E ATT-S NEY GENERAL 

CD EXAS 

Mr. Joe Resweber 

County Attorney 

Harris County 

Houston, Texas 

Opinion No. C- 697 

Re: Whether Clareivood House, 

an elderly persons’ 

retirement home, is exempt 

from ad valorem taxes as 

Dear Mr. Resweber: 

an institution of purely 

public charity. 

In connection with your request for an opinion on the 

above captioned matter, 

ing facts. 

we have been advised of the followClarewood ~House, hereinafter referred to as the 

Home, is owned by the Sharpstown Tower Corporation, which is 

incorporated under the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act for 

the oharitable or benevolent purposes of providing elderly 

persons with housing facilities and were specially designed 

to meet the physical, social, and psychological needs of the 

aged and contribute to their health, security, happiness, and 

usefulness in longer living. 

as an F.H.A Loan Project. 

The corporation Is 100s financed 

The Commlssloner of Internal Revenue 

has heretofore granted this corporation a tax exemption as having 

been organized~and operated exclus%vely for charitable purposes 

and no part of the earnings of which inures to the benefit of 

any private shareholder or lndivldual. See Sec. 501(c ( 

the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 501 c 

also annotations In 69 A.L R.2d 871, 878. 

I 31 35); 

The corporation’s property consists of 8.388 acres. of: 

land loaated In a metropolitan area of Houston, adjacent to 

the large Sharpstown Shopping Center. The Home was located 

to avoid isolation from the community and designed to meet 

the needs of elder1 citizens for adequate housing In that 

community, costing x 4,700,OOO.OO. It has eleven stories, 

containing two hundred eighty-eight apartment residence units, 

each having Its own private bath with tub or tub-shower combination. There are no’:ateps in the Home; only elevators and 

inolines which have handrails are provided,- with some units 

having side door ovens and baths for wheel-chair residents. 

A specially designed nursing aare unit is connected to the 

-3&a- 
Mr. Joe Resweber, Page 2 (C-697) 

Home by covered passageways and ramps. Included in the unit 

are rooms for occupational therapeutic activity of several 

kinds and rooms for residents requiring nursing care by 

resident nurses. A twenty-four nursing unit is provided at 

rates which the residents can afford to pay and at a rate 

well-below the prevailing rates in 'hiouston. A furnished 

chapel and various recreational areas' are available to all 

without cost, Much, of the cost of operating the Home is to 

be paid for by contributions or donations, which now exceed 

$450,000.00. No founder's or finder's or admission fee is 

charged, but those residents who are financially able to 

pay for their care are charged a fee on a basis determined 

by the Board of Directors. Admission.,in each case is 

determined on its own merits and as a matter of mutual 

agreement. Hotel-type room and bath, with 288 square feet 

normally bring a fee of $80.00 monthly; efficiency units 

of 354 square feet for $100.00 monthly; the one-bedroom, 

living dining combination, with kitchen, electric range, 

and more elaborate facilities for $150.00 monthly; twobedroom, two-bath apartments extensive facilities and containing 780 square feet for $190.00 monthly, ten of which 

are specially designed for wheel-chair tenants. Additional 

elaborate facilities include a library, game room, beauty 

shop, restaurant, hobby rooms, auditorium for lectures and 

cultural events, telephone and message service, coin-operated 

laundry, and sun decks. All apartments are air-conditioned 

with a picture-window view.. and have,,tile flooring. When it 

becomes debt-free, the land and buildings are required to be 

deeded to the First Methodist Church. 

Fifteen units In the Home have so far been set aside for 

use by retired persons unable to pay for such facilities, three 

of which are oocupied by tenants paying no rental and six of 

which are occu 

nine of the 28 2; 

led by tenants paying only partial rental. Thus 

apartment units havebeen occupied by tenants 

who are unable to pay the normal rental charges, and at this 

time, an additional six patrons unable to pay are being added 

as tenants. The Board of Directors assert they are increasing 

the number of full and partial charity tenants just as fast as 

resources permit! Revenues have not been sufficient to pay 

the debt charges and all operating expenses and over $450,000.00 

In deficits have had to be raised by donations. Although It was 

a group of Individuals who organized the Home, It Is non-sectarian, with most denominations represented by tenants. The 

average age of the 275 residents Is 77. Sixty per cent of 

them receive Social Security benefits,~ sixty-five per cent being 

under 72; and one-third of the residents would face serious 

-3353- 
Mr. Joe Fiesieber, page 3~ (C- 697) 

difficulty without the social security. All are unemployed 

but five. The Board of Directors have avoided requiring information smacking of a “pauper’s oath” or disclosure of their 

amount of income; but in all cases it asrrertains that the aged 

persons are “needy” and it Is satisfied that no recipient of 

charity Is a property owner. Our rough calculation Indicates 

that an average apartment unit costs approximately $~~,OOO.OO 

to ereat. 

Cn the basis of the information furnished to us in a 

letter of the Vice President and General Manager, we compute the following data relevant to apartments which have 

been in use on a charitable or part-paid basis, as follows: 

Total of the usual monthly rental 

Total monthly rental charged and oollected 

‘Lpg 

. 

Anount commuted per month as charity 7m.00 

When wemultiply this $785.00 per month by 12’, we arrive at 

ths awn of $9,420.00 which represents part of the charity contributed by Clarewood House during a year’a period of time. 

Under conditions at the date of this writing, it is anticipated 

that .more than $18,000.00 will be ,-presented as charity for this 

tax year. 

In addition, it~ia fair to atate that charity is also 

preaent not only from the Home paying the entire or partial 

oosts for some of the residents but also charity,is present 

with respect to all of the aged residents who are furnished 

services and facilities at a rate substantially less than cost. 

We have not attempted to convert this charity into dollars, 

but it appears that the charity to the public resulting from 

the operation of the Home is substantial and not merely nominal, 

aa the revenues have not been anffioient to pay debt charges 

and operating expenses and over $450,000,00 in deficits have 

had to be raised by donations. 

The Home claims exemption from ad valorem taxes under 

Article VIII, zection 2 of the Constitution of Texas, which 

provides that . . . the legislature may, by general laws, 

exempt from taxation . . . instltutlons~ of purely public 

oharlty; and all laws exempting property from taxation otffer 

than the property above mentioned shall be null and void. 

The Legislature, in Article 7150, Section 7, V.C.S. of 

Texas, provided: 

-3354 
Mr. Joe Resweber, Page 4 (C-697) 

,” Public charities. All buildings and personal'property belonging to Institutions 

of purely public charity, together with 

the lands belonging to and occupied by 

such institutions not leased or otherwise 

used with a view to prof%t, unless such 

rents and profits and all moneys and credits 

are appropriated by such institutions solely 

to sustain such institutions and for the 

benefit of the sick and disabled members 

and their families and the burial of the 

same, or for the maintenance of persons 

when unable to provide for themselves, 

whether such persons are members of such 

institution or not. An Institution of 

purely public charity under this article 

Is one which dispenses Its aid to Its 

members and others in sickness or distress, 

or at death, without regard to poverty or 

riches of the recipient, also when the funds, 

property and assets of such institutions are 

placed and bound by its law to relieve, aid 

and administer in any way to the relief of 

its members when in want, sickness and distress, and provide homes for its helpless 

and dependent members and to educate and 

~maintaln the orph$ns of its-deceased members 

or other persons. ‘/ 

In Interpreting the phrase “purely public charity” in 

our Constitution, Article VIII, Section 2, the word "purely" 

in the Constitutional provision above quoted modifies the word 

“charity” and not the word “public” so as to require an lnstltution to ha've a wholly altruistic quality and exclude from It 

every private or selfish interest or profit or corporate gain. 

Benevolent dc Protective Order of Elks v. City of Houston, 44 

. . 4uu, 4 (Tex.Civ.App. 1931, error ref.). 

The property of the institution must be used wholly and 

exclusively for charitable purposes and such use of the property 

must be actual, direct, and exclusive. City of Houston v. 

Soottlsh Rite Benevolent Assn., 111 Tex. 191 230 S . W . 

n cannot be used to engage In. a c~ommerclal &siness. gk!;:?' 

v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society 280 S.W.2d 3r7TTex 

55 error ref.). Nor may it bi used to enter into 

a landlord ani tenant relationshlp'which creates a commercial 

transaction or lease, particularly where rent is paid. David 

371~2d 

rent is not paid such ion-charitable 

ere actual 

use destroys the exemptlon. 

-3355- 
Mr. Joe Reaweber, page 5 (C- 697) 

of Longview v. Markham - McRee Memorial Hospital, 152 S.W.2d 

(T C A 1941 j . s anta R osa Infirmary v. City of San 

Antonioex&?:W~P&6 (T&E. Sup. Ct. 1924). H owever, our courts 

inthese cases have clearlv indicated that charitable institutions might derive, as an incident of the administration-of the 

charities, rents and profits where they were devoted directly 

and solely to those very charities. 

In the Santa Rosa Infirmary case, 

Moreover, as pointed out 

supra, where all facilities 

are exCluslvely operated by members of the institution, tax 

exemption Is not lost by the needy patron capable of paying, 

doing so, for maintenance or for services rendered therein by 

others not wholly engaged in a charitable work. Nor did the 

operation of a small drug store in the building destroy the 

tax exempt structure. The requirement Is merely that the 

buildings be used and occupied by the charitable Institution 

and none other. 

It Is pertinent to observe that such a charitable lnstltution aa an Infirmary need not be supported exclusively by 

gratuities or donations to be exempt from taxation, since it 

was held in the Santa Rosa Infirmary case, supra, that it does 

not loae ita exempt status by paying for its plant from incidental earnings or expending its funds realized therefrom in 

training nurses, being within the proper upkeep and maintenance 

needs for which profits may be appropriated. 

Rev. 494, 497. 

7 Baylor Law 

From the above authorities, it is also seen that ownership as well as exclusive use by the charitable Institution is 

required tn the sense of a perpetual dedication of the property 

and the miscellaneous mutations of profits derived to charitable 

uaea or purposes. No private individual may obtain any profit 

or gain, or If a corporate owner is involved, no distributable 

earnings, such as dividends, may result. In addition, the 

institution must benefit persons indefinite in numbers and 

oersonalitles. to the end that they will be prevented from 

becoming burdens to society or to the State.‘ 

v. Missouri-Pacific Lines Hospital Ass.!n., 99 

Civ.App. 1930B error ref.) 

Cn the other hand, the authorities above cited hold that 

the chatity is not required to be universal to be public and 

the institution is not reauired to search out the needy persons 

on the highways and byways. Raymondvllle Memorial Hospital v. 

State 253 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex.C?v.App. 1952, error ref., n.r.e.f; 

eylor Law Rev. 133, 138. The charity is deemed public if 

It affects all of the people of a state or community through 

-3356- 
Mr. Joe Resweber, Page 6 (C- 697) 

its assumption, to a material extent,‘that whidh otherwise 

YF 

t become the obligation or duty ,of the state or community. 

awme charity Is not necessarily rendered “private” 

as distinguished from “public’ because limited In sect, class 

or fraternal order, etc. 11 Baylor Law Rev. 137. It is said 

‘oharlty need not be universal to be public.” -City of Palestine 

v. Missouri-Pacific Lines Hospital Ass’n., supra; B.P.O.E. Lodg 

V. ty of houston, 44 S . W . 26 4oti (T ex.Clv.App’ 193, error ref. e, . 

The latest definition and test of charity, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Texas. Is set out in River Oaks 

barden Club v. City of Houston, 370 S.W.2d 851 (1963’). I 

fl t four decision th Court applied the so-called “q%i 

pr?qui” idea earlier’exp~essed In City of Houston v. Scottish 

Rite Benevolent AssIn., supra, wherein It was said that a 

charitable Institution must meet three criteria to warrant 

tax exemption: (1) It must make no gain or profit, (2) must 

accomplish ends wholly benevolent, and (3) must benefit persons 

indefinite in number by preventing them from becoming burdens 

on the community or state. 

707-708. 

18 Southwestern Law Journal 703, 

It affirmatively appears from the River Oaks Qarden Club 

case, supra, that first; In order to justly a charitable tax 

exemption, the institution’s activity Itself must be one in 

which the state or community could have an obligation to support; 

and secondly, the institution must substantially tend to lessen 

that obligation so that the.benefits therefrom run to a relatively, 

large segment of the public. Further, It cautions us that a 

charter declaration of the purpose and obligations Is not conclusive, and we must look further to the actual operations of 

the institution and the effect and result thereof. No guidelines are provided as to just what actlv%fles are to be deemed 

to be government obligations or just what degree, or percentage 

or extent of charitable benefits must be provided to warrant 

an exemption. Institutions, though plainly altruistic, will 

apparently’ not be held to be purely charitable which do not 

provide provable benefits covering a substantial number of 

people in those areas falling within the traditional definition 

of public welfare. Examples are institutions devoted to the 

promotion of the fine arts of gardening, dramatics, interior 

decorating, maintenance of historical landmarks, or those arts 

characterized as “aesthetio”, as evidenced in the River Oaks 

Carden Club case, supra. It is left to the function of our 

courts to determine where the line will be drawn and to provide 

other examples. 

-3357- $, 
nr. Joe Resueber, Page 7 (C-697) 

The problem of applying the rule of River Oaks, 

to the facts of this or other situations is accurately 

in 18 Southwestern Law Journal 703, 711 (1964): 

supra , 

described 

‘Even If the courts interpret the uid ro E 

standard liberally, the uncertainty %iTi- w lc pervades the criteria-for charitable exemptions 

in Texas will work a hardship’onlnstitutione 

in the ..fringe area. In most cases one should 

be able to look to the constitution and the 

exempting statutes to determine whether a 

narticular oraanisatlon auallfles for exemotion. 

It is our considered opinion that, assuming an absence 

of controverey,as to the particular facts submitted, the Home 

may not be said to fall within the “fringe area.” While the 

courts have failed to state what they regard as sufficient 

charitable benefit running to the public, they have said that 

if It was shown to be “substantial,” the charitable exemption 

could be established. Based upon the facts submitted to us, it 

Is our opinion that the substantial benefit test has been met. 

What is ade,quate housing for the needy aged? According to our 

governmental current standards of society by 1961, adequate 

housing !‘means housing which the aged can afford, which meets 

the special physical needs of the aged, and which is designed 

to avoid isolation from the rest of the community or an lnstitutlonallsed feeling.” (White House Conference on Aging Policy 

Statement on Housing, January 11, 1961). According to the 

Polioy Statements and Recommendations of the White House Conferenoe on Aging, February, 1961, the average person can now 

expect to live longer than before - past seventy and into the 

eighty bracket - and will have longer periods of retirement. 

We now have five times more people over sixty-five than we had 

In 1900; the number will double in the next forty years, while 

the number over seventy-five will triple. In Harris County, 

Texas, the problem is the same and within the next four years, 

there will be 108,600 people over sixty-five. The harsh social 

-3358- 
Hr. Joe Resweber, Page 8 (C-697) 

and economic facts revealed in the Conference Report show that 

suoh a “retired citizen Is one who by reason of age has ceased 

to work his customary intensity of employment. 

not engage in other types of part-time occupation. He *y Or 2: 

regular normal earned Income, however, hae in fact ceased.” 

The problem, of adequate housing and care for the aged 

18 being undertaken as an obligation by all echelons of government. Drugs and medical care have extended life; the industrial 

revolution and population explosionhave combined to bring an 

ever increasing higher standard and quality into the lives of 

even the poor and needy. What 18 now “decent” and “reaeuaable” 

houelng and care for the aged was, indeed, luxury when the 

framers wrote our State Constitution over one hundred years 

Since the introduction of the common law Into this 

%,“;e in 1840 the Texas Constitutions have been framed with 

reference to it. and our Constitution 1s reoulred to be lnterQreted in the light of the development of Uie common law as 

declared by the courts of the 

The Supreme Court of Texas will apply words in the 

Constitution to present-day conditions and may find words ‘to 

have been therein used In a eenee broad enouah to include things 

not then within human e 

2 

erience or knowledge. ” Roy v. Schneider, 

110 Tex. 369, 221 S.W. 8 0, 918 (1920). Since the Supreme Court 

in River Oaks Garden Club v. City of Houston, BuQra, has said 

that the framers of our Constitutions Intended the meaning of 

the charitable exemption to cover “that which otherwise might 

become the obligation or duty of the community or the state” 

(370 S.W.2d 854, ~‘s;,c ..I,, it Is therefore necessary to observe 

what obligations the government has undertaken and how the 

courts of the country have interpreted purely Qubllti charity 

in the light of the common law. In addltlon, our Constitution, 

Art. III, Sec. 51a, authorizes certain expenditures for needy 

aged persons, and the Le 

through 1524k, 1528a, t 

lslature, In Articles 6%c, 6753, 1524b 

12 9k has provided extensively for the 

care and housing of the aged. We do not read Into these 

governmental obligations an Intent to exclude tax exemQtlon 

for charitable activities to be undertaken by the citizens 

themselves. The state government claims no monopoly on charity. 

The obligation or duty of government under ItB general 

welfare powers is aa narrow or broad a8 the customs, mores, 

ethics, standards, and eoolal conscience of it8 people at a 

-3359- .: 

r 
Mr. Joe Retiweber, Page 9 (C-697) 

particular time. There could therefore be no fixed, unchanging, and inflexible meaning of what constitutes "charity," 

nor do we think the constitutional framers intended to write 

Into the Constitution a particular standard or social concept 

ai':tbelr time. The concepts of "general welfare" and "charity" 

are not etatlc. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century 

ago are interwoven in our day with the well-being of the 

community and etate. 

The' White House Conference of 1961 established the Qrinciple and objective that "All aging people . should be adequately housed,in a suitable neighborhood of their choice and 

supplied with community facilities and services at rents they 

can afford. There Is, and will continue to be, a need for an 

lhcreaee in all types of housing . . . . The aged have special 

needa as to both their housing and their total environment. 

Integral parts of their problem on the planning and developing 

of 'facilities for the aged - such as transportation, shopping, 

medical and hospital facilities, 

outletcl and congenial neighbors." 

utilities, churches, cultured 

All of these things the Home 

in this case sought to provide in a purported charitable way. 

We have heretofore rendered 0 inion Numbers WW-771 (1960), 

WW-1277 (1962) ww-1318 (1 

and Opinion No: C-357 (196 

w&24 (1962) C-209 (1964) 

), in which we recognized that hohes 

for the aged, under the facts submitted, were Institutions of 

purely public charity and involved that which otherwise might 

beoome the obligation or duty of the community or state within 

the legal concepte set out In River Oaks Carden Club v. City of 

Houston, supra. This is in accordance with the common law 

meanlna of nurelv DubliC charits in other Surisdlctlons and we 

‘, 

The authorities throughout the nation are generally In 

accord In upholding this legal concept, as so clearly set out 

in Flfleld Manor v. County of Los Angeles, sups, 10 Cal.Rptr. 

at Q. 249 : 

-3360- 
Mr. Joe Resweber, Page 10 (C-697) 

II 

. . . Relief of poverty 1s not a condition 

of charitable asalstance: If the benefit conferred has a sufficiently widespread social 

value, a charitable purpose exibts. It is a 

matter of common knowledge that aged people ': 

require care and attention apart from financial 

assistance, and the supply of this care and 

attention Is as much a charitable and benevolent purpose as the relief of their financial 

wants. Every clvlllz~ed community must provide 

facilities, either public or private, for the 

care of old people regardless of financial 

condition. . . . 

. . :.. . 'The concept of charity Is not confined to the relief of the needy and destitute, 

for "aged people require care and attention 

apart from financial asslBtance, and the BUQQ~Y 

of this care and attention 1s as much a charltable and benevolent purpose as the relief df 

their financial wants!,' So the 'charge of fees 

by such an institution aB a home for the aged 

will not necessarily prevent its classification 

as charitable If such Bums "go to pay the expenses of operations and not to the profit of 

the founders or shareholders," for all persons~ 

may "'under certain conditions be proper subjects 

of charity." In short, as the word "charity" 

Is commonly unaeistood in modern usage, It does 

not refer only to aid, to the poor and destitute 

and exclude all humanitarian activities, though 

rendered at cost or less, which are maintained 

to care for the physical and mental well-being 

of the recipients, and which make it less 

likely that such recipients will. become burdens 

on society." 

1st Homes, Inc. v. Horn, 226 Ore. 298, 

) the court also recognized the 

o;e authorities, and that such homes 

for the aged could,.be an exerapt charitable lnatltutlon, 1:' 

likening them in analogg to the charitable teats applied to 

hospitals, but denied the exemption upon the ground ,that the 

facts revealed the lack of any charter provlslon for a contlnuatlon of charitable works aen, the assets were disposed of in 

the event of corporate dissolution. Other determlnlng factors 

considered to be relevant in the determination, besides the 

charter purposes and by-law QroViSion8, Were the aQQllOatlOn 

L 

-3361- 
Mr. Joe Resweber, Page 11 (C-697) 

or use of receipts; whether patrons received the same ,treatment 

irrespective of ability to pay; whether the doors of the home 

were open to the poor as well as the rich and without other 

discrimination; whether charges were made to all patrons and 

whether any charges were made to the Indigent; whether a charltable trust fund was created; and whether If the home had no 

operational gains, there were offsetting advantages. 

The Court In Trainee v. St. Petereburg Methodist Rome, Inc., 

173 So.26 176 (Fla. Igbb}, recognized that providing homes for 

the aged wa8 a proper charitable Qurpoae, but denied the 

exemption upon a showing that the facllltlea were not available 

to the general public, many applicants were not accepted unless 

they are able to pay, and,the charter failed to disclose what 

would happen to its assets in the event of corporate dissolution. 

In the oaae of Clarewood House, we assume the facts to be 

true that rufflclent applicants not able to pay are accepted 

by the Boerd of Directors under the circumstances. 

The Ohio Supreme Court, in The Phllada Home Pund v. Board 

31 (19bb) and the Nebraska Supreme 

as v. O.E.A.'Senior Citizens, Inc 

7l9 725 m denied a chktable 

whos; purpose war; merely “the furnlahlng of low cost housing at Its real cost.’ This activity the 

courta said did not In itself fall within the meaning of “charity,’ 

declaring that “the reason for exemption Is present benefit to 

the general public sufficient to justify the loss of tax revenue.” 

The Institutions were unable to show clearly sufficient facts to 

satisfy this test. In the County of Douglas case, supra, although 

it was shown that the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury 

Department had ruled that the institution Van owned and operated 

exclusively for charltable’purposes, the Court nevertheless held 

to the contrary, saying: 

“The design and purpoees of the building 

on the land was to furnish housing to 

selected people at low cost. There is 

nothing to Indicate that it was to be below 

the cost of the service furnished. . . . 

In fact no right to remain In occupancy other 

than at the will of the defendant waB a declared 

purpo:e except as to a limited olass of occupants. 

. . . (111 N.W.2d 725). 

-336,s 
Hr. Joe Resweber, Page 12 (C-697) 

In the case of Clarewood House, we are advised by the 

facts submitted that the malti”purQoBe and use Is not the mere 

fUI?liBhing of relatively low-cost housing to selected people 

but that charity Is the purpose, and the right to remain in 

occupancy Is not at the will of the Board. The mere lack of 

a church sponsor does not prevent the Home from having a chllrltable exemption. Apparently the cederal government Is satisfied 

with Its exclusive charitable purpose and use and saw fit to 

finance it one hundred per cent and give it an exemption from 

taxes on the ground that it was organized and operated as excluslvely charitable. 

We find no substantial or material distinctions to be 

made on the facts herein related as to Clarewood House as compared to those related in our previous opinions. In Opinion 

C-357, suppa, for exampl&, Lnvolving &you l%Xio%?, sponsored by 

the Brazes Presbyterian Church, there was ‘I)o:: more charitable 

benefit running to the public for Its operation than Is shown 

in the Clarewood case, 

In writing this opinion, we have attempted to set out 

such legal guidelines as exist on the question presented for 

the benefit of any other Interested parties faced with a 

similar question. We hasten to point lout, however, that we 

have assumed that no factual controversy exists between the 

taxing authority and the party seeking the exemption. In issuing official opinions, this office 1s not authorized to resolve 

disputed factual Issues. Cur opiniona are based solely upon 

the application of legal principles to the facts submitted to 

us. If a taxing authority and a party seeking a tax exemption 

are not in agreement aa to the evidential facta upon which a 

claim for exemption 1s based, the Qartles must resolve their 

dlaoute in a oourt of law that Is authorized to resolve dlwuted 

l.a‘QaG.oulirly true, as stated by the-cited authorities, because 

the burden of clear proof ls.~.on the one tilalming exemption; 

exePlptlons from taxation are $5ver favored; and all doubts are 

resolved against the exemption and in favor of the taxing power. 

SUMMARY 

The Attorney General’s office 1s not authorized to 

pas0 on fact questlone. However, under the facts submitted, which we assume as true and unoontrover&lal, 

-3363- 
Mr. Joe Resweber, Page 13 (C-697) 

Clarewood House is deemed to be an institution 

of purely public charity which would be entitled 

to exemption from ad valorem taxes under Article 

VIII, Section 2 of the Texas Constitution. 

Yours very truly, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney General of Texas 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Pat Bailey 

Robert Flowers 

RJoy gYY; 

. . 

APPROVED FOR TIiE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: T. B. Wright 

-3364-