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Opinion issued July 26, 2012.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-12-00341-CV

———————————

IN RE HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP AND

PATRICK L. HUGHES, Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

CONCURRING OPINION

I join in the Court’s opinion holding that federal courts do not have 

exclusive jurisdiction over this case. The Court holds, and I agree, that regardless 

of whether federal courts have jurisdiction over cases like this one, relators have 

not established that such jurisdiction would be exclusive of, rather than concurrent 

with, state courts’ jurisdiction. I write separately only to address another approach 

to the issue. Specifically, like the federal district court that considered this issue 
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before us,1I would hold that, under the existing record, relators have not 

established two prerequisites to the existence of federal jurisdiction over this case: 

(1) the existence of a “substantial” federal question and (2) harmony with the

careful balance between federal and state courts. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 

Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (setting forth four-part test for 

embedded-federal-question jurisdiction). Because federal courts do not have

jurisdiction over this case, they necessarily do not have exclusive jurisdiction. 

Embedded-Federal-Question Jurisdiction

The jurisdictional provisions of the United States Code grant federal district 

courts original jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 

or treaties of the United States.” This is often referred to as “federal question 

jurisdiction” or “arising under jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. An action “aris[es] 

under” federal law when (1) federal law creates the cause of action or (2) in some 

rare cases, when a cause of action created by state law nevertheless turns on a 

substantial question of federal law. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312, 125 S. Ct. at 

2366–67 (noting that federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claim is less 

common); see also Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 

699, 701 (2006) (describing category of cases as “special and small” and “slim”); 

Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections of State and Federal Power: State Judges, 

 

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RX.com, Inc. v. O’Quinn, 766 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795–97 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
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Federal Law, and the “Reliance Principle”, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 283, 298 (2006) 

(“routine efforts to come within this statutory head of jurisdiction should be 

rejected in favor of allowing the state court to apply and interpret the applicable 

federal law”). The second type of federal-question jurisdiction is often referred to 

as embedded-federal-question jurisdiction.

The questions in this legal malpractice suit—arising out of relators’

prosecution of a Sherman Act claim in federal court—are whether federal question 

jurisdiction exists over this state-law action and, if so, whether that jurisdiction is 

exclusive. Under this record, I answer the first question in the negative, and 

therefore do not need to reach the second question (although I join in the Court’s 

answer to that question). Answering the first question requires a four-part inquiry: 

(1) do real-party plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims require resolution of an issue 

of antitrust law under the Sherman Act; if so, is that antitrust issue (2) actually 

disputed and (3) substantial; and (4) will federal jurisdiction disturb the balance of 

federal and state judicial responsibilities. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312–14, 125 S. 

Ct. at 2366–68; see also Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. 2011), 

petition for cert. filed, No. 11-1118 (U.S. March 9, 2012). Requiring an affirmative 

answer to each of these four inquiries is necessary to ensure that reference to an 

embedded federal issue is not “a password for opening federal courts” to any state 

malpractice action “embracing a point of federal law.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. 
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Relators’ plea to the jurisdiction fails to satisfy two of these elements. First, 

the record before us does not establish the existence of a “substantial” federal 

question. Second, relators have not demonstrated that affording federal courts 

jurisdiction over malpractice actions like this one would not upset the careful 

balance between federal and state courts.

A. The record does not show a substantial, disputed federal issue

Relators’ petition in this Court is premised primarily on their broad 

interpretation of Minton and its application of the standards articulated in Grable. 

Relators contend that, under Minton, they have shown the presence of an “actually 

disputed” and “substantial” federal issue (the second and third factors under 

Grable) merely by asserting that they are contesting whether the real-party 

plaintiffs could have prevailed on their underlying Sherman Act claim. They 

characterize this fact as being “absolutely dispositive.” But that conclusion is not 

compelled by Minton for several reasons. First, while Minton involved a 

meaningful legal and factual dispute over intersecting patent law doctrines, relators

have not demonstrated that the federal issues here require anything more than the 

application of established federal law to factually-disputed claims. Second, the 

Minton court expressly limited its holding to the facts of that case, and the 

circumstances favoring federal jurisdiction in Minton are not present here.
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1. Minton turned on a substantial, legally and factually disputed 

issue of federal patent law

In Minton, the Texas Supreme Court held that federal courts had exclusive 

jurisdiction over a legal malpractice lawsuit arising out of the defendants’ handling 

of a patent claim. Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 640–47. Relators construe Minton as a 

sea-change in the doctrine of embedded-federal-question jurisdiction, essentially 

eliminating Grable’s “actually disputed” and “substantial” federal issue 

requirements when the federal issue arises from an area of federal law in which 

Congress has created claims that may originate only in federal courts. But the 

Minton Court did not presume a “substantial” federal question merely because the 

malpractice action before the Court would require the application of federal patent 

law; instead, the Court determined that the federal issue in that case was, in fact, 

substantial and actually disputed.

The federal issue in Minton was whether the “experimental use” exception 

would have excused Minton’s patent claim from the statutory on-sale bar against 

patents filed more than one year after the patented invention is sold. Id. at 638. The 

application of patent law’s “experimental use” doctrine was dispositive of 

Minton’s malpractice action: Minton’s sole assertion of negligence was premised 

on his attorneys’ failure to timely plead and brief the experimental use exception in 

the federal patent litigation. Id. at 642. The Court recognized the “strong interest in 

having federal patent law applied uniformly.” Id. at 645; see also 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 1295(a) (vesting federal circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals). 

Despite all of this—a state-law claim that depended entirely on the interaction 

between a federal statute and a federal-common-law exception to that statute in an 

area of law in which the courts have recognized a strong interest in uniform federal 

interpretation and application—the Minton Court expressly noted that whether the 

federal issue was sufficiently substantial to justify exclusive federal jurisdiction 

was a “close” call. Id. at 643. If Minton was a close call, this is an easy one.

2. Relators have not shown a substantial federal issue that is both 

legally and factually disputed 

Minton instructs that in order for a disputed federal issue to be substantial 

there must be more than factual disputes regarding the application of the federal 

laws to the case—there must also be a legal dispute.2Id. at 644 (stating that 

 

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In Minton, there was a factual dispute regarding the applicability of the 

experimental use exception to the on-sale bar to patentability of the invention. The 

court of appeals’ opinion reveals that there was also, however, a legal dispute. 

Minton v. Gunn, 301 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010), rev’d on 

other grounds, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011) (noting that dispute was 

“predominately one of fact”). In the court of appeals, the parties disagreed on the 

standard that applies for determining when testing is sufficient to constitute an 

experimental use. The plaintiff contended that “experimental use is supported by 

any testing needed to convince the inventor that the invention is capable of 

performing its intended purpose in its intended environment.” Id. at 712 n. 46. The 

court of appeals disagreed and held that the testing must relate to a claimed feature 

of the patented invention. Applying this standard, the court of appeals concluded 

that the testing evidence offered by the inventor did “not, as a matter of law, 

support experimental use.” Id. at 712. Because the court of appeals affirmed a noevidence summary judgment on this basis, the disputed legal issue was critical to 

the ultimate issue in the case. In contrast, in this case, there is no evidence of a 

significant, disputed legal issue in the plea to the jurisdiction.
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plaintiff was required to prove that federal issue was “legally and factually 

viable”); see also id. at 642–43 (“the legal and factual viability” of federal issue

was “clearly in dispute”). It is the construction of the law—not its application, 

which is often left to the jury—in which the expertise of federal judges is 

particularly helpful and uniformity is needed. A dispute over the application of the 

law to the facts of the case is insufficient to open the doors to the federal 

courthouse. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 315 (“meaning of the federal [law]” must be 

actually in dispute); id. at 316 (observing that the Court in Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986), 

“assumed that federal law would have to be applied to resolve the claim” but 

nevertheless determined that federal jurisdiction was unavailable). The Grable

Court rejected the “expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a statelaw claim will suffice to open the ‘arising under’ door.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. 

Instead, it twice stated that the issue is whether there is a dispute “respecting the 

validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.” Id. (quoting Shulthis v. 

McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912).

Relators rely on certain defenses asserted by the antitrust defendants in the 

underlying Sherman Act lawsuit as establishing a substantial federal issue.

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Even if 

 

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To the extent relators rely on expert reports they provided this Court after oral 

argument, we may not consider evidence not before the trial court at the time of 

the plea to the jurisdiction hearing. See In re Taylor, 113 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex. 
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we were to look at its defenses in the original lawsuit,4relators have not 

demonstrated on this record that those defenses implicate a legal dispute involving 

the validity or construction of federal antitrust law, as opposed to the mere 

application of such law to the facts of this case. The mere fact that the “case within 

the case” is based on Sherman Act claims supports a fair inference that federal 

issues may arise in the course of the litigation. These may include the issues 

identified in relators’ plea to the jurisdiction and may include disputes that are 

primarily legal in nature or disputes that are more fact-oriented. But at this point 

we can only speculate; the record does not establish that these defenses would 

require anything other than a “fact-bound and situation-specific” analysis under 

generic principles of antitrust litigation. See Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701, 

 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (stating that, in mandamus 

proceedings, we “focus on the record that was before the trial court” and exclude 

from our consideration filings “that were not part of the trial court record at the 

time of the hearing on the motion that is the subject of the original proceeding.”). 

Even if I were to consider these reports, it is still not clear to me that there is a 

substantial federal question; relators’ motion for summary judgment (which realparty plaintiffs filed after oral argument and was also filed after the ruling on the 

plea to the jurisdiction) is not based on any arguments under the Sherman Act.

4 Real-party plaintiffs contend that we cannot consider this evidence under the wellpleaded complaint rule, a federal standard that limits subject-matter-jurisdiction 

inquiries to the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. 

Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 

(1983) (“the plaintiff’s complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal 

law”). Arguably, the inquiry here could be governed by the Texas procedure that 

permits challenges to the existence of jurisdictional facts in a plea to the 

jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–

27 (Tex. 2004). Because the documents on which relators rely do not demonstrate 

a substantial, disputed federal issue, I need not decide this issue.
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126 S. Ct. at 2137 (stating that “fact-bound and situation-specific” federal 

questions are insufficient to create arising-under jurisdiction); Bennett v. Sw. 

Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2007) (“What the Court said about 

Grable in Empire Healthchoice can be said here too. We have a fact-specific 

application of rules that come from both federal and state law rather than a contextfree inquiry into the meaning of a federal law.”). 

3. Minton is an expressly limited holding 

Although this case, like Minton, is a malpractice action arising out of the 

prosecution of a federal cause of action, that fact does not, alone, establish a

substantial federal issue. The Supreme Court rejected that kind of sweeping 

displacement of state-law claims in Grable. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S. Ct. 

at 2368 (rejecting “single, precise, all-embracing” test for determining embedded 

federal jurisdiction) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 

U.S. 800, 821, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 2180 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 317–

18, 125 S. Ct. at 2370 (describing Merrell Dow as disclaiming “any bright-line 

rule” and explaining that “questions of jurisdiction over state-law claims require 

‘careful judgments’” and a “contextual enquiry”); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, 

106 S. Ct. at 3232 (rejecting use of a “single, precise definition” to determine 

arising-under jurisdiction). Consistently, the Minton Court expressly limited the 

scope of its holding, stating that it would not “cause all legal malpractice suits 
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arising out of patent litigation to fall under the exclusive patent law jurisdiction of 

the federal courts,” and cautioning that the opinion “should only be construed as 

conferring exclusive federal patent jurisdiction based upon the specific facts of this 

case.” Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 646. Furthermore, the Court noted that “any state 

litigant asserting a legal malpractice action to recover for damages resulting from 

his patent attorney’s negligence in patent prosecution or litigation must also satisfy 

all four elements of the Grable test to place his claim under exclusive federal 

jurisdiction,” and that “[i]n the context of state-based legal malpractice claims, 

plaintiffs will not always be able to meet such a burden.” Id.

In addition to the absence from the record of a substantial legal dispute over 

federal law, several other key facts favorable to federal jurisdiction in Minton are 

not present here. First, antitrust law does not present the same heightened need for 

uniformity and predictability presented by questions of patent validity. See, e.g., 

USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 284 (5th Cir. 2011)

(observing that special federal interest exists in developing uniform body of patent 

law, and that interest is protected by “Congress’s grant of exclusive appellate 

jurisdiction over patent cases to [federal circuit] court.”); see also USPPS, Ltd. v. 

Avery Dennison Corp., 676 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J., concurring) 

(contending that Federal Circuit’s approach to legal malpractice cases comports 
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with Grable because “substantive patent law issues” implicated in such cases are 

necessarily substantial). 

Second, patent law’s “experimental use” exception to the on-sale bar was the 

fulcrum of the Minton action—the failure to properly plead and brief the 

“experimental use” doctrine was the sole act of negligence Minton pleaded, and 

Minton alleged that failure, alone, caused him to lose his patent claim—and that 

issue was brought to a head in the trial court through summary judgment 

proceedings. Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 642. Here, the negligent conduct pleaded is 

failure to file the underlying litigation timely; the Sherman Act defenses relators 

identify (which were pleaded by the defendants in the underlying action) are, under 

this record, only some of the issues that may be relevant to proving the causation 

element of real-party plaintiffs’ malpractice claim. Cf. id. at 646–47 (favorably 

citing Roof Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Hill, 679 F.Supp.2d 749, 754 (N.D. Tex. 2010) 

(explaining that state legal malpractice action involving attorney’s “failure to meet 

deadlines and communicate with [his] client” and in which “[p]atent issues are 

merely floating on the periphery” did not trigger exclusive federal patent 

jurisdiction), and Genelink Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 722 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601 

(D.N.J. 2010) (holding that where state malpractice claim was based on missed 

deadlines, and not on the validity of the actual patent itself, there was no patent 

issue triggering exclusive federal patent law jurisdiction)).
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4. Conclusion on the “substantial federal issue” element

A substantial contested federal issue is one that involves “a serious federal 

interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum” and 

“an important issue of federal law” that is “both dispositive of the case and . . . 

controlling in numerous other cases.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313, 315, 125 S. Ct. 

2367–68; Empire Healthcare, 547 U.S. at 700, 126 S. Ct. at 2137. It is also central 

to the parties’ dispute. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312, 320, 125 S. Ct. at 2367, 2371

(disputed federal issue was “at the heart of the state-law title claim”); Empire 

Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 699 n.5, 126 S. Ct. at 2136 (describing the classic 

federal-question jurisdiction claim as one “predicated on the centrality of a federal 

issue”); see also Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 645; Hoffman, 81 TUL. L. REV. at 300 

(stating that disputed federal issue “may not be some minor point of federal law, 

but instead vital, relevant, and significant . . . to a wide range of persons and 

behavior” and “an issue is of widespread import”).5Thus, relators’ burden to show 

 

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This requirement, known as the centrality requirement, 

addresses whether the plaintiff's claim is “federal enough” to 

justify invocation of federal question jurisdiction. Centrality 

asks how much—an assessment ill-suited to a cut-and-dried 

rule. It calls for a standard that . . . tends to collapse 

decisionmaking back into the direct application of the 

background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards 

allow for the decrease of errors of under- and overinclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion 

than do rules. Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into 

account all relevant factors or the totality of the 
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a substantial issue is not a light one. They must demonstrate both the issue’s 

importance in the suit itself and in the greater scheme of the development of the 

law. Relators have failed to carry this burden to show a clear abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion warranting mandamus relief.

B. Relators have not shown that recognizing federal jurisdiction here 

would not disrupt the careful balance between federal and state courts

Relators likewise fail to satisfy the fourth, and arguably most important, 

prong of the Grable test. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 310, 125 S. Ct. at 2365 (stating

that “the national interest in providing a federal forum” for the federal issue 

involved in case was “sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federalquestion jurisdiction” without distorting the “division of labor between state and 

federal courts”); see also Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 644. Specifically, relators ask this 

Court to hold that an action traditionally pursued in state court now belongs 

(exclusively) in federal court, despite a federal district court’s determination that it 

lacked any (much less exclusive) jurisdiction over the case. But they have not 

demonstrated that such a holding would not disturb the balance of judicial 

 

circumstances. We should not be surprised or disappointed, 

then, if the centrality inquiry does not always yield litmuslike answers. The nature of the inquiry requires nuance and 

balancing. 

Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory 

Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 320 (2007).
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responsibility Congress has struck between federal and state courts under the 

procedural posture of this case.

Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. And federal courts have expressed 

concern that the doors to their courts should not be opened too wide for claims that 

are traditionally handled by state courts—like legal malpractice claims—under the 

doctrine of embedded-federal-question jurisdiction. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 319, 

125 S. Ct. at 2371 (finding jurisdiction only after determining that recognizing 

federal-question jurisdiction over actions like that before Court “would not 

materially affect, or threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation” by 

introducing flood of state claims into federal courts). Here a federal court has 

already rejected relators’ contention that federal courts have jurisdiction over this 

case. Congress elected to make a federal court’s determination that a case should 

be remanded generally non-reviewable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Schexnayder v. 

Entergy La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004). To allow a state court to 

second-guess a federal court that has already remanded a case because it 

determined that it lacked jurisdiction would be contrary to Congress’s intent in 

limiting review of remand determinations. If a federal court decides to close its 

doors to a claim, a state court should not force the federal courthouse door open.

“[T]here must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in 

exercising federal jurisdiction.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S. Ct. at 2368. Here
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that assessment counsels against a state-court declaration that, contrary to the prior 

decision of a federal court upon removal, federal courts—and federal courts 

alone—bear the burden of providing a remedy for a state-law cause of action 

merely because federal law may be applied to an element of the claim.

Conclusion

Courts should attempt to avoid “upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or at 

least assumed) by Congress.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S. Ct. at 2368. Legal 

malpractice claims are on the side of the line that is “ordinarily resolved in state 

courts.” Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 683, 126 S. Ct. at 2127. Therefore, in 

deciding whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants federal courts arising-under jurisdiction, 

courts “should await a clear signal from Congress” that it intends to displace state 

courts of this task. Id. Because no such signal exists here, I would conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plea to the jurisdiction on the 

record before it. 

I therefore concur in the Court’s opinion.

Harvey Brown

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle.

Justice Brown, concurring.