## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S

A p p e l l a t e C o u r t

V illage of Algonqu in v. Lowe , 2011 IL App (2d) 100603

Appellate Court Caption THE VILLAGE OF AL GONQU I N, Plaintiff and Responde n t-Appellant,

v. J AS. A

. L OWE, his Heirs and/or Assigns, CL ARENCE J

. EBE L
, his Heirs and/or Assigns, OAK PARK NATI ONAL BA NK, as Trustee of a Trust Ag ree ment Dated 5/17/54 and Known as Trust No. 2084, BEN J AMIN C. GETZ EL MA N, his Heirs and/or Assigns, THE NORTHEN TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee of a T r u st Ag ree ment Dated 3/26/26 and Known as Trust No. 6478, UNKNO WN OWN E R S
, and NONRECORD CL AIMANTS, Def endants (Ter

renc e Nag el and Bonnie Nag el, Petitioners-Appe llees).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2–10–0603

Filed J une 1, 2011

Held I n proce eding s on a village ’s complaint for eminent-domain condemnation of a g roup of streets and associate d tree -lawn/pa rkwa y

are as in the village
, the trial court p roperly g rante d appellee s’ section 2–1401 petition to vacate the judgme nt purporting to g ive the village title
to a seg ment of the condemne d proper ty on which no road had been built that they had used as their driveway and primary means of vehicle acc ess to their detac hed g ara g e, since they wer e not proper ly serve d and the lack of persona l jurisdiction over them made the condemnation judgme nt void as to them.Dec ision Under

Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of McHenry County No. 06–ED–13; the Hon. Michae l T. Caldwell, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affirmed.

Counsel on Appea l J ennife r J. Gibs on, of Z ukowski, Roge rs, Flood & McArdle , of Cry stal L ake, f or appe llant.

Michae l E. Kalland, of K alland & Romag , of Elg in, for appe llees.

Panel J USTI CE HUDSON delivered the judgme nt of t he court, with opinion. J ustices Z enoff

and Schostok conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion

OP INION

¶ 1 The trial court g rante d a petition that Terr ence Na gel an d Bo n n i e Nag el filed under section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil P roce dure (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2–1401 (West 2008)). The pe tition asked the court to vacate a J uly 26, 2007, judgme nt that purported to g ive the Villag e of Alg onquin title to cer tain land in the Villag e. That land included property that the Nag els wer e using for their driveway

. The timing of the petition was such that g ranting i t could be proper only if the judgme nt was void. The Nag els asserted that the Villag e had not obtained persona l jurisdiction over them, so that the judgme nt was void as to them. The trial
court ag ree d. The Villag e now arg ues that it obtaine d persona l jurisdiction ove r the Nag els by publication service

. We disag ree , as a plaintiff cannot obtain persona l jurisdiction o v er a def endant that it has ne ver soug ht to identify . We theref ore a ffirm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On Dec em b er 2 9
, 2 0 0 6
, t h e Vi l l age fi l ed a co m plaint for the eminent-doma in condemnation of a g rou p o f streets and associate d tree -lawn/pa rkwa y are as within the Villag e. I n the suit, the Villag e soug ht fee -simple title to all of the are as desig nated as streets

1

Documents ass oci at ed wit h the complai nt sugg est tha t sever al add it ion s had bee n m ade to 1 the V il la ge in the 1950 s but tha t the re had never bee n a st and ar d ded ic at ion of some of the ar eas des ignat ed for st re et s wit hin tho se add it ion s. As a re sul t, the re cor ded ti tl e to some of the la nd use d

or int end ed t o be use d f

or st re et s r emained in th re e i ndi vidual s a nd t wo l and tr ust s.

-2-and all of the bordering tree - lawn/par kway are as. The property that the Villag e soug ht was thus a series of strips of land 60 fe et wide with many interconne ctions. Some of the stree ts that the de v el o p er h ad platted had never been built, but the Vil lag e neverthele ss soug ht to condemn the land desig nated for the unbuilt streets. I n the complaint, the Villag e named as defe ndants J as. A. L owe, Clarenc e J

