CONTENTS

Preface

Text

Notes

About the Author
PREFACE

This paper on neutral rights on the high seas and the origins of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch 

War grew out of a much larger and continuing study of the Royal Navy during the 

American Revolutionary War.

The rights and duties of both neutrals and belligerents on the high seas during war is a 

complex subject. National policy, strategy, naval tactics, diplomacy, economics, 

international and metropolitan law, the laws and customs both of the sea and of war, 

and the threat or the use of brute force by nation-states to attain their goals--all become 

intertwined and are as difficult to unravel as a splice in a length of wire rope.

Against a background of gunfire and continual diplomatic crises, politicians, diplomats, 

navy officers, admiralty court judges, lawyers, merchant shipowners, the owners of 

cargoes, and insurance companies all manipulate and maneuver in an attempt to gain 

their own ends. Rarely do any of these interests coincide. What may be sound admiralty 

law might be bad diplomacy. A seemingly legal and profitable trading venture might 

result in the loss of a ship or the beginning of a war. Or what the military and naval 

leaders of a state think is an absolutely necessary military measure may be seen by 

politicians and diplomats as a sure way of bringing about national ruin.

The subject of neutral rights during war is a complex one, and one I could not have 

approached without the assistance of a large number of people who work for various 

libraries and archives in the United States and Great Britain. I especially want to thank 

the staffs of the Public Record Office; the National Maritime Museum; the Institute of

Historical Research, University of London; the Paul Klapper Library, Queens College, 

City University of New York; and the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College.

I am wholly responsible for any 

sins of omission or commission in 

this study. David Syrett

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
TEXT

Blockades have always been employed as a strategy in naval wars. In the simplest of 

terms, a blockade is nothing more than the use of naval forces to deny an enemy the 

ability to move ships and goods across bodies of water. Though the general concept of 

a naval blockade is easy to understand, the conduct of such a strategy not only involves 

the deployment of warships but also generates a complex set of diplomatic and legal 

problems. For upon the institution of a naval blockade, questions such as what kinds of 

goods are contraband? what constitutes a legal blockade? and what are the rights and 

duties of neutral vessels on the high seas? are raised immediately in admiralty courts 

and foreign offices by both belligerent and neutral nations.

From the beginning of the American War of Independence in 1775, the Royal Navy, with 

varying degrees of success, used the weapon of blockade against the American rebels. 

While this policy brought forth a string of protests from neutrals over the violation of their 

rights on the high seas.1 It was generally agreed in principle that the British, under 

international law and the laws of war, had the right to seize the ships and goods of the 

American rebels as well as warlike materials, such as gunpowder, on board neutral 

vessels en route to America. However, with the beginning of the naval war with France 

in 1778, the British instituted blockades and policies that produced diplomatic crises 

with neutral European powers and a war with Holland.

The sinews of naval power in the age of wooden ships were naval stores. Masts, 

timbers, planking, tar, pitch, canvas, hemp, and ironware such as nails were required to 

build and maintain eighteenth-century warships. The main sources of most of these 

articles in Europe were the Baltic and Scandinavian nations. The British Isles lay like a 

barrier reef between the major ports and naval bases of France and Spain and the 

maritime approaches to the Baltic and Scandinavia. As a result, naval stores bound for 

France and Spain in the eighteenth century had to run a gauntlet of British naval bases 

and cruisers. British policy during a war with France or Spain was to prevent, by means 

of blockade, naval stores and certain other materials from reaching French ports from 

Scandinavia and the Baltic. This policy produced an endless series of incidents and 

crises over the rights of neutrals on the high seas, as the French, finding it impossible to 

use their own merchant ships to import naval stores, employed the cover of neutral-flag 

merchant ships to accomplish that end. At the same time, British policy was to intercept 

all vessels on the high seas and to seize warlike goods or naval stores bound for 

France.

On 29 July 1778, even though war had not been officially declared, the Royal Navy was 

directed by an order in council to capture or destroy all French goods and ships 

encountered on the high seas.2 Twenty-five days later, the Admiralty was directed to 

order the Royal Navy to intercept, seize, and bring into British ports any neutral vessels 

found to be carrying "Naval or Warlike Stores" to French ports.3 The intent of this 

directive was to prevent the French from using the protection of a neutral flag to import 

naval stores for the use of the French Navy. This policy embraced the doctrine that "free 
ships do not make free goods" and defined both contraband and blockade in terms that 

were not accepted by a number of European nations and even ran contrary to some 

treaties to which Britain was a signatory.4 In the narrowest legal definition of the term, 

contraband of war embraced only those items that were clearly warlike materials, such 

as arms and munitions. But in 1778, the British government, as it had before and would 

in the future, was following a flexible definition of contraband formulated by authorities 

such as Grotious, who divided all goods into these three types:

• Arms and munitions that are clearly contraband in time of war. 

• Articles that are of no use whatsoever in military operations and that can be freely carried to an enemy. 

• Goods that, while not in themselves warlike materials, would under certain circumstances be of military 

assistance to an enemy, and would, therefore, be subject to seizure as contraband on the high seas if 

transported by a neutral to an enemy port or if owned by enemy citizens.5

On 22 October 1778, George Harris, the Admiralty's advocate, clearly stated Britain's 

legal justification for seizing naval stores and other goods found on neutral ships:

And I further apprehend, that under particular circumstances, (of which I take the Govt. 

to be at liberty to admit proof if occasion should require it) even these goods, which are 

enumerated in the Spanish and Dutch treaties as not contraband, may also be stopped 

and sold in England; if they are merchandise of promiscuous use, [of which France] is 

either publicly known to be in great want of such merchandise for the purpose of war, or 

proved by the affidavits of indifferent and credible persons so to be.6

Depending upon military and strategic circumstances, then, any object could become 

contraband and, thus, be subject to seizure. This doctrine led the British to follow what 

many observers thought to be at best a contradictory policy with regard to defining 

contraband. For example, on 5 April 1780, the Admiralty's advocate, George Harris, 

advised the Admiralty not to seize the Danish ship Maria, loaded with foodstuffs bound 

to a French port, while on 9 February 1782, the High Court of Admiralty ordered that a 

cargo of flour on board the Imperial ship Saint Paul be sold to the Royal Navy in order to 

prevent the flour from reaching the enemy.7 George Harris, in a legal opinion about 

staves written from Doctors` Commons, clearly stated the British doctrine of what 

constituted contraband.

Stave of no sort have been as yet in my rememberance, regarded as naval stores not withstanding the quantity, in 

many instances have been much larger than at present.

On the whole, unless it could be made to appear, or was a known fact, that the French at Brest were, at this time, in 

very particular want of casks for carriage of their ship provisions, I think the vessel ought not to be detained, under 

the general order for stopping naval stores going to the enemy.8

This doctrine of military necessity, when carried out to its logical conclusion, does not 

even protect from seizure goods specifically stated as noncontraband in treaties 

between Britain and various other nations. To British admiralty courts, treaties were 

agreements between nations that were similar to contracts in the respect that if an 

enemy used an article of a treaty to subvert the intent of that treaty, then that particular 

article of the treaty was void. For example, if the French, in league with citizens of the 

Netherlands, were to use article four of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1674, which states 
that naval stores are not contraband, as a means of obtaining naval stores under cover 

of the Dutch flag in order to wage war against the British, then the intent of the treaty 

would be clearly subverted and naval stores on Dutch ships belonging to French 

subjects or bound to France would be subject to seizure.9

Even if the Royal Navy intercepted a neutral ship carrying material that was not enemy 

property or bound to the enemy, the entire burden of proof still fell on the ship's master 

and owners. According to Harris,

I do not apprehend it to be the meaning of any treaty, between England and Russia that 

the Russians shall be at liberty to carry the goods of the enemies of U. Britain and if I 

am right in this assertion, the captain of the Russian ship will be in fault, if the papers on 

board do not express that the cargo is for the account and risque of Russians--for, if ye 

cargo should in reality be Russian property, that the papers on board do not declare it 

so to be, the Russians have no just cause of complaint either on the foundation of 

general law or of treaties. . .10

To British admiralty courts, what legally constituted contraband changed according to 

strategic requirements, and the burden of proof that a cargo, such as naval stores, was 

not contraband fell entirely upon the neutral ship's master and owners.

In addition to this constantly changing mosaic of legal opinions as to the nature of 

contraband, the British government also employed a strategy of blockade that was 

considered by many two be illegal. To some nations--Russia, for example--a legal naval 

blockade had to be what is known as a "close" or "effective" blockade,11 in which 

warships had to be stationed in such a manner as to prevent, at all times, any ship or 

vessel from leaving or entering a besieged port or place. If these conditions were not 

met, the protesting nations argued, the blockade was illegal. However, for strategic 

reasons, it was the policy of the British government during the American Revolutionary 

War not to closely blockade particular enemy European ports, but rather to conduct 

what is known as a "distant" blockade, which called for the seizure of enemy and neutral 

merchant shipping on the high seas. British squadrons, in order to be able to intercept 

all east-to-west movements of merchant shipping along the northwest coast of Europe, 

were stationed at focal points or choke points of maritime trade, such as the eastern 

approaches of the English Channel. This strategy, because it was not a blockade of a 

particular place or port, was considered by some to be a "paper" blockade, and thus 

illegal, because it resulted in a general searching by the Royal Navy of all merchant 

ships passing through the Channel.

Because of the confusion caused by disagreements over what constituted contraband 

and legal blockades, many neutrals, as well as belligerents, did not understand that the 

British government based what it considered to be a right to stop, search, and seize 

merchant ships on the high seas on the principle of national self-defense and ultimately 

the survival of Great Britain as a nation-state. The British government believed and 

acted upon the assumption that the unwritten law of national self-defense overrode 

articles in treaties and legal definitions as to what were legal blockades and the nature 
of contraband. On 27 October 1778, Lord Suffolk, a British secretary of state, in a 

dispatch to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, stated Britain's position bluntly 

and clearly: according to Suffolk, "The great & unanswerable principle of Self-Defense 

indispensably obliges His Majesty to prevent, as far as possible, his enemies from being 

supplied with naval or warlike stores."12

It was the failure by many to understand that Britain would go to any lengths to prevent 

naval stores from reaching her enemies that led to political and strategic miscalculations 

among both neutrals and belligerents. From the beginning of the fighting with France in 

1778 until the end of the war, it was the unchanging policy of the British government to 

seize all naval stores found on board neutral ships if they belonged to enemy subjects 

or were bound to enemy ports "what ever may be the consequences."13 British 

diplomats stationed in Baltic and Scandinavian ports and capitals were instructed to 

supply detailed intelligence of the movements of all ships carrying naval stores to 

France. Through the use of spies, money, and all the usual means at the command of 

diplomats for obtaining information, a steady flow of intelligence from such places as 

Elsinore, Götenborg, Dantzig, Riga, and St. Petersburg reached the Admiralty in 

Whitehall, indicating that French agents were secretly procuring and shipping naval 

stores to France in neutral, for the most part Dutch, ships.14 on 29 August 1778, Vice 

Adm. Matthew Buckle, commander in chief in the Downs, reported to the Admiralty that 

he had begun seizing and bringing into British ports Dutch, German, and Scandinavian 

ships loaded with naval stores bound for French ports.15

The Royal Navy's squadron stationed in the Downs was the instrument employed to 

prevent naval stores from reaching France. The squadron usually consisted of one 64-

gun ship of the line, a few frigates and sloops of war, and a score or more of small 

armed cutters. These small armed vessels were stationed in the Downs, in the Straits of 

Dover, and off the English and French coasts, and at times ranged along the coasts of 

the Netherlands (see map 1).16 It was the mission of these armed cutters to intercept and 

inspect every merchant ship they encountered. If a merchant ship, no matter what 

nation's flag it was flying, was found to be carrying naval or warlike stores to France and 

to Spain as well, the ship would be seized, by force of arms if .necessary, and brought 

into an English port. Day after day, the warships of the Downs squadron cruised in the 

narrow seas between England and the Continent, seizing neutral merchant ships.
Map 1. The Channel Area

Legally, neutral merchant ships did not have to submit to being searched on the high 

seas. Stopping, searching, and seizing neutral merchant ships by the Royal Navy on the 

high seas was considered by British admiralty courts to be "an act of superior force."17

The British government, by the threat of, or the actual use of force of arms, was seizing 

neutral merchant ships carrying naval stores on the high seas to enemy ports and was 

imposing its own interpretation of what constituted contraband and legal blockades 

upon various neutral nations. Almost immediately after the beginning of the fighting 

between Britain and France in 1778, the British government instituted a number of 

measures intended to moderate, if not to prevent, the protests of neutral nations whose 

ships were being seized by the Royal Navy. For example, on 29 September 1778, the 

Admiralty was ordered to release all Dutch ships held in British ports that did not have 

cargoes of naval or warlike stores bound to French ports or to the American rebels. 

