Number 68, March 1996

**U.S. StrategicObjectives 
in East Asia
by Hans Binnendijk* 
Workshop Summary

- The central objectives of U.S. strategy for the East Asia-Pacific region are to foster politicalstability, maintain access to regional markets, ensure freedom of navigation, and prevent the riseof any hostile hegemon. The United States seeks to ensure that no Asian nation's economicstrength is translated into military power hostile to the United States. Forward deployed U.S.forces are a principal means of securing such an outcome.

- If the United States is to maintain a force presence once the North Korean threat is gone, it isessential to begin now to construct a new intellectual framework, build solid public support, andrecast the U.S. long-term commitment in terms of power projection capability.

- The United States needs to harmonize its economic and security interests, with the clearunderstanding that emphasizing short term economic concerns over longer term securityconcerns risks achieving neither sustained economic growth nor enhanced security.

- China's growing economic power will eventually produce commensurate military power.  Thisis potentially troublesome because Chinese leaders currently view the United States as an obstacleto national reunification and to China's playing a defining role in regional affairs.  While Chinawill probably not use military means to force reunification unless Taiwan moves to establishindependence, tension in the Taiwan Strait will likely persist for years.

- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is unlikely to survive long term, but a suddencollapse would risk conflict, pose staggering economic and political problems for the Republic ofKorea (ROK), and alter the regional strategic equation.  It is essential to strive for as soft a landingas possible.
- The United States and Japan need to review the basis for cooperation on Taiwan and Koreacontingencies.  The most important immediate task is to coordinate policies in advance, and thento create a mechanism to coordinate contingency planning.  
**Fundamental Strategic Objectives

	The central objectives of U.S. security strategy in the East Asia-Pacific region include fosteringpolitical stability, maintaining access to regional markets, ensuring freedom of navigation, andpreventing the rise of any hostile hegemon. More specifically, the U.S. central objective should be toensure that no Asian nation's economic strength is translated into military power hostile to theUnited States.  Current tensions in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean peninsulacould be a starting point for peer competitor rivalries.  Over time, such rivalries might expand toinclude conflict over resources, markets, jobs, and environmental issues.
**U.S. Approach to East Asia Policy

	While U.S. economic and security interests in the region are increasing, U.S. leverage isdecreasing.  Nevertheless, the United States will continue to possess major strengths:  global militarycapability, the value of access to the U.S. market, the carrots of investment and technology transfer,and the desire of virtually all regional powers for a continued U.S. military presence.  Our militarypresence/capability in the region is the most influential of these points of advantage. 
	The United States can, however, more fully exploit these strengths by carefully reexaminingpresent priorities.  In relations with Japan, for example, it is necessary to determine whethereconomic or security concerns should be emphasized.  Similarly, U.S. relations with China would bebetter served if it were possible to rank order our expectations for China's policies on Taiwan, non-proliferation, human rights and trade.   
	Asian countries, China in particular, want to be taken seriously and treated with respect.  In aregion made up of increasingly confident, prosperous, outward-looking countries, the United Statesfaces a more difficult leadership challenge now that the Cold War is over.  Some problems may welldefy resolution, and it may be necessary to accommodate a higher level of stress with some Asianpowers.  The U.S. regional position might be improved if Washington were to lower its expectationson what can be accomplished, especially on moral or ideological issues.  
**The U.S. Overseas Military Presence

	Both U.S. and regional interests would be served by a U.S. military presence in the East Asia-Pacific region once North Korea is no longer a threat. The United States needs to consider makingseveral adjustments, however, if we are to sustain such a long term military presence.  
	First, if U.S. bilateral ties with the ROK and Japan are to continue to flourish, we need to continuebuilding a new intellectual framework and a solid base of public support in all three countries. U.S.action alone is not sufficient. The Japanese and Korean governments must educate their citizens onthe value of security ties with the United States, and marshal public support.  Failure to begin nowin Korea and continue with Japan increases the likelihood that post-unification Korean nationalismwill make it impossible to sustain even a reduced U.S. troop presence on the peninsula. The currentpressure to reduce the U.S. presence in Japan would surely increase if Japan were the only Asiannation hosting large U.S. forces.  
	Second, strategic flexibility might be enhanced eventually by transitioning away from the 100,000troop level and recasting U.S. regional commitment in terms of power projection capability.  U.S.considerations might center on the composition and justification of U.S. forces in the East Asia-Pacificregion following resolution of the Korea issue.  For the near to mid-term, however, Secretary Perry'sdeclaration that we would maintain 100,000 troops in the region, with 47,000 in Japan, will remaina political bellwether of the U.S commitment.     
	Finally, a key objective for the United States must be to gain explicit Chinese acknowledgementthat the United States has legitimate reasons for keeping military forces forward deployed in theregion, and that China will not attempt to undermine that presence.  For its part, the United Statesmust avoid being perceived by the region as provoking Chinese bellicosity by overestimating China'scapabilities, by defining China as an adversary, or by assuming China's hostile intent.
**Thinking About Economics and Security

	Domestic economic concerns in the United States and many Asian countries have increased thesalience of economic arguments in foreign policy and national security debates.  A single-mindedfocus on near-term economic concerns, however, will erode the overall environment in which longer-term U.S. security aims must be achieved.  It is necessary, therefore, to concentrate on harmonizingUnited States economic and security interests.  While it is difficult to argue convincingly that aforward security presence in the East Asia-Pacific region guarantees U.S. economic interests, theabsence of a forward presence would reduce overall American economic, political, and militaryclout, including opportunities for high level lobbying for strategic investment and commerce.  Inaddition, maintaining our forward defense presence serves to reinforce the fundamental position thatthe United States will not accept hegemonic exclusion from areas of trade or strategic salience.  
	Despite the avowed primacy of economic issues, the United States arguably undervalues itseconomic interests.  For example, the United States could optimize the use of tied aid (bilateral andmultilateral) for the fostering of U.S. commercial advantage, and could more carefully determinewhich regional areas are of highest importance to the United States in order to orchestrate strategicinvestments. 
	The argument that economics is of primary importance also fails to convince because neitherJapan nor Singapore, while both possessing extremely strong economies, feels particularly secure. Both are clearly willing to state that their security requires a forward U.S. military presence.  The truemeasure must be that economic growth enhances security but is, by itself, no guarantee of safety.  
	There is a clear implication that managing the new security environment will require a greaterdegree of sharing of responsibilities.  New forms of cooperation with regional powers will becomemore common. In the new security environment, the increasing capability of the regional powers ismostly help, not hindrance.
**China 

	The rise of China presents a challenge for which there is no instructive historical guide.  Thereare three major considerations:
	First, **the doubling of China's GDP every ten years represents unprecedented economic growth**and will provide Beijing with the means to develop commensurate military power, auguring rapidchange in the security environment.  Second, from Beijing's perspective, **Chinese policies on Taiwanand the South China Sea** are matters of national reunification, not ideology.  Chinese leadersunderstand and appreciate the stability engendered by the presence of U.S. forces.  However, theyalso tend to view the U.S. military presence and the alliances with Japan and Korea as obstacles toachieving the reunification of Chinese territory.  Similarly, the alliances are seen as potentialobstacles to the expanded regional role so desired by Beijing. Third, for historical reasons, **China isconcerned with upholding its national sovereignty**.  U.S. positions on human rights, intellectualproperty, and arms sales are often viewed as challenges to that sovereignty.  As a result, Chineseleaders are inherently suspicious of U.S. strategic intentions and motivations.
	While Beijing is unlikely to compromise on its claims of sovereignty over Taiwan, it is doubtfulthat China will use military means to force reunification unless the Chinese leadership is convincedTaiwan is moving inexorably toward independence. If that were the case, China might well provewilling to pay the price for attacking Taiwan, with limited prospect that the United States could detersuch an attack. The challenge for the United States,  China and Taiwan, is to prevent things fromgetting to this point.  
	The U.S. policy of deliberate ambiguity is designed to deter Beijing while discouraging Taipeifrom pushing for independence.  Ambiguity carries an inherent risk, however, that people on bothsides may misinterpret the U.S. position.  Recently, senior U.S. officials have reaffirmed the U.S. "oneChina" policy.  But there is also a need for private diplomacy that goes beyond what U.S. officials cansay publicly.  The United States must continually reiterate to Beijing that there would be graveconsequences if China were to attack Taiwan.  The United States also needs to make it clear to Taipeithat moves towards independence are dangerous and that U.S. military assistance is by no meansassured if Taiwan declares independence.
	Evolution towards democracy in China--if it occurs--will not reduce the widespread desire ofmainland Chinese to complete the reunification of China. Economic development and the rise ofdemocracy might, however, help to offset the fears of the Taiwanese people regarding Beijing andreduce resistance to at least discussing some form of integration across the Strait.  In any case, theTaiwan issue will likely vex U.S. relations with China for many years into the future.                 
**The Korean Peninsula

	The crucial questions concerning Korean unification are "when and how," not "if."  However,even under the best of circumstances, integrating the DPRK into a peninsula-wide Republic of Koreawill be daunting, and a sudden collapse would be particularly dangerous:

- It could lead to conflict, either between rival factions within the North, or by inducing the DPRKmilitary to lash out against the South--and the U.S--in an all-or-nothing gamble; 

- It would present the South with staggering problems in absorbing the North economically andpolitically; 

- It would alter the strategic equation in Northeast Asia, undercutting the rationale for the U.S.military presence on the peninsula and raising questions regarding a united Korea's relationshipwith Japan.     

	Given the possible implications of a DPRK hard landing, it is in the interest of the United Statesas well as the region to engineer as soft a landing as possible for the reunification of Korea. TheUnited States, Japan and China could do much to facilitate a soft landing. U.S. leadership isindispensable, and we should consult closely with the ROK government without allowing Seoul todictate the precise terms or the pace of U.S.-DPRK relations.
**Japan

	The United States and Japan need to develop a basis for cooperation on Taiwan and Koreacontingencies.  Japan today is poorly prepared politically to respond to a crisis in either area.  TheJapanese government has yet to decide what manner and levels of support could be provided, andit is a long way from putting into place the required coordination mechanisms.  Ideally, Japan wouldprovide similar kinds of support to the U.S. in the East Asia-Pacific region that the European alliesprovided during the Gulf War.  But, even though Japanese politics is evolving in a favorabledirection, and even though Tokyo is feeling increasingly uneasy about China, such support isunlikely in the near-term unless we address the issue directly.  It is clear that a post-Cold Warscenario where Japan provides money while the U.S. spills blood in Asia is unacceptable andpotentially destructive of the alliance. This, in turn, would have obvious negative consequences forthe U.S. security position in the East Asia-Pacific region.  At the same time, it is important to carefullycalibrate demands on Japan.  Tokyo's self-constrained security policies are an important factor inregional stability.
	In the face of potential conflict on Taiwan and Korea, the most important immediate task is thatthe U.S. and Japan coordinate policies in advance.  Once the two governments are in agreement onthe diplomacy, they need to create a mechanism to coordinate contingency planning at all levels ofgovernment.  Lower level staff talks, in isolation, are inadequate for issues of such importance to theU.S.-Japan security relationship.

Recommendations

- DoD should begin laying the groundwork for a future U.S. troop presence in the East Asia-Pacificregion that is based on power projection capabilities and the revolution in military affairs.  Futurepresence must take into account political expectations in the region, and benefits to U.S. strategicinfluence.

- The United States should attempt to intensify the security dialogue with the PRC, the central focusof which should be each side's long range strategic interests.  

- The United States and Japan should begin substantive discussions on how to coordinate responsesto possible Taiwan and Korea contingencies.

- The United States needs to engage both the ROK and Japanese governments in a campaign tobuild a new understanding for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia once NorthKorea ceases to be a threat. 

- The United States needs to create a more effective interagency mechanism to coordinate economicand security policy for the East Asia-Pacific region.

About the Workshop

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) co-sponsoreda workshop assessing U.S. policy in the East Asia-Pacific region in February 1996. Thirty-five expertsparticipated, including many current and former senior officials in the foreign policy, nationalsecurity and intelligence communities. This paper reviews significant issues raised at the workshop.
* Written with the assistance of Dr. Lee Endress, Dr. Ronald Montaperto, and Colonel Bill Drennan.For more information contact: Dr. Binnendijk, Dr. Montaperto, or Colonel Drennan at INSS (202-685-3837); or Dr. Endress, J-53,  PACOM (808-477-0885). Opinions, conclusions, and recommendationsexpressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily representthe views of PACOM, INSS, National Defense University, the Depart-ment of Defense, or any othergovernment agency.

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