. Ebel, Be njamin C. Getzelman, their heirs and assig ns, and two land trusts that had banks as trustees. I t further alleg ed that other persons might exis t with assorted interests in the property and named these persons as defe ndants under the desig nations of “unknown owner s” and “non-r ecor d claimants.” Acc ompany ing the complaint was an “Af

fidavit for Publication Reg arding Unknown Owner s and Non-Rec ord Claimants.” I n it, an attorney for the V illage aver

red a s follows:
“Af fiant *** states that in additi o n t o t he persons desig nated by name on the Complaint filed in the above cause , there may be other person( s) who are interested in said action who have or claim[ ] some rig ht, titl e, intere st or a lien in, to or upon the real proper

ty , or some part there of, described in the Complaint; that the name of

eac h such person( s) is unknown to the Plaintiff and to this Affiant, and upon diligent inquiry
, cannot be asce rtained, and such other persons are made parties defe ndant to said ac tion by

the name and description of ‘unknown owner s.’ Affia nt further states, in addition to persons desig nated by name on the Complaint filed in the above case , and ‘unknown owner s’ there may be other parties wh o h ave an interest in the Premises that have not y et been rec orded, cannot b e determined by Plaintiff, and such other p ersons are made parties defe ndant to said action by the name and description of ‘non-re cord c laimants.’ ” ¶ 4 On Februa

ry 1, 2007, the Vil lag e filed a pub l i s h er ’s ce rt ificate of publ ication t hat was addre ssed t o all the parties listed in the complaint and that purported to make all of them parties to the e minent-domain ac tion. ¶ 5 The Villag e filed a ffidavits of pe rsonal ser vice on the two bank trustees. ¶ 6 On Marc h 9, 2007, the Villag e filed a second aff idavit for service by publication in w hich it s o u gh t t o s erve Getzelman, L owe, Ebel, and their heirs and assig ns. I n that aff idavit, counsel for the Villag e aver red that, despite diligent inquiry
, th e n am es o f the heirs and assig ns rema ined unknown and they could not be found. I n a s ec o n d aff idavit, a private investigator aver

red that he had soug ht Getzelman, L owe, and Ebel and could not find them, but he had evidenc e that at least two of them had died. The Vil l age p u b l i s h ed notice to Getzelman, L owe, Ebe l, and their he irs and assig ns. ¶ 7 Next, the Villag e moved fo r d efault judgme nt ag ainst all the parties it had orig inally named, including unkn own owner s and nonrec ord claimants, and the court g rante d that motion. ¶ 8 On J uly 26, 2007, the court enter ed judgme nt for the Villag e. The order stated that L owe, Ebel, Getzelman, “their heirs and/or assig ns,” and the two bank trustees had been serve d, but had failed to appea

r. It further said that “[j] udg ment is e ntere d in f avor of Plaintiff, V illage of Algonquin,” and ag ainst the s ame parties t hat i t described as ha ving f ailed to appe ar. In other words, the order did not mention unknown owner s or nonrec ord claimants. The court g rante d the Villag e fee -simple absolute title to the property as listed i n t h e orig inal

-3-complaint.

¶ 9 On J anuary 20, 2010, the Nag els filed their section 2–1401 petition. They asser ted that, beca use the Villag e had not proper ly serve d them, the trial court had lacke d persona l jurisdiction over them, making the condemnation judgme nt void as to them. They all eg ed that they lived at 1109 Pioneer Road and that they used as their driveway and primary means of vehicle acc ess to their detac hed g ara g e a seg ment of the condemne d property on which no road had been built. The Nag els further alleg ed that they had boug ht the ir property in 1975 and that the driveway and the associate d g ara g e wer e alre ady in place

. Finally
, they alleg ed that the Villag e was awa

re of their use of t he seg ment for their driveway , as shown by its having sent the Na g els two letters concerning the condition and use of t he drive way . They attache d the letters a s exhi bits. ¶ 10 T h e Villag e responde d, arg uing, among other things, that, beca use t h e l et t er s we re outside the rec ord, they wer e inadmissible as evidenc e of lack of persona l jurisdiction ove r the Nag els. I n support of that arg ument, it ci t ed Mu slim Community Center v. Village of Morton Grove
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 355 (2009). I n that decision, while deciding whether a trial court had “subjec t matter ju ri sdiction,” the reviewing court stated that “ ‘[ i] n the case of a collater al attack on a judgme nt, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the judgme nt attacke d, and want of jurisdiction m u s t ap p ea r on the fac e of the rec ord.’ ” Muslim 2 Community Center
, 392 I ll. App. 3d at 358 (quoting Scheller v. Trustees of Schools of Townshi p 41 North, Range 12, East of the Third Principal Meridian
, 67 I ll. App. 3d 857, 866 (1978))

. ¶ 11 T h e court had a hear ing on the petition at which it did not hea r t es t i m o n y o r ad m i t exhibi ts. The arg uments at the hearing sug g est th at both parties assumed that the condemnation order had applied to unknown owner s and nonrec ord claimants. Counsel for the Nag els arg u ed that the Nag els had g ained rig hts to the property throug h adver se possession. He also told the court that the Vil lag e had sent the Nage ls a letter telling them that they could no longe r use their driveway

. The court ruled that the condemnation judgme nt was void as to the Na g els, thus gr anting their petition. ¶ 12 T h e Vi l l age filed a timely notice of appeal. It now repe ats its arg uments that lac k o f
persona l jurisdiction must be appar ent on the fac e of the rec ord for a judgme nt to be void and that no flaw in jurisdiction of the Na g els was a ppare nt in the record. I t also arg ues that the

rec ord positively shows that it g ained persona l jurisdiction over the Nag els throug h the published notice. The briefs of both parties assume that the condemnation judgme nt was, on its fac e, applicable to nonrec ord claimants, the class of defe ndan t i n t o which the Nag els would most li kely

fall.

¶ 13 ANAL YSI S ¶ 14 I nitially
, we note that the trial court probably intended that the condemnation judgment

A col la te ra l at ta ck is an at ta ck by m e ans of a fr ees ta ndi ng vehicl e, “su ch as *** [a ] 2 pet it ion [ ] bro ught unde r sec ti on 2–14 01,” on a fi nal j udgm ent

. Peop le v. Mi ngo , 403 I ll

. App. 3d 968, 970

- 71 ( 2010 ).

-4-b e applicable to all whom the Villag e described as defe ndants, including the unknown

owner s and nonrec ord claimants. That it enter ed the default judgme nt ag ainst all defe ndants strong ly implies this. Thus, the Villag e likely would be entitled to have the court modify the condemnation judgme nt nunc pro tunc to include unknown ow ners and nonrec ord claimants. See, e.g. , Kingbrook, Inc. v . Pupurs , 202 I ll. 2d 24, 32 n.3 (2002) (noting that, even a fter a
court has otherwise lost jurisdiction, it may corr ect an order nunc pro tunc when the rec ord clea rly shows an err or in the form of the orig inal judgme nt). Given this, we ca n ac t most eff iciently by acc epting the parties’ assu m p t ion that the judgme nt applied to unknown

owner s and nonrec ord claimants. We also note that since this case conce rns the g ranting of

a section 2–1401 petition without an evidentiar y hearing–e ssentially
, judgme nt on the pleading s–our revie w is de novo

. See P eo p l e v. Vincent
, 226 I ll. 2d 1, 14-17 (2007) (discussing why the de novo standard of revie w is applicable to dismiss als and judgme nts on the pleading s in section 2–1401 proce eding s). ¶ 15 Turning to the parties’ arg uments, we see that the Villag e’s brief implies at times that we should presume the judgme nt to be valid ag ainst every one with a claim–ef fec tively
, valid
ag ains t t h e wo rl d

. A judgme nt that aff ects the status of property and is g ood ag ainst the world is, as we discuss, a judgme nt in rem

. We there fore addre ss the question of whether an eminent-domain action is an action in rem

. I n City of Crystal Lake v. La Salle National Bank
, 121 I ll. App. 3d 346 (1984), we held that it was. ¶ 16 C r

ys t a l L a ke i s t h e s o l e ca se in which this court has disc u s s ed wh et h er an eminent-domain condemnation is an action in rem

. There
, we held th at t h e “court of competent jurisdiction obtains jurisdiction of the res upon the filing of a[n eminent-domain] petition.” Crystal Lake
, 121 I ll. App. 3d at 351. Thus, acc ording to that holding, the rele vant jurisdiction is over the property , not any individual defendants. I ndeed, “ [t ]he leg al fiction underlying an in rem proce eding is that the ‘prope rty , not the owner of the property , is liable to the complainant. It treats property , there fore
, as the defe ndant, susceptible of being tried and condemned, while the owner mere ly g ets not i ce , al o n g wi th the rest of t he world, and
may appea

r for his property or not.’ ” ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. McG ahan
, 237 I ll. 2d 526, 532-33 (2 0 1 0) (quoting R ufus W aples, Treatise on Procee dings In Rem § 1, at 2 (1882))

. The conseque nce of this is that “[t] he distinguishing char acte ristic of a judgme nt in re m is that it operates direc tly upon property and is binding upon all pe rsons in so far as their interest in the property is conce rned.” (Emphasis added.) Kill ebrew v. Kill ebrew
, 398 I l l

. 432, 437 (1947). Put another way , the resulting judgme nts are enfor cea ble ag ainst nonparties. In re Possession & Control of the Commissioner of Banks & Real Es t a t e of Indepe ndent Trust C orp. , 327 I ll. App. 3d 441, 466 (2001). ¶ 17 After car eful revie w, we reje ct the holding in Crystal L a ke an d co n cl u d e that, in an eminent-domain action, a court must have persona l jurisdiction over aff ecte d persons for two

rea sons. One
, t h e an aly sis in Crystal Lake fails g iven curr ent statutory law. Two, the

rea soning in Crys t a l L a ke g oes ag ainst the supreme court’s holding in McG ahan
, which
teac hes that in rem actions bear for m al m arke rs of being in rem that are absent in eminent-domain a ctions. ¶ 18 The analy sis in Crystal Lake applies only when an action is in rem by statutory provision, and no such provisi on for eminent domain curr ently exis ts in I llinois

. I n C r ys t a l L a ke
, we

-5-stated that we were adopti ng the rea soning of San Bernardino Valley Municipal W ater District v. Gage Canal Co.
, 37 Ca l

. R p t r. 856 (1964). Gage Canal in turn relied on a California Code of

Civil Procedur e provision that stated:
“ ‘Any judgme nt rende red in such a[n eminent-domain] proce eding shall be binding and conclusive not only upon the persons named as defe ndants and serve d with proce ss but upon *** all persons unknown claiming any rig ht, title, est at e or interest in the
property descr

ibed in the complaint and shall have the forc e and eff ect of a judgme nt in rem.’ ” Gage Canal Co. , 37 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (quoting Ca l. Civ. P roc. Code § 1245.3)

. Nothing in curr ent I llinois statutory law g ives simil ar eff ect to condemnation judgme nts. I n d eed, section 10–5–10(d) of the Eminent Domain Act (Ac t) (735 I L CS 30/10–5–10( d ) (West 2008)) states that “[a]ny interested persons whose names are unknown may be made parties defe ndant by the same descriptions and in the same manner as provided in other civil

case s.” Thus, the law assumes that individual parties, not the land itself, are the defe ndants

3 in an eminent-domain action. Further, the Act, unlike the California statutory provision, does not use the phra se “ in rem ” any wher e. ¶ 19 The holding in Crystal Lake is also out of harmony with McGahan
, in which the supreme court discussed at leng th w hat ac tions are truly in rem . The McG ahan court noted ong oing confusion in Illinois courts betwee n actions that are in re m and those that are quasi in rem , that is, o nes t hat decide property rig hts only as between the serve d parties. McG ahan
, 237 I ll. 2d at 535. Noting that at the heart of in rem jurisdiction is the fiction that the property is the defe ndant, the Mc Ga h a n court stated that “[o] ne of the pivotal differ ence s betwee n in

rem and quasi in rem actions i s whether the defendant is the prope rty or a named person.” McG ahan
, 237 I ll. 2d at 532, 536. I t further noted that in rem proce eding s mus t i n cl u d e a proce dure desig ned to g ive notice to the world

. McG ahan
, 237 I ll. 2d at 536-37. I n an eminent-domain a ction such as this one, the pr operty is not named as a party , no provision is made for notice to the world, and the rele vant statute provides for normal, individual defe ndants. We conclude
, foll o wi n g t he g uidelines in McG ahan
, that an eminent-domain action such as this one is not in rem

. Thus, the judgme nt was eff ective only as to defe ndants whom the Villag e prope rly made pa rties to the ac tion. ¶ 20 Given that conclusion, we can logic ally turn now to the issue of who the defe ndants wer e in this action and what provision the law makes for service upon them. Under standing that the action is not in rem is an aid to the analy sis. Such understanding is a reminder that, even when the plaintiff has identified and serve d some defe ndants using g eneric descriptors such

as “nonre cord claimants,” this is not the same thing as making the world a defe ndant. There fore
, rules for allowing service by publication can apply only to defe ndants whom the plaintiff has unsucce ssfully attempted to identify (as well as those the plaintiff cannot rea ch for other rea sons). ¶ 21 Section 2–206(a) of the Code de scribes the require ments for service by publication: “Wheneve r, in any action aff ecting property *** within the jurisdiction of the court,

T he I ll ino is Mu nic ipa l Code ’s eminent

- domain pro visio n inc orp ora te s the Act ’s pro visio ns 3 by ref er enc e. 6 5 I LCS 5/ 11–6 1–1 (W est 200 8).

-6-*** plaintiff *** shall file, at the office of the cler k of the court * **, an aff idavit showing that the defen d an t re s i d es or has g one out of this State, or on due inquiry cannot be found, or is conc eale d within this State, so that proce ss cannot be se rved
upon him or her, and stating the place of residenc e of the defe ndant, if known, or that
upon diligent i n q u i ry his or her place of residenc e cannot be asce rtained, the cler k shall cause publication to be made i n s o m e n ew spaper published in the county in which the action is pending

. *** The publication shall contain *** the names of the parties to be se rved by

publication ***.” 735 IL CS 5/ 2–206(a) (West 2008). Al though this provision g ives a plaintiff a way to serve defe ndants whom it cannot find despite trying, it does not allow for bl an ket service on those who might have claims but whom the plaintiff has not attempted to identify

. Put another way , no matter how diligently

a plaintiff has soug ht one defe ndant (or class of defe ndants), that diligenc e is not transfe rable
to other defe ndants. A broade r rea ding might allow a plaintiff to make a judgme nt eff ectively in rem b y filing a broad and vag ue aff idavit. Moreove r, a broade r rea ding might allow
pu b lication service on obviously interested persons to whom the plaintiff simply never thought or attempted to g ive notice, a result in obvious tension with due proce ss principles. ¶ 22 Her e, in its filing in the trial court, the Villag e described its at t em p t s t o fi nd the title

owner s and their heirs and assig ns. I t d id not describe any specific attempt to find any

nonrec ord claimants; it said s imply that it thought such might exis t. This was so despite circ umstances that sug g ested that many such persons exis ted. The maps in the Villag e’s filings show many residential lots border i n g t h e p roperty

. The houses on those lots surely have driveway s that cross the tree -lawn/pa rkwa y are as of the property t o get access to the
streets. Eac h driveway thus implies a potential claim to a rig ht to use the proper ty for acc ess to the associate d lot. Cont rary to what the Villag e ar g ues, its appar ent dilige nce in se eking the i ndividual titleholders and thos e who might claim from t h em is irrele vant t o its ability
to serve nonrec ord claimants by publication. Thus, published notice could be eff ective only
to those whom the Villag e had actua lly soug ht to identify

. As the Villag e never soug ht any

nonrec ord claimants, its publ ished notice wa s not effe ctive as to the N ag els. ¶ 23 We turn now t o the rule in Muslim Community Cent er an d t h e Vi llag e’s assertion that lack of jurisdiction must ap p ea r on the fac e of the rec ord. Given that its aff idavits do not support its claim to have serve d the Nag els by publication, we need not addre ss whether the letters introduced by the Nag els rebut the Villag e’s evidenc e of service

. This does not make the rule entirely irrele vant, howeve r. The Villag e could benef it from the ru l e o n an odd presumption. We could, in theory
, p re s u m e t he judgme nt to be applicable to the Nag els simply beca

use the rec ord fails to positively show that they are not me mbers of the class of heirs and assig ns, that is, t hat they are not persons in the class that the Villag e did seek. Howeve r, we reje ct such a presumption. ¶ 24 The court in Muslim Community Center held that “ ‘[i] n the case of a collater al attack on

a judgme nt, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the judgme nt attacke d, and want of jurisdiction must appea r on the fac e of the rec ord.’ ” Muslim Community Center
, 392 I ll. App. 3d at 358 (quoting Scheller
, 67 I ll. App. 3d at 866). This holding was not a departure; rathe r, t he rule i s an old one, going back at least t o the s upreme court’s decision in Cullen

v. Steve ns , 389 I ll. 35
, 3 6 -4 2 (1944). Neve rtheless, at least in the rea lm of persona l

-7-jurisdiction, the rule has some problematic implications. I f a court lacks personal jurisdiction

over a party , the judgme nt is void as to that party and t h e p ar t y can attack it at any time, including collater ally

. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education
, 201 I ll. 2d 95, 103 (2002). I f it is true both that a judgme nt enter ed without jurisdiction can be attacke d collater ally and that, in a collater al attack for lack of jurisdiction, the lack of jurisdiction must appea r on the fac e of the rec ord, the implication is that th e ap p ea ranc e of jurisdiction on the fac e of the

rec ord is suf

ficient to c reate jurisdiction in fac t. T his w ould be so even if the documents in the record showing jurisdi ction wer e the product of frau d o r serious error and the put ative defe ndant had no notice of the proce eding

. Such conseque nces are not in harmony with due
proce ss considerations. ¶ 25 We also note that a well-e stablis h ed l i n e of prec edent in the appellate court takes the position that false aff

idavits can confe r no jurisdiction. An example of that position is clea rly
set out in Equity Residential Properties Managem ent Corp. v

. Nasolo
, 364 I ll. App. 3d 26, 32 (2006): “[I ]f the statut o ri l y mandated inquiries are not made, a plaintiff’s aff idavit for constructive service ‘does not speak the truth and cannot confe r jurisdiction.’ [C itations.] The party claiming the bene fit of construc tive service bear s the burden of showing strict compliance with every require ment of the statute, and nothing else will confe r jurisdiction to the court or g rant validity to the cour t ’s j u dg ment. [C itation.] When a defenda nt has not been served with p roce ss as required by law, the court has no jurisdiction over that defe ndant and a defaul t j u d gm ent enter ed
ag ainst him or her is void. [C itations.] A petition attacking a judgme nt as void may be broug ht at any

time, in either a dire ct or c ollatera l proce eding .” Simi lar case s include Bank of New Y ork v. Unknown Heirs & Legatees
, 369 I ll. App. 3d 472, 476 (2006), First Bank & Trust Co. of O’Fallon v. King
, 311 I ll. App. 3d 1053, 1056 (2000), Hous eh o l d F i n ance Corp., III v. Volpert
, 227 I ll. App. 3d 453, 454-55 (1992), and First Fede ral Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago v. Brown
, 74 I ll. App. 3d 901, 906-07 (1979). Perhaps signific antly
, in none of these case s d o es t he court emphasize that the attack is collater al. I ndeed, in some, such as Naso l o i t s elf, the collater al char acte r is mere ly a deduction fr om a close r eading of the fa cts. ¶ 26 De s p i te the implications of the rule in Muslim Community Center
, and d es p i t e t h e prec edent contra

ry to it, the rule is on e that the supreme court has never overr uled or abrog ated. I t i s t h u s binding on us. We need not, howeve r, extend it to circ umstances in which the supreme court never applied it. We find no case in which a court applied the rule to presume that a

person wa s within a class of de fendants named only g ener ically

. ¶ 27 The Villag e implies that the rule can cre ate not just a burden on an undisputed defe ndant
to show from the rec ord a flaw in service
, but also, at least in some circ umstances, a burden

on a possible defe ndant to show from the rec ord that he or she is not a defe n d ant. Some instances of such a presumption would lead to absurd results. For instance, if a plaintiff has

a judgme nt ag ainst a person named J ohn Smit h, someone named J ohn Smit h must rely solely

-8-on the rec ord to show that he is the wrong J ohn Smit h. For cing the Nag els to show from the 4

re co rd that they are not heirs or assig ns of L owe, Ebel, or Getzelman would be eq u al l y

u n r e asonable

. Quite simply
, court rec ords typically do not contain s u c h e xte n s iv e in f o rma ti o n about matters that would most often be collater al to the case

. We are awa re that the Villag e has not sug g ested that the rule in Muslim Community Center works in this way

. We mere ly point out an obvious li mit of the rule. ¶ 28 The Villag e sug g ests that application of the rule in Mus lim Community Center cre ates

a presumption that the judgmen t binds any person who has a nonrec ord claim. That
sug g estion assumes, of course , that the rec ord is somehow consistent with proper service on

every possible nonrec ord claimant. Our discussion of section 2–206(a) shows why this is not the case here

. The claim of the mere possible exis tence of nonrec ord claimants is insufficient
to constitute service on such claimants as a class. The rec ord ref utes the claim of service on the Nag els, and the tria l court wa s corr ect to hold the judg ment void as to them.

¶ 29 CONCL USI ON ¶ 30 For the rea sons we have stated, we aff irm the judgme nt g ranting the Nag el s ’ s ec t i o n 2–1401 petition. ¶ 31 Affirmed.

Under the pre cede nt supporting Muslim Community Center , the “r ecor d” in this 4 context does not include the entire c ommon-law re cord. Cullen , 389 I ll. at 36-42, contains an extensive discussion of what filing s count as part of the re cord w hen per sonal jurisdiction is challeng ed.

-9-