J-A09041-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

RONALD GRANT CHAMPNEY,

Appellee No. 714 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Suppression Order April 20, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-54-CR-0001243-1998

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2016

The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the suppression court 

which granted the pre-trial suppression motion of Appellee, Ronald Grant 

Champney.1 Specifically, it challenges the suppression of statements 

Appellee made to Pennsylvania State Police Officers on May 13, 1998. We 

affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This interlocutory order is appealable because it is a Commonwealth appeal 

in a criminal case where the Commonwealth has “certifie[d] in the notice of 

appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the 

prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); (see Notice of Appeal, 4/21/15, at 1); see 

also Commonwealth v. Brister, 16 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“The 

Commonwealth’s good faith certification, alone, provides an absolute right to 

appeal; it is not required to demonstrate the need for the evidence.”) 

(citation omitted).
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This case stems from the shooting death of Roy Bensinger in 1997. 

Appellee was convicted of the murder of Bensinger in 1999; however, he 

was granted post-conviction relief, and a new trial. Prior to this trial, he filed 

a suppression motion seeking to suppress several statements he made while 

being interrogated as a suspect in the Bensinger murder investigation. We 

take the factual history relevant to this appeal in this matter from the 

suppression court opinion.

On November 25, [1997], [Sergeant] Shinskie[, of the 

Pennsylvania State Police,] accompanied [Trooper] Grimm in 

transporting [Appellee] from the county prison to his preliminary 

arraignment [on unrelated arson charges]. Tpr. Grimm drove, 

and Sgt. Shinskie rode in the backseat with a cuffed [Appellee].

At the hearing [on Appellee’s motion to suppress], Sgt. 

Shinskie testified that [while they drove,] he was seizing upon 

every opportunity to talk with [Appellee] about the Bensinger 

case. Sgt. Shinskie allowed [Appellee] to read the arson 

complaint and then advised him of his Miranda2rights. The 

sergeant’s approach to [Appellee] was to engage in low key 

conversation, giving [Appellee] information that he had received 

during the investigation, and inviting [Appellee] to comment. On 

the way back from the MDJ office, [Appellee] was asked to 

return with the officers to the police station to make a 

statement. [Appellee] responded that he would have to speak to 

an attorney before doing so. Instead of taking him to the police 

station, he was returned to the prison. The Commonwealth has 

referenced to no incriminating statements during this 

conversation.

[Appellee’s] preliminary hearing on the arson charges 

occurred on December 23, 1997. He was again transported 

there by officers Shinskie and Grimm in the same manner as 

before. Sgt. Shinskie again advised [Appellee] of his Miranda

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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rights. After some light conversation, [Appellee] said, “I see you 

caught David Blickley.” Sgt. Shinskie testified that Blickley was 

an associate of [Appellee] and was suspected of committing 

burglaries and home invasions in the Philadelphia area. 

Blickley’s ex-girlfriend was married to Bensinger at the time he 

was shot.

Sgt. Shinskie responded to [Appellee] by acknowledging 

that Blickley had been caught and telling [Appellee] that Blickley 

was giving information regarding the homicide and [Appellee’s] 

possible involvement. [Appellee] said that he knew someone 

would have to take the blame. Shinskie asked if Beth Bensinger 

was involved, and [Appellee] responded that there was no 

reason for her to be involved.

On the return trip to the prison, about one hour later, Sgt. 

Shinskie asked [Appellee] if he shot Bensinger. [Appellee] 

responded, “Before I make any kind of statement, I think I 

should talk to Frank Cori.” Sgt. Shinskie knew that Frank Cori 

was an attorney who had represented [Appellee]. He was 

returned to the prison with no more conversation of note.

The next contact by Shinskie with [Appellee] occurred on 

May 13, 1998. Sgt. Shinskie accompanied Detective Pummer of 

the Lehigh County District Attorney’s Office to see [Appellee] at 

the prison. Detective Pummer wanted to question [Appellee] 

about an arson in Allentown. They met with [Appellee] in a 

prison conference room. [Appellee] was advised of his Miranda

rights and signed a waiver form.

