,. 
In the wake of joint and combined operations in Panama and the Middle 

East, U.S. Special Operations Forces @OF) received accolades from their commanders, the media, and the public. Given the missions SOF performed in 

()perutions Just Cause and Desert Storm, this praise was earned. 

In the past, however, special operations have not always been viewed so 

positively. Prior to the early l%Xls-when President John F. Kennedy expanded 

U.S. Special Forces and made counterinsurgency the cornerstone of his Flexible 

Response doctrine-the lot of special operations soldiers was far from satisfactory. 

Few in number, they were criticized as elitist and were considered suitable only 

for behind-the-lines oporations in a major East-West conflict. 

Little has been written about the missions and activities of special forces 

in the lS!jOs and even less abaut their predecessors in World War II. The Jedburghs were one such group, dropped in three-man teams in France during 1944 

to sssist the Allied advance from behind German lines. Dr. S. J. Lewis’ study 

on the activities of a number of Jedburgh teams operating in northern France 

during the last year of the war addresses this often-overlooked aspect of the 

war in Europe. This study should udvnnce the understanding of Special Operations b’orces on the part of military professionals and civilians alike and stimulate further inquiries into a topic still shrouded in mystery and misunderstanding. 

October 1991 ROGER J. SPILLER 

IXrector 

Combat Studies Institute 

CSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed 

herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the I.)epartment of 

the Army or the Department of Defense. 
Jedburgh Team Operations 

in Support of the 

12th Army Group, 

August 1944 ‘. 

bY 

S. J. Lewis 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Lewis, S. J. 

Jedburgh team operations in support of the 12th Army Group, 

August 1944 / by S.J. Lewis. 

P. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references (p. ). 

I. World War, 1939-1945-Commando operations. 2. United 

States. Office of Strategic Services-History. 3. Subversive 

activities-France-Normandy. 4. Normandy (France)-History. 

5. United States. Army. Army Group, lath-History. 6. World 

War, 1939-1946-Campaigns-Normandy. I. Title. 

D794.5.L49 1991 

940.64’21-dc20 91-26878 

CIP 
Jedburgh feam Operations 

.-.~---. --. - 

CONTENTS 

Illustrations ............................................... ..vi i 

Preface .................................................... ..i x 

Introduction ................................................. 1 

The Opktional Situation, 15 August 1944 .................. 16 

German Rear-Area Administration and Security ........... .18 

Team Jacob, 12 August 1944 ............................... ,20 

Team Aubrey, 12 August 1944 .............................. 22 

Team Augustus, 15 August 1944 ........................... -26 

Team Andrew, 15 August 1944 ............................. .29 

Teams Benjamin and Bernard, 20 August 1944 ............ .33 

Team Alfred, 24 August 1944 ............................... 39 

Team Arnold, 24 August 1944 ............................... 43 

Team Archibald, 25 August 1944 ........................... .47 

Team Stanley, 31 August 1944 .............................. 51 

Team Rupert-Philip, 31 August 1944 ....................... .54 

Conclusions ............................................... ..5 9 

Appendix A. Air-Dropped Supplies to Occupied France, 

October 1943-September 1944 ................ ,67 

Appendix B. Summary of Jedburgh Team Operations ....... 69 

Notes ....................................................... 71 

Glossary .................................................... 79 

Bibliography ................................................ 81 

V 
ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figures 

1. Communications channels for SFHQ . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 8 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

Maps 

Jedburgh teams in France, June-September 1944 , , . . . . x 

Jedburgh teams deployed to northern France . , , . . . . . . . . 2 

Team Aubrey’s area of operations in the Seineet-Marne . . , . . , , , . , . . . . . , . , . , , . . , . . . :. , , . . . . , . . , . . . . . . . . 23 

Team Augustus’ area of operations in the Aisne 

Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...27 

Team Andrew’s area of operations in the Ardennes . . . . 32 

Teams Benjamin and Bernard’s area of operations 

in the Meuse-Argonne . . . . ..l...*.....I.I.....*..*.**... 35 

Team Alfred’s area of operations in the Oise River 

valley ,....,,.....,.,..,,,......,....,,...,..,.......... 41 

Team Arnold’s area of operations in the Marne 

Department . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,..,,.,.....,..,,........ 44 

Team Archibald’s area of operations near Nancy . . . . . . 49 

Team Stanley’s area of operations in the HauteMarne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...52 

Team Rupert-Philip’s area of operations in the 

Meurthe-et-Moselle . . . . . , , . . , , , , . . . . . . . . . , q , , , , , , . , , . , . . . 56 

Team Rupert-Philip’s area of operations (additional) 

in the Meurthe-et-Moselle , , . . . . , , . . . . . , . . , , , . , , , . . . . . . , . 58 

vii 
‘f 

‘i 

I 

! 

‘1 

L 

: 

‘ 

I would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank those 

who generausly assisted in this effort: the archivists of the 

Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv; the Patton family and the staff of 

the Library of Congress Manuscript Division for permission to 

use and cite the diary of General George S. Patton, Jr.; Dr. 

Richard Sommers of the U.S. Army Military History Institute 

for providing access to the diary of General Hobart R. Gay; 

John Taylor and Will Mahonney of the National Archives for 

their usual speed and efficiency in assisting with the OS9 records; and Robin Cookson, Rat Yeager, Major John Diviney, 

Major Terry Griswold, Dr. Timothy Nenninger, and Dr. Lawrence 

Yates for their helpful advice. I would especially like to thank 

former members of the OSS and Jedburghs who took their valuable time and effort to assist in this effort, particularly Mrs. 

Daphne Friele, without whom this study would not have been 

possible. 

This study was made possible by financial support from the 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command. 

xi 
PREFACE 

In the summer of 1944, Allied special operations teams known 

as Jedburghs parachuted into occupied Europe to cooperate with 

resistance groups behind German lines and to aid in the advance 

of Allied ground forces. Each of the ninety-nine Jedburgh teams 

consisted of three specially trained volunteers. Clandestine 

operations of the kind that the Jedburghs conducted often have 

been recounted in memoirs and novels, but only a portion of 

the actual operational records have been declassified. The Jeds, 

as they called themselves, were but one group charged with 

clandestine work. Individual agents, inter-Allied missions, Special 

Air Service (SAS) troops, and other such organizations will only 

be included in this study when they specifically influenced Jedburgh operations. 

This study examines the aperations of the eleven Jedburgh 

teams dropped into northern France during the summer of 1944, 

with particular emphasis on the degree to which they assisted 

in the advance of the 12th Army Group from Normandy to the 

German border. The treatment of these Jedburgh teams will be 

arranged chronologically, by date of insertion. The area of operations covered by these teams reached from the Belgian border 

in the north, south to Nancy. Jedburgh operations south of 

Nancy lie beyond the scope of this study. The operational records 

of the eleven northern teams form the core of the documentation 

for this study, although a good deal of the story told here has 

been gleaned from other sources, memoirs and interviews with 

Jedburgh veterans (see map I). Regrettably, the records of the 

Special Forces Headquarters (SFMQ), the organization with 

General Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedit.ionary Forces (SHAEF), that provided operational command 

and cantrol for Jedburgh teams, remain classified and, therefore, 

were not available for use in this study. 

I have resolved to follow M. R. D. Foot’s example and capitalize the names of intelligence circuits to assist the reader amid 

the sea of names and cade names used to protect these operations. The name of each individual in the text is the individual’s 

real name (as well as that can be determined). The nom de 

guerre of each French Jedburgh will be mentioned in the appropriate footnote. I have adopted the word “Axis” as a generic term 

for the German-dominated security forces. In some instances, 

these rear-area defense forces were not German, but Vichy security forces, such as the &Wee. 

ix 
I -1 

_ _ I 

MINAIIET. 

Map 1. Jedburgh teams in France, June-September 1944 

X 
The sun was setting on 7 July 1944 at Harrington Air Base 

some fifty miles north of London. Captain Bill Dreux, a thirtyone year old lawyer from New Orleans, like his two partners, 

was weighted down by a .$ficaliber pistol, carbine, ammo, binoculars, money belt, escape kit, flashlight, tobacco, and map 

case and could barely move. Over all this equipment, each man 

wore a camouflaged body-length smock. Dreux felt wrapped like 

a mummy and had trouble getting out of the station wagon. 

Finally, after the driver had assisted each out of the vehicle, 

the three tightly wrapped men waddled slowly in short, jerky 

steps toward a black-painted B-24 Liberator. The absurdity of 

the situation was not lost an the bomber’s U.S. Army Air Corps 

crew, who succumbed to laughter. After a last cigarette, Bill 

Dreux, his partners, and the crew scaled the B-24 and took off 

for Brittany. Dreux and his two colleagues were Jedburghs.1 

Jedburghs were volunteers specially trained to conduct suerrilla warfare in conjunction with the French Resistance in support of the Allied invasion of France. Bill Dreux and his two 

partners survived their mission Their story has already been 

told, however, and with some skill, in one of the few published 

Jedburgh memoirs. This paper will examine the role of the eleven 

Jedburgh teams parachuted into northern France in the summer 

of 1944 whose story has not been told (see map 2). These eleven 

teams, like Dreux’s, worked mostly with French teenagers and 

the few Frenchmen not drafted into German labor organizations 

or prisoners of war in Germany. Many Jedburgh teams had 

difficulty radiaing London, and some that did contact London 

doubted that their reports were acted upon. After the Jedburgh 

operations in France concluded, the teams’ after-action reports 

reflected a sense, not of failure, but rather of frustration. The 

teams felt they could have been used more effectively. The major 

reason for this frustration was a professional officer corps 

unfamiliar with the capabilities of unconventional warfare and 

the multiplicity of s’ecret organizations (several of them new) 

competing for recognition, personnel, funds, and missions. 

Following the fall of fiance, in July 1940, the Chamberlain 

cabinet, in one af its last acts, created the Special Operations 

Executive (SOE). Independent of other British intelligence services, its charter was suitably unique: to foster sabotage activity 

in Axis-occupied countries. Two offices in the War Office and 

one in the Foreign Office had been studying the subject since 

1 
2 
1938, and they combined to form SOE.2 Although SOE ran 

intelhgence circuits, it was independent of the Secret (or Special) 

Intelligence Service @IS), which today is known as MI 6.3 In 

similar fashion, the Special Air Service Regiment remained 

independent of SOE and SIS. David Stirling, who created the 

SAS in 1941, summarized his organization’s purpose as follows: 

. . . firstly, raids in depth behind the enemy lines, attacking HQ 

nerve centres, landing grounds, supply l.ines and so on; and, 

secondly, the mounting of sustained strategic offensive activity from 

secret bases within hostile territory and, if the opportunity existed, 

recruiting, training, arming and coordinating local guerrilla 

elements4 

The United States approached World War II without a strategic intelligence organization. It first created the Coemmittee of 

Information, a conspicuous failure that soon became the Office 

of Strategic Services (OSS). Its director, William (“Wild Bill”) 

Donovan, allowed it to duplicate the functions and methods of 

the British intelligence organizations, to which it was closely 

tied. But whereas the British effort was marked by independent 

competing organs, Donovan attempted to unify the many facets 

of the secret world in his neophyte OSS. Following September 

1942, the OSS special operations branch jained the SOE London 

Group to create a combined office known as SOE/SO on Baker 

Street in London.5 

S0E”s first director, Dr. Hugh Dalton, explained his organizations purpose as follows: 

We have got to organize movements in enemy-occupied territory 

comparable to the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland, to the Chinese 

Guerillas now operating against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars 

who played a notable part in Wellington’s campaign or-one might 

as well admit it-to the organizations which the nazis themselves 

have developed so remarkably in almost every country in the wodd. 

This ‘“democratic international” must use many different methods, 

including industrial: and military sabotage, labour agitation and 

strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and 

German leaders, boycotts and riots.6 

One of the most important personalities in SOE was Sir 

Colin McV. Gubbins, who eventually became its executive director. Born in Japan in 1896, Gubbins was a slight Scot who 

had served in the artillery on the Western Front in World ‘War I, 

in Ireland during “the Troubles,” and in northern Russia during 

the Russian Civil War. In 1939, in the War Office’s small 

unconventional war section, he wrote twa short pamphlets: “The 

Art of Guerilla Warfare” and “Partisan Leaders’ Handbook.“’ 
4 

He created the “Independent Companies” (later renamed commandos) and successfully led several of them in Norway in 1940. 

May 1942 found him a brigadier general with the title of military deputy to head of SOE.7 

In May 1942, SOE entered into talks involving its support 

of a future Allied invasion of northwestern Europe. The British 

Chiefs of Staff foresaw SOE activity occurring in two phases. 

In the first phase (cooperation during the initial invasion), SOE 

would organize and arm resistance forces and “take action 

against the enemy’s rail and signal communications, air personnel, etc.“8 During the second phase, after the landing, SOE would 

provide guides for British conventional units, guards for important locations, labor parties, and organized “raiding parties 

capable of penetrating behind German lines.“9 

. 

Brigadier Gubbins and SOE developed the Jedburgh concept 

from these discussions with one paper, drafted by Peter 

Wilkinson, summarizing its activities as follows: 

As and when the invasion commences, SOE will drop additional 

small teams of French speaking personnel carrying arms for some 

forty men each. The role of these teams will be to make contact 

with local authorities or existing SOE organizations, to distribute 

the arms, to start off the action of the patriots, and, most particularly, to arrange by W/T [wireless telegraphy] communication the 

dropping points and reception committees for further arms and 

equipment on the normal SOE system. Each Team will consist of 

one British Officer, one W/T operator with set and possibly one 

guide.‘” 

On 6 July, Gubbins (recently promoted to major general) 

briefly explained the project to the head of the SOE security 

section, requesting a code name for teams “to raise and arm 

the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against 

the enemy’s lines of communication.“ll The following day, the 

security section issued the project the code name “Jedburgh,” 

after a small town on the Scats-English border.12 

The Jedburgh project evolved along with the changing Allied 

invasion plans of the Continent. Later in the month, SOE resolved that seventy Jedburgh teams would be required, with the 

British and Americans each providing thirty-five. In August 

1942, the British Chiefs of Staff informed SOE that there was 

no longer a requirement for Jedburgh teams to provide guides 

and labor or raiding parties, effectively eliminating phase two 

of the original proposal. On 24 December 1942, a meeting at 

General Headquarters, Home Forces, determined that Jedburghs 
Lt. Cd. Henry C. Cox, Jr., and Lt. Cal. Carltern Smith, R.A., Jedburgh heads at 

Baker Street 

would al be uniformed soldiers and that one of the two officers 

in each team should be of the nationality of the country to 

which the team would deploy. This signified that the project 

would require Belgian, Dutch, and French soldiers. Furthermore, 

Jedburgh teams would be dropped to secure areas, where SOE 

agents would receive them. Each team would be given one or 

more military tasks to perform in their area. In addition, since 

it would take at least seventy-two hours to deploy a team and 

have them operational, Jedburgh teams would not be used to 

assist the tactical plans of conventional ground forces. Finally, 

SOE would provide twelve Jedburgh teams to further examine 

the concept’s possibilities and limitations during Exercise Spartan 

from 3-11 March 1943.13 

Exercise Spartan simulated an Allied breakout from the initial invasion lodgement area. SQE’s Jedburgh teams attempted 

ta assist the British Secand Army advance, with the 8th Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers in the role of local resistance 

groups. SOE also used this opportunity to test the insertion of 

individual agents behind enemy lines and the role of SOE staff 

officers at army and corps headquarters. Each of these parties 

communicated via an, SOE radio base in Scotland. Following 

the exercise, SOE concluded that Jedburgh teams should be 

inserted at least forty miles behind enemy lines to conduct 
6 

small-scale guerrilla operations against enemy lines of communication. The exercise also demonstrated that each army and 

army group headquarters required an SOE liaison and signals 

detachment. SOE also concluded that it should maintain a small 

detachment with the Supreme Headquarters.l* 

SOE and OSS, after compiling the Spartan lessons learned, 

both began the process of moving similar position papers through 

the British and American hierarchies, seeking approval, support, 

and personnel. On 19 July 1943, Lieutenant General Frederick 

R. Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, 

recommended that the SOE proposals be approved. To his 

understanding, SOE, would provide small staffs and signal detachments to each army and army group headquarters (and the 

Supreme Allied Commander’s headquarters) ‘(for controlling 

resistance groups.“15 Jedburgh teams would constitute a strategic 

reserve in England until D Day “to provide, if necessary, suitable 

leadership and equipment for those resistance groups found to 

be in need of them.“16 Two days later, the British Chiefs of 

Staff approved the SOE proposal, with the Americans following 

suit on 24 August 1943. By October, SOE and OSS each agreed 

to provide sufficient personnel to field 35 Jedburgh teams plus 

15 reserve teams-a total of 300 men in 100 teams.17 

SHAEF created a special forces (SF) detachment for each 

army and army group headquarters to coordinate these operations with the field army. These detachments linked the field 

headquarters with SOE/SO. Each detachment fielded about 

twelve officers and twenty men. The senior OSS officer with 

the U.S. Third Army described the organization as follows: “The 

SF Detachment was an orthodox military staff organized to 

provide the Commanding General of the Army a direct means 

to exercise control over the organized resistance elements and 

to use these elements in connection with military operations.“18 

The detachments, however, had no means of directly contacting 

those organized resistance groups and Jedburgh teams other than 

through SOE/SO. That organization summarized agent and 

resistance group reports and dispatched those summaries to the 

SF detachments.‘” 

To integrate this effort with the Allied invasion of France, 

SOE/SO on 1 May 1944 became the Special Forces Headquarters 

responsible to SHAEF’s G3 Branch. Although SOE had several 

sections running circuits in France, the most important were 

RF Section (circuits supporting General Charles de Gaulle) and 

F Section (which operated non-Gaullist circuits). De Gaulle’s 
7 

government in exile still remained at arm’s length, but on 

occasion, its intelligence branch, Bureau C&n&al de Renseignements et I’&%ion (BCRA), cooperated with SOESO. One such 

occasion was a 25 January 1944 London meeting to discuss the 

reception of Jedburgh teams in France. WE, OSS, and the 

BCRA agreed to finance a mission for BCRA and F Section to 

establish reception committees and safe houses for Jedburgh 

teams. Through herculean efforts, de Gaulle’s government 

managed to largely unify the many diverse French resistance 

groups, in March 1944 announcing the creation of the Farces 

Francakes de l’Int6riezbr (FFI). The FFI included the Communist 

Franc Tireurs eC Partisans (FTP-French leftist resistance organization}, the largest and most active resistance organization. 

It remained difficult, however, for the many diverse French resistance organizations to cooperate without considering postwar 

political dilemmas.20 

In JuIy X944, SHAEF directed de Gaulle’s subordinate and 

personal friend, Pierre Koenig,21 commander of the FFI, to 

gradually assume command over SFHQ operations in France. 

The transfer did not occur until 21 August. In any case, this 

was largely a political and cosmetic measure, because Kaenig’s 

deputies from SOE and OSS maintained the mechanisms of command, communication, and supply (see figure I).22 Most of the 

eleven Jedburgh teams examined here operated in eastern 

France, known as Region C to the FFI, commanded by District 

Military Representative “Planete.” Region C! consisted of the 

Ardennes, Marne, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Vosges, Bas-Rhin, 

and Haute-Rhin Departments. This had been a difficult area in 

which to operate from the beginning, but in August 1944, it 

became even more difficult, as the Vichy police, the A&ice, and 

its supporters fled east with the remnants of the defeated 

German Army.23 

In mid-September 1943, with the Allied invasion of France 

just around the corner, no Jedburgh force existed. Over the next 

three months, SOE and OSS each recruited officers and non 

commissioned officers (NC&) with French language skills-all 

volunteers. The NCOs would serve as radio operators, the officers 

as either Jedburghs or staff officers of the SF detachments. Little 

is known of the SOE selection process, but the OSS qualifications for Jedburgh officers were as follows: 

Officers recruited as leaders atid seeconds in command should be 

picked for qualities of leadership and daring, ability to speak and 

understand French, and all-around physical condition. They should 
8 

SPECIAL FORCES 

DETACHMENT 

Figure 1. Communications channels for SFHQ 

be experienced in handling men, preferably in an active theater of 

operations, and be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind 

enemy lines and operate on their own for some time. They must 

have had at least basic military training and preferably have 

aptitude for small arms weapons.24 

Qualifications for the NC0 radio operators were less stringent, 

requiring only a working knowledge of French and the ability 

to attain a speed of fifteen words per minute before leaving the 

United States. They, too, had to be in top physical condition. It 

would appear that the screening procedures were quite rigorous: 

of the fifty-five officers selected for further Jedburgh training 

in Great Britain, only thirty-five became Jedburghs. This signified that the OSS was forced to secure additional volunteers 

from U.S. Army units in Great Britain. Several of those volunteers did not join their colleagues until February, a good month 

after basic training had already begun.25 

Although SOE and OSS were theoretically coequals in 

SOE/SO (and later in SFHQ), SOE remained dominant. SOE 

provided the training sites and most of the instructors. The 

American volunteers arrived in Great Britain in late December 

1943, with the officers spending two weeks going through 

psychological tests near Peterfield, south of London. The officers 

then split into three groups and rotated through the Special 
9 

Jedbwgh sergeants practicing radiotelegraphy 

Men participating in physical training, rear entrawe of Milton Hafl 
Audience in a demolition class: first row left to right-Sgt. Jock Lindsay, Sgt. Ken 

Seymour (Br., Team Jacob), and Capt. Hugo Hood (Br.); second row center-Capt. 

Giles Mounoury (“Bourriot” of Team Desmond); third row-Capt. Godfrey Marchant 

on the left (Br., Team Aubrey), Sgt. lvor Hooker fourth from left (Br., Team Aubrey), 

and Capt. Philip Donoven; fourth row-Sgt. Neville Wood on the left (Br.), and Sgt. 

Alan de Ville fourth from left (Br., Team Arnold) 

Jeds on the pistol range at Milton Hall 
11 

Training Schools (STS) No. 6 at Walsingham, No. 45 at Fair-ford, 

and No. 40 at Gumley Hall. The sixty-two American NC% attended: the SQE communications school at Henley-on-Thames. 

Like the -officers, however, they also underwent the ubiquitous 

psychological tests and practiced marksmanship, self-defense 

@aught by farmer members of the Shanghai Police}, and physical 

training. In late January, all the Americans attended the Bingway parachute school, a three-day course, where they trained 

on ‘&rachuting through the small hole (joe hole) of an l&%F 

bomber2& 

Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spaoner of the British Army 

establishsd the, Jedburgh training school at Milton Hall, a large 

estate four miles from l?eterborough, England. Operational training for the Jedburghs began there in February 1944, emphasizing 

guerrilla warfare tactics and skills: demolitions, use of enemy 

weapons, map reading, night navigation, agent circuit operations, 

intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, counterespionage, 

ambushes, security, the use of couriers, and hand-to-hand combat. 

Almost all Jedburghs practiced French, Morse code, and long 

marches. The Jedburghs also received briefings on the history 

and organization of the resistance in France and other European 

countries. The final seventy French volunteers did not arrive at 

Milton Hall until March 1944, after SOElSO had conducted a 

recruitment drive through: the Middle East. From 31 May to 8 

June, &any Jedburgh teams participated in Lash, the last 

large-scale exercise. In Leicestershire’s Charnwood Forest, the 

teams rehearsed receiving orders, linking up with ressstance 

groups, and later leading attacks against targets designated by 

radio message. SOEISO, or SFHQ as it was now known, expressed pleasure with the exercise, although the simulated guerrillas had been observed moving during daylight in large groups. 

SFHQ concluded that the guerrillas should have approached 

their targets in smaller bands. In the category of “minor criticisms,” the guerrilla groups had received vague orders, which 

led to confusion. In addition, the groups had difficulty with their 

escape and evasion techniques.“” 

The Jedburghs formed their own teams in March and April, 

between the large-scale training exercises. In early April, Lieutenant Colonel George Richard Musgrave, British Army, became 

the new commandant at Milton Hall. By April, training was 

by and large complete, and on 2 May 1944, fifteen Jedburgh 

teams sailed for North Africa in preparation for insertion into 

southern France from Algiers. The teams remaining at Milton 
The main wing and front entrance to Milton Hall 

Hall continued to train while awaiting their alert or warning 

order. As a rule, upon receipt of their alert order, the team would 

be isolated and driven to a London safe house, where SFHQ 

representatives from SOE’s country sections briefed the officers 

on the particulars of the mission, local conditions, and background information. Although most Jedburghs entered France 

wearing military uniforms, several teams were informed at the 

briefing that they would be parachuted into France in civilian 

clothes. Needless to say, if they were caught wearing civilian 

clothes, the Germans would treat them as spies. From there, 

the team was usually driven to Harrington or’ Tempsford Air 

Bases to await a flight that same evening. Other air bases were 

occasionally used, but Harrington fielded the modified blackpainted bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force’s 801st (Provisional) Bomb Group (Heavy), while the RAF’s 38th Group flew 

out of Tempsford. SFHQ maintained its supply and packing area 

(known as Area H) some thirty-five miles from Harrington near 

the village of Holme. Many of the Jedburghs heard of the D 

Day invasion while on Exercise Lash in Leicestershire. There 

was a general sense of disappointment upon the realization that 

they would be deployed not before, but after, the invasion. By 

the end of June, SFHQ had dispatched thirteen Jedburgh teams 

to France (six from England and seven from North Africa). At 

the end of July, the number of teams in France increased to 

twenty-five, although none had been dropped north of the Seine 

River.28 

The Jedburgh concept had evolved considerably from 

Gubbins’ original 1942 proposal. The number of teams mush- 
13 

roomed from ‘70 to 100, of which 93 would deploy to France 

and another 6 to Holland in support of Operation Market-Garden. 

From being a British force, the Jedburghs became an international one including Americans, French, Eelgians, and Dutch. 

Basically, they constituted an unconventional warfare reserve 

in theater to provide leadership, organization, training, weapons, 

supplies, and communication links to FFI resistance groups, They 

would.be inseded at least forty miles behind enemy lin,es and 

hence would not usually “be ‘in a position to pravide tactical 

assistance to conventional forces. The teams would conduct 

unconventional warfare against German lines of communication, 

but not until toId to do so by SFHQ. When Lieutenant General 

Frederick Morgan approved the Jedburgh concept in 1943, it was 

with the understanding that the special forces detachments at 

army and army group headquarters would control the organized 

resistance groups behind German lines. Furthermore, he believed 

it was the job of his army commander to exercise that control. 

Haw suitable, however, were the senior army officers for directing unconventional warfare behind enemy lines? 

Modern professional officer corps, as a rule, have very little 

interest in uncanventional warfare. That was certainly the case 

fur the senior commanders and staff officers of World War II, 

CommandEng officer of the Jedburgb, Lt. Cal. George Richard Musgrave at Milton 

Hall 
14 

Gassing up a B-24 of the U.S. Eighth Air Force’s 801st (Provisional) Bomb Group 

H-leav) 

trained in the branch schools and staff colleges of the 1920s 

and 1930s. Robin Brook, senior SOE adviser to SHAEF, observed 

that the regular officers he served with had little knowledge of 

or interest in unconventional warfaree29 The SF detachments 

began to see similar patterns upon taking the field in France. 

As early as 12 July, when the commanders of the 10th and 

11th SF Detachments met, one observed: “It appears from his 

experience and ours here that Armies working under Army 

Groups are not very strategically minded.“~iO The first response 

of the U.S. Third Army upon breaking out of the Normandy 

bridgehead was to disarm the FFI. It took a directive from the 

12th Army Group to establish that the FFI were allies and not 

enemies.81 Basically, there was little interest in SF detachments 

or what was happening 100 kilometers in the enemy’s rear, To 

complicate the situation further, the SF detachments could only 

contact Jedburgh teams and resistance groups through SFHQ. 

Another possible cloud on the horizon was the efficiency of 

communications between resistance groups, SFHQ, and the SF 

detachments. With more and more Allied special operations teams 

and resistance groups operating behind German lines, would 

SFHQ be capable of receiving and analyzing the increasing radio 

traffic and giving the SF detachments sufficient information to 

act upon? 
15 

dedburgh teams were but one special operations instrument 

available to SHAEF in the summer of 1944. Current military 

doctrine emphasizes a rational construd of Special Operations 

Forces, an umbrella concept encompassing numerous organizations and functions ranging from psychological warfare and civil 

affairs all the way to elite special forces teams conducting 

direct-action missions deep behind enemy lines. In 1944, however, 

there was no sneh concept. Theoretically; SHAEF and its SFHQ 

provided the umbrella to encompass the many special-operationstype forces. But as we have seen, the Allied special operations 

effort was marked by different organizations competing for funds, 

personnel, and missions. ‘Although pledged to support SHAEF 

in the invasion of western Europe, a number of organizations 

remained independent, the most conspicuous being British Intelligence and the Special Air Service .Regiment. A number of 

Jedburgh teams in the field, when confronted with a mission 

beyond their means, specifically requested reinforcement by SAS 

parties. Unfortunately, SFHQ did not control the operational use 

of those forces. The modern cancept of “deconfliction” (ensuring 

that simultaneous special or intelligence operations do not conflict or compromise each other) did not exist. 

Jedburgh afficers at the bar in Milton Hall on Bastille Day 
16 

The experience and skills of FFI groups (and SOE agents 

inserted to work with the resistance) varied considerably. Some 

groups were rather familiar with the reception procedures (flashlight identification signals and two lines of bonfires) and had 

even used the procedures once or twice. Other groups would form 

their first reception committee to meet a Jedburgh team. A coded 

BBC message (known as a blind transmission broadcast) 

informed each FFI group of the impending arrival of a Jedburgh 

team. Some Jedburghs trained to receive a small aircraft in the 

field to evacuate the severely wounded. Jedburghs, however, 

were expected to remain in the field until they linked up with 

advancing Allied ground forces. This event was called being 

“overrun” and required no special procedures other than a Jedburgh showing his SFHQ identification paper. The Jedburghs 

who would parachute into northern France followed the progress 

of Operation Overlord in the newspapers and BBC newscasts. 

Until they received their warning order and briefing in London, 

however, they did not know where they would be inserted. Of 

the 12th Army Group and its operations, they knew next to 

nothing. 

The Operational Situation, 16 August 1944 

The Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 succeeded 

at all points, and Allied control of the sea and air ensured the 

rapid buildup of follow-on forces. The German High Command 

erroneously believed the main invasion would come farther north, 

in the Calais area. This misconception, along with Allied air 

interdiction, slowed the arrival of German reinforcements. The 

feared German counterattack never took place. Instead, a battle 

of attrition developed-a battle the Germans could not afford to 

fight. The strain on the German Army began to show by 13 

June, when the U.S. VII Corps stretched the German line to 

the breaking point, severing the Cotentin Peninsula on 18 June 

and advancing north to capture the port of Cherbourg. The Allied 

armies in Normandy continued to grow in strength and experience as they wore down the Germans, who still ably defended 

the difficult Bocage terrain. On 18 July, the U.S. First Army 

captured St, Lo, while the British Second Army engaged most 

of the German armored divisions near Caen. What was needed 

was one powerful thrust to break through the German line. That 

occurred with Operation Cobra on 25 July 1944, when the U.S. 

First Army broke through the positions of the German Seventh 
17 

Army, ably exploiting the hreakout and reaching Avranches on 

31 July. 

On I August, the Allied armies reorganized into two army 

groups. General Bernard Montgomery commanded the Zlst Army 

Group, consisting of the Canadian First and the British Second 

Armies, while General Omar Bradley commanded the U.S. 12th 

Army Group, with General Courtney Hodges’ U.S. First Army 

and General. George S. Patton, Jr.‘s, U.S. Third Army, Patton’s 

Third Army swept acres’s Brittany in a vain attempt to secure 

a usable harbor and then swung east against minimal opposition. SHAEF headquarters had been reading the most secret 

German signals communications and realized that Hitler, instead 

of allowing his forces to retreat to a defensible position, was 

about to counterattack at Mortain. This provided SHAEF the 

opportunity to surround and trap most of German Army Group 

B sauth of the Seine River. On 13 August,. however, as the 

Canadian First and U.S. Third Armies were approaching each 

other to close the trap, General Bradley halted Patton’s forces. 

Eventually, several days later, the trap closed, but the delay 

allowed many of the German troops to escape north acro’ss the 

Seine. A second attempt to destroy German Army Group B, by 

trapping it against the Seine River, also, failed. Nevertheless, 

the Allies had largely destroyed the Ge‘rman Fifth Panzer and 

Seventh Armies. ‘On the morning of 15 August, the second Allied 

invasion struck, not at Calais, but along the French Riviera. 

Although the German forces in the west had been thoroughly 

defeated, Hitler, from his headquarters hundreds of miles away, 

issued orders to defend the Seine River and later the Marne 

River, as if the defeat in Normandy had not taken place. He 

did, however, allow the German forces in southern France to 

withdraw north, which made possible their escape. For the 

German commanders and troops, each day was a struggle to 

survive. Faced with total Allied air superiority, the remnants of 

the German Army could move freely only at night or in rain or 

fog. To their rear, the French Resistance had risen in arms and 

posed a real threat to any German force smaller than a company. Qn paper, German commanders still acted as if they were 

obeying Hitler’s orders, but in actuality, they were simply trying 

to save what was left of their battered formations, They marched 

east, mostly at night, taking shelter behind the successive river 

lines in northern France, hoping to get back to Germany. 

The Allied commanders, hke their German counterparts, fully 

understood the magnitude of the German defeat in Normandy. 
18 

The only question remaining was how to exploit the situation. 

For the U.S. Seventh Army that had invaded southern France, 

this was rather simple: it would advance north up the Rhone 

River valley. General Eisenhower reexamined the preinvasion 

planning and decided to exploit the advance beyond the Seine 

River. He directed the 21st Army Group to advance northeast 

through Belgium and directed Bradley’s 12th Army Group to 

protect the 21st Army Group’s southern flank. General Patton’s 

Third Army launched a subsidiary offensive due east towards 

Metz and Nancy. Both the western Allies and the. Germans 

expected the war to end within weeks. The only shadow on the 

horizon was the possibility that the Allied system of logistical 

support would halt their triumphant procession to the east. 

By 15 August, SFHQ had deployed only two Jedburgh teams 

in northern France in front of the advancing 12th Army Group. 

Nine more teams were soon to follow. Recent experience in 

Brittany demonstrated that U.S. Army field commanders were 

particularly impressed with the help of FFI guides and scouts. 

Therefore, most of the Jedburgh teams sent into northern France 

were instructed to be prepared to send FFI volunteers to meet 

the advancing field armies. SHAEF possessed abundant supplies 

to be parachuted to the SOF forces, but with resistance groups 

springing into action all across France, the limited air assets 

could not provide immediate delivery. SFHQ’ briefing officers 

informed most Jedburgh teams that deployed in northern France 

that it would take eight days for them to receive supply drops. 

German Rear-Area Administration and Security 

For the most part, the Jedburgh teams would not encounter 

German main-force combat units, but rather the rear-area 

security-administration and supply units of the Military 

Governor of France, the military government directly responsible 

to the German Army High Command. The German security 

forces observed a noticeable increase in French Resistance activity early in 1944, particularly in nocturnal English parachute 

drops of arms. As early as January and February, the Military 

Governor of France reported that his major effort was devoted 

to fighting the French Resistance with his security units, East 

Battalions (composed of Russians), and military police. By May, 

there was increased resistance activity in Brittany, which had 

earlier been rather quiet. The Germans believed that the major 

resistance activity was Communist inspired and centered in 
19 

southeast France and Dordogne. German security forces knew 

the basic organization of the resistance, its radio links to 

London, and its mission to prepare for and assist the coming 

Allied invasion of France. They also concluded that the majority 

of the population sympathized with and provided support to the 

resistance. Furthermore, French police and security forces for 

the most part were merely going through the motions of tracking 

down the resistance and in some instances assisted the resistance. The number of French who wilhngly provided information 

to the Germans was actually quite small and presumably known 

to the resistance. German security soon began ta form the image 

of French Communists, professionals, former army officers, and 

students lined up shoulder to shoulder against the occupation 

force. The Third Reich considered all resistance activity to be 

terrorism, which was to be met with counterterrorism: shootings, 

illegal arrests, and torture. To assist in the more unspeakable 

aspects of this policy, the SS provided Gestapo and other security offices in the larger cities across France.32 

Besides the garrison of Paris, the Military Governor of 

France divided France into four sectors, each with a military 

commander: northwest, northeast, southwest, and south. Each 

military commander possessed basically one lW&ommandan~ur 

headquarters for each French department, usually commanded 

by a colonel or brigadier general and from 2,000 to 3,000 personnel. Most of those personnel, however, were administrators 

and sometimes civilians or women. The sector military 

commanders also possess,ed several security regiments and on 

occasion one or two East Battalions. The Jedburgh teams we 

shall examine in this study jumped into the sectors of either 

the Military Govemar of Northwest France or Military Governor 

of Northeast France, the former’s headquarters located at Paris 

and the latter’s in Dijon. The experience of the Chaumont garrison indieated the inherent dilemmas of the German situation. 

FeEdkommandantul- 769 governed the Haute-Marne Department 

in northeastern France from the city of Chaumont and maintained a smaller headquarters (AussensOelde) in Langres. Qne of 

its senior civil servants, a Dr. Achten, observed that Chaumont 

remained quiet and orderly through, the German occupation. 

Since early August, the headquarters was responsible for eons.tru&ing defenses behind the Marne River, its sector of the 

Kitzinger Line. Dr. Achten reported that about 60 percent of 

the French mal;es in the area helped construct the fortifications 

and assisted the Germans in moving livestock and grain north 

of the Marne. He noted that the only difficulty was a tendency 
20 

of the German vehicles to break down. It would appear that as 

long as the area appeared quiet and orderly, the German occupation forces were satisfied. In reality, the forced laborers along 

the Marne sabotaged both the German motor vehicles and fortification efforts. Many of those same workers weeks later helped 

guide U.S. Third Army units through and around the Kitzinger 

Line. In addition, by August 1944, the German occupation forces 

really did not want to know what was happening in the countryside. The threat of FFI ambushes led the occupation forces to 

send only large armed groups outside their garrison. In August 

1944, there were vast stretches of France, particularly in the 

south, virtually unobserved by the Germans.33 

Team Jacob, 12 August 1944 

On the night of 12 August 1944, SFHQ dispatched Team 

Jacob to the Vosges area north of Epinal as the twenty-sixth 

Jedburgh team to the Continent. They landed at about 0100 on 

13 August near the village of La Petite-Raon. SFHQ had previously been unable to support the eastern area of France and 

in mid-August resolved to send a Jedburgh team to the area. 

The SAS resolved to dispatch the ninety-one-man Team Loyton 

to the area also. Jedburgh Team Jacob was to assist the local 

Maquis, cooperate with the SAS, but to remain under the command of SFHQ. They were to avoid open offensive action against 

Axis forces. Team Jacob consisted of Captain Victor Andrew 

Gough (British), Captain Maurice Boissarie (French), and Sergeant Ken Seymour (British). Gough was a pleasant young man 

from Somerset, who before entering the service had been a cartoonist. It was Gough who created the design for the Special 

Forces wings that the Jedburghs wore on their uniforms.“4 

. 

On 16 August, Team Jacob radioed SFHQ reporting that 

they had landed safely and were with a Maquis two kilometers 

south of Vexaincourt. Sergeant Seymour injured his ankle in 

the jump, but they expected him to be ambulatory in seven days. 

Meanwhile, the team used the SAS radio operator and hoped to 

meet “Planete” in a day or two. Of the 800 FFI volunteers in 

the area, ‘only 50 were armed. Some 600 were forced to remain 

as sedentaire, inactive in their homes. In two messages on 26 

August, the team requested a large supply drop and indicated 

that their radio set was not functioning. On 5 September, Jacob 

reported that they had not yet received another radio but that 

they had contacted SAS Team Loyton. It would appear that 
A Jedburgh briefing in a London fiat @hulated) 

several days earlier Jacob and SFHQ had attempted to conduct 

an arms drop that proved unsuccessful, resulting in numeraus 

FFI casualties when Axis forces attacked them an the drop zone 

(DZ). On the fallowing day, Team Jacab canceled that night’s 

arms drop, reporting that Germans were on the DZ. 

SFHQ next heard from Team Jacob on 15 September, when 

it reported that Sergeant Seymour had been captured on 17 

August and was rumored to have been shot on the 20th. In a 

recent battle, Captain Boissarie had been killed along with 100 

Maquis. Another 100 Maquis had been captured with the remainder dispersed. On 16 September, Captain Cough (Jacab”s sole 

survivor) radioed SFHQ stating that he had rallied 200 Maquis 

and with SAS assistance had armed them. Hle also reported that 

the transmitter and radio set recently dropped had broken during 

the drop. Cough said he planned to eantinue using the SAS 

set. At 1900, 18 September, Captain Cough sent his last message: 

Have contacted 800 Maquis under Mar&r. Sent message with 

SAS yesterday for arms drop. Gave ground. SAS will liaise [liaison] 

with you. Great difficulty warkilkg alone. Can’t come up an regular 

skeds [schedules]. Will come up cm emergency when can. Please have 
22 

your message ready for me on this channel. Have not had money 

yet. SAS having personnel drop to team here tomorrow. Please send 

money addressed to me with one of their officers.3B 

SFHQ continued to send messages to Team Jacob through 

28 September. Captain Gough was captured in the days following 

18 September and executed on 25 November 1944 at the Schirmek 

La Broque concentration camp in Alsace. He is buried at the 

Durnbach Commonwealth Cemetery near Bad Tijlz, Bavaria, 

Captain Boissarie (alias Baraud) apparently died in a skirmish 

on 4 September 1944 at Viambois Farm in the Vosges. Sergeant 

Seymour was captured by the Germans, survived incarceration 

in a concentration camp, and returned to England.36 

Team Aubrey, 12 August 1944 

SFHQ dispatched Aubrey as the twenty-seventh Jedburgh 

team to France from the United Kingdom. It was to assist the 

SPIRITUALIST network (code name for the organizer and 

circuit) in the Seine-et-Marne region east of Paris, providing an 

additional communication link to London, particularly for the 

delivery of arms and ammunition. The team consisted of Captain 

Godfrey Marchant (British), Captain J. Chaigneau (French), and 

Sergeant Ivor Hooker (British). They received their briefing in 

London on 11 August and left for Harrington Air Base at 1700. 

The team wore civilian clothes for the jump and took off in a 

modified B-24 from Harrington at 0015 on 12 August, followed 

by two more B-24s carrying weapons, ammunition, and equipment. At about 0155, the team parachuted without incident into 

a DZ near La Plessis-Belleville and were greeted by Major Rene 

Dumont-Guillemet, the leader of the SPIRITUALIST circuit, and 

a large reception committee from the village of St. Pathus (see 

map 3).37 

On the evening of 12 August, the team cycled to the village 

of Forfry, where they established themselves in a safe house. 

The following day, Sergeant Hooker developed a case of the 

mumps, and since there were no Germans in the village, he set 

up his radio and operated it from his sick bed throughout most 

of the remainder of the mission, On the 14th, SFHQ approved 

Captains Marchant and Chaigneau’s request to shift operations 

to the suburbs of northern Paris, where Major Dumont-Guillemet 

had identified some 1,500 volunteers. The team believed it much 

safer to operate in the built-up suburbs than in the gently rolling 
La Plessis-Belleville 

-5 0 1 

SCALE 1:5

Map 3. Team Aubrey’s area of operations in the Seine-et-Marne 

._ ., _- . (_ ., ^. .I -- ._, _._- 
24 

hills of the Seine-et-Marne. Captain Marchant secured Spanish 

identity papers and traveled daily throughout the suburbs, instructing small groups (including Parisian gendarmes) on sabotage techniques. The local resistance group provided Captain 

Chaigneau with false papers and a motorcycle, and he served 

as a liaison between resistance groups. On 21 August, Chaigneau 

and Marchant decided that with the German Army retreating 

from France, it was time to move to the Meaux area. When 

Marchant and the SPIRITUALIST radio operator, “Blaise,” 

bicycled back to St. Pathus, however, they found an SS and a 

German Army field unit camped about the village. The Germans 

moved north on 24 August, and the following day, Major 

Dumont-Guillemet, on his own initiative, instructed his forces 

to rise in revolt. Within hours, however, SFHQ radioed to tell 

him that the revolt could not start until SFHQ sanctioned the 

rising. Major Dumont-Guillemet and Captain Marchant then 

conferred and agreed that to call off the uprising would only 

create confusion. They decided to go ahead with the insurrection. 

Team Aubrey put on their uniforms again on 26 August 

and awaited the arrival of the FFI volunteers from northern 

Paris. The latter arrived the following morning in some twenty 

vehicles, having managed to avoid large German military 

convoys escaping to the north. This FFI group with Major 

Dumont-Guillemet and Team Aubrey attempted to set up an 

ambush position near Rougemont, between Oissery and Forfry. 

It was not a bad defensive position, resting upon a sunken 

road38 with a good field of fire to the south, protected on the 

west by a heavy wood and on the east by marshy ground 

impassable to armored vehicles. The problems were twofold: the 

Maquis were basically unorganized and untrained, and the men 

really had no idea what would be coming down the road into 

their ambush. Only two Bren guns were operational, and only 

the Jedburghs knew how to operate the four Piats (a hand-held 

antitank rocket). Even as the FFI column unloaded at the sunken 

road, a German armored car opened fire on two FFI vehicles in 

Oissery. Seconds later, a German light tank opened fire on the 

vehicles in the sunken road. After about eighty minutes, at about 

1230, with the arrival of additional Germans, Major DumontGuillemet directed a covering force to hold off the Germans while 

the remaining men dispersed. Captain Marchant said he would 

remain with the covering force and ordered Sergeant Hooker to 

leave the field. Hooker moved east along the streambed, where 

he met Major Dumont-Guillemet. They spotted Captain 

Chaigneau about thirty yards ahead of them. Captain Marchant 
25 

and the covering force held their positions for a short while 

until another German tank approached and opened fire at close 

range, whereupon the covering force also fled. Marchant was 

forced to crawl north to a lake, where he hid for the next eight 

hours. The German armor continued to fire, killing Captain 

Chaigneau in the streambed with a high-explosive shell. The 

mud in the streambed was rather deep, so Hooker, DumontGuillemet, and the others crawled some two kilometers through 

the mud until they finally reached the shelter of the woods. 

From there, the group dispersed, with Hooker (who had discarded 

his codes) and Major Dumont-Guillemet making their way to a 

safe house in Nongloire-par-Puisieux.39 

Major Dumont-Guillemet and Sergeant Hooker spent the next 

day at the safe house. On the morning of 29 August, they awoke 

to the sound of machine guns and discovered a U.S. VII Corps 

column advancing down the road to Soissons. They received a 

ride from the Americans to Meaux, from where they returned 

to Paris. On the XRh, Sergeant Hooker borrowed a jeep and 

drove to Forfry, where he found Captain Marchant, and the 

two returned to Paris, Major Dumont-Guillemet had already 

returned to London, and the two surviving members of Team 

Aubrey followed soon after. 

The German armored unit that Team Aubrey encountered 

belonged in all probability to the LVIII Panzer Carps, which 

was responsible to the German First Army an 25-27 August. 

It consisted of the remnants of several severely battered divisions, including the Panzer L&r and 9th Panzer Divisions. The 

LVIII Panzer Corps concentrated its efforts on bIacking the 

major road nets north of Paris until 27 August, when it was 

forced to retire to the line Beaumont-SurviIlers-Dammartinen-Goele-Meaux. In the nineteen days it was in the field, Team 

Aubrey provided valuable information to London, particularly 

targeting data an adive Luftulaffe airfields north ‘of Paris. In 

addition, although SFHQ probably knew of the withdrawal of 

the Eerman”s Paris garrison, Team Aubrey*s confirmation of its 

departure on 19 August undoubtedly assisted in clarifying the 

situation, Captain Marchant estimated that the FFI lost eightysix men and women killed in the 27 August engagement near 

Bougemont. Godfrey Marehant, originally from Buenos Aires, 

died in April 1945 when his B-24, bound for an SQE mission in 

Burma, crashed on takeoff near Calcutta. Ivor Hoaker survived 

the war, returning to England to live in Suffolk County. He 

died in June 1988.40 
26 

Team Augustus, 16 August 1944 

SFHQ dispatched Augustus as the thirty-fourth Jedburgh 

team to the Continent on 15 August 1944 to the Aisne region, 

where it was to assist the local Maquis and serve as an additional communication link to London (see map 4). Major John 

H. Bonsall, U.S. Army (USA), the team leader, was born on 11 

June 1919 in Morristown, New Jersey. After attending a number 

of preparatory schools, he entered Princeton University, where 

he was in the ROTC program. He was commissioned an Army 

second lieutenant upon graduation in 1941, although he planned 

to follow his father’s example and practice law. He was called 

to active duty in August 1941, arrived in England in December 

1943, and was promoted to major in April 1944. Captain Jean 

Delwiche (French) and Technical Sergeant Roger E. Cote (USA) 

were the other members of the team. Delwiche was a professional 

officer born in Vivaise, a small village ten kilometers north of 

Laon. He was a profoundly quiet man, undoubtedly the result 

of the death of his wife and child to illness. 

On the night of 15 August, the team flew from England 

with twenty-four containers weighing three tons and with no 

other passengers. Landing near the hamlet of Colonfay, about 

fifteen kilometers south of Guise, they moved to Le Nouvion-enThierache, the local resistance headquarters. On the afternoon 

of 16 August, they reached a farm near the village of Clary, 

which the resistance suggested would be much safer. The team 

radioed SFHQ on 17 August that the reception had gone perfectly. Two days later, they reported that they had successfully 

contacted the local resistance leader. At that meeting, they apparently decided to follow the suggestion of the resistance to 

conduct operations to the south near Soissons. On 20 August, 

the team radioed that the resistance movement in the Aisne 

Department was quite advanced, with 1,100 men armed and 

trained and 4,900 unarmed men.41 

On 21 August, the team moved south about 100 kilometers 

to the village of Rugny. Through 24 August, the team sent 

London several reports on specific targets for the Allied air 

forces, mostly large German troop columns headed east for the 

German border or trains stuck between railroad demolitions. On 

the 25th, however, Augustus reported that there were so many 

German troops in the area that it would be unwise to form any 

Maquis and that hiding places were becoming harder to find. 

The following day, the team reported that the Germans were 
/ 

Map 4. Team Augustus’ area Ot aperations in the Aisne Department 

27 
28 

Gas cans being loaded into containers to be airdropped (picture taken at Holme) 

constructing field fortifications behind the Aisne River, although 

without minefields. On 28 August, they learned that American 

tanks were in the vicinity and moved north to Soissons. There, 

they briefed staff officers of the U.S. 3d Armored Division on 

German defenses in the area. The American officers displayed 

particular interest in the German camp at Margival.42 SFHQ, 

on 30 August, sent Augustus the following message: 

Have received order from Army commander for FFI to take all 

possible steps to preserve following Somme bridges from enemy 

demolition. All bridges Amiens area, also at Moreuil, Boves, 

Fiquigny, Conde, Longpre. You should attempt to preserve these 

bridges for about four days after receipt this message. This is 

important task. Count on you for fullest cooperation. If you need 

arms can drop from low flying typhoons.4” 

Team Augustus presumably received this message. That same 

day, the team passed through the American lines north of Laon 

(south of Froidmont), an area well known to Captain Delwiche. 

A subsequent OSS investigation revealed that all three members 

were shot and killed on the night of 30 August at the village 

of Barenton-sur-Serre, Apparently, German troops stopped a 
29 

h~~~e-draw~~ cart and found the three occupants in civilian 

clothes, carrying false French identity cards, and equipped with 

weapons, a radio;, and other equipment. Since the German troops 

were the remnants of an armor& unit interested mainly in 

eaeaping to the German border, they undertook ‘no further 

searches but merely shot the team and soon departed in the 

rain, The horse, still towing its cart, returned on its own to its 

stable in Mr. Magnien’s barn, which was occupied by armed 

FFI volunteers. The return of the: horse and empty cart created 

considerable consternation, Mr. Magnien and his colleagues found 

the bodies of Jedburgh I team Augustus the following morning, 

buried the three men at the B’arenton-sur-Serre cemetery, and 

subsequently erected a memorial in their honor.44 

Operations in eastern France and Belgium were particularly 

difficult for SFHQ owing to the great distance from England 

a.nd the proximity of German training areas and Axis security 

forces. In mid-April 1944, SFHQ dispatched the first four 

members of the CITRONELLE” inter-Allied mission to the 

Ardennes. The mission’s leader, French Colonel Paris de Bollad&e and seven more men parachuted into the area on 5 June. 

Their mission was to contact and assist Maquis on the FrenchBelgian border of the Ardennes. The Germans soon launched a 

series of attacks in the area, and an American member of 

CITRONELLE, Captain Victor J. Layton, radioed SFHQ to report that a German attack on 12 June had scattered the resistance group. He reported 5 FFI members killed, 140 captured, 

and estimated that perhaps 100 remained.45 

SFHQ on the night of 15 August dispatched Jedburgh Team 

Andrew to the southern Ardennes in Belgium, where they were 

to assist the FFI with arms deliveries and provide another 

communicatio’ns link to London. The team consisted of Major 

A. H, S. (‘“Henry”) CoombeTermant (British), Lieutenant Edouard 

Comte d’aultremont (Belgian), and Sergeant Frank Harrison 

(British). Henry Coombe-Tennant was born on 9 April 1913 in 

the Vale of Neath, South Wales, and subsequently became a 

career officer, serving in the Welsh Guards. As a member of 

the, British Expeditionary Force in 1940, he was captured near 

*Code name for twelve-man inter-Allied mission led by Colonel Paris de 

B&&i&e inserted into the Ardennes on 12 April and 5 June 1944. 
Display of equipment and supplies used by special operating forces: cortex, limpet 

(mine), mortar shells, radio receiver, and pencil time fuses 

Boulogne. In 1942, he and two colleagues escaped from their 

German POW camp near Warburg in Westphalia and were 

fortunate enough to link up with the COMET network in 

Belgium, which assisted their return to England. Upon his return 

to England, Coombe-Tennant attended a staff college and in 

1943 served on the SOE planning staff on Baker Street. Soon 

thereafter, he volunteered for the Jedburgh project. One of the 

members of the COMET network was Count d’oultremont, born 

on 27 September 1916 in Paris, a resident of Brussels, who was 

of medium height, well built, with blonde hair and mustache, 

and distinguished in appearance. In 1943, d’oultremont followed 

the COMET escape route, shortly before the Germans rolled up 

the network. The two men were rather surprised to meet each 

other again at Milton Hall and decided to form their own team. 

With d’oultremont on the team, they guessed they would be 

inserted into Belgium. The team received their alert on 8 August 

and on the 10th traveled to London for their briefing. The 

briefer8 informed them that the resistance forces in the Ardennes 

had recently lost 200 men in an engagement, and only 150 
L 

31 

remained. SFHQ instructed Team Andrew to contact the 

CITRONELLE mission upon their arrival. Two French officers 

on a similar mission would fly with the team. In addition, a 

ten-man Belgian SAS force on an independent mission would 

parachute with them (see map 5).46 

On the night of 15 August, the group flew to the Ardennes 

skirting a storm with high winds. SFHQ dispatched two bombers 

to the Ardennes that night carrying thirteen parachutists and 

forty-eight containers weighing approximately six tons total. 

Upon approaching the DZ, the landing lights were clearly visible, 

and the SAS team jumped first, about two kilometers east of 

Revin. The aircraft turned around to make a second pass, but 

this time the landing lights could not be spotted. Upon being 

informed that they would either have to jump “blind” or return 

to England, Major Coombe-Tennant decided to risk the jump. 

The strong wind scattered the team, but during the remaining 

hours of darkness, they located each other and buried their 

chutes. The Belgian ,SAS team had disappeared to conduct its 

own mission. At dawn, Team Andrew marched through the forest 

until they found a woodsman’s cottage, where they were offered 

shelter. On 17 August, a Maquis lieutenant arrived and took 

them to meet Colonel de Bolladiere’s CITRONELLE mission. 

Along with some other equipment, Team Andrew lost its radio 

crystals in the drop and was therefore dependent upon 

CITRONELLE’s radio for contacting SFHQ. 

On 25 August, the de Bolladiere group received a request 

for help from a Belgian resistance group about five miles to 

the east that was in a skirmish with a German convoy. Colonel 

de Bolladikre took about sixty men with him and found the 

ambush site. Upon spotting women in the convoy, he ordered 

that it not be attacked; but it was too late, and a firefight 

ensued. The following day near noon, a German company from 

Belgium found and attacked the CITRONELLE group as they 

were having lunch. The Germans’ use of 60-mm mortars proved 

particularly effective, and the CITRONELLE mission lost eight 

men killed and twelve wounded, including Colonel de Bolladiere 

and Lieutenant d”Oultremont. The Germans, however, had not 

expected such firepower, and both forces simultaneously 

retired-the CITRONELLE group to a camp south of Tourbillon. 

The following day, Coombe-Tennant and Captain Layton 

returned to the scene of the engagement and observed that the 

Germans had not removed their dead. The CITRONELLE group 

subsequently remained deep within the forest about two miles 
32 

Les Hautes Buttes 

Bois de Revin 

ARDENNES 

Map 5. Team Andrew’s area of operations in the Ardennes 
33 

north of the French border. Their main link to the outside world 

was a Capuchin friar, Anton Hegelmann, who periodically visited 

their camp, Since they had little ammunition, they remained at 

their hideout the following week.47 

Around 1 September, the group learned of the advance of 

the US. Army and decided 60 move south toward Gharleville. 

Upon reaching Charleville, they discovered that the U.S. Army 

had dready seized the town. The group did, however, set up an 

ambush and managed to intercept a group of Germans retreating 

east. U.S. First Army’s 10th SF Detachment picked up the team 

on 8 September at V Corps headquarters and gave them a ride 

to Paris. Major Coombe-Tennant and Lieutenant d”Omtremont 

left for Brussels to rejoin their regiments, leaving S,ergeant 

I&u&am to file the final report Team Augustus was in the 

field for slightly more than three weeks, working with the 

CITRONELLE inter-Allied mission. The CITRONELLE group 

obviously undertook direct military action prematurely and 

consequently was forced to spend one critical week in hiding. If 

the CITRONELLE mission materially assisted the advance of 

Allied ground forces, it was only indirectly: by tying down 

German forces and constituting yet one more possible threat to 

German forces retiring east.48 

Major Coombe-Tennant returned to the Welsh Guards, served 

in the Middle East, and retired in 1956. In 1961, he joined the 

B‘enedictine Order. On 6 November 1989, he died at Downside 

Abbey, Edouard Comte d’Oultremont survived the war and 

returned to Brussels, where he died on 3 February 1988. The 

Jedburgh community subsequently lost tout 

Had30Il.4~ 

Teams Benjamin and Bemard, 20 August 1944 

SFHQ planned to dispatch Teams Benjamin and Bernard 

on the night of 19 August I.944 to the Meuse-Argonne mea of 

northeastern France to assist the local FFI. Team Eenjamin 

consisted of Major A. J. Forrest (British), Lieutenant Paul Moniez 

(France), and Second Lieutenant H. Kamiraski (France) and was 

to operate east of the Meuse River. Team Bernard consisted of 

Captains J. de W, (“‘Jock”‘) Waller (British), Etienne Nasica 

(France), and Sergeant Cyril M. Bassett (BritishI. Each team 

parachuted with the standard Jedburgh radial set, with which 

they were to contact SFHQ in London to arrange the delivery 
Special operations personnel arrive at Tempsford Air Ease for a takeoff later in the 

evening. The man in front is carrying the TR-1 suitcase radio. 

of additional weapons and supplies. Following a request for such 

supplies, it would take an estimated eight days for delivery.50 

The two teams received a joint briefing on 17 August that 

proved suspiciously brief. Information on the state of the resistance in eastern France proved sketchy, and the teams were 

not provided with detailed maps of the area. The planned jump 

for 19 August did not transpire, but on the following night, each 

team took off*in a bomber from Fairford Air Base. Both bombers 

found their way to the DZ, several kilometers south of 

Clermont-en-Argonne, but could not spot the landing lights until 

directly above them. As the six Jedburghs parachuted, they suspected that something had gone wrong in the reception committee (see map 6). 

The FFI reception committee had no previous experience 

working with parachuted men or materiel so consequently had 

not selected or prepared a suitable DZ. They had picked a very 

small field surrounded by the Argonne Forest. Thus, five of the 

Jedburghs, along with sixteen packages and about thirty containers, landed in the trees. The reception committee had selected 

a DZ that was far too small and complicated the problem by 

placing the landing lights too close to the tree line. Furthermore, 

they had only fifteen men, so it took two days and three nights 

to assemble the scattered containers and parachutes. 
Map 6. Teams Benjamin and Bernard’s area of operations in the Meuse-Argonne 

__ .- -- __ 
36 

On 21 August, two local resistance leaders escorted the 

Jedburghs to their camp on the edge of the Argonne, three miles 

south-southwest of Clermont, where at 0630, they established 

radio contact with SFHQ. They used Team Bernard’s radio, since 

the other radio had been destroyed in the drop. They also decided 

to remain together in one large team until another radio could 

be supplied. It was not until 23 August that two senior FFI 

officials, “Colonel Aubusson” and “Angelet” (assistants of 

“Planete”), arrived to brief them on the local situation. They 

reported that “Planete” was in Nancy planning for a major 

operation in the Vosges and that he desired the FFI to harass 

the Germans in the Argonne region east and west of the Meuse. 

To accomplish this, there were about 600 men scattered about 

this rural area and another 300 in St. Mihiel. The Franc Tireurs 

et Partisans (FTP) had an estimated forty men in Stenay, 200 

in Spincourt, and 50 in Souilly. To confuse the situation further, 

about 3,000 Russian POWs worked as miners in Bassin-de-Briey. 

The two team leaders decided, therefore, to split up and 

return to their original plan. They would call for six priority 

parachute-supply drops at the beginning of the new moon: three 

in the Bernard sector west of the Meuse and three in the 

Benjamin sector east of the Meuse. They planned to arm a 

nucleus of 200 men in each sector. They consequently began 

preparations, contacting the local FTP leader to arrange his 

cooperation and to prepare for Team Benjamin to cross the 

Meuse. Then disaster struck. 

The following morning, 24 August, the Gestapo and Milice, 

posing as FFI Maquis at the town of Lea Islettes, arrested the 

local FFI leaders (see map 6). The two Jedburgh teams learned 

of this several hours later and began to carry off as much of 

their equipment as possible to a new camp. Later in the afternoon, 150 Axis troops led by an SS captain raided the Jedburgh 

camp evacuated only hours earlier. Through coincidence, an FTP 

patrol from Souilly, desiring to coordinate with the Jedburghs 

and secure more arms, arrived at the camp to find not Maquis 

but a large enemy force. The FTP fled, losing ten men and, no 

doubt, some measure of confidence in their FFI colleagues. The 

Jedburghs abandoned their earlier plans, knowing now that they 

were being hunted, They consequently moved again that same 

night through the heavily wooded Argonne to the western side 

of the Biesme valley into the Fori% Domaniale-de-Chatrices. 

The move to the western side of the valley took three days, 

during which scouts attempted to determine the level of damage 
37 

done by the Les Islettes incident. On 28 August, they learned 

that one of the FFI leaders had been captured “with a. map 

showing the planned supply DZs. The following day, thegroup 

met with Major Rooney’s SAS group l&pert, both groups having 

selected the same DZ for that night’s supply drop. After coordinating for a joint drop, the SAS canceled the drop later that 

evening. Probably on this same day, SFHQ informed Team 

Benjamin of the imminent arrival of American ground forces 

and requested that Benjamin send guides through the German 

lines to meet them.51 

On 30 August, the guides dispatched by the Jedburghs contacted the advancing American force (the U.S. 3d Cavalry Group, 

U.S. XX Corps), providing them with an estimate of the local 

situation. In the morning, the Jedburghs made three offensive 

patrols on the Ste. Menehould-Lee Islettes-Clermont road, hoping 

to cut off retreating German forces. They also desir&d to prevent 

the destruction of the railway tunnel and bridges of Ste. 

Menehould. The road patrol encountered no German forces. A 

second patrol found the railway tunnel abandoned and not rigged 

for detonation. The third patrol (consisting of Lieutenant Moniez, 

Commandant Dulac, and six men} entered Ste. Menehould, killing 

four Germans, but later withdrew at the approach of German 

troops. A party of eighty FFI that was supposed to assist at 

Ste. Menehould proved unable to fight through German forces5* 

The U.S. XX Corps began its advance on Verdun on 30 

August, led by its 3d Cavalry Group and the 7th Armored 

Division. The cavalry seized Ste. Menehould at 0545 on 31 

August, and Combat Command A of the 7th Armored Division 

moved toward Verdun to capture a bridgehead over the Meuse 

River. The Germans had destroyed all of the Meuse River bridges 

in the area except the main bridge at Verdun, which was rigged 

for demolition and defended by a rear guard with two Mark V 

Panther tanks. As units of Combat Command A entered the 

town shortly after noon, a number af FFI volunteers ran under 

the bridge and managed to cut the wires to the explosive charge 

before the German sentries opened fire. Minutes later, the tanks 

of Combat Command A arrived, knocked out the two Panthers, 

and proceeded east to secure the bridgehead. 

On 31 August, before the arrival of American forces, Captain 

Nasica was wounded in a skirmish with a German patrol at 

Futeau. in the Biesme valley. The Maquis advanced along the 

Biesme valley, taking Les Islettes on 1 September. On 2 September, the group,(about 100 men} entered Clermont and began 
38 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert 1. Powell, 

commander of the 1 lth Special 

Forces Detachment of the U.S. Third 

Army 

to intercept German stragglers, killing or capturing about fifty 

men. The Jedburghs had turned over command of the Maquis 

to Commandant Dulac and on 31 August moved east across 

the Meuse toward Verdun. Upon reaching that historic town, 

they discovered troops of the U.S. XX Corps in force and decided 

to contact U.S. Third Army headquarters to receive new instructions. On the return drive as they approached Clermont, a 

German outpost opened fire on their truck, wounding everyone 

except Captain Waller and Lieutenant Moniez. The Jedburgh 

team fled, losing its truck, radio, and the last of its personal 

equipment. During the previous night, a regiment of the 15th 

Panzergrenadier Division had driven the Dulac Maquis out of 

Clermont and occupied the town. The Jedburgh group infiltrated 

through the German lines and reached Epernay on 2 September, 

where Captain Waller met them. On the following day, they 

reported to Lieutenant Colonel Powell of the 11th SF Detachment 

at U.S. Third Army headquarters in Ch6lons.53 

The Jedburgh group rested and reequipped over the week. 

Captain Nasica and Sergeant Bassett were evacuated from local 

hospitals to England. On 11 September, Colonel Powell directed 

the group to assist the PEDLAR* circuit in the Chaumont area 

*PEDLAB was an intelligence circuit led by Major Bodington that operated 

in the ChalBns-sur-Marne area, see pp. 48-47. 
39 

(see Team Arnold report on PEDLAR). The group subsequently 

participated. in a daylight supply drop at Garganville on 13 

September and, following the capture of Chaumont, assisted 

Major Bodington in the demobilization of his Maquis. From 

18-22 September, Teams Benjamin and Bernard stored excess 

parachuted arms at Nancy. They returned to England on 2 

October, observing that they should have been deployed at least 

two months prior to 20 August. They also noted that SFHQ 

had basically ignared the Meuse-Argonne region until August 

1944, by which time it was too late to create an efficient organization. Teams Benjamin and Bernard served in France for 

roughly six weeks, although only nine days before the U.S. Third 

Army overran the area. Effective Axis security forced the two 

teams to hide from 24-30 August. Between 30 August and 2 

September, four of the six Jedburghs were wounded, with two 

requiring evaeuation5” 

In many ways, the story of Teams Benjamin and Bernard 

provides more questions than answers. Their after-action report 

makes no reference to ,the FE1 of Verdun and the capture of 

the Verdun bridge, even though Verdun was only some thirty 

kilometers to the east. In similar fashion, U.S. Army records 

fail to mention any Jedburgh teams operating in the area. We 

also know that on 30 August, SFHQ ,directed Jedburgh teams 

to seize bridges in front of the U.S. First Army to assist the 

advance of the ground forces. There is no indication, however, 

that similar messages, were sent to the SOF teams in front of 

the U.S. Third Army. How it came to pass that an FFI group 

knew when and how to cut the wires of the demolitions on the 

Verdun bridge remains open to question. 

SFHQ disDatched Team Alfred on 24 August 1944 to the 

Oise Rive; vidiey north of Paris to assist in organizing the local 

FFI, particularly through providing them an additional radio 

link to London and assisting in the delivery of arms. The team 

consisted of Lieutenant G. Herenguel (Freneh), Captain L. D. 

MaeDougall (British), and Sergeant Albert W. Key (British), The 

team left Milton Hall in somewhat of a rush on the morning of 

9 August for London, after which they prepared for their jump. 

It was not until 23 August that they received a rather hurried 

second briefing on the FFI and German situation in the Oise 
40 

sector. They were also informed that it would take about eight 

days for the delivery of arms drops. The briefing officer told 

them that if they found themselves within forty miles of the 

battle zone, they were to recruit fifteen volunteers and move 

toward the Allied army, gathering tactical information along 

the way. Upon landing in France, they were to contact the local 

FFI chief, DuPont-Montura. The team was instructed to avoid 

open combat (see map 7).5” 

That night at 2300, Team Alfred departed on a two-hour 

flight through a rather severe storm for the DZ at Le Moulin 

(in all probability about fifteen kilometers northeast of 

Compie’gne), where the pilot dropped the packages and containers 

with some difficulty. He then gained altitude for a second pass 

so the team could safely jump, but amid fierce winds, he could 

not spot the landing lights and was forced to cancel the jump. 

The following night, they tried again, and after a fifty-minute 

search for DZ Moulin, the RAF bomber dropped both the 

Jedburgh team and their packages and containers. It proved 

an excellent drop, and it took little time for the reception committee to assemble the team and equipment and take them to 

the safety of a nearby quarry. As it turned out, the reception 

committee had secured the containers and packages dropped the 

previous night but had moved the equipment to a village some 

twenty kilometers away. Thus, the team would have to do 

without their personal kits for some time, 

On the morning of 26 August, Lieutenant Herenguel traveled 

to Clermont, where he met Commandant DuPont-Montura, the 

FFI commander for the Oise area. Following their meeting, Team 

Alfred sent the following message to SFHQ: “Have contacted 

Chef FFI departmental. Five to six thousand partisans in area 

poorly organized but very enthusiastic and demand arms and 

yet more arms. 400 of total armed in area Compidgne Clermont. 

Area Beauvais destitute of arms.“56 That night, the team vainly 

awaited an arms drop at DZ Moulin. The following morning, 

word arrived that there were parachutists nearby at Franc&es, 

so Captain MacDougall went to investigate. He returned later 

with five Special Air Service men, Their aircraft could not find 

the DZ, so the team dropped “blind,” although the pilot did not 

drop the arms containers. The following day, Team Alfred 

radioed London, reporting the nonarrival of their arms shipment 

and stating that large bodies of disorganized German troops 

were moving north through Montdidier toward Lille. A coded 

BBC broadcast heralded another drop for that evening, so once 

42 

again, the team assembled at DZ Moulin. This time, they waited 

until 0230, when a heavy thunderstorm struck. Team Alfred later 

learned that the arms shipment had been dropped some fifteen 

kilometers away, where the local Communist-Party-sponsored 

resistance group had retrieved it.51 

At this time, German activity forced Team Alfred to seek a 

safer location each day. On 28 August, they took shelter in a 

cave located in a small wood. That same day, the team sent 

SFHQ at least three messages, reporting that the Germans were 

destroying their air base at Creil, preparing bridges for demolition, and at several locations erecting antitank obstacles and 

minefields. The team also reported that it had dispatched five 

volunteers toward the Allied lines to gain tactical information. 

That same day, the team received its first message from SFHQ, 

enigmatically requesting exact map references-information the 

team was certain that agent “Pasteur” had already sent to 

London. 

On 29 and 30 August, the team informed SFHQ that the 

Germans were preparing the Oise bridges for demolition and 

suggested that to prevent their destruction, London should send 

arms and an SAS group if possible. Team Alfred also reported 

that the Oise valley remained heavily congested with German 

troops and gave the location of forty tanks south of CompiBgne. 

The team still hoped to set up several ambushes, even though 

it would have to use aged rifles and shotguns. Then at 1100 on 

30 August, it received the following message from SFHQ: “Would 

like you to take all possible steps on receipt this message to 

preserve following Somme bridges from enemy demolition. All 

bridges Amiens area. Also at Moreuil, Boves, Fiquigny, Conde, 

Longpre. Try to keep bridges in state of preservation for about 

4 days. This target of highest importance. Can drop arms to 

you from low flying typhoons if you need them.“58 

Team Alfred had still not received any arms drops, so 

attempting to stop the German Army from blowing up a number 

of bridges proved a rather difficult task. The team on 31 August 

radioed London twice requesting arms drops and that evening 

set off to conduct two ambushes. Lieutenant Herenguel and 

Sergeant Key remained with the ambush party, while Captain 

MacDougall took the radio with a horse and cart and attempted 

to contact the FFI in Amiens, When he arrived in Fen&es at 

the same time as an American armored column, an American 

staff officer provided him with a vehicle so he could rapidly 

reach Amiens. But just as he was preparing to leave Ferri&es, 
43 

word arrived that the British Army had already captured the 

town. Team Alfred’s ambushes went rather well, at Franc&es 

shooting up a German calumn while receiving few losses. The 

second ambush killed a small group of Germans while liberating 

thirty American prisoners of war. The following day, large U.S. 

Army forces overran the area. Team Alfred subsequently 

remained in the area working with the FFI attempting to locate 

German stragglers. After spending three days in Paris, the team 

returned to the United Kingdom on 27 September. 

The team concluded its after-action report with the following 

paragraph: ““This was the tale of the team Alfred, not a very 

glorious one but not through any fault of the team. If we had 

been dispatched when we were first ‘alerted’ some two weeks 

previous to our actual departure (team was ‘alerted’ and ‘briefed 

on 9 August but did not leave until 24 August) we could have 

done something useful.” Team Alfred spent four weeks in France, 

but only eight days before U.S. Army conventional forces overran 

the area. Perhaps their own postmortem was too critical, for 

the team did provide valuable information on German troop 

movements and defenses .5$ Lieutenant Herenguel died on 8 

September 1945 in Nape, Laos. Albert Key died shortly after 

the end of the war. The Jedburgh community subsequently lost 

contact with Captain MacDougall.ea 

2Ream Arnold, 24 August 1944 

The Marne Department of eastern France proved a difficuh 

area for the French Resistance. SOE resolved to open an intelligence circuit in this area and picked one of its more experienced operatives to lead it, Major Nicholas R. Bodington (almost 

always misspelled Boddington). A former Reuters Paris 

correspondent, Bodington had already undertaken several 

journeys to occupied France. SFHQ sent him to the Marne region 

in early July 1944 to reopen the PEDLAR circuit. Jedbugh Team 

Arnold would assist Bodington”s circuit in late August (see map 

82.61 

SFHQ dispatched Team Arnold late in the evening of 24 

August 1944 to the Marne area near Epernay to assist the local 

FFI. The team consisted of Captain Michel de Carville (French} 

of the French Colonial Infantry, Lieutenant J. H. F. Monahan 

(British), and Sergeant Alan de Ville (British). The team flew 

from Tarrant Rushton Airdrome at 2230 on 24 August in two 

.---.-- ~__--._-__.___ -... _ 
44 

5 0 1 2 3 KM 

SCALE 1 5rl.rJoo 

‘/ FORET DE VASS‘ 

Map 8. Team Arnold’s area of operations in the Marne Department 
The supply roam a$ Milton HalE 

Halifax bombers of the RAF”s 38th Group, taking with them 

thirty containers of supples. They dropped at 0030 on 25 August 

in civilian clothes southwest of Epernay near the village of 

Igny-Comblize. 62 The DZ was easily recognized, and the team 

jumped without difficulty. Major Bodington (code-named “Nick’“) 

led the reception committee, which fetched the containers and 

retrieved all the equipment except Team Arnold’s leg bags with 

their personal weapons, maps, uniforms, and crystals for the 

radio. As a result, the team could not contact SFHQ.63 

Major Bodington provided a secluded hunting lodges4 and 

several guides to the Jedburghs and suggested that they control 

the zone from Epernay west to Dormans. On 26 August, Team 

Arnold sent four agents (selected by Bodington) south to contact 

the advancing forces of the U.S. Third Army. The team also 

decided to form a Maquis as soon as possible. The local FFI 

had already armed some 260 men from “parachuted arms and 

hoped to field 200 more. On 27 August, while the team was 

visiting local FFI leaders, the resistance group in Cerseuil shot 

and killed a member of the Organization Todt (a labor organization that performed construction for the Wehrmacht). Team 
46 

Arnold decided to use this incident to raise the Cerseuil FFI to 

insurrection. On the way to Cerseuil, however, a German patrol 

spotted the team and drove it into hiding. The team spent that 

night in the village of Try. In the morning, they were awakened 

by the sound of German Army columns crossing the Marne River 

bridge at Try. Team Arnold sent word for the FFI to assemble 

at Try. Later in the morning, elements of the U.S. 7th Armored 

Division’s Combat Command B and the local FFI arrived and 

attempted to seize the Marne bridge. As the Allied forces 

approached, however, the German defenders blew up the bridge 

and successfully warded off a subsequent American attack. The 

FFI assisted the troops of the 7th Armored Division by providing 

a flank screen and taking care of the wounded.@ 

The German organization that prepared the defense of this 

sector of the Marne was Brigadier General Eckart von 

Tschammer und Osten’s Feldkommandantur 531, which administered the Marne Department, but from some distance away in 

Ch?dons-sur-Marne. Its nearest office or outpost was in Epernay. 

In Ch&lons the Germans did not view resistance activity as very 

threatening and continued to work until American armor arrived 

on 28 August. The Germans concentrated on repairing roads 

and bridges and preparing demolitions. One major problem was 

transporting French collaborators and their families east, with 

some 200 leaving Chalons-sur-Marne only on 27 August. Besides 

assembling livestock north of the Marne, the Feldkommandantur 

was also responsible for constructing defensive positions behind 

the river’s north bank. Only 7,690 of the requisitioned 12,000 

French workers appeared on the first day. The Germans soon 

noticed that the French were sabotaging their vehicles. Lieutenant General Franz Beyer’s LXXX Corps headquarters assisted 

in the construction of this sector of the Kitzinger Line. The 

German forces that crossed the Marne bridge at Dormans were 

the remnants of Lieutenant General Kurt von der Chevallerie’s 

First Army retiring from the upper Seine. Included in this force 

was a battle group of the Panzer Lehr Divisionflfl 

From 29 August until 2 September, Team Arnold collected 

weapons from the FFI. They reported no ,disturbances. On 2 

September, along with Major Bodington and his Maquis, the 

team moved to Montier-en-Der, where they were to help collect 

German stragglers. The team discovered few if any Germans at 

Montier-en-Der, however, and resolved to move on to St, Dizier. 

They found that town occupied by about three companies of 

resistance troops and contacted Colonel de Grouchy, the head 
47 

of the resistance in the Haute-Maine. Their tranquility was 

disturbed on 8 September, when news came down through FFI 

channels to prepare rapidly to move south. Team Arnold went 

to U.S. Third Army headquarters for more precise orders and 

in the hope of s~ecuring more arms. Personnel at Patton’s headquarters instructed them to move on Chaumont with all available 

forces to prevent German forces fimn escaping to the north.“? 

Major Bodington dispatched one company from St. Dizier 

toward Chaumont on 10 September. The following day, Team 

Arnold followed with two half companies. They found FFI troops 

oeeupying villages on the road between Juzonnoeourt and 

Boulogne, the latter village being ten kilometers north of 

Chaumont and the closest point to the German pasitions. The 

Zd French Armored Division secured Chaumont an 13 September, 

ending any possible threat to Patton”s s,outhern flank. 

On 14 September, the FFI forces returned home. Team 

Arnold reported in at Paris on the 19th and later continued on 

to London. They observed that they had been inserted far too 

late to organize and coordinate resistance activities, that it had 

taken too long far them to receive their requested arms drops, 

and that since they had been parachuted in civilian clothes, 

they should have been issued false identity papers. Team Arnold 

was in France only three days before linking up with the US. 

Third Army. Its remaining twenty-three days were devoted to 

colIeeting weapons and finally leading FFI troops to Chaumont.68 

Jedburgh training, as previously mentioned, proved quite 

rigorous and, at most times, injured Jeds could be found in the 

local hospital. In May, while the Jedburghs were forming their 

own teams at Milton Hall, Major Arthur du P. Denning (British), 

Lieutenant Franeois Coste (Frendh), and Master Sergeant Roger 

L. Pierre (U.S.), while in the hospital, resolved to form their 

own team. Denning was a rather imposing figure at six feet 

three inches in height, with a trim regimental mustache and 

ever-present pipe. Coste was a career officer in the French Army, 

a St. Cyr graduate, who was usually found smoking’s cigarette. 

Roger Pierre was a nineteen year oEd New Yorker. Upon their 

return to Milton Hall, their “self selection” was approved, and 

they volunteered to jump into France in civilian clothes. After 

receiving their briefing in London, however, their mission was 
48 

canceled. Finally, after waiting fourteen days in London, 

Denning and Coste received another briefing on 25 August. Team 

Archibald would jump in their uniforms near Nancy, contact 

“Planete,” and assist the FFI through training, liaison, and delivery of weapons. Their premission briefing, however, was based 

on information six months old, and hence out of date, They 

were not informed that other Allied agents were operating in 

the same area nor that Team Archibald would be delivering a 

large sum of money to “Planete.” The team was instructed to 

avoid pitched battles with Axis forces.69 

That same day, the team drove north for Harrington and 

took off in a bomber at 2045. The pilot had difficulty identifying 

the DZ but dropped the team and equipment an the second pass 

at 0110 of 26 August in the Nancy region near the For& de 

Charmes (see map 9). Two sixty-man reception committees, each 

desiring weapons, met the team. Major Denning gave half the 

weapons to each group and decided to join the For& de Charmes 

Maquis, which already possessed some weapons, was led by a 

Captain Noel, and was capable of some military action. On 

retrieval of the parachuted equipment, the team discovered that 

their radio set was destroyed and numerous weapons seriously 

damaged in the drop. Another agent from SFHQ, however, 

(code-named “Careful”) was in the area and informed London 

that Archibald had arrived. Team Archibald received another 

radio with the first parachuted delivery of supplies, 

Captain Noel led the team to his Maquis camp, where Major 

Denning and a former Yugoslavian captain attemped to repair 

the damaged firearms. Team Archibald also began to receive 

parachute drops-some expected, some a surprise. In the latter 

category was a ten-man Canadian SAS team with three jeeps 

led by a major code-named “Peter.” After much handshaking 

and backslapping, the SAS team drove off toward St. Die and 

never returned. Team Archibald later discovered that the entire 

SAS team was killed in combat. 

Archibald’s guerrilla band soon rose to a strength of 300 

armed and 250 unarmed men. “Planete” finally arrived to receive 

his 35 million francs, but he could offer little information on 

the resistance situation in the area. He promised, however, that 

one of his deputies would subsequently deliver that information. 

That deputy eventually arrived but only after the end of guerrilla 

operations with the arrival of U.S. Army field units. Upon 

learning of the approach of a German division, the group left 

150 armed men to await further arms drops in the For& de 
5 0 1 2 3 KM 

SCALE 1.50.000 
50 

Charmes and moved the remainder to Lemenil-Mitry in the Bois 

de Chivoiteux. 

The Germans subsequently swept the For& de Charmes, 

burning the village of St. Remy. Maquis Noel lost much of its 

impetus when “Planete” called its leader away to Nancy. On 2 

September, however, Captain Montlac led a resistance group to 

the German depot at Tantonville, in the afternoon ambushing 

a German column along the way and subsequently participating 

in an action at Tantonville. News received during the morning 

indicated that advancing US. Army field forces were only some 

thirty-five kilometers away, so Major Denning resolved to contact 

them. He encountered the 42d Cavalry Squadron and gave them 

his interpretation of the situation, but on the return trip, he 

ran into a skirmish and received a slight wound in the thigh, 

Upon returning to the Maquis camp, Denning discovered that 

Captain Coste and several of the group had been wounded, 

Owing to the severity of their wounds, Denning sent the wounded 

behind German lines to a Catholic hospital in Luneville. If asked, 

the driver carrying them was to declare that they were “innocent 

victims of FFI terrorists.” Denning remained with the Maquis, 

hoping to assist the U.S. Army in securing bridges over the 

Moselle.70 

The only bridges between Nancy and Charmes not defended 

and rigged for demolition were at the towns of Charmes and 

Langley. Denning’s group managed to capture the bridge at 

Charmes, driving off the small garrison in a coup de main in 

the evening, The U.S. Third Army, however, ran out of gasoline 

and was unable to push forward to Charmes. The Germans 

subsequently retook the town and destroyed the bridge during 

their defense of the Moselle. With the Americans temporarily 

out of fuel and German reinforcements now available, the front 

soon stabilized along the Moselle River. In early September, 

Patton’s forces secured bridgeheads across the Moselle north of 

Bayon at Lorey, St. Mard, and Velle and asked the FFI for 

assistance. Major Denning consequently took four companies of 

Maquis across the river, placing one company in each village 

and a fourth in Domptail. Captain Noel meanwhile formed an 

800-man mobile group that assisted in providing rear-area and 

flank protection in the no-man’s-land between the U.S. Third 

and Seventh Armies. Following a brief trip to Paris, Major 

Denning returned to the Nancy area, but by and large, 

Jedburgh-FFI operations had come to a close, The French 

government intended to incorporate the Maquis into a field army, 
51 

and SHAEF saw no further use for Jedburgh teams. Team 

Archibald made numerous requests for arms drops after 3 September, but SFIIQ or the RAF managed to avert the delivery 

of arms. Finally, on 31 October, the US. Third Army dire&d Team 

Archibald to return to the United Kingdom. Team Archibald 

served in the field for more than two months, although only 

nine days before the arrival of U.S. Third Army units. The team 

provided invaluable assistance in organizing a large Maquis that 

fought as a conventional infantry force with the U.S. Third 

Army along the Moselle River.7k 

Team St-anley, 31 August J-$44 

SFHQ dispatched Stanley as the fifty-third Jedburgh team 

to France on 31 August 1944 to the Haute-Marne region. It 

consisted of Captain Oswin E. &aster (British), Lieutenant 

Robert Cantais (French), and Sergeant E. J. (“‘Jack”) Grinham 

(British). In addition, two French aspirants, Lieutenants Denis 

and Ely, jumped with Team Stanley and accompanied them 

throughout the operation, usually commanding platoon-size FFI 

groups. &win Craster had served since 1939 in the 5th Battalion 

of the Oxfordshire and Buekinghamshire Light Infantry. When 

it became apparent that his unit would not be sent into combat, 

he and several of his comrades volunteered for operations behind 

German lines. Cantais was a regular in the French Army, who 

eventually retired as a colonel. Jack Grinham h%d previously 

served in the Rayal Armoured Corps. Their mission was to assist 

the FFI near Chaumont on the Plateau de Langres-particularly 

in setting up air-supply drops. ,SFHQ also directed them to 

prevent the destruction of several engineering structures in 

eastern France. By this late date, SFHQ knew of the imminent 

arrival of Allied ground forces, so Stanley received instructions 

to immediately dispatch agents to serve as guides for the 

advancing ground forces (see map la).72 

Team Stanley was in a London hotel as late as 31 August, 

wondering if they would in fact ever be sent into action, when 

they received the alert notification. As they drove north for 

Tempsford airfield, Craster and Cantais received their briefing 

in the back of a truck. Team Stanley took off at 2045 on 31 

August in a Stirling bomber. They parachuted shortly before 

midnight from too high an altitude, so the five parachutists and 

numerous cannisters scattered considerably near Riviere-les- 

53 

Fosses, about twenty-five kilometers south-southwest of Langres. 

The reception committee ass&ted in the retrieval of the equip 

ment and provided the team with shelter and transportation 

They spent the night’ in the village and on the evening of 2 

Septemb’er drove about twenty-two kilometers northeast in the 

rain to join an organized Maquis, which they found in the woods 

west of Buss&es-l&s-Belmont, On 3 September, the team reported 

that 300 armed Maquis were in the area along with three cornpanies of the French 1st Regiment, which had defected to the 

Allies along with sixty French gendtirmes. They estimated that 

another 2,000 Maquis could be raised if SFHQ dropped sufficient 

arms. The French 1st Regiment possessed only hght infantry 

weapons and enough ammunition to last one day. The team 

also discovered that the Germans had already destroyed the 

facilities SFHQ had requested saved.’ An SAS troop in jeeps 

arrived one morning and ‘asked to use the dedburgh’s radio, since 

theirs had been smashed on landing. Sergeant Grinham sent 

their message for them, and the SAS disappeared the following 

day? 

Through 14 September, Team Stanley provided excellent 

information to SFHQ on German forces in the area, including 

the heavy road traffic toward Langres (held by 8,000 Germans, 

with one general identified) and Chaumont (which the Germans 

were preparing for defense). The team attempted to avoid pitched 

battles as a result of insufficient arms and ammunition. Beginning on 7 September, however, they began to capture small 

groups of German troops attempting to escape east from the 

Ray of Biscay on the road from Champlite to Bonne. On 8 

September, the team received its first message from SFHQ, which 

requested more information on a prospective DZ. The following 

night, however, the team received its weapons drop. On 11 September, a large body af German troops and their Russian 

auxiliaries occupied the villages of Grenant, Saulles, and 

Belmont. A platoon of the French 1st Regiment on its way to 

guard the Saulles Chateau ran into these German forces and 

was repulsed. Team Stanley radioed SFHQ and requested that 

Allied aircraft attack the Germans dug in around the Belmont 

cemetery. Three hours later, four U.S. P-47s arrived and inflicted 

considerable damage an the German force, particularly the 

motorized transports. Team Stanley reported that they had no 

idea whether the P-47s’ arrival was a result of their message or 

simply a coincidence, but. it certainly improved their relations 

with the Maquis. 
54 

On the following day, Team Stanley radioed London that 

the German forces around Belmont remained stationary and 

indicated that they would surrender to the US. Army, but not 

to the FFI. On the same day, the FFI captured five Indians in 

German uniforms (from the Indian Legion). On 13 September, 

the Maquis contacted reconnaissance elements of French troops 

of the U.S. Seventh Army advancing from the south. While the 

French unit attacked the three villages occupied by the Germans 

(Grenant, Saulles, and Belmont), Team Stanley and the Maquis 

helped mop up German stragglers in the woods, guarded POWs, 

and protected the unit’s rear. On 15 September, SFHQ told Team 

Stanley that their mission was completed and to return to 

England via Paris. 

It remains unclear when Team Stanley dispatched local FFI 

volunteers to contact advancing Allied ground forces. In all 

probability, they did so on 1 or 2 September, since the volunteers 

returned to inform Team Stanley that they had successfully made 

contact. Since Team Stanley jumped into the no-man’s-land between the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies, they sent messengers 

in both directions.74 

Team Stanley served in the field for fifteen days. Later, they 

reported that they had been dispatched to France at least a 

month too late. They obviously had little time to prepare the 

Maquis for combat. In addition, Team Stanley had instructions 

to prevent the destruction of several engineering structures, but 

when they landed, the Germans had already destroyed them. 

The team also observed that while the former Vichy officers 

were far too passive, the young volunteers performed quite well. 

The team also felt that SFHQ ignored their messages, particularly their requests for arms drops and an undamaged radio 

set. The team suggested that in the future, such Jedburgh teams 

be capable of direct communication with Allied aircraft so that 

enemy columns could be attacked immediately.76 

Team Rupert-Philip, 31 August 1944 

SFHQ dispatched Rupert on the night of 31 August as the 

fifty-first Jedburgh team to France, It was to enter the 

Meurthe-et-Moselle region, assist the local FFI, particularly with 

communications and resupply, and provide information to 

advancing Allied ground forces. The team consisted of Captain 

J. Liberos (France), First Lieutenant Robert A. Lucas (U.S.), and 
Specialist Third Class Joseph M. Grgat (U.S. Navy), Liberos 

was a career officer in his early forties, a St. Cyr graduate 

originally from Rouen. Robert Lucas was a twenty-seven year 

old infantry officer from Sheldon, Iowa, who had served in the 

Iowa National Guard and received his commission in 1942. 

Joseph Grgat was about twenty-one years old and from Uniontown, Pennsylvania. A young Frenchman in civilian clothes 

briefed Team Rupert in a safe house in the suburbs of northern 

London, telling them that their main’ mission was to prevent 

German sabotage of French utility structures between Nancy 

and Verdun. The team departed Har’rington Air Base at 2125 

of 31 August and flew east without incident. West of Mirecourt, 

they parach’uted at about 0200, landed safely, and were met by 

a reception committee of about fifty FFI. Ten minutes later, 

another team of two French officers landed at the DZ from 

another B-24, so the area proved rather noisy and overcrowded. 

Team Rupert recovered all its gear except their civilian clothes, 

two carbines, and two bags including the cipher document. They 

decided to accompany the Offroicourt Maquis, which had three 

trucks and drove them most of the way to the camp (see maps 

11 and 12).76 

On Friday I September, SFHQ radioed Team Rupert to tell 

them the team’s” name was changed to Philip, The team’s radio, 

however, had been misplaced by the Maquis during the move, 

so they were out of contact with London. They spent the day 

with the Offroicourt Maquis, which consisted of about 100 men 

organized in 3 platoons. They spent the night in Viviers-le? 

Offroicaart attempting to contact a representative of “Planete.“\ 

The following dgy around noon, the team met a light column 

of the .U.S. Third Army at Jevoneourt. Team Philip recovered 

its radio, but their search of the DZ did not produce the lost 

cipher document. The team spent the night at Foreelles-St. 

Gorgon and on the morning of Sunday, 3 September, set off to 

contact the Lemenil-Mitry Maquis. That Maquis, which worked 

with Team Archibald (see pp. 47--51), had withdrawn from the 

For&t de Charmes and consisted of about 3,00 armed and 400 

unarmed men. Team Philip, at about 0900~ 9found them at a 

large abandoned building, where they were under periodic fire 

from a German heavy-weapons platoon. In fighting west of 

Bayon and. so’uth ,of the Rayon-Vezelise road, the Germans 

inflicted rather heavy casu<ies on the Maquis, including three 

officers. At about noon, Team Philip radioed SFHQ, stating that 

they were with Team Archibald at Lemenil-Mitry and requesting 
56 

, , _ . 

.~Lemenil-Mitry 

Map 11, Team Rupert-Philip’s area of operations in the Meurthe-et-Moselle 
67 

an arms drop for 500 men at a DZ 3 kilometers west-southwest 

of Bayon (see map 12).77 

With the death of Captain Maurin and the absence of Major 

Denning, Captain Liberos of Team Philip attempted to prevent 

the Germans from destroying the bridges at Bayon and Bainville. 

Liberos sent two young French women on bicycles to determine 

if and how the Germans were defending the bridges. He also 

dispatched three groups of Maquis to the two towns to fire on 

the Germans if the latter attempted to blow up the bridges. In 

addition, he sent three volunteers to Bayon to sabotage the 

electric charges for its three bridges. At 1700, Team Philip 

radioed SFHQ, reporting that the bridge at Bayon was mined 

but not heavily guarded and that Majors Denning and Montlac 

had been slightly wounded. Major Denning returned at 2000 and 

approved Captain Liberos’ actions.78 

On Monday, 4 September, with the return of Major Denning, 

Team Philip prepared to travel to Nancy, The team left 

Lemenil-Mitry at approximately 1900 in a truck. As they were 

driving out of Houdreville at about 2015, a column of military 

vehicles approached from the rear and opened fire.. The three 

Jedburghs and their French driver all jumped out of the truck 

to seek cover. The approaching column proved to be the Reconnaissance Platoon of the U.S. 25th Cavalry from the U.S. Third 

Army. Its -lieutenant regretted firing on Team Philip, fearing 

that the gunfire had alerted the German column he was stalking 

on a parallel road. Captain Liberas, Lieutenant Lucas, and the 

driver remained uninjured, but they could not locate Specialist 

Grgat. They consequently spent the night in the For& 

Domaniale-de-Serres west of Houdreville (two kilometers north 

of Vezelise) with an American platoon. The following day, as 

more U.S. Army field units passed through the area towards 

the Moselle River, the team searched for Specialist Grgat, but 

without success. In the evening, they entered their slightly 

altered truck and drove to Parey-St. Cesaire, where they spent 

the night. On Wednesday at noon, they radioed SFHQ, reporting 

that they were in the For& de Goviller (five kilometers northnortheast of Goviller), that they had still not contacted “Planete,” 

and again requesting resupply of their codes. That evening, as 

they were starting a trip to Toul, they encountered Colonel 

Charles H. Reed, commander of the U.S. 2d Cavalry Group, and 

followed his advice that it would be best to spend the night in 

the forest.7g 

Gn Thursday, 7 September, the team drove to Toul, where 

they contacted the local Maquis leader and Lieutenant Ripley 
58 

- 

Map 12. Team Rupert-Philip’s area of operations (additional) in the Meurthe-et-Moselle 
59 

of the US. Third Army’s 11th Special Forces Detachment. Team 

Philip radioed SFHQ in the afternoon, informing London that 

it was impossible to contact “Planete” in Nancy and requesting 

new orders. They awaited instructions from SFHQ until 9 September, when they drove to the headquarters of the U.S. Third 

Army. There, the Special Forces detachment commander informed 

them that Specialist Grgat had escaped and was on his way 

back to London. Lieutenant Colonel Powell gave Team Philip 

the following mission: 

In liaison with the Chef de BataiElon Joly. Lieutenant Couton, 

.F.F.I. Chief at Verdun, and Chef de Rata&n Duval, F.M.R. for the 

region Cornflans.Brieg-Lorrgwy-Longayon, ta arm the Maquis of 

Verdun (2,000 men) and of Conflans (1,000 men). Once the men are 

armed and regrouped in the north, to pratect the left flank of the 

3rd U.S. Army.8ff 

Team Philip operated out of Verdun for the next weeks and 

met with a local FFI officer in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain 

arms drops from SFHQ. On Sunday, 17 September, the 11th 

Special Forces Detachment at U.S. Third Army headquarters 

directed the team to report to the 12th Special Forces Detachment at the H&e1 Cecil in Paris. Liberos and Lucas remained 

in Paris for several days and then returned to London. 

Team ‘Philip served in the field seventeen days, a period 

marked by repeated frustrations. Its members concluded that they 

had been dispatched to France far too late. They also observed 

that they were never able to contact “Planete” or his deputies 

and consequently were unable to reach Nancy. They noted that 

the Maquis from rural areas proved more &able than their 

urban counterparts. Team Philip also coneluded that the resistance volunteers were very enthusiastic but took too many casualties in combat. Robert Lucas subsequently served with the OSS 

in northern China. He left -the U.S. Army as a captain in January 1946 and settled in the greater Kansas City area. After 

World War II, Joseph Grgat resided in Bowling Green, Ohio, 

where he died in early May 1988. Captain Liberos survived the 

war to retire as a colonel in Toolon.** 

The operations of the eleven Jedburgh teams in northeastern 

France demonstrate a number of institutional failings. It would 

be altogether too easy ta focus one’s attention on radios that 
60 

did not function, teams inserted too late, or army staffs without 

the ability to directly contact the special operations forces (SOF) 

teams on the paths of their advance. One major problem was 

that SOE and OSS were new organizations attempting to conduct 

special operations with the new means of radio and aircraft. It 

should not be surprising that new organizations breaking new 

ground would encounter unforeseen difficulties. The second major 

problem was with the officer corps of the Allied armies, particularly at the senior levels, which remained unaware of the capabilities of SOF teams beyond postlinkup tactical assistance. 

Most U.S. Army division, corps, army, and army group 

headquarters turned in favorable reports on both the French 

Resistance and the Special Forces detachments for the summer 

campaign of 1944. U.S. Army field commanders were particularly 

enthusiastic regarding the help provided by French guides who 

accompanied American units, briefed them on local conditions, 

interpreted for them, and led them around German positions. 

In short, U.S. commanders appreciated the tactical benefits provided by the French Resistance. There is scant reference, however, in the SF detachment summaries to Jedburgh teams or 

other special operations teams.B2 

The SF detachments themselves frequently remarked that 

army headquarters remained uncertain where they would be 

operating in the future, which naturally retarded planning. On 

29 July 1944, the First Army’s 10th SF Detachment planned 

ahead only as far as Chartres and Dreux, and they were still 

not examining the area north of the Seine on 2 August. One of 

the problems was that the American staff officers and commanders had been schooled to not extend their boundary lines 

beyond the front, a practice many still maintained in August 

1944. On 24 August, the detachment observed: “The army tactical 

plan is still confused. Col(one1) Colby at this moment is conferring at 12 Army Group with Col(one1) Jackson and it is expected 

that he will bring back to this Hq future tactical plans of the 

American Armies on the continent.“6s 

Besides a reluctance to plan ahead and inform subordinate 

headquarters of those plans, it would seem that the SF detachments did not always receive timely and accurate reports from 

SFHQ regarding resistance activities, as the following summary 

reveals: 

Resistance Activities at V Corps: On arriving at this Corps on 

7 September, we found them in the midst of the French Ardennes. 

They had just picked up the Citronelle Mission and Jedburgh 
61 

Andrew. These missions proved very disappointing, as they had been 

quite inactive. From their reports to London which had been transmitted to us in the field it had never appeared that resistance was 

very well organized in the Ardennes. This was found to be the 

opposite of the truth, and it seems that it was the Citronelle Mission 

that was not well organized. The local FFI had been doing a 

marvelous job for the V Corps throughout the entire area. The G-3 

assigned, through Major Broussard, areas of responsibility to the 

FFI. It was very interesting to see that on the G-3 operations map 

the boundaries laid out for the FFI, as well as for the regular 

regiments and battalions, Major Broussard had one group of almost 

500 armed men whom he dispatched here and there to clean up 

German pockets. Where necessary the FIJI groups were augmented 

by light tanks and on several occasions with Anti-Aircraft units. It 

is interesting to note that the AA units in this Corps were used 

mostly to clean up Germans and not in their normal role.*4 

This summary is revealing in several aspects. It tells us 

that the SF detachment was unaware of the difficulties in 

operating agents and networks in eastern France and Belgium, 

of the previous troubles SQE had encountered there, and of the 

very difficult time the CITRQNELLE Mission (and Team 

Andrew) had in the Ardennes. The above-quoted summary also 

reveals that in spite of the difficulties, many French and 

Belgians came out to help the Allied cause once there was a 

realistic chance to participate without committing suicide. One 

might disparage such late election, but the vohmteers provided 

valuable as,sistance that SHAEF’s ground commanders appreciated. Furthermore, eastern France and Belgium proved one of 

the more difficult areas in which to operate, and premature 

revolts, as has been demonstrated, often led to catastrophe. 

Finally, the detachment’s summary indicates certain preconceived 

notions about daing business, for example, a tendency to equate 

success with quantification: the number of armed FFI fielded, 

the number of POWs taken, or the number of sabotage actions. 

Those totals were usually associated with tactical missions. 

Operational significance, possibilities for further exploitation, or 

lessons learned tended to be deemphasized. It would appear, 

therefore, that the army headquarters were not the only ones 

thinking shallow and not deep. 

The 11th SF Detachment of the U.S. Third Army used FFI 

troops to a far greater extent than the US. First Army. The 

U.S. Third Army used large bodies of resistance troops to assist 

in the reduction of German garrisons of the Breton seaports 

and subsequently used some 15,000 FFI troops to guard the Loire 

River line as the U.S. Third Army swept east toward the German 

border. Nevertheless, there are relatively few references in the 
62 

11th SF Detachment’s summaries to Jedburgh teams, and those 

merely reported the linkup of ground units with the Jedburgh 

teams. The detachment observed the 4 September FFI capture 

of the Moselle bridge at Charmes but failed to mention the 

participation of Jedburgh teams.85 

As demonstrated in the reports of the eleven Jedburgh teams 

dropped in front of the 12th Army Group, most Jedburghs concluded that they had been inserted far too late. That sentiment 

was shared by many other Jedburgh teams regarding their own 

operations. Such spirit and aggressiveness speaks well for those 

soldiers but raises a number of awkward questions. We have 

observed how inherently dangerous such operations were. What 

would the teams have accomplished had they in fact been inserted a month or two earlier? In all probability, they would 

have recruited, armed, and trained more FFI volunteers. Had 

that been done, it would have made it all the more difficult to 

restrain the FFI from premature revolt and also would have 

given Axis security forces greater opportunity to infiltrate the 

resistance. The teams would also have sent additional radio 

messages to London, which would have given the Germans a 

greater opportunity to locate the radios with direction-finding 

sets. There were many areas in occupied France where it was 

very hazardous for individual agents to operate. To have inserted 

three-man, uniformed teams into such areas probably would have 

been risking too much. 

One of the major problems with SOF operations in 1944 

was clearly communications. Jedburgh team reports indicate that 

radios packaged in 1944 had a tendency to break during parachute drops. During training exercises early in 1944, a number 

of problems became evident, but by August, those problems had 

obviously not been resolved. Jedburgh team reports also demonstrated the feeling that their radio messages were not being 

listened to or acted upon. It would appear that in August 1944, 

the SFHQ message centers were receiving so much traffic that 

it became impossible to analyze, act upon, and disseminate information. The difficulties in the field were best summarized in 

the report of the SF detachment officer operating with the U.S. 

4th Armored Division in Brittany, who on 12 August observed: 

In my estimation and in the Division’s the FFI did good work. 

It was a great sense of security to see armed friendly civilians all 

around us. They served an excellent purpose in that they helped to 

guard our supply lines and that they rounded up and cleared the 

area of German stragglers. However, due to lack of communications 
63 

between myself and this Headquarters, and myself and field, R&stance could not be controlled to the maximum effectiveness for use 

to the Division. Due to a lack of concrete orders, both concise and 

timely, from London, greater action on the part of Resistance in 

front of the Division was lost. All told, I would estimate that Resistance had been used at 50 percent efficiency in the Brittany 

campaign.86 

In the area of communications, there were obvious problems 

with the radio sets, Furthermore, in August 1944, SFHQ receiving 

stations received too many messages to effectively evaluate and 

act upon. And finally, a real problem existed in the inability of 

the ground force headquarters to effectively communicate tactically with the SOF groups. 

One problem not unique to operations in the summer of 1944 

was the dilemma of SOF organization. As a number of Jedburgh 

team reports indicate, when teams requested reinforcement by 

an SAS party, they usually did not receive it. On the other 

hand, there were numerous instances of Jedburgh teams 

encountering unannounced SAS parties. In most instances, when 

that occurred, the two groups simply went their separate ways. 

These “private wars” of the SAS often hindered the resistance, 

drawing Axis retaliation against the resistance and local villagers, usually after the SAS party had already extitrated. One 

thing is certain, however, and that is that the creation of separate and competing organizations, such as the SAS and SFHQ, 

leads to overlapping functions and creates the opportunity for 

unnecessary friction. 

At army and army group headquarters, staff cells did on 

occasion incorporate SOF into their future plans. Before the 

Operation Cobra breakout f?ram Normandy, SIIAEF developed 

a plan using a large portion of the SAS brigade to cooperate 

with ground units in capturing Quiberon Bay in Brittany. That, 

like many other plans, was soon outdistanced by events. When 

the 21st Army Group undertook the ill-fated Operation MarketGarden in September, six Jedburgh teams deployed to support 

the operation.*7 In the Jedburgh team operations we have looked 

at, hawever# there was only one instance of an army or army 

group request for direct operational support: the 30 August request to seize and bold the Somme River bridges and those near 

Amiens for four days. Team Angustus was wiped out that 

evening, and Team Alfred was too far away and in too threatened a position to undertake the mission. The request itself, 

however, was far too ambitious. It might have been possible 

for each team to sneak in and b’law up one bridge, but it would 
64 

have been suicide to attempt to hold those bridges for any length 

of time. 

Within the British special operations community, there was 

a feeling that the higher-level commanders, particularly 

Montgomery, failed to appreciate the possible uses of SOF. It 

remains difficult, however, to find a U.S. Army commander who 

had a firm grasp of those potentialities. One searches in vain 

through the published Patton Papers for a reference to SOF, 

finally discovering a transcript of a 7 September 1944 press 

conference where a correspondent asked how much support he 

had received from the FFI. Patton responded: “Better than 

expected and less than advertised.“88 In his diary, however, on 

2 September 1944, he observed: “General ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan 

was in camp when I got back and was most complimentary. 

While I think the efforts of his cohorts (office of strategic 

services) are futile, I personally like and admire him a lot. I 

will now get set for the next move.“ag This is not meant to single 

out General Patton as one of the generals who stubbornly 

opposed the use of SOF. To the contrary, he proved one of the 

commanders open to new ideas. He in fact used the FFI and 

SOF teams from SFHQ to a greater extent than his colleagues. 

Nonetheless, he disapproved of them. If even the bold and 

imaginative commanders disapproved of operations in the 

enemy’s rear, what chance did such operations have in SHAEF’s 

future? The answer to that question was not long in coming; 

SHAEF began to disassemble the SF detachments during the 

first week of September 1944, and by the end of the year, most 

of the Jedburghs and a large number of other SOF personnel 

had been transferred to Asia. SHAEF justified its decision by 

observing that there was no prospect for successful guerrilla 

warfare in Germany. That was no doubt a correct assessment, 

but one also senses a certain relief, as if unwanted house guests 

had finally departed. 

One is left finally with the impression that the concept of 

Jedburgh operations was ahead of its time. The requirements 

for radios, modified aircraft, and other specialized equipment and 

weapons pushed the limits of 1943-44 technology and were not 

entirely reliable. In the realm of organization, this concept was 

relatively new and of necessity grew out of SOE’s experiences 

in intelligence gathering. Indeed, one of the most instructive 

examples from these operations was the use of intelligencegathering networks that provided guides and security for the 

insertion of the Jedburgh teams (what is known in today’s 
65 

Special Forces lexicon as “area assessment” or “pilot” teams). 

That SFHQ organization proved deficient in a number of areas 

(i.e., failure to develop networks in eastern France, late deployment of Jedburgh teams, and inability to rapidly resupply teams 

in the field) should not have came as a surprise since such a 

major undertaking had not been tried before. Furthermore, the 

inability of senior ground commanders to appreciate the value 

of SOF and operations in the enemy’s rear must also be placed 

within the historical context. For the generals of World War 

II-educated in the military schools of the 1929s and 1930sguerrilla warfare tended to be an alien concept.90 One of the 

most important lessons to be learned from these operations is 

that senior ground force commanders and their staffs must be 

fully educated in SOF capabilities and limitations. 

It remains difficult to assess the effectiveness of the eleven 

Jedburgh teams dropped in front of the 12th Army Group in 

August 1944. ‘Like the other teams dropped to the south, they 

provided organization, tactical expertise, and training to the FFI 

volunteers. Upon linkup with advancing Allied ground \ forces, 

they also provided well-documented assistance. The teams were 

designed, however, to work behind enemy lines, and it is on 

that basis that their performance must be evaluated. Viewed 

dispassionately, one must conclude that the operations of these 

eleven teams in northeastern France were only marginally successful. Their major contributions were indirect and defy quantification: their psychological effect upon occupied France and the 

German occupation force and their role in providing intelligence 

data, both to SFHQ by radio and by sending guides to meet 

the advancing Allied ground forces. That the teams could have 

been much more effective certainly was not the fault of the 

individual Jedburghs, who proved tough, resourceful, skilled, and 

highly motivated. It was not the job of these teams to singlehandedly defeat the German Army in the west, and in any case, 

three-man teams were absurdly small, In the event of even one 

casualty, operations became extremely difficult if not impossible. 

If the Jedburghs may be faulted for anything, it is perhaps 

that they were too willing to enter into combat. 

It would be altogether too easy to describe the shortcomings 

of these operations as the result of an institutional failure, but 

there was no SOF institution per se to blame. SOE and OSS 

were brand new organizations inventing the scope, direction, 

organization, and methods of SOF operations. SOE and OSS were 

so new and insecure that they were both abolished in 1946 and 
66 

therefore do not actually qualify as institutions. Upon reflection, 

it appears remarkable that SFHQ achieved as much as it did. 

One of the more important successes of the Jedburgh operations 

was the psychological impact the teams had on the citizens of 

occupied France. Following years of occupation, the sight of 

uniformed Allied soldiers behind the lines was a harbinger of 

liberation and a call to action. As these Jedburgh team operations have demonstrated, that call did not go unanswered. The 

ultimate triumph of the Jedburgh project, however, was in the 

successful formation of teams of professional and nonprofessional 

soldiers from different nations who worked together toward a 

common goal. To make an accurate and fair evaluation of 

Jedburgh operations, it remains clear that more study is required, 

not only of Jedburgh activities in other parts of France but 

also their subsequent operations in China and Southeast Asia. 
APPENDIX A 

Air-Dropped Supplies to Occupied France, 

October 1943-September 1944 

Containers Packages 

RAF USAAF RAF USAAF 

Ott--Dee 1943 1,202 - 263 - 

Jan-Mar 1944 6,096 619 1,676 22% 

Apr-Jun 1944 12,188 4,151 2,828 2,359 

Jul-Sep 1944 29,932 15,423 4,591 7,642 

67 
Team 

Jacob 

Date Inserted End of Mission Mission 

12 August 

Auhrey 12 August 

Augustus 

Andrew 

o-3 

and Bernard 

co 

Alfred 

Arnold 

Archibald 

StdeY 

RUpSrtPhilip 

15 August 

15 Aunust 

20 August 

24 August 

25 August 

26 August 

18 September 

30 August 

30 Auaurrt 

8 September 

2 October 

2’7 September 

19 September 

31 October 

31 August 15 September 

31 August 17 September 

Assist local FFI. 

Ass& local FFT. 

As& local FFI 

and CITRONELLE 

inter-Allied mission. 

Atmist local FFI. 

Assist local PH. 

Assist local FFI. 

Assist local FFI. 

Assist Inca1 FFI and 

prevent destrvction 

of several enginewing 

struetur!%. 

Losses 

Team wiped out 

by 18 September. 

Capt. Chaigneau 

kilbxi in action. 

All killed by 

SO August. 

D’ckdtremont 

slightly wounded. 

No killed, four 

of six wounded. 

NOW% 

NOXi@. 

Capt, Caste wounded. 

NOW% 

Assist local FFI and NOIlt% 

prevent destruction 

of utility structures 

in eastern France. 

Re

Numeraus FFI ca

Eighty-six FFI ki

Provided informat

movements. 

Numerous FFI ca

Misdon comprom

Lea Islettes, 24 A

Provided informat

movements and 

Led PFl advance 

Directed WI ae 

with U.S. Third 

Provided infmmat

troop movements. 

U.S. Seventh Arm

Helped screen lef

Armu. 

r-. . 
NOTES 

1, William B. Dreux, NQ Bridges BEown, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 

Dame Freas, 1971). 

2. M. R. D. Foot, SQE in France: An Account of the Work of the &itish 

Special Operations Executive in France, 1940-$944 (London: Her Majesty’s 

Stationery Office, 1966), l-39; Renjamin Cowburn, A% Cloak, MO Dagger 

(London: Jarrolds, 1966); Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Yaws (London: MuUer, 

1957); Bickham Sweet-Es&%, Baker Street IrreguEar (handan: Methuen, 

1965); and David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, f94@-1945: A 

Srsrvey of b&z Special @per&ions Executive, I%%& Doczlments (Toronto: 

University of Toronto Press, 1985). 

3. F. H, H&key, et al., British Izztelligence in the Secmd World War: Its 

Ir@ence on Strategy and Operatiom, 3 Vola. (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 1979-88). 

4. John Strawson, R History of the S.A.S. Regiment (London: Seeker & 

Warburg, 1985), l-19. 

5. Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: The O.S.S. and the Origins of 

the CIA. (New York: Basic Books, 1983). See also William Casey, The 

Secret War Against Hitler (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988); 

United States War Department, Strategic Services Unit, History Project, 

Vol. 1, The War Report of the 0% (Off ice of Strategic Services), and Vol. 

2,, The Overseas Rugets: Eke War Repwt of the QSS, with a new introduc 

tion by Kermit Roosevelt (New York WaIker and Co., 1976), hereafter cited 

as WDSSUHP, with the short title for the volume; Thomas F. Tmy, Donovan 

altd C.I.A.:~ A History of the Establishment of the Central InteEEigenee 

Agency (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books., 1981); Corey Ford, Donovan of 

0.S.S. (Boston, EUIA: Little, Brown & Co,, 1970; and Stewart Alsop and 

Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: T&e 0. S. S. and American Espionage (New 

York: Reynal P Hit&cock, 1946). 

6. M. 3X D. Foot, SOE: An Outline History of the SpeciaE Opemtims Executive, 

TM?--46, rev. ed., Foreign Intelligence Book Series (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), 19, hereafter cited as Foot, SOE (rev. 

ed.). 

7. Ibid, 13-36; and Gervase Cowell, SOE Adviser, Great @it&in Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office, to Captain Robert G. Gutjahr, 14 February 1990, 

provided by Gutjahr to the author. A photograph of Gubbins appears in 

Foot, SOE in France, opposite page 196. 

8. Ibid.; and Arthur Brown, “The Jedburghs: A Short History” (privately 

published, Kent, United Kingdom, 1%X), l-5. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid.. 

11. GSS’London: Special Operations Branch and Secret intelligence Branch 

War Diaries (microfilm; Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 

1985), roll 3, frames Q631-33, hereafter cited as OSS/London SO microfilm. 

12. Ibid. 

71 
72 

13. Cowell to Gutjahr. 

14. OSS/London SO microfilm, roll 3, frames 631-43. 

15. Ibid., roll 3, frames 643-44. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Ibid., roll 3, frames 644-46. 

18. Colonel C. S. Vanderblue, memorandum to General William J. Donovan, 

Subject: Report of C. S. Vanderblue on OSS Operations with the Third 

Army, 15 November 1944, Entry 99, Folder 50, Box 12, Record Group 

226, Records of the Washington History Office, Office of Strategic Services 

National Archives, Washington, DC, hereafter cited as RG 226. 

19. Ibid.; European Theater of Operations Report July 1944, RG 226, Entry 

99, Folder 117, Box 93, RG 226; U.S. Army, 3d Army 11th Special Forces 

Detachment, G-3 Section Plan for Resistance Movements in Brittany, 10 

August 1944, London SO., Entry 115, Box 50, RG 226; and Colonel Frank 

Mills, U.S.A. (ret.), telephone conversation with the author, 14 September 

1988. 

20. OSS/London SO microfilm, roll 3, frames 672-76; and Foot, SOE in 

France, 16-39, 278-86, and 360-69. 

21. General Marie-Pierre J. F. Koenig was born in 1898, became a professional 

officer, and served in World War I and the Rif campaign. In 1940, he participated in the Allied Expedition to Norway and subsequently joined General 

de Gaulle in Paris, He distinguished himself at Bir Hakeim in the 1941 

Gazala battles in North Africa. In 1944, he became Commander of the 

French Forces of the Interior and subsequently was the military governor 

of Paris, and later commander of the French occupation army in Germany. 

He died in 1970. 

22. Throughout August, SFHQ operated under the titular direction of the 

organization created for General Koenig, the Etat-major des Forces 

Francaises de l’Int6rieur (EMFFI). For the sake of simplicity, however, the 

author decided to continue the 1944 U.S. Army nomenclature of SFHQ as 

the organ of command. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, United 

States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 138-67 and 231-39; and 

Franklin Canfield, telephone conversation with the author, 29 December 

1988. 

23. “Planete” was the code name of Gilbert Y. E. Grandval, who was born on 

12 February 1904 in Paris. He was a businessman until 1940, when the 

fall of France led him to join the French Resistance. Following the war, 

he served as governor of the Sarre and subsequently held numerous ambassadorial posts for the French government. Gilbert Grandval and A. Jean 

Collin, Lib&ration de 1’Est de la France (Paris: Hachette Litterature, 1974); 

John Bross, telephone conversation with the author, 18 March 1989; and 

Joseph de Francisco, telephone conversation with the author, 23 March 

1989. 

24. OSS/London SO microfilm, roll 3, frames 648-61. 

25. Ibid. 
73 

26. Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novata, CA: Presidio Press, lS86), 13-31; Dreux, hr, Bridges B&w, 25-69; 

Robert G. Gutjahr, “The Role af Jedburgh Teams in Operation Market 

Garden,” MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990, 36-34; and Elliot J. Rosner, “The Jedburghs: 

Combat Operations Conducted in the Finis&e Region of Brittany, France, 

From July-September 1944,‘” MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990, 24-32. 

27. Ibid. 

28. OSS/London SO microfilm, roll 3, frames 631-84; Faot, SOE in France, 

400-402; WDSSUHP, The Overseas Targets, 199-204; Col. Aaron Bank, 

U.S. Army [ret.), interview with the author, Fayetteville, NC, 29 April 1985; 

Major &win Craster, British Army (ret.), to the author, 25 November 1988; 

and Robert Lucas, telephone conversation with the author, 28 December I 

1988. 

29. Foot, SOE [rev. ed.), 167. 

30. OSS/London SO micro~film, roll 5, frame 162. 

31. Hobart R. Gay, Diary, entry of 6 August 1944, p. 442, Hobart R. Gay Papers, 

Archives US. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 

32. I have resolved to translate Feldgendarmerie as military police. Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich, Ia Nr. LI60/44 g.Kdos., Paris of 15 March 

1944, Einsatzbericht fuer die Monate Januar und Februar LS44, in folder 

RW 35/30 Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich Abt. Ia Einsatebericht 

1.1.44-29.2.44, Bundesarchiv-Milit&rarchiv, Freibury in Breisgau, Federal 

Republic of Germany, hereafter cited as B&MA.; and Feldgendarmerie 

Trupp d 728 Tgb,-Nr. 41/44 geh. Sens, 11 February 1944, Erfahrungen im 

Kampf gegen den Terror und Widerstand; Befehlshaber Nordwestfrankreich 

Abt. Ic, 5 August 1944, Ereignis- und Erfahrungsbericht fusr die Zeit vom 

1.7. his 31.7.1944 Nr. 31; 4. Kampanie 2, Funkmessabteilung B. Nr. G 667/44, 

15 May 1944, Kurzbrief Auszug aus Geheim-Tagesbefehl Nr. l/44, in RW 

35145, untitled, B.A.-MA. 

33. The Third Reich maintained the fibtion of an independent Vichy government, so the Eeldkommandantur staffs in southern France carried the 

nomenclature of German Liaison Staff, folder RW 35’31 Mil. Bef.Fr. KlK5 Kartenband; Bericht der Verw. Gruppe der FK 769 Chaumont 10.9.1944, 

signed Bberrat Dr. A&en, in RW 35/1278, B.A.-MA. 

34. Vi&r A. Gough was born on 11 September 1918 in Hereford and before 

the war worked as a mechanical en&eer in Bristol for the Imperial Tobacco 

Company. He received his commissian in the Somerset Light Infantry in 

1940. Captain Maurice Boissarie used the nom de guerre of Baraud. Team 

Jacob report, frames 376-79, roll 4, CBS/London SO mic%o&lm; Daphne 

Friele to the author, 17 February 1988; Joseph de Fran&co, telephone 

conversation with the author, 2 October 1989; and Strawsan, A History of 

the &AS. Regiment, 136-40, 273. 

35. Team Jacob report. 

36. The OSS history erroneously listed the 15 September message as being 

sent ~‘n 15 August. Daphne Friele to the author, 17 February 1988; Daphne 
74 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

Friele, telephone conversation with the author, 1.2 November 1988; and E. 

J. Grinham to the author, 1 December 1988. See also Gilbert Grandval and 

A. Jean Collin, Libtfration de l%st de la France (Paris: Hachette Litterature, 

1974), 112-15, 140-46. 

The leader of the SPIRITUALIST network used the nom de guerre of Major 

Armand; his real name was Rene Dumont-Guillemet. He was a thirty-five 

year old veteran who had entered France earlier in the spring, Lieutenant 

Chaigneau used the nom de guerre of Telmon. Foot, SOE in France, 368; 

Daphne Friele to the author, 17 February 1988; and Richard A. Rubinstein 

to the author, 8 December 1988. 

The Team Aubrey report edited by the OSS referred to the road as a 

“sunken road.” An examination of a 1974 1:50,000 topographical map does 

not support this assertion. Nevertheless, since it could have been a sunken 

road in 1944, I have maintained the report’s usage of the term. The team 

report also referred to “the Forest of Rougemont,” which does not appear 

on a modern map. See Institut Geographique National, M 761 Dammartinen-Golle, XXIV-13. 

I have corrected the report’s more obvious spelling and typing errors, changing Mongloire to Nongloire and Doissons to Soissons. 

Team Aubrey report, frames 380-97, roll 4, OSS/London SO microfilm; E. 

J. Grinham to the author, 1 December 1988; Foot, SOE in France, 368; 

Daphne Friele to the author, 17 February 1988; and Richard A, Rubinstein 

to the author, 8 December 1988; and Brown, “The Jedburghs: A Short 

History,” 29. 

Team Augustus report, frames 649-54, roll 4, OSS/London SO microfilm; 

Appendix ‘A’ to G-3 Periodic Report no. 73 issued by SFHQ, London, 16 

August 1944, RG 226; G-3 Reports 10-111. and l-19, entry 99, folder 56, box 

13, RG 226; Joseph de Francisco, telephone conversation with the 

author, 28 September 1989, and General Paul Aussaresses, French Army 

(ret.), to the author, 19 October 1989. Decheville was the nom de guerre of 

Captain J. Delwiche, Daphne Friele to the author, 1 July 1988. Bonsall 

was a dedicated yachtsman and music lover, and a scholarship for musical 

studies is maintained in his memory at Princeton, Mrs. Katharine B. Strong 

to the author, 7 December 1988. Feldkommandantur 602 in Laon governed 

the Aisne Department with subsidiary offices in St. Quentin, Soissons, and 

Chateau-Thierry, folder RW 35/31, Kl-K6, B.A.-M.A. 

Ibid.; United States Army, 3d Armored Division, Memorandum to the 

Adjutant General, Washington, DC, 25 September 1944, Subject: Action 

Against Enemy, in World War II Operations Reports, Record Group 407, 

National Archives, hereafter cited as RG 407; and United States Army, 3d 

Armored Division, CCB S-2 Journal and File, 28-31 August 1944, Memorandum to G-2 3AD, Subject: S-2 Activities for Period 280001 to 292200, 

signed Castille, RG 407. Neither report specifically mentions contact with 

a Jedburgh team from 28 to 30 August. 

The names of these towns were garbled in transmission. Team Augustus 

report. 

Same sources as note 41; Veterans of OSS Newsletter, Special Fortieth 

Anniversary Issue (Winter 1986):60-61; General Paul Aussaresses to the 
45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

75 

author, 25 October 1989; and United States Army, 3d Armored Division, 

spearhead dn. the West, 1941--65 (Frankfurt am Main-Schwanheim: Franz 

Jos. Henrich Druckexei und Verlag, 1$45), 80-86, 203-7. 

The colonel’8 last fame was Paris de Bslladiere, who came from one of 

France’s older noble fan&es, He volunteered for this mission after recovering &om rather severe wounds received at Bir Hakeim. Grandvai and Collin, 

LEb&atiotz, 57, 78-82, 133-36, 178-88; Western European Section SO 

Branch, OSS Progress report, 13 June to 2’7 June 1944, of 28 June 1944, to 

Chief SO Branch, OSS, GP-23 (15 April‘to June 30 1944), entry 99, folder 

no. 3, box 2, RG 22% and Foot, SW isz Francsue, 365, 403. 

Henry Coombe-Tennant attended Eton and subsequently won a double first 

at Trinity College, Cambridge. Besides +being a distinguished scholar, he 

was also an avid hunter and a pianiti of considerable talent. Before being 

captured near Boulogne, he aseisted the escape of @een Wilhelmina, far 

which the Netherlands government subeequently awarded him a decoration. 

D’Gultremont”a full name was Edouard Charles Antoine, Comm d’Chdtremont 

et du Saint Empire, Team Andrew report, frames 643-48, roll 4, OS& 

London SO microfilm; Major A. H. S. Coombe-Tennanta British Army (ret.), 

to Daphne Friele, 30 November 1988; Major A H. S. CoombeTennant, interview with the author, Downside Abbey, England, 9 May 1989; and The 

Times (London), 14 November 198920. Colonel Grabowski commanded 

Fek@mmmaadantur 684 in Charleville; governing France% Ardennes Department with smaller headquarters in Rethel and Voutirs, RW 35131, Kl-K5, 

B.A.-M.A.’ 

Team Andrew report; Activity Report of Captain Victor J. Layton, frames 

171-222, roll 3, @%/London SO microfilm; Appendix ‘A’ to G-3 Periodic 

Report no. 73 issued by SFHQ, London, 16 August 1944, G-3 Reports 10.llland I-19, entry 99, folder 66, box 13, RG 226, A. IE. S. CoombeTennant to 

Daphne Friele, 30 November 1988; and Coombe-Tennant interview, 9 May 

1989. 

Team Andrew report; Report of Captain Layton; A. H. S. Caombe-Tennant 

to Daphne Friele, 30 November 1988; E. J. Grinham to the authar, 1 December 1998; and Coombe-Tennant interview, 

At the end of World War II, Major Coombe-Tennant received the Military 

Cross and the Croix de Guerre. See the sources in note 46. 

Moniez used the nom de guerre of Marchand, Kaminski used the name 

Camouin, and Nasica used the nom de guerre of Prato (the village where 

he was born in Corsica). Team Benjamin report, frames 518-35, roll 4, 

OSWLondon SO microfilm; Daphne Friele to the author, 17 February 1988; 

and Daphne Friele, telephone conversation with the author, 10 August 19%. 

See also Grandval and Collin, Lihr&ation, SCb-96. PeCdkommaxLdantur 627 

in Bar le Due administered the Meuse Department, with smaller headquarters in Cammercy, Verdun, and B&y, in RW 35’31, Kl-K5, B.A.-MA. 

Team Benjamin report. Most, of SAS team Rupert’s fifty-eight men parachuted into the area on 4 August to attack railroads. Strawson, A History 

of the S.A.S. Regiment, 266. 

Team Benjamin report. 

Ibid. 
76 

54. 

66. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

59. 

60. 

61. 

Ibid. 

Lieutenant G. Herenguel used the nom de guerre of De Wavrant, Daphne 

Friele to the author, 7 February 1988. Feldkommandantur 638 in Beauvais 

administered the Oise Department with smaller headquarters in Compidgne 

and Senlis, folder RW 35/31, Kl-K5, B.A.-M.A. 

Team Alfred report, frames 536-45, roll 4, OSS/London SO microfilm. The 

team report made numerous references to the village of La Neuville Roy, 

which does not appear on maps of the area. In all probability, that village 

is La Neuville-sur-Ressons, north of Compiegne (XXIV-lo), which shall be 

referred to in the text as La Neuville. 

In all probability, the parachutists were SAS team Wolsey, led by a Lieutenant McDeritt, directed to report on German dispositions in the CompibgneSoissons area. Team Alfred report; and Strawson, A History of the S.A.S. 

Regiment, 271. 

The names of these towns were garbled in transmission. Team Alfred report. 

Team Alfred report; and Daphne Friele to the author, 17 February 1988, 

Daphne Friele to the author, 17 February 1988; and E. J. Grinham to the 

author, 1 December 1988. 

Bodington was a middle-aged, bespectacled man, who had last traveled to 

occupied France in 1943. During the six months leading up to the D Day 

invasion, SFHQ used him to lecture various Allied staffs and units on the 

political situation in France. See Foot, SOE in France, 49, 343, 409. Bodington’s photograph is opposite page 196 in Foot. 

62. The team report stated that the drop was at Igny-le-Jard, but modern maps 

do not indicate an Igny-1eJard in the area. This village is probably IgnyComblize. 

63. Michel de Carville used the nom de guerre of Michel Coudray. The Jedburgh 

community has since lost touch with J. H. F. Monahan and Alan de Ville. 

Team Arnold report, frames 646-56, roll 4, OSS/London SO microfilm; 

Daphne Friele to the author, 1 July 1988; and E. J. Grinham to the author, 

1 December 1988. 

64. Mortgrange, point 247. 

65. Team Arnold report. 

66. Schlussbericht des Verwaltungsgruppenleiters der Feldkommandantur 531 

Chalons-sur-Marne of 11 September 1944 in RW 36/1278, which erroneously 

lists von Tschammer und Osten’s rank as colonel. Anlage zu Befh. NO 

Is/Pi Nr. 840/44 g.Kdos, of 20 August 1944 in RW 3511307 (untitled); and 

14. Pi./S.R. 95 of 4 July 1944 Nr. 454 geh., Sprengentwurf fuer die Stcassenbrucke ueber die Marne (50 m. westlich vom Elektr. u. Gaswerk) bei Epernay 

Dep. Marne, in RW 35/1305, all in B.A.-M.A. A battle group of the Panzer 

Lehr Division crossed the Dormans bridge in the morning, where it met 

the engineer battalion of the Panzer Lehr Division. It is possible that 

remnants of the 48th Infantry Division, 1’7th SS Panzer Grenadier Division 

and the 1010th Security Regiment also crossed the Marne at Dormans. 

Colonel Helmut Ritgen, German Army (ret.), interview with the author, 16 

May 1989, Celle-Boye, Federal Republic of Germany. 
77 

67. 

68’. 

69. 

70. 

71. 

72. 

73. 

74. 

75. 

76. 

77. 

78. 

79. 

Team Arnold repart. 

Ibid. 

Coste used the nom de guerre of Montlac. Team Archibald report, frames 

557-71, roll 4, OS&/London SO microfilm; Daphne Friele to the author, 1 

July 1988; and Roger Pierre, interview with the author, Washington, DC, 

19 December 1988. FeEcdkommandexs~ur 591 in Nancy governed the Meurtheet-Moselle Department with a smaller headquarters in Luneville, RW 35/31, 

Kl-K5, B.A.-M.A. 

Commandant Noel was the nom de guerre of Frederic Remelius, who survived the war and subsequently had a successful business career in Belgium. 

Team Archibald report; and Pierre interview. See also Grandval and Collin, 

Lib&ration, 139-40. 

Allied forces liberated Montlac (Caste] in the Luneville hospital. Despite 

his serious wound, he remained in the French Army, eventually retiring as 

a colonel. Ibid. 

Clantais used the nom de guerre of Carliere, London-History-Off-OF.2 Team 

Stanley report, entry 101, box 1, Jedburgh Stanley I, RID/Archives, RG 

226; Daphne Friele to the author, 17 February 1988; Oswin Craster to the 

author, 25 November 1988; and E. J. Grinham to the authar, 1 December 

1988. Far the situation of ~e~dkommandantur 769 in Chaumont, see pp. 

18-20. 

The actual name of the French regiment was La Premier Rdgiment de 

France. Team Stanley repor@ and Oswin Craster to the author, 25 November 

1988. It is possible these SAS men belonged to the fifty-five troops of SAS 

team Hardy, which aperated on the Plateau de Langres through 18 September 1944. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

De Rotten was the nom de guerre of J. Liberos. Robert Lucas was born in 

Sheldon, Iowa, on 22 January 1917, entered the Iowa National Guard in 

1934, and received his commission through OCS in 1942. Team Philip report, 

entry 101, box 1, Team Philip, RG 226; and Robert Lucas, interview with 

the author, Leavenworth, KS, 15 October 1988. 

The OSS report erroneously printed Foreelles-St. Gorgon as Fortelles-St. 

Goron (see IGN XxX-16). Team Philip report. Fczldkommandantur 591 in 

Nancy governed the Meurthe-et-Moselle Department with a smaller headquarters in Luneville, RW 35/31, Kl-K5, B.A.-M.A. 

Ibid. 

Lucas interview; and Team Philip report. Charles Hancock (“Hank’“) Reed 

was born on Christmas 1900 in Richmond, Virginia. He graduated from 

West Point in 1922 as a cavalry of%er and subsequently was known as 

one of the better horsemen in the Army. He graduated from the Command 

and General Staff School in 1941. As commander of the 2d Cavalry Group, 

he wan the Distinguished Service Cross, Purple Heart, two Silver Stars, 

and the Bronze Star, among other medals. At the end of the war, he planned 

and led the rescue of the Lipiszaner stallions of the Spanish Riding School 
78 

of Vienna. He retired at his own request in February 1948, returning to 

Richmond to direct his family’s business. He died on 7 April 1980 in Richmond at the age of seventy-nine. Assembly 40 (December 1981):131. 

80. Team Philip report. 

81. Same sources as note 76. 

82. Frame 162, roll 5, OSWLondon SO microfilm. 

83. Frames 193-211, roll 5, OSS/London SO microfilm. 

84. Frame 260, roll 5, OSWLondon SO microfilm. 

86. Frame 335, roll 5, OSWLondon SO microfilm. 

86. Frame 354--55, roll 5, OSWLondon SO microfilm. 

87. Gutjahr, “Role of Jedburgh Teams.” 

88. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 

1974), 2:539-41. 

89. General George S. Patton, Jr., Diary, entry of 2 September 1944, Manuscript 

Division, Library of Congress. 

90. See Major John F. Diviney, “Command Control Communications Counter 

Measures in the Ardennes” (unpublished manuscript; Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

1989), which illustrates the difficulty U.S. Army commanders had in 

1944-45 in adjusting to new forms and methods of warfare. 
BBC. British Broadcasting Company, the national radio system 

I of hhhe United Kingdom, which sent blind transmission broadcasts to FFI groups and SOF groups in the field. 

Bren gun. British light machine gun ZdB30 Mark I, adopted 

in 1934 (a modification of the Czech Zb26 machine gun), which 

fired .303-inch aminunititin. This was a reliable magazine-fed 

gas-operated selective-fire weapon weighing 10.04 kilograms. A 

distinctive feature of this weapon was the top-loading thirtyround bsx magazine, 

CITWONELLE. Code name for the twelve-man inter-Allied mission led by Colonel Paris de &lladi&re, which was inserted into 

the Ardennes on 12 April and 5 June 1944. 

Containers. A strong metal or plastic cylindrical case under 

six feet in length containing supplies to be parachuted to 

resistance groups or SOF teams. The H container consisted of 

five metal cell& while the C container simply had one large 

compartment. 

DMR. DeEigrce M&c&e de Region, the FFI military delegate of 

a region, who normally organized reception committees for 

Jedburgh teams. 

DZ. Dropping zone. 1’ i 

EMFFI. Etat Majeur Farces Franeaises de k’Int&ieure-the / 

headquarters of the French Forces of the Interior. 

FTP. Franc Tir&rs et Partisans, French Resistance organization representing the political Left. i 

Gestapo’. German secret police (Geh&ne Staats P&se& i 

&&c&s. The name given to French guerrilla bands. The word 

originalry signified the high ground in southeastern France 

/ covered with scrub growth in which the French guerrillas operated and from which they took their name. 

M&%X. Vichy France police organization. 1 

OG. Operational group composed of specially trained volunteers, 

officers, and enlisted men who were dispatched on missions of / 

sabotage and guer”rilla fighting. 

Organization Todt. German civilian organization responsible 

for large-scale engineering construction for both civilian and 

military projects. 
80 

Packages. Rectangular boxes dropped from an aircraft by parachute to SOF groups-also known as “special packages.” They 

usually contained items that could not fit into a container. 

“Pasteur.” Code name of agent Wladimir Ritter. 

PEDAGOGUE. Cover name for intelligence circuit and SOE 

organizer in the Reims area, who was infiltrated on 30 July 

1944. 

PEDLAR. Cover name for intelligence circuit led by Major 

Bodington that operated in the Chalons-sur-Marne area. 

Piat. Acronym designator for a British hand-held antitank 

weapon, which stood for-projector, infantry, antitank. It 

weighed 32 pounds and was effective against armor up to a 

range of only 100 yards, which made it rather unpopular with 

the troops. Its advantage over the bazooka or the Panzerfaust 

(German equivalent) was that it could also fire high-explosive 

and smoke shells. 

“Planete.” Code name for the FFI DMR in northeastern 

France, Gilbert Grandval, subsequently a minister in the French 

government. 

SAS. Special Air Service. British Army airborne force for 

special operations. 

Sedentaires. Individuals who sympathized with the French 

Resistance but who did not take part in guerrilla warfare, often 

because of the lack of arms. 

SFHQ. Special Forces Headquarters, the combined SOE/SO 

headquarters in SHAEF responsible for the planning and execution of special operations. 

SHAEF. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. 

Skeds. Abbreviation for the word schedule, used to denote 

scheduled radio messages between SFHQ and SOF units and 

agents in the field. 

SPIRITUALIST. Code name for organizer and intelligence 

circuit operating in Paris, infiltrated on 5 February 1944. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Ctwreqmndence 

Aussaresses, Paul, General, French Army (ret.), to the author, 19 October 1989 

and 25 October 1989. 

Coombe-Tennant, A. H. S., Major, British Army (ret.), to Mrs. Daphne Friele, 

30 November 1988. 

Cowell, Gervaser, SOE Adviser, Great Britain Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 

to Captain Robert G. Gutjahr, 14 February P99Q. 

&aster, Oswin, Major, British Army (ret.), to the author, 25 November 1988. 

Friele, Mrs. Daphne, to the author, 17 February 198%. 

Grinham, E. J., to the author, 1 December 1988. 

Rubinstein, Richard A., to the author, 8 December 1988. 

Strong, Mrs. Katherine B., to the author, 7 December 198%. 

Bank, Aaron, Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.)W Interview with the author, FayettevilIe, 

NC, 29 April 1985. 

CaombeTennant, A. H. S., Major, British Army (ret). Interview with the author, 

Downside Abbey, England, 9 May 19%9. 

Lucas, Robert. Interview with the author, Leavenworth, KS, I5 October 198%. 

Pierre, Roger. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, 19 December 1988. 

Ritgen, Helmut, Colonel, German Army (ret,). Interview with the author, 16 May 

1989, Celle-Boye, Federal Republic of Germany. 

Telepltons Comemations 

Eross, John, Telephone conversation with the author, 18 March 198%. 

Canfield, Franklin. Telephone conversations with the author, 29 December 1988 

and 17 March 198%. 

Francisco, Joseph de. Telephone conversations with the author, 23 March 1988 

and 28 September 1989. 

Friele, Mrs. Daphne. Telephone eonversa;ions with the author, 10 August 198% 

and 12 November 1988. 

Lucas, Robert. Telephone conversation with the author, 28 December 1988. 

Mills, Frank, Colonel, US. Army (ret.). Telephone conversation with the author, 

14 September 1988. 

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81 
82 

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MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990. 

OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War 

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Rosner, Elliot J. “The Jedburghs: Combat Operationa Conducted in the Finis&e 

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83 

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