EUROPEAN ADAPTATION TO EXPEDITIONARY

WARFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Andrew Dorman

November 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-106-7

ii
FOREWORD

Organizations created to fight the last war better are not going to win

the next.

General James M. Gavin

The NATO Alliance deterred Soviet aggression towards

Western Europe by maintaining a large ground force of several

corps supported by numerous air armadas. Success lay partly on

vigilance and partly on the large heavy mechanized and armored

divisions, which were suited for intensive combat in Central

Europe. That era has passed, unlikely to be replicated again. To

its credit, the Alliance recognized this change and began adapting

almost immediately.

In this monograph, Dr. Andrew Dorman briefly examines the

European response to the changing security environment and the

opportunities presented by the European Security and Defense

Policy Expeditionary Force. As he correctly observes, the

establishment of a European expeditionary force will be no easy

matter, will require substantial investment, and will take years

to complete. However, it is the right course for Europe to take.

The European Union (EU) cannot manage emerging security

issues using Cold War legacy forces because they are too

ponderous to deploy. A lighter, more nimble expeditionary force is

critical to EU policy.

Dr. Dorman also points out that the United States must

remain involved in the EU initiatives. Europe cannot go it alone

and will need advice and perhaps even material support if it is to

realize its ambitious agenda.

This monograph was written under the Strategic Studies

Institute (SSI) External Research Associates Program. SSI is

pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of debate concerning

European security issues.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW DORMAN is a lecturer and a research associate

at the Centre for Defence Studies. He previously taught at

the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich and at the

University of Birmingham where he completed his master’s

and doctoral degrees. He has worked for Birmingham’s

Security Studies Research Program and is a regular

lecturer at the Southampton University Defence Studies

Unit. He is a founding member of the Defence Diplomacy

Research Group at King’s College London. Dr. Dorman is a

noted author of several books on policy, military, and

security issues, notably Defense under Thatcher, 1979-89,

March 2002; The Changing Face of Military Power, March

2002, and Britain and Defence 1945-2000: A Policy

Re-evaluation (with S. Croft, W. Rees and M.R.H. Uttley).

He currently holds research awards from the Leverhulme

Trust and British Academy.

iv
SUMMARY

As has North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the

European Union (EU) is adapting to the changing regional

and global security environment in the wake of the Cold

War. Almost immediately, Europe began to recognize that it

could not barricade itself from the world and live off the

peace dividend while instability rampaged along its border.

The existing European security organizations (Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe [OSCE],

Western European Union [WEU]) were ill-suited to deal

with the host of new challenges, and as the Balkans conflicts

revealed, the European contribution to NATO had fallen

woefully behind.

European relevance in the security arena required the

EU to develop an expeditionary force capability. After

nearly a decade of evolution, the concept of a European

expeditionary force developed and formed the centerpiece of

the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) generated during the 1999 EU Helsinki Summit.

Primarily intended for the Petersberg Tasks—

humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, and use of combat

forces in crisis management including peacemaking—the

expeditionary force shall comprise 50,000 to 60,000 troops,

with an additional 140,000 troops in support of extended

operations. A 5,000-strong police contingent shall

supplement the force by providing crisis management

expertise. To wean Europe from the United States, the EU

will procure sufficient air- and sealift (and sharing of

airframes within the EU under the Air Transport and Air

Refuelling Exchange of Services (ATARES) agreement;

logistics; Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR);

and combat support to provide it with the capability to

deploy the force within 60 days and sustain it for a year.

v
The headline goal is both ambitious and difficult.

Realization of the expeditionary force will require European

states to reform or abolish conscription; restructure their

forces (modularize) to permit multinational formations;

invest significantly in airlift (Airbus A400M) to develop a

European Air Transport Command; and, improve sealift

and sea power capabilities. Moreover, the EU must increase

its precision attack and C4ISR capabilities significantly if it

wishes to operate alongside the United States.

The United States can foster the development of the

ESDP expeditionary force by:

 monitoring EU progress as it develops a light,

expeditionary force;

 encouraging modularization of European units;

 encouraging NATO to cover shortfalls in areas such as

supression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), sealift, and

airlift;

 encouraging NATO to conduct structural reforms to

enable it to conduct multiple contingency operations;

 remaining patient, as EU reforms will be slow;

 considering adoption of the ATARES model for

increased capability sharing;

 offering the EU the C-17 should the Airbus A400M

fail;

 offering the U.S. Civil Reserve Fleet and Naval Ready

Reserve Fleet systems for EU study;

 encouraging the Europeans to explore off-the-shelf

technology as a cost saving measure;

 formalizing embarkation and debarkation as part of

NATO mission essential task listing;

vi
 encouraging Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force

equivalent for southern Europe;

 encouraging EU development of joint surveillance,

target attack radar systems (JSTARS);

 encouraging full implementation of the Helsinki

Headline Goals, especially C4ISR, precision attack,

and sustainability; and,

 encouraging consortiums within the EU as well as

between the EU and the United States.

The establishment of an EU expeditionary force makes

sense because it increases burden-sharing and also

symbolizes shared risk in between the United States and

Europe. Now that Europe is secure, the time is ripe for

Europe to take on added security responsibilities.

vii
EUROPEAN ADAPTATION

TO EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S ARMY

INTRODUCTION

The issue of European defense has been the source of far

greater conflict since the end of the Cold War than during it.

During the Cold War, Europe was dominated by the

confrontation between the superpowers, with virtually all

the states of Europe either formally or informally members

of one or other alliance. Since 1989 Europe has witnessed

significant change—the Soviet Union has collapsed and the

Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) no longer exists, while

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has found

itself involved for the first time in the actual application of

force in Yugoslavia.

Further afield, the end of the Cold War has brought little

respite. The previously reticent attitude of the European

powers to the deployment of their military forces outside the

NATO region has given way to the commitment of

significant military forces in a variety of operations both

within and outside Europe. These have included the Gulf

War and the subsequent operation to relieve the Kurds in

Northern Iraq, peace support operations in Cambodia,

humanitarian operations in Somalia, operations throughout the Balkans, with Macedonia looking set to be the next

deployment, and the dispatch of British troops to Sierra

Leone.

While all this has been going on, there has been a

significant battle over the changing security agenda. At one

level, the various security organizations within Europe, the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE), Western European Union (WEU), NATO, and

European Union (EU), have all sought to take charge of the

security agenda. Initially the OSCE (then the Conference on

1
Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]) was viewed as

the favorite with many, particularly in Central and Eastern

Europe, viewing NATO as a defunct organization similar to

the WTO. However, with the CSCE’s failure during the

early stages of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the WEU

currently folding into the EU, we have been left with two

dominant European security organizations—NATO and the

EU.