After some questions regarding arsons in Allentown and 

Tremont, Sgt. Shinskie told [Appellee] that he believed he could 

put together probable cause for homicide charges against 

[Appellee]. In response, [Appellee] asked what he was looking 

at. When Shinskie replied that he did not know, because he 

could not make deals, [Appellee] told him to go get Cal Shields, 

who was then the [Schuylkill County] District Attorney. After an 

unsuccessful attempt to locate Mr. Shields, Shinskie returned to 

the conversation with [Appellee].

When Sgt. Shinskie noted that a .30 caliber firearm was 

used to kill Bensinger, [Appellee] said “Yeah. The guns are kept 

in a locker in the basement of the home.” Shinskie told 

[Appellee] that he understood the gun was destroyed. 

[Appellee] responded, “That’s a lie. The gun is not destroyed. I 

know who has the gun. And they might have sold it or have it 
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somewhere. But that’s a lie. It was not destroyed.” When 

Shinskie told [Appellee] that Chris Reber was involved, 

[Appellee] replied, “No he’s not involved. He only dropped me 

off.”

The last conversation between Sgt. Shinskie and 

[Appellee] occurred on October 8, 1998. On that date, 

[Appellee] was arrested in the instant case. Officers Shinskie 

and Grimm transported [Appellee] from the county prison to 

their barracks. Along the way, Shinskie commented that Beth 

Bensinger had made some interesting statements concerning 

[Appellee’s] involvement in the Roy Bensinger shooting. 

Shinskie testified that his goal was to get [Appellee] to 

comment. [Appellee] replied that she probably got immunity.

Also on the way, he was given the affidavits of probable 

cause to read and thereafter stated that it did not matter 

because he was going to die anyway. When Shinskie asked 

what [Appellee] meant, he said he had tuberculosis and was 

going to tell his attorney not to appeal so his death would come 

sooner. Once they arrived at the barracks, [Appellee] was read 

his Miranda rights and signed the waiver form.

(Suppression Court Opinion, 4/20/15, at 2-5).

On October 25, 1999, a jury convicted Appellee of murder of the first 

degree for the killing of Roy Bensinger, and sentenced him to death on 

October 26, 1999.3 Appellee filed a direct appeal; the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania affirmed on September 24, 2003. (See Commonwealth v. 

Champney, 832 A.2d 403 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939 (2004)). 

On June 1, 2005, Appellee filed a timely petition pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.S.C.A. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA court 

conducted an evidentiary hearing on Appellee’s petition. On June 3, 2008, 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court imposed Appellee’s sentence on November 17, 1999.
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the court concluded that trial counsel was ineffective for, among other 

things, not seeking to suppress certain statements. It granted postconviction relief ordering that Appellee was entitled to a new trial. An evenly 

divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that ruling per curiam on April 

24, 2013. (See Commonwealth v. Champney, 65 A.3d 386 (Pa. 2013), 

cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1276 (2014)).

On February 6, 2015, prior to the new trial, Appellee filed a pre-trial 

suppression motion seeking to suppress the statements that he gave to Sgt. 

Shinskie on November 25, 1997, December 23, 1997, May 13, 1998, and 

October 8, 1998. The suppression court held a hearing on March 13, 2015. 

On April 20, 2015, it entered an order granting the motion to suppress in 

part and suppressing Appellee’s statements from the May 13, 1998 and 

October 8, 1998 encounters with Sgt. Shinskie.4 This timely appeal 

followed.5 

____________________________________________

4

In its opinion, the suppression court concluded that neither party identified 

a statement from the November 25, 1997 encounter that the 

Commonwealth would want to proffer as evidence. (See Suppression Ct. 

Op., at 6). With regard to the December 23, 1997 statements, it concluded 

that because Appellee initiated the conversation with Sgt. Shinskie, his 

statements were not obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and should 

not be suppressed. (See id. at 9). 

5

Pursuant to the court’s order, the Commonwealth filed its concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on May 18, 2015. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The suppression court filed its opinion on May 28, 2015, 

in which it referred to its April 20, 2015 opinion granting the motion to 

suppress. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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The Commonwealth raises two questions on appeal:

I. Did the [suppression] court err in granting the motion to 

suppress statements made to law enforcement authorities on 

May 13, 1998 where [Appellee] failed to make a clear and 

unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel?

II. Did the [suppression] court err in granting the motion to 

suppress statements made to law enforcement authorities on 

May 13, 1998 when there was a sufficient break in [Appellee’s] 

custody to end the presumption of involuntariness established in 

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)?

(Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4).

Our standard of review for an appeal from the grant of a motion to 

suppress is well-settled:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression 

order, this Court may consider only the evidence from the 

defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the 

prosecution that, when read in the context of the record as a 

whole, remains uncontradicted. In our review, we are not bound 

by the suppression court’s conclusions of law, and we must 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to 

the facts. We defer to the suppression court’s findings of fact 

because, as the finder of fact, it is the suppression court’s 

prerogative to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight to be given to their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 92 A.3d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 106 A.3d 724 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). “Where, as in the 

instant case, there is no meaningful dispute of fact, our duty is to determine 

whether the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts of the 

case.” Commonwealth v. Ruey, 892 A.2d 802, 807 (Pa. 2006).

In its first issue, the Commonwealth claims that the suppression court 

erred in its conclusion that Appellee clearly invoked his right to counsel on 
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December 23, 1997. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 19-30). Specifically, it 

argues that the statement, “I think I should talk to Frank Cori”, was 

ambiguous, the suppression court failed to consider the context of the 

statement, and incorrectly considered the subjective belief of Sgt. Shinskie. 

(Id. at 23; see id. at 24-30). The Commonwealth relies on Davis v. 

United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), to argue that Appellee’s request was 

equivocal and he did not clearly ask for an attorney. Thus his statements to 

Sgt. Shinskie on May 13, 1998 should not have been suppressed. (See

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 22-27). We disagree.

In Miranda[, supra], the Court adopted a set of prophylactic 

measures to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right from the 

inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation. . . . 

[The Court] reasoned, [u]nless adequate protective devices are 

employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 

surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can 

truly be the product of his free choice. 

To counteract the coercive pressure, Miranda announced 

that police officers must warn a suspect prior to questioning 

that he has a right to remain silent, and a right to the presence 

of an attorney. After the warnings are given, if the suspect 

indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must 

cease. Similarly, if the suspect states that he wants an attorney, 

the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. 

Critically, however, a suspect can waive these rights. 

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-04 (2010) (quotation marks and 

some citations omitted).

In Edwards, supra, the Supreme Court held that 

when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present 

during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot 

be established by showing only that he responded to further 

police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been 
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advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, . . . 

having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 

counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities 

until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused 

himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 

conversations with the police.

Edwards, supra at 484-85 (footnote omitted).

In Davis, supra, the Supreme Court considered an interview between 

a suspect, Davis, and law enforcement agents wherein Davis said “[m]aybe I 

should talk to a lawyer.” Davis, supra at 455. The interviewing agent then 

clarified whether Davis was “asking for a lawyer or is he just making a 

comment about a lawyer, and [Davis] said [‘]No, I’m not asking for a 

lawyer[.’]” Id. After a break, the agents continued the interview for 

another hour until Davis said: “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything 

else.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that in the first statement, 

because Davis had not unambiguously or unequivocally requested counsel, 

the officers were not required to immediately cease questioning. See id. at 

460-61. It held that “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda

rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and 

unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461 (emphasis 

added). The Court did not consider whether Davis’s second statement was 

an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. 

Here, the suppression court concluded that Appellee’s statement, 

“Before I make any kind of statement, I think I should talk to Frank Cori”, 

was a clear request for an attorney. (Suppression Ct. Op., at 9). The court 

likened Appellee’s statement to the second statement in Davis, and 
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reasoned that “[i]n both instances, the agents in Davis and Sgt. Shinskie 

had no trouble construing the suspect’s statement that he ‘thinks’ he wants 

to see an attorney as a request for counsel.” (Id. at 12). The suppression 

court concluded that “[t]his request by [Appellee] for counsel before giving 

any further statements was clear and unambiguous.” (Id. at 12). 

After careful review, we conclude that the record supports that on 

December 23, 1997, Appellee made a clear request for an attorney when he 

said “Before I make any kind of statement, I think I should talk to Frank 

Cori.” (Suppression Ct. Op., at 9); see Davis, supra at 461. We agree 

with the suppression court’s conclusion that this statement properly invoked 

Appellee’s right to counsel. Therefore, pursuant to Edwards, supra, after 

he clearly requested an attorney on December 23, 1997, Appellee should not 

have been subject to further interrogation on May 13, 1998 without an 

attorney present. See id. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not err 

when it suppressed Appellee’s May 13, 1998 statement. See Hudson, 

supra at 1241. Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s first issue does not merit 

relief. 