Also, orders were issued to all British privateers and warships not to seize any such 

ships in the future.18 At the same time, the British government began a program of 

preemptive buying of all naval stores and other contraband found on board neutral 

merchant ships. Parliament passed an act that set aside various parts of the Navigation 

Acts and authorized the Commissioners of the Navy to purchase for the King's use all 

naval stores and other contraband found on neutral merchant ships brought into British 
ports.19 The Admiralty, on 19 October 1778, was directed to order the Navy Board to 

purchase at fair market value all naval stores that were either condemned as enemy 

property or "restored to the claimant upon condition that the same shall be sold for the 

King's use." At the same time, theordered to pay all of the fees, freight, demurrage, 

Commissioners of the Navy were neutral merchant ships' legal and other similar 

expenses.20

Preemptive buying of naval stores by the British government was intended to obtain 

additional naval stores for the use of the Royal Navy and, at the same time, to prevent 

naval stores from reaching the French and, later, the Spanish. Further, by not 

condemning neutral merchant ships, by buying all naval stores that were not 

condemned as enemy property, and by paying in full for such things as freight, 

insurance, legal fees, demurrage, and the like, the British minimized the financial loss to 

the owners of the merchant ships seized by the Royal Navy. Economically, what did it 

matter to the owners of a Dutch merchant ship carrying a cargo of French-owned naval 

stores if the British seized their ship, for the cargo did not belong two the shipowners 

and their vessel would, in due course, be released with all expenses paid by the British 

government. While this preemptive buying of naval stores was very costly to the British 

government,21 it was designed to show that British policy was not one of simply seizing 

neutrals' property without compensation, but rather that it was a legitimate effort to 

prevent naval stores from reaching Britain's enemies.

Still, when it became known that the Royal Navy was seizing merchant ships in the 

English Channel and carrying into British ports every merchant ship, regardless of 

nationality, whose cargo consisted of naval stores bound for France, a huge diplomatic 

crisis erupted in various European capitals. To some neutrals, the outbreak of fighting 

between Britain and France in 1778 appeared to be an opportunity for economic gain. 

The Dutch, for example, had in the past made much money running guns and other 

munitions to the American rebels through the free port on the Dutch island of St. 

Eustatius in the West Indies.22 Profits from secretly supplying munitions to the American 

rebels were insignificant, though, when compared with what could be made by 

supplying naval stores to the French by running or breaking the British blockade under 

cover of a neutral flag. To some neutrals, the beginning of fighting between the British 

and the French and the issues created by British seizures of naval stores on the high 

seas appeared as a setting inviting an attempt to redress the European balance of 

power or as an opportunity to increase one's prestige or power by becoming a third 

force, or perhaps even a mediator in the conflict. To other neutrals, the British conduct 

concerning neutral rights on the high seas appeared to be outrageous. Britain, as it had 

done during the Seven Years' War, was attempting, it appeared, without regard to 

treaties, international law, or the laws and the customs of the sea, to dictate by means 

of brute force what type of conduct it would permit neutral merchant ships on the high 

seas.

During the Seven Years' War, Britain could treat neutrals with a heavy hand and 

disregard their protests because the Royal Navy was supreme at sea and the French 

were tied up in a land war in Germany. But 1778 was not 1762, and the diplomatic and 
military situation in Europe had changed markedly over a decade and a half. The British 

Army was tied down in an endless war in America, while the French Army was not even 

engaged. The French Navy appeared to be capable of effectively confronting the naval 

power of Britain, while knowledgeable diplomatic observers saw that Spain was also 

slipping towards war with Britain. Should that happen, the Royal Navy would be 

confronted, on paper at least, by enemies with an overpowering naval strength. In 

places such as Amsterdam, The Hague, Berlin, Copenhagen, Petersburg, there were 

now people reasons, thought that Britain should declare as contraband any article that 

naval stores, and that perhaps it was now possible, as it had not been during the Seven 

Years' War, to force Britain to back down and change its policies. Furthermore, in the 

capitals of the neutral nations of Europe, French diplomats, French money, and French 

power were secretly pressing for the neutrals to force Britain to embrace the policy that 

"free ships make free goods." As the Royal Navy continued without letup to seize 

neutral ships carrying naval stores to France, the question of whether or not the neutral 

powers could or would force Britain to change its policy was hotly debated in every 

capital in Europe.

British seizures of naval stores presented each neutral nation with different problems or, 

in some cases, opportunities. Sweden, a minor commercial and naval power, but a 

major producer of naval stores, wanted for political and economic reasons to ship and 

sell naval stores to the French, but without precipitating a naval war with Britain. On 20 

November 1778, Thomas Wroughton, the British ambassador to Sweden, wrote to the 

authorities at Whitehall that he had been informed by the king of Sweden that that 

country "could by no means acquiesce" to the seizure of naval stores on board Swedish 

merchant ships bound to France. According to the Swedish king, the seizures made by 

the British were contrary to various treaties between Sweden and Britain. Moreover, the 

Swedish economy would be greatly hurt because naval stores were the major products 

exported by the country. If the trade in naval stores was stopped, then Sweden would 

have no way to pay for those goods that it needed to import. The payment for Swedish 

cargoes seized by the British would result in great losses to Swedish merchants and 

shipowners because the resulting monies would in no way cover the entire cost of the 

voyages.23 In other dispatches from Stockholm written in the autumn and winter of 1778, 

Wroughton informed the British government that Swedish merchants were outraged and 

confused by the British seizures because the Swedes did not know what the true policy 

of the British government was. Contraband was being interpreted by the British to mean 

naval stores, which was such a wide-ranging term that it could mean just about 

anything. If, however, naval stores meant tar,iron, and deals, the Swedes felt this meant 

"There is an end at once of the principal productions of this Kingdom." The Swedes 

complained, also, that British privateers were taking their ships "without the least 

shadow o f justice."24 On 2 March 1779, Wroughton reported that discussions of AngloSwedish relations with the Swedish authorities broke down because "naval stores is the 

Rock on which we always split, as he [the king of Sweden] says it would be equal to 

shutting up the ports of the Kingdom, and consequently [is something] to which the King 

would never acquiesce."25
It is clear that during the winter of 1778-79, either the Swedish merchants and 

government did not know of the British policy of preemptive buying of naval stores, or if 

they did, they did not understand the economics of the program. The economic 

problems of the Swedes resulting from British seizures of naval stores were quickly 

settled. Con 19 February 1779, Wroughton was directed to inform the Swedes that they 

should ship their naval stores directly to England, where "no better market can surely 

exist during a state of hostilities like the present."26 The sale of naval stores in British 

markets and the British policy of preemptive buying apparently satisfied Swedish 

merchants, for as early as 15 June 1779, Wroughton reported from Stockholm "that the 

merchants of this place are extremely pleased & contented with the manner that 

judgment has been passed upon some of their ships & cargoes lately by the Court of 

Admiralty." Economics and merchants, however, are one thing, while kings and national 

prestige are another. In the same dispatch, Wroughton informed London that the king of 

Sweden disregarded the statements of Swedish merchants and informed the British 

diplomat that the seizures of Swedish merchant ships by the Royal Navy were matters 

of "principle" and "that he had reason to complain."27

Throughout the winter and spring of 1779, Wroughton reported to London many 

conflicting bits of intelligence about what would be the Swedish government's reaction 

to the British policy of seizing naval stores on Swedish merchant ships bound for French 

ports. There was talk in Stockholm of the Baltic or northern powers forming some kind 

of association to protect merchant ships from seizure.28 There was intelligence that 

Swedish merchant ships were going to use fake papers to mask their real destinations 

and the ownership of cargoes.29 Also, there were many reports that the Swedes were 

going to use warships to convoy their merchant ships to France, their objective being "to 

protect the commerce, and navigation of the trading subjects against any power who 

should endeavour to circumscribe the independency of the Swedish flag." Wroughton 

believed that the fitting out of warships to escort Swedish trade was being paid for by 

the French.30 The use o f convoys to protect Swedish merchant ships carrying naval 

stores to France was a clever ploy, requiring nerve, but also entailed dangers. It was not 

considered can act of war for the British to search at merchant ship on the high seas for 

contraband. However, should the Royal Navy stop and search a warship legally 

commissioned by the king of Sweden, Britain would be committing an outright act of war 

against Sweden. But was it an act of war for the British to use superior force to stop, 

search, and seize Swedish merchant ships carrying contraband under the protection of 

the Swedish Navy? Would consideration of such things as national honor and prestige 

lead to war between Sweden and Britain?

The choice between war or peace in 1779 was up to the Swedish government to 

decide. On 14 May 1779, Lord Weymouth, a British secretary of state, directed 

Wroughton to inform the Swedish government that Britain would not permit neutrals to 

ship naval stores to France under any circumstances.31 Wroughton, writing from 

Stockholm on 20 July 1779, stated to the authorities in London that it was his 

considered opinion that if the Royal Navy used force against a Swedish warship to 

maintain the blockade against the French, the Swedes "would take a decided part with 

the House of Bourbon who have animated them to this equipment and according to 
many appearances have contributed to the expense of it."32 On 31 August 1779, 

Wroughton was ordered to inform the Swedish government that, with or without convoy, 

Britain would not permit Swedish merchant ships to carry naval stores to France.33

British resolve and Swedish nerve were put to the test on 5 December 1779, when the 

Swedish frigate Trolle and two Swedish merchant ships loaded with naval stores bound 

to French ports arrived in the Downs. Rear Adm. F. W. Drake, the commander of the 

squadron in the Downs, seized the two Swedish merchant ships. The captain of the 

Swedish frigate sent am officer on board Drake's flagship and demanded that the British 

admiral release the two Swedish merchant ships. The Swedish officer then informed 

Drake that if the two ships were not released, the captain of the Trolle "must take such 

steps, as the orders from his Court have pointed out for him to pursue; which Adm. 

Drake understands to [be] use [of] Force, to attain his purpose." Drake then told the 

Swedish officer that his orders would not permit him to release the two merchant ships.

After the Swedish officer left his flagship, Drake wrote a dispatch to the Admiralty 

explaining the situation and sent it to London by express. At 0500 on 8 December 1779, 

Drake received instructions from the Admiralty not to release the two Swedish merchant 

ships and to repel force with force. On no account, however, was the admiral to fire the 

first shot. Drake then sent an officer on board the Trolle to inform the Swedish captain of 

his instructions. At the same time, the secretary to the Swedish ambassador to the 

Court of St. James arrived on board the Trolle with orders for the Swedish warship not 

to attempt to regain possession of the two Swedish merchant ships. Shortly thereafter, 

the Trolle departed from the Downs, leaving behind the two merchant ships.34 It is not 

known whether the captain of the Trolle was acting on his own or whether the whole 

incident was staged by the Swedes to see if the British were prepared to go to war with 

Sweden over the question of the shipment of naval stores to France. The Swedes came 

closer to war than they perhaps realized at the time, for on 19 November 1779, the 

British cabinet had decided to stop Dutch merchant ships from carrying; naval stores to 

the French, even if it resulted in war.35 During the course of the Trolle incident, the 

British clearly convinced the Swedes that they were prepared to go to any lengths, even 

war, to prevent the shipment of naval stores to France. The Swedes backed down over 

the incident in the Downs because they did not want a war with the British and because 

it appeared at the end of 1779 that diplomacy might be a better way of obtaining their 

objectives.

Because of geography, politics, and greed, the Dutch, unlike the Swedes, were not to 

be given the opportunity to choose between war and peace. Politically, economically, 

and militarily, the Netherlands were caught between Britain and France. By 1778, the 

Dutch were a minor military and naval power with the second largest merchant marine 

in Europe. If the Dutch did not appease the French, there was always the possibility that 

the French Army would take over the country. However, if the Dutch made England an 

enemy, then there was the possibility that the British would use the Royal Navy to 

conquer Dutch colonies and to destroy the Dutch economy through harrassment of the 

nation's merchant marine and fishing fleets.
In March 1779, the Prince of Orange, the stadtholder and commander of the Dutch 

armed forces, informed the states of the province of Holland that if the Netherlands 

were "to protect their trade" and neutrality., an army of from fifty thousand to sixty 

thousand men, plus sixty ships of war, would be required.36 A force of this size most 

likely could not have been raised: the Dutch were divided politically, and the nature of 

the Dutch government precluded an effort of this type. The Netherlands comprised 

seven provinces, each of which had a vote in the States General. The representatives 

of each province in the States General were picked by the states of the province. These 

legislative bodies were, in turn, controlled by self-perpetuating (oligarchies that made up 

the governments of various cities in a province and were called the Council of Regents. 

This series of legislative bodies comprised the republican part of the Dutch government, 

while the monarchical part was the stadtholder, which was hereditary in the House of 

Orange-Nassau. The stadtholder was the commander in chief of the Dutch armed 

forces, director of the East India Company, and president of the Bank of Amsterdam. 

The resolves of the States General were law. There were, however, certain areas where 

the constitution was vague and over which the States General, the stadtholder, the 

states of the province, and the Council of Regents simultaneously claimed sole 

jurisdiction. Foreign diplomats and even Dutch officials and politicians often found 

themselves enmeshed in the complicated each of Dutch government in such a way that 

nobody could find a solution to even the simplest of problems.

Even if one learned to understand the workings of the Dutch government, there was still 

the fact that the Dutch were hopelessly divided into pro-French and pro-British factions. 

In general, the maritime and commercial provinces, such as Holland, were pro-French, 

styled themselves republicans, and controlled the States General, while the inland 

agricultural provinces were pro-British and backed the stadtholder. The supporters of 

the stadtholder were known as the court, or Orange, party. This political division is easy 

to understand, for the House of Orange-Nassau had long been militarily and 

dynastically connected with England, while the merchants of a city such as Amsterdam 

saw Britain as the nation that had broken Dutch naval power and that was now in the 

process of economically reducing the republic to a second-rate commercial power. To 

many Dutch merchants it was a case of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." They 

were also aware that money could be made by selling such things as naval stores to the 

French.37 In 1778, then, the Dutch, militarily weak and deeply divided, with an almost 

unworkable form of government, had to contend with all the forces generated by a naval 

war between Britain and France.

The British and the Dutch in 1674 and 1678 had agreed upon two conflicting treaties 

designed to regulate the conduct of each nation in the event one of them was involved 

in a war. The Anglo-Dutch Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1674 specifically stated 

that naval stores were not contraband and that if one power were at war, the other had 

the right to trade with both the warring powers. Only warlike materials, which were 

closely defined as arms and munitions, were considered contraband and subject to 

seizure. But the Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678 required that in the event the British 

became involved in a war, the Dutch would aid Great Britain with six thousand troops 

and twenty warships.38 Clearly these two treaties were contradictory.
With the advent of a naval war with France in 1778, it became British policy to seize all 

Dutch merchant ships carrying naval and warlike stores to French ports but not to 

demand that the Dutch supply the troops and warships to fight the French, as called for 

in the Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678. To the British, it was acceptable for the Dutch to 

carry on trade as if it were peacetime, just as long as they did not ship naval or warlike 

stores to the French. That is, if the Dutch did not ship naval stores to the French, then 

they could continue to enjoy all the other advantages of the Anglo-Dutch Commercial 

and Maritime Treaty of 1674 and to bear none of the burdens of the Anglo-Dutch 

Alliance of 1678.39 On 21 August 1778, the Admiralty issued orders for the ships of the 

Royal Navy to stop, search, and seize any neutral merchant ships found to be carrying 

naval stores to French ports.40 Several days later, on 1 September 1778, the British 

ambassador to The Hague, Sir Joseph Yorke, informed the stadtholder that Dutch 

merchant ships were carrying naval stores to France and that the Royal Navy would 

seize any Dutch ships with cargoes of naval or warlike stores en route to France.41 If a 

Dutch ship was found to be carrying naval stores to France, the whole matter would be 

turned over to the High Court of Admiralty, where it would be handled in the words of 

Yorke "with the most impartial justice."42 On the other hand, if a Dutch merchant ship 

was stopped and found not to be carrying naval or warlike stores to the French, even 

though it was carrying French goods between French ports, the ship and cargo would 

be immediately released.43 In order to strengthen this policy and to make sure that both 

the Dutch and the commanders of British cruisers understood British policy in regard to 

Dutch shipping, an order in council was issued on 14 December 1778, directing all 

British cruisers not to seize any Dutch merchant ships except those carrying warlike or 

naval stores to French ports.44 This precaution did not placate Dutch merchants, 

shipowners, and republicans, whose protests intensified as the Royal Navy put its policy 

into effect.45

To avoid the possibility of seizure by the British in the English Channel, several hundred 

merchant ships had taken shelter in the Texel. This great mass of shipping was to be 

escorted down the English Channel by nine Dutch warships. Nearly all of the merchant 

ships in this convoy carried innocent cargoes. However, intermixed with the rest of the 

convoy and loaded with naval stores were at least fifteen ships that had not been given 

instructions and signals by the commander of the escort.46 Even though they 

accompanied the convoy, these fifteen ships were not according to British law, legally a 

part of the convoy.47 There were also a number of merchant vessels that had received 

instructions and signals from the escort commander and that carried mixed cargoes of 

innocent goods and naval stores. In the autumn of 1778, the British were not yet ready 

for a showdown with the Dutch, so they permitted this convoy to pass down the Channel 

unmolested, despite the knowledge that some naval stores would reach French ports.48

This was, however, the first and last Dutch convoy of merchant ships that the British 

would let pass down the Channel without stopping, searching, and seizing by force if 

necessary those merchant ships that carried naval stores. While various Dutch 

legislative bodies were debating whether or not to permit ships carrying naval stores to 

be escorted by Dutch warships, Yorke informed the Dutch government that in the future 

the British would not under any circumstances permit Dutch ships to carry naval stores 
to France.49 On 3 November, the British ambassador wrote to Suffolk that if the British 

stood firm, the Dutch government would forbid naval stores to be convoyed to France 

and would in the end "let their merchants clamor on, till they sink into an acquiscence. . . 

. In this manner your objective will be obtained, tho' with bad grace . . . ."50 Several days 

later, Suffolk informed Yorke that what the Dutch did really did not matter, for "if the 

Dutch push us to the wall, and, like Shylock in the play, will be contented with nothing 

but their bond, the moderation and Forebearance we wish to show must be superseded 

by a less scrupulous conduct."51

While British, French, and Dutch politicians, diplomats, and merchants argued during 

1779 over such things as limited and unlimited convoys, the rights of neutrals, and the 

nature of contraband, the ships of the Royal Navy's squadron in the Downs hunted 

enemy cruisers, convoyed British trade, and stopped, searched, and seized neutral 

merchant vessels carrying naval or warlike stores to Britain's enemies. This type of 

operation was a dirty, dangerous, and frustrating assignment, but when carried out 

correctly, it paid big dividends. On many occasions, intelligence supplied mostly by 

British diplomats enabled Rear Admiral Drake to deploy ships and vessels to intercept a 

particular neutral ship or group of ships carrying contraband. For example, on 15 March 

1779, Drake reported to the Admiralty that he had directed the cutter Wells and two 

hired armed cutters to cruise between the South Sand and Calais in order to intercept a 

neutral ship loaded with cannon bound for Toulon.52 Drake's dispatches to the Admiralty 

contained scores of accounts of the interception and seizure of neutral merchant ships 

carrying contraband down the Channel to enemy ports.53

The interception of neutral merchant vessels was just one of the many tasks of the 

Downs squadron. Ships also had to be deployed to escort vessels carrying flax seed 

from Dutch ports to Ireland and Scotland,54 as well as merchant shipping passing 

through the Downs to either London or Spithead.55 Furthermore, escorts had to be 

supplied to British merchant ships proceeding to neutral ports on the Channel.56 Another 

task of the squadron in the Downs was to hunt down enemy cruisers operating in 

English coastal waters and in the Channel, for as Drake noted, "the sea hereabouts 

swarms with French privateers."57 On 23 February 1779, Drake had to dispatch the 

Amphitrite and the cutters Fortune and Peggy as far north as F am'orough Head to hunt 

for a French privateer thought to be operating in that region. On 10 June 1779, the 

admiral had to order the armed cutters Jackall and Sprightly to Margate in order to 

capture or drive away a French dogger and shallop that were chasing colliers into 

Margate Road.58 Also, armed vessels had to be deployed to guard the anchorage at the 

Downs in order to prevent the French in rowboats and other small craft from crossing 

the Channel at night and cutting out and capturing British merchant ships within sight of 

Drake's flagship.59

Another function of the Downs squadron was to obtain intelligence about enemy naval 

forces in the French Channel ports. For example, on 25 July 1779, Drake sent the 

armed cutter Robert and Jane to Ostend to pick up the latest intelligence from the 

British consul in that port. At the same time, another cutter was ordered to proceed 

along the French coast as far west as Heve de Grace. On 2 September 1779, the 
Robert and Jane was sent to observe Dunkirk "to be ascertained what number of 

vessels are laying in that Port."60 Even though Drake had some forty ships of the Royal 

Navy and hired armed cutters under his command at any given time,61 because of bad 

weather, navigational difficulties at the eastern entrance of the Channel, the need to 

repair damaged ships, and the great number of different missions assigned to his 

squadron, he never had enough ships and was constantly requesting that the Admiralty 

reinforce the Downs squadron.62 The shortage of ships and vessels, however, was 

overcome, and the Downs squadron was able to protect British trade in the region, beat 

off French privateers, and dispatch vessels to gain intelligence of enemy movements 

and strengths in the eastern approaches of the English Channel. Above all else, the 

Downs squadron during 1779 prevented, or to a great extent retarded, the movement of 

naval stores being freighted in neutral merchant ships through the English Channel to 

French ports.

At the beginning of 1779, the British ambassador to The Hague, Sir Joseph Yorke, 

believed that the only possible policy for the government of the Netherlands was to 

"endeavor to amuse both England and France, in order to avoid either Powers 

executing their threats." The British ambassador also thought that the main objective of 

French policy in the Netherlands was to obtain naval stores and that because there was 

so much money to be made, any number of Dutch merchants would be more than 

willing to assist the French in this endeavor.63 In a dispatch written on 1 January 1779, 

Yorke pointed out to his superiors in London that the Dutch were so weak militarily that 

they could not resist pressure from either the French or the British. The French, 

however, as well as a number of Dutch merchants, did not comprehend or understand 

British policy, for even though Britain was fighting both France and the American rebels 

and heading towards war with Spain, the authorities in London would never permit 

France to use the protection of the Dutch flag to ship naval stores to French ports. A 

neutral Netherlands, Yorke believed, would be of much greater advantage to the 

French, because of the Anglo-Dutch Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1674, than a 

country at war whose merchant marine and seaborne trade were being destroyed by 

British sea power.64 The French, however, did not see things the way Yorke did, and by 

19 February 1779, the British diplomat reported to London that he believed "the Court of 

France will have the States comply or refuse, & nothing else will be accepted."65

According to Yorke, French political and economic pressure was putting the 

Netherlands in a position where the country would have to decide between war with 

Britain or war with France.

On 24 June 1778, the French government issued a decree that embraced the concept 

that warlike materials such as arms and munitions would be considered contraband 

when found on board neutral merchant ships and would be subject to seizure. This 

decree was designed to stimulate the efforts of French cruisers, for contraband was so 

ill-defined in this document that it could mean almost anything, including naval stores. 

Very quickly, though, the French saw that this policy was a mistake, and on 26 July 

1778, a new decree on prize law and contraband was issued, which proclaimed the 

principle that "free ships make free goods," with the exception of warlike materials 

defined narrowly as arms and munitions. The intent of the 26 July decree was to make it 
not only possible, but also very profitable, for neutrals to carry goods to French ports. In 

the case of the Netherlands, however, the 26 July decree was to be used as a weapon 

to force that country into insisting that Britain adopt the principle that "free ships make 

free goods." The French scheme was very simple: reward those cities and provinces in 

the Netherlands who wanted the Dutch to use force to make Britain accept the doctrine 

that "free ships make free goods" and to punish those Dutch cities and provinces that 

were pro-British or that simply did not want to force on the British principles of neutrality 

that had been defined by the French.

On 23 February 1779, the British ambassador at The Hague learned that the French 

had issued another decree calling for the seizure of all Dutch ships--with the exception 

of those belonging to the cities of Amsterdam and Haarlem--carrying British property.66

This action was just the first step in the French scheme, far on 1 March 1779, the 

French government revoked the decree of 26 July 1778 and applied the prize law to all 

Dutch ships, with the exception of those belonging to Amsterdam and Haarlem, which 

was set forth in the decree of 23 June 1778. In addition, a tax of 15 percent was laid on 

all Dutch ships entering French ports, with the exception of those belonging to 

Amsterdam and Haarlem. The purpose of this policy was to punish the pro-British 

provinces of the Netherlands, while rewarding Amsterdam and Haarlem (whose ships 

carried most of the naval stores to France) for their attempts to obtain a vote in the 

States General calling for the use of unlimited convoys to protect Dutch ships carrying 

naval stores to French ports.67 This French policy wounded the Dutch body politic in 

much the same way that an explosive-laden harpoon wounds a whale.

The major French diplomatic objective in the Netherlands during 1779 was to force the 

Dutch to provide naval escort, or what was termed "unlimited convoys," to Dutch 

merchant ships carrying naval stores to French ports. The method the French used was 

to give Amsterdam and Haarlem commercial advantages in the hope that other cities 

and provinces of the Netherlands would support the French cause in order to gain 

similar advantages. Yorke suggested to London that Britain might discriminate against 

ships belonging to Amsterdam and Haarlem just as the French were treating ships 

belonging to other provinces of the Netherlands. Yorke also mentioned that the Royal 

Navy might provide convoy for all Dutch merchant ships other than those belonging to 

Amsterdam and Haarlem.68 Yorke's suggestions were not taken up immediately, and it 

remained British policy to prevent, as much as possible, the innocent trader from 

suffering any inconvenience from the war,69 while backing up the stadtholder in his 

efforts to impede pro-French moves to institute convoys to French ports.

On 30 March 1779, Yorke was directed to inform the Dutch government that "to grant 

Convoy indiscriminately to their Ships going to the Ports of France, such a measure can 

only be considered a Determination to supply them with such Materials as they may 

most stand in need of in the present war." Also, if the Dutch adopted the policy of limited 

convoys, or not escorting ships loaded with naval stores, the Dutch government would 

find itself "under the greatest Difficulties, in forming Instructions to their Admiralty, in the 

Description of such Articles as are to be excluded from the Convoy." Even if the Dutch 

government defined contraband exactly as the British admiralty courts did, it would be of 
little assistance, for a "Merchant will always contrive to evade every Regulation which 

does not coincide with his Interests." Yorke was also ordered to support in whatever 

way possible the Prince of Orange and the Dutch ministers "to exert their utmost 

Endeavours to prevent the measure of granting Convoy, at the Instigation of those who 

act under the Influence of France."

70

Seven days later, Yorke was directed to inform the Dutch government that the subjects 

of the States General, because of the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Commercial and 

Maritime Treaty of 1674, "have greater Indulgence than those of other Neutral Powers." 

Also, the British government believed that "The meaning of the Word Convoy implies an 

apprehension, and carries with it at least an unfriendly appearance, and in the Eyes of 

Europe it will be considered as a Signal to the other Maritime Powers to follow 

Example." Yorke was further ordered to inform the Dutch government "in the most 

explicit, though in the most temperate and friendly Terms," that the British would not 

permit "ships having Naval Stores on board, although they should be accompanied by 

Ships of War, to go to the Ports of France."71 The British position was very clear, and it

was one that would not change, even with the threat of invasion of the British Isles 

brought about by the operations of the combined Franco-Spanish fleets in thewestern 

approaches of the English Channel. The Dutch would not under any circumstances be 

permitted to ship naval stores to France.

The Dutch reaction to British and French diplomatic threats and pressure was to stall. 

The stadtholder, who was pro-British, and a number of Dutch officials who saw the 

dangers of war with either France or Britain, adopted a policy of entangling the whole 

question of granting convoys, whether they were limited or unlimited, in the complex 

machinery of the Netherlands' government in such a way that the whole question would 

be tied up for months in various legislative bodies. The province of Holland made a 

motion in the States General that unlimited convoy be granted to Dutch merchant ships 

proceeding to French ports. The stadtholder and his followers managed, with a majority 

of one vote, to get the whole question of convoys referred to the states of the provinces, 

with the result that the States General could not take any action on the question until 

these legislative bodies had acted upon the subject. It would thus be weeks, if not 

months, before the question of convoys again came before the States General.72

While Dutch politicians debated the convoy issue, the British prepared for the worst and, 

at the same time, increased diplomatic pressure on the Netherlands. On 13 April 1779, 

Yorke was directed, in the event that the Dutch government adopted a policy of 

convoys, to find out the size of each convoy, the strength of its escort, the instructions 

given to the escort, and the dates on which convoys were to sail in order that the Royal 

Navy could intercept them.73 Then, on 18 May 1779, he was directed to make sure that 

the stadtholder, the Dutch ministers, and every member of the States General 

understood that the granting of convoys in any form for Dutch merchant ships going to 

French ports would result in the Royal Navy stopping these convoys by force of arms, if 

need be, and that one could not "reflect on the probable Issue of this most necessary 

and indispensable order, without feeling the greatest Emotion." Yorke stated that it was 

the opinion of the British government that this whole problem had been brought about 
by Amsterdam and Haarlem trading with and becoming allied with the French 

government in ways that were contrary to the constitution of the Netherlands. And if the 

States General voted down the motion to institute convoys, then the British would treat 

goods and ships belonging to Amsterdam and Haarlem an if they were allies of the 

French, while the other cities and provinces of the Netherlands could continue to enjoy 

the privileges granted to them under the Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1674.74

The Dutch were clearly caught between Britain and France. Yorke was near the truth 

when he informed Whitehall on 30 July 1779 that the Dutch wished "to gain time, & see 

[what direction] the turn of Affairs might] take, & particularly the events of the 

campaign."75 The Dutch knew that the first movements of the Franco-Spanish attempt to 

invade England had just begun, and that if the French and Spanish succeeded in that 

enterprise, the Netherlands' problems would cease to exist.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1779, Dutch politicians debated the convoy 

question. The problem in the end always came down to the same choices: should the 

Dutch navy convoy Dutch merchant ships to French ports or not? If the Dutch instituted 

convoys, should they be limited or should they be unlimited? It was on these points that 

the argument over convoys within the Dutch government centered, with the French 

attempting to get the Dutch to decide on unlimited convoys, while the British wanted the 

Dutch to drop the whole idea of convoys. On 22 July 1779, the British increased the 

diplomatic pressure on the Dutch by officially requesting that the Netherlands, under the 

terms of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678, supply the troops and warships to fight the 

French and the Spanish.76 The Dutch did nothing, and the British did not press the 

matter, for they were merely setting up an excuse to enable them, if necessary, to 

disregard totally the Anglo-Dutch Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1674. On 18 

September 1779, the French in an attempt to force the pro-British inland farming 

provinces to support unlimited convoys, increased the economic pressure against the 

Dutch by prohibiting the importation into France of Dutch cheeses. This measure failed 

because the stadtholder personally bought up one hundred thousand guilders' worth of 

cheese to offset the loss of the French market.77 The British and the French were 

diplomatically fighting each other over the political control of the Netherlands.

The diplomatic crisis confronting the Netherlands over the question of convoys was 

made much more complex by the arrival on 3 October 1779 of Capt. John Paul Jones's 

squadron in the Texel. Jones had been ordered by the French government to escort a 

number of merchant ships to France. However, by the time Jones reached Dutch 

waters, the merchant ships had already sailed. Perhaps one could detect the slippery 

hand of Benjamin Franklin at work in Jones's arrival in the neutral waters of the Texel. 

For Franklin, the wily American diplomat in Paris, always knew how to embarrass 

everybody during a diplomatic crisis. Jones's command consisted of four warships. Two 

of these ships were commissioned French warships and flew the French flag. The other 

two, the Serapis and the Countess of Scarborough, flew the American flag and had both 

American and French officers with American commissions. To make matters more 

complex, the Serapis and the Countess of Scarborough held British prisoners of war, 

and the ships themselves were ex-British warships that had been captured by Jones in 
his celebrated and hard-fought action off the coast of Yorkshire on the night of 23 

September 1779.

Immediately upon the arrival of the American officer in Dutch waters, Yorke demanded 

that Jones be arrested by the Dutch as a pirate because the Netherlands did not 

recognize the American Congress. The French, on the other hand, did not want Jones's 

squadron to be known as an American force, because it might give the British the 

excuse to go to war with the Dutch, and at this time, the Netherlands was of more use to 

the French as a neutral than a cobelligerent. Therefore, the French ambassador refused 

to proclaim Jones's squadron as either American or French. Jones himself told Dutch 

authorities that he was an American officer with an American commission, that the 

Serapis and Countess of Scarborough were American warships in which both American 

and French officers served, and that all of them held American commissions. Jones 

then implied, just to make matters a little more confused, that he had a French 

commission as well as an American one, but that the French commission had been lost 

when his flagship, the Bonhomme Richard, had sunk.

The Dutch were again caught in a predicament, for the British wanted Jones arrested as 

a pirate, and the Dutch could not figure out whether Jones was an American or a 

French officer, or both. The French government remained silent about the status of 

Jones. The American refused to leave the Texel voluntarily without receiving orders 

from Franklin in Paris, and the doctor was not about to send any such orders. The 

Dutch could not solve their problems by throwing Jones out of their waters because this 

might be an affront to the French, if in fact the American held a French commission. If 

Jones were forced to leave the Texel at once, it would be a British diplomatic victory; if 

he stayed longer in Dutch waters, his presence would show that the French 

diplomatically had the upper hand in the Netherlands. Furthermore, every day that 

Jones's squadron, with two ships flying the American flag, stayed in the Texel, it gave 

the appearance that the States General recognized the rebel American government. 

This was the objective that Franklin had in mind when he permitted Jones to proceed to 

the Netherlands.

From the Dutch point of view, Jones could not have picked a worse time to appear in 

the Texel, and each day that Jones remained in Dutch waters, the whole thing became 

more complex and embarrassing. For example, at one point, the British prisoners on 

Jones's ships rioted, and a number of them escaped only to be pursued by American 

seamen and marines, with the assistance of the Dutch civil authorities. While silence 

reigned at the French embassy, Yorke was demanding in ever stronger tones that 

Jones be arrested. The only answer for the Dutch was to fall back on their best 

diplomatic weapon--lethargy. Yorke quickly found that no part of the Dutch government 

had the power or the authority to determine the nationality of Jones's squadron. In fact, 

when the French decided that it was time to make Jones's force into a French one, the 

American captain refused to say he was in the service of the French and kept the 

American flag flying in the Texel. The problem of Jones's squadron had turned into a 

huge diplomatic wrangle, and it remained so until well after the Dutch had decided the 
convoy question. Then, and only then, did the American officer leave Dutch waters, 

after having enraged the British and embarrassed both the Dutch and the French.78

During the first two weeks of November 1779, the Dutch failed to resolve the convoy 

question. On 5 November, Yorke reported that the states of Holland had voted for a 

limited convoy, from which ships loaded with naval stores would be "absolutely 

excluded." A week later, on 12 November, Yorke informed London that the States 

General of the Netherlands had voted for two limited convoys. One convoy was to 

protect Dutch merchant ships proceeding to the Mediterranean; the other was for the 

West Indies.79 Clearly, two limited convoys from which ships carrying naval stores would 

supposedly be banned fell far short of the French wish for unlimited convoys between 

Dutch and French ports, in which ships carrying naval stores would be under the 

protection of Dutch warships. The British were against any form of Dutch convoys and 

considered the distinction between limited and unlimited convoys to be almost 

academic. On 14 September 1779, Yorke warned London that "I have been more afraid 

of a concession for Limited Convoy than any thing else, knowing that suspicious ships 

would attach themselves to such a convoy, & endeavour to get thro' under cover of it."80

Whether a convoy was limited or unlimited, the British were going to stop it, by force if 

need be, and seize any Dutch merchant ship found to be carrying naval stores or other 

contraband, even if this action resulted in fighting between the convoy's naval escort 

and the ships of the Royal Navy.81

On 7 December 1779, Yorke reported to London that there were more than fifty 

merchant ships loaded with naval stores in Dutch ports waiting to proceed down the 

English Channel.82 By 14 December, Yorke knew that the French were going to use the 

cover of the convoy bound for the Mediterranean to pass naval stores down the 

Channel to French ports. Why the Dutch government did not know or want to believe 

what the British reaction to such a move would be is unclear, for Yorke had informed 

them over and over again that any Dutch convoy would be intercepted by the Royal 

Navy. Underwriters, as usual, had a clearer understanding of the situation than the 

politicians, for as Yorke reported, those ships carrying naval stores and proceeding with 

the convoy could not obtain insurance, while ships sailing independently, even if loaded 

with naval stores, had no trouble obtaining insurance.83

On 27 December 1779, a Dutch convoy of twenty-seven merchant ships, escorted by 

five Dutch warships under the command of Schout-bij-nach Graaf van Bylandt, sailed 

from the Texel towards the English Channel. From the moment that the Dutch ships left 

the Texel, they were followed by British armed cutters, which supplied intelligence as to 

the exact movements of the Dutch convoy to Rear Admiral Drake, as well as to the 

Admiralty. The Admiralty, knowing that the Dutch might attempt to run a convoy down 

the Channel, had on 12 December formed a small squadron at St. Helens under the 

command of Capt. Charles Feilding. Its purpose was to intercept any Dutch convoys 

that entered the Channel.84 Upon receipt of orders from the Admiralty and intelligence 

from a number of British cutters that had been observing the movements of Bylandt's 

convoy, Feilding's command sailed from St. Helens on the morning of 30 December to 

intercept the Dutch convoy and to search the merchant ships in it for contraband.85
At about 1500, between St. Alban's Head and Portland on the English side of the 

Channel, Feilding's ships sighted the Dutch convoy. At 1645, the commander of the 

convoy's escort requested that Feilding send an officer on board his ship to explain to 

him the intentions of the British squadron. Capt. Samuel Marshall was ordered to go on 

board Bylandt's flagship and "in the most civil manner possible, to beg he [the Dutch 

admiral] would allow [him] to visit his Convoy." Marshall, together with the Dutch 

admiral's flag captain, soon returned to H.M.S. Namur, Feilding's flagship, with Bylandt's 

answer, which was a flat refusal. The Dutch captain explained to Feilding that the 

merchant ships of the convoy did not have cargoes of wood for ship construction or 

cordage but that a number of them were bound to French ports with cargoes of hemp 

and iron, and that Bylandt would not permit the British to visit and search any of the 

merchant ships under his escort. Feilding then told the Dutch captain that his orders 

called for him to visit and search the Dutch merchant ships, that this would be done the 

next morning, and that he hoped that there would be no violence or resistance on the 

part of the Dutch. The Dutch captain again stated that his admiral's orders called for the 

use of force against any British attempt to visit and search any of the ships under his 

escort.

During the night of 30-31 December, the Dutch and British ships hove to while Feilding 

gave the Dutch admiral some time to think matters over. At 0800 on 31 December, 

Feilding ordered that a number of Dutch merchant ships be visited and searched. As 

ship's boats, each flying British colors, made their way to various Dutch merchant ships, 

Bylandt's flagship fired a cannon shot at one of the British boats. Thereupon, Feilding 

had a shot fired across the bow of the Dutch flagship. The Dutch admiral's ship and a 

large frigate nearby immediately answered by firing a broadside in the general direction 

of Feilding's ship. The Dutch fire was returned at once by H.M.S. Namur and H.M.S. 

Valiant, each of which fired about twenty or thirty rounds back at the Dutch warships. 

Then all the Dutch warships hauled down their colors. Feilding ordered nine Dutch 

merchant ships carrying hemp and iron to be seized and sent Marshall on board the 

Dutch flagship with directions to inform Bylandt that he was "at liberty to do as he 

pleased with his squadron." After gaining Feilding's permission, salutes were 

exchanged and the Dutch warships rehoisted their colors. Feilding then proceeded to 

St. Helens with his squadron and the Dutch merchant ships that had been seized. He 

was followed by two Dutch warships, for Bylandt insisted on staying with the seized 

Dutch merchant ships.86

To Feilding the incident was perplexing, for ten of the twenty-seven merchant ships that 

had sailed from the Texel with Bylandt had vanished, and the British captain could not 

understand why the Dutch government would escort with five warships "a few small 

vessels" with cargoes of iron and hemp. Feilding thought that it might be a cover to 

move ships with naval stores through the Channel on the French side.87 But from the 

tone of Feildina's dispatches, it is clear that the British officer knew tRat there was a lot 

more involved than just a few shiploads of naval stores, for the interception of Bylandt's 

convoy was a major step down the road toward war with the Dutch government. 

Perhaps Feilding could not understand why the Dutch were prepared to risk so much 

over a mere handful of merchant ships, for the officials in The Hague must have known 
that the British would have no choice other than to seize some of the ships in Bylandt's 

convoy. The king, after reading Feilding's dispatches, concluded that "We have done 

perfectly right; if we do not prevent our enemies from getting naval stores; it is 

impossible we can carry on the war or make a peace but on most disadvantageous 

terms.88

In the weeks following the seizure by the Royal Navy of nine Dutch merchant ships 

under convoy of Dutch warships, the British began systematically to enforce their 

concepts of maritime neutrality upon the Netherlands, seemingly without regard of the 

consequences of these measures. Lord George Germain, a secretary of state, summed 

up the British position when he wrote on 8 January 1780 that the British had given the 

Dutch sufficient grounds for declaring war and that the States General "must soon 

determine whether they will be governed by France or make common cause with us, for 

I think they will soon be driven out of impracticable neutrality."89

On 11 January 1780, Yorke was instructed to explain the British position to the Dutch 

authorities in strong terms. The British diplomat told the Dutch:

We cannot suffer you to carry Naval Stores to the Enemy, because that would be suffering You to give the Enemy 

effectual Assistance which is not only inconsistent with every Idea of Neutrality, but directly contrary to those positive 

Engagements by which You are bound to take an active Part in our Defense. 

However, Yorke did not at this time demand that the Dutch supply the troops and ships 

to aid Britain in its war with France and Spain as called for under the Anglo-Dutch 

Alliance of 1678. Britain did not want to appear to be pushing the Netherlands into war. 

The British diplomat at The Hague, though, was to make it totally clear to the Dutch 

authorities that Britain would not under any circumstances let the Netherlands use its 

status as a neutral and as an ally of Britain to aid the island kingdom's enemies.90 To 

drive this point home, British cruisers, at the end of January 1780, began seizing Dutch 

merchant ships carrying not only naval and warlike stores to enemy ports but also 

cargoes of provisions bound for the ports of France and Spain.91

Yorke believed that the Netherlands could not withstand the pressures of both Britain 

and France and that any course of action the Dutch followed promised "little 

satisfaction." In a dispatch from The Hague dated 22 February 1780, the British 

ambassador suggested that the privileges granted the Netherlands under the AngloDutch Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1674 be withdrawn so that the Royal Navy 

could deal with Dutch shipping just like that of any other neutral.92 On 14 March 1780, 

Yorke was directed by London to find out if the Dutch intended to fulfill the terms of the 

Angle-Dutch Alliance of 1678, so that the British could know whether to treat the 

Netherlands "as an ally or only as a friendly neutral power.93 When it became clear that 

the Netherlands would not give a satisfactory answer to this question, an order in 

council was issued on 17 April 1780 "suspending provisionally until further order the 

particular stipulations respecting the freedom of navigation of the subject of the States 

General of the United Provinces."94 With the suspension of the Angle-Dutch 

Commercial. and Maritime Treaty of 1678, the British adopted the following policy 

towards the Netherlands: "It is much better to leave the madness and infatuation to be 
cured by time, and events; and wait the operation of those cogent remedies which our 

cruisers will apply."95 Britain now looked upon the Netherlands as a hostile neutral 

power that was employing its merchant shipping secretly to assist France and Spain. 

The Royal Navy was to be used to prevent Dutch ships from carrying anything to the 

enemy, and on 30 May 11780, Yorke was directed to obtain the necessary intelligence 

to enable the king's ships to carry out this policy.96

By the second week in June 1780, Yorke had come to the conclusion that the 

Netherlands could only avoid war with either the British or the French by joining the 

League of Armed Neutrality that Catherine II, empress of Russia, was establishing.97

For months there had been talk in various European capitals of the neutral powers of 

northern Europe forming some kind of league to force Britain to change, or at least 

moderate, its concepts of blockade and contraband. As early as 22 September 1778, 

Yorke reported that the Danish mission at The Hague was floating the idea that the 

northern powers unite and use their combined strength to force the British to change 

their policy toward neutrals.98 Singly, northern neutrals, such as Denmark and Sweden 

did not pose a threat to British naval power, but together, the northern or Baltic powers, 

including Russia, and perhaps the Netherlands as well, had the combined naval force to 

tip the scales against Britain and force a change in its policy toward the European 

neutral nations.99 The idea of a league of northern powers, however, was little more 

than talk until 1780, for there was no leading nation or political personality willing or able 

to run the risks involved in forming a league of neutrals for the purpose of confronting 

England over the question of neutral rights on the high seas.

At the beginning of 1780, however, all of this changed when Catherine the Great of 

Russia took up the cause of neutral rights on the high seas. Russia was a major military 

power, produced large quantities of naval stores, and had almost no merchant shipping. 

From St. Petersburg in 1780, the diplomatic situation in the Baltic and western Europe 

must have looked most appealing to Catherine II. Russia was between Turkish wars, 

Britain was at war with both France and Spain, and the small neutral nations of northern 

Europe were being harassed by the Royal Navy. Further, it was British policy to gain an 

alliance with Russia to offset the success of French diplomacy in Europe, while it was 

French policy to do anything diplomatically to cause trouble for Britain. There could be 

no better opportunity for Catherine II to gain prestige on the European diplomatic stage 

than to champion the neutral nations of Europe and uphold their neutral rights on the 

high seas.100

Catherine's interest in the maritime rights of European neutrals appears to have been 

brought about by three separate events. In August 1778, the American privateer 

General Mifflin of Boston sank one British merchant ship and captured seven others off 

the North Cape of Norway. These British merchant ships were carrying Russian 

products from the port of Archangel. Catherine saw this as an illegal attack on Russian 

trade and proposed to Denmark-Norway that some joint naval action be taken to 

prevent such things from happening in the future. On 10 October 1778, Catherine 

believed that she had again been insulted, for the merchant ship Jonge Prins, loaded 

with flax and hemp bound to Nantes, became the first Russian ship to be seized by the 
British, who in the next several months were going to seize more Russian ships and 

Russian products on board neutral ships. When news reached Catherine on 30 January 

1780 that the Spanish had seized and carried into Cadiz a ship chartered by Russian 

merchants carrying a cargo of Russian corn to France and Italy, the empress sent a 

strong protest to Madrid.

By this time it appeared to Catherine that nobody--Americans, British, Spanish--

respected the rights of Russia on the high seas. This was not a question of economics, 

for most Russian naval stores were bought by British factors in Russian ports and either 

shipped to England or sold to French agents, who then shipped them to French ports in 

neutral bottoms that were mostly Dutch. The English factors told British diplomats in 

Russia which neutral ships were carrying naval stores to France so that the Royal Navy 

could seize these ships. A neutral shipowner might lose money if his ship were seized 

and condemned, but the Russian producer of naval stores received his money before 

the cargo had even been loaded.101 Clearly, to Catherine II, this question was not a 

matter of economics but rather one of respect and prestige that must be decided to her 

advantage.

By the middle of February, Catherine had come to the conclusion that she must take her 

place as the leader of the European neutrals and declare her concepts of neutral rights 

on the high seas to both neutrals and belligerents. Spain provided Catherine the 

occasion to set her diplomatic offensive in motion. On 17 February 1780, news arrived 

in St. Petersburg that the Spanish had seized a Russian merchant ship, the St. 

Nicholas, loaded with corn bound for Italy. The corn on board the St. Nicholas was sold 

at Cadiz, over the protests of the Russian consul, with the Spanish not even attempting 

to determine the nationality of the ship ca its cargo. On 19 February, Catherine secretly 

issued a ukase, written in her own hand, ordering the fitting out of fifteen ships of the 

line and five frigates.102 This was followed on 10 March 1780 by a "Declaration of the 

Empress of Russia regarding the Principles of Armed Neutrality to the Courts of 

London, Versailles and Madrid." In this declaration Catherine stated that the belligerents 

must govern their conduct toward neutral merchant ships according to the following five 

principles:

1) That neutral vessels may navigate freely from port to port and along the coasts of the 

nations at war.

2) That the effects belonging to the subjects of the said Powers at war shall be free on 

board neutral vessels, with the exception of contraband merchandise.

3) That, as to the specification of the above mentioned merchandise, the Empress holds 

to what is enumerated in the 10th and 11th articles of her treaty of commerce with Great 

Britain, extending her obligations to all the Powers at war.

4)That to determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this designation shall apply only 

to a port where that attacking Power has stationed its vessels sufficiently near and in 

such a way as to render access thereto clearly dangerous.
5) That these principles shall serve as a rule for proceedings and judgments as to the 

legality of prizes.

The Russian declaration ended with a statement that if the belligerents did not conduct 

themselves according to these principles, Catherine would force them to respect the 

commerce of her subjects by force of arms.103 On 3 April 1780, the, Russian 

government presented to the States General of the Netherlands and to the courts of 

Copenhagen, Berlin, Stockholm, and Lisbon a memorandum suggesting that these 

nations form, in conjunction with Russia, a League of Armed Neutrality with the 

objective of employing the combined naval forces of each of these nations to enforce 

the concepts of maritime neutrality as set forth by Catherine's declaration of 10 March to 

the warring powers.104

There was nothing secretive about the Russian memorandum of 3 April. At The Hague, 

Yorke knew its contents one day after it had been presented to the States General.105

To the French and Spanish, it was an advantage for Russia to set up a league of neutral 

maritime powers to enforce such things as the doctrine that "free ships make free 

goods" and that only a close blockade is a legal one, for then they could continue to 

employ neutral shipping to import goods such as naval stores. Thus, both France and 

Spain quickly stated that they accepted Catherine's principles of neutrality as set forth in 

the declaration of 10 March 1780.106

For Britain the problems created by Catherine's declaration and the proposed setting up 

of the League of Armed Neutrality were much more complex than those of its enemies. 

For example, how far would Russia and the other northern powers go in using force to 

uphold what they considered to be their rights on the high seas? Were the northern 

powers prepared to fight the British (who were the biggest buyers of naval stores) in the 

Downs? Was the League of Armed Neutrality a Russian diplomatic bluff or a ploy to 

gain prestige? or could Catherine be bought off with some kind of concession? Then 

there was the problem of the Dutch, whose ships carried most of the naval stores to 

France and Spain. The pro-French faction in the Netherlands was stronger than the 

supporters of Britain. Would Britain or Britain's enemies benefit more from a neutral 

Netherlands that was a member of the League of Armed Neutrality? Would it be 

advantageous to have the Netherlands as a cobelligerent of France and Spain? To 

answer these and many other questions required time and more information, so the 

British answered Catherine's declaration by stating only that His Majesty's government 

would conduct itself in accordance with international law.107

To informed observers, Russian policy in 1780 was perplexing and contradictory. For 

example, the Swedish foreign minister on 31 March 1780 told the British ambassador 

that he thought that "it appeared strange" for Russia to fit out a squadron of thirty 

warships "for the sake of protecting two or three merchant ships at the most."108 On 11 

April 1780, Lord Stormont, the British secretary of state for the Northern Department,

stated that the intentions of the Russian government "are so problematical that I know 

not what opinion to form." But if Catherine was really going to pit into effect the policies 
called for in her 10 March declaration and 3 April memorandum, then the British could 

not and would not subscribe to such a doctrine.109

During the spring of 1780, it became clear to the British that the Russians were bluffing 

and that Catherine would not and, in fact, could not let the question of neutral rights on 

the high seas result in Russia becoming involved in a naval. war with the British. The 

British ambassador to Russia, Sir James Harris, had many sources of intelligence 

among the officers of the Russian Baltic fleet, for many of them were British. On 26 May

1780, Harris informed London that the British commander of the Russian Baltic fleet, 

with the backing of all the other British officers, had told Catherine that they would not 

serve in a conflict against Great Britain.110 In two other dispatches, dated 20 and 23 

June 1780, Harris informed London that the orders of the Russian Baltic fleet ran totally 

contrary to the principles of the League of Armed Neutrality. Russian warships were 

directed to protect only Russian merchant ships, not to protect the property of 

belligerents on neutral merchant ships, and not to protect merchant ships belonging to 

other neutrals.111

Even with this intelligence, the authorities in London continued to be confused, for on 18 

July 1780, Stormont wrote to Harris, "The more I reflect upon all that has passed of late, 

the more I am inclined to believe that we have not got to the bottom of this strange 

business."112 The thing that the British government did not understand was that there 

was no firm basis for the Russian moves and that setting up the League of Armed 

Neutrality did not represent a policy. Rather, it represented a huge diplomatic fishing 

expedition for Catherine to gain diplomatic prestige by appearing to be the leader of the 

neutral maritime powers of Europe. Not understanding this, the British continued their 

policy of either making or offering concessions in the hope of gaining an alliance with 

Russia.

At the same time, the British would not give an inch when it came to the League of 

Armed Neutrality. On 8 August 1780, Stormont informed Harris that if the Russian 

government applied the provisions set forth in the League of Armed Neutrality to the 

Dutch, it would be "a measure little short of direct hostility and as pernicious in its 

consequences as actual war."113 On the other hand, several months later, on 20 

October 1780, Harris was directed to find out from the Russian government if there was 

a piece of British territory that could be given to Russia in exchange for an alliance.114

On 20 November 1780, orders were issued to all British cruisers to seize only those 

Russian merchant ships whose cargoes consisted of warlike materials, such as 

munitions, and not naval stores and provisions.115 Then, on 3 January 1781, the British 

cabinet directed Harris to offer the island of Minorca to Russia for a "Great and 

Essential Service Actually performed."116 This scheme was never actualized, however, 

for Russia had little use for a western Mediterranean island that the Spanish thought 

ought to belong to Spain. The confusion in London as to the real objectives of the 

League of Armed Neutrality and the lengths to which Britain was prepared to go in order 

to obtain a Russian alliance show, if nothing else, that Catherine really knew how to 

play a suitor along.117
During the summer of 1780, the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm signed 

conventions with the Russian government embracing the principles of the League of 

Armed Neutrality as set forth in the Russian memorandum of 3 April 1780. Both 

Denmark-Norway and Sweden, however, created diplomatic loopholes to protect 

themselves from the Royal Navy and, in the case of Denmark-Norway, to increase that 

country's share of the international carrying trade. The British resident at Copenhagen, 

Sir Morton Eden, was able to negotiate a secret explanatory article to the Anglo-Danish 

Treaty of 1670 that specifically made naval stores contraband. This secret Anglo-Danish 

explanatory article was signed on 4 July 1780, and on 9 July 1780, Denmark-Norway 

signed a convention with Russia that embraced the principles of the League of Armed 

Neutrality in which the doctrine that "free ships make free goods" was upheld, while 

contraband was defined by the terms of the Anglo-Danish Treaty of 1670.118 What 

Denmark-Norway did was to square a circle diplomatically by proclaiming that "free 

ships make free goods," while, without the knowledge of the Russians, defining naval 

stores as contraband of war. The court of Copenhagen's policy was to placate both the 

British and the Russians by joining the League of Armed Neutrality while refraining from 

transporting naval stores on board its merchant ships to French and Spanish ports. This 

policy, especially after the Royal Navy had driven the Dutch merchant marine from the 

seas, resulted in a substantial increase in Denmark-Norway's overseas trade and 

increased the size of the country's merchant marine.119

Stockholm, as did Copenhagen, employed legalistic, diplomatic subterfuge so as not to 

enrage either Britain or Russia. On 1 August 1780, Sweden signed a convention with 

Russia that was similar to the one signed by Denmark-Norway, in that it upheld the 

principle of "free ships make free goods" while employing the definition of contraband 

that was stated in the Anglo-Swedish Treaty of 1661.120 The treaty of 1661 upheld the 

doctrine that "free ships make free goods," but it defined contraband as "all other things 

necessary for warlike use," a definition vulnerable to various interpretations.121

With the exchange of all the necessary notes and declarations, these conventions 

became a three-way alliance, ducking the vital question of the transport of naval stores, 

and calling for mutual armed assistance to protect Danish-Norwegian, Swedish, and 

Russian neutral rights. Another set of agreements was later signed to neutralize the 

Baltic and to prevent all warlike acts in that sea.122 Because these agreements either 

stopped the shipment of naval stores or sidestepped the issue, the way in which 

Denmark-Norway and Sweden joined with Russia in the League of Armed Neutrality 

effectively settled in Britain's favor the question of transporting naval stores in DanishNorwegian and Swedish ships to French and Spanish ports.

The Netherlands had the most to lose and perhaps the most to gain from the Russian 

proposal of the League of Armed Neutrality in 1780. Among the nations that received 

the Russian memorandum of 3 April 1780, the Dutch were the major neutral carriers of 

naval stores to French and Spanish ports. If the Dutch joined the League of Armed 

Neutrality and if this league of neutrals was capable of protecting neutral merchant 

ships carrying naval stores to the French and Spanish, then Dutch merchants and 

shipowners would gain huge profits. If, however, the League of Armed Neutrality did not 
or could not protect the Dutch from the Royal Navy, then the cost to the Netherlands 

would be huge. The Dutch could not expect naval aid from the French and Spanish 

because their major naval forces were stationed hundreds of miles west of the 

Netherlands at Brest and Cadiz. The British Channel squadron stood between the 

Netherlands and the naval forces of the two Bourbon powers. The Netherlands also had 

to attend to the protection of its colonies in the East and West Indies. War with Britain 

would result in the destruction of the Dutch merchant marine and its overseas trade. 

The Dutch only dimly perceived the great risk of an Anglo-Dutch war should they 

attempt to join the League of Armed Neutrality.

On 24 April 1780, one week after the British had withdrawn the privileges enjoyed by 

the Dutch under the Anglo-Dutch Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1674, the States 

General of the Netherlands passed a resolution stating that it agreed with the principles 

of neutrality as proclaimed by the empress of Russia in her declaration of 10 March and 

memorandum of 3 April. Two days later, on 26 April, the French government issued a 

declaration to the Dutch saying that it approved of the armed neutrality.123 Maybe if the 

Dutch had immediately joined the League of Armed Neutrality on the terms put forth by 

Catherine, the British would not have had the information or time to put into effect the 

means to forestall this action. But the Dutch stalled and attempted to negotiate special 

terms with the Russians in return for joining the league. What the Dutch wanted was a 

Russian pledge to protect the Netherlands' East and West Indian possessions.124 The 

problem, from the beginning, was that the Dutch thought that the Russians were serious 

about protecting neutral rights on the high seas. What the Dutch did not see, or did not 

want to see, was that the League of Armed Neutrality was designed to gain prestige for 

Catherine and not really to protect neutral maritime rights. Also, the Russians did not 

have the means or the desire to protect Dutch colonies against British attack. On 12 

September, the Russian empress informed the Dutch that under no condition would she 

guarantee Dutch overseas possessions, and that the Dutch could not expect such a 

guarantee for merely joining the League of Armed Neutrality.125

By August 1780, it had become just a question of time before Great Britain declared war 

on the Netherlands. While Dutch diplomats were in St. Petersburg negotiating with the 

Russians over the terms for the Netherlands to join the League of Armed Neutrality, the 

British on several occasions warned the authorities at The Hague that such a step 

would most likely result in an Anglo-Dutch war. Stormont thought that if the Dutch joined 

the league, they would "leave us no alternative and must be treated as the secret 

enemies of that nation with which they ought to be the firmest friends."126 The British 

government under no circumstances would permit the Dutch, even under the protection 

of the League of Armed Neutrality, to transport naval stores to the ports of France and 

Spain. By August 1780, the question of the Dutch joining the league in conjunction with 

Denmark-Norway, Sweden, and Russia was to a great extent academic. On 11 August 

1780, Yorke at The Hague reported that the French had requested that the States 

General remove the taxes on exporting naval stores from the Netherlands because they 

were developing means to transport naval stores through the Netherlands and Belgium 

to French Channel ports by means of a complex system of inland waterways (see map 

2).127 The Admiralty learned on 21 August 1780 that the French system of inland 
waterways was developed to such an extent that the French could move naval stores 

from the Netherlands to the port of Nantes on the Bay of Biscay.128

The ability of the French to transport naval stores from the Netherlands to French ports 

by means of inland waterways destroyed the effectiveness of the British blockade in the 

Channel. Dutchmen, acting as secret French purchasing agents, could buy naval stores 

on the account of a firm of Dutch merchants in Baltic ports, then ship these naval stores 

as Dutch property on Dutch merchant ships to the Netherlands. Upon reaching a Dutch 

port, the naval stores could be sent to the French by means of inland waterways. There 

were no legal grounds for the Royal Navy to seize a neutral Dutch merchant ship 

carrying what appeared to be Dutch property from a neutral Baltic port to the 

Netherlands. The British blockade of the Channel had been outflanked. On 1 

September 1780, Yorke reported to London that there was "an immense quantity of 

Masts" which were going to be shipped from the Netherlands to French naval bases by 

means of inland waterways. Some weeks later, Yorke reported that there was no talk of 

instituting convoys for Dutch shipping and that the "conveying of naval stores thro' the 

Low Countries to France continues."129 The only way that Britain could now prevent 

naval stores from reaching the French was to declare war on the Netherlands and 

extend the blockade of the Channel to cover the Dutch coast. But if Britain declared war 

on the Netherlands, it had to be done quickly, before the Dutch officially became a 

member of the League of Armed Neutrality, in order to avoid diplomatic problems with 

the Russians.

The major stated reason for Britain's declaring war on the Netherlands on 20 December 

1780 was the existence of a draft of a treaty between the American rebels and the city 

of Amsterdam. On 3 September 1780, the American diplomat and former president of 

the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens, was captured by a British cruiser. Among 

some of Laurens's papers that had been fished out of the water by British seamen was 

a draft of a treaty drawn up at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1778 by an American diplomat, William 

Lee, and an agent of the city of Amsterdam, Jean de Neufville. Authorities on diplomatic 

history and law generally agree that the Lee-de Neufville Treaty was void before it was 

even signed. Nevertheless, the British government considered this document to "all 

intents & purposes, equivalent to actual aggression"a declaration of war. Yorke was 

ordered to demand that the States General immediately punish those officials of the city 

of Amsterdam who were responsible for the Lee-de Neufville Treaty.130
Map 2. Inland Waterways

On 3 October, dispatches from St. Petersburg arrived at The Hague, and the States 

General now had to decide whether to join the League of Armed Neutrality without a 

Russian guarantee of protection for Dutch colonies.131 Ten days later Stormont 

requested that Yorke obtain detailed intelligence on Dutch military and naval capabilities 

in Europe, the West Indies, and the Far East, in order that the British could prepare for 

hostilities with the Netherlands.132 Yorke fulfilled this request on 7 November, when he 

reported to Stormont that the Netherlands was "by no means prepared for war" and that 

there were in the Netherlands only thirty-six warships equipped for service and only 

sixteen of these carried fifty or more guns.133 On 24 November 1780, Yorke reported to 

London that the States General of the Netherlands had voted to join the League of 

Armed Neutrality and that a courier would be dispatched to St. Petersburg the next day 

with the necessary papers to declare the Dutch accession to the league.134 When news 

of the Dutch decision to join the League of Armed Neutrality reached London, the 

authorities there thought that the Netherlands was now "a secret enemy," and Yorke, on 

16 December, was ordered to remove himself secretly from The Hague to neutral 

Antwerp.135 The British government had decided that the only way to stop the flow of 
naval stores to France and Spain was to declare and wage war against the 

Netherlands.

On 20 December 1780, Britain declared war against the Netherlands and issued orders 

in council forbidding the departure of Dutch ships and cargoes from British ports and 

authorizing the capture and destruction of all Dutch ships and property found on the 

high seas.136 The decision to declare war was made in secret and timed so that it would 

be proclaimed before the Netherlands had legally joined the League of Armed 

Neutrality. Yet, at the same time, the States General would technically have just enough 

time to respond to the British demand that the authorities of the city of Amsterdam be 

punished for the Lee-de Neufville Treaty. When the Dutch ambassador to the Court of 

St. James protested the declaration of war, stating that the Netherlands was a member 

of the League of Armed Neutrality, he was bluntly informed by British officials that it was 

impossible for the Netherlands to be a member of any league of neutrals, for the States 

General was a belligerent power.137

The publicly given reasons for the declaration of war against the Netherlands were the 

refusal to abide by the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678, secretly assisting the 

American rebels, supporting enemies of the British in the Far East, and entering into a 

secret alliance with the American rebels.138 The excuse for declaring war on the 

Netherlands was the existence of the Lee-de Neufville Treaty. The occasion for 

declaring war was the Dutch decision to join the League of Armed Neutrality. But the 

real reason why Britain went to war with the Netherlands in December 1780 was to be 

able to prevent, by means of blockade, the flow of naval stores through Dutch ports (by 

means of inland waterways) to French naval bases on the Channel and on the Atlantic 

coasts of France.

On 4 January 1781, the States General of the Netherlands officially acceded to the 

conventions of the League of Armed Neutrality between Denmark-Norway, Sweden, 

and Russia. Several days later the States General requested under the terms of the 

League of Armed Neutrality that the other members of the league come to the aid of the 

Netherlands in the war against Britain.139 No aid was ever given to the Dutch by the 

league's members. It was perceived by Yorke, when the Netherlands decided to join the 

League of Armed Neutrality, that the Dutch only saw "security, honour, and the means 

of making a figure, whilst they shut their eyes & ears to every reflection which [ran] 

counter to their passion."140

The British had gambled that the League of Armed Neutrality would offer no protection 

to the Dutch, that Catherine's stand on the maritime rights of neutrals was talk and bluff, 

and that Russia would not, at the end of 1780, go to war to save the Netherlands from 

the wrath of British sea power.141 When the British declared war on the Netherlands, 

nobody in London could say for sure just what the Russians would do. On 18 February 

1781, Lord Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote ". . . the fact is, that we are 

at this moment in the most ticklish crisis with the Court of Russia, and that at this instant 

the giving them the least cause of complaint or entering into any altercation with them, 

might have the most decisive & fatal consequences."142 Catherine, however, had gotten 
out of the League of Armed Neutrality what she had wanted, which was diplomatic 

prestige. The empress would not fight for a thing she described to Sir James Harris as 

the "League of Nullity."143

There also would be no assistance to the Netherlands from the French and Spanish. 

Yorke had seen as early as 16 May 1780 that an Anglo-Dutch war was not in the 

interest of Paris, for "it would deprive France the use of the Dutch flag, which is so 

necessary to them."144 When the Dutch became cobelligerents in the war against 

Britain, French interest in the Netherlands, which had been largely diplomatic, went by 

the wayside. The Dutch did not have to face the Royal Navy alone, for the American 

rebels, the French, and the Spanish were all fighting the British. But none of these 

powers could assist the Netherlands in the North Sea. The Dutch were victims of 

opportunistic French and Russian diplomacy and perhaps their own greed and hatred 

for the British, which made them fail to see the great economic and naval dangers 

involved in supporting or adhering to policies that would leave the Netherlands isolated 

in Europe, while confronting British naval power. This would be fatal to the Dutch 

economy, because in the light of hindsight, the war with England could perhaps have 

been avoided if the Dutch had viewed the situation rationally.

The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War was a disaster for the Netherlands. It had a catastrophic 

effect on Dutch seaborne trade. When Britain declared war against the Netherlands on 

20 December 1780, units of the Royal Navy were dispatched to blockade the Dutch 

coast. Day after day, the Royal Navy patrolled the coast of the Netherlands and the 

eastern approaches of the English Channel, searching for intelligence and for ships 

attempting to carry contraband to Dutch, French, and Spanish ports.145 Some of the 

British ships blocking the Netherlands stayed at sea for such long periods of time that 

their crews were subject to scurvy and the Admiralty had to make arrangements for 

provisions to be sent to warships on blockade duty in the North Sea from English east 

coast ports.146 The British blockade of the coast of the Netherlands destroyed Dutch 

seaborne trade as well as the economy of the rest of the nation. On 24 August 1781, an 

intelligence report reached the Admiralty stating that "the Harbour of Amsterdam was 

like a desert, & nothing going forward either hostile or mercantile."

147 A little less then a 

year later, the commander of the squadron blockading the Netherlands wrote to the 

Admiralty that what little Dutch seaborne trade that existed was being conducted under 

cover of neutral flags.148 The Dutch just did not have the ships or manpower to break the 

British blockade of the Netherlands.149

British strategy was simple: blockade the coast of the Netherlands and the eastern 

approaches of the English Channel to prevent enemy shipping from entering or 

departing Dutch ports, and prevent neutrals from carrying contraband to Britain's 

enemies. The blockade of the Netherlands and the Downs also greatly hindered enemy 

cruisers operating against British east coast shipping lanes and the ships carrying naval 

stores to England from the Baltic. The British also formed a North Sea squadron to 

intercept Dutch ships attempting to reach the Netherlands by way of the North Sea and 

to protect British shipping from attack by enemy naval forces.150 In case the Dutch 
appeared to be preparing to break the blockade of the Netherlands, units of the Channel 

squadron were, from time to time, transferred to the Downs or to the North Sea.

During May 1781, for example, the Admiralty received a number of intelligence reports 

to the effect that the Dutch navy was preparing to break the British blockade of the 

Netherlands.151 On 31 May 1781 Vice Adm. Hyde Parker, Sr., was ordered to proceed 

from Spithead with three ships of the line and four smaller warships. His mission was to 

reinforce the escorts of the British convoys proceeding from the Firth of Forth and the 

Thames to the Baltic and to escort the Baltic trade from Elsinore to Britain.152 On 23 July 

1780, Parker, while escorting the British Baltic trade to Britain, received a dispatch from 

the Admiralty saying that a squadron of Dutch warships had broken out of the Texel and 

was escorting a number of Dutch merchant ships out of the North Sea. Parker was 

directed to leave the British convoy with a small escort and to intercept the Dutch. 

Parker, however, did not think he should reduce the strength of the convoy's escort 

when there was a Dutch squadron at large in the North Sea.153

On the morning of 5 August, on Dogger Bank, Parker intercepted the Dutch convoy and 

its naval escort. The British admiral immediately dispatched his convoy to Britain under 

escort of several small warships, while forming his seven largest ships into a line of 

battle.154 There was no maneuvering or Jockeying for position by either of the two 

squadrons. The eight Dutch warships were in line-ahead position as Parker's squadron 

approached. Neither side fired a shot until both squadrons were within "half a musquet 

shot" of each other. When the fighting began, it was gunport-to-gunport.

For three hours and forty minutes, the British and Dutch blasted each other at pointblank range. The fighting ended only when both sides' warships became so damaged 

that they were unmanageable. Parker, in his official dispatch to the Admiralty, stated 

that "His Majesty's Officers and Men behaved with great bravery, nor did the Enemy 

show less gallantry." The British lost 104 men killed and 339 wounded, while the Dutch 

squadron, which was commanded by Rear Adm. Johan Arnold Zoutman, lost 144 men 

killed and 399 wounded. The next day, the British frigate Belle Poule found what 

appeared to be a Dutch seventy-four-gun ship of the line sunk in twenty-two fathoms 

with its topgallant masts, a pennant still flying, showing above the surface of the water. 

The flag was the only trophy of the action. The Battle of Dogger Bank was a tactical 

draw, for no ships were captured. The British and Dutch convoys escaped attack. 

Strategically, the battle was a British victory, for the Dutch warships and their convoy 

retreated to the Texel, and the Dutch fleet never again left the protection of that 

anchorage until the end of the war .155

The Battle of Dogger Bank was the only major fleet action in the North Sea between the 

British and the Dutch navies during the Fourth Angto-Dutch War. For the Royal Navy, 

the dangerous and difficult work of blockading the Dutch coast and the eastern 

approaches of the English Channel would continue until the end of the war.156 On 14 

September 1781, an intelligence report was sent to the Admiralty stating that there were 

in various Dutch ports ten ships of the line, twelve frigates, five East Indiamen, and 

some smaller warships.157 The Dutch Navy was still a possible threat, and at various 
times the Admiralty received intelligence reports that the Dutch were again going to 

attempt to break the British blockade 158 During 1782 the Admiralty twice ordered major 

units of the Channel squadron into the North Sea to reinforce the blockade of the coast 

of the Netherlands.159 There were no major battles to be fought in the North Sea, 

however, for the Dutch would not send a squadron to sea. After the Battle of Dogger 

Bank, the Royal Navy's main tasks in the North Sea were to maintain the blockade of 

the Netherlands and the eastern end of the English Channel, to search neutral 

merchant ships for contraband, to hunt down enemy cruisers, and to protect British 

trade from attack.

Was the British effort to prevent naval stores from reaching enemy ports successful 

during the American Revolutionary War? There can be no doubt that thousands of tons 

of naval stores were seized by the ships of the Royal Navy carrying out their blockade. 

But, strategically, did this effort neatly affect French and Spanish naval operations? Was 

greatly British blockade worth a great diplomatic crisis with European neutral nations 

and the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War? These questions and many others are difficult to 

answer. The interception of naval stores bound to French and Spanish ports did, in 

some ways, affect the operations of enemy naval forces.

But was the blockade strategically effective? That is, did it deprive the French and the 

Spanish of such quantities of naval stores as to prevent or greatly hinder the operations 

of their navies? The answer is most likely no. The British were never able to cut off 

supplies of naval stores reaching French and Spanish ports. But in the case of France, 

British blockades did force the French to expend great effort and huge amounts of 

money to procure the naval stores required to carry on the war.160 The cost of 

subverting; British blockades drove up greatly the expense of carrying on the weir for 

the French nation, and it contributed to the financial collapse of the French royal 

government.161

The real victim of British blockades and French and Russian diplomacy was the 

Netherlands. While the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War required the British to extend the 

already overtaxed resources of the Royal Navy to cover a new North Sea theater of the 

war, it also resulted in the destruction of the Dutch merchant marine and the smashing 

of the economy of the Netherlands. At the same time, war with the English opened the 

Dutch overseas empire to attack. The Royal Navy, in its efforts to prevent naval stores 

from reaching Britain's enemies, delivered to the Dutch a series of blows from which it 

would require years for the Netherlands to recover.

NOTES

Abbreviations and explanations of documents used in notes:

Abbreviations--

f., ff.: folio, folios
p., pp.: page, pages [This abbreviation is used only with citations of documents]

PRO: Public Record Office

Documents collections at the Public Record OfficeADM/1/519-20, Commander-in-Chief at the Nore 

ADM/1/661-65, Commander-in-Chief at the Downs 

ADM/1/1791, 4135-36, 3143-45, Secretaries of State to the Admiralty

ADM/1/3886, Letters from Doctors' Common 

ADM/2/373, Admiralty to the Secretaries of State 

ADM/3/86, 90, 92, 95, 96, Admiralty Minutes 

ADM/7/300, Solicitor's Opinions

ADM/51/363, Captain's Log 

PC/2/122-23, 125, Orders in Council 

SP/84/562, 565-66, 569-73, State Papers Foreign (Netherlands) 

SP/91/102, 104-106, State Papers Foreign (Russia) 

SP/95/128-30, State Papers Foreign (Sweden)

1. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/4135, f. 19.

2. PRO, PC/2/122, 383-40.

3. PRO, ADM/1/4136, f. 60.

4. For example, the Anglo-Dutch Commercial and Maritime Treaty of 1674 especially 

states that naval stores are not contraband in time of war. Daniel A. Miller, Sir Joseph 

Yorke and Anglo-Dutch Relations, 1774-1780 (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1970), 

118-19.

5. See Sir James Allan Park, A System of the Law of Marine Insurances, with Three 

Chapters on Bottomry, the Insurance of Lives, and Insurance Against Fire. 7th ed. 

(London, 1787), 290-91.

6. PRO, ADM/7/300, f. 29.
7. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/3886, Gostling to Stephens, 8 May 1780; ADM/1/3887. Gostling to 

Stephens, 9 February 1782.

8. PRO, ADM/7/300, f. 123.

9. See Reginald Godfrey Marsden, ed., Documents Relating to Law and Customs of the 

Sea, 2 vols., Publications of the Navy Records Society, vols. 49, 50. (London: Navy 

Records Society, 1915-16), 2:341.

10. PRO, ADM/7/300, f. 202.

11. See James Brown Scott, ed., The Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800: A 

Collection of Official Documents, Preceded by the Views of Representative Publicists

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), 274.

12. PRO, SP/91/102, f. 511.

13. PRO, SP/84/562, ff. 156-57, 236.

14. E.g., PRO, ADM/3/86, 13 and 29 October, 4 November 1778; SP/91/102, ff. 273, 

293, 304-306; SP/95/128, 25 September, 17 October 1778.

