alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of 103 Rest. Inc., Petitioner, v. New York State Liquor Authority, Respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul a determination of the State Liquor Authority, dated October 31, 1968, which revoked petitioner’s restaurant liquor license and made demand upon petitioner’s surety bond of $1,000, on the ground that petitioner had permitted trafficking in narcotics on the licensed premises. Determination modified, on the law, by annulling the revocation and the bond demand and substituting therefor a provision that the license be suspended for 30 days. As so modified, determination confirmed, without costs. In our opinion, the punishment imposed was excessive and should be reduced to a suspension of 30 days. Rabin, Acting P. J., Benjamin, Munder, Martuscello and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-11-0001021 16-JUN-2014 08:07 AM
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 99.7



CONTACTS:  Duane Kimble                           Ken Di Paola or Joel Pomerantz
           Baldwin Piano & Organ Company          The Dilenschneider Group
           (513) 754-4647                         (212) 922-0900


                         BALDWIN PIANO COMPLETES SALE OF
              CONTRACT ELECTRONICS DIVISION TO AYRSHIRE ELECTRONICS

                  SALE WILL REDUCE DEBT AND CREATE SINGLE FOCUS
                        ON BALDWIN'S CORE PIANO BUSINESS

       Mason, Ohio, January 29, 2001 -- Baldwin Piano & Organ Company (NASDAQ:
BPAO) today announced that it has completed the sale of its Contract Electronics
Division to Ayrshire Electronics, LLC for $9.7 million. Net of any near-term
transaction expenses, Baldwin expects to receive approximately $9.0 million,
which will be used to repay outstanding indebtedness.

       The company also expects to record a loss on the sale of approximately
$4.2 million, or $1.21 per share. The loss, which includes a revaluation of
certain raw material inventories of $800,000 after tax, or 23 cents per share,
will be reflected in the company's fourth quarter 2000 results for the year
ended December 31, 2000.

       Karen L. Hendricks, chairman, president, and chief executive officer of
Baldwin said, "The sale of Contract Electronics was the next step in our
multi-year plan to deleverage Baldwin's balance sheet and restore our core piano
business to profitability. This transaction returns Baldwin to its roots as a
piano manufacturer and marketer."

       The transaction includes the sale of all assets and liabilities related
to the Contract Electronics business with the exception of the company's
remaining land and building located in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Ayrshire has
agreed to lease the Fayetteville facility from Baldwin for a minimum period of 2
years.

                                     -more-
<PAGE>   2


                                       -2-


       Ayrshire Electronics, LLC is a newly formed entity with the express
purpose of acquiring Baldwin's Contract Electronics Division. The controlling
shareholder of Ayrshire Electronics is Milo D. Bryant, a Louisville businessman
who has controlling interests in several other companies including CDR
Manufacturing, Inc., another contract electronics company; Challenger Lifts,
Inc.; Ayrshire Resources, LLC; and Bryant Books, LLC.

       Baldwin Piano & Organ Company, the maker of America's best selling
pianos, has marketed keyboard musical products for over 140 years.

                                      # # #

"Safe Harbor" statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: This release contains forward-looking statements that are subject to risks
and uncertainties, including, but not limited to, the impact of competitive
products and pricing, product demand and market acceptance, reliance on key
strategic alliances, fluctuations in operating results and other risks detailed
from time to time in the company's filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Case 4:99-cv-00317-RH Document 194 Filed 08/04/00 Page 1 of 1
#### §§ 4284.1121-4284.1130 [Reserved]
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-19-00017-CR

John Ray THATCHER,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR0442

Honorable Jefferson Moore, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE WATKINS, AND JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. 

SIGNED February 13, 2019.

_________________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 228 (Monday, November 29, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 73157]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-29872]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 7247]


The Designation of Falah-i-Insaniat (and Other Aliases) as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Section 1(b) of 
Executive Order 13224, as Amended

    Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) 
of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive 
Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 2003, 
and Executive Order 13372 of February 16, 2005, I hereby determine that 
the organization known as Falah-i-Insaniat (and other aliases) has 
committed, or poses a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism 
that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, 
foreign policy, or economy of the United States.
    Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order 
13224 that ``for those persons * * * determined to be subject to the 
order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States * * 
* prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this 
order would render these measures ineffectual,'' I determine that no 
prior notice needs to be provided to any person subject to this 
determination who might have a constitutional presence in the United 
States, because to do so would render ineffectual the measures 
authorized in the Order.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register.

