alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

DUSTEN A. MAHON

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:20-cv-171-TKW/MJF

TIM BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This case is before the Court based on the magistrate judge’s Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 47) and Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 48). The Court 

reviewed the objections de novo pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), and based on 

that review, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s determination that the 

claims against Defendants Contini and Ward1 are barred by the doctrine of issue 

preclusion. 

The Court did not overlook Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant Contini is not 

in “privity” with the defendants in the prior case, Case No. 5:17cv181; however, 

even if that is correct, it is immaterial because the parties that need to be in privity 

for issue preclusion to apply are the party in the prior case where the issue was 

1

 Plaintiff’s objections did not challenge the recommended dismissal of the claims against 

Defendant Ward.

Case 5:20-cv-00171-TKW-MJF Document 49 Filed 03/18/21 Page 1 of 3
2

litigated and the party against whom issue preclusion is being applied in the current 

case, and here, those parties are one and the same, i.e., Plaintiff. Because the claims 

against Defendants Contini and Ward are barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, 

the Court need not address the magistrate judge’s alternative determination that the 

complaint fails to state a claim against those defendants; however, for what it’s

worth, that determination is consistent with the Order adopting the Report and 

Recommendation in the prior case (which Plaintiff did not appeal), which explicitly 

determined that the claims Plaintiff wanted to belatedly assert against Contini and 

Ward—which are substantively the same as the claims asserted against them in the 

current case—were “inadequate as a matter of law.”

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1. The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted and 

incorporated by reference in this order.

2. Defendants Contini and Ward’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is 

GRANTED, and the claims against those defendants are DISMISSED

with prejudice.

3. This case is recommitted to the magistrate judge for further proceedings 

with respect to the other defendants.

Case 5:20-cv-00171-TKW-MJF Document 49 Filed 03/18/21 Page 2 of 3
3

DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of March, 2021.

T. Kent Wetherell, II 

T. KENT WETHERELL, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 5:20-cv-00171-TKW-MJF Document 49 Filed 03/18/21 Page 3 of 3
Exhibit 32

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Material Sciences Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended August 31, 2010,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Clifford D. Nastas, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



October 7, 2010By:

/s/ Clifford D. NastasClifford D. NastasChief Executive Officer


In connection with the Report,
I, James D. Pawlak, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Controller and Corporate Secretary of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



October 7, 2010By:

/s/ James D. PawlakJames D. PawlakVice President, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Controller and Corporate Secretary




32
§ 5001.507 Lender transfer. ( a ) After the issuance of a loan note guarantee, a lender may sell or transfer the entire loan to a new lender with prior written approval of the Agency. The Agency may approve the sale or transfer to a new lender if the following conditions are met. The new lender: ( 1 ) Is an eligible lender in accordance with § 5001.130 of this part and is approved as such;
( 2 ) Is able to service the loan in accordance with the original loan documents;
( 3 ) Agrees in writing to acquire title to the unguaranteed portion of the loan held by the original Lender and assumes all original loan requirements, including liabilities and servicing responsibilities; and
( 4 ) The transfer to the new lender is requested in writing by the borrower, the proposed new lender, and the original lender of record, if still in existence.
( b ) Upon Agency approval, the original lender must transfer to the new lender the: ( 1 ) Original promissory note and loan security documents;
( 2 ) Original loan note guarantee;
( 3 ) Original personal and corporate guarantee(s);
( 4 ) Loan payment history; and ( v ) The new lender must agree to accept the current loan terms, including the interest rate, secondary market holder (if any), collateral, loan agreement terms, and guarantors. The new lender can modify the loan terms after acquisition only by submitting a written request to the Agency and receiving Agency approval.
( vi ) The new lender must certify to the Agency that the loan transfer has been completed in accordance with applicable laws and all provisions of the original loan remain in full force and effect.
( c ) The Agency will not pay any loss or share in any costs (*e.g.,* legal fees, appraisal fees and environmental assessments) for a voluntary transfer of lender. This includes situations where a lender is merged with or acquired by another lender and situations where the lender has failed and been taken over by a Federal regulatory agency such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the loan is subsequently sold to another lender. However, in situations where the lender has failed and been taken over by a Federal regulator and the loan is liquidated rather than being sold to another lender, the Agency will pay losses and share in costs as if the Federal regulatory agency were an approved new lender.
( d ) In cases when there is a transfer to a new lender or when a lender has been merged with or acquired by another Lender, the Agency and the new lender must execute a new lender's agreement, unless the new lender already has a valid lender's agreement with the Agency.
( e ) After Agency approval of a transfer of lender, all terms of the original loan note guarantee shall transfer to the benefit of the new lender.
OAO 247 (02/08) Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

United States of America )

)

)

)

)

)

v.

Wesley Mount Case No: 5:93cr5038-002/LAC

USM No: 03293-017

Date of Previous Judgment: 19 April 1994

(Use Date of Last Amended Judgment if Applicable) Defendant’s Attorney

Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

Upon motion of : the defendant 9 the Director of the Bureau of Prisons 9 the court under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) for a reduction in the term of imprisonment imposed based on a guideline sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered and made retroactive by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(u), and having considered such motion,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion is:

: DENIED. 9 GRANTED and the defendant’s previously imposed sentence of imprisonment (as reflected in 

the last judgment issued) of months is reduced to .

I. COURT DETERMINATION OF GUIDELINE RANGE (Prior to Any Departures)

Previous Offense Level: 36 Amended Offense Level: 34

Criminal History Category: III Criminal History Category: III

Previous Guideline Range: 235 to 293 months Amended Guideline Range: 188 to 235 months

II. SENTENCE RELATIVE TO AMENDED GUIDELINE RANGE

9 The reduced sentence is within the amended guideline range.

9 The previous term of imprisonment imposed was less than the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time

of sentencing as a result of a departure or Rule 35 reduction, and the reduced sentence is comparably less than the

amended guideline range.

9 Other (explain):

III. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

240 months remains the required mandatory minimum.

Except as provided above, all provisions of the judgment dated 19 April 1994 shall remain in effect.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Order Date: s/L.A. Collier 11 April 2008

Judge’s signature

Effective Date: Lacey Collier, Senior U.S. District Judge

(if different from order date) Printed name and title

Case 5:93-cr-05038-LC-MD Document 579 Filed 04/11/08 Page 1 of 1
#### § 3560.614 Reserve accounts.

When on-farm labor housing operations include 12 or more units, the Agency will require such properties to comply with the reserve account requirements in § 3560.65.
#### § 3560.567 Establishing the profit base on initial investment.

The requirements established under § 3560.68 apply to applicants eligible under § 3560.555(a)(2) and operating as a limited partnership with a nonprofit general partner.
#### § 29.1037 Nested.

Any lot of Types 11-14 tobacco which has been loaded, packed or arranged to conceal tobacco of inferior grade, quality or condition. Nested includes: (a) Any lot of tobacco which contains injured or other inferior tobacco, any of which cannot be readily detected upon inspection because of the way the lot is packed or arranged; (b) Any lot of tobacco which consists of distinctly different grades, qualities or conditions and which is stacked or arranged with the same kinds together so that the tobacco in the lower portions of the lot is distinctly inferior in grade, quality or condition from the tobacco in the top portion of the lot.

[52 FR 28534, July 31, 1987]
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-92,056-01

EX PARTE BRADLEY MICHAEL WHEELER, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 17586A IN THE 12TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM GRIMES COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possession with

intent to deliver a controlled substance and sentenced to imprisonment. He was later released to

parole.

While on parole, Applicant alleges that he was arrested in Bexar County for driving while

intoxicated, and he bonded out of the county jail. A parole revocation (a/k/a “blue”) warrant was

later executed, and Applicant was arrested and held in the Bexar County Jail on the blue warrant. 

According to Applicant, through habeas counsel, the new driving while intoxicated charges have
2

never been filed, and he is still being held in the county jail pursuant to the blue warrant but has not

received a parole revocation hearing, although he has repeatedly requested one. See TEX. GOV’T

CODE 508.282(a)(1)(A)-(B). 

Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. In these circumstances,

additional facts are needed. As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1960), the trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. In this case, the trial court

recommended that relief be denied, stating that Applicant should have filed his habeas application

in Bexar County, where Applicant is being held pursuant to the blue warrant. However, pursuant

to Article 11.07, section 3(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, an application for writ of

habeas corpus must be filed with the clerk of the court in which the conviction was obtained, and

the clerk shall assign the application to that court. Applicant’s conviction was obtained in the 12th

District Court of Grimes County, and his application was properly filed in that county.

The trial court shall order the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Office of the General

Counsel to file an affidavit addressing the issue of whether the Parole Board is timely providing

Applicant with a parole revocation hearing. The trial court shall make findings of fact and

conclusions of law as to Applicant’s claims, and the trial court may make any other findings of fact

and conclusions of law that it deems relevant.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time must
3

be requested by the trial court and shall be obtained from this Court.

Filed: December 16, 2020

Do not publish
Page 1 of 2

 

1 The pleading submitted for filing by Petitioner was entitled Motion for Certificate of Appealability

relating to the Report and Recommendation entered by the Magistrate Judge on March 11, 2005. The Court

has therefore construed the document as objections to the Report and Recommendation.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

BRYAN KEITH EDMONDSON,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No.: 5:03cv99/MCR/EMT

JAMES CROSBY, JR.,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

O R D E R

This habeas action was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On March 11, 2005, the

Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition with prejudice. (Doc. 32). No

objections having been, the Court on April 14, 2005, entered an Order adopting the Report

and Recommendation and dismissing the petition. (Doc. 33). On April 15, 2005, the Clerk

docketed objections filed by Petitioner,1 which objections reflect were submitted to prison

officials for mailing on April 11, 2005. (Doc. 35). Although Petitioner’s objections are

untimely, the Court vacates its Order of April 14, 2005, and enters the instant Order in its

stead. 

This cause having come on for consideration upon the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation dated March 11, 2005, and Petitioner’s having been furnished a

copy of the Report and Recommendation and been afforded an opportunity to file

objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), the Court has made

a de novo determination of Petitioner’s objections filed April 15, 2005. Having considered

the Report and Recommendation, and Petitioner’s objections thereto, the Court has

determined that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted.

Case 5:03-cv-00099-MCR-EMT Document 36 Filed 04/18/2005 Page 1 of 2

EDMONDSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA, et al Doc. 36

Dockets.Justia.com
Page 2 of 2

Case No. 5:03cv99/MCR/EMT

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. The Order dated April 14, 2005, is VACATED.

2. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and

INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE in the instant Order. 

3. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED with prejudice.

4. The Clerk shall re-enter judgment accordingly.

DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of April, 2005.

 s/ M. Casey Rodgers 

M. CASEY RODGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 5:03-cv-00099-MCR-EMT Document 36 Filed 04/18/2005 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

VERNE SKEETE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 5:20cv217-MW/MJF

STURGEON AQUAFARMS II LLC,

a Florida limited liability company,

Defendant.

_________________________/

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

INITIATE SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff moves to initiate supplemental proceedings. ECF No. 53. “Under 

Florida law, a party is entitled to proceedings supplementary if the party: (1) 

establishes that the party is the holder of an unsatisfied judgment; (2) identifies the 

issuing court and case number; (3) states the unsatisfied amount of the judgment; 

and (4) confirms that execution is valid and outstanding.” Estrada v. Sorrento 

Townhomes, LLC, 164 So. 3d 675, 676 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2013). 

Plaintiff does not hold an unsatisfied judgment. Instead, Plaintiff has rights

under the settlement agreement. “[A] settlement agreement is essentially a contract.” 

Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff agreed to drop his claims; Defendant agreed to pay. See Kokkonen v. 
2

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (stating, in addressing a 

settlement agreement, “[t]he short of the matter is this: The suit involves a claim for 

breach of a contract, part of the consideration for which was dismissal of an earlier 

federal suit.”).

Because Plaintiff does not hold an unsatisfied judgment, the motion to initiate 

supplemental proceedings is DENIED.

1 The Clerk is directed to close the file. 

SO ORDERED on November 8, 2021.

s/Mark E. Walker 

Chief United States District Judge

1 Plaintiff suggests that he seeks to assert personal liability against Mark Zaslavsky and 

Mark Gelman for misusing “the corporate structure.” ECF No. 53 at 12, 17. As this Court noted 

previously, “it is not this Court’s place to offer an advisory opinion on the merits of Plaintiff’s 

arguments.” ECF No. 52. This includes passing on whether Plaintiffs could assert personal liability 

against third parties through some other vehicle.
#### § 51.1237 Unclassified.

Unclassified shall consist of cleaned Virginia type peanuts in the shell which fail to meet the requirements of either of the foregoing grades. The term “unclassified” is not a grade within the meaning of these standards but is provided as a designation to show that no definite grade has been applied to the lot.
SCPW-20-0000427

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

 

NA#AU PONO

LIKO O KALANI MARTIN, Petitioner,

vs.

DAVID IGE, Governor of the State of Hawai#i and future occupants

of the Executive Branch of the State of Hawai#i, Respondent.

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.)

Upon consideration of petitioner’s “Petition for a Writ

of Prohibition & Justice”, filed on June 19, 2020, the documents

attached thereto and submitted in support thereof, and the

record, it appears that petitioner fails to demonstrate that

petitioner is entitled to the requested extraordinary relief from

this court or that petitioner lacks alternative means to seek

relief. See Honolulu Adv., Inc. v. Takao, 59 Haw. 237, 241, 580

P.2d 58, 62 (1978) (a writ of prohibition “is an extraordinary

remedy . . . to restrain a judge of an inferior court from acting

beyond or in excess of his jurisdiction”); Gannett Pac. Corp. v.

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCPW-20-0000427

24-JUN-2020

08:28 AM
Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 226, 580 P.2d 49, 53 (1978) (a writ of

prohibition is not meant to serve as a legal remedy in lieu of

normal appellate procedures; rather, it is available in “rare and

exigent circumstances” where “allow[ing] the matter to wend its

way through the appellate process would not be in the public

interest and would work upon the public irreparable harm”). 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of

prohibition is denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 24, 2020.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Richard W. Pollack

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

2
Case 3:20-cv-05503-RV-HTC Document 86 Filed 03/10/23 Page 1 of 1
#### § 29.93 When appeal may be refused.

If it shall appear that the reasons stated in an appeal are frivolous or unsubstantial or that the act or this subpart have not been complied with, the appeal may be denied or dismissed. When an appeal is denied or dismissed, the appeal inspector shall (a) notify the appellant by telegraph or in writing giving the reason for such denial or dismissal; (b) mail a copy of such notification to the Division; and (c) return or release to the appellant, or other person designated by him, any certificate or sample which was filed with the appeal. All expenses incurred in connection with an appeal prior to its refusal or dismissal shall be paid by the appellant, as provided in § 29.126.