At the same time, the security agenda has been

challenged.1 For example, while President of the European

Commission (EC) Jacques Delors concluded:

[w]e cannot limit our horizons to the new Europe. All around us,

naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and

underdevelopment are combining to create potentially

dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization

and conflict, aggravated by the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction.

The Community must face this challenge. If it is to be worthy of

the European ideal it must square up to the challenges of

history and shoulder its share of the political and military

responsibilities of our old nations, which have always left their

mark on history.2

More recently, Britain’s current Labour government has

sought to set out an internationalist agenda. At a key speech

made in Chicago during the celebrations of NATO’s 50th

anniversary, Prime Minister Tony Blair reinforced this

point:

Twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo.

The fact that we are engaged is the result of a wide range of

changes—the end of the Cold War, changing technology; the

spread of democracy. But it is bigger than that. I believe the

world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalization

has transformed economies and our working practices. But

globalization is not just economic, it is also a political and

security phenomenon.3

2
While all this has been going on, there has been

significant change to Europe’s armed forces. Since 1989

they have invariably been reduced in size, and there has

been a slow shift away from conscription in favor of

professional forces. They also have begun to be reorientated

away from their Cold War threat-based tasking with its

emphasis on home defense, towards an expeditionary

warfare capability in different forms. However, the progress

has generally been slow, and in Kosovo the Europeans found

themselves totally dependent upon America for the conduct

of the majority of the air campaign.4 When the Americans

subsequently put a limit on their own ground deployment,

the Europeans struggled to put sufficient land forces

together in time to implement the peace agreement.5

Commentating after the conflict, European Commissioner Chris Patten stated:

The first point is that, frankly, Europe is failing to pull its

weight in NATO. The statistics are telling. The European

members of NATO spend around 60 percent of what the USA

spends on defense, but our capacity to project military force is

10-15 percent of Washington’s. With some 2 million in our

military forces, we scarcely deploy 2 percent of that number for

the Kosovo operation. Three-quarters of the aircraft,

four-fifths of the ordnance and most of the intelligence in the

former Yugoslavia was provided by the U.S. That makes us

weaker allies than we should be. We have to put these defects

right.6

This view is shared within NATO. The Secretary-General

recently summarized the problem thus:

[T]ough decisions on defense restructuring and defense

spending have to be made now. Because unless nations

provide the necessary and in some cases missing defense

capabilities, the scope for political decision making and action

by NATO or the EU would be seriously limited.7

The author therefore seeks to examine the reality behind

the European rhetoric about force capability and makes

3
recommendations for the U.S. Army. This monograph has

been divided into four parts:

First, it will set out six reasons, some new and some old,

why European states either singularly, in groups, or

collectively will use military force in an expeditionary

fashion.

Next, it will examine how the two key security

institutions within Europe, the EU and NATO, have

adapted to the changing strategic environment and assess

their proposed developments.

Then, it will identify trends in Europe’s power projection

capabilities. This will include an examination of changes in

posture, force makeup, and procurement programs.

Finally, it will critically evaluate the extent to which the

changes in Europe’s defense priorities match the likely

threat scenarios and force development plans. Implications

for the U.S. Army will then be drawn and recommendations

made.

SIX REASONS FOR SENDING

THE CAVALRY

Six principal reasons exist why the European states,

either individually or collectively, will continue to resort to

deploying expeditionary forces. First, Europe contains a

number of former colonial powers, each with a long history

of using military intervention. A history of colonization has

left Britain and France, in particular, with vestiges of their

empires which continue to require their support, while

others still retain an interest in their former colonies. An

example of this occurred in 1991 when the French and

Belgians flew troops into the former Belgian colony of Zaire

to organize the evacuation of Western nations and help

suppress rioting. More recently, the British government felt

it necessary to deploy forces to Sierra Leone, initially as part

of a Services-led evacuation but later in support of the

fledgling democratic government.

4
Second, Europe’s dependence upon other states for the

supply of essential raw materials including oil has received

renewed interest. This led then WEU Secretary-General

Willem van Eekelen to argue that the movement of defense

policy within Europe towards the protection of its wider

interests will result in a greater linking of foreign and

defense policy. This would be in line with the Clausewitzian

argument of military force becoming the extension of

foreign and economic policy.8 More recently, Britain’s

Strategic Defense Review (SDR) expressly argued that, as a

defense review, it was foreign policy-led, and SDR has been

seen within Europe as a model for others.9

Third, external political pressure for the use of military

intervention will continue. The United States historically

has called upon its European allies for joint action when its

own interests have been involved. The European states

have also as individuals been firm supporters of United

Nations (U.N.) operations. As the U.N. requirement for such

operations remains the requisite force, contributions from

Europe are likely to remain. Moreover, Europe has three of

the five permanent members of the Security Council—

Russia, France and the United Kingdom. In the case of the

latter two, their continued presence on the Security Council

has been linked to their support to U.N. operations.

Fourth, the threat posed by the spread of ballistic

missiles and weapons of mass destruction encourages the

use of preventative military action. Concern has long been

expressed in this area, notably in Britain’s 1993 Defense

Estimates,10 although less emphasis has been placed upon

the issue of national missile defense than on the option of

preemptive action.

Fifth, the ramifications of ethnic unrest in the states

bordering Europe have caused growing fear. Since the end

of the Cold War, turmoil in the Balkans has led the various

states of Europe to deploy a significant number of troops to

Bosnia and Kosovo. Europe’s experience of World War I has

left its leaders with a particular fear of conflict escalation

5
within the region, and the area remains a source of

deep-seated rivalry. Moreover, the political unrest that

percolates in the North African and Near East regions is a

source of concern since they have access to Europe.