    Dated: September 28, 2010.
Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2010-29872 Filed 11-26-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-10-P
#### In the Matter of the Claim of James Marquis, Appellant, v Frank’s Vacuum Truck Service, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[814 NYS2d 363]

Peters, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed February 20, 2004, which ruled that claimant did not sustain a causally related injury and denied his claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

Claimant, a truck driver, made an application for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of a gunshot injury that he suffered to his left knee when he was attacked by several men upon leaving a restaurant where he had just taken a lunch break. The Workers’ Compensation Board denied his claim, finding that the injury-causing incident occurred at a time when he had substantially deviated from his employment. This appeal by claimant ensued, and we now affirm.

An injury is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law if it arises out of and in the course of the claimant’s employment, whereas purely personal activities are deemed outside the scope of employment and not compensable *(see*Workers’ Compensation Law § 10; *Matter of Pedro v Village of Endicott,*307 AD2d 598, 599 [2003], *lv dismissed*1 NY3d 546 [2003], *lv denied*2 NY3d 706 [2004]; *Matter of Bigley v J & R Music Elecs.,*269 AD2d 667, 667 [2000]). The determination as to which of *1039the two aforementioned categories an injury falls into is a factual one left for resolution by the Board *(see Matter of Pedro v Village of Endicott, supra*at 599; *Matter of Cruz v Karl Ehmer, Inc.,*282 AD2d 841, 842 [2001]).

Here, substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that claimant had deviated from the scope of his employment and, therefore, was not entitled to receive benefits. Approximately IV2 years prior to this incident, claimant had been questioned by the police and had his truck impounded as a result of his alleged solicitation of a prostitute in the particular area where the attack herein occurred. Consequently, he had been warned by the employer to never again return to that area while working. As noted by the Board, claimant’s contrary assertion that the employer had not restricted him from returning to that area is belied by his actions following the attack. Instead of immediately contacting the police and/or seeking medical attention, claimant got into his truck and drove several blocks away to a truck stop and, even then, initially attempted to dissuade some bystanders from calling the police. Such a reaction by claimant lends credence to the Board’s determination that he was in a prohibited area when he sustained his injury. In addition, record evidence establishes that claimant strayed from a slightly shorter and more commonly used route of travel in order to get to the area where the incident transpired. Based upon all of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s decision that claimant had deviated from his employment.

Each of the remaining contentions raised by claimant in his pro se brief have been examined and found to be without merit.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Spain and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
160 So.2d 230

#### David J. SMITH v. John P. WHITTINGTON, Marquette Casualty Company and Hanover Insurance Company.

No. 47123.

Feb. 14, 1964.

In re: David J. Smith applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish' of Caddo. 159 So.2d 327.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal there is no error of law in its judgment.
**Exhibit 99.3**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

 

In connection with thequarterly report of SurgiCare, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for theperiod ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert Horn, Chief Financial Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of myknowledge:

 

(1) The Report fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

 

(2) The information containedin the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 

/s/ DAVID BLUMFIELD

David Blumfield, Co-CEOAugust 13, 2002

 

----
Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

JOE HENRY SCOTT, III,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:19cv3753-RV/HTC

JOHN BROWN FINDLAY, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

O R D E R

This cause comes on for consideration upon the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation dated November 5, 2019. (Doc. 5). The parties were provided 

a copy of the Report and Recommendation and were afforded an opportunity to file 

objections pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). No objections 

have been filed.

Having considered the Report and Recommendation, I conclude that the 

Report and Recommendation should be adopted.
Page 2 of 2

Case No.: 3:19cv3753-RV/HTC

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 5) is 

adopted and incorporated by reference in this Order.

2. Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted

3. The clerk is directed to close this case file.

DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Roger Vinson 

ROGER VINSON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
**EXHIBIT 99.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of TransMontaigne Inc.(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Donald H. Anderson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifypursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge: 

|   | (1)    |   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                |
|--------|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |   |
|   | (2)    |   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

|                                                                                                                                                                                          |   |   |   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| /S/ DONALD H. ANDERSON                                                                                                                                                                   |   |   |        |
| **Donald H. Anderson****President, Chief Executive, Chief****       Operating Officer and ViceChairman****November 14, 2002**     |
EXECUTION COPY

 

**AGREEMENT FOR TRANSFER AND EXCHANGE**

AGREEMENT FOR TRANSFER AND EXCHANGE (“**Agreement**”), dated as of September 12, 2008, between TERRESTAR CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation (“**TerreStar**”) and SKYTERRA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation (“**SkyTerra**” and, together with TerreStar, the “**Parties**”).

**RECITALS**

**WHEREAS**, Motient Ventures Holding Inc. (“**MVH**”), a Delaware corporation and indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of TerreStar, owns 29,926,074 shares (the “**SkyTerra Shares**”) of non-voting common stock, par value $0.01 per share, of SkyTerra;

**WHEREAS,** pursuant to an Exchange Agreement among TerreStar, MVH and SkyTerra, dated as of May 6, 2006(the “**Exchange Agreement**”), TerreStar is obligated to use its commercially reasonable efforts to distribute the SkyTerra Shares to the holders of TerreStar’s common stock;

**WHEREAS**, MSV Investors, LLC (“**MSV Investors**”), a Delaware limited liability company and indirect wholly owned subsidiary of SkyTerra, owns 4,216,270 shares (the “**Networks Shares**”) of common stock, par value $0.001 per share of TerreStar Networks, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“**Networks**”);

**WHEREAS**, MSV Investors Holdings, Inc. (“**MSVIH**”), a Delaware corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of SkyTerra, owns 3,136,428****shares (the “**TGL Shares**”) of common stock, par value $0.01 per share, of TerreStar Global Ltd., a Bermuda corporation (“**TGL**”);

**WHEREAS**, pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stockholders Agreement of Networks, dated as of May 6, 2006 (the “**Stockholders Agreement**”), the ability of MSV Investors to sell or otherwise transfer the Networks Shares is limited;

**WHEREAS**,****TerreStar desires that MVH be permitted and enabled to sell or otherwise Transfer the SkyTerra Shares, and SkyTerra desires that MSV Investors be permitted and enabled to sell or otherwise Transfer the Networks Shares and that the transferees thereof have the right, but not the obligation, to exchange Networks Shares for shares of common stock of TerreStar; and

**WHEREAS**, TerreStar desires to acquire from MSVIH the TGL Shares.

**NOW THEREFORE**, in consideration of the foregoing and the mutual covenants and agreements herein contained, and intending to be legally bound hereby, the Parties agree as follows:

**ARTICLE I.**

**DEFINITIONS**

|   | Section 1.1 | Certain Defined Terms.  For purposes of this Agreement: |
|--------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|

 

----
2006-0708.

#### Nitz v. Wolfe.

In Habeas Corpus. On petition for writ of habeas corpus of Richard Nitz. Sua sponte, cause dismissed.

Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, O’Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
March 28, 2009 Exhibit 10.44




Exhibit 10.44


RELEASE OF CLAIMS AND VESTING AGREEMENT

I agree that the goodwill payment, as calculated in the letter to which this Exhibit A is attached (the
"Goodwill Payment"), to be made by Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. ("Maxim") is full and complete satisfaction
for the expiration and termination of my vested stock option(s) to purchase shares of common stock of Maxim identified below (the
"Option").  


Vesting Requirement

I agree that the Goodwill Payment will vest as follows:  




	1/6 of the Goodwill Payment will vest on August 15, 2009, 
	1/6 of the Goodwill Payment will vest on November 15, 2009, 
	1/6 of the Goodwill Payment will vest on February 15, 2010, 
	1/6 of the Goodwill Payment will vest on May 15, 2010, 
	1/6 of the Goodwill Payment will vest on August 15, 2010, 
	1/6 of the Goodwill Payment will vest on November 15, 2010,





subject to my continued employment at Maxim on each applicable vesting date.  


Release of Claims

By signing below, I irrevocably, unconditionally and completely release, acquit and forever discharge each of the Releasees (as defined
below) from any Claim (as defined below), and irrevocably, unconditionally and completely waive and relinquish each and every Claim
that I may have had in the past, may now have or may have in the future against any of the Releasees, relating to any written or oral
agreements or arrangements relating to the Option.  For this purpose, the term "Releasees" means: (i) Maxim, (ii) each
affiliate of Maxim, and (iii) the successors and past, present and future assigns, directors, officers, agents, attorneys and
representatives of the respective entities identified or otherwise referred to in the foregoing clauses (i) and (ii); and the term
"Claim" means all past, present and future disputes, claims, controversies, demands, rights, obligations, liabilities, actions
and causes of action of every kind and nature, including, without limitation, (x) any unknown, unsuspected or undisclosed claim,
and (y) any claim or right that may be asserted or exercised by me in my capacity as a stockholder, director, officer or employee of
Maxim or in any other capacity.

I hereby expressly waive the provisions of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code regarding the waiver of unknown claims,
which provides as follows:
"A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO
EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE MATERIALLY
AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR."




AGREED:


	
_______________________________

Signature
	
 
	
_______________________________

Option Number(s)
	
 

	
_______________________________

Name (Please print)
	
 
	
_______________________________

  Date and Time
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JOEY ARNEZ DONALDSON,

D.O.C. # 372350,

Plaintiff,

v. 4:20cv76–WS/MAF

OFFICER HAWKINS and

OFFICER BENNETT,

Defendants.

 

ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

FOURTH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is the magistrate judge's fourth report and recommendation

(ECF No. 109) docketed August 9, 2022. The magistrate judge recommends that

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 106) be granted. Plaintiff did

not file a response to Defendants’ motion, nor has he filed any objections to the

report and recommendation.

Having considered the record, the court finds that the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation is due to be adopted.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Case 4:20-cv-00076-WS-MAF Document 110 Filed 09/08/22 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

1. The magistrate judge's fourth report and recommendation (ECF No. 109)

is hereby ADOPTED and incorporated by reference into this order.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 106) is GRANTED. 

3. The clerk shall enter judgment stating: “All claims are dismissed with

prejudice.”

DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of September , 2022.

s/ William Stafford 

WILLIAM STAFFORD

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 4:20-cv-00076-WS-MAF Document 110 Filed 09/08/22 Page 2 of 2
160 So.2d 225

#### Simon GARY v. FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK.

No. 47083.

Feb. 7, 1964.

In re: Simon Gary applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Iberia. 158 So.2d 866.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Court of Appeal there appears no error of law in its judgment.
#### In the Matter of Alfred Berg, Appellant-Respondent, v George S. Gerber, as Supervisor of the Town of Clarkstown, et al., Respondents-Appellants.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to compel the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of Town Engineer of the Town of Clarkstown, the parties cross-appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, dated November 23,1979, which, after a nonjury trial, denied petitioner reinstatement but directed that he be paid his salary for the calendar year 1977, less any moneys he may have received through other employment, unemployment benefits, etc. Judgment reversed, on the law and on the facts, without costs or disbursements, and proceeding dismissed on the merits. It was error for the trial court to award petitioner salary for one year while at the same time finding that he had no right to reinstatement as a permanent civil service employee, which he claimed to be. This matter was once before presented to us and at that time we directed that a hearing be held to clarify the nature of petitioner’s appointment *(Matter of Berg v Gerber,*59 AD2d 906). It is clear, now that such hearing has been held, that petitioner was appointed pursuant to sections 20 and 24 of the Town Law for the term of years therein prescribed. Since he was not reappointed when his initial term expired, he served thereafter at the will of the respondents-appellants pursuant to section 5 of the Public Officers Law, without the protections accorded by section 75 of the Civil Service Law. There has been no proof offered that his appointment was intended to be otherwise or that any change in the manner or import of the appointment was adopted by resolution of the town board. Furthermore, it is doubtful that had such a resolution been adopted, it could have legally altered the term for this office prescribed by the Town Law (see *Matter of Sullivan v Taylor,*279 NY 364, 369-370; cf. Municipal Home Rule Law, § 10, subd 1, par [ii], cl a, subcl [1]; and cl d, subcl [3] [we note the latter subclause was adopted subsequent to petitioner’s appointment and, therefore, has no bearing on this case]). While it is true that the petitioner’s name was specifically listed in a collective bargaining agreement which was to be in effect until December 31, 1977, one year beyond his termination date, the trial court erred in holding that he had a right to believe that his employment would be continued to such date. The agreement herein speaks of the conditions of employment and not of employment itself. It was merely a fact recited therein that petitioner occupied his position at the time the agreement was drawn and signed. No greater significance may be given to this fact and such agreement could not alter the petitioner’s statutory term of office (see *Matter of Hansell v City of Long Beach,*61 AD2d 84, 89). Accordingly, the award of salary for 1977 was improper. Titone, J. P., Gibbons, Margett and O’Connor, JJ., concur.