-- II 
e~iem~er-5ece~~er E944 originated at the U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College as a~ i~tr~d~ct~ry lessor to a course on wrps operations. It 

is an ada~tatiofl of a narrated slide presentation used ta provide students with a historical context 

on which, to base their studies of current doctrine. The Lorraine Campaign, which included failures 

as well as successes, was chosen because it encompassed a variety of operations that involved 

such factors as logistics, intelligence, and weather. 

This overview serves as a paint of departure for more in-depth studies, sets the stage for the 

analysis of unit ~~erat~o~s from platoon to corps, and furnishes a useful reference for studying 

branch operations in battle. Repeated reference to this overview will give students an insight into 

specific operations or single branch actions, 

This study also provides a concise summary of Third Army operations iu one rsf the World War II 

European campaigns. Officers beginning their studies of American military history wiEl find that T/E 

kwailae Campa&gn overview contains important fessons for soldiers in today’s Army. 

LOUIS D. F. FRASCHi 

Colonel, Infantry 

Director, Combat Studies Institute 

6Sf publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in a CSI publication 

are those ef the authior and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department 

of Defense. 
The Lorraine Campaign: 

February 1985 A 

u.s* 

Command 

Staff 

Army 

and General 

College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 $‘1:-17$3 
Library of Congress Catalogia~~E-in-Publicatioll Data 

Gabek, Christopher R. (Christopher Richard), 1954 

The Lorraine campaign. 

Bibliography: p. 

1. World War, 19341945-Campaigns-France-Lorraine. 

2. Lorraine (France)-History. I. Title. 

D762L63G3 1937 $%40.54’21 87-690 
ILLUSTRATIONS 

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Maps 

European Theater 

Geography of Lorraine 

., . . l . . . * * . . 

. . . . . . . . Route of the Red Ball ixpriss . . . . Third Army Positions, 1 September i944, . . . 

Lorraine 

XII Corps PLA: G Septembe; hi-41 

. a 

$anc$ 1 . 6 

Capture of Nancy by XII Corps, 

11-16 September 1944 e * . ‘ . . . German Counterattacks AgaiAs; XII Corps, 

19-30 September 1944, Nancy e . e . e , , . XX Corps at Metz, 5-25 September 1944 . . . . Third Army Dispositions, 

25 September 1944, Lorraine . * . . . . . L 

XX Corps Operations, October 1944, Metz . . . XII Corps Attack, 8 November 1944, Nancy ., . XX Corps Capture of Metz, 

B-21 November 1944 . . . a . . . , . . . . Third Army Operations, 

19 November-19 December 1944, Lorraine . * 

Third Army Redeployment, 

20-26 December '1944 , . . . . . . . . 

Third Army Operations in'lorraine . . . . . , Third Army Gains, 

September-December 1944, Lorraine * * . . . . 

1 Figures 

German Volksgrenadier Division, 1944 . . . . German Panzer Division, 1944 

German Banzer Grenadier Division: i914' 1 1 1 

Third Army in the Lorraine Campaign E a . . , U.S. Corps, 1944 . . . . * . . . l . 

U.S. Infantry Division'nith Attachments 

and Typical Task Organization . . . . . e e 

1J.S. Armored Division witb Attachments 

and Typical Task Organization . . . . . . . 

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LORRAINE OVERVIEW 

On 6 June 1944, Allied troops landed in Normandy, and 

the liberation of German-occupied France was underway. 

Throughout June and July, Allied soldiers expanded their 

beachhead against stiff resistance while 

strength for the breakout. building On 25 July, American forcg: 

under the command 'of LTG Omar Bradley,ruptured the German 

defenses on the western end of the beachhead and broke 

into the clear. The U.S. Third Army, under the command of 

LTG George S. Patton, Jr!, became operational on 1 August 

and poured through the gap. 

Thus began one of the most sensational campaigns in 

the annals of American military history. Patton's Third 

Army raced through a narrow corridor between the German 

Seventh Army and the sea, turned the flank of the entire 

German line in Normandy, and tore into the German rear. 

Third Army advanced in all four directions at once, with 

elements advancing south to the Loire River, west into the 

Brittany peninsula, north to a junction with the British 

near Falaise, and east towards the Seine River and Paris. 

(See Map 1.) 

The German forces in Normandy collapsed and, barely escaping total encirclement, streamed back toward Germany 

with crippling losses in men and equipment. Patton's army pursued ruthlessly and recklessly deep into France. 

Armored spearheads led the way, with infantry riding the 

backs of the tanks. Overhead, fighter-bombers patrolled 

the flanks, reported. on conditions toward the front, and 

attacked any German unit that took to the roads in 

daylight. Allied forces invaded southern France on 

15 August and joined in the pursuit. With the remnants of 

two German army groups in full retreat, the Supreme Allied 

Commander, GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, noted in his diary on 

5 September, "The defeat of the German Army is complete."' 

As Third Army neared the French border province of 

Lorraine, Third Army's intelligence sources seemed to 

confirm that the war was virtually over, The top-secret 

interceptions known as Ultra ,revealed that the 

Franco-German border was virtually undefended and would 

remain so until mid-September. A corps reconnaissance 

squadron reparted that the Moselle River, the last major 

water barrier in France, was also undefended. Patton 

issued orders to his corps to seize Metz and Nancy, sweep through Lorraine, and cross the Rhine River at Mannheim 

and Mainz. 

1 
+ ALLIED ADVANCES 

Tff I SEP 1944 

I -+ PLANNED ADVANCE, 

THIRD ARMY 

I O- 100 MILES 

SCALE 

Map 1. European Theater 

Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine 

would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, 

Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's 

end. But L;;;;:;; was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. the battle for Lorraine would drag on 

for more than.3 mdnths. Why did the rosy predictions of 

August go unfulfilled? And how did it come to pass that 

Lorraine would be the scene of Third Army's bloodiest 

campaign? 

The province of Lorraine is the most direct route 

between France and Germany. Bounded on the west by the 

Moselle River, on the east by the Saar River, with 

Luxembourg and the Ardennes to the north, and the Vosges Mountains to the south, Lorraine has been a traditional 

invasion route between east and west for centuries. The 

province has changed hands many times. Considered a part * 

2 
of France since 1766, Lorraine fell under German 

possession between 

1940-44, 

1870 and 1924, and again in the period when Hitler proclaimed it a ,part of Germany 

proper. 

Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the 

Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944. Except for its 

two principal cities, Metz and Nancy, the 

P 

rovince 

contained few significant military objectives. A ter the 

campaign a frustrated General Patton, sent the following 

message to the War Department: 

I hope that in the final settlement of the war, 

YOU insist that the Germans retain Lorraine, 

because I can imagine no greater burden than to 

be the owner of this nasty country where it rains 

every day and where the whole wealth of the 

people consists in assorted manure piles. 

Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and 

entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate 

military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial 

region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther 

north. The ancient trading cities of the upper Rhine that 

had tempted conquerors for centuries were no longer of 

primary rank in modern, industrialized Germany. Viewed in 

this light, it is understandable that the basic plan for 

the European campaign called for the main effort to be 

made farther north, in the 21st Army Group's zone, where 

the vital military and industrial objectives lay. (See 

Map 2.) 

Not only did Lorraine hold out few entidements, but it 

would prove to be a difficult battlefield as well. The 

rolling farmland was broken by tangled woods and numerous 

towns and villages, some of which were fortified. Because 

the ground rises gently from west to east, the Americans 

would frequently find themselves attacking uphill. Third 

Army would have to cross numerous rivers and streams that 

ran generally south to north and would have to penetrate two fortif ied lines to reach Germany--th.e French-built 

Maginot Line and the so-called Siegfried Line, 

Westwall, which stood just inside of Germany itself. TE 

Americans would not even be able to count on the 

unqualified support of 'Lorraine's inhabitants, for the 

Germans had deliberately colonized the province during their periods of control. 

With so little going for it, why did Patton bother 

with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the 

Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as 

many German forces as possible west of the Rhine. 

3 
MAGtNOT L/NE 

Map 2. Ceog-raphy of Lorraine 

Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 

12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were 

ordered to press ahead on a broad front. In late August 

1944, with the Lorraine gateway so invitingly open, it was 

unthinkable to Patton that Third Army should be halted in 

midstride. 

Unfortunately, 

disappoint 

one final fof,actthzf geography was to 

Patton's hopes rapid dash into 

Germany. Lorraine lies some 500 miles from the Normandy 

beaches over which Third Army still drew much of its 

suPPlY* During the August pursuit across France, Third 

Army consumed 350,000 gallons of gasoline every day. TO 

fulfill this requirement and to meet similar demands from 

First Army, Communications Zone organized the famous 

‘Red Ball Express, a nonstop conveyor belt of trucks 

connecting the Normandy depots with the field armies. 

4 
Map 3. Route of the Red Ball Express 

At its peak, Red Ball employed 6,000 trucks that ran 

day and night in an operation that became more difficult 

with every mile the armies advanced. To meet the demands 

of logistics, three newly arrived infantry divisions were 

completely stripped of their trucks and left immobile in 

Normandy. The use of the Red Ball Express represented a 

calculated gamble that the war would end before the trucks 

broke down, for the vehicles were grossly overloaded and 

preventive maintenance was all but ignored. The Red Ball 

Express itself consumed 300,000 gallons of precious 

gasoline every day --nearly as much as a field army. (See 

Map 3.) 

Thus, it was not surprising that on 28 August, with 

Patton's spearheads in the vicinity of Reims, Third Army's gasoline allocation fell 100,000 gallons short of 

requirements; and since all reserves had been burned up in 

the course of the pursuit, the pace of Patton's advance 
began to suffer almost at once. The simple truth was that 

although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, there was no 

way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the leading elements. 

gasoline at all. 

On 31 August, Third Army received no 

With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's 

spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River. 

For the next 

immobilized. 

5 days, Third was 

Eisenhower granted Army virtually 

the British and American logistical priority to 

armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily 

gasoline allotments. Patton's some 

gasoline from the Germans, troops captured 

depots, and received hijacked some from First Army 

gasoline receipts 

some gasoline by air, but when 

advance finally increased to the point that the 

could be resumed, the opportunity of 

through Lorraine unopposed had passed. sweeping (See Map 4.) 

10 0 10 MILES 

I , I 

SCALE I 

Map 41 Third Army Positions, 1 September 1944, Lorraine 

6 
The gasoline shortage was followed by a shortage of 

ammunition, particularly in the larger artillery calibers 

that had not been in great demand during the fluid 

pursuit. When operations became more static along the 

Lorraine border, there was no way to build up ammunition 

stocks because all available trucks were carrying 

gasoline. By 10 September, Third Army's artillery 

batteries received only one-third of a unit of fire per 

day. Other shortages would crop up as the campaign 

progressed. At one time or another, rations, clothing, 

mattress covers, coffee, tires, tobacco, antifreeze, 

winter clothing, and overshoes would all be in critically 

short supply. 

Third Army's intelligence sources began to run dry,;: 

the same time as its gas tanks. Ultra intercepts 

proved invaluable during the pursuit when fleeing German 

units relied heavily on the radio for communication. 

Ultra would continue to produce intelligence of 

significant strategic value, but as Third Army approached 

Lorraine, Ultra. provided less and less information of an 

operational and tactical nature. Free French sources had 

cooperated actively with Third &my during the pursuit, 

but Lorraine, with its partially hostile population and 

its swelling German garrison, was not a favorable setting 

for Resistance activities. Military intelligence interpreter teams found fewer knowledgeable natives willing to 

be interviewed, and the barrier posed by the Moselle River 

prevented the easy flow of both civilian agents and combat 

patrols. Moreover, the corps commanders did not receive 

Ultra at all. Their corps intelligence assets could, at 

best, see only 15,000 yards behind the enemy's front. 

Significantly, the American gasoline crisis and lapse 

in intelligence coincided with a major German buildup in 

Lorraine. When Patton's tanks sputtered to a halt, the 

German forces defending Lorraine totaled only 9 infantry battalions, 

the first 

2 artillery batteries, and l”,,:;;ks. .During week in September, while Army was 

immobilized, German forces flowed into Lorraine from the 

northern sector of the front, from southern France, and 

from Italy. The headquarters charged with the defense of 

Lorraine was Army Group G, under the command of 

GEN Johannes Blaskowitz. 

later Fifth Panzer Army although all were badly 

entire Western Front 

Gerd von Rundstedt, who 

Normandy campaign until 

"Make peace, you fools!" 

First Army, Nineteenth Army, and 

were Biaskowitz's major forces, 

depleted. Responsibility for the 

devolved upon Field Marshal 

had held that post during the 

he told Hitler's headquarters, Hitler restored von Rwndstedt to 

7 
command on 1 September and ordered the field marshal to 

keep Patton out of Lorraine 

German 

until the defenses along the 

frontier could be built up. Von Rundstedt also 

began amassing forces for a counterattack in the Ardennes 

that would eventually take place in December. 

Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be 

considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered 

whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and 

still others consisting entirely of soldiers with stomach 

ulcers. The 62 also identified a new series of German 

formations designated volksenadier divisions. (See ;;“r;re 1.) ,--- These hastily constituted divisions numbered 

10,000 men each and possessed only six rifle 

battalions; in theory they were to be provided with extra 

artillery and assault guns to compensate for the 

quantitative and qualitative their 

infantry. inferiority of 

Two to 3 panzer divisions faced Third Army in a 

mobile reserve role, but these units had managed to bring only 5 or 10 tanks apiece out of the retreat across 

France. (See Figure 2.) Instead of rebuilding the 

depleted panzer divisions) Hitler preferred to devote tank 

production to the creation of ad hoc formations, 

designated panzer br igades , that were controlled at the 

corps or army level. Other formations that Third Army would face in Lorraine included 

(mechanized infantry divisions) and elements o 

Waffen SS. - (See Figure 3.) 

Figure 1. German Volksgrenadier Division, 1944 

8 
Figure 2. German Panzer Division, 1944 

Figure 3. German Panzer Grenadier Division, 1944 

On the eve of the autumn battles along the German 

frontier, von Rundstedt's Western Front forces were 

outnumbered 2 to 1 in effective manpower, 25 to 1 in 

artillery tubes, and 20 to 1 in tanks. But despite its 

tattered appearance, the army that rose up to protect the 

borders of the Fatherland was not a beaten force. When 

Patton's troops received enough gasoline to resume their 

advance towards the Moselle on 5 September, after a delay of nearly a week, the troops quickly discovered that the 

great pursuit was over. Instead of running down the 

fleeing fragments of shattered German units, soldiers .a11 

along Third Army's front encountered enemy soldiers who 

contested every foot of ground and who counterattacked 

9 
Eli I-h 

Figure 4. Third Army in the Lorraine Campaign 

viciously to recover lost positions. Third Army intelligence clearly indicated that the Germans were no 

longer in headlong retreat, Yet some time would pass before E’atton and his corps commanders accepted the fact 

that the pursuit had ended. 

At the same time that Army Group G received 

reinforcements, Patton’s Third Army was being tr imed 

down. In the pursuit across France, Third Army had 

controlled four far-flung corps, but during September two 

of those corps were detached from Patton’s command. For 

most of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army would consist of 

two corps, the XX and the XII. Four to six infantry divisions and two or three armored divisions would carry the bulk of the burden for the next 3 months. In addition 

to these major combat elements, Third Army controlled 2 

quartermaster groups totaling 60 companies, 2 ordnance 

groups compr is ing 11 battalions, and 6 groups ~ of 

engineers. An antiaircraft artillery brigade and a tank 

destroyer brigade provided administrative support to their 

respective battalions, most of which were attached to 

lower echelons. (See Figure 4.) 

Each of Third Army’s two corps pos.sessed as organic 

troops a headqwar ters with support elements and a corps artillery headquarters. In the Lorraine campaign, two or 

three infantry and one or two armored divisions were 

10 
X pq /xq-J ] ^.“: 1 ADDITIOliAL CSS 

PRDVIDED BY 

THtRD ARMY 

Figure 5. U.S. Corps, 1944 

usually attached to each corps. One or two cavalry groups of two squadrons each provided corps reconnaissance. (See Figure 5.) 

CWPS artillery consisted of four to five field 

artillery groups controlled by a corps fire direction 

center (FDC), which could allocate its assets to the 

divisions or control them itself. Corps artillery also 

tied into the divisional artillery, making it possible to 

coordinate every field artillery tube within that corps. In the Lorraine campaign, the corps zones became so wide 

that one FIX could not control all of the 

artillery. corps A field artillery brigade headquarters frequently served as a second FDC, splitting the corps 

zone with the corps artillery FDC, 

The corps ??DC system was highly efficient at massing artillery fires and proved to be extremely respogsive and 

flexible. On one occasion during the Lorraine campaign, 

an infantry unit about to make an assault contacted XX 

Corps FDC with a request for artillery support. The FDC 

plotted the target and issued orders to the appropriate 

artillery battalion. The battalion in turn assigned the 

mission to a battery which delivered 67 rounds on the 

target. The total elapsed time from receipt of request to 

completion of the mission was 6 minutes, At the other 

ex,treme) XII Corps artillery, aided by the 33d Field 

Artillary Brigade, organized a program of fires in support of the November offensive that involved 380 concentrations 

over a 4-hour period . 

11 
The American infantry division in World War II was the 

15,000-man triangular division, so called because it 

possessed three infantry regiments, each of which 

consisted of three battalions, and so on. Four battalions 

made up the divisional artillery, whose primary weapons 

were the 105~mm, and 155~mm howitzers. Typically, the 

triangular division, which was originally designed to be a 

“light division,“’ also included plug-in components such as 

quartermaster trucks, extra artikiery, and extra 

engineers, For example, although the division could 

motorize only one regiment with organic truck assets, by attaching six quartermaster truck companies, it could be 

made 100 percent vehicle mobile. Most infantry divisions 

controlled a tank battalion and a tank destroyer battalion 

which was usually equipped with tank-like vehicles. The 

division was capable of breaking down into regimental combat teams, each with its own complement of artillery, 

engineers) armor, and tank destroyers. Regimental combat 

teams, however, were not provided with support elements. 

The infantry division had to fight as a division. (See 

Figure 6.) 

DIVISION WITH AlTACHMENTS 

xx 

TYPICAL TASK ORGANIZATION 

Figure 6. U.S. Infantry Division with Attachments and Typical Task Organization 

12 
DIVISION WITH ATTACHMENTS < 

Figure 7. U.S. Armored Division with Attachments and Typical Task Organization 

The 1944 armored division was a relatively small 

organization of 11,000 men and 263 tanks. It possessed 

three tank battalions, three battalions of armored 

infantry, and three battalions of self -propelled 

artillery. Three task force headquarters, designated 

Combat Commands A, B, and R, controlled any mix of 

fighting elements in’ battle. According to doctrine, the 

armored division was primarily a weapon of exploitation to 

be committed after the infantry division had created a 

penetration. The M-4 Sherman tank reflected this 

doctrine. It was mobile, reliable, and mounted a general 

purpose 75-mm gun in most of its variants. In keeping 

with doctrine, tank destroyers and not tanks carried the 

high-velocity antitank guns. (See Figure 7.) 

The relationship among field army, corps, and division 

was prescribed by LTG Lesley J. McNair, head of Army Ground Forces in Washington. Divisions were to be lean 

and simple, offensive in orientation, with attachments 

made as necessary. The. corps was designed to be a purely 

tactical headquarters that could handle any mix of 

infantry and armored divisions. The field army allocated 

divisions to the corps and assigned supplemental combat 

support and service support elements where needed. 

13 
Logistics flowed from Communications Zone through the 

field army to the divisions, theoretically bypassing the 

corps CXhel0n. In actual practice, the corps did become 

involved in logistics, -at least to the extent of 

designating truck heads and allocating service support 

units. The typical division slice in the European theater 

was 40,000 troops, of which 15,000 were organic to the 

division, 15,000 were corps and army troops, and 10,000 

were Communications Zone personnel. 

Rounding out the weapons in Patton's arsenal for the 

Lorraine campaign was the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAG), 

which had cooperated with Third Army throughout the 

pursuit across France, Fighter-bombers from the XIX TAC 

flew 12,000 sorties in support of Third Army during August, but in September, TAG's efforts would be divided 

between the Lorraine front and the battles being waged to 

reduce the German fortresses still holding out along the 

French coast. As the autumn wore on, XIX TAC would be 

increasingly frustrated by poor weather. By this stage in 

the war, however, the German air force was capable only of 

sporadic operations. 

Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third 

Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and 

denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, 

Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war 

could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group 

ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize 

crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz. 

Patton's forces were already on the move. 

The focus of attention in September was on XII Corps, 

commanded by MG Manton S. Eddy. The XII Corps was the 

southern of Third Army"s two permanent corps. Its 

principal components were the 35th and 80th Infantry 

Divisions and the 4th Armored Division. Later in the 

month, the 6th Armored Division would join the corps. 

Eddy's immediate objective was Nancy, one of two major 

cities in Lorraine. Although unfortified, Nancy was 

protected by the terrain and, most important, by the 

Moselle River. (See Map 5.) 

The XII Corps1 first attempt to capture Nancy began on 

5 September, the day that Third Army received just enough 

gasoline to resume its advance. Eddy ordered 35th 

Division to attack Nancy from the west. Simultaneously, 

the 4th Armored Division, passing through a bridgehead 

across the Moselle (to be secured by 80th Division), would 

attack the city from the east. The plan was foiled when 

14 
LEGEND 

ILLLW, FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS 

Nap 5. XII Corps Plan, 5 September 1944, Nancy 

80th Division failed to obtain its bridgehead. The 

crossing attempt, staged at Pont-&-Mousson, was made 

straight off the march, without reconnaissance, secrecy t 

or adequate artillery support. Such improvised operations 

had worked during the pursuit, but when the 8Qth, Divisi;on 

pushed 

the 

a battalion across the Moselle, it ca”,‘,‘,:de;d with 

3d Panzer Grenadier Division, just * from 

Italy. The Germans held dominating ground and could not 

be dislodged. The American bridgehead collapsed, and the 

survivors returned to the west bank. 

Following this reverse, Eddy took 5 days to regroup 

his corps and prepare a more deliberate operation. On 

11 September, a regiment of 35th Division, supported by 

corps artillery, established a bridgehead across the 

15 
'"'FORWARD LlNE OF TROOPS 

Map 6. Capture of Nancy by XII Corps, 11-16 September 1944 

Moselle south of Nancy and fought its 

city. 

toward the 

North of Nancy, 80th Division madFaya successful 

crossing on the following day at Dieulouard. This time 

secrecy and a 

Dieulouard 

careful deception plan paid off. The 

bridgehead was established against little 

opposition 

However, 

and pontoon bridges were quickly emplaced. 

once the initial surprise wore off, German 

reaction to the Dieulouard bridgehead was savage. artillery fire and repeated Heavy counterattacks by 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division threatened to erase 80th Division's 

brrdgehead across the Moselle. (See Map 6.) 

Early on the morning of 13 September, Combat Command A 

of 4th Armored Division began to cross into the threatened 

bridgehead. The leading armored elements routed a German 

16 
counterattack then in progress and broke through the 

German forces containing the bridgehead. Spearheaded by 37th Tank Battalion, under the command of 

LTC Creighton Abrams, and reinforce'd by a battalion of 

truck-mounted infantry froIx 80th Infantry Division, Combat 

Command A punched into the enemy rear, overrunning German 

positions with all guns firing. Operating on a front 

equal to the width of the lead tank and with its supply 

trains accompanying the combat- elements, Combat Command A 

covered 45 miles ' 

headquarters responsize 

37 hours, overran the German 

for the defense of Nancy, and 

established a position blocking the escape routes from the 

city. Combat Command B, which had passed through the 

bridgehead south of Nancy, linked up with Combat Command A 

between Arracourt and Luneville. 

35th Division on 15 September. Nancy itself fell to the 

With XII Corps established on the east bank of the 

Moselle, LTG Patton hoped to resume the war of movement in 

which Third Army excelled. He ordered MG Eddy to attack 

eastward with divisions in column. The objective of 

XII Corps was still to cross the Rhine. The Germans, who 

had no reserves in the area, feared that XII Corps was on 

the verge of a breakthrough. But before he resumed the 

eastward advance, Eddy chose to clear out pockets of 

resistance around Nancy, giving the Germans 3 days to 

bring reinforcements to the sector. Army Group G received 

orders to drive in XII Corps' right flank and throw 

Patton's forces back across the Moselle. To carry out 

this mission, the Germans recreated Fifth Panzer Army, a 

hastily scraped together force commanded by General 

Hasso von Manteuffel, an armor expert imported from the 

Russian Front. From 19 to 25 September, two panzer 

brigades of the LVIII Panzer Corps hammered at Combat 

Command A's exposed position around Arracourt. Although outgunned by the German Panther tanks, the American 

Shermans and self-propelled tank destroyers enjoyed superior mobility and received overwhelming air support 

when the weather permitted. The fogs which interferred 

with American air strikes also neutralized the superior 

range of German tank armament. At the end of the 

week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and 

7 tank destroyers Post but claimed 285 German tanks 

destroyed. (See Map 7.) 

To the north of Fifth Panzer Army, the German First 

Army attempted to eliminate XII Corps' bridgehead across 

the Seille River. The 559th Volksgrenadier Division 

launched a series of attacks against 35th Division in the 

Grgmecey Forest that lasted from 26 to 30 September. In 

contrast to the tank battle at Arracourt, 35th Division"s 

engagement at Grgmecey was a swirling infantry battle 

17 
LEGEND 

)I FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS 

SCALE 

Map 7. German Counterattacks Against XII Corps, 19-30 September 1944, Nancy 

fought out at close quarters among thick woods and 

entrenchments left over fram World War I. After 3 days of 

chaotic, seesaw fighting, Eddy ordered the 35th to 

withdraw across the Seille, an order which Patton promptly countermanded. .The arrival of 6th Armored Division from 

Army reserve restored the situation with a double 

envelopment of the hotly contested forest. However, 

Eddy’s status as corps commander suffered badly. His 

relationship with the division commanders never fL.llLy 

recovered, and Patton seriously contemplated relieving 

him. (See Map 7.) 

Hitler responded to the loss of Nancy and the failed 

German counterattacks by relieving Blaskowitz from command 

of Army Group A. To replace him, Hitler chose General 

Hermann Balck, an experienced corps cammander from the 

Russian Front. 

18 
In the northern sector of Third Army’s front, 

MG Walton Walker’s XX Corps also established a bridgehead 

across the Moselle during September. Walker’s orders were 

to capture Metz and sweep to the Rhine, a task far beyond the capabilities of a corps that held a 40-mile front with 

three divisions, the 5th, 90th) and 7th Armored. 

Moreover, Netz, unlike Haney,’ was thoroughly fortified. 

Forty-three intercommunicating forts on both sides of the 

Moselle ringed the city. Although some of the older 

fortifications dated from the nineteenth century, the more 

modern ones could house garrisons of up to 2,000 men and 

were armed with heavy artillery mounted in steel and 

concrete turrets * Designed to hold an entire field army, 

the Metz fortifications were manned by 14,000 troops of 

the 462d Division. At this point in the eampa ign, 

xx corps was using Michelin road maps and thus had 

virtually no knowledge of the Metz fortifications. (See 

Map 8,) 

+** FORTIFICATIONS 

MAGfNOT LINE 

FORWARD LlNE OF TROOPS 

5 IQ MlLES 

SCALE 

Map 8. XX Corps at Metz, 5-25 September 1944 

19 
On 7 September, 

assault on Metz, 

5th Infantry Division opened the 

attacking ignorant of the fact that it was 

the most strongly fortified city in Western 

Europe. 

pieces 

For a week one of its regiments was chewed to 

among the forts west of the Moseile, which were 

manned by students of an officer candidate school. Even 

when reinforced by a combat command of the 7th Armored 

Division, the American attack made little 

Incidently, progress. 

which 

this action took place on the same ground upon 

two German field armies were mauled in equally 

unsuccessful assaults during the 1870 France-Prussian War. 

In an attempt to encircle Metz, MG Walker also ordered 

5th Division to establish a bridgehead across the Moselle 

south of the city. made at Dornot, 

The 5th Division's first crossing, 

prepared 

was a makeshift frontal assault against a 

which included 

17th SS Pan~~?$;enadier Division. ,elements of the 

was marked-- by great confusion. 

The crossing operation 

It lacked adequate 

artillery support, and it was subjected to hostile fire 

coming from both banks of the river. Four companies 

established a tiny bridgehead on the east bank which was 

bombarded continuously by artillery and mortars. For 

2 days the bridgehead forces turned back repeated 

counterattacks, while German fire disrupted ferrying operations and the 

Finally, prevented building of a the survivors bridge. in the bridgehead were withdrawn 

without their equipment, 

A more carefully planned crossing operation succeeded 

nearby at Arnaville on 10 September. Under the covering fire of 13 artillery battalions, plus air support and a 

generated smoke screen, 5th Division established a 

permanent bridgehead over the Moselle that became the main 

divisional effort. 

P-47s of 

The artillery of XX Corps and the 

XIX Tactical Air Command helped break up counterattacks mounted by the 3d and the 17th SS Panzer 

Grenadier Divisions. Although the 5th Divis?ion had 

successfully crossed the Moselle, the ring of 

fortifications protecting Metz was still virtually 

#. intact. The 7th Armored. Division crossed into the 

Arnaville bridgehead with orders from MG Walker to hook 

behind Metz while 5th Division captured the city itself. 

However, the terrain was unsuited to armored operations, and 5th Division was bled white --by the end of the month 

the 5th required 5,000 fillers to bring it up to 

strength. Meanwhile, 

front. 

a stalemate ensued along XX Corps' 

20 
On 25 September, Third Army operations came to an 

abrupt halt. Even with the Red Ball Express running at 

full. capacity, logistical support was inadequate to 

sustain operations by all of the Allied forces on the 

Gent inent. Accordingly, GEN Eisenhower decreed that the 

main Allied effort would come from the British 21st Army 

Group, which received transportation priority. The 12th 

Army Group, including Third Army, was to hold its present 

positions until the logistical crisis receded. LTG Patton 

was unwilling to yield the initiative to the enemy, so he 

ordered Third Army not to dig in, but rather to establish 

outpost lines and maintain active, mobile reserves. (See 

Map 9.) 

Map 9. Third Army Dispositions, 25 September 1944, Lorraine 

21 
: Third Army was relatively dormant from 25 September to 

8 November. Patton’s forces utilized the time to 

carefully husband resources and build up reserves for 

future operations. Stringent gasoline rationing went into 

effect on 3 October, and although gasoline receipts for 

the month were only 67 percent of requested amounts, Third 

Army managed to amass a small reserve, The larger calibers of ammunition were also strictly rationed. To 

take the place of silent artillery tubes, tanks a tank 

destroyers, and mortars were surveyed in for use as 

artillery. Extensive use was also made of captured German 

ordnance. One time on target (TOT) fired in XX Corps’ 

zone was executed with captured German 105~mm howitzers, 

l$;;dan-made 76.2-m guns and French 155-mm howitzers 

captured from the .Germans), and German 88-mm 

antitank guns. Eighty percent of the artillery ammunition 

expended by XX Corps in the last week of October was of 

German origin. 

A number of factors facilitated Third Army’s 

logistical recovery. One of these was the speed with 

which the French railroad system was rehabilitated and put 

to military use. Although the railroads in Normandy had 

been thoroughly interdicted prior to and during the 

invasion, those in central and eastern France were 

relatively undamaged by Allied aircraft and had been 

abandoned almost intact by the retreating Germans. During the October lull, Third Army brought its railheads as far 

forward as Nancy. For a time, Third Army personnel actually operated the trains themselves I The French 

civilian sector provided rolling stock and trained 

personnel to supplement Third Army’s quartermasters. 

The French civilian economy, by providing what we 

today call “host nation support,” helped ease Third Army’s 

logistical burdens in other ways as well. The Gnome-Rhone 

engine works in Paris were retooled to repair American 

tank engines. Other manufacturers produced tank escape 

hatches and track extenders that greatly facilitated 

mobility in the Lorraine mud. When colder weather 

precipitated a critical shortage of antifreeze, French 

industry supplied thousands of gallons of alcohol in lieu 

of Prestone, Local sources also produced fan belts, and 

when tires became so scarce that all spares were removed 

from their racks and Put into use, French tire 

manufacturers turned their production over to the U.S. 

Army. With Patton’s permission, Third Army’s ordnance 

units moved inside existing French facilities with the 

result that ordnance productivity increased 50 percent. 

In fact, Third Army utilized everything from local coal 

mines to dry-cleaning plants. 

Captured German supplies were another important scmrce 

of materiel during the October lull. In addition to the 

22 
weapons and ammunition mentioned earlier, Third Army used 

captured gasoline transported in captured jerricans, spark 

plugs rethreaded for American engines, and thousands of 

tons of food that fed both soldiers and local civilians. 

BY the time full-scale operations resumed in 

November, Third Army's program of rationing and local 

procurement had resulted in the establishment of 

substantial reserves, On the average, each division held 

zhzays of Class I and 5 days of Class III supplies when 

eastward advance was resumed. Except for heavy artillery shells, the ammunition shortage was no longer critical. 

Third Army's intelligence picture also improved during the October lull. Through Ultra and other sources, the 

German order of battle was well known to Third Army's G2 

and would remain so throughout the campaign. Ultra 

revealed that the Germans, too, were rationing gasoline. Even the panzer divisions 

horse-drawn 

were partially dependant on 

transportation. The XX Corps received 

detailed plans of the Metz fortifications obtained from 

archives in Paris and supplemented by French officers who 

had built and manned the citadel. The most encouraging intelligence received in October revealed that the Germans 

were withdrawing many of their best units from Lorraine, 

including Fifth Panzer Army. Intelligence did not 

disclose, however, that these forces were being amassed 

for the Ardennes counteroffensive which came in December. 

The quality and quantity of Patton's forces improved while the German defenders in Lorraine declined in 

effectiveness. During October and the first week in 

November, American units were rotated out of the line to 

rest, refit, and absorb replacements. The XX Corps gave 

up the 7th Armored Division but acquired the 95th Infantry 

and 10th Armored Divisions in return. In addition, XII 

Corps obtained the 26th Division, raising Third Army's strength to six infantry and three armored, divisions. 

Although ordered by 12th Army Group to hold its 

position, Third Army conducted several limited operations 

during the October lull. The XII Corps closed in on the 

Seille River, and giving its new units some exposure to combat 

securing jump-off positions for future operations. 

Meanwhile, 

Metz. An 

XX Corps prepared for a systematic reduction of 

extensive and highly integrated artillery 

observation system was established that tied together 70 

ground observation posts and 62 airborne observers. All 

XX Corps divisions rotated out of the line for training in 

the reduction of fortifications. The 90th Division 

patiently cleared the Germans out of Maizisres-lss-Metz in 

23 
a carefully controlled operation that simultaneously opened the only unfortified approach to Metz and provided 

the division with experience in urban combat. 

Map 10.) (See 

On 3 October, XX Corps' battle-scarred 5th Division 

mounted an ill-advised attack on Fort Driant, one of the 

fortress complexes protecting Metz from the south and 

west. With the support of 23 artillery battalions, 1 rifle battalion reinforced by tanks and tank destroyers 

managed to occupy Driant's surface, but the American 

infantrymen were unable to penetrate the 

galleries. underground American artillery was 

ineffective against Driant"s disappointingly five batteries. An American 

&-inch gun scored eight direct hits on one of Driant's 

artillery turrets, silencing the German piece for 15 

minutes, after which it resumed operation. days of fighting Following 10 

infantry were 

in which 50 percent of the assaulting 

killed or wounded, American forces withdrew 

from Fort Driant. (See Map 10.) 

On 21 October, Third Army received orders to resume 

full-scale offensive operations on or about 10 November. 

Patton's objective was still the Rhine River. By this 

time Third Army outnumbered the Germans in Lorraine by 

250,000 to 86,000. However, the Germans were about to 

obtain a valuable ally in the form of the weather. Seven 

inches of rain fell in November, about twice the normal 

amount. Twenty days that month had rain. Lorraine 

suffered from its worst floods in 35 years. On two 

different occasions, floodwaters washed out the Moselle 

bridges behind the midst of 

fighting. 

the Third Army in heavy Almost all operations were limited to the hard 

roads, a circumstance that the Germans exploited through the maximum use of demolitions. Third Army engineers built over 130 bridges during November. 

The weather virtually negated American air 

superiority. The XIX Tactical Air Command, which had 

flown 12,000 sorties in the golden days of August, flew 

only 3,500 in November. There was no air .activity at all 

for 12 days out of the month. 

Third Army's offensive began on 8 November in weather 

so bad that MG Eddy, XII Corps commander, asked Patton to 

postpone the attack. Patton told Eddy to attack as 

scheduled or else name his successor. 

lack of Despite the total 

air support, Eddy attacked on the 8th and 

throughly surprised the defending Germans, who believed 

that the weather was too bad to allow offensive 

operations. The most massive artillery preparation in 

Third Army history preceded XII Corps' attack. All of XII 

24 
e++ FORTEFICATIONS 

w MAGINOT LINE 

w FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS 

Map 10. XX Corps Operations, October 1944, Metz 

Corps' artillery plus 5 battalions borrowed from XX 

Corps-- for a total of 42 battalions and 540 guns--poured 

22,000 rounds on the stunned Germans. At 0600, XII Corps 

jumped off with three infantry divisions abreast and two 

armored divisions in corps reserve. Instead of waiting 

for a decisive opportunity in which to commit his reserve, 

Eddy broke the armored divisions up into combat commands 

and sent them into the line on D plus 2, thus relegating 

Third Army's most powerful concentration of armor to an 

infantry-support role. With the American armor dispersed, 

the defending German 11th Panzer Division was able to 

restrict XII Corps' rate of advance with a relatively thin 

delaying screen and local counterattacks. (See Map 11.) 

General Walker's XX Corps made its main attack across 

the Moselle in the Metz sector on 9 November, one day 

after XII Corps. It, too, achieved surprise. The 90th 

25 
LEGEND 

&&&, FORWARD LINE OF TROOPS 

a 5 IO MILES 

Map IL XII Corps Attack, 8 November 1944, Nancy 

Division and 10th Armored Division had shifted to assembly 

areas north of .Thionville in great secrecy. A detachment of special troops maintained radio traffic and manned 

dummy guns in the vacated zone. There was no artillery preparation so as not to disclose the imminent attack. 

The Moselle flooded out of its banks, which complicated the crossing operation but had the side benefit of 

inundating the German minefields on the east bank and lulling the defenders into a false sense of security. Finally, 95th Division staged a demonstration south of 

Thionvikle that involved crossing a battalion to the east 

bank, thus drawing farther north. 

attention away from the main effort 

General Balck, commander of’ German Army Group G, had ordered his units to hold the front with a 

minimum of strength until the artillery barrage had passed, anticipated whereupon they were to rush forward in 

force to meet the American assault waves. Since there was 

26 
FORTIFICATIBNS I , MAGINOT LINE 

FORWARD LINE OF TROOPSI 

1 5 l@MI!.ES 

SCALE 

Map 12. XX Corps Capture of Metz, 8-21 November 1944 

no artillery barrage, and since the Germans otherwise 

failed to predict the attack, Balck’s defensive scheme was 

unhinged at the outset of the operation. (See Map 12.) 

The 90th Division crossed the swirling waters of the 

Moselle at Koenigsmacker early on 9 November and 

established a secure bridgehead . The 10th Armored 

Division moved up to the west bank, ready to cross into 

the bridgehead as soon as the engineers were able to build 

a bridge. Due to the high, fast waters, 5 days would pass 

before armor crossed the Moselle in force. The Moselle 

crossings taxed Third Army’s engineers to the utmost. An 

infantry support bridge put in behind 90th Division was 

swept away, and the approaches were flooded. When the 

waters finally subsided, bridges were established for the 

90th and 95th Divisions, only to be inundated by a 

27 
second flood even greater than the first. The bridges themselves were saved, but their approaches were 

completely underwater rendering them useless until the 

Moselle once more receded. Meanwhile, liaison aircraft 

and amphibious trucks helped keep the bridgehead supplied, 

and concentrated artillery fire from the west bank helped 

break up the repeated German counterattacks mounted 

against 90th Division until armor could cross the Moselle. 

The XX Corps’ artillery also saw tab it that the 

Germans suffered as much as possible from the atrocious 

weather. The 17 artillery battalions supporting 90th 

Division shelled all buildings in the assault area) driving the defenders out into the rain and mud. The U.S. 

Eighth Air Force contributed to this effort by sending 

over 1,000 four-engine bombers to conduct saturation 

bombing of the towns and’ villages in the assault area. 

The poor weather forced the airmen to bomb by radar, which 

detracted significantly from the accuracy of the attack. 

With 90th DivisiQn established at Koenigsmacker, 5th 

Division pushing north from the Arnaville bridgehead, and 

95th Division advancing across the old Franco-Prussian War 

battlefield west of the city, XX Corps had three divisions 

poised to close on Metz. Then, XX Corps created another 

threat by converting 95th Division’s demonstration at 

LJckange into a major effort and reinforcing it with 

armQr. Given the designation Task Force Bacon, this 

battle group fought its way toward Metz in mobile columns 

led by tanks and tank destroyers that shot up all possible 

centers of resistance, to the extent of- using 3-inch 

antitank guns to knock out individual snipers. All of the 

forces closing on Metz employed new techniques in dealing 

with fortified areas. Frontal assaults were avoided. 

Instead, 

and strongpoints and forts were surrounded, bypassed, systematically reduced with high explosives and 

gasoline. Task Force Bacon entered Metz from the north 

on 17 November, the same day 5th Division reached the city from the south and 95th Division neared the Moselle 

bridges tQ the west. As street fighting ensued in Metz 

itself, xx Corps) artilLery laid interdiction fire on all 

German escape routes east of the city. (See Map 12.) 

Although Hitler had declared that Metz was officially 

a fortress, meaning that it would hold out to the last 

man) GeneraP Balck decided to make no further sacrifices 

for the city. He abandoned the second-rate division 

fighting in downtown Metz and broke contact, withdrawing 

to the east. On 19 November, 90th Division and 

5th Division linked up east of Metz, completing the 

encirclement of the city. Although some of the forts held 

out for two more weeks, the commander of the German 

28 
garrison in Metz surrendered on 21 November. Thus, XX 

Corps was the first military force to capture Metz by storm since 451 A.D. 

The XX Corps left some elements at Metz to reduce the 

holdout forts and regrouped the remainder of its forces to 

join XII Corps in Third Army's eastward advahce. The next 

obstacle confronting Patton's troops was the Westwall, known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line, that lay just 

within Germany proper. The 10th Armored Division had 

finally crossed the Moselle on 14 November with orders to 

exploit east and north to the Saar River. The American 

tanks made some progress to the east against the 

determined resistance of the 21st Panzer Division, but the 

push to the north came 

extension of 

to a halt along an east-west 

the Westwall. There would be no clean 

breakthrough in XX Corps' sector, just as there had been 

none for XII Corps. (See Map 13.) 

LEGEND 

MAGINOT LINE 

WEST WALL 

I,0 f , 10 MILES 

SCALE 

Map 13. Third Army Operations, 19 November-19 December 1944, Lorraine 

29 
The German defenders were critical of 

for, 

but grateful Patton"s decision to advance on a broad front of nine 

divisons spread out over 60 miles. 

felt that the Americans made a 

In particular, they 

grave error in not 

concentrating their three armored divisions into one corps 

for a knockout blow. The 3 panzer divisions in Lorraine 

were down to 13, 7, and 4 tanks respectively, a fact that 

Patton was well aware of, thanks to Ultra. On paper, there were 12 German divisions facing Third Army@s 9, but 

in reality, the defenders possessed just 1 battalion for 

each 4 miles of front. Therefore, Patton's decision to 

tie his armored divisions to the infantry enabled the 

Germans to delay the Third Army with a thin screen and 

pull the bulk of their forces back into the Westwall. 

Facilitating the German delaying action were the 

fortifications of the Maginot Line, numerous streams, and 

of course, the weather. Noncombat casualties, most due to 

trench foot, roughly equaled combat casualties for the 

month of November. Moreover, 95 .percent of the trench 

foot cases would be out of action, at least until spring. Part of the blame for the high rate of noncombat 

casualties must go to the Quartermaster, 

of Operations, European Theater 

who had refused to order a newly developed 

winter uniform for the troops because he believed that the 

war would end before cold weather came. 

was there an adequate 

Not until January supply of jackets, raincoats, 

overshoes, blankets, and sweaters. As a result, 46,000 

troops throughout the theater were 

talized, European the equivalent of three infantry divisions. hospiWeather and enemy action took 

among the infantry, 

their greatest toll 

Army's casualties. 

which sustained 89 percent of Third 

By the end of November, Patton could 

no longer obtain enough infantry fillers to replace the 

losses among his rifle units. Manpower planners in the 

Pentagon had failed to foresee that the battle along the 

German frontier would be a hard-fought affair conducted in 

terrible weather and had thus failed to allocate enough 

manpower to infantry training. Back in the States, tank 

destroyer and antiaircraft 'battalions were broken up and 

sent to infantry training centers. In Lorraine, General 

Patton "drafted" 5 percent of army and corps troops for 

retraining as infantry, Westwahl sent 

and when bloody fighting along the 

infantry losses soaring, he ltdraftedr' an 

additional 5 percent. 

In early December, Third Army's leading elements had 

pushed across the German border at several places along its front as the Germans withdrew into the Westwall. The 

95th Division captured an intact bridge across the Saar 

River at Saarlautern in XX Corps' zone and encountered 

30 
some of the stiffest resistance yet experienced, as the 

German troops fought to defend their own soil. The 

Americans discovered that the town of Saarlautern itself 

was part of the Westwall. Unlike the Maginot Line or the 

Metz fortifications, the Westwall did not consist of 

gigantic underground fortresses and heavy artillery 

emplacements. Instead, it was a belt of tank obstacles, 

barbed wire, pillboxes, and fortified buildings. Although 

the Germans considered the Westwall to be antiquated, 

shallow, and poorly equipped, it nonetheless constituted a 

formidable military obstacle. In Saarlautern the fighting 

was literally house-to-house and pillbox-to-pillbox. To 

facilitate the slow infantry advance, XX Corps' artillery 

fired in direct support of small units. The 8-inch and 

240-mm pieces adjusted their fire on individual buildings 

on one side of the street, while American infantrymen on 

the opposite side of the street prepared to advance. The 

90th Division forced a crossing of the Saar at Dillingen and encountered similar resistance. Casualties mounted as 

the Germans brought to bear the heaviest artillery fire 

that Third Army had yet experienced. (See Map 13.) 

With toeholds established in the Westwall, LTG Patton 

initiated planning for a new offensive scheduled to .jump 

off on 19 December. Veteran units such as the 

long-suffering 5th Division were pulled out of the action 

for reorganization and training. Patton received another 

corps headquarters, III Corps, and some fresh units, 

including 87th Division. Third Army's objectives for the 

December offensive were the same as they had been in 

August--bridgeheads across the Rhine in the vicinity of 

Mannheim and Mainz. 

Preparations for the attack were well under way when, 

0t-l 16 December, Third Army received fragmentary 

indications of trouble in First Army's sector to the 

north. It rapidly became apparent that a full-scale 

German counteroffensive was under way in the Ardennes. 

Patton quickly canceled the December offensive and 

implemented a contingency plan drawn some days 

previously. The XX Corps abandoned its uzearly bought 

bridgeheads over the Saar and assumed defensive positions 

on the west bank. On 20 December, XII Corps and 

III Corps, which had supervised the retraining of infantry 

fillers, shuffled divisions and turned north to strike the 

flank of the German penetration in the Ardennes. Third 

Army eventually assumed control of one other corps 

fighting in the Ardennes. The reorientation of a field 

army from east to north involved routing 12,000 vehicles 

along four roads, establishing a completely new set of 

supply points, and restructuring Third Army's entire 

31 
signals network 

Luxembourg. 

to support a new army headquarters in 

Bulge on 

Third Army troops entered the Battle of the 

22 December, 

Abrams of Arracourt 

and 4 days later LTC Creighton fame led his battalion of the 4th 

Armored Division to the relief of Bastogne. (See Map 14.) 

The Lorraine campaign, which began in September with 

the promise of imminent victory, ended in December with 

Third Army rushing north to help avert disaster in the 

Ardennes. What conclusions can be drawn from this costly and frustrating campaign? 

Historians and analysts have often criticized the American commanders in the Lorraine One shortcoming that they have identified campaign. 

was a 

toward overoptimism, tendency 

an understandable development given 

h, ALLIED LINES 20 DEC 

-II, PLANNED OFFENSIVE I 

--+ REDEPLCWMENT 

Map 14. Third Army Redeployment, 20-26 December 1944 

32 
the great victories won in July and August and the 

information generated by Ultra. The successful conduct of 

the operational level of war requires the commander to 

kook beyond the immediate battlefield and project himself 

forward in space and time, but this trait was carried to 

excess in Lorraine at the echelons above corps. From 

September to December, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton had 

their si hts set firmly beyond the Rhine. 

ff Consequently, they un erestimated the obstacles and opposition that 

their soldiers would have to overcome along the way. 

Thus, a difference in outlook arose between the higher commanders who drew large arrows on maps and the tactical 

units fighting for yards of muddy ground. 

General Patton can also be faulted for neglecting to 

practice economy of force. We have noted several 

instances in which Third Army's forces were spread out OR 

a broad front in an attempt to be strong everywhere with 

the result that they were decisively strong nowhere. In 

retrospect, the imp.ortant battle * September was 

XII Corps' fight around Nancy, and in !&vember the main 

effort was XX Corps' assault against Metz. And'yet Patton 

failed to concentrate Third Army's resources ' 

reinforcement of the corps engaged in decisi:: 

operations. Furthermore, Patton never made an attempt to 

punch through the German defenses with divisions in 

column, even though he received approval for such an 

operation from his superior, LTG Bradley. One rule of 

thumb for mechanized forces that emerged from World War II 

was to march dispersed but concentrate to fight. In 

Lorraine, Third Army fought dispersed. (See Map 15.) 

A similar criticism can be made of Patton's corps 

commanders. Walker and Eddy tended repeatedly to disperse 

their divisions and assign them missions beyond their 

means. We have seen several examples of important 

operations undertaken by divisions or parts of divisions 

without ade uate planning or 

8 though forces coul have been obtaine~"PPd)r~;gmeevnet"the effoFihEG 

practicing economy of force. The corps commanders were 

trapped between Patton, who continually urged aggressive action, and the grim realities of terrain, weather, and a 

determined enemy. Perhaps it is not surprising that at 

times Walker and Eddy became preoccupied with local 

problems and lost sight of the broader issues. As a 

result, at the corps level the Lorraine campaign was a 

disjointed affair, with little cooperation between corps, 

and little continuity from one operation to the next. 

However, such operations as the tank battle leading to 

Arracourt and the 90th Division crossing of the Moselle at 

Koenigsmacker demonstrated that the American corps 

commanders were not incapable of applying force in a 

flexible and decisive manner. 

33 
10 0 10 MILES I , I 

SCALE 

I 

Map 15. Third Army Operations in Lorraine 

The Lorraine campaign taught us some lessons in 

combined arms warfare. The tank and the airplane, two 

weapons which were commonly believed to have 

revolutionized warfare, were an unbeatable combination 

during the pursuit leading up to Lorraine. But when the 

enemy dug in and the weather turned bad S infantry, 

artillery, and engineers reemerged as the dominant arms. 

The critical shortage of infantry fillers demonstrated 

that the American high command had failed to anticipate 

this development. _ 

This campaign also demonstrated some of the drawbacks 

associated with the concept of a relatively Light division 

reinforced by corps attachments. The triangular division 

embodied the characteristics of mobility and maneuver, but 

in Lorraine it was repeatedly employed in direct assaults 

against an emplaced enemy. The heavy casualties that 

34 
occurred sin such operations were more than the triangular division could sustain, with the result that the entire 

division was often rendered virtually combat ineffective 

and had to be withdrawn from the line to rebuild. Perhaps the division, corps, and army commanders should be faulted 

for failing to utilize a greater degree of maneuver for 

which the triangular division was much better suited. The 

concept” of plugging in temporary reinforcements from corps 

was seldom practiced as prescribed by doctrine. Instead, 

corps tended to assign combat and support elements to the 

division on a semipermanent basis, thus making up for some 

of the muscle that the triangular division lacked 

organically. 

The American armored elements were not at their best 

in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the 

weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army commander for binding his armored divisions into 

infantry-heavy corps. Patton’s reluctance to mass his 

armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who 

believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful 

in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting them. At a lower level, the combat command concept provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized 

control, but it also tempted .Patton’s corps commanders to 

break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat 

commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army’s armored punch. Organizationally, the Armored Division of 

1944 proved to be weak in infantry, a shortcoming often 

made good by detaching battalions from infantry divisions 

and assigning them to armored combat commands. 

Ln addition, American tank crews repeatedly paid a 

heavy price for a doctrinal decision made before the war 

that declared tanks to be offensive weapons not intended 

for defensive combat against other tanks. As a result of 

this official policy, the M-4 Sherman tanks in Lorraine 

were badly outgunned by German panzers that mounted superb 

antitank pieces. The tank-stopping task was officially assigned to the tank destroyers, which were supposed to be 

thinly armored, highly mobile, heavily armed antitank 

specialists. Dot tr ine called for the majority of tank 

destroyers to be pooled in special corps and army antitank 

reserves t which could rush to the scene of an armored 

attack anywhere along the front. But Third Army didn’t 

need an antitank reserve in Lorraine because German tanks 

usually appeared a few at a time. 

destroyer concqpt 

Consequently, the tank 

was discarded after the war, when the 

U-S. Army decided that the best weapon to stop a tank was 

another adequately armed tank. 

35 
Finally, the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful 

and aggressive the commanding general may be. In the 

August pursuit that brought Third Army to Lorraine, General Patton daringly violated tac.tical principles and 

conducted improvised operations with great 

discovered, 

success. He 

however, that the violation of 

principles ' an unforgiving and cumulative 

Sooner or litser 

matter. 

every improvisation and shortcut taken 

must be repaid. Third Army's logl'stical shortcuts 

included burning up gasoline reserves to keep an advance 

going and then neglecting ammunition supply to bring up 

gasoline. The slowdown that affected all of the Allied 

forces in September and October was the inevitable price 

to be paid for gambling logistically that the war could be 

ended in August. Moreover, in spite of the logistical mobility afforded by motorization, remember that the 

trucks running the Red Ball Express consumed a greater and 

greater proportion of their the advance 

progressed, forcing Third Army tocgt"Rsto ";"wo time-honored 

methods of supply --railroad transport and local 

requisition. 

The lessons of the Lorraine campaign were not akl 

negative. The American soldier proved himself capable of 

carrying the fight to a determined enemy under adverse 

conditions, a lesson that would be demonstrated even more 

conclusively in the Battle of the Bulge. Armored troops 

more than held their own against an enemy possessing superior equipment. Infantry formations endured trench 

foot and debilitating casualty rates. The artillery"s ability to mass its fire at critical points was tactically 

decisive time after time. Engineers performed miracles in 

their efforts to keep Third Army moving in spite of 

demolitions and floods. Support troops overcame 

logistical nightmares through ingenuity and sheer hard 

work. When the weather permitted, the Army Air Force 

blasted out enemy strongpoints in close cooperation with 

the ground elements, denied the enemy the use of the roads 

in daylight, and forced him to abandon tactics that had 

worked against every other opponent. 

Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From 

September through November, Third Army claimed to have 

inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to 

capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved 

an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required 

over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, 

approximately one-third of the total number of casualties 

it sustained in the entire European war. (See Map 16.1 

36 
Map 16. Third Army Gains, September-December 1944, Lorraine 

Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a 

springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton 

turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the 

Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed 

after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its 

operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine 

campaign will always remain a controversial episode in 

American military history. 

37 ’ 

-- 
SUGGESTER READINGS 

Bennett, Ralph. Ultra in the WesL. New York: 

Scribner's, 1980. 

Bykofsky, Joseph, and Harold Larson. The Transportation 

Corps: Operations Overseas. U.S. Army in World War 

Washlngton, DC: 

story, 1957‘ 

Office of the Chief of Military 

Cole, Hugh M. The Lorraine Campaign. U.S. Army in World 

War II. Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. 

Army, 1950. 

Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Robert R. Palmer, and 

Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground -Combat 

Troops. U.S. -- Army-in WorldTar II. Washington, DC: 

Historical Division, U.S. War Department, 1947. 

Kemp, Anthony. The Unknown Battle: Metz, 1944. New 

York: Stein and Day, 1981. 

Koch, Oscar W. G-2: Intelligence for Patton. 

Philadelphia: Whitmore, 1971. -- 

MacDonald, Charles B.. and Sidnev T. Mathews. Three 

Battles: Arnaville; Altuzzo, and Schmidt. U.S. Army G-World War II.'- Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 

of Military History, 1952': 

Mayo, Lida. The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and 

Battlefront. U.S. Army in World War II. -J&Ziington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968. 

Mellenthin, F. W. von. Panzer Battles. Norman, OK: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. 

Ross) William F. The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in ----- the War Against Ger: manv, ~ U.S. 

Washington, DC: Office of 

Armv in World War II. , ~~ the Chief of Military History, 1965. 

U,S. War Department. General Staff. Small Unit Actions. 

American Forces in Action Series. WashingtoY,--Er Historical Division, War Department, [1946f. See 

"Singling (4th Armored Division, 6 December 1944)." 
A~~~TT~~A~T~~~ 

Dr. Christopher R. Gabel is an associate professor 

at the Cembat Studies iinstitute, U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College, Fort leavenworth, Kansas. 

He received his bachelor’s degree at The Pennsykania 

State University and earned MA. and Ph.D. degrees 

the inteowao and Warld War 

COMBAT STUDEES WSTfTUTE 

~is~~~~ 

The Combat Studies institute was established can 18 June 1979 as a department-revel activity 

within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort ~eave~~~rt~~ Kansas. CSI has the 

following missions: 

1. Conduct research DR historical topics pertinent to dactrkal cuncerns of the Army and publish 

the results in a variety af formats for the Active Army and Reserve ~om~~flemts. 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at ~~~~~~~ and assist other U~A~~S~ 

departments in integrating military history into their instruction. 

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Cammand’s executive agent for the deve~~~me~t 

anc$ coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the 

~~A~~~ service school system. 

4. Direct the ~~rn~i~ed Arms Center”s historical program. 
.