In its second issue, the Commonwealth claims that the trial court erred 

and should not have suppressed Appellee’s May 13, 1998 statements 

because “there was a sufficient break in custody that ended the presumption 

of involuntariness established in Edwards[, supra.]” (Commonwealth’s 

Brief, at 30 (emphasis and most capitalization omitted); see id. at 30-37). 

Specifically, it argues that, although Appellee was incarcerated, the time 
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between the two interrogations should have constituted a sufficient break in 

custody because Appellee’s custody was not the type of imprisonment that 

would create compelling pressure on him. (See id. at 35-37). We disagree.

In Shatzer, supra, the Supreme Court declined to extend the 

Edwards rule to situations where there was a sufficient break in custody 

between an accused’s request for an attorney and re-interrogation so as to 

dissipate the coercive effects of custodial interrogation. See Shatzer, 

supra at 113-14. The court reasoned:

It is easy to believe that a suspect may be coerced or 

badgered into abandoning his earlier refusal to be questioned 

without counsel in the paradigm Edwards case. That is a case 

in which the suspect has been arrested for a particular crime and 

is held in uninterrupted pretrial custody while that crime is being 

actively investigated. After the initial interrogation, and up to 

and including the second one, he remains cut off from his normal 

life and companions, thrust into and isolated in an unfamiliar, 

police-dominated atmosphere, where his captors appear to 

control [his] fate. That was the situation confronted by the 

suspects in Edwards, [Arizona v.] Roberson[, 486 U.S. 675 

(1988)], and Minnick [v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990)], 

the three cases in which we have held the Edwards rule 

applicable. Edwards was arrested pursuant to a warrant and 

taken to a police station, where he was interrogated until he 

requested counsel. The officer ended the interrogation and took 

him to the county jail, but at 9:15 the next morning, two of the 

officer’s colleagues reinterrogated Edwards at the jail. Roberson 

was arrested at the scene of a just-completed burglary and 

interrogated there until he requested a lawyer. A different 

officer interrogated him three days later while he was still in 

custody pursuant to the arrest. Minnick was arrested by local 

police and taken to the San Diego jail, where two FBI agents 

interrogated him the next morning until he requested counsel. 

Two days later a Mississippi Deputy Sheriff reinterrogated him at 

the jail. None of these suspects regained a sense of control or 

normalcy after they were initially taken into custody for the 

crime under investigation.
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Shatzer, supra at 106-07 (quotation marks, footnote, and some citations 

omitted). 

The Shatzer court then concluded that in Shatzer’s case, where he 

was imprisoned on a prior conviction, the “lawful imprisonment imposed 

upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified 

in Miranda.” Id. at 113. The court explained that where an inmate was 

already sentenced, the “interrogator has no power to increase the duration 

of incarceration, which was determined at sentencing.” Id. It distinguished 

this situation from that “in Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick, [where the 

suspects’] continued detention as suspects rested with those controlling their 

interrogation, and who confronted the uncertainties of what final charges 

they would face, whether they would be convicted, and what sentence they 

would receive.” Id. at 114.

Here, the suppression court found: 

In the instant case, [Appellee] was not a sentenced felon 

serving time. He was in jail only because he was awaiting trial 

on arson charges, and it was Sgt. Shinskie to whom [Appellee] 

had invoked his right to have counsel present. After doing so, 

[Appellee] had no opportunity to return to the normalcy of the 

life he had before being arrested on the arson charges. The 

State Police was the same agency that had filed the arson 

charge against [Appellee] and was asking him about the 

homicide.

(Suppression Ct. Op., at 15). The court then concluded that because 

Appellee was not a sentenced inmate, the Edwards rule was inapplicable 

and his May 13, 1998 statements should be suppressed. (See id. at 16).
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Upon review, we conclude that the record supports the suppression 

court’s finding of facts. See Hudson, supra at 1241. Furthermore, we 

conclude that because Appellee was not a sentenced prisoner who was 

serving a term of imprisonment, and because he was not returned to his 

normal life in between the two interrogations, his statements in response to 

Sgt. Shinskie’s interrogation on May 13, 1998 were properly suppressed 

under the Edwards rule. See Shatzer, supra at 113-14; Edwards, supra

at 484-85. Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s second issue does not merit 

relief.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2016