22 June 1995

Joint Pub 4-05

Joint Doctrine

for

Mobilization Planning
PREFACE

i

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this

publication apply to the commanders of

combatant commands, subunified commands,

joint task forces, and subordinate components

of these commands. These principles and

guidance also may apply when significant

forces of one Service are attached to forces of

another Service or when significant forces of

one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of the

commander, exceptional circumstances

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between

the contents of this publication and the

contents of Service publications, this

publication will take precedence for the

activities of joint forces unless the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in

coordination with the other members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more

current and specific guidance. Commanders

of forces operating as part of a multinational

(alliance or coalition) military command

should follow multinational doctrines and

guidance ratified by the United States. For

doctrine and procedures not ratified by the

United States, commanders should evaluate

and follow the multinational command’s

doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

 WALTER KROSS

 Lieutenant General, USAF

 Director, Joint Staff

1. Scope

This publication provides a conceptual

foundation for the planning and conduct of

joint military mobilization and demobilization

and some additional methods of force

expansion, including use of volunteers and

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup. It also

provides the context for joint participation in

the planning and programming activities

undertaken within the Department of Defense

under the Graduated Response framework,

especially those activities aimed at the

reconstitution of military capability to deter

any future threat to national security.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to

govern the joint activities and performance

of the Armed Forces of the United States in

joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis

for US military involvement in multinational

and interagency operations. It provides

military guidance for the exercise of authority

by combatant commanders and other joint

force commanders and prescribes doctrine for

joint operations and training. It provides

military guidance for use by the Armed Forces

in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not

the intent of this publication to restrict the

authority of the joint force commander (JFC)

from organizing the force and executing the

mission in a manner the JFC deems most

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the

accomplishment of the overall mission.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
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Preface

Joint Pub 4-05

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER I

MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. I-1

• The National Perspective ......................................................................................... I-1

• The Joint Military Perspective ................................................................................ I-4

• Summary .................................................................................................................. I-9

CHAPTER II

MOBILIZATION TENETS

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... II-1

• Mobilization Tenets ............................................................................................... II-1

• Summary ................................................................................................................ II-6

CHAPTER III

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... III-1

• National Direction and Control ............................................................................ III-1

• Military Command and Control ........................................................................... III-1

• Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution ........................................... III-1

• Summary ............................................................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IV

RESOURCE AREAS

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... IV-1

SECTION A. MANPOWER ............................................................................... IV-2

• Sources of Military Manpower ......................................................................... IV-2

• Mobilization Personnel Management Policy .................................................... IV-2

• Civilian Manpower ........................................................................................... IV-2

• Manpower Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-4

• Effects of Manpower Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ......................... IV-5

SECTION B. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT ................................................. IV-6

• Sources of Materiel and Equipment.................................................................. IV-6

• Materiel and Equipment Mobilization Options ................................................ IV-7

• Effects of Materiel and Equipment Mobilization on Other Resource Areas IV-7

SECTION C. TRANSPORTATION .................................................................... IV-8

• Sources of Mobilization Transportation ........................................................... IV-8

• Transportation Mobilization Options.............................................................. IV-10

• Effect of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas .................. IV-11
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Joint Pub 4-05

SECTION D. FACILITIES ............................................................................... IV-12

• Sources of Facilities ........................................................................................ IV-12

• Facilities Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-12

• Effect of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ........................... IV-16

SECTION E. INDUSTRIAL BASE.................................................................. IV-16

• Industrial Mobilization Sources ...................................................................... IV-16

• Industrial Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-16

• Effect of Industrial Mobilization on Other Resource Areas........................... IV-16

SECTION F. TRAINING BASE ....................................................................... IV-18

• Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity ........................ IV-18

• Effect of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas ....................... IV-18

SECTION G. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT ................................................. IV-19

• General ............................................................................................................ IV-19

• Sources of Emergency HSS ............................................................................ IV-19

• Options for Mobilizing HSS ........................................................................... IV-20

• Effect of HSS Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ................................... IV-21

SECTION H. COMMUNICATIONS ................................................................ IV-21

• Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support ................. IV-21

• Effect of Communications Mobilization Activities Other Resource Areas IV-21

SECTION I. HOST-NATION SUPPORT ......................................................... IV-22

• Sources of HNS ............................................................................................... IV-22

• Options for Mobilizing HNS .......................................................................... IV-22

• Effects of Mobilizing HNS on the Other Resource Areas.............................. IV-22

SECTION J. THE ENABLING RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENT, LEGAL

AUTHORITIES, FUNDING .............................................................................. IV-23

• General ............................................................................................................ IV-23

SECTION K. SUMMARY ................................................................................ IV-27

• Summary ......................................................................................................... IV-27

CHAPTER V

MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... V-1

SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING ..................................................... V-2

• Mobilization Planning and OPLANs ................................................................. V-2

• Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans ............................................. V-2

• Mobilization Estimate of the Situation .............................................................. V-3

• Mobilization and Deliberate Planning ............................................................... V-4

• Mobilization and Crisis Action Planning .......................................................... V-7
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Table of Contents

SECTION B. MOBILIZATION EXECUTION ................................................... V-8

• Mobilization Decisions and Orders ................................................................... V-8

• Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization......................................... V-8

SECTION C. SUMMARY ................................................................................. V-10

• Summary .......................................................................................................... V-10

CHAPTER VI

JOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... VI-1

SECTION A. DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING ............................................... VI-1

• Demobilization and National Security.............................................................. VI-1

• Demobilization Planning Guidelines ................................................................ VI-2

• Planning Considerations ................................................................................... VI-3

• Recovery Planning ............................................................................................ VI-3

SECTION B. EXECUTION ................................................................................ VI-4

• General .............................................................................................................. VI-4

• Demobilization Execution ................................................................................ VI-5

SECTION C. SUMMARY .................................................................................. VI-5

• Summary ........................................................................................................... VI-5

APPENDIX

A Legal Authorities .............................................................................................. A-1

B Automated Tools .............................................................................................. B-1

C Mobilization Estimate ...................................................................................... C-1

D Administrative Instructions .............................................................................. D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I—Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................. GL-1

Part II—Terms and Definitions ........................................................................... GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations ......................................................................... I-2

I-2 Graduated Response ....................................................................................... I-3

I-3 Mobilization/Demobilization Cycle ............................................................... I-7

II-1 Mobilization Tenets ...................................................................................... II-1

III-1 Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities .................................................... III-3

III-2 Military Department Responsibilities ......................................................... III-4

IV-1 Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options ............................ IV-3

IV-2 Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options ..................... IV-6
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Joint Pub 4-05

IV-3 Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options .................................... IV-9

IV-4 Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options .............................................. IV-13

IV-5 Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options .......................................... IV-17

IV-6 Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options ....................... IV-18

IV-7 Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options ................... IV-20

IV-8 Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization .................. IV-24

V-1 Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems ........................................ V-3

V-2 Mobilization in the Deliberate Planning Process ......................................... V-7

V-3 Mobilization and CAP .................................................................................. V-9

VI-1 Demobilization Planning Guidelines .......................................................... VI-2

VI-2 Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas ...................... VI-5
vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

•

Discusses the Mobilization and National Security Strategy

Describes the Objectives of Mobilization Tenets

Covers the Roles and Responsibilities of Mobilization Planning

Provides the Resource Areas Available for Mobilization

Planning

Discusses the Planning and Execution of Mobilization

Considers the Joint Planning and Execution of Demobilization

Mobilization is the process

of preparing for war or

other emergencies.

The President identifies

national objectives and

interests in the National

Security Strategy of the

United States.

The mobilization process of preparing for war or other

emergencies includes assembling and organizing personnel

and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the

Reserve component including federalizing the National Guard,

extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the

industrial base, and bringing the Armed Forces to a state of

readiness for war or other national emergency. There are two

processes implied in this definition: the Military Mobilization

Process and the National Mobilization Process.

The United States preserves its security by the judicious

application of national power to achieve national objectives

derived from national interests. A strong national defense

depends on maintaining a strong economy, infrastructure,

and viable network of multinational and regional political

alliances. The National Military Strategy implements the

Defense agenda which asserts that we can meet the challenges

of the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than was

required in the past but still a total force. The graduated

response process provides a planning framework for the

national direction and control of military and national

mobilization activities. The graduated response concept

comprises three stages of mobilization preparedness activity:

planning and preparation, crisis management, and national

emergency or war.

Mobilization and National Security
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Executive Summary

Joint Pub 4-05

The Total Force Policy is

one fundamental premise

upon which our military

force structure is built.

There are four

mobilization tenets that,

together, describe the

characteristics of

successful mobilization.

The roles of mobilization

management are the

responsibilities of the

National Command

Authorities and the Joint

Planning and Execution

Community.

From the joint operation perspective, the Total Force Policy

shifted significant military missions from the Active

component (AC) to the Reserve component (RC). This

policy increased reliance on military retirees, Department of

Defense civilians, contractor personnel, and host-nation

support, and ensured that mobilization actions will be

considered for most military operations. Mobilization and

demobilization are also functions of the joint operation

planning process which complement and support the

deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of

joint forces in crisis and war.

The four tenets that provide the foundation for mobilization

doctrine are as follows: Objective includes the clearly defined,

attainable, and decisive objectives that are imperative to joint

operations. Operational and mobilization planners must

coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for

mobilization actions is clearly understood, and the resulting

impacts clearly identified. Unity of effort demands the

integrated efforts of the nation’s military and national sectors

toward achievement of common objectives established by the

President. Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate

response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to

uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. Timeliness is

essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield

at the right time and place and requires the coordination of

resources, personnel and information in order to react faster

than the enemy.

The members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community

plan and execute joint military mobilization. The primary

executors of mobilization are the Military Departments.

They develop mobilization plans to support the combatant

commanders’ operation plans (OPLANs). They are guided in

these efforts by policy and resource levels established by the

Secretary of Defense and by planning tasks specified by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Combatant commanders’

OPLANs specify the level of mobilization and the RC forces

needed to support the plan. The Joint Staff is responsible

for integrating the mobilization plans of the Military

Departments, United States Special Operations Command, and

supporting Defense agencies; recommending resource

Mobilization Tenets

Roles and Responsibilities During Mobilization
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Executive Summary

The major mobilization

activities are viewed by

resource area and are

essential for timely force

expansion and

sustainment.

priorities and allocations; recommending levels of

mobilization; and monitoring the status and progress of

mobilization execution.

There are 12 interdependent resource areas that are

included in military mobilization. Mobilization planners and

decisionmakers should understand that activities occurring on

any one area may have an influence on each of the others. On

occasion, additional industrial production, training base

capacity, health service support, communications support, and

host-nation support is needed. The appropriate legal authorities

and funding may also need to be provided if conflicts or statutes

need to be resolved. Thorough coordination and effective

communications will ensure that mobilization activities

initiated in a resource area can be supported by the other

areas. Logistics provides the foundation of combat power

and is the bridge connecting the economy with the warfighting

forces.

Manpower, including personnel management, civilian

manpower, manpower mobilization options, and the effects

on other resource areas, is an important aspect of mobilization

and involve personnel from all levels. Materiel and

equipment includes all classes of supply, equipment on hand

in units, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the output

of the depot maintenance system and industrial base.

Transportation resources are required to support mobilization,

deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and

demobilization operations. Facilities are used to house, train,

equip, and support troops as well as storage space, maintain

equipment, and conduct operations. The industrial base

includes domestic commercial production facilities and

government-owned facilities. Training bases are used to train

nonprior Service personnel to support and sustain an expanded

force structure as well as offer reclassification and refresher

training for pretrained individual manpower. Health service

support is expanded to serve the mobilized force and provide

the capability to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute

casualties. The Federal Government relies primarily upon

commercial providers for the communications required for

national defense and crisis response. Host-nation support

provides manpower, equipment, facilities, and services during

war or emergency offset requirements. Mobilization planners

must consider the effect of mobilization activities on the

environment as well as the necessities of legal authorities

Resource Areas
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Executive Summary

Joint Pub 4-05

The relationship between

mobilization plans,

operation plans, and

campaign plans is very

important for planning

and executing

mobilization.

Military demobilization

planning is as important

as mobilization planning.

and funding to enable the timely execution of mobilization

activities. Without these resources, the other resource areas

would not be obtainable when necessary.

The mobilization annex of the JSCP guides the Military

Departments and combatant commanders in preparing

mobilization plans that will support the OPLANs developed

in the deliberate planning process. A campaign plan describes

how a series of joint major operations are arranged in time,

space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective. The

mobilization estimate of the situation provides a tool for

mobilization planners to make a systematic appraisal of

mobilization requirements and options in either a

deliberate or crisis action plan situation. A mobilization

base must be maintained at all times and requires resources,

manpower and industrial base capacity being the most

important, which can be made available to permit force

expansion and sustainment when necessary. Successful

mobilization planning during crises depends upon the

availability of accurate data regarding the readiness of RC units

and personnel, pretrained individual manpower, civilian

employees, and other support. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff recommends to the Secretary of Defense the

assets that are to be called up and their planned use when RC

forces are to be mobilized to augment the AC.

Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a crisis

situation or from a wartime military establishment and

defense-based economy to a peacetime configuration while

maintaining national security and economic vitality.

Demobilization plans must reflect the post-conflict missions

of supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for

battlefield recovery and redeployment operations. Ideally,

demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilization

commences. The proposed demobilization policies should

include joint force readiness, the health of the national

economy, and morale of and benefits for Service members

and the Department of Defense civilian employees and their

families. The supported and supporting commanders play a

coordinating and synchronizing role in order to ensure

readiness of assigned forces to required levels for future

conflicts. Military personnel are released from active duty or

returned to reserve status while materiel and equipment may

be mothballed, stored, distributed to other nations, destroyed,

Mobilization Planning and Execution

Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution
xi

Executive Summary

sold for scrap or turned over to the Defense Reutilization and

Marketing Offices.

This publication defines joint mobilization and demobilization

doctrine for joint forces within the broader context of joint

doctrine. It describes the role of mobilization and

demobilization in national security and military strategy and

defines joint mobilization tenets. It describes mobilization

roles and responsibilities at the national level and relates them

to roles and responsibilities for mobilization planning and

execution within the Joint Planning and Execution Community

(JPEC). It identifies the major mobilization decisions and

activities in each of 12 resource areas (manpower, materiel

and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base,

training base, health service support, communications, hostnation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding)

and describes how they affect each other. Finally, it outlines

the nature of military mobilization and demobilization planning

in joint operations and JPEC participation in planning and

programming activities.

CONCLUSION
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Joint Pub 4-05

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military and national mobilization. GR is the

process by which the United States

responds to early ambiguous or explicit

warning of an emerging national security

emergency. It includes preplanned measures

in the areas of force readiness, industrial base

preparedness, operational requirements, and

sustainability. From a joint operations

perspective, mobilization is a function of the

joint command and control process, which

together with the Department of Defense

(DOD) Total Force Policy provides the basis

for joint military mobilization planning

and execution. This chapter examines the

relationship between mobilization and

national security from both perspectives. It

concludes with a definition of demobilization,

an essential first step toward maintaining

national security after a crisis or war.

2. The National Perspective

“The highest type of strategy—

sometimes called grand strategy—is

that which so integrates the policies

and armaments of the nation that resort

to war is either rendered unnecessary

or is undertaken with the maximum

chance of victory.”

Edward Meade Earle

Makers of Modern Strategy

a. National Security Strategy. As a

nation, the United States preserves its

CHAPTER I

MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

I-1

1. Introduction

a. Mobilization is the process of

preparing for war or other emergencies by

assembling and organizing personnel and

materiel for active duty military forces,

activating the Reserve component including

federalizing the National Guard, extending

terms of service, surging and mobilizing the

industrial base, and bringing the Armed

Forces of the United States to a state of

readiness for war or other national emergency.

There are two processes implied in this

definition.

• The Military Mobilization Process by

which the nation’s Armed Forces are

brought to an increased state of readiness.

• The National Mobilization Process of

mobilizing the national economy to meet

non-defense needs and sustain the Armed

Forces in war or military operations other

than war.

b. From a national perspective, the

importance of a responsive mobilization

capability to our national security is implicit

in the President’s National Security Strategy

and its derivative military strategy. The

national process of graduated response (GR)

provides the framework for achieving the

desired mobilization capability and is a model

for coordinating resources and plans for

“The Congress shall have power...To provide for calling forth the Militia to

execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing

such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States,

reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the

authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by

Congress.”

Constitution of the United States, Amendment II
I-2

Chapter I

Joint Pub 4-05

security by the judicious application of

national power to achieve national objectives

derived from national interests. The President

identifies national interests and objectives in

the National Security Strategy of the United

States. National interests and objectives are

the ends of our national security strategy.

The ways and means for achieving these ends

are explained in broad terms by the President

in his political, economic, and defense

agendas. Each agenda includes a set of

policies and programs aimed at achieving

national objectives. Programs for maintaining

a strong national defense depend on our

maintaining a strong economy, infrastructure,

and viable network of multinational and

regional political alliances.

b. Military Strategy

• The National Military Strategy

implements the Defense Agenda of the

President’s National Security Strategy.

It is a strategy reflecting new and

enduring realities in a rapidly changing

post-Cold War world characterized by

instability and uncertainty and in which

the United States provides leadership.

Explicit in the military strategy is the

assertion that we can meet the

challenges of the foreseeable future

with a much smaller force than was

required in the past, but still a total

force--a carefully tailored combination

of Active component (AC) and Reserve

component (RC), together with retired

military personnel, DOD civilian

employees, DOD contractors, and hostnation support (HNS). Implicit in the

strategy is retention and improvement

of the capability for rapid and efficient

mobilization of forces and resources to

respond to natural disasters at the low end

of the range of military operations and

to deter or counter a broad spectrum of

threats to our national security.

• Figure I-1 depicts a representative range

of military operations together with the

levels of mobilization available to the

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

LEVEL OF RESPONSE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING FURTHER FORCE EXPANSION

CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

PRESIDENTIAL OR

CONGRESSIONAL

DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

GLOBAL

MULTIPLE REGIONAL

CONTINGENCIES

REGIONAL

CONTINGENCY

PEACE OPERATIONS

HUMANITARIAN

ASSISTANCE

COUNTER DRUG

CIVIL DISTURBANCE

NATURAL DISASTER

TOTAL

MOBILIZATION

FULL

MOBILIZATION

PARTIAL

MOBILIZATION

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED

RESERVE CALLUP

RC VOLUNTEERS

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations
I-3

Mobilization and National Security

GRADUATED RESPONSE

NATIONAL

DIRECTION

& CONTROL

MILITARY

COMMAND

& CONTROL

GRADUATED RESPONSE

RESOURCE AREAS

FEDERAL

INTERAGENCY

COORDINATION

& SUPPORT

MANPOWER

MATERIAL / EQUIPMENT

TRANSPORTATION

FACILITIES

INDUSTRIAL BASE

HEALTH SERVICE

SUPPORT

COMMUNICATIONS

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

ENVIRONMENT

LEGAL

JOINT

MILITARY

PLANNING &

PROGRAMMING

FEDERAL

AGENCY

PLANNING &

PROGRAMMING

MILITARY

MOBILIZATION

NATIONAL

MOBILIZATION

III

P

L

A

N

N

I

N

G

P

R

E

P

A

R

A

T

I

O

N

II

CRISIS

N

A

T

I

O

N

A

L

I E

M

E

R

G

E

N

C

Y

III

P

L

A

N

N

I

N

G

P

R

E

P

A

R

A

T

I

O

N

II

CRISIS

N

A

T

I

O

N

A

L

I E

M

E

R

G

E

N

C

Y

Figure I-2. Graduated Response

President when RC forces are needed for

an appropriate response. Congress has

provided the President with a

comprehensive menu of authorities for

tailoring an appropriate response in a

crisis. Several of these are available

without a declaration of national

emergency. Others require Presidential

or congressional emergency declarations.

Detailed discussions of mobilization

levels and emergency authorities are

provided in Chapter IV, “Resource

Areas,” and Chapter V, “Mobilization

Planning and Execution.”

c. Graduated Response

• As shown in Figure I-2, the GR process

provides a planning framework for the

national direction and control of military

and national mobilization activities.

Overall responsibility for GR rests with the

National Security Council (NSC) and its

interagency structure. Virtually every

Federal agency has a role to play in

managing a national response to a crisis.

National resources in the 12 resource areas

(manpower, materiel and equipment,

transportation, facilities, industrial base,

training base, health service support,

communications, host-nation support,

environment, legal authorities, and funding)

are focused on defense needs. The DOD

provides support to Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) during

natural disasters under the Federal

Response Plan. FEMA coordinates the

actions and programs of the other Federal

agencies in support of the DOD during

regional contingencies and mobilization

efforts.

• The GR concept comprises three

stages of mobilization preparedness
I-4

Chapter I

Joint Pub 4-05

activity: planning and preparation, crisis

management, and national emergency or

war.

•• Stage III—Planning and

Preparation. In Stage III, the United

States maintains vigilance, observing

national and international events for

developing threats to national security.

Federal departments and agencies

develop emergency plans and maintain

the capability to carry out the plans within

funding limitations. Although essentially

a period of peace, it is during this stage

that the gradual emergence of a potential

new threat would be perceived and

actions could be taken to deter the threat.

•• Stage II—Crisis Management.

Stage II activities are designed around

options for responding to specific crisis

situations as they develop. The

Department of Defense and other Federal

departments and agencies initiate

preparatory actions that are not feasible

during Stage III because of resource

constraints or the absence of a more

specific basis for focused planning and

preparation. During this stage, the

nation’s civilian leadership may elect not

to risk political capital and significant

economic disruption; these are

characteristic of overt mobilization

actions, but leaders may approve limited

actions for improving US preparedness.

Such actions would be designed to

maximize response potential with

minimum disruption of the economy.

Limited surge of the defense industrial

base, a Presidential declaration of

national emergency, and a Presidential

Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) could

occur as Stage II actions.

•• Stage I—National Emergency or

War. In Stage I, the United States

begins a mobilization of the economy

for a crisis or war. A Presidential or

congressional declaration of national

emergency should be expected at an early

point in Stage I activities. The principal

distinguishing feature between Stages I

and II is a substantial increase in the

magnitude of defense industrial

production and other essential

national defense activities. Industrial

base expansion will be characterized by

expanding facilities, building new

facilities, and conversion of non-defense

producers. Critical resources could be

diverted from nonessential production,

and significant disruption of the national

economy would be a consequence. The

increased demand for resources would

mandate increased interagency

coordination and support of mobilization

actions and prioritization of resource

shortages.

• Successful GR requires effective

interagency coordination in each stage

to synchronize production capacity, labor

force expansion and stabilization,

economic and trade policies, energy and

transportation allocations, and other

actions that prepare the United States to

respond to hostilities and signal its

commitment to national security.

3. The Joint Military

Perspective

a. Total Force Policy. The Total Force

Policy is one fundamental premise upon

which our military force structure is built.

It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused a

shift of substantial military roles and missions

to the RC along with the resources necessary

to maintain high levels of readiness, especially

in units that are needed early in a crisis. As

the Total Force Policy matured, military

retirees, DOD civilian personnel,

contractor personnel, and host-nation

support personnel were brought under its

umbrella to reflect the value of their

contributions to our military capability. Total
I-5

Mobilization and National Security

RESERVE FORCES PREPAREDNESS—LEGACY OF THE ’80s

During the 1980s, major improvements were made in Reserve Component (RC)

force readiness to perform wartime missions. By the fall of 1990, modernization

efforts had given the RC the ability to field approximately 84 percent (in dollar

value) of the equipment they required for war. The DOD policy of “First to

fight, first to equip” required resourcing both Active and RC units in the

sequence in which they were required to perform their wartime missions.

Successful recruiting efforts, the assignment to the RC of important peacetime

and wartime responsibilities, and substantially improved training opportunities,

also contributed significantly to improved RC force readiness.

The increase in RC readiness levels in the 1980s occurred concurrently with

the largest ever expansion of the RC peacetime structure. From 1980 to the

end of the decade, the number of Selected Reservists increased by 35 percent,

growing from approximately 850,000 to more than 1,150,000. This growth did

not come at the expense of personnel readiness. On the contrary, throughout

the decade, the Services devoted considerable resources to ensure individual

proficiency of Selected Reserve members. During this same period, more

emphasis was placed on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the pool of pretrained individuals.

Individual RC volunteers were integrated into the Active force from the start of

the Persian Gulf crisis, even before the involuntary Reserve call-up. By 22

August, more than 10,500 volunteer RC members already were serving on active

duty. Their contributions were essential to provide capabilities required from

the first days of the crisis—particularly strategic airlift—and to perform

missions almost exclusively assigned to Reserve units including, for example,

water purification and port security.

Thousands of Air Reserve Component (ARC) personnel volunteered within

hours of the initial US response to support the time-sensitive movement of US

personnel and materiel to the Persian Gulf. ARC volunteers flew 42 percent of

all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions.

They also provided continental United States (CONUS) base maintenance,

medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police support to deploying

Air Force units and airlift mission. By 22 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers

had moved seven million tons of cargo and 8,150 passengers to the theater.

As of 25 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers began operating Westover AFB,

MA as a major eastbound staging operation on a 24-hour basis. Westover

continued to operate on a volunteer basis for four months until these same

volunteers were mobilized on 3 December.

force policy focuses awareness and energy on

sound, thorough mobilization planning and

the development of procedures that are

essential to the timely activation of reserve

military power. The Total Force Policy was

tested by the war in the Persian Gulf, which

involved the largest mobilization and

deployment of Reserve forces since the

Korean War. There was significant reliance

on military retirees, DOD civilian personnel,

contractor personnel, and host-nation support

for critical skills and performance of many

essential tasks.
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US Naval Reserve (USNR) volunteers contributed medical, logistics, and cargo

handling skills to CONUS base support operations. While approximately 50

percent of all USNR volunteers were involved in health care, Naval Reservists

also were deployed outside the United States for other tasks. For example, a

detachment of Active Seabees at Subic Bay, Philippines, was deployed to

Southwest Asia (SWA) in August with their parent battalion. When a strike by

3,000 civilians of the public works center was imminent, 150 volunteers from a

Reserve public works center augmented units deployed to Subic Bay and

helped keep essential services in operation. As a result, the base suffered no

interruption in operations, and response time to trouble calls noticeably

improved. Some volunteers subsequently were deployed to Bahrain to

augment the Navy Logistics Support Force’s public works force.

Approximately 1,100 US Marine Corps Reserve volunteers supported the

preparation for deployment of Marine Corps (USMC) forces to SWA. They not

only provided maintenance and logistical support for deploying Active USMC

units but also transport services, to include KC-130T crews who flew

transatlantic refueling missions. In addition, they were assigned liaison and

linguist duties with deploying Active units.

US Coast Guard (USCG) Reserve volunteers provided port security and

supervised the loading of explosives and hazardous cargo at US east and Gulf

Coast ports. The USCG activated Port Security Harbor Defense Units from its

Ninth District (Cleveland) to work with US mobile inshore underwater warfare

units in SWA. This marked the first extended use of USCG volunteers for this

mission.

More than 5,580 Army RC personnel volunteered for temporary tours of active

duty. For example, during Operation DESERT SHIELD, Army Reserve (USAR)

terminal transportation unit members volunteered to work with the Military

Traffic Management Command to manage the flow of combat forces from US

east and Gulf Coast ports. Other USAR and National Guard (ARNG) volunteers

provided maintenance and logistics support, chemical defense training, and

aviation operations assistance for AC forces. RC medical personnel also

backfilled active Health Service Command professionals, who deployed during

the first days of the crisis. Some volunteers deployed directly to theater. South

Carolina ARNG members deployed with Third US Army to help establish

strategic communications for the headquarters.

The large number of RC members who volunteered during the conflict’s early

stages vividly demonstrates their commitment and dedication. Individual

volunteers also provided essential manpower before the decision to

involuntarily activate the Reserves had been made. This provided excellent

support during a difficult time. Ironically, the extent of the volunteering was

so wide-spread that a short-lived personnel problem was created when units

were particularly “short-manned” because their members were made up largely

of early volunteers. While corrected by cross-leveling and other personnel

actions, the irony of such a problem attests to the general success with RC

volunteers and, further, demonstrates the feasibility of using such measures

early in future crises.

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress,

 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992.
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Mobilization and National Security

b. Mobilization and Demobilization in

Joint Planning and Operations. Military

forces fulfill their role in maintaining our

national security by preparing for and, if

necessary, conducting joint operations across

the range of military operations (Figure I-1,

on page I-2). The Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

defines the functions, planning systems, and

information management tools for

accomplishing these tasks. Joint operation

functions are arrayed in the Mobilization/

Demobilization Cycle in Figure I-3. One

complete cycle is shown. It is meant to depict

an era of relative peace interrupted by a crisis

and war requiring the mobilization,

deployment, employment, sustainment,

redeployment, and demobilization of joint

forces. It shows the major steps in the

deliberate planning process that produced the

operation plan used as the basis for crisis

response. It also depicts a gradual return to a

peacetime environment secured by the return

to the pre-crisis force structure. The

mobilization and demobilization functions

have been emphasized to place them in

perspective with the other joint operation

functions.

• Mobilization

•• The mobilization function

includes activation of the RC and

surging and expanding the industrial

base. Lessons learned from the war in

the Persian Gulf and the emergence of a

new national military strategy at the end

of the Cold War have led US military

planners to a broader understanding of

the scope of activities that should be

included under the umbrella of the term,

mobilization. Planners have also

acquired an awareness of the importance

of mobilization planning for

contingencies requiring less than full

mobilization.

MOBILIZATION / DEMOBILIZATION CYCLE

Combatant Commander

Receives Planning Task

From CJCS

Combatant Commander

Develops Concept of

Operations

Combatant Commander

Prepares OPLAN

CJCS Reviews and

Approves OPLAN

Supporting Commanders

Prepare Supporting

Plans

Active

Component

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR WAR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

DELIBERATE PLANNING CRISIS RESPONSE DELIBERATE PLANNING

TIME

RESERVE COMPONENTS

FORCE STRUCTURE

EMPLOY

SUSTAIN

DEPLOY REDEPLOY

MOBILIZE DEMOBILIZE

Figure I-3. Mobilization/Demobilization Cycle
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•• Because the most visible mobilization

activity is activating members of the RC

serving in units or in individual

manpower pools, there has been a

tendency to focus planning on manpower

issues. Mobilization, however, involves

much more than expanding and filling

the military force with people. The

force must be equipped, trained, and

sustained over time if it is to achieve and

maintain its designed capability. These

activities require the support of the

DOD civilian work force and contractor

support. They also require increased

resources in the areas of materiel,

transportation, facilities, industrial

production, training base capacity, health

service support, command and control

communications, and host-nation

support. Extraordinary actions may be

required to ensure continued compliance

with, or temporary waivers of,

environmental protection laws. Funding

and legal authorities are also required to

enable mobilization activities.

Mobilization, therefore, must include

determining and satisfying demands

for these resources to support the total

force during deployment, employment,

sustainment, and redeployment.

•• Mobilization planning complements

and supports joint operation planning

conducted by the combatant

commanders. It is accomplished

primarily by the Military Services,

United States Special Operations

Command (USSOCOM), and their

major subordinate commands based on

guidance received from the Secretary of

Defense. It requires development of

supporting plans by the Defense

Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense

Information Systems Agency (DISA),

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA),

FEMA, Selective Service System (SSS),

Department of Labor, Department of

Health and Human Services (DHHS),

Department of Transportation (DOT),

Department of Energy, Office of Personnel

Management (OPM), and other Federal

agencies. Just as the Military Services

mobilize their reserve organizations and

individuals to augment military capability,

supporting Federal agencies must

oversee mobilization of the support

base required to sustain the mobilized

force. The Joint Staff supports the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

his role as principal military advisor to

the National Command Authorities

(NCA); facilitates resolution of conflicts

for scarce resources among the Services,

combatant commanders, and Defense

agencies; provides input for resolution

of claims for resources between the

military and civil sectors in wartime; and

oversees mobilization planning.

• Demobilization. Demobilization is the

process of transitioning a crisis or

wartime military establishment and

defense-based national economy to a

peacetime configuration while

maintaining national security and

economic vitality. Implied in this

definition are two types of activities:

those associated with reducing the

percentage of the nation’s production

capacity devoted to the Armed Forces

and defense industry, and those

undertaken to maintain national security

and economic vitality. These tasks, which

historically compete for resources, can

make the management of demobilization

even more complex and challenging than

mobilization. Demobilization planning

and execution are covered in Chapter VI,

“Resource Areas.”
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Mobilization and National Security

4. Summary

This chapter has examined the

relationships between mobilization and

national security from the national

perspective and from the perspective of joint

military operations. From the national

perspective, a rapid, efficient mobilization

capability is required to respond to abroad

spectrum of emergencies. National

mobilization capability is achieved through

coordinated planning and resource

management within the DOD and between

the DOD and other Federal agencies. The

GR process provides a planning framework

for national direction and control of military

and mobilization activities. From the joint

operation perspective, the Total Force

Policy shifted significant military missions

from the AC to the RC. This policy increased

reliance on military retirees, DOD civilians,

contractor personnel, and host-nation support,

and ensured that mobilization actions will be

considered for most military operations.

Mobilization and demobilization are also

functions of joint operations, which

complement and support the deployment,

employment, sustainment, and redeployment

of joint forces in crises and war.
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CHAPTER II

MOBILIZATION TENETS

II-1

1. Introduction

As shown in Figure II-1, there are four

mobilization tenets that describe the

characteristics of successful mobilization

and provide the foundation for mobilization

doctrine. The tenets are: objective, unity of

effort, flexibility, and timeliness.

2. Mobilization Tenets

a. Objective. Joint operations are

directed toward clearly defined, attainable,

and decisive objectives. Planning for joint

operations provides the basis for determining

whether the mobilization of reserve forces and

other resources is required to achieve the

objectives. Operational planners must

clearly understand the mobilization

implications associated with their plans to

ensure that needed resources are identified,

mobilized, and used effectively.

Requirements for activating RC forces must

be clearly identified, as well as the need to

expand the capability or capacity of other

resource areas. Operational and

mobilization planners must coordinate

their efforts to ensure that the time necessary

for mobilization actions is clearly understood,

and the resulting impacts clearly identified.

The supported combatant commander must

be apprised of the mobilization actions

required of the supporting commanders and

the supporting establishment.

“The art of war owns certain elements and fixed principles. We must acquire

that theory, and lodge it in our heads—otherwise we will never get very far.”

Frederick the Great

OBJECTIVE: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

The Persian Gulf War serves as a model for defining and articulating objectives.

In successive announcements, the NCA provided clear objectives: the

liberation of Kuwait, the defense of Saudi Arabia, the protection of US citizens,

and the restoration of stability to the region.

Initial mobilization and deployment supported a strategy based on international

economic, political, and diplomatic isolation of Iraq in addition to military

pressure. After several months, the United States and its coalition partners

concluded that the initial strategy would not achieve the objectives within a

reasonable period of time, given the continued buildup of Iraqi forces in the

occupied emirate and the concerted effort by the Iraqis to supplant Kuwait’s

political infrastructure. Accordingly, the original strategy evolved to one calling

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

FLEXIBILITY

TIMELINESS

MOBILIZATION TENETS

Figure II-1. Mobilization Tenets
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b. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort in

mobilization demands the integrated

efforts of the nation’s military and national

sectors toward achievement of common

objectives established by the President.

Integration is achieved through the

effective use of planning and execution

processes that provide for timely and

thorough coordination within the chain of

command and among the DOD, other Federal

agencies, and the civil sector. A manpower

callup alone, for example, would not be

sufficient to provide unit and individual

replacements to sustain a theater force in a

protracted conflict. At the time of callup or

induction, there must be enough

organizational clothing and equipment for

each Service member, as well as training base

capacity and facilities to provide necessary

training. At the time of deployment, there

must be enough strategic transportation to the

theater of operations. At the time of

employment, there must be enough combat

equipment in the theater, as well as food,

ammunition, fuel, and repair parts to sustain

peak performance. Additionally, there must

be adequate health service support available

in the event of injury or sickness. Unity of

effort requires the integration of

mobilization activities within each and

among the various resource areas. If

integration is not accomplished, insufficient

resources in one or more areas could delay

the arrival of unit and individual replacements

on the battlefield or impair their combat

effectiveness.

for offensive military operations against Iraq. If coalition political and economic

measures, together with mobilization and deployment of massive additional

forces, did not persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, the military power to

compel withdrawal would be ready.

Throughout, the objectives remained clear and unchanged. They guided

political leaders and military planners in mobilizing resources for executing

the strategy as it evolved. The result was a major victory and the achievement

of national and coalition objectives.

Training bases must have the capacity to satisfy manpower mobilization

requirements. This may require additional training for prior service and initial

basic training for nonprior service personnel.
II-3

Mobilization Tenets

c. Flexibility. Flexibility is necessary to

develop an appropriate response in a crisis,

overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to

uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war.

Flexibility for mobilization planning and

execution has been provided for in joint

planning and execution systems and in the

comprehensive set of legislated emergency

powers that give the President, in his

constitutional role as commander in chief,

wide latitude in crafting a response to a

developing crisis. There are substantial

emergency authorities available to the

President before a declaration of national

emergency, such as the PSRC authority and

authorities ensuring priority of industrial

production for defense needs. Other

authorities are made available to the President

upon a declaration of national emergency. The

National Emergencies Act provides that when

the President declares a national emergency,

he must specify the powers he is invoking.

Although the powers are limited to those

specifically invoked, others may be invoked

subsequently. This means that the President

has the flexibility to act incrementally to

signal US resolve in a developing crisis and

authorize certain preparatory actions without

causing undue provocation. Joint planning

and execution systems also provide

UNITY OF EFFORT: WORLD WAR I

The absence of unity of effort contributed to a confusing and wasteful World

War I mobilization. Only the most rudimentary advance planning had been

accomplished before the declaration of war in April 1917. This was based

largely on the nation’s reluctance to become involved in a European war,

resistance to war planning, and failure to coordinate US foreign and military

policies.

Months after war was declared, military leaders still had no idea of the size of

the force that would have to be raised. Lack of knowledge concerning the

situation in Europe and failure to use available intelligence resulted in a

succession of ever-growing estimates, which concluded that 1.3 million men

and 30 divisions would be needed by the end of 1918 and 100 divisions by

mid-1919.

There was little coordination of personnel and materiel acquisition activities.

Hundreds of thousands of conscripts reported to hastily constructed training

installations that would not be supplied with enough organizational clothing,

equipment, and weapons to properly equip them for several months.

The government, civilian economy, and Services competed for resources

without a competent coordinating authority. War production was chaotic.

Priorities for raw materials, labor, and electric power were determined in ad

hoc negotiations among public and private officials. East Coast ports of

embarkation were quickly overwhelmed, and inland transportation became so

congested that the President was forced to seize the nation’s railroad system.

A sealift shortage, evident even before German submarines began sinking

merchant ships faster than new ones could be built, cast doubts on the nation’s

ability to deploy forces to Europe even after they were trained and equipped.

The net result was that half-trained US forces were sent to France in British

vessels. The forces were largely equipped with British and French artillery,

tanks, machine guns, and aircraft, and were required to undergo further training

before they could be used effectively on the battlefield.
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maintaining reserve forces and other resources

at optimum readiness levels. Flexibility also

demands a system for accurately

monitoring the status and progress of

mobilization and the ability to replan and

redirect mobilization activities to work around

bottlenecks, resource shortfalls, and for

providing protection of the force, equipment,

and infrastructure being mobilized.

flexibility in mobilization by delegating

authority to the maximum extent consistent

with control in order to promote freedom of

action by subordinates and ensure continuity

when communications are disrupted. The

JointPlanning and Execution Community

(JPEC) also contributes to flexibility by

adaptive planning (i.e., developing a wide

range of military response options for

consideration by decisionmakers) and

FLEXIBILITY: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Flexibility overcame limitations in planning, force structure, and capabilities

in a number of instances during the Persian Gulf crisis and war of 1990-1991.

The availability of pre-positioned supplies and a fairly extensive host-nation

infrastructure enabled the combatant commander to turn the absence of a

fully developed deployment and transportation schedule to tactical advantage

at the beginning of the crisis by gambling on the deployment of combat

elements at the expense of logistic and administrative support units.

Forces deployed to the theater had insufficient organic transportation capability

to carry out the campaign plan. Intensive efforts by the Joint Staff and the

Department of State mobilized critical ground transport from host-nation and

allied assets to execute the planned offensive.

The decision to deploy the US Army’s VII Corps from Europe showed

considerable flexibility. The absence of the Soviet threat allowed what would

otherwise have been a dangerous gamble. Besides powerful combat forces,

VII Corps also included a fully structured support command, which proved

extremely useful in addressing theater logistic shortfalls.

Although the Persian Gulf crisis did not provide a truly strenuous test of

production surge capabilities, industry did accelerate output of critical supplies,

equipment, and munitions. Perhaps the best example of flexibility in this area

was the deployment of a system prototype still undergoing developmental

testing, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft. Its advanced

technology gave the combatant commander the capability to monitor the

battlefield and look deep behind enemy lines in a way never before possible.
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Mobilization Tenets

d. Timeliness. Timely mobilization of all

resources is essential to achieving

overwhelming force on the battlefield at the

right time and place. It is also essential to

seizing and maintaining the initiative. We

must be able to react faster than the enemy is

able to react. Achieving a capability for

timely mobilization of resources requires

timely indications and warnings of the threat

and appropriate response to such indications

and warning; efficient mobilization

procedures and frequent exercises; RCs with

the resources necessary to maintain required

readiness levels; a civilian work force

prepared to support military missions;

contractors prepared for their roles;

stockpiles of materiel and equipment to

sustain the force until industrial base output

can be expanded; and synchronized plans for

the expansion of transportation, facilities,

training base, health service support,

communications, and host-nation support

necessary to deploy, employ, and sustain the

mobilized force. Timeliness requires

obtaining relief from environmental and any

other legal or regulatory constraints, when

necessary, as well as legal authorities and

funding to enable each mobilization activity.

LESSONS ON TIMELINESS FROM 20TH CENTURY WARS

Timeliness has always been a major problem in mobilization. In World War I,

industrial mobilization was geared to a projected big push planned for the

summer of 1919. The surprising success of the last-ditch German offensive in

the spring of 1918, followed that autumn by the climactic Allied

counteroffensive, precipitated the commitment of US troops to combat armed

and equipped with British and French rather than American supplies and

weaponry.

In World War II, personnel mobilization could never be completely synchronized

with requirements. The result was a recurrent boom and bust cycle with regard

to enlisted and junior officer replacements. Partially trained troops repeatedly

had to be stripped out of units in training to fill up units in combat or about to

be deployed, thereby delaying the combat readiness of later deploying units.

The rapid demobilization after World War II, and neglect of military readiness

in the immediate postwar period, left the United States without a viable

capability for responding to a crisis that arose with little or no warning. The

unfortunate result was that we were woefully unprepared for the surprise North

Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. We conducted a desperate

delaying action, and were nearly forced off the Korean peninsula at Pusan,

before reinforcing units and other resources could be mobilized and deployed

to effectively counter the initial North Korean offensive.

Major mobilization decisions during the Persian Gulf crisis were deliberately

synchronized with United Nations resolutions and US congressional action.

In so doing, these decisions not only satisfied the operational requirements of

our joint military forces, they also provided clear signals of US resolve to

adversaries, allies, and the US public, whose continuing support for our Persian

Gulf policy was critical to its success.
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3. Summary

This chapter identified and defined four

mobilization tenets that, together, describe the

characteristics of successful mobilization.

Historical examples, drawn from selected 20th

century mobilizations, provide examples of

success or the consequences of failure to heed

each tenet.
CHAPTER III

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

III-1

“Prepare war, wake up the mighty men.”

Joel III:9

1. Introduction

This chapter describes roles and

responsibilities for joint military

mobilization planning and execution. The

roles and responsibilities for exercising

command and control of our military forces

and for military mobilization are the principal

focus of this chapter. The roles and

responsibilities of the various Federal agencies

that mobilize national resources to support and

sustain the nation’s military forces in time of

war are outside the scope of this publication,

but it is important to understand that virtually

every Federal department and agency would

provide significant support to the Department

of Defense if warranted by an emergency

situation.

2. National Direction and

Control

The Constitution of the United States

divides responsibility for and authority over

the nation’s Armed Forces between Congress

and the President. The NCA is the highest

authority that directs the nation’s

military—including mobilization. The NSC

at the direction of the President establishes

national security emergency preparedness

policy, normally by means of an Executive

order that assigns emergency preparedness

responsibilities, including mobilization, to the

DOD and other Federal departments and

agencies.

3. Military Command and

Control

For joint military operations, which include

the preparation and execution of integrated

mobilization plans, this fundamental

responsibility extends from the President and

the Secretary of Defense, as the NCA, to the

combatant commanders.

4. Joint Military Mobilization

Planning and Execution

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD)

• Basic guidance to direct and coordinate

mobilization planning within the

Department of Defense is contained in

the DOD Master Mobilization Guide

(MMG), which implements DOD

responsibilities under the NSC national

security emergency preparedness policy.

The MMG is the first level of

mobilization planning. It identifies

mobilization responsibilities for DOD

components and describes the tasks to be

performed in peacetime and at the time

of mobilization. It provides a

common foundation for the

preparation of detailed mobilization plans

by the Joint Staff, Military Departments,

and Defense agencies.

• Mobilization planning is heavily

influenced by the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which tasks

the combatant commanders, their Service

components, and the Military

Departments to develop and refine

operation plans (OPLANs) and

supporting mobilization plans.

Another influence on mobilization

planning is DOD Directive 1225.6,

“Equipping the Reserve Forces,”

which specifies the DOD policy of first

to fight, first to equip regardless of

component.
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• In time of crisis and war, OSD assists

the Secretary of Defense in managing

mobilization by developing

implementing guidance for issuance by

the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Staff,

Military Departments, and Defense

agencies. OSD assembles cost data and

compiles reports on the costs of military

operations, as required by law.

b. Joint Planning and Execution

Community. The JPEC collectively plans

for the mobilization, deployment,

employment, sustainment, redeployment,

and demobilization of joint forces. JPEC

members concerned with mobilization include

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff,

Military Departments, combatant

commanders and their Service components,

and selected Defense agencies. Their

mobilization responsibilities are covered in

the following paragraphs:

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman, in consultation with the

other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, prepares integrated plans for

military mobilization. Through the

Mobilization Guidance to the JSCP

(CJCS Instruction 3110.13), the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff establishes planning

relationships. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff develops mobilization

options and provides mobilization

recommendations to the Secretary of

Defense. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff is also responsible for

preparing and submitting to the

Secretary of Defense general strategic

guidance for the development of

industrial mobilization programs. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also

monitors the status and progress of

mobilization and prepares required

reports for submission by the President

to the Congress.

• Joint Staff. The Joint Staff supports the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

in integrating the mobilization plans of

the Military Departments and Defense

agencies. The Director of Logistics,

J-4, is the focal point in the Joint Staff

for integrating mobilization plans and

coordinating mobilization execution

during crises and war. The mobilization

roles of the Joint Staff are shown in

Figure III-1.

• Combatant Commanders. The

combatant commanders organize and

employ assigned and attached

forces. They are principally

responsible for the preparation and

implementation of OPLANs. They

participate in the development of

national military and theater strategies

and participate in the Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting System

(PPBS) in addition to their

operations planning responsibilities. As

part of their operations planning

responsibilities, they determine

mobilization requirements and, based

on additional planning guidance,

incorporate information on specific force

levels projected to be available into

OPLANs and OPORDs.

•• Supported Commanders.

Supported commanders are tasked in the

JSCP or by other joint operation planning

authority to prepare specific plans in

their respective areas of responsibility.

They specify the level of mobilization

needed to support the plan;

identify time-phased requirements for

RC forces; and identify the RC forces

needed for reinforcement, for

deployment and movement of the force,

and for backfill of deployed units. This

planning establishes the requirements

for forces and sustaining resources

upon which supporting mobilization
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Roles and Responsibilities

Figure III-1. Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities

JOINT STAFF

DIRECTORATE MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Manpower and

Personnel, J-1

Reviews manpower-related mobilization requirements.

Identifies options for personnel augmentation and recommends appropriate authorities.

Monitors the allocation and priorization of Inductees to the Services.

Initiates manpower mobilization reporting for the Joint Staff during a crisis.

Intelligence, J-2

Serves as the intelligence staff officer for the Joint Staff.

Provides information and warning about foreign intelligence and security service threats

to the force.

Operations, J-3

Provides the combatant commander’s requirements and the J-3’s recommendation to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the J-4 concerning the need for mobilizing

Reserve component units.

Recommends military courses of action in crisis and war.

Logistics, J-4

Prepares joint mobilization estimates and studies.

Prepares mobilization planning guidance for use by the combatant commanders.

Determines the adequacy and feasibility of mobilization plans to support operation plans.

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for legal authorities pertaining to mobilization.

Monitors the status and progress of mobilization and prepares required reports for

submission by the President to the Congress.

Develops recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the

level of mobilization, emergency authorities required, and the need for induction under

the Selective Service Act.

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to mobilization of

manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training

base, health service support, host-nation support, and their impact on the environment

and the economy.

Develops joint mobilization doctrine, policies, procedures, and reporting instructions.

Strategic Plans

and Policy, J-5

Develops concepts for military mobilization to support strategic concepts and objectives.

Prepares recommendations for declarations of national emergency and war.

Command,

Control,

Communications

and Computers,

J-6

Provides Joint Staff position to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military

Departments concerning mobilization requirements for command, control,

communications, and computers systems, facilities, and services.

Ensure the design of command and control systems is capable of supporting the National

Command Authorities, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Military

Departments, and combatant commanders during mobilization.

Operational

Plans and

Interoperability,

J-7

Plans, conducts, and evaluates mobilization exercises.

Force Structure,

Resources, and

Assessment, J-8

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact concerning Active/Reserve component mix and

other force and resource development issues.
III-4

Chapter III

Joint Pub 4-05

plans are based. This planning requires

extensive coordination among the

supported commander, supporting

commanders, and the Services.

Supported commanders request

invocation of emergency mobilization

authorities when ordered to execute

operation orders (OPORDs) requiring

mobilization support.

•• Supporting Commanders.

Supporting commanders are tasked in the

JSCP or by other joint planning authority

to provide augmentation forces and

other support to a designated supported

commander or commanders. In this role

they may also require mobilized assets

to accomplish their respective support

mission. Their supporting plans include

mobilization requirements when

appropriate. As noted above, extensive

coordination is required to ensure

that all mobilization requirements are

identified.

• Military Departments and USCG.

The Military Departments provide

forces and logistic support to the

combatant commanders at the direction

of the Secretary of Defense. In

peacetime, and until transferred to the

Department of the Navy in time of war,

the USCG serves under the control of the

Secretary of Transportation. USCG units

under DOT control may be assigned to a

combatant commander with the approval

of the Secretary of Transportation. They

provide forces to the combatant

commanders, except for forces under the

control of the Secretary of Defense and

those assigned to multinational

peacekeeping organizations. They

prepare detailed mobilization plans

identifying the actual forces and support

to be provided and execute mobilization

at the direction of the Secretary of

Defense. Specifically, the Military

Departments have the responsibilities

shown in Figure III-2.

• Defense Agencies. Four Defense

agencies have significant

responsibilities for supporting joint

military mobilization. They are DISA,

MILITARY DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Prepare military and industrial mobilization plans.

Identify and request invocation of emergency authorities

necessary to implement mobilization plans.

Plan for the fill and sustainment of organized and / or

structured units with all categories of personnel and

equipment.

Mobilize the Reserve Component in crisis and war.

Mobilize their civilian work force in crisis and war.

Figure III-2. Military Department Responsibilities
III-5

Roles and Responsibilities

DLA, Defense Finance and Accounting

Service (DFAS), and DMA. DISA and

DMA receive operational direction from

and report through the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of

Defense. DLA reports to the Secretary

of Defense through the Under Secretary

of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology, but is responsible for

providing materiel and services to the

combatant commanders and Military

Departments. DFAS reports to the

Secretary of Defense through the DOD

Comptroller. The following

paragraphs summarize the roles and

responsibilities of each of these

agencies in support of joint military

mobilization.

•• Defense Information Systems

Agency. During peacetime, DISA

participates in all command, control,

communications, and computers (C4)

mobilization planning activities with

OSD, the Joint Staff, DOD components,

combatant commanders, and commercial

vendors. DISA collects and analyzes the

telecommunications requirements

derived from this participation and

develops mobilization plans. During

war and military operations other than

war, DISA modifies its mobilization

plans, if required, and ensures the

responsiveness of the Defense

Communications System (DCS) to the

actual requirements of the NCA, OSD,

Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and

Services. DISA also manages the

National Communications System and

employs the nation’s commercial

communications resources to support

Defense requirements.

•• Defense Logistics Agency. Based on

the Services’ mobilization plans, DLA,

in peacetime, develops mobilization

plans to support the Military

Departments and other authorized

customers with DLA-managed materiel

and services. These plans include

substantial industrial preparedness

planning based on the combatant

commanders’ critical item list (CIL) and

extensive production base analysis

conducted in coordination with OSD, the

Joint Staff, and the Military Departments.

Across the entire range of military

operations, DLA provides logistic

support to the Services, advises the

Joint Staff on the status of inventories

of DLA-managed items, and

recommends resource allocations and

production priorities when appropriate.

•• Defense Finance and Accounting

Service. DFAS is the focal point for

joint financial management issues.

DFAS works with the combatant

commanders to develop the financial

management annexes to joint operation

plans. DFAS develops guidance

regarding personnel pay issues, providing

entitlement and tax information to

members and dependents, and ensuring

that the financial systems are able to

support mobilization efforts. DFAS has

formed a DFAS-wide crisis

management system to ensure that all

DFAS Crisis Coordination Centers are

informed of financial management issues

as they occur.

•• Defense Mapping Agency. In

peacetime, DMA develops and

maintains mobilization plans to ensure

continued mapping, charting, and

geodesy (MC&G) support to joint

forces under crisis and wartime

conditions. It provides the combatant

commanders with operational levels of

MC&G stocks sufficient to meet initial

mobilization requirements. In crisis and

war, DMA executes its plans and

procedures for increased data

collection and increased production and

distribution of its products.
III-6

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5. Summary

This chapter identified and described the

roles and mobilization management

responsibilities of the NCA and JPEC. The

members of the JPEC plan and execute joint

military mobilization. The primary executors

of mobilization are the Military

Departments. They develop mobilization

plans to support the combatant commanders’

OPLANs. They are guided in these efforts

by policy and resource levels established by

the Secretary of Defense and by planning

tasks specified by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in the JSCP. Combatant

commanders’ OPLANs specify the level of

mobilization and the RC forces needed to

support the plan. The Joint Staff is

responsible for integrating the mobilization

plans of the Military Departments,

USSOCOM, and supporting Defense

agencies; recommending resource priorities

and allocations; recommending levels of

mobilization; and monitoring the status and

progress of mobilization execution.
CHAPTER IV

RESOURCE AREAS

IV-1

1. Introduction

a. Military mobilization requires the

assembly and organization of resources in

12 interdependent resource areas as listed in

Chapter I, “Mobilization and National

Security.” Mobilization planners and

decisionmakers should understand that

activities occurring in any one area may

have an influence on each of the others;

(e.g., activating additional manpower creates

demands for additional materiel and

equipment, transportation, and additional

workloads at affected facilities). Depending

on the situation, it could also generate

requirements for additional industrial

production, training base capacity, HSS,

communications support, and HNS.

Increasing levels of manpower and other

resources may also create conflicts with

environmental protection statutes,

especially at various facilities in the United

States. Some mobilization actions may be

delayed until these conflicts are resolved by

either complying with environmental

protection standards or by requesting

temporary waivers. The appropriate legal

authorities and funding would also have to

be obtained to enable the callup.

Mobilization decisions in each resource

area, therefore, should be made with an

understanding of the effect the decision

could have on other resource areas.

b. Mobilization planners deal with

resource area interactions during

deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP)

through staff coordination and the exchange

of information among supported and

supporting organizations. Thorough

coordination and effective communications

will ensure that mobilization activities

initiated in a resource area can be supported

by the other areas.

c. This chapter provides an overview of

major mobilization activities by resource

area. The discussion of each area is presented

from a joint perspective; i.e., mobilization

activities common to two or more Military

Departments or undertaken to support and

sustain joint operations. The discussion in

each resource area includes listing the sources

of the resource, the options available to

decisionmakers for using the resource, and

the likely effect a mobilization decision

made in the area could have on the other

areas.

d. Logistics provides the foundation of

combat power and is the bridge connecting

the economy with the warfighting forces.

“The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons and

transport supplies; women will make tents and serve in the hospitals; the old

men will have themselves carried into the public squares to rouse the courage

of the fighting men, and to preach the unity of the Republic. The public

buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munitions

factories. All suitable firearms shall be turned over to the troops; the interior

shall be policed with fowling pieces and cold steel. All saddle horses shall

be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will

draw the artillery and the supply wagons.”

Decree by the Committee on Public Safety,

 (French Revolution, 23 August 1793)
IV-2

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Joint Pub 4-05

Logistics is the science of planning and

carrying out the movement and

maintenance of forces. It deals with the

design and development, acquisition, storage,

movement, distribution, maintenance,

evacuation, and disposition of materiel; the

acquisition, construction, maintenance,

operation, and disposition of facilities; the

movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of

personnel; and the acquisition or furnishing

of services. The art of logistics is how to

integrate the strategic, operational, and

tactical sustainment efforts within a

combatant commander’s area of

responsibility (AOR), while scheduling the

mobilization and deployment of units,

personnel, and supplies in support of the

employment concept of the combatant

commander. The relative combat power

military forces can bring to bear against an

enemy is constrained by the ability to deliver

forces and materiel to the required points of

application across the range of military

operations. Operational planners must

understand the importance of effective and

integrated logistics and mobilization

planning for joint operations at a time when

demands on military resources are increasing.

SECTION A. MANPOWER

“People and not things are the

fundamental factor determining the

outcome of war.”

General Lo Jui-Ching

May 1965

2. Sources of Military

Manpower

Manpower mobilization augments the

peacetime AC military end strength. Sources

of military mobilization manpower include

members of the RC, military retirees,

volunteers with prior service, and nonprior

service personnel who volunteer or are

drafted. These resources are organized by

law to provide responsiveness in crises.

Figure IV-1 associates these sources of

manpower with manpower mobilization

options and the actions required to initiate a

callup. The legal authorities required for the

callup of the various manpower pools are

listed with the corresponding option.

3. Mobilization Personnel

Management Policy

In addition to the callup of manpower from

reserve and retiree manpower pools and

conscription, three other actions can be

taken to ensure optimum availability and

utilization of manpower during

mobilization. These are stop-loss, stopmovement, and personnel redistribution

actions. Stop-loss actions allow the Military

Departments to retain personnel beyond their

terms of service. Stop-movement actions

refer to a number of policy and procedural

actions that can be taken by the Military

Departments to stabilize AC personnel and

ensure the maximum number are available for

assignment to theaters of operation or other

high-priority duties. These activities may

include canceling temporary and permanent

change of station travel, changing tour length

policies, and curtailing attendance at Service

schools. Redistribution actions are also

taken within the Military Departments during

a crisis to ensure that high-priority units are

maintained at the highest level of personnel

readiness until an efficient personnel fill and

replacement pipeline can be established.

4. Civilian Manpower

Civilian manpower is an integral part of

the DOD Total Force Concept. Future crises

across the range of military operations will

require careful management of the civilian

work force to support military operations in

overseas theaters of operations and CONUS.

a. In theaters, civilians with skills

essential to support military missions may
IV-3

Resource Areas

SITUATION SOURCES OF

MANPOWER

MOBILIZATION

OPTIONS ACTION REQUIRED

Domestic

Emergency (e.g.,

natural disaster,

civil disturbance)

Army National Guard

and Air National

Guard

Federalize National

Guard troops under

10 USC 12406 and

331-333

President publishes

proclamation and an executive

order.

Any level of

emergency (with or

without a declared

national

emergency)

Volunteers from the

National Guard and

Reserve

Call for volunteers

under 10 USC

12301(d)

Secretaries of the Military

Departments solicit volunteers

with needed skills and publish

callup orders.

Regular and Reserve

retirees with 20+

years of active service

Recall retirees under

10 USC 688(a)

Secretaries of the Military

Departments publish callup

orders.

Volunteer enlistees Enlist qualified

volunteers

Military Departments accept

qualified applicants in

accordance with DOD and

Service standards and policies.

Selected Reserve

- Units

- Individual

 Mobilization

 Augmentees (IMA)

Call to active duty up

to 200,000 Selected

Reservists under 10

USC 12304

(Presidential Selected

Reserve Callup)

President publishes Executive

order. Military Departments

publish callup orders based on

SECDEF implementing

instructions. President must

report to the Congress within 24

hours on anticipated use of

forces.

Draftees Initiate conscription National Command Authorities

requests amendment to the

Selective Service Act (50 USC

app. 451 et seq.) authorizing

conscription.

War or National

Emergency

Ready Reserve

- Units

- Individual Ready

 Reserves (IRR)

- IMAs

Call to active duty up

to 1,000,000 Ready

Reservists for up to

24 months under 10

USC 12302(a)

(Partial Mobilization)

Presidential proclamation of a

national emergency and an

Executive order (or

congressional declaration of

national emergency). Military

Departments publish call up

orders based on SECDEF

implementing instructions.

Remaining Ready

Reserve

Retired Reserve

Standby Reserve

Call to active duty

remaining Reserve

component personnel

under 10 USC 12301

(Full Mobilization)

Passage of legislation or a joint

resolution of the Congress

declaring war or national

emergency. Military

Departments publish callup

orders.

New units and

personnel

Add new force

structure and

personnel necessary

to achieve national

security objectives

(Total Mobilization)

Passage of legislation

authorizing additional force

structure and manpower.

Figure IV-1. Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options
IV-4

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05

remain after other US civilians and their

families have been evacuated. The Services

and Defense agencies designate these

personnel as emergency-essential and

provide necessary training and other support

for their crisis and wartime duties to include

the intrinsic responsibility of providing

protection to US civilians in the AOR

consistent with the capabilities and operational

mission. Other civilian employees with

critical skills may deploy to the theater

individually or with supported military

units. The geographic combatant commander

determines admission requirements to the

theater, and the respective Services and

agencies implement those requirements for

their employees. Some foreign-national

civilian employees (local or third country

nationals) may also remain to support the

mission based on the need for their skills, level

of danger, and agreements with the host

country.

b. In the United States, the Services and

Defense agencies reallocate incumbent

civilian personnel from peacetime to the

highest priority functions through detailing,

reassignment, and cross training. When a

crisis begins, the Services and agencies

activate Recruiting Area Staffing

Committees to find joint, local solutions for

meeting these requirements. Solutions can

include:

• Overtime and extended workweek

authorizations.

• Implementing plans for replacing

employees ordered to active duty

because of RC or retired-military

obligations.

• Using civilian retirees and retired

military personnel not expected to be

recalled.

• Using employees on loan from other

Federal, State, or local agencies.

• Using contractors.

• Joint advertising and allocation of new

employees after hiring.

• Activating applicable crisis procedures

with OPM regional offices and with State

and local employment offices to provide

required applicants on an expedited

basis.

5. Manpower Mobilization

Options

Manpower mobilization options provide

great flexibility to the NCA for responding

to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal

authorities available before a Presidential

declaration of national emergency or a

congressional declaration of national

emergency or war as shown in Figure IV-1

and Figure I-1. Before a declaration of

national emergency, the Secretaries of the

Military Departments can call for RC

volunteers who have needed skills and

activate them for short periods of time. RC

volunteers were used effectively during

Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in

Haiti. Volunteer Reservists and recalled

retirees were used in Operations DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the

Persian Gulf. PSRC authority makes up to

200,000 Selected Reservists available for up

to 270 days (10 USC 12304). It was also used

effectively in the Persian Gulf and during

recent operations in Haiti. This authority can

be used to send a strong signal of US resolve

to friends and foes alike and can serve as a

prelude to mobilization. A Presidential

declaration of national emergency and

invocation of the partial mobilization

authority makes up to one million Ready

Reservists available for up to 24

consecutive months. This partial

mobilization authority, also used for the first

time in the Persian Gulf crisis, includes

members of the IRR, which is a source of
IV-5

Resource Areas

pretrained manpower to be used as Service

needs dictate. Like the PSRC, activations

under this authority can be made

incrementally or all at once to meet the needs

of the crisis as it develops. A congressional

declaration of a national emergency or war

is required before full mobilization may be

ordered (10 USC 12301(a)). Under full

mobilization the Retired and Standby

Reserves become available, as well as Ready

Reserves not called previously. Manpower

requirements for force expansion beyond the

peacetime-authorized force structure and

sustainment in a protracted conflict may

require legislation authorizing activation

of the SSS for the conscription of additional

forces.

6. Effects of Manpower

Mobilization on Other

Resource Areas

a. Selected Reserve Manpower.

Mobilized Selected Reserve units create

time-phased demands for all classes of

supply, especially rations, fuel, and

ammunition; major items of equipment; and

repair parts. They also create temporary, but

significant, demands for intra-CONUS

transportation as they move from home

stations to mobilization sites and for strategic

airlift and sealift for deployment overseas.

They create workloads at existing facilities

for personnel support, energy, housing,

training areas, and storage and may require

construction of new facilities. They create

demands for additional industrial base

output of all classes of consumables and for

major end-items when war reserve stocks are

depleted. Mobilized Selected Reserve units

and personnel may impose limited demands

on the training base if some unit members

are unskilled or have not completed

mandatory training. They may create

significant demands on health service

support (HSS) as they mobilize, deploy, and

sustain casualties. Dependents of RC

members will also impose additional

workloads on CONUS health care

resources. When deployed overseas, Selected

Reserve units and personnel will create

demands for available HNS such as

transportation and facilities. Finally, they

require a legal authority to authorize their

callup and funds to pay for tours of active duty

and benefits.

b. Pretrained Individual Manpower

(PIM). Individuals mobilized from the

various sources (IRR, military retirees, and

Standby Reserve) place the same demands on

other resource areas, as described above, once

they report to their assigned units. Before they

are assigned to a unit, however, they create

demands for intra-CONUS transportation;

for an initial issue of clothing and individual

equipment; and for subsistence, housing,

and health care. Most individuals mobilized

from PIM sources will need reclassification

or refresher training in the training base. If

assigned overseas as unit fillers or

replacements, they will place a demand for

a nonunit personnel space on the strategic

transportation system and require weapons,

ammunition, and mobility bags.

c. Nonprior Service (NPS) Manpower.

NPS manpower (draftees and volunteers)

imposes essentially the same demands as PIM

imposes on the other resource areas. Because

they are untrained at accession, they will

impose demands on the training base for

basic and initial skills training.

d. Civilian Manpower. Civilian personnel

create demands on resource areas based on

their employment categories. DOD civilian

employees at military installations normally

live at home and only require a salary and

workspace to do their jobs. A DOD civilian

or contractor employee required in the

theater of operations may require clothing,

chemical and biological defense equipment

and training, passports and visas, housing, and

subsistence; intra-CONUS, strategic, and

intratheater transportation; basic battlefield
IV-6

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Joint Pub 4-05

SITUATION

SOURCES OF

MATERIEL AND

EQUIPMENT

MOBILIZATION

OPTIONS ACTION REQUIRED

Any level of

emergency

Equipment on hand

in units

Redistribute based on

emergency priorities

Military Department decisions

based on supported commanders

requirements and priorities.

War reserve and

pre-positioned

stockpiles

Release stocks Military Department decisions for

retail items. Joint Materiel

Priorities and Allocation Board

decisions for wholesale stocks

insufficient to meet demands of all

claimants.

Depot system Accelerate output Military Department decisions

based on supported commanders’

requirements and priorities.

Industrial base Accelerate output Military Departments and Defense

agencies act to surge production of

needed materiel and equipment.

Materiel and

equipment in

security assistance

pipelines

Divert needed

equipment from

security assistance

pipelines

National Command Authorities

decision based on a determination

that national security requirements

outweigh political consequences.

Domestic and

foreign commercial

vendors

Purchase off-the-shelf

products that meet

military requirements

Military Department and Defense

agency decisions based on

Federal acquisition regulations.

7. Sources of Materiel and

Equipment

The materiel and equipment resource

area includes all classes of supply. It

includes equipment on hand in units, war

reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the

output of the depot maintenance system and

industrial base. Additional sources include

items in the security assistance pipelines and

off-the-shelf items from domestic and foreign

commercial sources. These sources and the

options and actions for obtaining them are

listed in Figure IV-2.

survival training; and health care. The use of

DOD civilian and contractor personnel or

local nationals makes military personnel

available to fight. They are used because they

have critical skills that are not available in the

Military Services.

SECTION B. MATERIEL AND

EQUIPMENT

“When a nation is without

establishments and a military system,

it is very difficult to organize an army.”

Napoleon I

Maxims of War

Figure IV-2. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options
IV-7

Resource Areas

items are resolved by priority and

allocation decisions taken internally by the

Military Departments based on OPLAN

priorities and guided by the DOD policy to

equip earlier deploying units before those

scheduled to deploy later, regardless of

Service component. When confronted with a

materiel or equipment shortage common to

two or more US military claimants, the

Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

determines priorities among the Services.

The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation

Board (JMPAB) executes this responsibility.

The JMPAB is chaired by the J-4, Joint Staff

and includes other Joint Staff directors as well

as general or flag officer representatives

from the Military Departments. In coalition

warfare, the United States may be responsible

for providing significant materiel and

equipment support to one or more allies.

When shortages occur, priority and

allocation decisions for resolving conflicts

among allies, or between US claimants and

allies, are made by the NCA.

9. Effects of Materiel and

Equipment Mobilization on

Other Resource Areas

Increased materiel and equipment

densities create work loads requiring

additional manpower for operations and

maintenance. Higher equipment densities

generate requirements for additional repair

parts, tools, and test equipment. Additional

transportation resources would be required

to move items from storage or production sites

within the United States to destinations

outside the United States. Additional storage

and maintenance facilities may be required

at transshipment points and receiving

organizations. Industrial base output must

be capable of meeting the added demand for

spares. Training base capacity might have

8. Materiel and Equipment

Mobilization Options

Materiel and equipment mobilization

consists of many activities that can be grouped

under two major tasks: (1) increasing the

availability of materiel and equipment to

accommodate the needs of a larger active

force, and (2) alleviating shortages by

allocating or redistributing materiel and

equipment in accordance with emergency

priorities. These activities can be undertaken

either separately or in combination to equip

and sustain the mobilized force.

a. Increasing Materiel and Equipment

Availability. Decision options that increase

materiel and equipment availability include

the release of war reserve and depot stocks,

accelerating the output of the depot

maintenance system, diverting items from

foreign military sales and other security

assistance programs, accelerating production

rates of existing contracts for consumable

items like clothing and rations, and

procurement of commercial substitutes from

domestic or foreign sources. Each of these

actions increases the number of items in

the supply pipeline. Except for the diversion

of items earmarked for security assistance

programs, these options are exercised by the

Military Departments, DLA, and other

Defense agencies as they provide for the

logistic needs of their forces assigned to the

combatant commanders. Action to divert

items from security assistance programs

could have a significant effect on our relations

with affected allies and must be taken at the

NCA level. However, once diverted and

allocated to a Military Department, they are

distributed as determined by the owning

Military Department.

b. Allocating Materiel and Equipment

Shortages. Shortages of Service-unique
IV-8

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Joint Pub 4-05

commercial firms. These assets move units

and unit equipment through the

mobilization process from home stations to

mobilization sites and to ports of embarkation;

nonunit personnel from their homes to

reception and training sites and then to

replacement centers and ports of embarkation;

and nonunit equipment from production and

storage sites to ports of embarkation.

Deployment, employment, sustainment,

redeployment, and demobilization

operations are supported primarily by

strategic airlift and sealift, which move

units, nonunit personnel, and sustainment

items (nonunit equipment and supplies) from

the United States to the theaters of operation.

RC transportation terminal brigades and

battalions provide the military interface at

commercial seaports of embarkation,

deployment support brigades assist with

loading the equipment on commercial

transportation, and port security companies

provide security at military ocean terminals.

All of these units must be mobilized early

to support deployment from CONUS. The

sources of additional transportation resources

for mobilization and the options for

mobilizing them are listed in Figure IV-3. It

is important to note that transportation assets

to be expanded to provide additional operator

and maintenance personnel. HSS might also

have to be expanded to care for the increased

number of operator and maintenance

personnel. Additional funding would also

have to be obtained. Additional

communications support will be required to

process greater volumes of inventory

management and transaction data between

unit customers and points of supply and repair.

SECTION C.

TRANSPORTATION

“You can’t have any more of anything

than you can haul.”

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, USA

10. Sources of Mobilization

Transportation

Transportation resources are required to

support mobilization, deployment,

employment, sustainment, redeployment, and

demobilization operations. Mobilization

activities are supported principally by intraCONUS air, rail, highway, pipeline, port

facilities, and inland waterway assets of

Activating the CRAF is a proven option for augmenting organic airlift capability.
IV-9

Resource Areas

SITUATION

SOURCES OF

TRANSPORTATION

AUGMENTATION

TRANSPORTATION

MOBILIZATION

OPTIONS

ACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level of

emergency

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Reserve component airlift

assets

Task Air Mobility

Command, Reserve

component, and Naval

Reserve assets.

Secretaries of the Air Force and

Navy activate units and individuals

with an appropriate callup order.

Voluntary charter Charter available

commercial aircraft.

USCINCTRANS obtains

commercial charter airlift.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet

(CRAF) Stage I

Activate when required to

augment capacity.

USCINCTRANS activates and

operationally directs CRAF I

assets with SECDEF approval.

CRAF Stage II Activate when required to

augment capacity.

USCINCTRANS activates and

operationally directs CRAF II

assets with SECDEF approval.

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Voluntary charter Charter available

commercial vessels when

required to augment

USTRANSCOM controlled

fleet.

USCINCTRANS obtains

commercial charter shipping.

DOD reduced operational

status ships

Activate when required to

augment sealift capacity.

USCINCTRANS requests reduced

operational status approval.

Ready Reserve Force Activate when required to

augment sealift capacity.

USCINCTRANS requests through

CJCS; SECDEF approves (by

agreement with the Secretary of

Transportation (SECTRANS);

Maritime Administration (National

Defense Reserve Fleet)

implements.

Sealift Readiness Program

vessels

Activate when required to

augment sealift capacity.

USCINCTRANS, with approval of

SECDEF, activates with the

concurrence of SECTRANS, and

commands assets of the

SRP/VTA.

Voluntary Tanker

Agreement (VTA)

Augment when required to

augment sealift (tanker)

capacity.

USTRANSCOM activates as

required.

Fast Sealift Ships Activate when necessary

to augment sealift

capacity.

USCINCTRANS obtains

commercial charter airlift.

CONUS TRANSPORTATION

Commercial air, rail,

highway, barge,

transportation terminal unit

Activate the Contingency

response program.

Mobilize seaport of

embarkation transportation

terminal units.

The Contingency response

program team assembles at the

call of USCINCTRANS to prevent

or resolve transportation shortfalls.

Secretary of the Army publishes

callup order for transportation

terminal units.

Figure IV-3. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options
IV-10

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05

SITUATION

SOURCES OF

TRANSPORTATION

AUGMENTATION

TRANSPORTATION

MOBILIZATION

OPTIONS

ACTIONS REQUIRED

National

emergency or

war

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

CRAF Stage III Activate when necessary

to augment airlift capacity.

USCINCTRANS activates and

commands CRAF III assets with

the approval of SECDEF.

Foreign voluntary charters Charter available foreign

aircraft.

USCINCTRANS enters into

agreements with foreign carriers

consistent with the Fly American

Act.

NATO Allied

Pre-committed Civil

Aircraft Program aircraft

Request NATO resources

when required to augment

US airlift capacity.

North Atlantic Council requests

reinforcements and responds to

requests for airlift.

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Requisitioned US-flag and

effective United States

controlled shipping

vessels

Requisitioned as required

to meet sealift

requirements.

With declaration of National

emergency, SECTRANS

requisitions ships at the request of

SECDEF.

Naval Inactive Fleet of the

National Defense Reserve

Fleet

Activate when required to

augment sealift capacity.

With declaration of National

emergency, USCINCTRANS

requests through CJCS; SECDEF

orders activation.

NATO vessels Request NATO resources

when required to augment

US sealift capacity.

North Atlantic Council requests

reinforcements and responds to

requests for NATO ships.

CONUS TRANSPORTATION

Air, rail, highway, and

barge

Seek priorities and

allocations of domestic

transportation when

required to augment

capacity.

With declaration of National

emergency, the President invokes

priorities and allocations for DOD.

Aircraft Program airlift (in NATO

emergencies) can be called to provide the

needed capacity. Limited peacetime sealift,

operated by Military Sealift Command, can

be augmented by voluntary or contract charter,

activation of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF),

chartering, requisition of US-flag and effective

United States Controlled shipping (US

owned but under foreign registry), and a

limited number of NATO ships (in NATO

emergencies). Foreign-owned flag ships are

also a potential source of additional sealift

through chartering. Activation of any ships

from the National Defense Reserve Fleet

which remain after activation of the RRF

would only occur as attrition fillers.

must be mobilized before substantial

deployments can be executed.

11. Transportation

Mobilization Options

a. A variety of decision options are

available for mobilization of strategic and

intra-CONUS lift assets. As Air National

Guard and Air Force Reserve assets of the

Air Mobility Command (AMC) and airlift

assets of the Naval Reserve are being

activated, voluntary and contract AMC

charter, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF),

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) Allied Pre-committed Civil

Figure IV-3. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options (continued)
IV-11

Resource Areas

b. Defense priority for the various modes

of intra-CONUS transportation resources

can be obtained thr ough the

USTRANSCOM/Military Traffic

Management Command (MTMC)

Contingency Response Program (CORE).

CORE provides quick acquisition of domestic

surface transportation resources during

peacetime, national emergencies, or major

military deployments. The CORE network,

a major component of the CORE program, is

an association of members from DOT, the

Department of Defense, other Federal

agencies, and the commercial transportation

industry. The CORE network functions as a

rapid response team to prevent or resolve

transportation shortfalls.

12. Effect of Transportation

Mobilization on Other

Resource Areas

Mobilization of transportation resources

will substantially affect the manpower

resource area because highly skilled

operators and crews are required, as well as

maintenance and cargo handling personnel,

at ports and transshipment points. The effect

on ports, airfields, highways, pipelines,

railroads and inland waterways; facilities

required for activation, maintenance, and

storage; and repair parts and materials

handling equipment may be significant.

Legal authorities and funding are required

to enable transportation resource expansion.

Influence on the training base could be

significant in a protracted conflict with high

attrition rates of operator or crew personnel.

a. Augmenting Strategic Airlift. Each

additional aircraft affects runway,

throughput, marshalling, and temporary

storage capacity at airfields; these factors could

become constraints at departure, en route and

arrival airfields. Aircrews require subsistence

and transient quarters, and aircrew shortages

and crew rest considerations could also become

constraints. Influence on the military training

base should be minimal unless commercial

carriers lose their capability to conduct their

respective training. Some additional demands

will be placed on the industrial base as stocks

of repair parts are depleted. Shortages of aviation

fuel, lubricants, repair parts, hull and liability

insurance, and qualified mechanics could become

constraints.

b. Augmenting Strategic Sealift. In addition

to applicable constraints listed above, the charter,

requisition, or activation of each additional

ship draws on the available pool of licensed

officers, and certified merchant seamen. The

withdrawal of commercial vessel insurance and

war-risk exclusion for crew life insurance may

also constrain the use of commercial vessels. To

surmount this constraint, the President may

authorize the Secretary of Defense, acting

through the Secretary of Transportation, to issue

war-risk insurance under Title XII of the

Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 USC 1285.

Crew shortages could become a constraint,

particularly if market forces and mortality rates

result in a reduced pool of available private sector

US merchant mariners. Also, pulling ships from

normal commercial service can have adverse

long-term impacts on the commercial sealift

carrier’s business. Ships require berthing and

anchorage space at ports, which, together with

temporary storage, staging areas, cargo handling

capabilities, and transportation mode links,

determine throughput capacity. Laws governing

the handling of hazardous materials, such as

ammunition, limit the number of ports that can

handle such loads. Drydocks, shipyard

facilities, and skilled labor are required for

activation and periodic refitting. Constraints in

the other resource areas should be minimal except

in extreme conditions marked by high attrition.

Additionally, shortages of stevedores may be

experienced if heavy demands are placed on

multiple commercial ports within the same

geographic area.

c. Augmenting Intra-CONUS

Transportation Resources. The response

and assistance of the CORE Program
IV-12

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Joint Pub 4-05

Network enables the Department of Defense

to obtain transportation resources (air, rail,

highway, barge, pipeline, and port facilities) not

available through normal procurement

channels. If the voluntary efforts of the CORE

network members still result in transportation

shortfalls, the Department of Defense can

request that DOT issue priority service or

allocation orders to the commercial

transportation industry to support DOD

requirements. Demands in the other resource

areas should not be significant, except in extreme

circumstances. Spot shortages in operator, crew,

or maintenance personnel could occur if large

numbers of commercial carrier employees are

ordered to military duty or if local transportation

demands are heavy. Spot shortages of fuel, repair

parts, maintenance, and transshipment facilities

could also occur during peak periods. At some

installations, capacity of railheads and spurs could

be a constraint.

SECTION D. FACILITIES

“Fleets cannot operate without bases.”

Major General John A. Lejeune,

USMC (testimony to House Naval

Affairs Committee, 13 March 1920)

13. Sources of Facilities

The Department of Defense uses a wide

variety of facilities to house, train, equip, and

support troops. Facilities are also needed to

provide storage, maintain equipment, and

conduct operations. Military bases, depots,

medical treatment facilities, airfields, and

seaports are representative examples. Facilities

with the capacity for supporting increased

workloads during mobilization are obtained

from the following sources: commercial

facilities that support the Department of

Defense in peacetime; unused and standby

capacity at existing government facilities; and

new capacity developed on property acquired

by the Department of Defense through lease,

purchase, or exercise of other legal means.

These are listed in Figure IV-4, together with

the options and actions for acquiring needed

facilities during mobilization.

14. Facilities Mobilization

Options

Options for expanding facilities during

mobilization include reopening unused

capacity with actions short of new

construction, initiating emergency military

The Department of Defense exercises its legal authority to provide for port

facilities during mobilized sealift operations.
IV-13

Resource Areas

SITUATION SOURCES OF

FACILITIES

FACILITIES

MOBILIZATION

OPTIONS

ACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level of

emergency

Existing government

property

- Standby capacity Activate standby

capacity

Military Departments act within

available funding.

- Unused capacity Develop unused

capacity

Military Departments initiate

emergency military construction

projects using unobligated funds (10

USC 2803) or SECDEF Contingency

Construction Authority (10 USC 2804)

Newly acquired

property

Lease, purchase, and

develop as required

National

emergency or war

Existing government

property

Develop unused

capacity

Military Departments initiate

emergency military construction

projects with additional authorities

available upon declaration of national

emergency:

Newly acquired

property

Lease, purchase, and

develop as required

-SECDEF authority to modify current

military construction program within

military construction appropriations

and unobligated family housing

funding (10 USC 2808).

-Supplemental military construction

appropriations.

Recaptured former

government property

Recapture and develop

as provided by law

SECDEF acts under statutory

provisions for recapture of specified

parcels of former Federal property.

Figure IV-4. Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options

construction projects to increase capacity at

existing facilities, and acquisition of new

facilities through the recapture of former

federal property. Facilities can include all

kinds of military installations, airfields, and

seaports. CONUS and outside CONUS

facilities are included.

a. Initiate Emergency Military

Construction. The Secretary of Defense

and Secretaries of the Military

Departments can initiate emergency

military construction projects with

unobligated balances of military construction

funds, the Secretary of Defense contingency

construction authority, or with a modified

military construction program, enabled with

a declaration of national emergency and

unobligated military construction and family

housing funds. Beyond these options,

construction of new or expanded facilities

requires a request for a supplemental military

construction appropriation. Waivers or relief

from environmental protection statutes and

some occupational health and safety

regulations may also be required.

b. Acquire Additional Real Property

and Commercial Facilities. Under the law,

hundreds of parcels of former federal

property may be recaptured to provide land

and improved infrastructure for conversion

into needed facilities. In addition, privately

owned lands may be acquired by

condemnation for defense purposes, such as

training or manufacturing of ammunition and

other items of materiel.
IV-14

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05

CRAF: A MIDDLE-AGED SUCCESS

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), a 43-year old program designed to augment

the organic capability of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

with civil aircraft, was called into service first time ever on 18 August 1990.

On that date, Military Airlift Command (now Air Mobility Command (AMC))

activated the 38 cargo and passenger aircraft of Stage I to meet the initial

surge requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Secretary of Defense

followed 5 months later, on 16 January 1991, by activating CRAF Stage II, adding

more aircraft to meet the pressing sustainment requirements of Operation

DESERT STORM.

Established in 1952, CRAF was sized and structured to meet the threat of a

Soviet invasion of Europe. Its purpose was “to augment US military airlift forces

with civil air carriers to support emergency airlift requirements.” Under CRAF,

US air carriers voluntarily commit cargo and passenger aircraft to support

airlift requirements that exceed airlift capabilities. The carriers pledge specific

aircraft by tail number to one of three stages of crisis escalation: Stage I—

Committed Expansion; Stage II—Defense Airlift Emergency; or Stage III—

National Emergency. The CRAF support is also divided into five functional

segments: long-range international, short range international, domestic,

Alaskan, and aeromedical. Once activated, the carriers continue to operate

the aircraft and provide full support, including fuel, spare parts, and

maintenance. AMC, however, assumes mission control. Several carriers also

have agreed to serve as senior lodgers during Stage III. In that capacity, they

provide expanded ground support services to all aircraft and their crews, using

designated commercial airports.

Each stage of CRAF is designed to meet the increased airlift requirements of

escalating levels of emergency. The Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM can

call up Stage I aircraft on 24-hour notice to meet crisis requirements. The

Secretary of Defense can activate Stage II aircraft, also on 24-hour notice,

during an emergency that is less than a full mobilization. The Secretary of

Defense also can activate Stage III aircraft, under either of the following

conditions: one, the President or Congress declares a Defense-oriented

national emergency, or, two, in a situation short of a declared Defense-oriented

national emergency. In Stage III, the air carriers have 48 hours to make their

aircraft available to the government.

Although principally aimed at augmenting organic airlift capabilities during

wartime, the CRAF Program is also used to allocate some of AMC’s peacetime

values to carriers that commit aircraft to, for example, the long-range

international segment of CRAF, based upon aircraft type (cargo or passenger),

payload, block speed, and range, etc. AMC then uses the mobilization values

to establish “entitlements,” expressed in annual dollar shares of its cargo or

passenger business.

A “joint venture” concept provides another incentive for carriers to join the

CRAF Program. Under this concept, carriers are not required to convert the

mobilization values associated with their commitment into peacetime business.

Instead, they can trade those mobilization values to their joint-venture CRAF

partners that want to augment normal commercial business with military
IV-15

Resource Areas

movements. The concept was established to induce carriers, particularly smallpackage carriers, to join CRAF that may not do so otherwise.

The process for CRAF activation begins when the combatant commanders

specify their requirements, expressed in a variety of terms (military units,

equipment end items, ammunition, resupply materiel, etc.), and the date they

are needed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approves those

requirements, and USTRANSCOM translates the requirements into time-phased

deployment data and designates them for movement by either airlift or sealift.

USTRANSCOM then provides the airlift deployment data to AMC to develop

detailed lift requirements and the flight schedules necessary to meet them.

After programming its organic lift capability, AMC determines the civil

augmentation necessary, taking into consideration the amount currently

available by expanding the scope of on-going contracts (expansion buy). AMC

also assesses, as warranted, the CRAF stage that best meets the unsatisfied

airlift requirements, notifies the carriers of possible CRAF activations, and

either activates CRAF Stage I (with USTRANSCOM approval, sends a message

to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (through USTRANSCOM) requesting

declaration of an airlift or national emergency to activate either Stage II or III.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then notifies the Secretary of Defense,

who, if he concurs with the CJCS’s position, apprises the Secretary of

Transportation of his intent to activate CRAF. Once activated, the Chairman

assigns airlift priorities to meet the CINC’s requirements.

Shortly after the President’s decision to launch a military response to Iraq’s

invasion of Kuwait, US air carriers voluntarily began supporting the airlift

requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD through an AMC “expansion buy.”

They moved their first passengers on 7 August 1990. By the 17th, they had

completed in excess of 100 passenger and cargo missions (i.e. international

flights) involving more than 30 aircraft. On 18 August 1990, AMC activated the

38 aircraft from 16 carriers in CRAF Stage I. In one month, those aircraft flew

391 missions in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Over the next four

months, the number of CRAF missions increased to 1,903.

On 16 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense authorized the activation of

CRAF Stage II to meet the additional cargo airlift requirements of Operation

DESERT STORM. Consequently, by 12 February, the daily CRAF mission

capability increased to an average 23.4 missions per day, an 86 percent increase

over support for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The CRAF Program is a DOD success story. This program, first originated to

satisfy Cold War requirements, has proven its worth through the years in

satisfying peacetime airlift requirements that exceeded organic military lift

capabilities. Further, during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the US commercial

carriers responded to both the program’s incentives and the Stage I-II

activations completing in excess of 4,700 missions to move units, equipment,

and resupply materiel. This proved invaluable in providing AMC with the means

to satisfy the combatant commander’s surge, sustainment, and redeployment

requirements.

SOURCE: Review of Strategic Mobility Programs, Volume 2: Civil Reserve

Air Fleet, Bethesda: Logistics Management Institute, 1991.
IV-16

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Joint Pub 4-05

15. Effect of Facilities

Mobilization on Other

Resource Areas

Expanding facilities will require more

manpower, both military and civilian, to

staff tenant organizations and provide

required services. The greatest effect will

be on the civilian side in the form of contract

construction workers and DOD personnel

employed to expand tenant support services.

Host-nation civilians will provide the bulk of

this support overseas. There will be a

significant local demand for construction

materials and equipment—from stocks and

from the industrial base. As the facility grows

in capacity or expands operations, the

increased population will require more

health care and other support services. If

these resources are available, the effect on

planned facilities expansion will be minimal.

Shortfalls in these areas will reduce

capacity and constrain productivity.

SECTION E. INDUSTRIAL

BASE

“It is a war of smokestacks as well as

of men.”

George C. Marshall

(Address to the US Chamber of

Commerce, 29 April 1941)

16. Industrial Mobilization

Sources

The US industrial base includes domestic

commercial production facilities and

government-owned facilities. Some of the

government-owned facilities are government

operated and some are contractor operated.

Foreign producers of essential components

and parts must also be included, because

foreign producers may be the only source for

components of major equipment items.

Because of the unique relationship existing

between the United States and Canada, the

Canadian defense industry is recognized as part

of a single North American defense industrial

base. The capabilities of Canadian industry

may be included in US industrial

preparedness planning. Figure IV-5 lists

these sources together with the options and

actions required to expand their output.

17. Industrial Mobilization

Options

Industrial base expansion includes actions

to accelerate production within the existing

industrial infrastructure, add new production

lines and factories, and implement

provisions of the Defense Priorities and

Allocation System (DPAS). Because many

components of key military items of

equipment are now procured from offshore

sources, increased emergency procurement

from these sources has become, of necessity,

a major industrial mobilization option.

18. Effect of Industrial

Mobilization on the Other

Resource Areas

a. Expand the Industrial Base. Surge

production and industrial base expansion will

require additional skilled manpower from the

nondefense sectors of the national economy.

Local manpower shortages could develop

in areas hard hit by extensive military

manpower mobilization and competition

between DOD contractors and others for

limited numbers of the same skills. Materiel

and equipment stocks, transportation, and

facilities could be significantly affected if

raw materials, finished products, tools, and

test equipment become short; local and long

distance hauling is not sufficiently manned;

and new construction does not meet the

demand. Additional legal authorities may

be invoked or requested from the Congress

upon the determination that DOD production

in a crisis is being adversely affected.

Environmental and occupational health

and safety regulations may also require
IV-17

Resource Areas

The Department of Commerce is responsible

for DPAS activities concerning industrial

resources. Accordingly, the Department of

Defense will coordinate with the Department

of Commerce concerning industrial resource

issues requiring resolution through DPAS.

c. Obtain Allied Production Support.

The Department of Defense has become

increasingly reliant on offshore production

of essential components, repair parts, tools,

and test equipment needed for domestic

production of virtually all major weapons

systems and other key items of materiel and

equipment. Wartime surge and industrial base

waivers. Substantial additional funding may

be required to enable increased production.

b. Implement the DPAS. The DPAS is

authorized by the Defense Production Act (50

USC app. 2071) and allows preferential

treatment for contracts or orders relating

to certain approved defense or energy

programs for military production and

construction, military assistance to any foreign

nation, and stockpiling. This authority

specifically includes reordering national

priorities and rationing available industrial

resources (articles, materials, services, and

facilities, including construction materials).

SITUATION INDUSTRIAL BASE

SOURCES

INDUSTRIAL

MOBILIZATION

OPTIONS

ACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level of

emergency

DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

Commercial producers of

goods and services

Accelerate production from

current sources of goods

and services

Military Departments and

Defense Logistics Agency

contract for accelerated

production from current

producers of materiel based on

planned or actual consumption

rates and prioritized requirements

of the combatant commanders:

Expand production base

capacity

-Under provisions of Defense

Priorities and Allocation System

(DPAS), 50 USC app. 2071,

obtain priority performance on

DOD contracts and orders.

-Using DPAS authorities and

streamlined acquisition

procedures, increase industrial

capacity for production of materiel

and equipment required to

sustain the mobilized force.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Government-owned/

government-operated

production facilities

-Accelerate production rates or

activate standby and laid-away

production capacity at

government-owned/governmentoperated facilities and

government-owned/contractoroperated facilities.

Government-owned/

contractor-operated

production facilities

FOREIGN INDUSTRY

Commercial producers of

goods and services

-Seek additional production

from foreign suppliers.

Figure IV-5. Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options
IV-18

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Joint Pub 4-05

expansion can be expected to have a

significant effect on offshore producers as

well. The reliability of these sources could

significantly influence the ability to provide

needed materiel and equipment to support

and sustain operations. Conversely, the

availability of offshore production support in

areas where the domestic production base can

no longer expand, could have substantial

positive results on the manpower, materiel and

equipment, and facilities resource areas.

Similar to domestic source problems, foreign

supplier problems should be forwarded

through the DPAS chain for resolution by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the

Department of Commerce.

SECTION F. TRAINING BASE

19. Sources and Options for

Expanding Training Base

Capacity

The Services expand their institutional

training bases to train NPS personnel to

support and sustain an expanded force

structure. The training base also provides

reclassification and refresher training for

PIM who need it. Based on the rate of force

expansion and attrition due to casualties,

training base output requirements, over

time, are determined and compared to

available capacity. If there is a shortfall,

additional capacity is added by mobilizing

additional training organizations from the

RC, by hiring DOD civilian employees, and

by contracting for additional instructors and

other training resources from the private

sector. Sources, options, and actions for

expanding training base capacity are listed

in Figure IV-6.

20. Effect of Training Base

Expansion on Other

Resource Areas

Training base expansion may cause

significant effects on the manpower,

materiel and equipment, facilities, health

service support, and funding resource

areas. It may also affect the environmental,

transportation, industrial base,

communications, and legal areas. It is not

expected to have any measurable influence

on HNS, although the training of allied

military personnel, along with security

assistance and other agreements, could affect

the training base capacity.

SITUATION

SOURCES OF

ADDITIONAL

TRAINING BASE

CAPACITY

TRAINING BASE

EXPANSION

OPTIONS

ACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level of

emergency

Military Departments act to expand

their institutional training

establishments:

Wartime policies and

programs of instruction

Implement wartime

training policies and

programs

-Implement wartime programs of

instruction; extend the training day

and training week; increase class

size.

Reserve component

training units

Expand existing training

centers and schools

-Call up Reserve component training

base augmentation units as required.

New training centers

and schools

Add new training

centers and schools

Call up remaining Reserve

component training base

augmentation units; activate new

training units; acquire new training

facilities and support.

Figure IV-6. Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options
IV-19

Resource Areas

SECTION G. HEALTH

SERVICE SUPPORT

“No price is too great to preserve the

health of the fleet.”

Lord St. Vincent

Letter to the Admiralty, (1796)

21. General

Theater, CONUS, and aeromedical

evacuation HSS is expanded to serve the

mobilized force and provide the capability

to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute

casualties in CONUS. HSS requirements

are determined from decisions establishing

the theater medical support and theater

evacuation policy. Several factors, such as

casualty rates, availability and readiness of

HSS units, transportation resources, blood

supplies, and HNS assist in determining the

theater HSS required. CONUS hospital beds

and facilities are increased to accommodate

the expected flow of casualties and increases

in the population of the CONUS support base.

The aeromedical evacuation system is

increased to employ the necessary

contingency aeromedical evacuation

elements needed to support the increased

intratheater, intertheater and CONUS

evacuee requirements. The nonactive duty

beneficiary population eligible for

government health care may be transferred

to the Civilian Health and Medical Program

for the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)

Program or a Managed Care/TRICARE

contract as requirements for serving uniformed

military beneficiaries approach the available

capacity. Experience from Operations

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

indicated, however, that costs may be too high

for the CHAMPUS Program. The Military

Departments were required to backfill

vacancies created by deploying HSS personnel

with reservists in order to maintain the same

level of HSS care for dependents and retirees.

Military Department mobilization plans

should include provisions for activating RC

HSS professionals for immediate backfill

at CONUS medical treatment facilities.

22. Sources of Emergency HSS

The sources of skilled HSS manpower

and hospital beds to meet emergency and

wartime requirements for health care are

listed in Figure IV-7, together with the

options and actions required to mobilize

additional health care capacity.

During mobilization, health services support may be provided by reassigning

personnel from CONUS to hospital ships deployed to the theater of operations.
IV-20

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Joint Pub 4-05

23. Options for Mobilizing HSS

a. Options for mobilizing additional

health service support professionals

parallel those for other manpower skills.

In time of national emergency, the transfer of

members of the United States Public Health

Service (USPHS) commissioned corps to the

Department of Defense may also provide

additional health service professionals.

b. Theater HSS and aeromedical

support is expanded by calling up,

transferring, and reassigning health service

professionals from the CONUS base to AC

and RC HSS units and hospital ships deployed

to the theater. Additional callup of reserves is

required to backfill CONUS health service

facilities vacated by their peacetime staffs.

c. The CONUS HSS base is expanded,

as necessary, to provide care for casualties

returned from combat theaters. In addition

to expanding CONUS military hospitals, this

process may also include implementing, in

turn, the Department of Veterans Affairs

(DVA)-DOD Contingency Plan and the

National Defense Medical System (NDMS),

which provide additional beds and

professional staff from DVA and commercial

civilian resources.

SITUATION

SOURCES OF

HEALTH SERVICE

SUPPORT

MOBILIZING

HEALTH SERVICE

SUPPORT

ACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level of

emergency

Reserve component

health service support

units and individuals

Mobilize volunteer

individuals and units of

the Selected Reserve

Military Departments order units and

volunteer individuals to active duty

within the limits of Presidential

authorities invoked.

Department of Veterans

Affairs hospitals

Implement the

Department of Veterans

Affairs-DOD

Contingency Plan

DOD and Department of Veterans

Affairs act in accordance with the

Department of Veterans Affairs and

DOD Health Resources Sharing and

Emergency Operations Act (38 USC

8111A) when DOD requirements

exceed supply of continental United

States military hospital beds.

Host-nation health care

systems

Activate host-nation

support agreements

Geographic combatant commander

requests support in accordance with

agreements.

National

emergency or war

Reserve component

health service support

units and individuals

Mobilize remaining

Reserve component

health service support

units and individuals

Military Departments order Reserve

component units and individuals to

active duty.

Domestic civilian health

care system

Transfer United States

Public Health Service

commissioned

members to DOD or

United States Coast

Guard

United States Public Health Service

assigns members to DOD or USCG

with SECDEF or SECTRANS

request and Presidential Executive

order.

Activate National

Disaster Medical

System

SECDEF acts under provisions of

Public Health Service Act when bed

requirements exceed capacity of

DOD and Department of Veterans

Affairs.

Figure IV-7. Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options
IV-21

Resource Areas

microwave transmissions. In operations

other than war, the DCS and the Federal

Communications Commission jointly

operate a telecommunications services

priority system, which prioritizes the

provisioning and restoration of critical

Federal, State, local, and private circuits

needed for national security. DISA, the

manager of the National Communications

System (NCS), monitors situations that could

develop into emergencies, provides

recommendations for the use of resources, and

maintains liaison with commercial providers.

In time of national emergency or war, the

President may invoke special war powers

under Section 706 of the act (47 USC 606).

These powers allow the President to take

immediate measures to ensure the

continuous operation and security of

telecommunications services without

negotiations or the consent of those who are

affected. The DCS assets of the NCS are

reserved for the exclusive use of the DOD.

Other NCS assets support other departments

and agencies of the Federal government.

These other assets are made available to the

DOD in crises and war when DCS capacity is

exceeded. The Joint Staff controls only a few

communications assets, which are allocated

during emergencies to provide additional

communications in the theater of operations.

26. Effect of Communications

Mobilization Activities on

Other Resource Areas

Virtually all communications resources

required across the range of military

operations come from unused and

redirected capacity maintained in

peacetime. Some increases in personnel to

accommodate additional operations,

maintenance, and security needs may be

required. The effect on other resource areas

is expected to be minimal, except as the result

of unexpected attrition or protracted global

war, which would generate requirements to

replace fixed infrastructure.

24. Effect of HSS Mobilization

on Other Resource Areas

The process of expanding theater HSS

may significantly burden the manpower,

materiel and equipment, transportation,

facilities, industrial base, training base,

HNS, and legal resource areas. Increasing

the CONUS HSS base may significantly

influence the manpower, materiel and

equipment, facilities, industrial base, and legal

resource areas. Some effects could also be

felt in the transportation and training base

areas. The transfer of dependent and retiree

health care support to the CHAMPUS

Program or Managed Care/TRICARE

contract may have a significant effect on

funding. The effect of mobilization in the

remaining resource areas is not expected to

be significant. Few or no changes are

expected in the communications or HNS

areas.

SECTION H.

COMMUNICATIONS

“Communications dominate war...they

are the most important single

element...political or military.”

Mahan

The Problem of Asia, 1900

25. Sources and Options for

Mobilization

Communications Support

The Federal Government relies primarily

upon commercial providers for the

communications required for national defense

and crisis response. For this reason, the

Communications Act of 1934 provides the

President with substantial authority during

the entire range of military operations to

regulate and control virtually every form of

telecommunications resource at the national

and local levels. Included within this authority

are devices and stations for wire, radio, and
IV-22

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Joint Pub 4-05

SECTION I. HOST-NATION

SUPPORT

“We must take a powerful armament

with us from home to a distant

land...Here a friendly country is always

near, and you can easily obtain

supplies. There you will be dependent

on a country which is entirely strange

to you...”

Nicias of Athens

(on the Syracusan expedition,

415 BC)

27. Sources of HNS

Manpower, equipment, facilities, and

services provided by host or allied nations

during war or emergency offset requirements

for corresponding US military resources that

are not affordable or practical to maintain in

peacetime. A number of agreements are

maintained with an ever-growing array of

allies for defense cooperation during the

entire range of military operations. Every

effort should be made through the Department

of State and the Department of Defense to

establish some form of mutual support,

defense cooperation and/or cross-servicing

arrangements with US allies and emerging

democracies around the globe. Initial

cooperation can be achieved by helping to

establish a data base of military and

commercial capabilities available in each

nation, as well as standardized procedures to

allow for rapid communication and

understanding in a crisis situation.

Additionally, this process enhances diplomatic

efforts during peacetime and facilitates crisis

management/contingency decisionmaking by

quickly providing more options to US and

coalition NCA. Direct HNS is that which

can be provided by an ally’s military units

that are organized and equipped for that

specific purpose. Financial stipulations may

have already been established on a bilateral

basis with a formula spelled out formally in a

defense cooperation agreement. However,

other arrangements may be made based on

the situation at hand, to include multinational

agreements with a regional or coalition

organization or the United Nations (UN).

Financial reimbursement policies and

procedures may be developed through the use

of in and out audit surveys (UN system) or

some other process. Indirect support may be

provided by host-nation commercial entities

with licensing agreements or permissions

granted by an allied government.

28. Options for Mobilizing

HNS

a. Implement Existing Agreements.

Mutual support or defense cooperation

agreements can be implemented upon the

mutual consent of the United States and the

providing nation throughout the full range of

military operations.

b. Obtain Additional Support. The

variable and uncertain nature of global

security threats may create unforeseen

situations where it may be necessary to seek

ad hoc HNS. Such support is normally

obtained through government-to-government

negotiations or through negotiations

conducted at a mutually agreed lower level.

29. Effects of Mobilizing HNS

on the Other Resource

Areas

Implementation of existing or additional

mutual support or defense cooperation

agreements, depending on the nature of the

support provided, will affect the providing

nation or nations’ resource areas,

particularly manpower, materiel and

equipment, transportation assets, and possibly

facilities. In addition to offsetting US resource

requirements for the specified support, the

ability of the host-nation may greatly

influence one or more US resource areas,
IV-23

Resource Areas

particularly if the host nations are unable or

unwilling to provide the level of support

expected by the United States.

SECTION J. THE ENABLING

RESOURCES:

ENVIRONMENT, LEGAL

AUTHORITIES, FUNDING

“Modern war is a death grapple

between peoples and economic

systems, rather than a conflict of

armies alone.”

Bernard M. Baruch

1870-1965

30. General

Each of the nine resource areas discussed

in the preceding sections of this chapter

contributes to developing, expanding,

sustaining, or positioning military capability

so that it may be applied to protect our national

security interests in an emergency.

Mobilization planners, however, must also

consider the effect of mobilization activities

on the environment as well as the necessities

of legal authorities and funding to enable

the timely execution of mobilization activities.

This section discusses, in turn, the sources of

these enabling resources as well as the options

available and actions necessary to obtain them.

a. Environment

• General. The United States has a

substantial framework of

environmental laws. Awareness of

environmental issues, requirements for

compliance, and the liabilities or

penalties associated with noncompliance

mandate the identification and resolution

of environmental issues that affect

mobilization. Most environmental laws

and regulations do not provide automatic

relief or waivers in time of emergency,

and DOD policy in the United States is

to maintain environmental standards

to the maximum extent practicable

during emergencies. The implications

of this policy affect several resource

areas. For example, emergency

legislation may be required to exempt

temporarily critical industries and

military organizations from a wide array

of regulatory requirements. Some issues

regarding environmental matters in the

United States may require resolution

through the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA), such as fines levied

against the Department of Defense by

EPA or state authorities for violation of

environmental statutes. Additional

manpower and other resources may be

required to ensure continued compliance

with environmental protection

requirements. Military personnel may

be accountable in criminal

proceedings for failing to comply with

environmental statutes. The

Department of Defense is ultimately

responsible for compliance, cleanup, and

conservation involved in CONUS

military locations. Overseas, US policy

is to follow Final Governing Standards

developed by the designated DOD

executive agent. These standards are

based on host-nation law and the DOD

Overseas Environmental Baseline

Guidance Document, whichever is more

stringent, unless status-of-forces

agreements or other international

agreements require another standard.

• Types of Environmental Statutes

Affecting Mobilization. As shown in

Figure IV-8, four categories of

environmental statutes concern

mobilization planners.

•• Compliance. Compliance statutes

require DOD facilities to meet pollution

emission standards; to obtain and

maintain Federal, state, and local permits
IV-24

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05

to release pollutants; and to meet record

keeping and training requirements. EPA,

Coast Guard, state, and local

inspectors conduct periodic

inspections for compliance. In cases

of severe or long-standing

noncompliance, agreements are often

negotiated between the regulatory

agency and the installation commander.

If an agreement cannot be reached, issues

are referred to successively higher levels

of authority for resolution. Examples of

compliance statutes include:

Clean Air Act (42 USC 7401 et seq.)

Clean Water Act (33 USC 1251 et

seq.)

Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (42 USC 6901 et seq.)

•• Cleanup. Cleanup statutes obligate

the DOD to protect human health and

the environment from past activities

that have contaminated the land (e.g.,

firing ranges and waste disposal sites).

Included are sites the Department of

Defense now owns, or has owned in the

past, and non-DOD property where DOD

operations have been conducted or DOD

waste disposal has been arranged with the

property owner. Enforcement of cleanup

statutes normally relies on cleanup

orders or agreements. The Department

of Defense is required to survey all of its

property in CONUS and US territories for

potential hazardous waste disposal sites

and identify those that require cleanup.

The worst cases are identified on the EPA

National Priorities List, and their cleanup

is regulated by EPA. Examples of cleanup

statutes include the Comprehensive

EXAMPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

AFFECTING MOBILIZATION

COMPLIANCE

CLEANUP

CONSERVATION

IMPACT ANALYSIS

Clean Air Act

Clean Water Act

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensational

and Liability Act

Defense Environmental Restoration Program

Endangered Species Act

Coastal Management Act

National Environmental Policy Act

Figure IV-8. Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization
IV-25

Resource Areas

• Options for Obtaining Relief from

Environmental Requirements

•• The potential impact that

mobilization might have upon the

environment should be identified in

supporting mobilization plans and

should provide for compliance with

applicable environmental laws. When

compliance is not possible,

negotiations may be conducted with

Federal, state, and local agencies to

develop acceptable alternative means of

compliance. During some critical

mobilization activities, existing national

security exemption authorities may be

exercised. As a last resort, requests for

emergency legislation may be

submitted to exempt critical industries

and DOD organizations from regulatory

requirements.

•• Planning for actions to remedy

damage caused as the result of waivers

or noncompliance with environmental

standards during mobilization should be

taken as soon as possible. For example,

additional military and civilian personnel

with needed skills such as explosive

ordnance disposal may be required to

clean up the area of operations.

•• As most major contingencies have the

potential to significantly affect the

environment, planners should consult

with their supporting environmental

and legal offices at the earliest possible

time. Clean Air Act conformity

exclusion determinations should be

maintained in a single office along with

any agreements negotiated with

regulators.

b. Legal Authorities

• Categories of Legal Authority. There

are nearly 400 legal authorities drawn

Environmental Response Compensation

and Liability Act (42 USC 9601 et seq.)

and the Defense Environmental

Restoration Program (10 USC 2701 et

seq.).

•• Conservation. Conservation statutes

include a wide variety of requirements

for the Department of Defense,

including the acquisition and use of nonDOD Federal lands with specific

restrictions on designated wilderness

areas, wild and scenic rivers, national

monuments, and coastal zones. Also

included are requirements for the

management and protection of wildlife

and protection of historical property.

This legislation affects DOD training

areas. These statutes are predominantly

Federally enforced but may also be

enforced through citizen suits. Examples

of conservation statutes are the

Endangered Species Act as amended (16

USC 1531 et seq.) and the Coastal Zone

Management Act as amended (16 USC

1451 et seq.).

•• Impact Analysis. The National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42

USC 4321-4361, requires that major

Federal actions significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment be

preceded by a detailed statement by the

responsible Federal official. This

statement, commonly referred to as the

Environmental Impact Statement

(EIS), identifies the environmental

impact of the proposed actions, adverse

environmental effects that cannot be

avoided, and alternatives to the proposed

actions. Mobilization activities,

particularly as they relate to facilities and

location of manpower, may trigger the

need for EISs unless deemed an

emergency under 40 CFR 1506.11, and

other arrangements are made.
IV-26

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05

and may affect one or more other

resource areas. Appendix A, “Legal

Authorities,” contains a more complete

description of key legal authorities

relative to mobilization.

c. Funding

• Although financial considerations will

not necessarily be a major factor in

deciding on military action, funding

does often require special attention. To

facilitate funding mobilization for

unplanned military operations, it may be

necessary to cite special legal authorities

to provide financial resources before

receiving appropriated funds from the

Congress. At the outset of an operation,

senior decisionmakers should be

aware of the magnitude of associated

costs and recognize the possible

impacts on other areas. The Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not make

funding decisions. In peacetime, the

Chairman assesses the effect of

operational resource requests made by

the Military Departments and Defense

agencies in the PPBS process and

recommends to the Secretary of Defense

how available funding should be

distributed in order to implement

National Military Strategy. In wartime,

the Chairman, in consultation with the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, may provide advice

to the NCA concerning funding

priorities.

• Major mobilizations will affect

virtually all resource areas, well

beyond the costs of salaries, benefits,

and subsistence of the personnel

involved. The costs of transportation,

housing, HSS, training, and equipping

the force should be included in estimating

the total cost and should be included in

supplemental or amended funding

requests submitted to the Congress.

directly from, or based on, provisions of

the US Code, that enable or limit

mobilization and emergency actions.

As seen in the sources and options figures

in this chapter, many of these are

available to the President in any level of

emergency; others become available with

a Presidential declaration of national

emergency. Still others have been

reserved by the Congress pending

passage of a public law or joint resolution

of national emergency or declaration of

war.

• Action Required to Obtain Legal

Authorities. All emergency authorities

specify the level of emergency at which

they can be invoked and implemented.

Once invoked, the President may

delegate authorities to lower levels, if

allowed by law (e.g., the Secretary of

Defense, Secretaries of the Military

Departments, combatant commanders)

(3 USC 301). As provided in the

National Emergencies Act of 1976, 50

USC 1631, the President must

explicitly invoke the desired

emergency authorities in Executive

orders published in the Federal Register

and transmitted to the Congress. For

example, requests for manpower

mobilization authorities from the

Military Departments and combatant

commanders are integrated by the Joint

Staff and forwarded with a draft

executive order to the Secretary of

Defense as a recommendation for

Presidential action. Generally, for major

mobilization actions such as involuntary

manpower callups, which may be

sensitive in both the domestic and

international political arenas, authorities

are invoked for incremental levels of

personnel callup. Failure to obtain the

requested authority, waiver, or relief

precludes initiation of the desired

activity in a particular resource area
IV-27

Resource Areas

SECTION K. SUMMARY

31. Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of

major mobilization activities by resource

area. Mobilization planners and

decisionmakers at all levels in the JPEC

should understand that activities initiated in

any one area influence each of the others.

Thorough coordination and integration of

mobilization plans between resource area

proponents is essential for timely force

expansion and sustainment until the

termination or resolution of the emergency

that required mobilization.
IV-28

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER V

MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

V-1

1. Introduction

a . Mobilization plans support

combatant commanders’ OPLANs, selected

CONPLANs, functional plans, OPORDs, and

campaign plans. They are detailed plans

prepared by the Military Departments,

USSOCOM, and Defense agencies. They are

based on policy and planning guidance in

the DOD MMG and the Defense Planning

Guidance (DPG) and in tasks specified by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the

JSCP. They reflect requirements for force

expansion with RC units and PIM and for

expansion of the CONUS base to sustain the

mobilized force for as long as necessary to

achieve military and national security

objectives. They explain how force and

resource expansion is to be accomplished.

b. Mobilization is a complex, timesensitive process with many participants and

activities spanning the 12 resource areas.

Mobilization plans must be carefully

integrated among participants and resource

areas. Mobilization execution must be

sequenced and carefully synchronized to

ensure that resources are available to the

supported and supporting commanders when

needed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, supported by the Joint Staff,

integrates mobilization planning and

monitors the status and progress of

mobilization execution. The Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises the

Secretary of Defense on establishing

priorities; allocating resource shortages

among claimants; and redirecting execution

activities, when necessary, to eliminate

bottlenecks and overcome unforeseen

problems.

c. Opportunities to determine the validity

of mobilization plans and practice

mobilization procedures are provided by

periodic CJCS-sponsored worldwide

command post exercises. These exercises

involve the NCA, OSD, the Joint Staff, the

Services, the combatant commands, and other

selected Federal agencies.

d. This chapter provides a joint

perspective of mobilization planning and

execution. It explains the relationships

between mobilization plans, OPLANs, and

campaign plans. It introduces the

Mobilization Estimate of the Situation, a tool

to assist the thought processes of mobilization

planners and decisionmakers. It describes the

joint mobilization planning that takes place

within the deliberate planning and CAP

processes. It also provides an overview of

the mobilization execution process.

“The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of their people, took

care to put into the hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression as a

standing army. Their system was to make every man a soldier, and oblige

him to repair to the standard of his country whenever that was reared. This

made them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so.”

Thomas Jefferson

(Letter to Thomas Cooper, 1814)
V-2

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Joint Pub 4-05

SECTION A. MOBILIZATION

PLANNING

“The stroke of genius that turns the fate

of a battle? I don’t believe in it...You

think out every possible development

and (when) one of these developments

occurs, you put your plan in operation,

and everyone says, ‘What genius...’

whereas the credit is really due to the

labor of preparation.”

Ferdinand Foch

Interview, April, 1919

2. Mobilization Planning and

OPLANs

a. The MMG, Contingency Planning

Guidance (CPG), and the DPG provide

SECDEF guidance for mobilization

planning in support of joint operations. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff amplifies

the guidance in the mobilization annex (CJCS

Instruction 3110.13) of the JSCP.

b. The mobilization annex of the JSCP

guides the Military Departments and

combatant commanders in preparing

mobilization plans that will support the

OPLANs developed in the deliberate planning

process. Mobilization planning guidance

in the JSCP is focused on the areas of

manpower and industrial mobilization.

Manpower mobilization requirements derived

for each contingency establish the level of

mobilization assumed for each contingency

and drive the determination of mobilization

requirements in the 12 resource areas. The

industrial mobilization guidance requires the

Military Departments to conduct industrial

preparedness planning and to maintain a

production base that will support contingency

requirements.

c. During the deliberate planning process,

the Military Departments and USSOCOM

furnish mobilization-related information to

the combatant commanders, who

incorporate it into the OPLANs under

development or revision.

d. The major mobilization plans and

planning systems are shown in Figure V-1.

e. Manpower mobilization information

furnished by the Military Departments and

USSOCOM for inclusion in OPLANs

provides the foundation for detailed

planning in the other resource areas. This

information comprises the number of AC and

RC personnel required by Service and skill

for each option included in the OPLAN. The

functions are:

• Direct support for each option; i.e.,

units and individuals needed to augment

the supported commander’s combat and

support force.

• CONUS base ; i.e., units and

individuals required for the level of

CONUS-base expansion to support each

option.

• CONUS and outside CONUS

backfill; i.e., units and individuals

required to replace those deployed to the

theater of operations.

• Strategic transportation; i.e., units and

individuals needed to augment peacetime

strategic airlift and sealift capabilities.

3. Mobilization Plans and

Military Campaign Plans

a. A campaign is a series of related joint

major operations that arrange tactical,

operational, and strategic actions to

accomplish strategic and operational

objectives. A campaign plan describes how

a series of joint major operations are

arranged in time, space, and purpose to

achieve a strategic objective. They are the
V-3

Mobilization Planning and Execution

operational extension of the combatant

commander’s theater strategy. They translate

strategic concepts into joint plans for military

action by specifying how operations, logistics,

and time will be used to attain theater

objectives. Campaign plans communicate

the commander’s purpose, objectives,

concept, and intent to his subordinates and

also to supporting components, the Joint Staff,

and the Military Departments so they can

develop supporting plans. Campaign

planning encompasses both the deliberate

and crisis action planning processes. If the

scope of contemplated operations requires it,

campaign planning begins with or during

deliberate planning, thus unifying both

planning processes. A more complete

discussion of campaign plans is provided in

Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint

Operations,” and Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Doctrine

for Joint Campaign Planning.”

b. A campaign plan has important

implications for mobilization planners.

Firm strategic objectives, force levels, and the

added dimension of time provide key elements

of information with which the mobilization

planner can extend mobilization planning

and initiate additional force and resource

expansion options if needed. Additional

industrial mobilization and the reinstitution

of the draft may be indicated in the expectation

of a long war with high materiel and personnel

attrition. Conversely, if the campaign plan

expects a short war with low attrition,

mobilization planners can concentrate on

managing mobilization at a lower level.

4. Mobilization Estimate of the

Situation

a. A commander’s estimate of the

situation provides a logical process of

reasoning by which a commander considers

all the circumstances affecting the military

situation and arrives at a decision as to a

course of action to be taken to accomplish

the mission (Joint Pub 1-02). A staff estimate

is similar, with the major difference being that

the culmination of the staff estimate process

is a conclusion or recommendation

communicated to the commander.

Figure V-1. Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems

MAJOR MOBILIZATION PLANS AND

PLANNING SYSTEMS

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and

Execution System

Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan

Air Force War and Mobilization Plan

Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan

Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan

Defense Logistics Agency Basic Emergency Plan
V-4

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Joint Pub 4-05

b. The mobilization estimate format in

Appendix C, “Mobilization Estimate,” applies

the staff estimate concept to mobilization

planning. The mobilization estimate

provides a tool for mobilization planners

to make a systematic appraisal of

mobilization requirements and options in

either a deliberate or CAP situation. Although

designed from the point of view of the Joint

Staff, J-4, the format may be adapted to fit

the circumstances of mobilization planners on

the combatant commander and Service staffs.

c. Like other staff estimates, the purpose

of the mobilization estimate is to determine

whether the mission can be supported and

which COA is best. The mobilization

estimate requires input from all functional

areas of the Joint Staff, Service staffs, and the

corresponding staff sections at the combatant

commands. Although not every situation

demands an extensive planning effort, the

mobilization process is complex and

involves interactions among resource areas

that may influence the outcome of the

analysis. It is important, therefore, that the

mobilization proponent on a staff establish and

maintain effective communications with the

other staff sections.

d. The accuracy of the information

gathered to complete paragraph 2 of the

estimate and the quality of the analysis made

in paragraph 3 of the estimate are essential

to the validity of the mobilization estimate.

• In paragraph 2, a net assessment is

made of the mobilization capability in

each resource area. The net assessment

consists of the time-phased mobilization

capability or capacity in each resource

area compared to the requirements of

each COA. Shortages or overages should

be identified and quantified in terms of

the unit of measure used in the area (e.g.,

number of personnel, training seats, short

tons, hospital beds, and days of supply).

• In paragraph 3, estimates of the effects

of mobilization activities in each

resource area on the other areas are

made to determine if the mobilization

action is feasible. For example, when a

COA requires training base expansion,

the analysis process for paragraph 3

should establish that there are enough

qualified instructors, facilities,

equipment, and medical support for an

expanded training establishment. A

shortage in one or more of these areas

will limit the training base expansion and

may render the COA infeasible.

e. The completed analysis should

support conclusions concerning the

feasibility or infeasibility of each COA with

respect to mobilization and the ultimate staff

recommendation on the best COA.

5. Mobilization and Deliberate

Planning

During peacetime, mobilization planners

in the JPEC participate in two primary

activities: maintaining a mobilization base

and participating in the deliberate planning

process to develop detailed mobilization plans

to support OPLANs.

a. Maintaining a mobilization base at

resource levels adequate to support the

mobilization requirements of OPLANs is a

full-time peacetime task for mobilization

planners in all resource areas. The

mobilization base is defined as a pool of

resources that can be made available to

permit force expansion and sustainment

when necessary. The two most critical

resources in the mobilization base are

manpower and industrial base capacity

because of the time and expense involved in

developing skilled military and civilian

personnel and technologically sophisticated

military equipment.
V-5

Mobilization Planning and Execution

 • Manpower Programs. With policy and

planning guidance provided by OSD, the

Military Departments and

USSOCOM manage manpower

programs, which include RC manpower

pools with the numbers of personnel and

the skill mix required to meet estimated

wartime sustainability requirements. The

IRR and other PIM pools are maintained

by a combination of laws and policies,

such as the 8-year military service

obligation (10 USC 511) and programs

for recruiting and retaining skilled RC

personnel. Manpower programs are

funded through the PPBS process.

Manpower mobilization base

maintenance is also supported by the

SSS, which will draw on a pool of 18- to

26-year-old registrants if a military draft

is required to sustain the force and is

enabled by legislation.

 • Industrial Preparedness Programs.

Military Department and Defense agency

objectives for materiel and equipment

sustainability are to maintain war

reserve stocks of critical equipment in

sufficient quantities to fulfill estimated

sustainability requirements until

industrial base output can be expanded

to meet expected consumption rates. The

basis for industrial preparedness

planning is the combatant

commanders’ CILs. The CIL is the

accumulation of current inventory items

(consumable and nonconsumable) that

each combatant commander has

identified as deficient through routine

reporting in the Chairman’s Joint

Monthly Readiness Review.

• Maintaining a mobilization base in the

other resource areas requires planning

and investment by the Military

Departments for mobilization activities

such as facilities and training base

expansion, mobilization of strategic and

CONUS transportation resources, and

expanding HSS capabilities.

WE’LL MUSTER IF WE MUST

In sharp contrast to the dedicated professionals serving in the Reserve

Component today, the common, or enrolled, militia — every able-bodied male

citizen between the ages of 18 and 45 — was not quite what one might expect

it to be during the period 1820-1850. To say it was loosely organized and

trained would be, in most cases, an understatement. It appears the general

male population of that time was neither interested in military affairs nor in

the pomp and circumstance of war. In the East, where the enrolled militia was

hardly necessary since the frontier had been conquered at least to the

Mississippi River, the enrolled militia met rather irreligiously once or twice a

year for militia muster and drill, according to the law. If one had “the common

defense of the nation” in mind when he came to view such musters, it was

quickly dispelled as the day turned from muster to picnic to drunken brawl in

rather too rapid succession. Accounts of common militia musters are myriad

in newspapers and writings of the period; we shall savor a sample from Georgia

Scenes:

“At twelve, about one third, perhaps one half, of the men had collected, and an

inspector’s return of the number present, and of their arms, would have stood

nearly thus: 1 captain, l lieutenant; ensign, none; fifers, none; privates, present,

24, ditto, absent, 40; guns, 14; gunlocks, 12; ramrods, 10; rifle pouches 3;

bayonets, none; belts, none; spare flints, none; cartridges, none; horsewhips,

walking canes, and umbrellas, 10.”
V-6

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Joint Pub 4-05

In going through the manual, the captain had some choice words:

“ ‘Tention the whole! Please to observe, gentlemen, that at the word ‘fire!’ you

must fire; that is, if any of your guns are loaden’d, you must not shoot in

yearnest, but only take pretense like; and you, gentlemen fellow-soldiers, who’s

armed with nothing but sticks, riding-switches, and corn-stalks, needn’t go

through the firings, but stand as you are, and keep yourselves to yourselves.”

The drill proved just as ludicrous:

“ ‘Tention the whole! To the left—left, no—right—that is, the left—I mean the

right—left, wheel, march!’ In this the captain was strictly obeyed; some

wheeling to the right, some to the left, and some to the right-left, or both ways.

‘Stop! Halt! Let us try it again! I could not just then tell my right hand from my

left! You must excuse me, if you please; experience makes perfect, as the

saying is. Long as I have served, I find something new to learn every day; but

all’s one for that.’ ”

Before the aforementioned evolutions, however, the captain had twice sent

for some grog “for their present accommodation” to settle the dispute about

quitting or at least omitting the drill. Following the aforementioned mix-up,

the whole were dismissed. They immediately returned to you-know-where for

more of you-know-what. So much for another militia muster.

SOURCE: Winey, Michael, We’ll Muster if We Must, Vignettes of Military

History, Carlisle Barracks, US Army Military History Institute, 1976.

Reserve component assets are available to augment Air

Mobility Command Strategic airlift.
V-7

Mobilization Planning and Execution

b. CJCS Instruction 3122.03, “Joint

Operation Planning and Execution System

(JOPES) Volume II (Planning and Execution

Formats and Guidance),” establishes the

standard formats and guidance for

developing OPLANs. Mobilization planning

takes place in every phase of the deliberate

planning process, as shown in Figure V-2.

c. Detailed mobilization planning is

conducted and documented in each

OPLAN for the RC units and non-unit

personnel spaces (for estimated filler and

replacement requirements) scheduled in the

time-phased force and deployment data

(TPFDD). Mobilization plans in other

resource areas are more general and will

normally include provisions that are adaptable

for support of any OPLAN.

6. Mobilization and Crisis

Action Planning

a. The JPEC uses CAP procedures to

plan, mobilize, and deploy forces in timesensitive situations. Successful

mobilization planning and execution during

crises depends on the availability of accurate

data regarding the readiness of RC units and

personnel, PIM, civilian employees, and other

DELIBERATE

PLANNING

PHASE

OPERATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES MOBILIZATION

PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Phase I

Initiation

Supported commander receives planning task

and major forces apportioned for planning

from Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Level of mobilization assumed for

planning.

Mobilization base capabilities

reviewed

Phase II

Concept Development

Mission statement deduced Mobilization staff estimates are

completed

Subordinate tasks derived Supporting mobilization options are

chosen Concept of operations developed

Phase III

Plan Development

Forces are selected and time-phased Detailed supporting mobilization

planning is initiated Support requirements are computed

Deployment feasibility is determined

Mobilization shortfalls are identified

and resolved Shortfalls are identified and resolved

Operation plan is completed

Phase IV

Plan Review

Operation plan reviewed and approved by

CJCS Supported commander incorporates

mobilization information into

Supported commander revised OPLAN using operation plan

review comments

Phase V

Supporting Plans Supporting plans are prepared Detailed supporting mobilizationplans are completed

Figure V-2. Mobilization in the Deliberate Planning Process
V-8

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Joint Pub 4-05

required support. The readiness of the

mobilization base and the quality of prior

planning for drawing on its resources is also

key. Prescripted requests for legal authorities,

environmental waivers, and standby

legislation should be ready to submit to

decisionmakers. Standing operating

procedures (SOPs) should be current and

familiar to all military and civilian personnel

with major mobilization responsibilities.

Reference material supporting the SOPs

should be current and readily available.

Mobilization plans should be exercised and

validated as part of joint and Service exercise

programs. Ongoing mobilization base

planning and a well-coordinated exercise

program will increase the likelihood of

successful mobilization efforts during war

or other national emergencies.

b. Figure V-3 summarizes mobilization

planning activities by CAP procedure phase.

c. In a time-sensitive environment,

mobilization planners must continuously

monitor the developing situation in order

to determine the mobilization implications

and initiate the mobilization estimate process

as soon as possible. Joint Staff mobilization

planners should determine and advise the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the

mobilization feasibility of each COA under

consideration. Crisis action teams on the Joint

Staff and in the Military Departments should

prepare mobilization orders and requests for

legal authorities so that they are ready for

decisionmakers during execution.

SECTION B. MOBILIZATION

EXECUTION

7. Mobilization Decisions and

Orders

a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff recommends to the Secretary of

Defense the assets that are to be called up

and their planned use when RC forces are

to be mobilized to augment the AC. NCA

approval is required for the execution of

an OPORD. In preparing a mobilization

recommendation to the NCA, the following

should be considered:

• Assessments of the Services,

combatant commanders, and Service

component commanders.

• Input from the Joint Staff.

• Technical advice, legal opinions, and

policy considerations from OSD.

b. After the NCA decision to initiate

mobilization, the Secretary of Defense

directs the Military Departments to

proceed. The Services publish mobilization

orders in accordance with their respective

procedures. OSD may issue implementation

instructions and provide additional policy

guidance, if required.

c. Some mobilization actions require the

President or Secretary of Defense to notify

the Congress. For example, some legal

authorities require reports at specific intervals.

Others require specific information on how

the authority is being used and how long it

will be needed. Reports on expenditures

related to the crisis are also required. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

DOD Comptroller are normally responsible

for preparing these reports, which require

continuous coordination throughout the JPEC.

8. Monitoring the Status and

Progress of Mobilization

Because mobilization involves interrelated

activities in 12 resource areas, the NCA, OSD,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Secretaries of the Military Departments,
V-9

Mobilization Planning and Execution

PHASE I

Situation

Development

PHASE II

Crisis

Assessment

PHASE III COA

Development

PHASE IV

COA

Selection

PHASE V

Execution

Planning

PHASE VI

Execution

EVENT

Event occurs with

possible National

security

implications

CINC's report/

assessment

received

CJCS sends

warning order

CJCS presents

refined and

prioritized

courses of action

to National

Command

Authorities

(NCA)

CINC receives

alert order or

planning order

NCA decide to

execute operation

order

ACTION

Monitor world

situation

Increase

awareness

Develop COAs CJCS advice to

NCA

CINC develops

operation order

CJCS sends

execute order by

authority of

SECDEF

Recognize problem Increase reporting CINC assigns tasks

to subordinates by

evaluation request

message

CJCS may send

planning order to

begin execution

planning before

selection of COA

by NCA

Refine

time-phased force

and deployment

data

Submit CINC's

assessment

Joint Staff

assesses

situation

Force preparation CINC executes

operation order

Joint Staff advice

on possible

military action

CINC reviews

evaluation response

messages

Joint Planning and

Execution

Community

reports execution

status

NCA-CJCS

evaluation

Create/modify

time-phased force

and deployment

data

Begin

redeployment

planning

USTRANSCOM

prepares

deployment

estimates

Evaluate COAs

MOB ACTION

Monitor situation Review plans Complete

mobilization

estimates

Continue

planning

Request

mobilization

authority

Monitor progress

of mobilization

Estimate

mobilization

requirements

Recommand

mobilization COA

Improve

mobilization base

posture

Begin

demobilization

planning

OUTCOME

Assess that event

may have national

implications

NCA/CJCS

decide to develop

military COA

CINC sends

commander's

estimate with

recommended COA

NCA select COA CINC sends

operation order

Crisis resolved

Report event to

NCA/CJCS

CJCS releases

NCA COA

selection in alert

order

Redeployment of

forces

Figure V-3. Mobilization and CAP
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Joint Pub 4-05

USSOCOM, and other members of the JPEC

need accurate and timely information on the

status and progress of mobilization.

Information received by proponents in

each of the resource areas is analyzed and

coordinated with the other resource area

proponents to provide decisionmakers with

recommendations for controlling, replanning,

redirecting, or stopping mobilization

operations. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Vol

I (Planning Policies and Procedures),”

provides detailed procedures and automated

information to support operations planning

and execution.

SECTION C. SUMMARY

9. Summary

This chapter covered mobilization planning

and execution from the perspective of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It

explained the relationship between

mobilization plans, OPLANs, and campaign

plans. It introduced the Mobilization Estimate

of the Situation, which is a logical process

for determining feasible mobilization COAs

to support OPLANs. The chapter also

described mobilization planning activities that

take place within the various phases of the

deliberate and CAP procedures and concluded

with an overview of mobilization execution.
CHAPTER VI

JOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

VI-1

1. Introduction

a. Demobilization is the process of

transitioning from a crisis situation or from

a wartime military establishment and

defense-based economy to a

peacetime configuration while maintaining

national security and economic vitality. It

involves more than releasing personnel from

active duty, deactivating units, and

reorganizing the RC. Although these

activities drive the process, capability or

capacity in the other resource areas must be

reduced and reorganized at the same time. As

in mobilization, activities in each resource

area during demobilization will affect each

of the others. For this reason, close

coordination between resource area

proponents is just as important during

demobilization as it is during mobilization.

b. This chapter provides the national

and joint military perspectives of

demobilization planning and execution. It

relates demobilization to national security

strategy, the range of policy options available

to the national leadership, GR, total force

policy, and the range of military operations

discussed in Chapter I, “Mobilization and

National Security.” It also provides

guidelines for demobilization planning and

execution and an overview of demobilization

activities in the 12 resource areas.

SECTION A.

DEMOBILIZATION

PLANNING

2. Demobilization and National

Security

a. From a national perspective, the results

of a successful demobilization process

should put the United States in a position

to respond to future challenges to our

national security. Policies would be

established to regulate the pace of

demobilization and retain the military

capability required to ensure post-conflict

national security commitments during the

transition to a peacetime environment. The

Armed Forces would eventually be

returned to their precrisis structure by

releasing RC units from active duty. The size

of the total force, as well as the size of the

AC, RC, and civilian components could also

be changed as a result of the crisis, but any

such force structure changes are not inherent

to the demobilization process. Industrial base

and other civil sector resources mobilized

during the conflict would be released to fuel

the post-conflict national economy. Planning

and preparation for a future crisis would be

characterized by a return to GR Stage III

activities.

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to

discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twentyfive privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores

at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers;

no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”

Resolution of the Continental Congress

(disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784)
VI-2

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Joint Pub 4-05

b. The scope of demobilization will vary

according to the extent of the preceding

mobilization. As shown in Figure I-1, the

scope of mobilization can range from a

relatively brief use of a few volunteer

reservists to a protracted force and resource

expansion well beyond the original peacetime

levels. Demobilization of volunteers

following Operation URGENT FURY in

Grenada and the massive demobilization

following World War II are examples of the

range of the demobilization activities.

Demobilization planners and

decisionmakers, therefore, could be

challenged anywhere within these

extremes. The demobilization guidelines in

paragraph 3 provide guidance for planners

throughout this spectrum.

c. From a joint military perspective,

demobilization plans should reflect the

post-conflict missions of supported

commanders and be synchronized with plans

for battlefield recovery and redeployment

operations. DOD policies for the release of

reservists and RC units ordered to active

duty should first reflect military

requirements and then considerations of

equity and fairness for military personnel and

their families. The demobilization personnel

management programs of the Military

Departments will be challenged to facilitate

the return of Service members and their

families to civilian life and will need to

provide transition assistance as members

reenter an economy that could be depressed

because of economic conditions brought on

by the crisis. National Guard and Reserve

units and members ordered to active duty to

augment the AC will, consistent with

operational requirements, receive priority for

redeployment. They will be released from

active duty as expeditiously as possible.

3. Demobilization Planning

Guidelines

Study of the demobilizations following the

two World Wars and the Gulf War provide

valuable lessons for today’s demobilization

planners and have been distilled into the

following guidelines illustrated in

Figure VI-1 for demobilization planning

and execution:

a. Mission First. Demobilization plans

must support the post-conflict mission as it

evolves. The supported commander’s

immediate postwar priorities should come

first. As the transition to a peacetime state

proceeds, long-range national security

objectives should drive demobilization

activities to ensure the Armed Forces are

prepared for the next crisis.

Mission First

Begin Planning Early

Understand Possible Consequences

Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING GUIDELINES

Figure VI-1. Demobilization Planning Guidelines
VI-3

Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution

b. Begin Planning Early. Ideally,

demobilization planning should begin soon

after mobilization commences.

c. Understand Possible Consequences.

The proposed demobilization policies should

include consideration of the following:

• Joint force readiness.

• The health of the national economy.

• Morale of and benefits for Service

members and DOD civilian employees

and their families.

d. Coordinate and Communicate Plans

and Policies. The demobilization policies and

procedures that worked best in the past were

those that had been developed and coordinated

by interested personnel and agencies both

within and outside the Department of Defense.

Public information programs that explained

demobilization policies helped gain and

maintain public support.

4. Planning Considerations

a. Demobilizing the Armed Forces could

be a relatively straightforward return of

mobilized RC units and individuals to their

former status. It could also be a broader

process including measures such as

deactivation of units, rapid discharge of

individuals, and a major reorganization of the

RC, which might be necessary after a long

war. Similarly, demobilization of the defense

industry could range from an almost total

reconversion of a defense-oriented industrial

base to a simple reduction in the output of a

few providers who surged production to meet

the near-term demands of a short-lived crisis.

b. Recovery activities must also be

planned along with demobilization. These

include activities for restoring force readiness

and controlling the rate of industrial base

conversion to avoid disrupting the national

economy. As manpower is being released

from the Services and industrial production

is being cut back, the Services must retain or

replace skilled manpower required to restore

readiness and replenish war reserves and other

stocks to be prepared for the next crisis.

c. Demobilization planning is

accomplished at two levels. At the national

level, NCA must decide on the rate of

demobilization and the size and composition

of the post-conflict force structure and its

resource base. These national-level decisions

drive demobilization planning and resource

requests at the theater and supporting levels.

They also guide the post-conflict activities of

the supported and supporting commanders.

d. The key to military demobilization is

the supported commander. The

commander’s mission and requirements

should take precedence over all others. Other

general planning factors should include:

• The situation and requirements in other

theaters. The NCA, with the advice of

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

should establish a priority of support.

• Future missions in the theater.

• Availability of strategic lift for

redeployment.

• CONUS reception and processing

capacities for manpower and materiel.

5. Recovery Planning

a. Recovery planning should be closely

coordinated with demobilization planning.

Recovery includes the actions necessary in

the theater of operations and CONUS base to

restore a credible capability to respond, in the

short term, to a future threat. Included are

activities such as:
VI-4

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Joint Pub 4-05

• Rebuilding of major equipment items.

• Restorating personnel strength and

training readiness to required wartime

levels for future contingencies.

• Restoring war reserve stocks to

acceptable levels.

• Maintaining essential industrial surge and

expansion capabilities.

• Finalizing recovery of redeployed

equipment returned to CONUS.

• Terminating war-related contracts for the

convenience of the government.

• Reestablishing contracts at garrison or

home base as troops return.

b. The planning and resourcing of these

activities are the responsibility of OSD and

the Military Departments. The Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the NCA in

providing strategic direction for these efforts.

SECTION B. EXECUTION

6. General

Demobilization activities can begin

before the end of the crisis or war as the

need for resources declines and assets for

demobilization support become available.

Most demobilization actions, however, will

commence following the conflict when

immediate post-conflict missions have been

assigned by the supported commander and

requirements for military forces and resources

decline. Although demobilization, like

mobilization, is essentially a Military

Department responsibility, the supported

and supporting commanders play a

coordinating and synchronizing role when

the resources of two or more Services are

involved or when two or more Services are

competing for the same resources. In any

event, the combatant commanders monitor

the status and progress of demobilization

and concurrent recovery operations to

assess the adequacy of actions to restore

readiness of assigned forces to required levels

for future conflicts.

Military air bases with the capacity for supporting increased workloads are

demobilized during peacetime, but can be activated to provide the needed facilities

for conducting airlift staging operations during mobilization.
VI-5

Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution

7. Demobilization Execution

Following redeployment, the Military

Departments and USSOCOM deactivateunits

or return them to a reserve status. Military

personnel are released from active duty or

returned to reserve status. The number of

civilian employees may be reduced.

Materiel and equipment may be mothballed,

stored, distributed to other nations through

foreign military sales or other security

assistance programs, destroyed, sold for scrap,

or turned over to Defense Reutilization and

Marketing Offices. As with mobilization,

assets in the other resource areas are required

to support the demobilization of manpower

and equipment; but as these support

requirements decline, demobilization

activities are accomplished in the other

resource areas. Representative actions in

other resource areas are listed in Figure VI-2.

SECTION C. SUMMARY

8. Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of

military demobilization planning from

national and joint military perspectives. It

explained the relationship of demobilization

with national security strategy and the

concepts of GR, total force policy, and the

range of military operations introduced in

Chapter I, “Mobilization and National

Security.” It provided a set of

demobilization planning guidelines derived

from the lessons and experience of past

demobilizations. It also provided a brief

discussion of demobilization execution and a

representative listing of demobilization

activities in the 12 resource areas.

RESOURCE AREA ACTION

Transportation Strategic airlift and sealift assets are deactivated or returned to the Reserve

component or to the private sector.

Facilities

Buildings are closed, sold, or returned to the private sector or host nation.

Staffing is reduced. Contracts for services and utilities are reduced or

terminated.

Industrial Base Contracts are reduced in scope or terminated. Production capacity is laid-away

or converted to commercial use.

Training Base Capacity is reduced by closing training centers or reducing staffs and other

resources to provide capacity based on future demands.

Health Service Support

Hospital resources and staffs provided by the National Disaster Medical System

or the Department of Veteran Affairs-DOD Contingency Plan are released when

no longer required. Medical force structure is deactivated or returned to a

reserve status. Contracts with nongovernment and host-nation providers are

terminated.

Communications Support National and joint assets are redeployed. Leased capacity and equipment from

commercial sources are reduced in scope or terminated.

Host-Nation Support Agreements and contracts with host governments or commercial providers are

renegotiated or terminated.

Environment Military Departments and Defense agencies act to meet environmental

standards and regulations with cleanup and other appropriate activities.

Legal Authorities The President informs the Congress when legal authorities invoked for the crisis

are no longer needed and are revoked or rescinded.

Funding Funding required for demobilization and recovery activities is provided in

accordance with established peacetime procedures.

Figure VI-2. Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas
VI-6

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Joint Pub 4-05

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

LEGAL AUTHORITIES

A-1

1. General

a. Flexible and adaptive mobilization

planning requires a range of options available

before a declaration of national emergency,

as well as after. Legal authorities for

mobilization actions can be categorized as

being available in peacetime, or available after

a Presidential declaration of a national

emergency or a congressional declaration of

a national emergency or war.

b. Authorities available without a

declaration of national emergency may be

invoked by the President or, in some cases, a

department head like the Secretary of Defense

or Secretary of a Military Department.

Examples of such authorities are the PSRC;

the President’s option to suspend any

provision of law pertaining to promotion,

retirement, or separation of a Service member

during an RC activation (the stop-loss

authority); the Military Department

Secretaries’ authority to recall regular and

reserve military retirees with more than 20

years of active service; and authorities

requiring priority performance on defense

contracts.

c. A national emergency can be declared

by the President, the Congress, or both.

Current law regarding national emergencies

is contained in the National Emergencies Act

of 1976 (50 United States Code (USC) 1601-

1651). The act provides that when the

President declares a national emergency, the

specific authorities being invoked be included

in the declaration or in subsequent Executive

orders. Presidential powers are limited to

those authorities invoked until the President

subsequently announces the invocation of

additional specified authorities (50 USC

1621(b), 1631). Congress may terminate the

President’s declaration at any time with a

concurrent resolution and must review the

declaration and situation every six months (50

USC 1622).

d. Before 1976, a declaration of national

emergency, which made virtually all of the

President’s emergency powers available at

once, could be interpreted as an all-or-nothing

response regardless of the nature or perceived

severity of a crisis. The National Emergencies

Act of 1976 greatly reduced the risk that a

declaration of national emergency would send

overly provocative signals of US intent to

adversaries and unduly alarm allies. With the

same broad menu of emergency powers, the

President can now tailor the national response

in a crisis, without undue provocation, and

convey more accurate signals of US intent to

allies as well as adversaries.

e. The War Powers Resolution (50 USC

1541-1548) is a statute enacted over

Presidential veto that is intended to enforce

Congress’ war-making powers under article

I, section 8 of the Constitution. The resolution

declares that the President, as Commander in

Chief, may introduce US Armed Forces into

hostilities, or into situations where hostilities

are imminent, only pursuant to (1) a

declaration of war; (2) specific statutory

authorization; or (3) a national emergency

created by attack upon the United States, its

territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces.

The law requires the President to consult with

Congress in every possible instance before

introducing US Forces into hostilities or

situations where hostilities are imminent. The

resolution also requires the President to report

periodically to Congress on the status of US

Forces’ involvement in hostilities and

withdraw the forces within 60 days unless

Congress has either declared war or extended

the 60-day period.
A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 4-05

NOTE: Since passage of the resolution in

1973, Presidents have consistently

held the position the law

unconstitutionally infringes on the

President’s power to carry out his

role as Commander in Chief;

however, no President has yet

challenged the resolution in court.

Rather, Presidents have generally

consulted Congress before

introducing troops into potentially

hostile situations (e.g., the Persian

Gulf conflict and humanitarian

assistance in Somalia). This issue

has not been resolved and could

affect the US response in some

future crisis.

f. The “Digest of War and Emergency

Legislation Affecting the Department of

Defense, 1991” lists nearly 400 emergency

authorities available for mobilization and

crisis planning. This Appendix identifies and

briefly describes those emergency authorities

most likely to affect joint mobilization

planning and execution in each resource area.

2. Manpower

Individual and unit members of the RC may

be ordered to active duty voluntarily or

involuntarily under authorities provided in

title 10, USC.

a. Voluntary Order to Active Duty. The

Secretaries of Military Departments may order

any member of the RC to active duty with the

consent of the member (10 USC 12301(d)).

Members of the Army and Air National

Guard, however, cannot be activated under

this statute without the consent of the governor

of the state, commonwealth, or territory. RC

volunteers may be employed to augment the

active force for any operational mission or

contingency operation.

b. Presidential Selected Reserve Callup.

The President may authorize the Secretary of

Defense (or the Secretary of Transportation

with regard to the Coast Guard when it is not

operating as a Service of the Navy) to order

up to 200,000 members of the Selected

Reserve for any operational mission for not

more than 270 days (10 USC 12304). This

authority can be invoked with or without a

declaration of national emergency.

c. Partial Mobilization Authority.

Following a Presidential declaration of

national emergency or when otherwise

authorized by law, the President may authorize

the Secretaries of the Military Departments,

at the direction of the Secretary of Defense,

to order to active duty up to 1,000,000

members of the Ready Reserve (Selected

Reserve, IRR, and Inactive National Guard

(ING)), without their consent, for a period not

to exceed 24 consecutive months (10 USC

12302).

d. Full Mobilization Authority. The

President, upon a declaration of national

emergency or war by Congress or when

otherwise authorized by law, may invoke 10

USC 12301(a) authorizing the Secretary of

Defense to direct the Secretaries of the

Military Departments to order to active duty

any member of the RC (Ready Reserve,

Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve), without

their consent, for the duration of the

emergency or war plus six months.

e. Stop-Loss Authority. This authority

stops normal attrition of experienced military

personnel through expiration of enlistments,

retirements, and other routine releases from

active duty. With this authority, during any

period RC members have been involuntarily

ordered to active duty, the President may

suspend any provision of law relating to

retirement, promotion, separation of military

personnel determined to be essential to the

national security (10 USC 12305).

f. Retiree Recall. Under 10 USC 688 and

regulations established by the Secretary of
A-3

Legal Authorities

Defense, the Secretaries of the Military

Departments are authorized to recall to active

duty military retirees (AC or RC) who have

completed 20 or more years of active service.

Retired members may be assigned duties the

Secretary concerned considers necessary in

the interest of national defense.

g. Recall of the Retired Reserve. Reserve

members in a retired status (with less than 20

years of active service) can only be called

involuntarily to active duty in time of war or

national emergency declared by the Congress.

In addition, this authority requires that the

Secretaries of the Military Departments first

determine, with the approval of the Secretary

of Defense, that there are not enough qualified

Reserves available in other categories,

including the ING, to fill the required spaces

(10 USC 12301(a)).

h. Recall of the Standby Reserve. Units

and members in the Standby Reserve may be

ordered to active duty (other than for training)

only as provided in 10 USC 12301. In

addition, this authority requires that the

Service Secretaries first determine that there

are not enough qualified members in the

Ready Reserve in the required categories who

are readily available.

i. Call to Active Duty of Delayed Entry

Program Personnel. Qualified personnel

with no prior military service may be enlisted

as untrained members of the IRR for up to

365 days before reporting for active duty

under 10 USC 513. All such persons may be

ordered to active duty under all provisions of

the law and regulations applying to the IRR.

j. Conscription. If Congress deems it

necessary under the Selective Service Act (50

USC app 451-473), the Selective Service

System can begin involuntarily drafting

eligible, non-exemption men for military

service. Repeal of section 17(c) of 50 USC

app 467(c) is necessary before the Selective

Service System may initiate an involuntary

draft of nonprior service personnel.

3. The Defense Production Act

of 1950 (DPA)

Authority for expanding capability or

capacity in the materiel and equipment,

transportation and industrial base resource

areas is provided by the DPA. This act (50

USC app. 2061-2171), which has been

periodically revised and renewed by

Congress, provides that basis for the DPAS.

It authorizes the President, in peace, conflict,

and war, to divert national resources, deemed

critical to the national defense, from civil to

military use, and reorder economic priorities

to provide for the national defense and

national security. Specifically, the President

may require private sector providers of

materials and services, identified as essential

and critical to national defense, to give priority

performance to defense contracts and orders.

The President may also authorize government

agencies, like the Department of Defense,

Department of Transportation, and

Department of Commerce, to guarantee loans

needed by defense contractors to expedite

production, deliveries, or service.

4. Facilities

There are three fundamental emergency

authorities available to facilitate construction

projects required to expand facilities during

mobilization.

a. Emergency Construction Authority.

The Secretary of a Military Department is

authorized by 10 USC 2803 to execute

emergency military construction projects if

the Secretary determines: (1) the project is

vital to the national security or to the

protection of health, safety, or the quality of

the environment; and (2) the requirement for

the project is so urgent that to defer it for the

next military construction authorization act
A-4

Appendix A

Joint Pub 4-05

would be inconsistent with National security

or to the protection of health, safety, or the

quality of the environment. The maximum

amount a Secretary may obligate is $30

million taken from the unobligated balances

of funds appropriated for military

construction.

b. Contingency Construction. The

Secretary of Defense is authorized by 10 USC

2804 to execute contingency military

construction projects, before a declaration of

national emergency, upon determination that

the deferral of the projects would be

inconsistent with national security or national

interest.

c. Construction Authority in the Event

of a Declaration of War or National

Emergency. In the event of a declaration of

war or the declaration by the President of a

national emergency requiring use of the

Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense may

undertake construction projects needed to

support the Armed Forces without specific

legislative authorization. Such projects,

however, must be able to be completed within

the total amount of unobligated military

construction funds, including funds

appropriated for family housing per 10 USC

2808.

d. Recapture and Condemnation of Real

Property. There are more than 60 permanent

laws in the US Code authorizing the President,

Secretary of Defense, or specified Secretary

of a Military Department to recapture specific

parcels of former federal property for defense

purposes. In general, the availability of these

authorities is contingent on a declaration of

national emergency by the President or

Congress or the existence of a state of war.

As a practical matter, many of these sites have

been rendered virtually unusable for defense

purposes, because of commercial

development undertaken over the years since

some of these laws were enacted (some as

early as 1925). The US Army Corps of

Engineers, however, maintains a list of

properties still usable for national defense

purposes. In addition, 10 USC 2663 and 2664

authorize Secretaries of the Military

Departments to bring condemnation

proceedings, in courts with appropriate

jurisdiction, to acquire land or facilities

deemed necessary for a variety of defense

purposes including construction of training

sites, and production of munitions and lumber.

5. Training Base Expansion

There are no legal authorities specifically

directed to expansion of the military training

base in connection with mobilization.

Training base expansion activities, however,

may require activation of RC training units

and individual manpower, expansion of

facilities, equipment and transportation

resources, under emergency authorities

pertaining to these resource areas. Training

base expansion plans must also take into

account the provision of 10 USC 671, which

requires a minimum of 12 weeks of basic

training (or its equivalent) before assigning

any member of the Armed Forces to duties

outside CONUS. The intent of this law is to

ensure that no Service member is assigned

overseas without essential battlefield survival

skills.

6. Health Service Support

a. Activation of RC HSS units and

individuals is governed by the same

authorities for mobilizing other manpower

skills as discussed in paragraph 2 above.

b. The President is authorized by 42 USC

217 to declare the commissioned corps of the

USPHS a military service in time of war or

national emergency.

c. Under the provisions of the DVA and

Department of Defense Health Resources
A-5

Legal Authorities

Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (38

USC 8111A), the DVA will make available

to the DOD beds for the care of military

casualties.

d. The NDMS, established and

administered by the DHHS under the

authority of Executive Order 12656,

“Assignment of Emergency Preparedness

Responsibilities,” provides backup support to

the DOD and DVA HSS in caring for military

casualties. Although not legally obligated,

nonfederal public and private hospitals have

agreed to provide about 100,000 beds to

augment DOD and DVA resources, if needed

in an emergency. This commitment is

triggered when the Secretary of Defense

determines military casualties threaten to

overburden the DOD and DVA systems.

7. Communications

Section 706 of the Communications Act of

1934 (47 USC 606) authorizes the President,

during times of emergency or war, to exercise

extraordinary management or control over

national telecommunications resources to

meet requirements for telecommunications

services beyond those normally provided by

individual commercial suppliers or

government agencies.

8. Host-Nation Support

Authorities for obtaining HNS manpower

and services are provided in various treaties

in force to which the United States is signatory,

by 20 major agreements with foreign nations,

and over 400 logistic agreements.

9. Environment

Major environmental protection statutes

affecting mobilization are discussed in

Chapter IV, "Resource Areas." The President

has authority, when in the national interest, to

exempt Federal facilities from certain

provisions of environmental law. DOD policy

relating to environmental statutes, stems from

statutes and Executive Order 12088, which

requires the Department of Defense, together

with other Executive branch agencies, to be

in full compliance with applicable

environmental laws and regulations. The

Department of Defense has never sought

exemption from any provision of

environmental law.

10. Funding

The following emergency authorities are

available to the DOD to provide essential

funding for mobilization and other emergency

defense expenditures.

a. Budget Supplemental. The Secretary

of Defense may submit additional

appropriations requests to Congress to meet

urgent requirements.

b. Budget Amendment. The Secretary of

Defense may submit budget revisions to

Congress before the congressional

appropriations process has been completed.

c. Reprogramming. The Secretary of

Defense may reprogram funds within

appropriations thresholds established by

Congress to meet the requirements of any

emergency. Reprogramming actions above

established thresholds must be submitted to

Congress for approval.

d. Transfer Authority. Authority and

thresholds for transferring funds between

appropriations are established in the current

appropriations act. Transfers that exceed

thresholds require congressional approval.

e. Deficiency Authority (Food and

Forage Act). 41 USC 11 permits the DOD

to obligate funds in excess of amounts

authorized and appropriated to cover

necessities of the current year, under

circumstances in which appropriations for

clothing, subsistence, fuel, quarters,
A-6

Appendix A

Joint Pub 4-05

transportation, or medical and hospital

supplies are exhausted. This authority ensures

the availability of sufficient funds to care for

the unexpected increases in DOD personnel

strength as a result of a crisis and mobilization.
APPENDIX B

AUTOMATED TOOLS

B-1

1. General

JPEC:

a. Prepares systems to monitor forces and

phases of the crisis or mobilization.

b. Plans for information management

systems to consolidate automated data

processing (ADP) support for all functional

areas of a mobilization, thereby reducing the

total number of varying systems carrying

similar data.

c. Reduces administrative functions to

meet mobilization surge requirements.

d. Reviews ADP procedures that stimulate

development of effective C4 capabilities for

enhanced crisis response.

e. Designs and tests mobilization-related

ADP systems to ensure their ability to operate

effectively.

2. Planning

The Services mobilize, train, equip, and

prepare forces, including the RC, for

movements in CONUS to meet scheduled

deployment and employment dates.

Movement of mobilized RC units from home

station to mobilization station is a support

installation responsibility. MTMC, a

USTRANSCOM component command, is

responsible for planning intra-CONUS

movements to support mobilization and

deployment using OPLAN TPFDD files and

intra-CONUS movement data. The Services

and Defense agencies will provide significant

RC mobilization-related movement

requirements to USTRANSCOM. The

supported combatant commander prioritizes

and validates requirements to

USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM then

coordinates with the support installation and

supported combatant commander to resolve

movement constraints and advises the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of

transportation capabilities in CONUS. During

deployment, USTRANSCOM monitors the

movement of forces and materiel by commonuser lift from home station to the port of

debarkation. In this circumstance,

USTRANSCOM will immediately be able to

identify a conflict so resolution can be

obtained from the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate combatant

commander.

3. Reporting Systems

Supporting Mobilization

a. JOPES Deployment Data Base.

JOPES is the primary system for use in

planning joint military operations. It

consolidates policies and procedures for

developing, coordinating, disseminating,

reviewing, and approving joint OPLANs and

bridges the gap between deliberate planning

and the CAP process and execution. In most

cases, data derived from JOPES are also used

during execution. The CAP Procedures

contained in JOPES delineate the procedures

for developing response actions under timeconstrained conditions.

b. Force Augmentation Planning and

Execution System (FAPES). FAPES is being

developed as a military manpower

mobilization decisionmaker’s tool to capture

and integrate manpower capabilities for both

deliberate and crisis situations. FAPES will

assist the decisionmaker in determining

whether force augmentation is necessary to

satisfy time-phased requirements specified in

deployment, employment, and sustainment

planning. Monitoring the status and progress
B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 4-05

of mobilization is key to this process. FAPES

was used during Operations DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM to generate

reports on the status and progress of

mobilization for the Joint Staff.

c. Medical Planning and Execution

System (MEPES). The Joint Staff, J-4, is

tasked to coordinate the HSS mission for the

theater of operations and CONUS sustaining

base. MEPES is programmed to be the

medical module in JOPES. It is an operational

information management system that provides

the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and

component commands the capability to

analyze and evaluate alternative courses of

action (COAs) for allocation of health service

resources. MEPES aids the Services with

mobilization and provision of HSS services

and the commanders who are responsible for

deployment and employment of health service

resources. Each level of command has

specific and separate health service

management and information requirements

and responsibilities. Each level within the

JOPES process has the ability to provide

appropriate information to any other level.

With this information, joint and Service health

service planners support the other levels. The

current description of MEPES identifies two

components:

• Medical Planning Module (MPM)

(Phase I). The MPM is designed to

forecast the theater HSS resource

requirements based on the warfighting

scenario. The forecast includes:

•• The different spectrum of patients by

category and sector of employment in the

theater.

•• Selected HSS requirements across the

battlefield as well as within the afloat

battle groups.

•• Assistance in the development of the

HSS force structure.

•• Projections of the aeromedical

evacuation lift requirements.

•• Planning parameters for processing

patients at different echelons of care,

logistic region, and zone of operation.

•• Baseline values for determining

consumption rates and flow patterns for

Class VIII supplies.

• Medical Mobilization Planning and

Execution System (MEDMOB) (Phase

II). MEDMOB serves as the integrator

of both MEPES components. As a

conventional planning and execution

information system, MEDMOB is the

integrator and interface module

within the Reconstitution-Mobilization

(RECMOB) System to provide:

•• The integrated time-phased

requirements versus capability analysis

for manpower, Class VIIIA (medical

supplies), Class VIIIB (blood),

deployable hospitals, and medical

evacuation assets.

•• The capability to monitor the status,

progress, and medical readiness of

mobilizing units.

•• The time-phased availability of DOD,

host nation, and allied HSS.

•• The assessment information needed to

integrate the CONUS HSS planning

provided by the Services, DVA, and

NDMS.

d. Joint Industrial Mobilization

Planning Process (JIMPP)

• JIMPP is the generic term for the

planning and analytic process to be used

by the Services, Defense agencies, and

Joint Staff to:
B-3

Automated Tools

•• Prepare industrial mobilization plans

linked to deliberate and crisis

action planning procedures,

development, and execution.

•• Provide the analytical framework to

perform the industrial analyses required

by the Joint Strategic Planning System

and OSD.

•• Establish base line national industrial

base capability assessments tied to

potential military demand.

• JIMPP is used during deliberate planning

to conduct capability and risk

assessments, emergency procurement

budget mechanisms, time-phased

requirements lists, and narrative COAs.

Output may be forwarded to OSD and

other Federal agencies for use in broader

industrial mobilization planning. As an

analytical tool, JIMPP allows planners

to address what if questions from both

the supply and demand sides. Expected

outputs of the process include supplyside option summaries for GR, estimates

of a mobilizable force, and assessments

of plan feasibility. JIMPP consists of

three components: a Requirements

Module (REQMOD), which produces

weapons and munitions requirements,

associated shortfalls, replacement of

losses, and consumption rates; a VendorLevel Module for specific options and

capabilities (compares each item

requirement with its production rate and

produces surge and mobilization

requirements and shortfalls); and an

Industry-Level Module for a

macroeconomic sectoral-level analysis of

mobilization requirements and

capabilities for 240 industrial sectors.

e. Key Asset Protection Program

(KAPP). DOD Directive 5160.54, 26 June

1989, “DOD Key Asset Protection Program

(KAPP),” provides policy guidance for

planning to protect key assets, assigns

responsibilities for administering KAPP, and

authorizes the publishing of the Key Asset

List (KAL) as part of the KAPP. DOD policy

requires actions to protect key assets that are

included in military contingency plans for

military support to civil authorities and land

defense of CONUS. The functional purpose

of KAPP is:

• To support and assist the Secretary of

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and Commander in Chief,

US Atlantic Command in the continuing

review of the KAL in preparation for war.

• To facilitate the employment of military

and civilian resources to ensure

protection of key assets.

• To promote the security of key assets

within the United States and in US

territories and possessions by providing

to the owners or managers of such assets

appropriate advice, guidance, and

planning assistance on the application of

physical security and emergency

preparedness measures.

• To provide to the NCA guidance and

direction concerning the priority of key

asset protection missions upon execution

of plans that support KAPP.

f. Logistic Sustainment Analysis and

Feasibility Estimate (LOGSAFE).

LOGSAFE provides planners the capability

to estimate the logistical requirements of an

OPLAN and to determine logistic

supportability for various COAs. LOGSAFE

performs a series of three activities: generate

general and sustainment requirements plus

supply buildup, compare sustainment

requirements with available stockages for

logistical sustainability assessment, and

provide decision aid outputs and interface of

suitable data for various transportation

models.
B-4

Appendix B

Joint Pub 4-05

g. Joint Engineering Planning and

Execution System (JEPES). JEPES provides

a common automated system for the civil

engineer planners at the unified commands

and their components to determine the

feasibility of the civil engineering force,

construction material, and facilities to support

OPLANs. Further, it is used to:

• Generate time-phased facility

requirements based on an OPLAN.

• Analyze and assess engineering

support by comparing facility

requirements to in-theater facility assets

and host nation, contract, and troop

engineering capability.

• Provide facility feasibility assessment,

manpower, materiel, and nonunit cargo

requirements for other processes.

h. Joint Flow and Analysis System for

Transportation (JFAST). JFAST provides

rapid analysis of the transportation feasibility

of OPLANs and COAs before scheduling by

the transportation component command.

i. Defense Emergency Authority

Retrieval and Analysis System

(DEARAS). DEARAS is a specialized

computer-assisted legal research system for

items such as statutes, regulations, and judicial

decisions that defines DOD legal authority to

act in an emergency.

j. Joint Interoperability of Tactical

Command and Control Systems

Automated Message Preparation System

(JAMPS). JAMPS provides automated aids

to reduce operator training times for creation

of tactical messages, reduce errors in message

creation, and speed message generation and

transmission. Message preparation and

formats are standardized in order to expedite

message traffic across the Services.

k. Status of Resources and Training

System (SORTS). SORTS is an information

management system designed to support the

decisionmaking process of the NCA and

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SORTS

supports the registration of units, reporting of

basic unit identity elements, monitoring of unit

status, and distribution of unit information

throughout the JPEC. Distributed information

includes unit location, strength, readiness

factor, and category levels for equipment and

personnel. Individual units update the SORTS

data base by a Defense Information Systems

Network communications link. The system

constitutes the single automated tool for

maintaining and updating unit status.

l. Joint Pub 1-03, Joint Reporting

Structure (JRS). The JRS contains approved

reporting structures for information

interchange between military commanders. It

prescribes formats, codes, data element

definitions, and reporting procedures.

m. Dynamic Analysis and Replanning

Tool (DART). DART is an integrated set of

automated data force and processing tools and

a data base management system that provides

joint operators and planners the ability to

rapidly edit and analyze TPFDDs for data

accuracy.
APPENDIX C

MOBILIZATION ESTIMATE

C-1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Organization

Place of Issue

Date-Time Group, Month, Year

Mobilization Estimate Number ___________________

References: a. Maps and Charts.

 b. Other Pertinent Documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the combatant commander’s missions, taken from the mission analysis,

planning guidance, or other statements. (Look specifically for Reserve component missions;

e.g., offload the maritime pre-positioned ships, civil affairs, psychological operations, and

other appropriate items.)

2. ( ) Situations and Considerations

a. ( ) Assumptions

b. ( ) Mobilization Situation

(1) ( ) Availability of Manpower

(2) ( ) Transportation

(3) ( ) Equipment/Materiel

(4) ( ) Health Service Support

(5) ( ) Facilities

(6) ( ) Industrial Base

(7) ( ) Training Base

(8) ( ) Communications

(9) ( ) Host-Nation Support

(10) ( ) Environment

(11) ( ) Legal Authorities

(12) ( ) Funding

3. ( ) Mobilization Analysis of Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the

manpower, equipment/materiel, transportation, health service support, industrial, training

bases, communications, and legal authority resource areas that affect the proposed courses of

action to determine the manner and degree of that effect. The objective of this analysis is to

determine whether the mobilization requirements can be met and to isolate the implications

that should be considered by the combatant commander in the commander’s estimate.

a. ( ) Analyze each course of action from a mobilization point of view.
C-2

Appendix C

Joint Pub 4-05

b. ( ) The mobilization factors in subparagraph 2b are the factors to be analyzed for each

course of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint

of time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that may affect the

mobilization course of action.

c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep mobilization considerations foremost in mind. The

analysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all applicable

mobilization factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for comparisons

in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of Courses of Action

a. ( ) List the effect that manpower mobilization (for each level, including PSRC) has on

the other resource areas from a J-4’s point of view.

b. ( ) Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all resource

areas based on the mobilization decision.

5. ( ) Conclusions

a. ( ) State whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a mobilization

standpoint.

b. ( ) State which mobilization course of action can best be supported from a transportation,

equipment/materiel, and health service support standpoint.

c. ( ) Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the attention of

the combatant commander. Provide recommendations from the Services as to the methods to

eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _________________________
APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the

Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,

VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency,

and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics, J-4.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4-SMED/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and

Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal.

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7,

Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________
D-2

Appendix D

Joint Pub 4-05

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or foreign

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIA

Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative

support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, “Support of the

Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply Office

Distribution Division (Code 03443)

5801 Tabor Avenue

Philadelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base

Albany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must

be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AC Active component

ADP automated data processing

AMC Air Mobility Command

AOR area of responsibility

ARC Air Reserve Component

ARNG Army National Guard

C4 command, control, communications, and computers

CAP crisis action planning

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed

Services

CIL critical items list

CINC commander of a combatant command

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COA course of action

CONPLAN operation plan in concept format

CONUS continental United States

CORE Contingency response program

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

DART Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool

DCS Defense Communications System

DEARAS Department of Defense Emergency Authorities Retrieval and

Analysis System

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOT Department of Transportation

DPA Defense Production Act

DPAS Defense Priorities and Allocation System

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

DVA Department of Veterans Affairs

EIS environmental impact statement

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FAPES Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GR graduated response
GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05

HNS host-nation support

HSS health service support

ING Inactive National Guard

IRR individual ready reserve

JAMPS JINTACCS Automated Message Preparation System

JEPES Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System

JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation

JIMPP Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process

JMPAB Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community

JRS Joint Reporting Structure

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

KAL key assets list

KAPP Key Assets Protection Program

LOGSAFE logistic sustainment analysis and feasibility estimator

MC&G mapping, charting, and geodesy

MEDMOB Medical Mobilization Planning and Execution System

MEPES Medical Planning and Execution System

MMG Master Mobilization Guide

MPM medical planning module

MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA National Command Authorities

NCS National Communications System

NDMS National Disaster Medical System

NPS nonprior service

NSC National Security Council

OPLAN operation plan

OPM Office of Personnel Management

OPORD operation order

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PIM pretrained individual manpower

PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

PSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Callup

RC Reserve component

RECMOB Reconstitution-Mobilization

RRF Ready Reserve Force
GL-3

Glossary

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SECTRANS Secretary of Transportation

SOP standing operating procedures

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

SRP Sealift and Readiness Program

SSS Selective Service System

SWA Southwest Asia

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

UN United Nations

USAR United States Army Reserve

USC United States Code

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command

USMC United States Marine Corps

USNR United States Naval Reserve

USPHS United States Public Health Service

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VTA Voluntary Tanker Agreement
activation. Order to active duty (other than

for training) in the Federal service.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02)

active duty. Full-time duty in the active

military service of the United States. This

includes members of the Reserve

Components serving on active duty or fulltime training duty, but does not include fulltime National Guard duty. Also called AD.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

availability date. The date after notification

of mobilization by which forces will be

marshalled at their home station or

mobilization station and available for

deployment. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

C-day. See times.

D-Day. See times.

demobilization. The process of transitioning

a conflict or wartime military establishment

and defense-based civilian economy to a

peacetime configuration while maintaining

national security and economic vitality.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02)

Delayed Entry Program. A program under

which an individual may enlist in a Reserve

component of a Military Service and

specify a future reporting date for entry on

active duty in the Active component that

would coincide with availability of training

spaces and with personal plans such as high

school graduation. (Approved for inclusion

in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

draft. The conscription of qualified citizens

for military service. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub

1-02)

F-Hour. See times.

Federal service. A term applied to National

Guard members and units when called into

the service of the United States under

Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section

2 of the Constitution and 10 USC 12401-

12408. (Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

force module. A grouping of combat, combat

support, and combat service support forces,

with their accompanying supplies and the

required nonunit resupply and personnel

necessary to sustain forces for a minimum

of 30 days. The elements of force modules

are linked together or are uniquely

identified so that they may be extracted

from or adjusted as an entity in the Joint

Operation Planning and Execution System

data bases to enhance flexibility and

usefulness of the operation plan during a

crisis. Also called FM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force shortfall. A deficiency in the number

of types of units available for planning

within the time required for the

performance of an assigned task.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02)

home station. The permanent location of

Active units and Reserve component units

(location of armory or reserve center).

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02)

health service support. All services

performed, provided, or arranged by the

Services to promote, improve, conserve, or

restore the mental or physical well-being

of personnel. These services include, but

are not limited to, the management of health

services resources, such as manpower,

monies, and facilities; preventive and

curative health measures; evacuation of the

GL-4 Joint Pub 4-05

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the

medically fit and disposition of the

medically unfit; blood management;

medical supply, equipment, and

maintenance thereof; combat stress control;

and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory,

optometric, medical food, and medical

intelligence services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military

assistance rendered by a nation to foreign

forces within its territory during peacetime,

crises or emergencies, or war based on

agreements mutually concluded between

nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Inactive National Guard. Army National

Guard personnel in an inactive status not

in the Selected Reserve who are attached

to a specific National Guard unit but do not

participate in training activities. Upon

mobilization, they will mobilize with their

units. In order for these personnel to remain

members of the Inactive National Guard,

they must muster once a year with their

assigned unit. Like the Individual Ready

Reserve, all members of the Inactive

National Guard have legal, contractual

obligations. Members of the Inactive

National Guard may not train for retirement

credit or pay and are not eligible for

promotion. Also called ING. (Approved

for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub

1-02)

individual mobilization augmentee. An

individual reservist attending drills who

receives training and is preassigned to an

active component organization, a Selective

Service System, or a Federal Emergency

Management Agency billet that must be

filled on, or shortly after, mobilization.

Individual mobilization augmentees train

on a part-time basis with these organizations

to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty

training for individual mobilization

augmentees is decided by component

policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills a

year. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Individual Ready Reserve. A manpower

pool consisting of individuals who have had

some training and who have served

previously in the Active component or in

the Selected Reserve and have some period

of their military service obligation

remaining. Members may voluntarily

participate in training for retirement points

and promotion with or without pay. Also

called IRR. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

industrial mobilization. The transformation

of industry from its peacetime activity to

the industrial program necessary to support

the national military objectives. It includes

the mobilization of materials, labor, capital,

production facilities, and contributory items

and services essential to the industrial

program. (Joint Pub 1-02)

industrial preparedness program. Plans,

actions, or measures for the transformation

of the industrial base, both governmentowned and civilian-owned, from its

peacetime activity to the emergency

program necessary to support the national

military objectives. It includes industrial

preparedness measures such as

modernization, expansion, and preservation

of the production facilities and contributory

items and services for planning with

industry. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M-day. See times.

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling and

organizing national resources to support

national objectives in time of war or other

emergencies. See also industrial

mobilization. 2. The process by which the

Armed Forces or part of them are brought

to a state of readiness for war or other

national emergency. This includes

GL-5

Glossary
GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05

activating all or part of the Reserve

components as well as assembling and

organizing personnel, supplies, and

materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces

includes but is not limited to the following

categories:

a. selective mobilization. Expansion of the

active Armed Forces resulting from action

by Congress and/or the President to

mobilize Reserve component units,

individual ready reservists, and the

resources needed for their support to meet

the requirements of a domestic emergency

that is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. partial mobilization. Expansion of the

active Armed Forces resulting from action

by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by

the President (not more than 1,000,000 for

not more than 24 consecutive months) to

mobilize Ready Reserve component units,

individual reservists, and the resources

needed for their support to meet the

requirements of a war or other national

emergency involving an external threat to

the national security.

c. full mobilization. Expansion of the

active Armed Forces resulting from action

by Congress and the President to mobilize

all Reserve component units in the existing

approved force structure, all individual

reservists, retired military personnel, and

the resources needed for their support to

meet the requirements of a war or other

national emergency involving an external

threat to the national security. Reserve

personnel can be placed on active duty for

the duration of the emergency plus six

months.

d. total mobilization. Expansion of the

active Armed Forces resulting from action

by Congress and the President to organize

and/or generate additional units or

personnel beyond the existing force

structure, and the resources needed for their

support, to meet the total requirements of a

war or other national emergency involving

an external threat to the national security.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization base. The total of all resources

available, or which can be made available,

to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such

resources include the manpower and

material resources and services required for

the support of essential military, civilian,

and survival activities, as well as the

elements affecting their state of readiness,

such as (but not limited to) the following:

manning levels, state of training,

modernization of equipment, mobilization

materiel reserves and facilities, continuity

of government, civil defense plans and

preparedness measures, psychological

preparedness of the people, international

agreements, planning with industry,

dispersion, and standby legislation and

controls. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization site. The designated location

where a Reserve component unit or

individual mobilizes or moves to after

mobilization for further processing,

training, and employment. This differs

from a mobilization station in that it is not

necessarily a military installation.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization station. The designated

military installation to which a Reserve

component unit or individual is moved for

further processing, organizing, equipping,

training, and employment and from which

the unit or individual may move to an aerial

port of embarkation or seaport of

embarkation. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The

President and the Secretary of Defense or

their duly deputized alternates or
GL-7

Glossary

successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub

1-02)

Presidential Callup. Procedures by which

the President brings all or a part of the Army

National Guard or the Air National Guard

into active Federal service of the United

States under section 12406 of title 10 U.S.C.

and Chapter 15 of title 10 USC. (Approved

for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub

1-02)

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup

Authority. Provision of a public law (10

USC 12304) that provides the President a

means to activate, without a declaration of

national emergency, not more than 200,000

members of the Selected Reserve for not

more than 270 days to meet the

requirements of any operational mission.

Members called under this provision may

not be used for disaster relief or to suppress

insurrection. This authority has particular

utility when used in circumstances in which

the escalatory national or international

signals of partial or full mobilization would

be undesirable. Forces available under this

authority can provide a tailored, limitedscope, deterrent, or operational response,

or may be used as a precursor to any

subsequent mobilization. Also called

PSRC. (Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

ready reserve. The Selected Reserve,

Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive

National Guard liable for active duty as

prescribed by law. (10 USC 10142, 12301,

and 12302). (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

reserve component category. The category

that identifies an individual’s status in a

reserve component. The three reserve

component categories are Ready Reserve,

Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.

Each reservist is identified by a specific

reserve component category designation.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

Reserve Components. Reserve Components

of the Armed Forces of the United States

are: a. the Army National Guard of the

United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. the

Naval Reserve; d. the Marine Corps

Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the

United States; f. the Air Force Reserve; g.

and the Coast Guard Reserve. (Joint Pub

1-02)

Retired Reserve. All Reserve members who

receive retirement pay on the basis of their

active duty and/or Reserve service; those

members who are otherwise eligible for

retirement pay but have not yet reached age

60 and who have not elected discharge and

are not voluntary members of the Ready or

Standby Reserve. (Approved for inclusion

in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Selected Reserve. Those units and

individuals within the Ready Reserve

designated by their respective Services and

approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so

essential to initial wartime missions that

they have priority over all other Reserves.

All Selected Reservists are in an active

status. The Selected Reserve also includes

persons performing initial active duty for

training. See also ready reserve. (Joint Pub

1-02)

standby reserve. Those units and members

of the Reserve Components (other than

those in the Ready Reserve or Retired

Reserve) who are liable for active duty only

as provided in 10 USC 10151, 12301 and

12306. (Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

times. (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours

Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed

to be 24 hours long for planning.) The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05

normally coordinates the proposed date with

the commanders of the appropriate unified

and specified commands, as well as any

recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will

be established per plan, crisis, or theater of

operations and will apply to both air and

surface movements. Normally, L-hour will

be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour

day. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a

deployment operation commences or is to

commence. The deployment may be

movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems,

or a combination of these elements using any

or all types of transport. The letter "C" will

be the only one used to denote the above. The

highest command or headquarters responsible

for coordinating the planning will specify the

exact meaning of C-day within the

aforementioned definition. The command or

headquarters directly responsible for the

execution of the operation, if other than the

one coordinating the planning, will do so in

light of the meaning specified by the highest

command or headquarters coordinating the

planning. b. D-day. The unnamed day on

which a particular operation commences or

is to commence. c. F-hour. The effective

time of announcement by the Secretary of

Defense to the Military Departments of a

decision to mobilize Reserve units. d. Hhour. The specific hour on D-day at which

a particular operation commences. e. Lhour. The specific hour on C-day at which

a deployment operation commences or is

to commence. f. M-day. The term used to

designate the unnamed day on which full

mobilization commences or is due to

commence. g. N-day. The unnamed day

an active duty unit is notified for

deployment or redeployment. h. R-day.

Redeployment day. The day on which

redeployment of major combat, combat

support, and combat service support forces

begins in an operation. i. S-day. The day

the President authorizes Selective Reserve

callup (not more than 200,000). j. T-day.

The effective day coincident with

Presidential declaration of National

Emergency and authorization of partial

mobilization (not more than 1,000,000

personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup).

k. W-day. Declared by the National

Command Authorities, W-day is associated

with an adversary decision to prepare for

war (unambiguous strategic warning).

(Joint Pub 1-02)
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and CINCS

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones,

and who will develop

drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, CINC, or Joint

Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

l

l

l

The CINCS receive the pub and

begin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality

of each pub and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each pub is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision

l

l

l

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff

to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

CINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

l

l

l

STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy

as shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.

The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 4-05 Logistics

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 3-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINT

WARFARE

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formal

staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

l

l

l

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority

(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,

and Joint Staff

l

l

l

STEP #3

Two Drafts

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 4-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS C4 SYSTEMS

PERSONNEL

and

ADMINISTRATION