Sixth, internal politics increasingly have had an

important influence as foreign and domestic policy become

more entwined. In particular, domestic public opinion

influenced by the media has an important role to play

vis-à-vis the humanitarian intervention element within

military intervention.11

INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION

The change in the security environment led the states of

Europe to reconsider their security goals. The Cold War

emphasis upon consensus within NATO and the WEU was

rapidly undermined. This was nowhere more clearly

evident than in the approaches of the three principal West

European states—France, Britain and Germany—in 1989

to the future institutional map. France had been unable to

affect Alliance policy significantly ever since it had

withdrawn from NATO’s integrated military structure in

1966.12 This did not present a problem while policy

remained fairly static during the Cold War. However, the

events of 1989 required NATO to undergo significant

changes in order to survive. The French position meant that

their influence on this process of deciding changes in

Alliance policy was very limited. Within the WEU, however,

the active French involvement allowed them to have a far

greater say, particularly as a result of their close

relationship with Germany in both the EU and WEU. Thus,

during the early 1990s, the French emphasized the role of

the WEU as a separate security organization allied to the

EU rather than as a pillar of the Anglo-Saxon dominated

NATO. Yet France still wished to retain an American

military presence in Europe, albeit reduced, as a counter to

any German revanchism, and it could, therefore, only afford

6
to downplay the role of NATO rather than seek its abolition

altogether.

Britain, by way of contrast, had a significant level of

influence within NATO and felt that any shift away from

NATO in favor of the WEU could only have an adverse effect

upon British interests. Furthermore, the WEU lacked a

U.S. presence, and Britain, under successive Prime

Ministers, wished to preserve what vestiges of the “special

relationship” that remained with the United States. Thus

the British called for the full participation of France within

NATO, rather than emphasizing the WEU, knowing full

well that, of the three principal military posts within the

Atlantic Alliance, Britain was guaranteed one and the

United States the remaining two.13 Furthermore, a more

independent WEU allied to the EU posed significant

internal political problems for the then governing

Conservative administration with its deep divisions over

Europe.

The German position was ambiguous. On the one hand,

it wished to maintain the U.S. presence and involvement in

Europe through NATO, while on the other, it wished to

promote European integration and the developing special

relationship that Chancellor Kohl had with President

Mitterrand of France. However, for Germany the question

of the reunification with East Germany was a more pressing

priority. The remaining members of the WEU were arrayed

between the British and French perspectives.

As a result, the early and mid-1990s witnessed a

considerable amount of European rivalry for control of the

European security agenda. In the immediate aftermath of

the end of the Cold War, the various institutions were the

main forum for interstate rivalry, which brought these

institutions into direct conflict with one another and hence

delayed institutional adaptation.

However, since the mid-1990s, this has begun to change.

The experience in the Gulf and the early years of the

Yugoslav crisis encouraged France, under Chirac, to work

7
with NATO, and there began to be talk of France reentering

the integrated military structure. At the same time, Britain,

under Major, sought to develop the EU’s ability to

undertake collective action.14

This part of the monograph will not address the

management changes directly but instead focus on how

NATO and the EU have adapted towards an expeditionary

capability. It will be undertaken in two parts: first, through

an examination of NATO, and second, via an analysis of the

EU (the WEU will be considered under the EU given its

absorption by the EU).

NATO.

The need for economic and political reform within the

states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union tended to

preoccupy NATO. Nevertheless, at the July 1990 meeting of

the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the London Declaration

was issued.15 This was the Alliance’s first real statement of

intent on how it proposed to provide security in the

post-Cold War era. In this declaration the Alliance agreed to

extend NATO’s remit to the political dimensions of security

in recognition of the fact that security and stability are not

purely defined in terms of the military balance. More

importantly, from a capabilities point of view the Alliance

agreed to develop a new military strategy, which moved

away from “Forward Defense” towards a more relaxed

posture modifying “Flexible Response.” This aimed to

develop smaller, more mobile multinational forces, with

reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons.

In November 1991 the NAC agreed with the Alliance’s

New Strategic Concept. In the accompanying press release,

the members agreed that “[T]he challenges we will face in

this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by

one institution alone, but only in a framework of

interlocking institutions tying together the countries of

Europe and North America.”16 The new strategic concept

acknowledged that the Cold War military confrontation was

8
over, and that the security challenges faced by NATO were

now multifaceted and multidirectional in nature.17

On the military side, the Defense Planning Committee

(attended by all members with the exception of France)

approved measures aimed at implementing the new

Alliance strategy. Of the three major commands, the Allied

Command Channel (ACChan) was eliminated, thus ending

Britain’s control of one of the three major commands.18 Two

main changes occurred. One was the creation of a standing

naval force in the Mediterranean (STANDNAVFORMED)

in response to the lessons of the Gulf War about the

exposure of NATO’s southern flank.19 Second, and more

significantly, was the creation of the Allied Command

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) based on a pool of 10

divisions under British command.

The January 1994 summit finally resolved a number of

issues, with, for example, agreement to partake in

out-of-area peacekeeping operations under U.N. auspices.

More importantly, the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs)

idea was agreed upon, which presented the WEU with the

opportunity of using NATO command, control, and support

facilities in operations where it was felt that the WEU would

be a more suitable body to act than NATO. This also had

useful practical implications in that, where the Americans

were less inclined to get involved, the Europeans could still

obtain American logistical support in areas where they had

no comparable capability. Unfortunately, the idea behind

the CJTF concept has never been fully implemented, but it

is now accepted that, while it was originally earmarked as a

tool of the WEU, the mantle has now passed to the EU.

After the adoption of the CJTF concept, attention within

NATO was primarily focused on the enlargement issue and

supporting the Dayton agreement. As a result, improvements to NATO’s capabilities languished. Finally, with the

Kosovo conflict as a backdrop, it was agreed in April 1999 at

the Washington Conference to adopt a New Strategic

Concept and implement the Defense Capabilities Initiative

9
(DCI).20 The latter sets out targets for Alliance improvements for both Article 5 and Nonarticle 5 operations.

A number of lessons from Kosovo have been drawn

within NATO, the majority of which had already been

identified in the DCI. One additional lesson drawn by the

military staff has been the need to reconsider NATO’s

existing force structures to support Nonarticle 5 as well as

Article 5 operations. Currently, the ARRC is NATO’s single

deployable corps headquarters with the result that, once

this unit is deployed, NATO has no other available corps

headquarters to deploy. This was clearly evident when it

came to relieve the ARRC in Kosovo.

One suggestion has been to create three Higher

Readiness Corps, each supported by two lower readiness

corps.21 The goal of such a structure is two-fold. First, it

would enable NATO to undertake up to three simultaneous

Nonarticle 5 operations at corps level at any time. Second, it

has a built-in rotation structure, thus dealing with the

problem of what happens after the initial deployment.

While not formally approved as yet, these proposals reflect

the ongoing movement in NATO’s command structure away

from territorial defense towards expeditionary warfare. The

major limiting factors in these changes are, first, the

absence of France from the integrated military structure;

and second, the issue of cost in financial and institutional

priorities. Enlargement remains a major issue for NATO.

European Union.

The WEU, rather than the EU, was initially seen as the

main forum for a European military capability. The

importance and role of the WEU in the post-Cold War world

was discussed in December 1990 at the WEU Council of

Ministers.22 The subsequent communiqué highlighted the

three areas of contention within the WEU, the resolution of

which dogged WEU discussions throughout the period: (1)

the role of the WEU with the emergence of political union;

10
(2) the relationship of the WEU to NATO; and (3) the

question of out-of-area activities.23

Subsequently, at the EU’s Maastricht meeting, the

Treaty on Political Union was signed which established a

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the

WEU’s relationship to the EU. This aimed “to strengthen

the security of the Union and its Member States in all

ways”24 and, in practice, the WEU was seen as the main

organization for implementing the military side of security

policy with the EU providing the other elements.

The members of the WEU agreed to this and promised to

provide the requisite structures and means to carry out the

tasks of the EU as the French and Germans had wanted. To

facilitate this, it was agreed to move the WEU Council and

Secretariat to Brussels in order to be closer to the European

Commission and also to the NATO headquarters at Mons.

The WEU members also agreed to make military units

answerable to the WEU, with many of them also earmarked

to NATO (double-hatting).

In June 1992 the WEU Ministerial Council met, and the

resulting Petersberg Declaration attempted to tackle some

of the practical issues.25 It defined when the WEU would be

used, and these became known as the Petersberg Tasks:

 humanitarian and rescue tasks;

 peacekeeping tasks; and,

 tasks of combat forces in crisis management,

including peacemaking.

Despite these steps, only a little progress was made

subsequently despite NATO’s CJTF concept designed with

the WEU primarily in mind.

Developments in EU/WEU defense capabilities

continued to founder until the EU’s Amsterdam summit in

June 1997 where the European leaders agreed to provide a

crisis management mechanism for the EU partners.26 More

11
significantly, the United Kingdom launched the European

Defense Initiative at an informal EU summit in October

1998. At the Franco-British meeting at St. Malo in

December 1998, they agreed that the EU “must have the

capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military

forces, the means to use them, and a readiness to do so, in

order to respond to international crises.”27

However, progress remained slow, and the weaknesses

in European capabilities were painfully exposed during the

Kosovo conflict. This led to a Franco-British call for a

European intervention capability at corps level.28 The Joint

Declaration issued in London in November 1999 by the

British and French Governments gave a renewed impetus

to the St. Malo Declaration and put concrete proposals

forward, which were subsequently endorsed at the EU’s

Helsinki Summit.29

The Helsinki meeting in December 1999 marked an

historic breakthrough. It was finally decided to give

practical effect to the ambitions of the Amsterdam Treaty

and the Cologne European Council Declaration by

establishing a European military capability.30 In summary,

the:

EU Member States committed themselves to concrete goals for

capability improvement. They specified the scale of armed

forces that they should be able to deploy rapidly, with the right

skills and equipment, and able to sustain in a theatre of

operations until the military job is done. They agreed by the

year 2003 they should have modernised their armed forces so as

to be able to draw from a pool of deployable units (15 brigades) to

tackle the most demanding crisis management tasks, in

operations up to corps level (up to 50,000 to 60,000 personnel,

together with appropriate air and naval elements). These forces

are to be militarily self-sustaining for at least a year. The EU

Member States also agreed to develop collective capability goals

in such fields as command and control and strategic transport,

to address the specific capability shortfalls identified in the

audit of European capability undertaken by the Western

European Union.31

12
In reality, Helsinki’s goal of 50,000-60,000 troops equals

roughly 200,000 with rotation.32 But more than that, it has

necessitated a fundamental rethinking of the EU’s role. A

number of steps have been taken. Both the Council of

Minister’s Higher Representative and the European

Commission have created crisis centers to help manage

operations involving such forces. A Political and Security

Committee has been set up to help define policies by

developing options,33 and this has been matched by a

Military Staff tasked with providing strategic level but not

operational planning to the Council of Ministers.

From a NATO perspective, Deputy Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and the Supreme

Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) have been

identified as primary candidates for Operational

Commander and Military Strategic Operational

headquarters, and DSACEUR will act as strategic

coordinator between EU and NATO in peacetime and force

generator during a crisis.34

The Helsinki goals require the ability to deploy within 60

days and sustain for a year forces up to corps level by 2003.

Such a force is supposed to be self-sufficient with necessary

C3I, logistics, combat support, and appropriate air and sea

assets.35 To achieve this, a force catalogue has been

developed bearing significant similarities to the DCI.

Moreover, Helsinki included the creation of mechanisms

for handling civilian aspects of crisis management.36 This is

an area where the EU has the potential to provide a far

greater capability than NATO. According to Chris Patten:

Our experience with humanitarian aid, election monitoring,

police deployment and training, border control, institution

building, mine clearance, arms control and destruction,

combating illicit trafficking, embargo enforcement and

counter terrorism shows how comprehensive the

Commission’s roles already are.37

13
To support this, EU members have agreed to make 5,000

police officers available by 2003 within 60 days, with 1,000

to go within 30 days.38

These goals are ambitious, and it is clearly early in the

EU’s achievement of such capabilities. The one conceptual

area lacking is the types of operation envisaged for such a

force. Officially it is supposed to cover the full Petersberg

range and to expressly exclude collective security. Two

types of EU operations have been suggested: first, those

using NATO capabilities and assets; and second, those

without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities utilizing

an existing national or multinational command.39 However,

few within the EU are able to give any scenarios with any

conviction apart from the EU taking over a NATO mission

once the warfighting side of things has been complete and

the United States no longer wishes to be involved.

Moreover, the majority of these initiatives are at the

embryonic stage and their subsequent development cannot

be predicted.

MILITARY ADAPTATION

Military adaptation to expeditionary warfare, like

institutional adaptation, generally has been slow. An

official French Minister of Defense analysis of Kosovo

follows:

This conflict illuminated the differences between the military

means of the United States and Europe. The United States has

developed extremely large military means that are justified by

America’s world ambition since the end of the Second World

War. These gaps also result from the research efforts and

armament programs underway since the beginning of the 1980s.

. . . Our technological backwardness in certain areas, such as

information mastery in real time or stealth, is linked to the

lower level of financial means allocated to research (Europe’s

defense research budget is a third of the U.S. one) rather than to

the know-how of European companies. The Kosovo conflict has,

moreover, revealed quantitative deficiencies that could affect

our ability to sustain an operation of long duration as well as

14
capabilities that were completely lacking (cruise missiles,

radar satellite observation systems, offensive jammers,

aircraft identification systems).40

As the Cold War came to an end, the effects of the world

recession had already begun to put increasing pressure on

individual European governments to reduce defense

budgets prior to the changes brought about by the

revolutions in Eastern Europe. Domestic public opinion was

well ahead of the political leaders in reacting to events in

Eastern Europe and rising unemployment at home. In

response, defense budgets throughout Western Europe, and

indeed throughout Eastern Europe, began to suffer

significant cutbacks in real terms in anticipation of the

reductions that would be required with the successful

completion of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

process.41 Politicians from a variety of different persuasions

spoke of the “Peace Dividend” that would be available as a

consequence of these changes.

With few exceptions, a number of trends have become

clear in the defense budgets of the European states. The

initial planned reductions were largely overtaken by

further cutbacks with the exception of Sweden, France, and

Greece.42 However, even these states have had to make

further reductions. Thus in the United Kingdom, the

Options for Change review was rapidly followed by

Frontline First: The Defense Costs Study.

43 These reviews

have generally been about reducing overall numbers and

made token adjustments to force makeup. In effect, change

equalled less of the same. Only in the last few years have

some of the European states embarked upon a third wave of

reviews aimed at fundamentally addressing their

requirement to develop an expeditionary capability. In this,

the Bosnia and more recently the Kosovo experience has

added impetus. Here the Strategic Defense Review (SDR)

has been seen as the role model for such third generation

reviews.44 The SDR marked the United Kingdom’s formal

return to an expeditionary capability and set out a number

of force goals.

15
This part will therefore examine some of the key

post-Cold War trends in Europe’s military. These are: the

professionalization of Europe’s military—mobility,

precision attack, and Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

(C4ISR). While these do not cover the full range of changes

that have taken place, they encompass many of the key

areas identified in the DCI, the WEU audit of capabilities,

and the EU’s catalogue of capability requirements.

Moreover, they are key requirements for an expeditionary

capability and reflect many of the current dilemmas

confronting defense planners.

Professionalization of Europe’s Military.

The Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union had

encouraged the various European states to introduce

conscription in one form or another. This helped to provide

relatively large military forces at low cost. However, as the

Cold War came to an end, the Western world was confronted

by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. In Europe, both the

United Kingdom and France led the way in contributing

forces. Britain was unusual in that it had abandoned

conscription during the 1960s and was thus able to draw

upon its regular forces. In contrast, France found it difficult

to raise sufficient forces. The use of conscripts outside

France, and more generally in a war of choice rather than

one of national survival, was difficult, and France was

forced to replace rapidly its conscripts with regulars in those

units scheduled for deployment to the Gulf. Other countries

were to find similar problems in other operations, such as

the Italian deployment in support of the U.N. peacekeeping

force to Mozambique.

As a result, there has been a general move away from

conscript forces towards the maintenance of all-volunteer

forces. Such practice has been adopted by such countries as

Holland, France, and Belgium. This trend has not been

universal, with some states wishing to preserve conscrip16
tion for cultural, societal, or home defense reasons. Sweden

and Norway are good examples of those retaining

conscription. Consequently, a number of states have sought

a halfway house position, increasing the proportion of

professional forces and reducing the number, and often

length, of conscriptions. Germany, Italy, and Spain are all

good examples of this.

This trend has caused a number of problems. In practice,

this means that there is a steadily expanding manpower

pool within Europe available for use in expeditionary

warfare, even though the overall European military

manpower pool is diminishing. As a result, individual

European states will be more willing to support initial

operations; however, sustaining operations in the long run

may be problematic. An extreme example of this would be

the British experience of 1999 when the Kosovo

peacekeeping mission brought the deployment level of the

British armed forces to 47 percent for a brief period.45 From

an EU point of view, it has received commitments of more

than 100,000 troops for its on-call corps capability, but it has

insufficient troops to provide the requisite rotation if it is

required to undertake a long-term task at corps level.

Also within this process of adaptation, there have been

increasing moves towards the modularization of units below

the divisional level in order to provide building blocks for

operations, together with the creation of headquarters units

to manage multinational operations.46 This is good;

however, the various states are all doing this differently. In

the French case, they have adjusted their army to 51

regiments grouped into 9 brigades. Above the brigade level,

four divisional headquarters are available for operations,

which can also draw on a pool of divisional assets together

with the most appropriate mix of the nine brigades. In

contrast, the Germans have earmarked certain brigades for

the expeditionary role,47 while the United Kingdom is

implementing a system of brigade rotation to provide

various levels of unit availability.

17
These changes have not been without costs, and each of

these armed forces has had to reconsider its force makeup,

particularly in the areas of logistical and administrative

support. These support systems have generally taken far

longer to adjust because they have received less priority and

because a number of the problems have only emerged with

the shift to professional forces. The retention of personnel in

the wake of an overall reduction in the number of personnel

matched to the financial cost of professional armed forces

has also become an issue.

Mobility.

In conjunction with the movement towards professionalization, a steady increase in the emphasis given to

mobility has occurred. This is most clearly illustrated by the

ARRC and the rows surrounding what is now known as the

A400M transport aircraft. But progress has been very slow,

and the Kosovo experience, more than any other recent

operation, highlighted Europe’s inability to deploy ground

forces rapidly. General Sir Michael Jackson was only able to

deploy nine battalion units on the first day of ground

operation, four of which were British (two having arrived in

the preceding 96 hours). By the second day, two additional

battalions had arrived from France and the United

Kingdom.48

As a result, there have been moves to improve this

situation in three ways. First, have been calls to improve

airlift. As part of Helsinki, the EU states agreed to prepare

to develop a European Air Transport Command.49 The main

procurement program to support this is the Airbus A400M,

which had its memorandum of understanding at the recent

Paris air show. This included firm orders for 196 aircraft

plus probable options for Italy of 16. This program, if

completed, will significantly improve Europe’s ability to

deploy forces by air. Such a force will provide a significantly

enhanced lift capability and facilitate the carriage of some

outsized loads. Moreover, since it is a collaborative program,

18
it will mean interoperability is less of a problem, and there is

the potential to use this as a larger pool of aircraft under the

auspices of the Air Transport Command.50

A number of states have also purchased the new generation of Hercules transport aircraft. More significantly, the

United Kingdom has leased four C-17s from Boeing for 7

years, pending the delivery of A400Ms into service.51 The

first two of these aircraft have already been delivered and

have restored a capability lost with the retirement of the

Belfast fleet during the 1970s. The deal is important for it

marks a means by which a European state has been able to

acquire a capability at an affordable price. There are

limitations with such a deal in terms of usage, while the

small size of the fleet will pose problems, especially if other

European countries seek to rely on the aircraft’s availability

for their own usage under the auspices of the European Air

Transport Command.

At a lower level, the European Air Group has obtained

the Air Transport and Air Refuelling Exchange of Services

agreement (ATARES), whereby individual European states

can effectively hire each other’s aircraft. The advantage of

this lies in the efficiency savings that fall out of the

agreement.52 A further development along this theme has

been a Dutch proposal to contribute to the conversion of the

German A310 transport aircraft to the tanker/transport

role in return for access to these aircraft.

Second have been improvements in sealift. In terms of

amphibious lift capability, the Europeans are in the process

of significantly improving their capabilities.53 The Dutch

and Spanish have undertaken a joint program to develop a

Landing Pad Dock (LPD), with the Dutch now having one

ship in service and a second planned for service from 2007,

while the Spanish have built two vessels.54 The British have

also adopted this basic design, with four Bay class auxiliary

landing ships ordered to replace the earlier Landing Ship

Logistics (LSL).55 The British have also ordered two larger

LPDs to replace their existing aging vessels, and the Albion

19
class vessels are scheduled to enter service in 2003. This will

operate in conjunction with the HMS Ocean, the helicopter

carrier, and provide a significant amphibious lift capability.

Italy has also modernized its amphibious forces with the

construction of the three San Giorgio vessels.56 France has

begun to address its amphibious requirements with the

view that the two extra Foudre vessels should now be

21,000-ton helicopter carriers.57 These developments will

mark a significant improvement in the European force

capabilities once they all reach service, but, for the next few

years, there will be weaknesses as older ships reach the end

of their service lives.

Some improvements to the various Marine forces of

Europe have been matched to these improvements. Marine

units generally have benefited from the end of the Cold War

and the increasing stress placed upon an expeditionary

capability. The existing Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Brigade

remains committed to its NATO tasks and presumably also

will become available to the EU as the WEU winds up. It has

received a number of improvements, the latest being the

delivery of armored personnel carriers to the United

Kingdom’s forces to replace their unarmored BV-206s.58

Spain, France, and Italy have increased their level of

cooperation, and the British and French have agreed to

increase the collaboration between their respective

marines.

Strategic sealift, however, still remains

underdeveloped. One of the basic problems lies in national

rules governing the transportation of military personnel

and equipment. A number of states restrict the transport of

their personnel and equipment to state registered and/or

national crewed ships. Moreover, there is relatively little

peacetime training or planning for the deployment of

nonmarine units by sea. The single exception to this has

been the United Kingdom’s decision to acquire a six-vessel

roll-on/roll-off capability through a private finance

initiative.59 Once in service, these vessels will provide a

20
unique capability within Europe, similar in some respects to

the U.S. Ready Reserve Fleet.

Third, there are initial moves towards the lightening of

units. The British have begun to look at replacing the new

Challenger 2 MBT in 25 years with a future rapid effect

system weighing less than 20 tons. This would form part of

what has become termed the Ground Medium Force,

operational from 2025 onwards, similar to current U.S.

studies.60 However, only the United States and Britain,

within NATO, are studying a replacement tank.61 A number

of states are looking to replace their existing tracked

infantry fighting vehicles with wheeled variants, which will

be operational towards the end of this decade. Moreover,

France traditionally has maintained a light armoured

capability based on wheeled vehicles for operations in its

former colonies. This third trend is, therefore, only in its

infancy and needs to be developed further.

The other trend has been towards the creation of

airmobile forces. The Dutch have created an Air Assault

brigade supported by attack and support aircraft, while the

British have created the 16th Air Assault Brigade to fulfil a

similar role. These forces are supported by an increased

attack and support helicopter capability.

Precision Attack.

The Kosovo Campaign also highlighted the general

weakness in the Europeans precision attack capabilities.

Few members of NATO had this capability, and the

majority merely provided air defense aircraft to escort

NATO’s strike packages. There have been some

improvements here, with the British and French committed

to the purchase of a significant number of precision-guided

munitions such as the Storm Shadow, Brimstone, and

Maverick. However, there is a time lag before all these

become available, and the remaining members of the EU

and NATO still have some way to go even to match the

current British and French capability.The campaign was

21
noticeable for the first use of Tomahawk Land Attack

Missiles (TLAM) from a British submarine. While the

British contribution was limited both by the small number

of platforms available62 (one out of a planned force of ten)

and the paucity of its stockpile, its political significance was

important.63 Having more than one state able to contribute

a particular capability sometimes allowed NATO to strike

targets that it might otherwise have been unable to. The

importance of the capability seems to have been recognized

by both the French and the British. The latter are

undertaking a joint U.S./United Kingdom feasibility study

into re-engineering the Tactical Tomahawk to allow for its

launch from torpedo tubes.64 The French have begun

studies into equipping their attack submarines with a

500km naval variant of the Storm Shadow air-to-surface

missile.65

Overall, this remains an area of significant weakness

particularly in the short term. Both the DCI and the WEU

audit of capabilities have identified this as an area for

improvement. One solution to this may be the recognition

that, in any EU-led operation, there will simply have to be a

greater dependence upon so-called “dumb” munitions.

C4ISR.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is probably

the weakest area from a European point of view. Prior to

Kosovo, the Europeans lacked even the capability to

conduct a coordinated air campaign.

There have been a number of improvements. At the

lower end of the conflict spectrum both the United

Kingdom’s Permanent Joint Headquarters and its French

equivalent, the Centre Operational Interarmees, have the

capability to manage smaller crises, but subordinate

headquarters may be a problem. The United Kingdom now

is developing a CAOC capability able to deploy and manage

a limited air campaign. The French, in contrast, have

22
purchased the relevant equipment but mothballed it, with

personnel earmarked from other posts to mobilize it when

appropriate. This latter approach clearly has problems

when it comes to maintaining expertise.

On the land side, both NATO’s ARRC, with its

predominantly British headquarters, and the Eurocorps

offer the basis for potential headquarters, and both have

transitioned through the Balkans in recent years.

