IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 14, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. VERNICE DARLENE FARRAR

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. 83499A James A. Turner, Judge

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No. M2023-01440-CCA-R3-CD

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A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, Vernice Darlene Farrar, of three counts 

of first-degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of 

aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and three counts of fraudulent use 

of a debit card, for which she received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus 

twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to support her convictions for first-degree felony murder during the 

perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, and fraudulent use of a 

debit card. She also contends that the trial court erred in affirming her convictions as the 

thirteenth juror and that her sentence was excessive. After reviewing the record and 

considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM GREENHOLTZ, and KYLE 

A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Amanda J. Gentry, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Vernice Darlene Farrar.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Trevor Lynch, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

On June 26, 2019, Robert Owens arrived at the victim’s house to mow his yard. Mr. 

Owens, who had known the victim, Terry Barber, for fifty years, noticed that the victim’s 

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car and work truck were in the driveway, but the victim’s back door was open. This was 

not unusual as the victim often left the door open for his dogs, and Mr. Owens waited in 

the yard for several minutes for the victim to come outside and greet him. Eventually, Mr. 

Owens decided to go into the victim’s house to see if the victim was taking a nap. As he 

walked through the house, Mr. Owens called out for the victim but received no response. 

Mr. Owens noticed that the converted garage where the victim stored sports memorabilia 

and collectibles was not typically “that messy,” although the victim “wasn’t very tidy.” 

When Mr. Owens approached the victim’s bedroom, he saw the victim lying face-down on 

the floor with his hands and feet tied together with bungee cords. Mr. Owens immediately 

returned to his vehicle and called 911.

Deputy Matthew Arrington with the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department 

(“RCSD”) responded to the 911 call at the victim’s house. Upon arriving at the scene, 

Deputy Arrington observed Mr. Owens standing in the driveway. After waiting for 

additional patrol units, Deputy Arrington entered the victim’s house and located the victim 

on the floor in a bedroom. Medical personnel soon arrived, and Deputy Arrington assisted 

in securing the crime scene.

Detective Richard Brinkley with the RCSD assisted in processing the scene, 

photographing all evidence. In particular, Detective Brinkley photographed the victim’s 

car and truck in the driveway, a suitcase in the victim’s bedroom that contained bungee 

cords, and a Canon camera box.

Detective Dennis Ward with the RCSD obtained the victim’s financial records and 

discovered that several ATM transactions, as well as a CashApp transaction, occurred on 

the morning following the murder. The victim’s debit card was used to withdraw $100 

from Fifth Third Bank at 2:09 a.m., $200 from Pinnacle Bank at 2:25 a.m., and $300 from 

a different Fifth Third bank at 3:29 a.m. Detective Ward obtained photographs from the

Pinnacle Bank ATM, which showed a male wearing a “black hoodie with . . . white lettering 

on the sleeve” using the victim’s debit card to withdraw funds. The name associated with 

the CashApp account used to transfer funds from the victim’s account was Kevin Gailey, 

and a Murfreesboro Police Department officer informed Detective Ward that he had had 

prior dealings with a Devan Gailey, who appeared to be the same person. 

Detective Derrick McCullough with the RCSD canvassed businesses near the 

Pinnacle Bank and obtained video surveillance footage from the time of the ATM 

transaction from the Circle K convenience store across the street. Upon reviewing the 

surveillance video, Detective McCullough observed a small red car pull into the Circle K 

parking lot. A male matching the description from the ATM photographs exited the vehicle 

and walked toward the Pinnacle Bank. A few seconds later, the defendant exited the 

passenger side of the vehicle wearing a University of Alabama jersey. The defendant
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entered the Circle K, returned to the vehicle, and reentered the store with the second 

passenger, who purchased a beverage and lottery tickets. After exiting the store, the driver 

returned from the direction of the Pinnacle Bank, and they drove away. 

Detective Ryan Huggins with the RCSD was tasked with locating Devan Gailey. 

Upon learning that Mr. Gailey was staying at the Select Inn in Murfreesboro, Detective 

Huggins set up surveillance on the hotel, and Mr. Gailey was taken into custody during a 

traffic stop. During a search of Mr. Gailey, officers discovered the victim’s wallet; 

however, the victim’s debit card was not inside. Following his arrest, Mr. Gailey provided 

the names of the defendant and Brent Ross. Detective Huggins matched the defendant’s 

driver’s license photograph with images from the surveillance footage from the 

convenience store. He then located a cell phone number belonging to the defendant and 

her wife and sent an “exigent ping order” to T-Mobile for emergency tracking of the cell 

phone. Detective Huggins learned the defendant’s cell phone was in Tampa, Florida and 

gave the local police department a description of the defendant and the defendant’s wife’s 

vehicle. 

Sergeant Jeff Bartlett with the Tampa Police Department (“TPD”) received 

information regarding a black sedan with a Tennessee license plate that was involved in a 

homicide investigation and believed to be in Tampa. Sergeant Bartlett located the vehicle 

and initiated a traffic stop. When Sergeant Bartlett approached the vehicle, he found the 

defendant driving the vehicle and her wife in the passenger seat. Detective Nicole 

Sackrider with the TPD performed a search of the defendant and located the victim’s debit 

card inside the defendant’s wallet.

Sergeant Bartlett spoke with the defendant’s wife, who provided the address of her 

mother, Katie Childs. Ms. Childs provided consent for Sergeant Bartlett to search her home 

for Mr. Ross, who had not been located at the time. While in the residence, Sergeant 

Bartlett observed a football helmet and a University of Tennessee Smokey figurine, as well 

as collectible cars, duffle bags, coolers, blankets, and other memorabilia with various team 

logos on them.

After receiving word that the defendant was in custody in Tampa, Detective 

Huggins obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s house. Inside the defendant’s 

residence, Detective Huggins located “memorabilia that matched the description of what 

[the victim] had in his home,” including several hats and a University of Alabama wall 

clock. In the trash can on the defendant’s back porch, Detective Huggins observed twelve 

business cards from the victim’s sports collectible business.

Following the search of the defendant’s residence, Detective Huggins and Detective 

Steve Brown traveled to Tampa and interviewed the defendant. During the interview, the 
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defendant, who appeared alert but “[a] little bit foggy,” admitted to going to the victim’s 

house with Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross on the night of the murder. However, she stated that 

she did not go past the converted garage that stored the sports memorabilia and denied 

participating in the murder.

While in Tampa, Detective Huggins executed a search warrant on the home of the 

defendant’s mother-in-law and located a University of Alabama jersey that matched the 

one worn by the defendant in the surveillance footage from the convenience store, a 

University of Tennessee backpack, a Vanderbilt fleece blanket, a University of Tennessee 

diecast car, and a B.B. gun. Meanwhile, Detective Brown participated in a search of the 

defendant’s wife’s vehicle at the TPD impound lot. Inside the vehicle, Detective Brown 

collected two University of Tennessee hats and a Canon camera lens. After returning to 

Tennessee, Detective Brown contacted Mr. Owens, who reviewed photographs of the items 

collected from the residence and vehicle in Tampa and agreed that they were items he had 

seen in the victim’s house.

Dr. Erin Carney, an expert in forensic pathology, performed the autopsy on the 

victim. Dr. Carney testified that the victim’s cause of death was strangulation. Dr. Carney 

explained that the victim’s hyoid bone was broken on the left side and noted petechial 

hemorrhages in the victim’s left eye, redness and congestion in the victim’s right eye, 

congestion of the right sternothyroid muscle, and bruises on the victim’s right forearm. Dr. 

Carney also observed ligature abrasions on the victim’s wrists and ankles where the bungee 

cords had been removed. Dr. Carney testified the victim had a “mildly enlarged heart” and 

noted evidence of prior heart surgery, including a prosthetic heart valve.

The defendant testified on her own behalf, stating that she began drinking at the age 

of ten and using drugs at the age of thirteen. The defendant stated that she and her neighbor, 

Tammy Houston, would often drink and use drugs together while the defendant’s wife was 

at work. One afternoon, the defendant, Ms. Houston, and Mr. Gailey were using drugs at 

the defendant’s house when Ms. Houston stated that she knew how they could make some 

money. According to Ms. Houston, she had previously worked for the victim, and “[a]ll 

you had to do was talk to him, and you could take whatever you wanted.” Although they 

did not go to the victim’s house that day, the defendant and Ms. Houston went to the 

victim’s house together on two occasions to steal sports collectibles. The first time, the 

defendant stayed in the car while Ms. Houston and another man stole various items from 

the victim. However, the second time the defendant went to the victim’s house, she “loaded 

. . . up” Ms. Houston’s vehicle with sports collectibles from the converted garage. The 

defendant stated that she kept most of the stolen goods for herself and agreed that Ms. 

Houston sold the remaining items for drugs. According to the defendant, the victim was 

asleep during the second visit, and the defendant did not see him.
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On the night of the murder, Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross came to the defendant’s house, 

and they began drinking and using methamphetamine. Mr. Ross complained that he needed 

money because someone stole his vehicle, and Mr. Gailey suggested that they go to the 

victim’s house and steal items to sell for money. The defendant testified that she agreed to 

go with them but only wanted to take University of Alabama items for personal use. Mr. 

Gailey drove them to the victim’s house, and they entered through the converted garage. 

While the defendant testified she remained in the garage with the sports collectibles, Mr. 

Gailey and Mr. Ross continued through the house. The defendant heard the victim beg Mr. 

Gailey and Mr. Ross not to hurt him, but she did not go to the victim’s bedroom to check 

on him. Once they returned to Mr. Gailey’s vehicle, the defendant became aware that the 

men were in possession of the victim’s wallet and phone. She asked them if the victim was 

okay, and they confirmed that he was unharmed. The group then drove to the Circle K 

where Mr. Gailey walked to a nearby ATM to withdraw money, and the defendant and Mr. 

Ross purchased alcohol and cigarettes. Afterward, they went to another bank to withdraw 

money, before Mr. Gailey dropped the defendant off at her house. The defendant told them 

that she “wanted some more” drugs, so Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross purchased

methamphetamine with the money they had withdrawn from the victim’s account and 

returned to the defendant’s house, where the three of them used the methamphetamine 

together.

The defendant denied ever using the victim’s debit card and stated she did not know 

the victim’s PIN number until “[a]fter the fact.” The defendant testified she did not know 

that Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross planned to hurt the victim, and if she had known, she “would 

have never got in that car.” Although she acknowledged Mr. Ross brought her realisticlooking B.B. gun that night, the defendant stated that she let him borrow it several weeks 

prior to the murder. The defendant testified she wore a mask on the night of the murder

because she recently met the victim when her cousin attempted to buy the victim’s work 

truck, and she did not want him to recognize her. She denied stealing all of the items 

confiscated by police, claiming that she purchased several of the items on her own and that 

others were from the second time she went to the victim’s house with Ms. Houston. The 

defendant acknowledged having prior convictions for robbery, driving under the influence, 

and theft.

On cross-examination, the defendant stated that, although she was honest during her 

interview with detectives, “[her] words got twisted a lot” because she was on detox 

medication at the time of the interview. The defendant did not recall telling detectives that 

she asked Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross “how are you going to keep the man from calling the 

police from the time that you get the bank card until you get to the bank” or that they 

responded that they were going to tie up the victim and take his cell phone. The defendant 

also did not recall telling detectives that she “heard [Mr. Gailey] talking to [the victim], 

and [Mr. Gailey] saying we don’t want to hurt you, just give me the card and the number. 
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[The victim] repeated the number. Then he said, don’t hurt me.” The defendant denied 

stating in her interview that the victim “kept saying don’t hurt me,” testifying that the 

victim “only said that one time.”

The jury convicted the defendant of three counts of first-degree felony murder 

(counts one, two, and three), one count of especially aggravated kidnapping (count four), 

one count of aggravated robbery (count five), one count of aggravated burglary (count six), 

and three counts of fraudulent use of a debit card (counts seven, eight, and nine). Following 

a bifurcated hearing, the jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree 

felony murder convictions. The trial court subsequently imposed sentences of twenty-five 

years at 100% for count four, twelve years at 100% for count five, ten years at 35% for 

count six, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for counts seven, eight, and nine. The trial 

court merged counts two and three into count one and ordered counts four, five, six, seven, 

eight, and nine to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to count one, for 

an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years.

The defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied. This timely 

appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

support her convictions for first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a 

kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, and fraudulent use of a debit card.1

 The 

defendant also contends the trial court erred in affirming her convictions as the thirteenth 

juror and in imposing an excessive sentence. The State contends that the evidence is 

sufficient and the trial court fulfilled its duty as thirteenth juror and properly sentenced the 

defendant.

I. Sufficiency2

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the 

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn. 

R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury 

 

1 The defendant does not challenge her convictions for first-degree felony murder during the 

perpetration of a robbery, first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a burglary, aggravated 

robbery, and aggravated burglary.

2 For the sake of clarity, we have reordered and renumbered the issues from the order they appeared 

in the defendant’s brief.
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shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact 

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions 

involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and 

all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, 

accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of 

the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our Supreme 

Court has stated the following rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus, the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere, and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523 

(Tenn. 1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a 

defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted 

defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. 

Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

At trial, the State relied on a theory of criminal responsibility. “A person is 

criminally responsible as a party to an offense, if the offense is committed by the person’s 

own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the person is criminally responsible, or 

by both.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-401(a). Criminal responsibility for the actions of 

another arises when the defendant, “[a]cting with intent to promote or assist the 

commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, . . . 

solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense[.]” Id. § 39-

11-402(2). Criminal responsibility is not a separate crime but “is solely a theory by which 

the State may prove the defendant’s guilt of the alleged offense . . . based upon the conduct 

of another person.” State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999). 

The defendant need not physically participate in the crime in order to be criminally 

responsible. Phillips v. State, 76 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “Presence and 

companionship with the perpetrator of a felony before and after the commission of the 

offense are circumstances from which one’s participation in the crime may be inferred.” 

State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “No particular act need be 

shown. It is not necessary for one to take physical part in the crime[;] [m]ere 
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encouragement of the principal is sufficient.” Id. The defendant must “knowingly, 

voluntarily and with common intent unite with the principal offenders in the commission 

of the crime.” State v. Foster, 755 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).

A. Especially Aggravated Kidnapping and First-Degree Felony Murder

The jury convicted the defendant of the first-degree felony murder and especially 

aggravated kidnapping of the victim. As relevant to this appeal, first-degree felony murder 

is “[a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any . . . 

kidnapping.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2). Especially aggravated kidnapping 

occurs when one “knowingly removes or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere 

substantially with the other’s liberty” and “the victim suffers serious bodily injury.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 39-13-302 (a); -305 (a)(4). “‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that 

involves: (A) a substantial risk of death; (B) protracted unconsciousness; (C) extreme 

physical pain; (D) protracted or obvious disfigurement; (E) protracted loss or substantial 

impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty[.]” Id. § 39-11-

106(a)(37). 

In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows the defendant and Ms. 

Houston went to the victim’s house on two occasions to steal sports collectibles that were 

later exchanged for drugs. On the night of the victim’s murder, the defendant, Mr. Gailey, 

and Mr. Ross were drinking alcohol and using drugs when Mr. Ross indicated that he 

needed money. Mr. Gailey, who was present when Ms. Houston told the defendant about 

the victim’s house, suggested that they steal some of the victim’s sports collectibles. The 

defendant, Mr. Gailey, and Mr. Ross drove to the victim’s house and entered through the 

converted garage where the collectibles were stored. Before entering the house, the 

defendant asked Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross “how [they were] going to keep [the victim] 

from calling the police from the time that [they got] the bank card until [they got] to the 

bank,” and they responded that they were going to tie the victim up and steal his phone. 

The three of them were wearing masks, and Mr. Ross carried the defendant’s realisticlooking B.B. gun. While the defendant remained in the converted garage and decided 

which of the victim’s items to steal, Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross proceeded through the house 

toward the victim’s bedroom. The defendant heard Mr. Gailey tell the victim that he “[did

not] want to hurt [him], just give me the card and the number.” The victim gave them the 

requested information and repeatedly said, “don’t hurt me.” However, the defendant did 

not attempt to check on the victim during this time, instead choosing to make multiple trips 

to Mr. Gailey’s vehicle with bags full of stolen sports memorabilia. Mr. Gailey and Mr. 

Ross then tied the victim’s hands and feet together with bungee cords and strangled him to 

death. After leaving the victim’s house, the defendant, Mr. Gailey, and Mr. Ross stopped 

at multiple ATMs to withdraw money from the victim’s bank account, which was later 

used to purchase methamphetamine that they used together. During a search of her house, 
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her wife’s vehicle, and her mother-in-law’s house, detectives found numerous items that 

were identified as belonging to the victim. From this evidence, a rational jury could find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit or to promote or assist in 

the commission of the especially aggravated kidnapping of the victim or to benefit in the 

proceeds or results of the kidnapping and that the victim was killed during the kidnapping. 

The defendant argues that she was unaware of Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross’s actions 

toward the victim, and therefore, “[i]t would have been impossible for her to knowingly 

confine [the victim].” However, as we noted above, the defendant need not physically 

participate in the crime in order to be criminally responsible. Phillips, 76 S.W.3d at 9. 

Through its finding of guilt, the jury rejected her argument and accredited the State’s 

witnesses and theory of guilt based upon the defendant’s criminal responsibility for the 

conduct of another. We will not disturb that finding on appeal. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 

659, 659 (Tenn. 1997). The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Fraudulent Use of a Debit Card

The defendant was convicted of three counts of fraudulent use of a debit card under 

$1,000. “A person commits the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card who uses, 

or allows to be used, a credit or debit card or information from that card, for the purpose 

of obtaining property, credit, services or anything else of value with knowledge that . . . 

[t]he card is forged or stolen.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-118(b)(1).

In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial showed, while the 

defendant was in the victim’s house stealing sports collectibles, her accomplices murdered 

the victim and stole his debit card. The defendant, Mr. Gailey, and Mr. Ross then drove to 

three ATMs, and Mr. Gailey withdrew amounts of $100, $200, and $300. Mr. Gailey and 

Mr. Ross purchased methamphetamine with this money and brought the drugs back to the 

defendant’s house, where the three of them used the methamphetamine together. At the 

time of her arrest, the victim’s debit card was in the defendant’s wallet, and the defendant 

testified that she knew the victim’s PIN number. During her interview with detectives, the 

defendant admitted that Mr. Gailey and Mr. Ross told her that they were going to take the 

victim’s debit card prior to arriving at the victim’s house, and when the defendant asked 

how they were going to stop the victim from alerting the police, they stated that they were 

going to tie the victim up and take his cell phone. The evidence is, therefore, sufficient to 

support the defendant’s fraudulent use of a debit card convictions under a theory of 

criminal responsibility, and the defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II. Thirteenth Juror
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The defendant argues that the trial court erred in affirming her convictions as the 

thirteenth juror and that the weight of the evidence does not support her convictions. The 

State responds that the trial court properly acted as thirteenth juror. 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d) provides that “a trial court may grant 

a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the 

evidence.” This procedural rule has been described as “the modern equivalent to the 

‘thirteenth juror rule,’ whereby the trial court must weigh the evidence and grant a new 

trial if the evidence preponderates against the weight of the verdict.” State v. Blanton, 926 

S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The rationale behind the thirteenth juror rule 

is that “[i]mmediately after the trial, the trial court judge is in the same position as the jury 

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and assess the weight of the evidence, based upon 

the live trial proceedings.” State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1995). Rule 33(d) 

“imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in 

every criminal case, and that approval by the trial judge of the jury’s verdict as the 

thirteenth juror is a necessary prerequisite to imposition of a valid judgment.” State v. 

Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995). “[W]hen the trial judge simply overrules a 

motion for new trial, an appellate court may presume that the trial judge has served as the 

thirteenth juror and approved the jury’s verdict.” Id. Once the trial court fulfills its duty 

as the thirteenth juror and imposes a judgment, appellate review is limited to determining 

the sufficiency of the evidence. Moats, 906 S.W.2d at 435 (citing State v. Burlison, 868 

S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). 

At the conclusion of the defendant’s trial, the trial court stated that “[t]he findings 

of the jury as to the guilt of the [d]efendant are the order of the [c]ourt acting as the 13th 

juror.” During the motion for new trial hearing, the trial court addressed the defendant’s 

argument that it erred in affirming the defendant’s conviction as thirteenth juror, finding 

“that even if the [c]ourt did not place the lens of viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the State, the [c]ourt would find that the evidence was not only sufficient, but 

overwhelming to support the convictions.” Because the trial court fulfilled its duty as the 

thirteenth juror, our review is limited to the sufficiency of the evidence. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 

at 435. As previously discussed, the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s 

convictions, and therefore, the defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Sentencing

The defendant challenges the trial court’s decisions regarding the length and manner 

of service of her sentence. She asserts the trial court misapplied enhancement factor (10). 

She further argues the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. The State 

contends the trial court properly weighed the enhancement factors and bases for 

consecutive sentences.
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In determining an appropriate sentence, a trial court must consider the following 

factors: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the 

presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing 

alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) 

evidence and information offered by the parties on mitigating and enhancement factors; (6) 

any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to 

sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement the defendant 

makes on his own behalf as to sentencing; and (8) the result of the validated risk and needs 

assessment conducted by the department and contained in the presentence report. Tenn. 

Code Ann. §§ 40-35-113, -114, -210(b). In addition, the court must consider the 

defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, and “[t]he sentence imposed should be the least 

severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” Id.

§ 40-35-103(4), (5).

Pursuant to the 2005 amendments, the Sentencing Act abandoned the statutory 

presumptive minimum sentence and rendered enhancement factors advisory only. See

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-114, -210(c). Although the application of the factors is 

advisory, a court shall consider “[e]vidence and information offered by the parties on the 

mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.” Id. § 40-35-

210(b)(5). The trial court must also place on the record “what enhancement or mitigating 

factors were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for the sentence, in order to ensure 

fair and consistent sentencing.” Id. § 40-35-210(e). 

When an accused challenges the length and manner of service of a sentence, this 

Court reviews the trial court’s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion 

standard accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 

707 (Tenn. 2012). If a trial court misapplies an enhancing or mitigating factor in passing 

sentence, said error will not remove the presumption of reasonableness from its sentencing 

determination. Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709. This Court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing 

decision “so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the 

sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id.

at 709-10. Moreover, under such circumstances, appellate courts may not disturb the 

sentence even if we had preferred a different result. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 

346 (Tenn. 2008). The party challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court has the 

burden of establishing that the sentence is erroneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, 

Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.; State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).

A. Enhancement Factors
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The defendant argues the trial court misapplied enhancement factor (10). 

Specifically, the defendant contends that, because she “took active steps to mitigate the 

risk of bodily injury to [the victim] and believed that bodily injury would not occur,” there 

was no proof in the record that she had “no hesitation about committing a crime when the 

risk to human life was high.” The State contends the trial court properly weighed the 

enhancement factors.

Here, the trial court applied enhancement factors (1) the defendant has a previous 

history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to 

establish the appropriate range; (2) the defendant was a leader in the commission of an 

offense involving two (2) or more criminal actors; (4) a victim of the offense was 

particularly vulnerable because of age or physical or mental disability; (6) the personal 

injuries inflicted upon . . . the victim [were] particularly great; (10) the defendant had no 

hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high; (12) during the 

commission of the felony, the defendant intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury upon 

another person, or the actions of the defendant resulted in the death of, or serious bodily 

injury to, a victim or a person other than the intended victims; and (13) at the time the 

felony was committed, one (1) of the following classifications was applicable to the 

defendant: (C) released on probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1), (2), (4), (6), (10), 

(12), (13)(C). The trial court stated that it did not “place great weight” on factor (4) and 

found no applicable mitigating factors.

In considering enhancement factor (10), the trial court noted,

Again, the [c]ourt agrees with the State that when you break into someone’s 

home at night, three people with ski masks and a fake gun, something is 

bound to go wrong. And it did in this case.

Enhancement factor (10), requiring a finding that the defendant had no hesitation about 

committing an offense involving a high risk to human life, “is applicable only when there 

is proof that the defendant’s conduct in committing the offense created a high risk to the 

life of someone other than the victim.” State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 294 (Tenn. 2017). 

The record does not contain evidence reflecting that the defendant placed anyone other 

than the victim at risk. Accordingly, the trial court erred in applying this factor.

Moreover, while the trial court applied enhancement factors (6) the personal injuries 

inflicted upon . . . the victim [were] particularly great and (12) during the commission of 

the felony, the defendant intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury upon another person, 

or the actions of the defendant resulted in the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a victim 

or a person other than the intended victims, it did not specify to which convictions these 

enhancement factors applied. We note that it is well-settled that statutory enhancement 
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factors may not be applied if they are essential elements of the offense. See State v. Imfeld, 

70 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Tenn. 2002). Our supreme court noted that “proof of serious bodily 

injury will always constitute proof of particularly great injury.” State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 

597, 602 (Tenn. 1994). Accordingly, our Court has held that application of enhancement 

factor (6) is not appropriate in cases where serious bodily injury was an element of the 

offense. See id. at 602 (aggravated assault); State v. Nix, 922 S.W.2d 894, 903 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1995) (especially aggravated robbery); State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 82 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (vehicular assault). Therefore, the trial court erred in applying 

enhancement factors (6) and (12) to the defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated 

kidnapping and aggravated robbery.

Although the trial court misapplied enhancement factors (6), (10), and (12), there is 

no evidence in the record to suggest the trial court gave the factors great weight. 

Additionally, our supreme court has explained that a trial court’s “misapplication of an 

enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed . . . . So long 

as there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as 

provided by statute, a sentence imposed by the trial court within the appropriate range 

should be upheld.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. In this case, enhancement factors (1), (2), 

(4), and (13) were applicable to each of the defendant’s convictions, and enhancement 

factors (1), (2), (4), (6), (12), and (13) were applicable to the defendant’s convictions for 

aggravated burglary and fraudulent use of a debit card. Our review of the record indicates 

the trial court imposed a sentence within the applicable range after properly considering 

the evidence adduced at trial and the sentencing hearing, the presentence report, the 

principles of sentencing, the parties’ arguments, the nature and characteristics of the crime, 

the potential for rehabilitation, and the evidence of enhancement and mitigating factors. 

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(5), -114, -210(b). The defendant is not entitled to relief on 

this issue. 

B. Partial Consecutive Sentences

The defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. 

Specifically, the defendant contends the trial court erred in finding that she was a dangerous 

offender and that she had a record of criminal activity that is extensive. However, the 

defendant concedes that she was on probation at the time of the murder. The State contends 

the trial court properly weighed the bases for consecutive sentencing.

In State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851 (Tenn. 2013), the Tennessee Supreme Court 

expanded its holding in Bise to also apply to decisions by trial courts regarding consecutive 

sentencing. Id. at 859. This Court must give “deference to the trial court’s exercise of its 

discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences if it has provided reasons on the 

record establishing at least one of the seven grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated 
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section 40-35-115(b).” Id. at 861. “Any one of [the] grounds [listed in section 40-35-

115(b)] is a sufficient basis for the imposition of consecutive sentences.” Id. at 862 (citing 

State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735 (Tenn. 2013)).

A trial court “may order sentences to run consecutively” if it finds the defendant is 

“a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no 

hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high[.]” Tenn. Code. 

Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4); see State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tenn. 1995). Before 

a trial court may impose consecutive sentences on the basis that a defendant is a dangerous 

offender, the trial court must find “that an extended sentence is necessary to protect the 

public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences 

. . . reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses committed.” Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 

at 939. Our supreme court has stated that the trial court must make specific findings about 

“particular facts” which show the Wilkerson factors apply to the defendant. State v. Lane, 

3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999). 

In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court articulated its reasons, as follows:

[T]he [c]ourt does find that the [d]efendant is an offender whose 

record of criminal activity is extensive. The [c]ourt finds that the [d]efendant 

is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for 

human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk of 

human life is high, and that the circumstances surrounding the commission 

of the offense are aggravated.

Statutorily, they are defined as aggravated. Three of the offenses for 

which [the defendant] has been convicted have aggravated in the name. But 

the [c]ourt further finds that they are aggravated.

That confinement for an extended period of time is necessary to 

protect society from the [d]efendant’s unwillingness to lead a productive life, 

and the [d]efendant’s resort to criminal activity in furtherance of an antisocial lifestyle, and that the aggregate length of the sentences reasonably 

relate to the offense of which the [d]efendant stands convicted.

Further, the [c]ourt finds that the [d]efendant was on probation at the 

time, which is another factor.

. . . .
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[T]he [c]ourt does order consecutive sentencing. All the cases 

sentenced today would run . . . concurrent with one another, but consecutive 

to the felony murder convictions.

In determining whether to require the defendant to serve her sentences 

consecutively, the trial court found the defendant had no hesitation about committing a 

crime in which the risk to human life was high. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). 

As a result, the trial court determined the defendant was a dangerous offender.

The trial court then proceeded to consider the Wilkerson factors. Although the trial 

court stated on the record that an extended sentence was necessary to protect the public 

from further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the length of the defendant’s 

sentence reasonably related to his offenses, it failed to state the specific facts it found to 

satisfy its conclusion. See State v. Calloway, No. M2004-01118-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 

1307800, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 2, 2005) (“We agree with Defendant’s contention 

that the trial court failed to make the specific factual findings required by Wilkerson as a 

prerequisite to finding that Defendant is a dangerous offender for whom consecutive 

sentencing is appropriate. The mere recitation of the Wilkerson factors is not a substitute 

for the requirement of making specific findings.”); State v. Craig, No. E2001-01528-CCAR3-CD, 2002 WL 1972892, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2002) (“A mere statement

that confinement is necessary to protect society and that the severity of the sentence is 

reasonably related to the convicted offenses, without more, is insufficient to justify 

consecutive sentences [under Wilkerson].”); Wilkerson, 905 S.W.3d at 938 (holding the 

trial court must make “specific findings regarding the severity of the offenses and the 

necessity to protect society before ordering consecutive sentencing under Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-35-115(b)(4)”) (emphasis added). Because the trial court failed to make specific 

factual findings supporting factor (4), we cannot sustain its order imposing consecutive 

sentences on this basis. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 869 (“[W]hen trial courts fail to include 

the two additional findings before classifying a defendant as a dangerous offender, they 

have failed to adequately provide reasons on the record to support the imposition of 

consecutive sentences.”).3

The defendant also contends the trial court erred in finding she was an offender 

whose record of criminal activity is extensive. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2). Our 

supreme court recently held that a trial court should consider the following non-exclusive 

factors when finding that a defendant has an extensive record of criminal activity:

 

3 We typically would remand the case so that appropriate factual findings can be considered and 

made. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 864. However, given our holding below that consecutive sentences were 

properly ordered on other ground, a remand for these purposes is unnecessary.
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(1) The amount of criminal activity, often the number of convictions, both 

currently before the trial court for sentencing and prior convictions or 

activity;

(2) The time span over which the criminal activity occurred;

(3) The frequency of criminal activity within that time span;

(4) The geographic span over which the criminal activity occurred;

(5) The multiplicity of victims of the criminal activity; and

(6) Any other fact about the defendant or circumstance surrounding the 

criminal activity or convictions, present or prior, that informs the 

determination of whether an offender’s record of criminal activity was 

considerable or large in amount, time, space, or scope.

State v. Perry, 656 S.W.3d 116, 129 (Tenn. 2022) (footnotes omitted). Prior convictions 

or criminal activity “may demonstrate ‘a consistent pattern of operating outside the 

confines of lawful behavior’ and provide some stronger measure of justification for finding 

that a defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive.” Id. at 131 

(quoting State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 748 (Tenn. 2013)).

Despite this guidance from our supreme court, in the present case, the trial court 

simply stated that it “[found] that the [d]efendant is an offender whose record of criminal 

activity is extensive.” Because the trial court did not articulate any reasoning for its finding 

on the record, its decision to impose partial consecutive sentences based on Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 40-35-115(b)(2) is not entitled to deference. Nevertheless, we note that 

the record supports a finding that the defendant’s record of criminal activity is extensive.

In addition to the nine convictions the defendant received for her role in the murder of the 

victim, the presentence report shows that the defendant had four felony convictions and ten 

misdemeanor convictions spanning the defendant’s entire adult life as well as multiple 

states and counties. The defendant also admitted to using illegal drugs, including marijuana 

and methamphetamine. As such, we affirm the trial court’s order imposing consecutive 

sentences based upon the defendant’s extensive record of criminal activity.

Notwithstanding the trial court’s insufficient findings regarding § 40-35-115(b)(2), 

(4), the trial court also found that the defendant was being sentenced for an offense

committed while on probation, an additional basis for imposing consecutive sentences. See 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(6); Pollard, 423 S.W.3d at 862 (“Any one of these 

grounds is a sufficient basis for the imposition of consecutive sentencing.”) (citing 
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Dickson, 413 S.W.3d at 748). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

imposing consecutive sentences, and the defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgments of the 

trial court. 

____________________________________

 J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE