No. 90-171 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1991

STATE OF MONTANA and

DOUGLASA. HEGEMAN, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of theEighteenthJudicialDistrict, In and for the County of Gallatin, The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judgepresiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Jeff Renz, Esq., Billings, Montana Eula Compton, Esq., Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General; Kathy Seeley, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana William Schreiber,Esq., Belgrade, Montana

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: February 28, 1991 ~ecided:April 2, 1991

I ClerkChief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. Douglas 

### A. Hegeman appeals his convictions and sentences of failing to display a motor vehicle registration on demand, disorderly conduct, and obstructing a police officer, following a bench trial in the Eighteenth Judicial District,Gallatin County. We reverse and remand. Mr. Hegeman raises the following issues: 1. Did the District Court lack jurisdiction over this case by reason of the city court's failure to enter sentence and judgment against Mr. Hegeman? 2. Did the District Court err when it denied Mr. Hegeman's right to a jury trial because Mr. Hegeman failed to demand a jury trial inhis notice of appeal, inviolation of anunpublished court rule?3. Was Mr. Hegeman charged and convicted of disorderly conduct for engaging in speech and gestures that are protected under theMontana and United States Constitutions? 4. Is 

### 5 45-7-302 (I),MCA, on its face, unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, or is this statute unconstitutionally overbroad as it was applied to Mr. Hegeman? OnOctober 2, 1989,Belgrade CityPolice OfficerJohnWoodland observed and stopped a vehicle that did not have a 1990 renewal sticker on its front licenseplate. Upon stoppingthevehicle,the vehicle's driver, later identified as Douglas Hegeman, loudly andvigorously challenged Officer Woodland's authority to make the stop, claiming that the officer did not have probable cause. Officer Woodland repeatedly requested Mr. Hegeman to produce his motorvehicle registration,hisdriver's license,andhisproof of insurance. Mr. Hegeman,however, repeatedly refused toprovide Officer Woodland with the requested documentation. Furthermore, Mr. Hegeman exhibited an aggressive and abusive behavior toward Officer Woodland through a display of verbal intimidation and threatening arm gestures. Accordingly, Officer Woodland mentally reviewed possible defensive actions he could employ to defend himself. After several minutes of this continued behavior, Officer Woodland repeatedly requested Mr. Hegeman to exit his vehicle. Mr. Hegeman repeatedly refused Officer Woodland's requests. Mr. Hegeman finally exited his vehicle when Officer Woodland assured him that he would not be physically harmed. Following his departure from his vehicle, Officer Woodland once again requested Mr. Hegeman to produce his motor vehicle registration, his driver's license, and his proof of insurance. Mr. Hegeman responded that he did not know where his driver's license was, but produced several documents from his vehicle's glove compartment one of which washismotor vehicle registration. Attached to his motor vehicle registration was the 1990 renewal sticker, which should have been on the vehicle's front licenseplate. At a later time,Mr. Hegemanproduced his driver's license and proof of insurance. Officer Woodman then inquired if Mr. Hegeman was in fact Douglas A. Hegeman; Mr. Hegeman did not respond. Officer Woodman then informed Mr. Hegeman that he was under arrest for disorderly conduct and effected the arrest. On November 28, 1989, Mr. Hegeman, appearing 

### s,was convicted of failing to display a motor vehicle registration on demand, disorderly conduct, and obstructing a police officer following a jury trial in city court. Immediately after the jury rendered its verdict, Mr. Hegeman filed a notice of appeal. Mr. Hegeman included a claim in his notice of appeal that "Until a decision is rendered by the District Court, the City of Belgrade is furtherbarred from action toward thedefendant pursuant to 

## [§I 46-20-204(3)[

## ,] [MCA]

# .'I The city court thereafternoted: "Request to continue sentencing until after appeal--approved.@' On February 9,1990,Mr. Hegeman, again appearingpro se,was tried 

### & novo at a bench trial before the District Court, and was again convicted of thecharges. Mr. Hegemanreceived the following sentences: a $25.00 fineplus a $10.00 misdemeanor fee for failure to exhibithismotor vehicle registration when requested; two days in jail,

### a $100.00 fine,and a $10.00 misdemeanor fee for disorderly conduct; and thirty days in jail, a $300.00 fine, and a $10.00 misdemeanor fee for obstructing a peace officer. These sentences have been stayed pending this appeal by Mr. Hegeman.1. Did the District Court lack jurisdiction over this case by reason of the city court's failure to enter sentence and judgment against Mr. Hegeman? Mr. Hegeman argues thatbecause the Belgrade City Courtnever imposed sentence, or entered judgment against him, the District Courtneverobtained jurisdiction ofMr. Hegeman'scase. We agree. A district courtmay have concurrent original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction over criminal matters involving misdemeanors. See Mont. Const., Art. VII, 

## s 4 (jurisdiction of district courts); 55 3-5-301 to -303, MCA (original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction of district courts). In particular, § 3-5-302(2), MCA, provides: The district court has concurrent original jurisdiction with the justice's court in the following criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor:

(a) misdemeanors arising at the same time as and out of the sametransactionas a felony or misdemeanor offensecharged indistrict court;

(b) misdemeanors resulting fromthereduction of a felony or misdemeanor offense charged in the district court; and (c) misdemeanors resulting from a finding of a lesser included offense in a felony or misdemeanor case tried in district court. Except in these identified instances, a district court is limited to appellate jurisdiction ofmisdemeanor cases. Mont. Const. Art. VII, !j 4;55 3-5-301to -303,MCA. However, impositionof sentenceand final judgment by a justice or city court are a prerequisite to appeal to a district court. 

### See §§ 46-17-311(2), 46-20-104(1), MCA. Furthermore, a party may not consent to subject matter jurisdiction nor waive the want of jurisdiction. State v. Akers (1938), 106 Mont. 43, 57, 74 P.2d 1138, 1145. Clearly, this case was not within the District Court's original jurisdiction as it does not fall into any of the identified instancesunder 5 3-5-302(2), MCA. And, this case was not within the District Court's appellate jurisdiction because the city court failed to impose sentence and enter a final judgment against Mr. Hegeman. We therefore hold that the District Court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's sentence and judgment and instruct the District Court to remandthiscasetotheBelgrade City Court for imposition of sentence and final judgment. Because we find reversible error in this first issue,we decline to discuss the other three issues raised by Mr. Hegeman in this appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Chief JusticeWe concur: