PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 20-2999

______________

TYRONE WILLIAMS,

Appellant

v.

SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI;

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF

PENNSYLVANIA; 

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY DAUPHIN COUNTY

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3-18-cv-01004)

District Judge: Hon. Malachy E. Mannion

Argued: September 21, 2021

_______________

Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and RENDELL,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 18, 2022)
2

Craig M. Cooley [ARGUED]

Cooley Law Office

1308 Plumdale Court

Pittsburgh, PA 15239

Counsel for Appellant

Ryan H. Lysaght [ARGUED]

Dauphin County Office of District Attorney

101 Market Street

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Ronald Eisenberg

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

1600 Arch Street

Suite 300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellees

______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Tyrone Lamont Williams, a state convict, seeks federal 

habeas relief. He claims his trial attorney was unconstitutionally negligent for failing to call a witness and raise self-defense 

arguments. But his trial attorney’s alleged negligence is not 

self-evident, as his trial attorney may have reasonably thought 

that self-defense arguments would detract from an alibi 
3

defense. To show his trial attorney was negligent, Williams 

would need to develop the record in District Court. But the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 forbids

federal courts from supplementing the record developed in 

state court except in narrow circumstances not relevant here. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Williams has not carried his burden of proof and may not develop the record on remand, so we 

will affirm the District Court’s denial of his petition.

I

A

Brandon Granthon was shot dead after midnight on a 

street corner in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. When police arrived, 

they found Granthon dressed in black, with a 0.40 caliber handgun next to him, and eight grams of crack cocaine in his pocket. 

Police found two kinds of bullet casings nearby: nine spent 

0.45 caliber casings and one 0.40 caliber casing. The handgun

next to Granthon was jammed, with three bullets left in the 

magazine. Granthon was killed by a 0.45 caliber round fired 

from a different gun. 

1

Granthon, it turns out, was shot over a few missing 

grams of crack cocaine. The events that led to Granthon’s death 

began a day earlier, when he bought an ounce of crack cocaine

from Ronald Burton through a middleman, Preston Burgess. 

Granthon thought the bag felt light, and later confirmed “he 

was short a couple grams.” J.A. 282 (Tr. 140). Dissatisfied, 

Granthon asked Burgess to orchestrate a refund exchange later 

that night in Burgess’s house. 
4

The refund did not go smoothly. Granthon showed up at 

the house dressed in black, looking “nervous.” J.A. 282

(Tr. 141). Burton did not show up, so Granthon left. That is 

when Williams, the petitioner here, unexpectedly arrived at 

Burgess’s house, followed some moments later by Burton. 

Burgess called Granthon to reschedule the refund, and Burton 

and Granthon agreed to complete the refund by themselves outside a local bar—three blocks from the corner where Granthon 

was shot dead. Burton left the house with Williams. Ten 

minutes later, Burgess heard several gunshots fired. 

2

Jeffrey Lynch and Greta McAllister were smoking 

crack cocaine in an alley near the crime scene that night. They 

saw a dark SUV parked in the alley and watched two hooded 

men get out. The men were both carrying guns. Lynch recognized one of the men as Burton, one of his drug dealers. But he 

could not see the other man’s face. 

Burton and the other hooded man hid behind a car and 

a telephone pole. One of them then said, “there he go,” and 

ducked as Granthon walked on the opposite side of the street

in the direction of the bar. J.A. 290 (Tr. 172). Burton and his 

hooded accomplice ran across the street. Lynch heard—but did 

not see—about ten gunshots fired. A former marine, Lynch 

claims he heard two types of gunshots, one louder than the 

other, suggesting two calibers. Moments later, he saw Burton 

and the other hooded man run down the alley and drive off in 

the SUV. 
5

B

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged Burton 

with first-degree murder and various other criminal offenses. 

The evidence linking Burton to the homicide was overwhelming. Apart from Lynch’s testimony identifying Burton as one 

of the hooded men, Burton’s cellphone log showed he called 

Granthon moments before the shooting. At the time of the call, 

cell tower records placed Burton within one-half to two miles 

of the crime scene. 

Lacking any plausible alibi defense, Burton’s trial attorney argued that Granthon fired first, presenting theories of selfdefense, defense of others, and imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter during the trial. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 

§§ 505, 506, 2503(b). 

Georgio Rochon was an important defense witness in 

Burton’s trial. Rochon testified that he was playing videogames in a house nearby when he heard two shots. He approached a window and saw a man shoot four times while running across the street. The first two shots he heard sounded 

“just like a pop-pop,” and the four louder shots that followed

“were more of a bang-bang.” Appellee’s Suppl. Br. 11.

1 According to Burton, Rochon’s testimony—pop-pop, followed by 

1 We assume, without deciding, that we may consider 

Rochon’s testimony, even though it was never introduced in 

state court or District Court. No one objected when we requested it, and in any event, Rochon’s testimony is quoted in

noticeable judicial decisions.
6

bang-bang—suggested that Granthon fired the smaller caliber 

gun first, and Burton fired back.2

The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense but refused to instruct the jury on defense of others or imperfect selfdefense voluntary manslaughter. The jury convicted Burton of 

first-degree murder and several other crimes, and he was sentenced to life in prison. 

On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated 

Burton’s murder conviction, finding error in the trial court’s 

refusal to instruct the jury on defense of others and voluntary 

manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Burton, 43 A.3d 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (unpublished table decision). Viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to Burton, the Superior Court 

acknowledged that “this issue presents a very close question,” 

but it ultimately concluded that the evidence could have supported a finding of defense of others as well as voluntary manslaughter, relying in part on Rochon’s testimony. J.A. 209 & 

n.7. The Commonwealth did not retry Burton, and the trial 

court resentenced Burton for his remaining convictions “to an 

aggregate term of incarceration of not less than twenty-two and 

one-half nor more than forty-five years.” Commonwealth v. 

Burton, No. 1873 MDA 2016, 2017 WL 3172598, at *2 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. July 26, 2017). 

2 Lynch, by contrast, testified in Williams’s later trial that he 

“couldn’t tell” whether the sounds came in any order. App. 298 

(Tr. 203).
7

C

Williams was up next. He was charged with first-degree 

murder, conspiracy, and reckless endangerment of another.3

The Commonwealth largely recycled the evidence it had presented during Burton’s trial. But the evidence linking Williams 

to the crime was weaker. Although Lynch knew Williams from 

prior drug deals, he did not recognize Williams that night. No 

one recognized Williams as one of the hooded men, and no cell 

phone records placed him near the scene that night. Williams, 

for his part, told police he was not there. He claimed he spent 

the night at a casino, but he offered conflicting alibi stories to 

police detectives, and he never used his casino rewards card 

that night. 

Williams’s trial lawyer’s “defense theory” was that Williams was “not placed at the scene.” J.A. 338 (Tr. 365). He did 

not call Rochon to testify at trial, nor did he make the case for 

self-defense or voluntary manslaughter. Williams’s trial counsel did seek an instruction of voluntary manslaughter during a 

sidebar before closing arguments, but the trial judge denied his

belated request for lack of supporting evidence. 

Williams’s alibi defense did not work out. Williams was 

convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy, and reckless endangerment of another. He was sentenced to life in prison. Williams appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1682 MDA 2012, 2014 WL 10803011, 

at *13–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2014). Williams’s conviction became final after he failed to seek discretionary review 

3 He was also charged with unlicensed carrying of a firearm, 

but that charge was dropped during trial.
8

from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Pa. R. App. 

P. 1113(a). 

D

Within a year, Williams sought post-conviction relief in

Pennsylvania state court. His post-conviction counsel raised a 

single ineffective-assistance claim: he argued that his trial 

counsel was ineffective because he failed to call Williams’s 

niece, Quanisha Williams, as an alibi witness. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Both 

Quanisha and Williams testified that Williams’s trial counsel 

ignored their pleas to have Quanisha take the stand as an alibi 

witness. On the other hand, Williams’s trial counsel testified 

he had no recollection of Quanisha and no records documenting her existence or interest in being an alibi witness. Williams 

also never mentioned his niece Quanisha in either of his contradictory statements to police detectives. And as Williams’s 

trial counsel pointed out, even if Quanisha had come forth during the trial, introducing her as an alibi witness “would have 

presented a third version of events,” further undercutting Williams’s credibility. J.A. 186.

Pennsylvania’s state courts rejected this ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 

No. 249 MDA 2016, 2016 WL 6901354 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 

23, 2016). 

E

Williams timely filed this federal habeas petition, now 

represented by his current attorney. Williams’s new counsel 

presented a different ineffective-assistance claim: he argued 

Williams’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a 
9

self-defense or voluntary manslaughter theory and for failing 

to have Rochon testify. 

The District Court denied the habeas petition. Williams 

v. DelBalso, No. CV 3:18-1004, 2020 WL 5217088, at *13 

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2020). Relying on a five-factor test derived 

from a Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision, the District 

Court held that Williams’s new ineffective-assistance claim 

lacked merit because “[t]here simply is no evidence that 

Rochon was available or willing to testify at Williams’ trial.”

Id. at *7 (relying on Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 90 

(Pa. 2008)). This appeal followed.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 

2253. The petition was timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

“Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing 

and relied on the state court record, we exercise plenary review.” Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 2014).

III

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 

Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 

The right to counsel includes “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 

(1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 

n.14 (1970)). But “there is no right to counsel in state collateral 

proceedings,” including state post-conviction proceedings. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991); see also 

Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1737 (2022) (“[W]e have 
10

repeatedly reaffirmed that there is no constitutional right to 

counsel in state postconviction proceedings.”).

There is a time and place for state convicts to raise their

right to effective trial counsel. The Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and related judicial 

doctrines prescribe those times and places. State prisoners must

first raise their federal claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). “State prisoners, however, often fail to raise 

their federal claims in compliance with state procedures, or 

even raise those claims in state court at all.” Shinn, 142 S. Ct. 

at 1732. When that happens, state procedural law usually considers those arguments “waived”—meaning they can no longer 

be raised. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9544(b) (“[A]n 

issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed 

to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal 

or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”). “In these cases, 

the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds,” not a misunderstanding of federal constitutional rights. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730. For that reason, and to 

preserve AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement, “federal courts 

generally decline to hear any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts consistent with the [State’s] own procedural rules.” Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1732 (quotation marks 

omitted). 

But there are exceptions. “When a claim is procedurally 

defaulted, a federal court can forgive the default and adjudicate 

the claim if the prisoner provides an adequate excuse.” Id. One

common excuse for procedural default is based on the equitable rule first announced in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 

Under that equitable rule, when a prisoner’s state post-conviction lawyer was negligent for failing to raise an ineffective-assistance claim that “has ‘some merit,’” we may hear the claim, 
11

even though the prisoner never raised it in state court. Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 937 (3d Cir. 

2019) (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14).

Williams never raised his current ineffective-assistance 

claim in state court, so he “waived” his argument. See 42 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9544(b). Williams argues that Martinez excuses his default. Maybe so, but we need not dwell on this issue. For even if we excused Williams’s failure to raise his ineffective-assistance claim in state court, “[t]here is an even 

higher bar for excusing a prisoner’s failure to develop the statecourt record.” Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1733. AEDPA does not allow us to excuse Williams’s separate failure to develop the record just because his state post-conviction lawyer did a bad job. 

Id. at 1737. We are therefore limited to the facts developed in 

state court. And on a closed state record, Williams cannot show 

his trial counsel was ineffective.

A

Before explaining why Williams’s ineffective-assistance claim fails, we pause to address the District Court’s holding. According to the District Court, to succeed on his ineffective-assistance claim, Williams bears the burden of showing 

that Rochon was willing to testify at Williams’s trial. The District Court derived this requirement not from federal law, but 

from a Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision setting forth a 

five-factor test of uncertain origin. Under that test, Pennsylvania courts generally require a defendant to show that:

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew 

of, or should have known of, the existence of the 

witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for 
12

the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony 

of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial.

Clark, 961 A.2d at 90. The dispute here is about the fourth requirement—showing a witness’s willingness to testify. The 

Commonwealth arguesthat this requirement aligns with Strickland and urges us to apply it here. We decline to do so. As we 

have said before, and reiterate once again, “[a]bsent extenuating circumstances, such as the existence of a privilege or the 

witness’s incapacity or death, whether a witness is ready and 

willing to testify is irrelevant since defense counsel can compel 

testimony through a trial subpoena.” Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 

224, 239 n.10 (3d Cir. 2013). Compulsory process, after all, is

guaranteed in criminal trials by the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 

(1987) (“Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial . . . .”). 

Unwilling witnesses can be made to testify.4

The Commonwealth, though, argues we should superimpose Pennsylvania’s requirement on Strickland because, “at 

least in Dauphin County,” witnesses often perjure themselves 

4 We have sometimes examined a state court’s finding that a 

witness would have been unwilling to testify, as if it mattered. 

See Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 681 (3d Cir. 2006). Today, 

we make clear that, absent a testimonial privilege, willingness 

to testify does not matter.
13

or disobey court subpoenas under threat of contempt.

5 Maybe 

so. But we presume, sensibly, that witnesses prefer to cooperate and tell the truth than risk going to jail. Cf. Commonwealth

v. Long, 625 A.2d 630, 633 (Pa. 1993) (“An individual may be 

found in contempt for refusing to testify after being ordered to 

do so by the court.”). 

In any event, the Commonwealth’s concerns ring hollow here, and we see no relevant extenuating circumstances. 

Rochon testified in Burton’s trial, so there is no reason to think 

he would go rogue in Williams’s nearly identical trial. Moreover, if Rochon had died, disappeared, or refused to testify, Williams’s trial counsel could have introduced Rochon’s prior

sworn testimony instead. Pa. R. Evid. 804(a)(2), (5); id.

804(b)(1). And if Rochon perjured himself by offering a different version of events, Williams could have used his prior

testimony and police statement to impeach him. Either way, 

Williams’s trial counsel had the tools to elicit Rochon’s original version of events, even in Dauphin County.

Williams need not prove that Rochon would have been 

a willing witness. We reject Pennsylvania’s contrary rule. Williams, to be sure, must show that his trial counsel should have 

known about Rochon as part of his showing of negligence. But

given that the trial took place after Burton’s victory on appeal,

and given Rochon’s recorded statements to police, we have little difficulty concluding that a competent trial attorney should 

have known about Rochon.

5 Oral Argument at 27:56–28:05, https://www2.ca3.

uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/20-2999TyroneWilliams

v.SuperintendentMahanoySCI.mp3.
14

B

We will affirm on a different ground, in two steps. First, 

AEDPA forbids the District Court from developing the facts

relevant to the merits of his ineffective-assistance claim in federal court. Second, Williams cannot carry his burden of proof

on the state court record. As a result, we must affirm the District Court’s denial of Williams’s federal habeas petition.

1

We start with AEDPA. To ensure federal habeas relief

does not become a substitute for ordinary error correction, 

“AEDPA imposes several limits on habeas relief.” Shinn, 142 

S. Ct. at 1731. AEDPA, as relevant here, requiresfederal courts 

to review a state court’s “determination of a factual issue” with 

deference. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This restriction would mean 

little, however, if state prisoners could avoid AEDPA’s “highly 

deferential standard of review” by failing to develop the record 

in state court. Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1739–40. Section 2254(e)(2) 

prevents that evasion. It says, in full:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual 

basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the 

court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

claim unless the applicant shows that—

(A) the claim relies on—

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review by 

the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
15

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have 

been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant 

guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Williams does not argue that he meets 

the narrow exceptions listed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), and 

he does not. Instead, Williams argues that AEDPA’s prohibition does not apply. He makes plausible arguments, but recent 

Supreme Court precedent compels us to reject them.

a.

Before discussing Williams’s specific arguments, we 

provide legal background. We have interpreted 2254(e)(2) on

several occasions. In Cristin v. Brennan, we concluded “that 

the plain meaning of § 2254(e)(2)’s introductory language 

does not preclude federal hearings on excuses for procedural 

default at the state level.” 281 F.3d 404, 413 (3d Cir. 2002); 

see also id. at 419 (“§ 2254(e)(2)’s restrictions do not apply to 

hearings on procedural default . . .”). We reached that conclusion for two principal reasons. First, we reasoned that a hearing

used to support an excuse for a procedural default—like a Martinez hearing—is not a hearing on “a claim” under AEDPA, 

because it is not a claim for relief on the merits. Id. at 417–18. 

Second, we reasoned that state prisoners “cannot be faulted . . . 

for not having previously presented the facts underlying arguments that would have been, on the whole, irrelevant or premature before state courts.” Id. at 417; see also id. at 416
16

(“Indeed, it would be surpassing strange to require Cristin to 

establish a record in state court about why he is not appealing 

a particular judgment while simultaneously failing to appeal 

that judgment.”). We noted, however, that “a rare case could 

exist when a petitioner relies solely on ineffective assistance of 

counsel to establish both cause and prejudice and as a claim for 

substantive habeas relief.” Id. at 416 n.11. In such a case, we 

thought, perhaps the prisoner may have an adequate opportunity to develop the facts in state court. Id.

After Cristin, the Supreme Court decided Martinez. In 

the aftermath of Martinez, it is no longer “rare” for state prisoners to rely on ineffective assistance of trial counsel both to 

excuse a procedural default (under Martinez’s “some merit” 

prong) and to obtain relief on the merits. 

Relying on Cristin and Martinez, Williams makes two 

principal arguments. First, asking us to extend Martinez’s logic

to AEDPA, Williams argues that prisoners should not be at 

fault for failing to develop the record when their state postconviction counsel was negligent. After all, Martinez excuses 

a prisoner’s failure to raise an ineffective-assistance claim altogether. Given that, why should a prisoner be blamed under 

AEDPA for his attorney’s similarly negligent failure to develop the facts? Second, by following Cristin’s holding that 

AEDPA does not forbid hearings on excuses for procedural default, Williams suggests the District Court could still a hold

Martinez hearing. And going one step further than Cristin, Williams suggests that once the Martinez evidence is part of the 

federal record on habeas review, the District Court could rely 

on the new evidence to evaluate the merits of the underlying 

ineffective-assistance claim.
17

Williams’s arguments were debatable when he made 

them. But no longer. After oral argument, the Supreme Court 

decided Shinn v. Ramirez. Shinn thoroughly rejected these arguments. Under AEDPA, “a state prisoner is responsible for 

counsel’s negligent failure to develop the state postconviction 

record.” 142 S. Ct. at 1735. Or, in AEDPA’s terms, a prisoner 

fails “to develop the factual basis of a claim” even when his 

state post-conviction attorney was negligent. Martinez does not

excuse a prisoner’s separate failure to develop the facts under 

AEDPA, for the simple reason that judge-made equitable rules 

cannot claim supremacy over statutory text. Id. at 1736. It follows, then, that when a state post-conviction attorney negligently fails to develop the facts needed to support a claim, “a 

federal court may order an evidentiary hearing or otherwise expand the state-court record only if the prisoner can satisfy 

§ 2254(e)(2)’s stringent requirements.” Id. at 1735. Nor may

federal courts “end-run” AEDPA by holding hearings on an 

excuse for procedural default, and then using the expanded federal record to decide the merits of a habeas claim. Id. at 1738.

Rather, “when a federal habeas court convenes an evidentiary 

hearing for any purpose, or otherwise admits or reviews new 

evidence for any purpose, it may not consider that evidence on 

the merits of a negligent prisoner’s defaulted claim unless the 

exceptions in § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied.” Id. While this makes 

Martinez a dead letter in many cases, “that is a reason to dispense with Martinez hearings altogether, not to set 

§ 2254(e)(2) aside.” Id. at 1738–39.

After Shinn, Cristin and Martinez do not help Williams.

Williams, through his attorney, had a chance to develop the 

facts needed to support his current claim in state court. He 

elected instead to litigate a different claim that was rejected on 

the merits, and so he failed to develop the record to support his 
18

new claim. While Martinez may give him a second chance, 

AEDPA does not. And even if our precedent in Cristin would 

allow a Martinez hearing, the District Court may not use the 

expanded record to decide the merits of Williams’s ineffectiveassistance claim, so a Martinez hearing would be a waste of 

time unless Williams can prevail on the state record.

Cristin, to be sure, remains the law of the circuit to the 

extent it is consistent with Shinn. While Shinn suggests that

“[t]here are good reasons to doubt” our reading of the word 

“claim” in Cristin, it does not abrogate our holding that, generally, AEDPA’s text does not forbid federal courts from developing the facts needed to excuse a procedural default. Id. at 

1738. But Shinn does set limits on Cristin’s reach. Shinn makes 

clear that, when a prisoner is at fault for failing to develop the 

record needed to support a constitutional claim on the merits in 

state court and cannot satisfy section 2254(e)(2)’s exceptions, 

federal courts may not consider evidence first gathered during 

an excuse hearing allowed by Cristin to decide the constitutional claim on the merits. Id. at 1738. To avoid prolonging 

federal habeas proceedings, Shinn also instructs that in these 

cases, federal courts must skip hearings altogether and deny 

habeas relief unless the prisoner prevails on the merits considering only the state court record. Id. at 1739. So before holding 

a Martinez hearing, as allowed by Cristin, federal courts in 

these cases should decide whether an underlying ineffectiveness claim succeeds considering only the state court record. If 

not, federal courts should deny relief without more. With those 

limitations, Cristin remains binding in this circuit.

b.

Williams next argues that AEDPA’s prohibition is limited to formal evidentiary hearings. The statute’s plain 
19

language, after all, is limited to an “evidentiary hearing.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). It does not, for example, speak directly to 

depositions or other means of civil discovery used to expand

the state record. In this view, the District Court may expand the 

state court record through far-reaching civil discovery so long 

as it does not call a formal evidentiary hearing. 

Supreme Court precedent forecloses this reading of the 

statute. See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004) (per 

curiam) (AEDPA’s “restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary 

hearing.”); Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1738 (reaffirming Holland).

The reason for that is straightforward: a literal reading of evidentiary hearing “would have countenanced an end-run around 

the statute. Federal habeas courts could have accepted any new 

evidence so long as they avoided labeling their intake of the 

evidence as a ‘hearing.’” Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1738. While reasonable minds may disagree with this reading, Supreme Court 

precedent is binding, and we follow it here.

* * *

Williams failed to develop the facts supporting his new 

merits claim in state court. Under AEDPA, he may not do so

in federal court, through an evidentiary hearing or otherwise. 

We must consider his ineffective-assistance claim on a closed

state record.6

6 We “typically remand for the District Court to consider” ineffective-assistance claims “in the first instance,” particularly 

when “an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine 

whether trial counsel was ineffective.” Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 378 n.14 (3d Cir. 2018). 
20

2

Williams argues that we may conclude his trial attorney 

was ineffective even on a closed state record. We disagree.

“Under Strickland, a defendant who claims ineffective 

assistance of counsel must prove (1) ‘that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and 

(2) that any such deficiency was ‘prejudicial to the defense.’” 

Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) (citations omitted)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 692). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. We must “eliminate the distorting 

effects of hindsight” and recognize that “[t]here are countless 

ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” Id.

“When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion 

of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). While the Commonwealth has 

“not provided any strategic explanation for trial counsel’s failure” to present a self-defense argument, it is not difficult “to 

identify one.” Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 

F.3d 365, 382 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient when neither the court nor the Commonwealth identified an explanation for counsel’s failure to 

raise an issue at trial). Presenting a self-defense theory would 

risk undercutting Williams’s alibi defense. See Lewis v. Horn, 

581 F.3d 92, 108 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Nor can we conclude that 

Lewis has demonstrated that his counsel performed 

No evidentiary hearing is available, and the issues are fully 

briefed, so there is no need for a remand.
21

unreasonably by failing to present a theory of self defense in 

addition to, or instead of, the alibi defense.”). Williams’s trial 

counsel could have argued in the alternative, but arguing in the 

alternative to a jury is not always the best idea. Good trial lawyers often choose to make one consistent argument to a jury

rather than two “factually inconsistent” arguments at the risk 

of undercutting their story’s credibility. See id.7

Williams points out that Burton succeeded where he 

failed because Burton’s trial counsel raised a self-defense theory and presented Rochon’s testimony, while Williams’s trial 

counsel did not. But Burton and Williams were not in the same 

boat. The evidence linking Burton to the homicide was overwhelming. The evidence linking Williams to the homicide less 

so. For that reason, Williams’s trial counsel faced a strategic 

dilemma that Burton’s counsel did not. Burton’s counsel had

only one reasonable choice. Williams’s trial counsel had to 

choose between arguing innocence, self-defense, or trying to 

do both at the same time.

Either way, Williams’s trial counsel had no great options. An alibi defense was risky given Williams’s weak alibi, 

but the reward of success could be great. As the judge put it to 

the jury, if Williams “was not there and [was] not involved in 

any way, shape, or form then obviously he can’t be guilty of 

anything.” J.A. 338 (Tr. 365). Relying on an alibi defense was 

not inherently unreasonable, as the evidence placing Williams 

7 We note, also, that calling Rochon could have directly undermined Williams’s alibi if Rochon recognized Williams as the 

man he saw when he approached the window. 
22

at the crime scene as one of the hooded men was circumstantial

and required an inferential leap.

On the other hand, an argument of self-defense or voluntary manslaughter was also an uphill climb. Lynch testified 

that the hooded men ambushed Granthon with guns as he 

walked toward the bar, amply supporting a first-degree murder 

conviction no matter who fired first. Under Pennsylvania law, 

a killing by “lying in wait” is murder in the first degree. 18 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2502(a), (d). And deadly force is not justifiable when the killer, “with the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself 

in the same encounter.” Id. § 505(b)(2)(i). Given Lynch’s testimony, the likelihood of a successful self-defense argument 

was slim. And while a successful self-defense argument would 

acquit Williams, an imperfect-self-defense conviction is still “a 

felony of the first degree,” and carries up to twenty years in 

prison. Id. §§ 1103(1), 2503(c).

Burton’s success on appeal does not suggest otherwise. 

As the Superior Court’s ruling in Burton suggests, when the 

facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Burton, a reasonable jury could have found self-defense or voluntary manslaughter. But even under that generous standard, the court 

thought it was “a very close question.” J.A. 209 n.7. Trial 

counsel cannot be blamed for thinking a jury may not have 

viewed the facts supporting self-defense in the light most favorable to Williams, or for not making an argument that was 

barely reasonable enough for a jury instruction. A self-defense 

argument was no cakewalk, so we cannot say it was inherently

unreasonable to focus on an alibi defense to the exclusion of 

self-defense. This case therefore falls within the strong presumption of reasonableness.
23

The presumption may be overcome with case-specific 

evidence of negligence. For example, if the evidence showed 

that Williams’s trial attorney never heard of Rochon, or that he 

meant to have Rochon testify and forgot, that failure from “inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment,” would likely fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Wiggins v. 

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 (2003). But here, we have no specific 

evidence of negligence in the state record, and “the absence of 

evidence cannot overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Dunn v. Reeves, 141 S. Ct. 2405, 2407

(2021) (per curiam). We have no trial counsel testimony on the

relevant issue. The best evidence we have is that Williams’s 

trial counsel requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction 

before closing arguments, without supporting that instruction

request with Rochon’s testimony. Perhaps that suggests that by 

the end of trial, Williams’s attorney had second thoughts about 

making a self-defense argument to the jury. But that does not 

mean that his initial choices in presenting evidence during 

trial—including not calling Rochon—resulted from negligence, not a tactical decision. While that isolated request lends 

some circumstantial support to Williams’s ineffective-assistance claim, it cannot overcome the strong presumption of reasonableness. 

* * *

We will affirm the District Court’s denial of Williams’s 

petition.