Nevertheless, given the general weaknesses in this area,

the development of the idea of U.S. brigades commanding

other nations’ divisions has appeal, although there would be

political sensitivities.

However, the problem is as much political as it is

military. Various European states wish to have their

“share” of the command leads and capabilities but few wish

to invest seriously in the capabilities. Here the Helsinki

Headline Goals may become more important than NATO’s

DCI as a means of encouraging the requisite resources to be

allocated to these tasks. A positive note has been struck by

the EU’s commitment to using NATO doctrine and

approaches to warfighting.

Other contentious issues remain. Kosovo was foremost a

battle for the control of information. The weaknesses in the

existing European intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities were exposed during the Kosovo conflict.

In terms of intelligence, the EU, like NATO, entirely

depends upon the information supplied by individual

nations. In Kosovo, NATO largely depended upon the

United States, and this is likely to continue. The EU is likely

to remain in a similar position with the British, in

particular, unlikely to want to alter their intelligence

relationship with the United States to prioritize the EU.66

Thus, NATO, the EU, and Europe in general are likely to

remain dependent upon the United States.

One obvious area for improvement lies in the provision of

an airborne radar for monitoring the land battle (U.S.

JSTARS program). The United Kingdom has ordered five

23
ASTOR aircraft for delivery in 2005.67 However, Britain’s

European partners are further away from fielding any

capability, while the ideas of a NATO force similar to its

AEW fleet remain unfulfilled. Germany, France, Italy, the

Netherlands, and Spain are going ahead with a

demonstrator project scheduled for testing in 2005.68 A

NATO force, or indeed a EU force similar to the existing

NATO AWACS force, is the logical way ahead, and this

needs to be encouraged if it is going to be achieved.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions.

It would be relatively straightforward to argue that the

European expeditionary capability is largely a myth, and

progress has been and is likely to remain extremely slow.

What is already clear is that there is considerable potential

for the Europeans to develop their own expeditionary

capability. A number of steps have been taken, and it is

important to note the words of David Yost: “In contrast with

most of its European allies, the United States has been

preparing forces for transoceanic power projection for

decades.”69

During the Cold War, Europe’s military forces were in

many ways able to act autonomously from one another. For

example, NATO’s Central Front consisted of a number of

national corps all working on separate lines of communication, which in wartime they would retreat along. It is only

now, with the shift from territorial defense to expeditionary

warfare, that there has been a significant requirement to

work together, become inter-operable, and create the ability

to project forces. The work undertaken by the European Air

Group reflects some of the problems and successes

encountered. During the Cold War, individual air bases

generally supported a particular nation’s aircraft. It has

taken time to discover and train to support other states’

24
aircraft and to project that capability into the field but this

is being achieved.

The United Kingdom’s House of Commons Select

Committee on Defense rightly concludes that:

The political advantages of multinational cooperation include

sharing risks, demonstrating collective intent and, by acting

in unison in pursuit of a common cause, bringing greater

international pressure to bear on an adversary than a single

nation would be able to do on its own. The military advantages

are that cooperation adds depth (strength in numbers) and

breadth (additional capabilities) to a force, as well as providing access to national or regional logistic infrastructures and,

in certain circumstances, access to high value information and

intelligence.70

Both NATO’s DCI and the WEU’s study of capabilities

indicated the same basic weaknesses, and the respective

members of NATO and the EU have agreed to remedy these.

While there has clearly been movement, a considerable

amount of ground to cover remains.

Interoperability remains a key issue. The pace of

improvement in U.S. information systems continues to

widen the gap still further, and the United States already

has been forced to retain some legacy systems. There are a

number of potential ways to mitigate the problems,

particularly in terms of C4ISR. For example, an increasing

use of commercial off-the-shelf systems may facilitate a

closing of the gap, but it requires the Europeans to

emphasize compatibility as a funding priority. In other

areas, the fulfilment of the Defense Trade Security

Initiative to streamline export controls at least would allow

all the EU and NATO members access to key defense

capabilities in the first instance.

Alternatively, the adoption of role specialization would

allow individual European states to focus their resources on

particular capabilities. Here the ATARES agreement might

serve as a model of how this could work. It has already been

shown to reduce costs, which allow funds to be spent in other

25
areas. Alternatively, increased recourse to the private

sector either at the national level or the EU/NATO level

may provide the opportunity to maintain or develop

capabilities that would otherwise be unaffordable. The

disadvantage of such an approach is that it abrogates the

idea of shared risk, and it also increases dependency within

the EU and NATO.

Recommendations.

 That the U.S. Army continues to monitor developments by the EU in adapting to expeditionary warfare

and see how they evolve. At present, they are at such

an embryonic stage they neither present a significant

capability nor threat to NATO or U.S. interests.

 That the U.S. Army encourages its European allies to

standardize their approach to the modularization of

their units. This would to facilitate their interchangeability.

 That the U.S. Army reviews what capabilities it lacks

in sufficient number and is unlikely to obtain at the

national level, and encourages NATO to develop these

as a substitute. Examples here include additional

SEAD, sealift, and airlift.

 That the U.S. Army encourages NATO in its

structural adaptation so that it can support more than

one operation at any one time. The U.S. Army needs to

consider its own level of commitment to this.

 That the U.S. Army continues to support the ongoing

reform of the EU and NATO. The potential for the

reform to slow is considerable within both bureaucracies and individual state agendas.

 That the ATARES model be adopted more widely as a

means of efficient capability sharing.

26
 That the European A400M program is pressed ahead

as a matter of urgency, and, if it should fail, recourse

to the acquisition of C-17s as an alternative be

considered. In the short term, other European states

should consider the temporary leasing of C-17s from

Boeing in a manner similar to the United Kingdom.

 That the Europeans investigate whether they can

create their own version of the U.S. Civil Reserve Air

Fleet as a means of supplementing their air transport.

 That the Europeans examine whether the use of

privately funded capabilities, such as the United

Kingdom’s six ALSLs, will provide capabilities at an

affordable price.

 That the Europeans reconsider their respective

national legislation governing the transport of their

own personnel and equipment by sea. Here the EU

may serve as the perfect platform for coordinating

national legislation. This should be aimed at enabling

them to be transported by other NATO/EU partners.

 That the process of loading and unloading army units

be practiced regularly.

 That the Europeans consider acquiring their own

variant of the U.S. Ready Reserve Force, perhaps

under the aegis of the EU.

 That efforts to create a southern equivalent to the

Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force be encouraged.

 That NATO presses ahead with its own JSTARS force

similar to the existing NATO AWACS force.

 That the Europeans begin to look more seriously at

the future construct of their armies and particularly

the ideas of a lighter force.

27
 That the DCI and Helsinki Headline Goals be

implemented in full, particularly in regards to C4ISR,

precision attack, and the area of sustainability.

 That the use of contracturization by individual states

and by the EU and NATO be more actively considered.

ENDNOTES

1. See Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From

EDC to CFSP, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000.

2. Jacques Delors, “European integration and security,” Survival,

Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, March/April 1991, p. 100.

3. Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community,” Speech

made to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, April 22,

1999, http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2316.

4. See House of Commons Defense Committee, “Fourteenth Report:

Lessons of Kosovo, Report and Proceedings,” HC.347, session

1999-2000, London: The Stationery Office, 2000.

5. Lord Robertson, “European Defense: the Way Ahead,” Speech to

the RIIA Conference, October 7, 1999.

6. Right Honorable Chris Patten, “The EU”s Evolving Foreign

Policy Dimension—the CESDP after Helsinki," Speech to a Joint

Meeting of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee with

members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 00/51, February 22,

2000.

7. Lord Robertson, “Opening Statement,” Meeting of the North

Atlantic Council, Budapest, Hungary, May 29, 2001.

8. Willem van Eekelen, “WEU on the way back to Brussels,” speech

given at Chatham House on September 22, 1992, p. 3, WEU Press

Review, No. 161, September 24, 1992.

9. “The Strategic Defense Review,” Cm.3,999, London, HMSO,

1998, p. 2.

10. “Statement on the Defense Estimates 1993—Defending Our

Future,” Cm.2270, London, HMSO, 1993, p. 10.

28
11. The role of the media in influencing public opinion has been

clearly evident in Britain with the recent airlift of wounded from Bosnia.

Operation IRMA, the British aerial evacuation of a number of seriously

wounded individuals from Bosnia, was due largely to the media focus on

the plight of one child.

12. See Adrian Treacher, “Europe as a Power Multiplier for French

Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation,” European

Security, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 33.

13. Britain had Commander-in-Chief Channel; and the Unitd

States, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied

Commander Atlantic.

14. See Michael Clarke, “French and British Security: Mirror

Images in a Globalized World,” International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4,

October 2000, pp. 725-739.

15. “London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance,”

issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the

meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London, July 5-6, 1990.

16. “Rome Declaration on peace and cooperation,” issued by the

Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the

North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991, Press

Communiqué S-1 (91) 86, November 8, 1991, pp. 1-8, p. 1.

17. The Alliance’s strategic concept, agreed by the Heads of State

and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic

Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991, para. 25.

18. “Beginning of meeting of Defense Planning Committee—

recommendations from Military Committee on new structures of forces

and command,” Atlantic News, No. 2,378, December 13, 1991, pp. 1-2, p.

2.

19. Idem.

20. “Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Press Release

NAC-S(00)69, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm.

21. Luke Hill, “Rapid reaction HQ shortlist down to nine,” Jane’s

Defense Weekly, January 31, 2001, p. 3.

22. Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, Paris, October 10,

1990, para. 3.

29
23. Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, Paris, Communique,

December 10, 1990.

24. Treaty on European Union, Maastricht 1992, Article J.1, para. 2.

25. “WEU Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration,” Bonn, June

19, 1992, www.weu.int/eng/documents.html.

26. “The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide—Common

Foreign and Security Policy,” www.europa.eu.int/scaplus/leg/en/

lvb/a19000.htm.

27. Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, St.

Malo, France, December 3-4, 1998.

28. Joint Declaration of the British and French Governments on

European Defense, Anglo-French Summit, London, November 25, 1999;

“Moving Forward European Defense,” MoD Press Release No.421/99,

November 25, 1999.

29. Ministry of Defense, “Statement on the Estimates, 1999,”

www.mod.uk/policy/wp99, para. 17.

30. Right Honorable Chris Patten, “The Future of the European

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the role of the European

Commission,” Speech 99/215 at the Conference on the Development of a

Common European Security and Defense Policy, Berlin, December 16,

1999.

31. Ministry of Defense, “Statement on the Estimates, 1999,”

www/mod.uk/policy/wp99, para. 17; see Michael Clarke, “French and

British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World,” International

Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4, 2000, pp. 725-739.

32. Right Honorable Chris Patten, “The EU’s Evolving Foreign

Policy Dimension—The CESDP after Helsinki.”

33. 401X0078 Council Decision of January 22, 2001, setting up the

Political and Security Committee.

34. Remarks as prepared for delivery by Secretary of Defense

William S. Cohen, Informal NATO Defense Ministerial Meeting,

Birmingham, United Kingdom, October 10, 2000.

35. 2308 Council-General Affairs/Defense: Military Capabilities

Commitment Declaration, Press Release 13427/2/00, November 20,

2000, Brussels.

30
36. Right Honorable Chris Patten, “The Future of the European

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the Role of the European

Commission,” Speech 99/215 at the Conference on the Development of a

Common European Security and Defense Policy.

37. Idem.

38. European Council Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria Da

Ferra, June 19-20, 2000.

39. Cologne European Council, Annex III—European Council

Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on

Security and Defense, Press Release 150/99, June 3-4, 1999.

40. David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European

Union,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000/1, p. 103.

41. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military

Balance, 2000-1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 297.

42. J. A. C. Lewis, “French Plan Bucks Trend in Defense Budgets

Cuts,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 7, 1994, pp. 15-18.

43. See Andrew Dorman, “Crises and Reviews, 1945-2000,” in

Stuart Croft, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees and Matthew Uttley, eds.,

Britain and Defense 1945-2000: A Policy Re-evaluation, Harlow:

Pearson, 2001.

44. Michael Clarke, “French and British Security: Mirror Images in

a Globalized World," International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4, October 2000,

p. 726.

45. Michael Evans, “A woman’s place is not in the SAS,” The Times,

February 12, 2001.

46. George A. Bloch, “French Military Reform: Lessons for

America”s Army?" Summer 2000, p. 37.

47. See Kerry Longhurst, “The reform of the German Armed Forces:

Coming of Age?” European Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 2000, pp.

31-44.

48. Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Jackson, “KFOR: The Inside

Story,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 1, February 2000, p. 15.

31
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32
64. Richard Scott, “UK Lays Foundations for Tactical Tomahawk,”

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33
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Andrew Dorman

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell