as a force multiplier: it produces greater fighting

effectiveness through better use of battlefield resources. Digitization of the

battlefield is the Army’s latest effort to bring it closer to its long-term goal.

Prior Army efforts focused on automating command and control at the

corps and division levels whereas digitization extends this automation to

the brigade and lower echelons, including individual weapons platforms.

1

This includes 1,230 appliques, new software, a new digital radio, message protocols and standards,

simulations and experiments, and evaluation of the results of the experiments from fiscal years 1995

through 1997.

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Digitization of the battlefield is part of a major effort to reshape the Army

and, thus, it is one of the Army’s highest priorities. The Army hopes to

identify how digitization will improve combat power and how to change its

organizational structure, doctrine, and tactics to take advantage of

digitization.

Army battlefield digitization started in the 1980s with the development of

five corps- and division-level command and control systems collectively

known as the Army Tactical Command and Control System. Their

development and fielding have been a struggle. Two systems were fielded

in 1993 and 1994, with limited capabilities. Two other systems are

scheduled to undergo operational testing in 1995 and in 1996. The fifth

system is scheduled to undergo its second operational test in 1996.

The Army’s strategy for digitizing the battlefield uses a bottom-up

approach that experiments echelon by echelon with several digital

systems simultaneously. It is a massive effort involving brigade-, division-,

and corps-level experiments over the next 5 years. Advanced warfighting

experiments were performed in 1993 at the company level, and in 1994 at

the battalion level. Current plans call for a brigade experiment in

February 1997, a division experiment in February 1998, and a corps

experiment in April 1999.

There are many digital systems to evaluate. For example, 25 unique digital

systems and more than 120 items of equipment were evaluated in the

battalion experiment. More than 40 digital systems, including potentially

1,200 appliques,2

 may be evaluated during the brigade experiment. The

applique, which began its development when a contract was awarded on

January 6, 1995, will provide digital capability to weapon systems that do

not have any.

The major feature of the applique will be the situational awareness that it

provides to its users. A digital map will display the locations of friendly

and enemy forces and update their movement in near real time. This

common picture will be provided simultaneously to all units in the

brigade, from the command staff to the individual M1 tanks and other

weapons platforms.

2

“Applique” is the name in general use for what is formally known as the Force XXI Battle Command

Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System. It consists basically of a laptop computer, FBCB2 applications

software, a Global Positioning System receiver, and a communications interface.

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Digitization Plan

Requires High

Investment in Early

Phases

The investment required for what the Army describes as the equivalent of

the concept exploration and definition phase is $272 million through fiscal

year 1997. For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the equivalent of the

demonstration and validation phase and the engineering and

manufacturing development phase, the cost is expected to be $125 million,

bringing the total development effort to $397 million. The cost primarily

covers the development and acquisition of the applique and its integration

onto many different vehicles, helicopters, and other platforms. It also

covers the development of a digital radio and other related products.

These research and development costs are relatively high because it is

expensive to equip a battalion, a brigade, a division, and a corps with

appliques for experiments. In the conventional concept exploration and

definition phase, only a few prototypes of a system would be bought for

experiments. The Army’s position is that, although these costs are

relatively high, the resources are needed to demonstrate the utility of a

digitized force.

Through 2005, the Army estimates that $2.1 billion is needed to field and

sustain Force Package I.3

 About 77 percent of this amount is to equip the

force with appliques. The cost to equip the rest of the Army with appliques

is not known, but according to Army officials, it could be $2 billion

through 2011. This is in addition to funds already programmed for other

digital battlefield efforts such as the five systems that comprise the Army

Tactical Command and Control System and the embedded systems whose

costs are born by the weapon systems themselves.

Digitization Plan Has

Numerous Risks

The Army faces numerous technical, program, cost, and schedule risks in

implementing its master plan for battlefield digitization. These risks are

integration, software development, hardware costs, unknown quantity

requirements, communications, and interoperability with other command

and control systems.

Integration The integration of the applique onto different platforms represents a

technical risk. The underlying cause of this risk is that each platform is

different and requires a separate solution in terms of installation kits. For

example, the installation kit that works for a tank may not necessarily

work for an infantry fighting vehicle or a helicopter.

3

Force Package I units are the highest priority combat units in the Army since these units deploy first

and require the highest level of equipment support and training. The term Force Package I includes

five divisions along with their corps headquarters and combat service support elements.

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Software Development Software development is an additional technical, cost, and schedule risk in

our view because no appliques have been delivered and tested. More will

be known after a critical design review in August 1995, and evaluations of

interim software currently scheduled for July, September, and December

1995 and January and May 1996 have occurred. During this period, soldiers

from Fort Knox will evaluate each version of software.

Implementing all software functions and requirements will require

additional engineering; in fact, 30 percent of applique software, which is

needed for the brigade experiment, is estimated to be new code. The rest

of the software is existing Brigade and Below Command and Control

(B2C2) software4

 and elements of the Forward Area Air Defense Command

and Control, the Combat Service Support Control System, and the

Enhanced Position Location Reporting System software, which have only

been demonstrated separately and not as an integrated system.

Hardware Costs Applique hardware costs may be understated, depending on (1) how

frequently hardware will be replaced, (2) what mix of computers will be

used in future experiments and fieldings, and (3) whether higher end

machines with more memory and speed will be needed. The Army may be

required to upgrade applique computers every 2 to 3 years or sooner to

take advantage of industry’s technology advancements. The Army is still

deciding on the proper mix of militarized, ruggedized, and commercial

computers to be used for the brigade experiment. Currently, it is moving

away from militarized toward ruggedized computers, which are less costly.

However, the commercial computers, which are the least costly of the

three variants,5

 may not be rugged enough for the job. If the brigade

experiment shows that more militarized and ruggedized computers are

needed, that would drive up the costs of future experiments and

deployment. The brigade experiment may also show that the appliques

cannot do the job in terms of memory and speed. If so, higher end

machines would be required, which will also increase costs.

Quantity Requirements Cost risk is further aggravated by unknown quantity requirements for the

applique. Because total quantity requirements are unknown, the total cost

4

An earlier version of this software was used during the battalion experiment at the National Training

Center in April 1994.

5

The militarized computer costs about $93,000, the ruggedized computer over $14,000, and the

commercial computer about $11,000 based on program unit costs. Militarized hardware has been

specifically designed for military use under adverse conditions. Ruggedized hardware is more robust

than commercial computers but less stringent than militarized hardware.

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B-261753 

of the applique and the FBCB2 program is unknown. The 1997 brigade

experiment may show that installing an applique in every tank, helicopter,

and weapon system is useful but not affordable.

Communications Army officials have told us that having adequate communications is key to

the 1997 brigade experiment; otherwise, it may have to be postponed. The

Army is developing a tactical internet that increases the digital capacity

and connectivity of three existing radio based communications systems.6

However, the tactical internet is not expected to be delivered to the Army

until May 1996, only 1 month before the start of training for the

experiment. Consequently, it represents a significant schedule risk.

If successful, the tactical internet will provide a short-term solution to

meeting the Army’s data distribution needs. However, long-term needs will

increase as the Army becomes dependent on automation and adds new

digital systems to its inventory. Because of this, Army officials told us that

they will require two new data distribution systems, one in the interim to

be potentially more capable but less costly than the current system, EPLRS,

and another one in the future to meet long-term needs. Developing an

interim digital communications system for a 10 division Army could cost at

least as much as EPLRS, or more than $900 million, and could take years to

field.7

 In our view, the data distribution issue is the weak link in the Army’s

plan because a new, interim system will be needed to meet the increasing

communications demands imposed by the digital battlefield in the next

century. Until it is resolved, we do not believe the full potential of

battlefield digitization or automation will be realized.

Interoperability A schedule risk is posed because a number of systems must interoperate

with the applique and be available for integration and testing prior to the

1997 brigade experiment. An example would be the five division- and

corps-level systems that comprise the Army Tactical Command and

Control System. Interoperability has been demonstrated through a very

limited number of messages being exchanged between these systems.

However, database to database exchange, which is critical to providing

6

These three systems are the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) —a dedicated

data distribution system at division and below, the Mobile Subscriber Equipment—a voice and data

communications system with telephone-like service in the corps and division areas, and the Single

Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System—a new generation of combat radios used primarily for

voice communications in all Army units down to the platoon level.

7

Cost would depend on the technology, capacity, speed and grade of service, and the number of

subscribers in the network.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
B-261753 

commanders with an accurate, near real-time common picture of the

battlefield, has not been achieved.

Army Risk Reduction

Efforts

In commenting on our report, the Army recognizes the risks that we

discuss and believes that it has taken steps to mitigate them. These include

(1) the establishment of the Army Digitization Office, which provides

high-level oversight by reporting to the Chief of Staff of the Army; (2) the

establishment of the Digital Integrated Laboratory to assess

interoperability issues; (3) the establishment of a “user jury” to provide

early assessments of applique performance; and (4) the development of a

Risk Management Master Plan. While these efforts are commendable, we

still believe that the risks are substantial in number and formidable

obstacles to the success of the digitization of the battlefield and we will

continue to monitor the program to determine whether these risk

reduction efforts really work.

Experimentation

Approach Is

Inadequate

The Army’s experimentation master plan states what experiments are to

be performed through 1999, but it does not provide specific goals and clear

criteria to support decisions to proceed with the experiments and buy

additional appliques and other equipment. Thus, there is no criteria for

measuring whether the experiments will be successful. As a result, the

Army could continue to conduct large-scale, costly experiments at the

brigade, division, and corps level, no matter what the results would be. For

example, the 1994 battalion-level experiment lacked specific goals and exit

criteria. Despite poor results in that experiment, the Army is moving on to

a larger scale, brigade-level experiment in 1997, at a cost of $258 million. In

addition, the Army’s experimentation approach lacks adequate

instrumentation and data collection.

Experimentation Approach

Lacks Specific Goals

Specific, measurable, and quantifiable goals are needed to evaluate

program achievements and assure program success. The Army’s

Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) stated this

requirement in its report on the 1994 experiment. Its recommendation was

to “establish entrance criteria for hardware and software to ensure

equipment used by the units is reliable and interoperable, and insights and

data generated on force effectiveness meet established goals and

expectations.”

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Although the experimentation plan identifies numerous goals, such as

increased lethality, it does not say how much lethality is to be achieved

from the battalion experiment to the brigade and division-level

experiments. Increased lethality is measured by many factors, such as the

number of enemy troops, artillery pieces, and helicopters lost in battle.

However, neither numeric criteria nor a baseline is given for these factors.

The Army intends to determine effectiveness based on increasing trends in

a series of simulations, technical tests, and field and subfield experiments

over the next 5 years.

The Army does not believe that either pass/fail criteria or a baseline are

necessary at this stage since it is only experimenting. However, given that

the experiment is expensive and important to its future, the Army should

have measurable goals that it is expecting to achieve. Attainment or

nonattainment of these goals, rather than subjective assessments alone,

can best show the Army where it must direct its resources and whether it

is appropriate to proceed to the next experiment.

1994 Digitized Battalion

Experiment Did Not Meet

Expectations

From April 10 to April 23, 1994, a battalion-level experiment was

conducted at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. It was

the first experiment to use a digitized battalion task force. The experiment

did not have (1) specific goals, (2) a specific way to measure success, or

(3) a baseline to compare the digitized battalion’s performance to.

However, some Army leaders expected that the digitized “blue” force

would defeat its nondigitized opponent called the “red” force. This did not

happen.

In the absence of specific goals, thresholds for performance, and a

baseline, the Army compared the outcomes of seven nondigitized units

that participated in four training rotations against the same well-trained

red force at about the same time. Four units were at the National Training

Center prior to April 1994, one at the same time as the digitized battalion,

and two were there after the digitized unit’s exercise. The comparison

showed that the blue force generally performed no better than the seven

other nondigitized blue forces against the red force. For example, the loss

exchange ratio (the ratio of enemy losses to friendly losses) of the

digitized blue force was about the same as the seven nondigitized blue

forces in offensive and defensive engagements. The main reasons for these

poor results were the immaturity of the B2C2 software, its lack of

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interoperability with the M1A2 tank’s command and control software,8 and

a lack of hands-on training with the digital systems. Despite these poor

results, the Army decided to proceed to the brigade-level experiment

instead of redoing the battalion experiment because it would have slowed

the digitization effort by a year and cost several million dollars.

Adequate Instrumentation

and Data Collection Are

Lacking

Instead of using a more controlled test environment like an operational

test where empirical data can be collected by instruments, the Army used

a warfighting experiment environment and less instrumentation and data

collection. As a result, OPTEC could not collect enough data to assess the

performance of digitization in the 1994 battalion experiment. It reported

that

“. . . additional instrumentation at critical nodes would allow increased confidence in

experiment outcomes. It would permit a determination of when systems are operational,

when they are used, how much they are used, who is communicating with whom . . . and if

the systems are down, is the cause hardware, software, radio propagation, or human error.

. . . The lack of instrumentation does not provide system developers the kind of information

they need to troubleshoot problems identified during the exercise and make needed fixes.”

Objective data is vital in decisions to proceed to the next experiment and

finally to full-rate production and deployment. The Army is planning to

provide a more controlled environment for data collection of 100

instrumented vehicles during a 9-month training period prior to the

February 1997 brigade experiment. However, it is unclear whether this will

be enough in the context of numbers and critical nodes. The Army, in

conjunction with an independent test agency, needs to decide specifically

what instrumentation is needed to provide sufficient objective data to

support moving the experiment forward.

Marine Corps Funding

Issues

Last year, Congress directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in its

plans for the digital battlefield. This has been done. Also, in fiscal year

1995, the Army provided the Marine Corps with $429,000 to help it launch

its digitization program. The Army will also provide the Marines—at a cost

of about $2.3 million to the Army—with enough appliques and installation

kits to equip a light-armored reconnaissance company to participate in the

1997 brigade experiment.

8

This software is part of the Intervehicular Information System, which is embedded in the Army’s

newest tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
B-261753 

Despite these efforts, the Marines will have a $4.8 million shortfall in fiscal

year 1996 research and development funds for equipment, engineering

support, and operational demonstrations, which will affect its preparation

for the Army’s 1997 brigade experiment. The Army says it cannot provide

additional assistance to the Marines because it has no more resources.

Thus, the Marines’ participation in the Army’s 1997 experiment appears to

be unknown.

This situation illustrates that the Marine Corps needs assured funding to

solidify its participation and success in all of the Army’s digital battlefield

experiments. These experiments may show that the Marines need

additional appliques and communications systems to assure its

interoperability with the Army in future joint combat operations. Thus, the

Army; the Navy, which oversees Marine Corps funding; and DOD need to

work together to produce a specific plan to create and assure Marine

Corps funding.

Recommendations To help ensure that resources are directed appropriately and the Army has

the data it needs to determine whether it should (1) buy additional

appliques and (2) proceed to the next level of experiments, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of the

Army to develop specific, measurable goals and exit criteria for each

phase of digital battlefield experimentation. Further, the Secretary of

Defense should independently verify the goals’ attainments.

To carry out congressional direction, we also recommend the Secretary of

Defense insure that the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the

Marine Corps identify resources to support the Marine Corps’ participation

and success in the Army’s battlefield digitization effort.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD partially concurred with the recommendations in our draft report.

While the steps it plans to take on eventually establishing measurable

goals substantially complies with our recommendation, we still have

differences on the timing and specificity of the goals and the independent

verification of the attainment of those goals.

DOD believes that while it is necessary to have some means to judge the

outcome of these large-scale experiments, it is too early in the program to

have specific goals and measurable standards that have a pass or fail

criteria associated with them. We disagree and continue to maintain that

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
B-261753 

specific, measurable goals are needed, even at this early stage because of

the expenses involved, the scale and progressive nature of the

experiments, and their importance to the Army. By not establishing

specific goals now at this level of experimentation, DOD and the Army are

escalating risk as each advanced warfighting experiment progresses from

the brigade to the division and finally to the corps levels. The

DOD-supported Army approach continues the risk associated with

acquiring millions of dollars of appliques and other related developments

without knowing whether previous experiments were successful. Without

some limits and controls, the Army could spend hundreds of millions of

dollars on these experiments without having an adequate basis to judge

whether it should continue them.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the attainment of

these yet to be established measurable goals needs to be independently

verified by DOD and points to the involvement of the Director, Operational

Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). We acknowledge that DOT&E involvement is a

very positive step in the direction we recommend. However, it is still

unclear whether DOT&E will actually (1) approve of specific, measurable

goals early on as we recommend instead of the general ones that DOD and

the Army advocate and (2) verify the attainment of those goals in each

advanced warfighting experiment.

DOD’s recognition of the Marine Corps’ funding issue and its statement that

it is working with the services to resolve it, essentially complies with the

intent of our recommendation. We intend to monitor DOD’s implementation

efforts.

DOD’s comments are addressed in the body of this report where

appropriate and are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along with

our evaluation.

Scope and

Methodology

We performed our review primarily at the Army Digitization Office in

Washington, D.C., and the Program Executive Office for Command and

Control Systems, and the Program Executive Office for Communications

Systems at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. We also visited the Army’s

Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Armor

Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the Combined Arms Center at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas; OPTEC, Arlington, Virginia; and the Program

Executive Office for Aviation, St. Louis, Missouri. In addition, we

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
B-261753 

contacted DOD’s DOT&E, Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. Marine Corps

Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia.

We conducted our review between October 1994 and June 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the

Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will also be made available to

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202)512-6548 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report were

William L. Wright, Donald F. Lopes, and Edwin B. Griffin.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Systems Development

 and Production Issues

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated August 25, 1995.

GAO Comments 1. We have identified these efforts in the body of our report. We believe

that the Army’s intentions are encouraging. However, we will continue to

monitor the program to determine whether these risk reduction efforts

really work. We still believe that the risks are substantial in number and

formidable obstacles to the success of the digitization of the battlefield.

2. The steps the Army plans to take on eventually establishing measurable

goals substantially complies with our recommendation. We still have

differences on the timing and specificity of the goals and the independent

verification of the attainment of those goals. DOD believes that while it is

necessary to have some means to judge the outcome of these large scale

experiments, it is too early in the program to have specific goals and

measurable standards that have a pass or fail criteria associated with

them. We disagree and continue to maintain that specific, measurable

goals are needed, even at this early stage because of the expenses

involved, the scale and progressive nature of the experiments, and their

importance to the Army. By not establishing specific goals now at this

level of experimentation, DOD and the Army are escalating risk at higher

levels as each advanced warfighting experiment progresses from the

brigade to the division and finally to the corps levels. DOD supported Army

approach continues the risk associated with acquiring millions of dollars

of appliques and other related developments without knowing whether

previous experiments were successful. Without some limits and controls,

the Army could spend hundreds of millions of dollars on these

experiments without having an adequate basis to judge whether it should

continue with them.

3. We acknowledge that the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

(DOT&E) involvement is a very positive step in the direction we

recommend. However, it is still unclear whether DOT&E will actually

(1) approve of specific, measurable goals early on as we recommend

instead of the general ones as DOD and the Army advocate and (2) verify

the attainment of those goals in each advanced warfighting experiment.

4. DOD’s recognition of the Marine Corps’ funding issue and its statement

that it is working with the services to resolve it, essentially complies with

the intent of our recommendation. We will continue to monitor DOD’s

implementation efforts.

(707078) Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-25 Battlefield Automation
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