15. PRO, SP/84/562, f. 8.

16. For an example of the deployment of the squadron in the Downs, see PRO, 

ADM/1/663, 15 September, 2 December 1779.2 December 1779.

17. Park, System of the Law, 557. 

18. PRO, ADM/1/4136, f. 109.

19. Geo. III, cap. 67, sec. 41. Statutes at Large (London, 1778), vol. 32, pt. 2, 367.

20. PRO, SP/84/562, f. 283.

21. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/3886, 29 September 1779. Navy Board to Stephens, 29 

September 1779.

22. See J. F. Jameson, "St. Eustatius and the American Revolution," American 

Historical Review 8 (1903):686-708.

23. PRO, SP/95/128, Wroughton to Suffolk, 20 November 1778.

24. PRO, SP/95/128, Wroughton to Suffolk, 9 and 16 October, 15 December 1778; 

SP/95/129, 1 January 1779.
25. PRO, SP/95/129, Wroughton to Suffolk, 2 March 1779.

26. PRO, SP/95/129, Weymouth to Wroughton, 19 February 1779.

27. PRO, SP/95/129, Wroughton to Weymouth, 15 June 1779.

28. PRO, SP/95/129, Wroughton to Suffolk, 16 January 1779.

29. PRO, SP/95/129, Wroughton to Weymouth, 8 June 1779.

30. PRO, SP/95/129, Wroughton to Suffolk, 1 and 3 January, 5 and 12 February, 21 

May 1779.

31. PRO, SP/95/129, 14 May 1779. 

32. PRO, SP/95/129, 20 July 1779. 

33. PRO, SP/95/129, Weymouth to Wroughton, 31 August 1779.

34. PRO, SP/95/129, Admiralty to Stormont, 6 December 1779; Stormont to Admiralty, 

7 December 1779; Drake to Admiralty, 8 December 1779; Stormont to Wroughton, 21 

December 1779.

35. John Montagu, fourth earl of Sandwich, The Private Papers of John, Earl of 

Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771-1782, edited by George Reginald Barnes an 

Join Hely Owen, 4 vols., Publications of the Navy Records Society, vols. 69, 71, 75, 78 

(London: Navy Records Society, 1932-38), 3:106 (hereafter cited as Sandwich, Private 

Papers).

36. PRO, SP/84/565, f. 138.

37. For an account of the workings of the Dutch government and of various political 

factions, see Miller, Sir Joseph Yorke, 14-19.

38. Ibid., 116-19, are the texts of these treaties.

39. See Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (New York: D. 

Apple ton-Century Co., 1935), 130-43.

40. PRO, ADM/2/337, ff. 326-28.

41. PRO, SP/84/562, ff. 18-19. 

42. PRO, SP/84/562, ff. 25-26.

43. E.g., PRO, SP/84/562, f. 12.
44. PRO, PC/2/123, 151-54.

45. PRO, SP/84/562, ff. 48, 109.

46. PRO, SP/84/562, f. 62.

47. David Syrett, "The Organization of British Trade Convoys during the American War, 

1775-83," Mariner's Mirror 62 (May 1976):173.

48. Bemis, Diplomacy, 143-44.

49. PRO, SP/84/562, ff. 386, 438, 441. 

50. PRO, SP/84/562, f. 369.

51. PRO, SP/84/562, f. 385.

52. PRO, ADM/1/662, Drake to Stephens, 15 March 1779.

53. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/662, Drake to Stephens, 5 and 10 August 1779; ADM/1/663, 

Drake to Stephens, 16 and 21 September, 3 and 20 October, 30 November, 2, 4, 5, 8, 

13, and 17 December 1779.

54. PRO, SP/84/565, f. 120.

55. E.g., PRO ADM/1/662, Drake to Stephens, 20 May 1779.

56. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/661, Drake to Stephens, 10 March, 10 April 1779; ADM/1/662, 

Drake to Stephens, 5 June, 16 July 1779.

57. PRO, ADM/1/662, Drake to Stephens, 26 August 1779.

58. PRO, ADM/1/661, Drake to Stephens, 23 February 1779; ADM/1/662, Drake to 

Stephens, 10 June 1779.

59. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/661, Drake to Stephens, 3 March 1779.

60. PRO, ADM/1/662, Drake to Stephens, 25 July 1779; ADM/1/663, Drake to 

Stephens, 2 September 1779.

61. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/663, Drake to Stephens, 1 September 1779.

62. E.g., PROs ADM/1/661, Drake to Stephens, 14 March 1779; ADM/1/662, Drake to 

Stephens, 10 and 25 July 1779; ADM/1/663, Drake to Stephens, 24 November, 28 

December 1779.
63. PRO, SP/84/565, ff. 55-56. 

64. PRO, SP/84/565, f. 6.

65. PRO, SP/84/565, f. 94. 

66. PRO, SP/84/565, f. 104. 

67. Bemis, Diplomacy, 130-43. 

68. PRO, SP/84/565, ff. 109-11, 136, 157, 

69. PRO, SP/84/565, ff. 146-47.

70. PRO, SP/84/565, ff. 167-71. 

71. PRO, SP/84/565, ff. 177-80. 

72. PRO, SP/84/565, ff. 159-61, 213. 

73. PRO, SP/84/565, f. 195.

74. PRO, SP/84/565, ff. 254-57. 

75. PRO, SP/84/565, f. 59.

76. The Annual Register (London, 1779), 428. 

77. Miller, Sir Joseph Yorke, 77.

78. Ibid., 78-87; Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography (Boston, 

MA: Little, Brown, 1959), 242-66.

79. PRO, SP/84/566, ff. 320, 322.

80. PRO, SP/84/566, f. 191.

81. PRO, SP/84/566, f. 175; Sandwich, Private Papers 3:106.

82. PRO, SP/84/566, f. 392.

83. PRO, SP/84/566, f. 405.

84. Sandwich, Private Papers, 3:10-11.
85. Feilding's squadron consisted of the Namur, Centaur, Valiant, Portland, Seaford, 

Thunderer, Courageux, Camel, Hawke, Buffv and a number of small cutters and an 

armed brig. PRO, SP/84/569, f. 25.

86. PRO, ADM/1/1791, 29 and 31 December 1779, :3 January 17

87. PRO, SP/84/569, ff. 191-92.

88. Sandwich, Private Papers, 3:114.

89. Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on Manuscripts in Various 

Collections, 8 vols.(London: Printed for H.M. Stationery Office by Mackie & Co., 1901-

14), 6:165.

90. PRO, SP/84/569, ff. 35-40.

91. E.g., PRO, ADM/3/90, 28 January 1780; SP/84/569, ff. 64, 99, 103.

92. PRO, SP/84/569, ff. 130, 156-57.

93. PRO, SP/84/569, f. 215.

94. PRO, SP/84/570, f. 241.

95. PRO, SP/84/570, ff. 37-38.

96. PRO, SP/84/570, f. 91.

97. PRO, SP/84/570, ff. 136-38.

98. PRO, SP/84/562, f. 120.

99. For an account of the naval forces of the Baltic states, see Roger Charles Anderson, 

Naval Wars in the Baltic, 1522-1850 (1910; reprint, London: F. Edwards, 1969), 236-39.

100. Russian policy and Catherine's motivations in 1780 are very difficult to 

comprehend. I have based most of my conclusions concerning Russian policy and 

Anglo-Russian relations on Isabel de Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed 

Neutrality of 1780: Sir James Harris' Mission to St. Petersburg during the American 

Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962).

101. Ibid., 71-72, 78, 156.

102. Ibid., 157-59.

103. Scott, Armed Neutralities, 273-74.
104. Ibid., 275-76.

105. PRO, SP/84/570, f. 212.

106. Scott, Armed Neutralities, 279-80, 284-86. 

107. Ibid., 282.

108. PRO, SP/95/130, Wroughton to Stormont, 31 March 1780. 

109. PRO, SP/91/104, f. 206.

110. PRO, SP/91/105, ff. 78-79. 

111. PRO, SP/91/105, ff. 155, 159. 

112. PRO, SP/91/105, f. 197.

113. PRO, SP/91/105, f. 225. 

114. PRO, SP/91/106, f. 74. 

115. Scott, Armed Neutralities, 238-39.

116. George III, king of Great Britain, The Correspondence of George the Third from 

1760 to December 1782, ed. Sir John Fortescue, 6 vols. (London: Macmillan and Son, 

1927-28), vol. 5, doc. nos. 3230, 3233.

117. For the whole confusing story of Britain's quest for a Russian alliance, see de 

Madariaga, Britain.

118. Scott, Armed Neutralities, 295-304.

119. Lauritz Pettersen, "The Influence of the American War of Independence upon 

Danish-Norwegian Shipping," and Herman Kellenbenz, "The Armed Neutrality of 

Northern Europe and the Atlantic Trade of Schleswig-Holstein and the War of 

Independence," in The American Revolution and the Sea (London: National Maritime 

Museum, 1974), 70-81.

120. Scott, Armed Neutralities, 311-17.

121. Bemis, Diplomacy, 155n.

122. The texts of all the notes, conventions, treaties, and declarations can be found in 

Scott, Armed Neutrality.
123. Ibid. 283-84, 286-88. 

124. PRO` SP/gl/l06, f. 7. 

125. PRO, SP/9I/l06, ff. ll-l2,

126. PRO, 8P/84/571, ff. 109, 124-25; 8P/84/572, f. 16. 

127. PRO, SP/84/57l, ff. I53-55.

128. PRO, 4DM/1/4l43, ff. 13, 29. 

129. PRO, SP/84/572. ff. l, l27. 

130. PRO, SP/84/572, ff. l0l-3, I06-24. 

131. PRO, SP/84/572, ff. 82-85.

132. PRO, SP/A4/572, ff. l67-68. 

133. PRO, 8P/84/573. ff. 41, 43. 

134. PRO, SP/84/573, f. 103. 

135. PRO, SP/84/573, f., 223.

136. PRO, PC/2/l25, 489-93, 5l3-l5.

137. George III, Correspondence, vol. 5, doc. nos. 2935, 3209-ll,

138. Scott, Armed Neutralities, 330-34.

139. Ibid., 351-58.

140. PRO, SP/84/573, f. 103. 

141. PRO, SP/9T/106, f. 201. 

142. National Maritime Museum, Middleton Papers, Sandwich to Middleton, 18 

February 1781.

143. James Harris Malmesbury, first earl of Malmesbury, The Diaries and 

Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury, 4 vols. (London, 1844), 

1:355.

144. PRO, GP/84/57O, f. 53.
145. E.g., PRO, ADM/1/664, Drake to Stephens, 16 February, 2 May 1781; ADM/1/665, 

Drake to Stephens, 6 April, 18 June 1782; ADM/3/92, 1 and 12 January, 12 April 1781.

146. PRO, ADM/1/520, Stewart to Stephens, 23 August 1781.

147. PRO, ADM/1/4144, f. 142.

148. PRO, ADM/1/519, Ross to Stephens, 4 June 1782.

149. Charles Ralph Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (New York: A. A. 

Knopf, 1965), 275-76.

150. Sandwich, Private Papers, 4:83-87.

151. PRO, ADM/1/644, Drake to Stephens, 14 and 21 May 1781; ADM/1/4145, ff. 17, 

15, 32.

152. Princess Amelia, Fortitude, Bienfaisant, Buffalo, Preston, Dolphin, and Alert sloop. 

Sandwich, Private Papers, 4:87-90.

153. PRO, ADM/1/519, Parker to Stephens, 31 July 1781.

154. Fortitude, Bienfaisant, Berwick, Princess Amelia, Buffalo, Preston, Dolphin. PRO, 

ADM/1/519, State and Condition of His Majesty's Squadron...1 August 1781.

155. PRO, ADM/1/519, Report of the number of officers and seamen killed and 

wounded in the action with the Dutch fleet Sunday, 5 August 1781; Parker to Stephens, 

6 August 1781; ADM/51/363, 4-5 August 1781; W B. Rowbotham, "The 97th Regiment 

at the Action on the Dogger Bank, 1781," Journal of the Society for Army Historical 

Research 19 (Spring 1940):16-18 

156. PRO, ADM/1/520, Stewart to Stephens, 4 and 18 October 1781.

157. PRO, ADM/1/520, State of the Enemy ... the 14th September 1781.

158. E. g., PRO, ADM/1/520, Stewart to Stephens, 26 December 1781; ADM/3/95, 6 

May, 13 July 1782; ADM/3/96, 25 September 1781.

159. PRO, ADM/1/519, Ross to Stephens, 1 June 1782; ADM/3/96, 6 August 1782.

160. Paul Walden Bamford, Forests and French Seapower, 1660-1789 (Toronto, 

Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1956), 68-69, 152-55, 176-81.

161. See Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of 

Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787 (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1975), 342-

44.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. David Syrett, a former John F. Morrison Professor of Military History at Combat 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, is currently a 

professor at Queens College, City University of New York. Syrett, whose specialty is 

eighteenth-century naval history, received B.A. and M.A. degrees from Columbia 

University and a Ph.D. degree from the University of London.