IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

United States of America

ex rel. Rayme M. Edler, M.D.

Plaintiffs,

v. Case 3:20-cv-05503-RV-HTC

Escambia County

Defendant.

_____________________________/

PLAINTIFF RELATOR’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW 

IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Dr. Edler alleged Escambia County submitted claims for payment to the 

government for emergency medical transportation despite knowing that many

employees who provided those services were not certified as Medicare and Florida 

require. Each claim related to these services is a false claim under the False Claims 

Act. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. 

Four county officials identified in the Complaint as leading the frauds have 

been arrested and charged with felonies and misdemeanors related to the 

allegations raised by Dr. Edler. One has already pleaded no contest to falsifying the 

exact EMT and paramedic certificates at issue here. The others’ cases are pending. 
ii

Contents

I. There has been no public disclosure................................................................1

II. Even if there were a public disclosure, Relator is an original source. ............6

III.The Complaint is not an impermissible “shotgun” pleading...........................7

IV.The Retaliation Claim is Plausible. ...............................................................13

A. The Complaint alleges Dr. Edler engaged in protected activity......... 15

B. Defendant knew of Dr. Edler’s protected activities. .......................... 15

C. Defendant retaliated against Dr. Edler. .............................................. 15

V. The Complaint Meets Rule 9(b)’s Particularity Requirement.......................18

A. The Complaint pleads the who, what, and when. .............................. 18

B. The Complaint need not plead specific claims. ................................. 19

C. “On information and belief” allegations are acceptable. ................... 23

D. Identity of EMTs and paramedics are unnecessary for Rule 9(b)...... 25

E. Rule 9(b) requires an “indicia of reliability,” not claims. .................. 26

VI. If necessary, Relator will move for leave to amend............................27

VII. Conclusion...........................................................................................29
iii

Authorities

Cases

Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 

1996) .....................................................................................................................12

Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 Fed. Appx. 597 (11th Cir. 2008)........13

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).....................................................13

Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, 674 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2012)...................................7

Briggs for use & benefit of United States v. Quantitech, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-01690-

ACA, 2021 WL 461694 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2021)..................................................14

Brown v. Morehouse Coll., 829 F. App’x 942 (11th Cir. 2020)...............................14

Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir. 1994) ......3

Crispell v. Fla. Dept. of Children & Families, No. 8:11-cv-1527-T-30EAJ, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116965 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2012)..........................................13

Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1996)...............................................12

Hammond v. Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc., 218 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2000)..........16

Hickman v. Spirit of Athens, Alabama, Inc., 985 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2021)..........14

Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018)..................................8

Profit v. Rabon, No. 1:19-cv-129-MW-GRJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24794 (N.D. 

Fla. Jan. 9, 2020) ..................................................................................................24

Tavantzis v. Am. Choppers, No. 6:14-cv-1519-Orl-40TBS, 2015 WL 6736753 (M.D. 

Fla. Nov. 4, 2015)...................................................................................................12

Townsend v. Bayer Corp., 774 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 2014)..........................................16

U.S. ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2006) ................................22

U.S. ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2021) ........ 3, 4, 5

U.S. ex rel. Bingham v. BayCare Health Sys., No. 8:14-cv-73-T-23EAJ, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 107220 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2015)..................................................21
iv

U.S. ex rel. Brown v. Walt Disney World Co., 361 F. App’x 66 (11th Cir. 2010) ......3

U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002)19, 23, 26, 

27

U.S. ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines, Inc., 912 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2018) ......... 13, 14

U.S. ex rel. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., Inc., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 

22019936 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003).............................................................. 23, 27

U.S. ex rel. Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. 2011 WL 2269968 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 

2011).....................................................................................................................22

U.S. ex rel. Lorona v. Infilaw Corp., No. 3:15-cv-959-J-34PDB, 2019 WL 3778389 

(M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2019) ......................................................................................12

U.S. ex rel. Matheny v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 671 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2012).18

U.S. ex rel. Michael A. Rehfeldt, Plaintiff, v. Compassionate Care Hosp. Gr. Inc., No. 

5:19-CV-00304-TES, 2021 WL 2229057 (M.D. Ga. June 2, 2021)........................14

U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805 (11th Cir. 2015)........................2

U.S. ex rel. Sanchez v. Lymphatx, Inc., 596 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2010)..................17

U.S. ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 3, 4

U.S. ex rel. Walker v. R & F Props. of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 

2005).............................................................................................................. 26, 27

United States v. Choudhry, 262 F.Supp.3d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2017)...............................12

United States v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., 591 F. App’x 693 (11th Cir. 2014)..... 21, 27

United States v. HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x 783 (11th Cir. 2018)............20

Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) ........................................18

Webb v. Compath, Inc., No. 5:03CV272-MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 8164786 (N.D. Fla. 

May 20, 2005), rep. and recc. adopted, 2005 WL 8164800 (N.D. Fla. June 21, 

2005).....................................................................................................................16

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015)... 8, 9, 12
v

Weinerth v. Ayers, No. 2:10-cv-170-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 4955836 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 

2010) .....................................................................................................................12

Statutes

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)...................................................................................9, 10

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) ...................................................................................9, 11

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)..................................................................................... passim

31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) .................................................................................9, 11, 14, 16

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) ..........................................................................................10

42 U.S.C. § 1983......................................................................................................12

42 U.S.C. § 1985......................................................................................................12

Fla. Stat § 403.161 ...................................................................................................24

Fla. Stat. § 401.27 ............................................................................................. 10, 25

Fla. Stat. § 401.41 ....................................................................................................24

Fla. Stat. § 831.01 ....................................................................................................24

Fla. Stat. § 838.022 ........................................................................................... 24, 25

Fla. Stat. § 895.03 ....................................................................................................24

Other Authorities

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Sample Claim Form..................... 10, 22

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).............................................................................................9, 11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ..........................................................................................1, 2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ................................................................................. 2, 13, 24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)........................................................................................... passim

Fed. R. Evid. 20 .......................................................................................................24

Regulations

42 C.F.R. § 410.41 ............................................................................................ 10, 25
1

ARGUMENT

Escambia’s Motion should be denied because the Complaint pleads facts 

with particularity that present a “plausible” claim for relief under the False Claims 

Act, as required by Federal Rules 8(a), 9(b), 10(b) and 12(b)(6). In addition, 

Defendant’s public disclosure argument is completely without merit as it is 

premised on an old and inapplicable version of the statute. 

I. There has been no public disclosure.

Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the Complaint “to the extent 

that” the allegations are “based” on publicly disclosed information is a non-starter. 

Defendant’s motion is premised on the wrong statute, the wrong Federal Rule, the 

wrong standard, and the wrong caselaw. The current version of the False Claims 

Act (“FCA”) provides: 

(e)(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, 

unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same 

allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were 

publicly disclosed—

(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which 

the Government or its agent is a party;

(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or 

other Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or

(iii) from the news media, unless the action is brought by the 

Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original 

source of the information.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (emphasis supplied). 
2

However, the entirety of Defendant’s argument is based on the pre-2010 

version of this statute which provided that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over 

an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or 

transactions . . . .” Pre-2010 version of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis 

supplied). The current statutory test is whether “substantially the same allegations 

or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3730(e)(4)(A). Defendant’s mistake is but one reason this portion of the motion 

must be denied.1

First, the public disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional. U.S. ex rel. 

Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 2015) (“We conclude that 

the amended § 3730(e)(4) creates grounds for dismissal for failure to state a claim 

rather than for lack of jurisdiction.”). There is no viable Rule 12(b)(1) motion here. 

This change from 12(b)(1) to 12(b)(6) is a difference that matters. Post-2010, the 

burden is on the defendant to prove their defense. Id. (approvingly quoting one of 

several decisions describing the post-2010 public disclosure bar as “effectively an 

affirmative defense.”) 

1

 100% of Defendant’s authorities pre-date the operative amendments. In fact, 

Defendant quotes from the wrong version of the statute when purporting to 

define an “original source.” ECF 20 at 7. 
3

Second, even applying the correct test and the correct Rule, there has been 

no public disclosure here. Defendant’s recitation of the legal test for public 

disclosure is woefully incomplete.2 The Cooper test is still a valid starting point, 

but it is far from the end of the analysis. The Cooper test first asks: 

(1) have the allegations made by the plaintiff been publicly disclosed; 

(2) if so, is the disclosed information the basis of the plaintiff's suit; 

(3) if yes, is the plaintiff an ‘original source’ of that information.

U.S. ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 

2021), quoting Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 565 

n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) cert. denied, No. 20-1463, 2021 WL 1951877 

(U.S. May 17, 2021).

“So, under the Cooper framework, the first prong becomes dispositive where 

the plaintiff's allegations have not been publicly disclosed.” Bibby, 987 F.3d at 

1353. To analyze this issue under the current statute, the Eleventh Circuit has 

adopted the D.C. Circuit’s Springfield formula for determining whether the 

allegations of fraud which support a Relator’s claim have been publicly disclosed. 

2

 Defendant’s reliance on “based in any part” from U.S. ex rel. Brown v. Walt 

Disney World Co., 361 F. App’x 66, 68 (11th Cir. 2010) is misplaced. Brown no 

longer comports with the statutory text and the law of this Circuit. The statute now

permits qui tam suits to proceed unless “substantially the same allegations or 

transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed.” 31 U.S.C. § 

3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The old, pre-2010 text barred suits “based upon the 

public disclosure” which is the source of the “based in any part” language in Brown.
4

Under that formula, one generally must present a submitted statement 

or claim (X) and the true set of facts (Y), which shows that X is untrue. 

These two things together allow the conclusion (Z) that fraud has 

occurred. There is no allegation of fraud under this formula unless each 

variable is present. Where only one element of the fraudulent 

transaction is in the public domain (e.g., X), the qui tam plaintiff may 

mount a case by coming forward with either the additional elements 

necessary to state a case of fraud (e.g., Y) or allegations of fraud itself 

(e.g., Z).

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also U.S. ex rel. Springfield 

Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Here, Defendant has failed to do anything other than recite an incomplete 

version of the Cooper test. Defendants do not actually assert or point the Court to 

the existence of ANY public disclosure—making it impossible for the Court to 

find that any information in the public domain is an “allegation” under the 

Springfield test. 

At worst, the Complaint includes a reference to public reporting that 

documents Dr. Edler’s pre-suit disclosure of information to various governmental 

authorities and the criminal enforcement activities that resulted from Relator’s 

original information.3Compl. at ¶¶ 40, 72–73. These activities do not support 

3

“The reason for the public disclosure bar is fairly obvious. Without it,

opportunistic relators—with nothing new to contribute—could exploit the FCA's 

qui tam provisions for their personal benefit.” Bibby, 987 F.3d at 1353. This is not 

a concern here where any assertedly public disclosure originated with Relator.
5

Defendant’s motion and instead comport with Dr. Edler’s status as an original 

source. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).

The Complaint cites two news articles but neither disclose the X, Y, and Z of 

the fraud allegation. The first reported Escambia’s substandard emergency care and 

noted only that Dr. Edler questioned how training was done.4 The word “fraud” 

does not appear in the article. Nor is there any mention of the government 

receiving or paying any bills for emergency services or of training, licensing, or 

certifications being falsified. The second article reports only that four Escambia 

employees had been arrested and charged with falsifying emergency services 

training records.5 Again, there is no mention of billing, invoicing, or payments. 

None of these articles are an “allegation” of the fraud which might support the 

existence of a public disclosure. Bibby, 987 F.3d at 1354 (holding the disclosure of 

the amount of an alleged overcharge did not “publicly disclose the ‘allegations.’). 

Here, no claims—much less any false claims plus the true facts—were publicly 

disclosed.

4

 See Compl. at ¶ 40 citing Jim Little, Pensacola Nurse Fights to Change EMS 

Policies After Video of Son’s Care at Crash Scene, Pensacola News J. (Apr. 30, 

2019), https://www.pnj.com/story/news/2019/04/30/escambia-county-ems-nursefights-change-after-video-sons-care-crash/3586888002.

5

 See Compl. at ¶ 73.
6

Defendant references allegations which pre-date Dr. Edler’s employment with 

Escambia. But it provided no indicia that this knowledge came from the narrow set 

of sources statutorily defined as public disclosures: “a Federal criminal, civil, or 

administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party . . . or other 

Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation[,] or from the news media.” 31 

U.S.C. § 3730. Without pointing the Court to any source—much less a source 

defined by statute as a public disclosure—Defendant has failed to carry its burden 

as to this portion of its argument.

The claims raised in the Compliant are not “substantially the same” as any 

“allegations or transactions” which have been publicly disclosed and the motion 

must be denied as a matter of law. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).

II. Even if there were a public disclosure, Relator is an original 

source.

Even if the Court were to determine that “substantially the same allegations or 

transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed”—which they 

were not—the Court would still be required to deny the motion because Relator is 

an original source. The FCA explicitly permits the maintenance of qui tam suits 

where the Relator is an “original source” which is defined as a person who:

either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has 

voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which 

allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who 
7

has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the 

publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily 

provided the information to the Government before filing an action 

under this section.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(b). Here, Relator meets both prongs of the disjunctive

statutory test.6

As alleged, Dr. Edler reported the frauds beginning in March 2019, before the 

first of the articles cited in the Complaint were published. Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 61–62, 

64–65.7 The Complaint also specifically alleges that Relator “voluntarily disclosed

. . . to the Government before filing[]” exactly as required by the statute. Id. at ¶ 4. 

Because the well pleaded facts which appear in the Complaint must be accepted as 

true, there is simply no basis for Defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Edler’s 

status as an original source. See Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, 674 F.3d 1238, 1240

(11th Cir. 2012) (requiring pleaded facts to be construed in favor of the plaintiff). 

III. The Complaint is not an impermissible “shotgun” pleading.

Defendant argues the Complaint is a “shotgun pleading.” ECF 20 at 5–7. It is 

not. A shotgun pleading is one that is “calculated to confuse the ‘enemy,’ and the 

6 Defendant has not identified any materials it contends “counts” as a public 

disclosure. Consequently, we assume, arguendo, the news articles cited in the 

Complaint are the basis for Defendant’s argument. 

7

 See also Little, supra note 4.
8

court, so that theories for relief not provided by law and which can prejudice an 

opponent’s case...can be masked.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 

792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). The Complaint here contains no such 

extralegal theories of recovery nor has Defendant identified any. Typically, a 

shotgun pleading contains a variety of contract and tort claims interwoven in a 

haphazard fashion. See id. The Complaint has none of these.

A paradigmatic shotgun pleading makes it “impossible for any Defendant to 

reasonably frame an answer.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1352 

(11th Cir. 2018). See Weiland at 1325 (same). Importantly, nowhere does 

Defendant claim any pleading deficiency has prevented it from “reasonably 

fram[ing] an answer.” Id. Instead, Defendant simply declares the Complaint a 

“shotgun pleading.”

In fact, the closest Defendant comes to explaining the asserted shortcomings 

are to note that the Complaint contains a standard incorporation clause before each 

cause of action and uses “ambiguous language” to describe the nature of the 

retaliation Relator suffered. ECF 20 at 5–6. These nits do not make the Complaint 

an impermissible shotgun pleading. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit in Weiland

distinguished between improper incorporation clauses which roll the distinct 

allegations of one count “into every successive count on down the line” and the 
9

proper incorporation of a well pleaded and well-organized “facts” section into the 

individual causes of action. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324. The Complaint utilizes the 

proper version of incorporation clauses and not the impermissible version. 

Defendant is right that Rule 10(b) requires that “each claim founded on a

separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count or

defense[]” but only “[i]f doing so would promote clarity[.]” (emphasis supplied).

The Complaint raises three interrelated claims all under the FCA: 

• Escambia submitted false claims for payment for emergency services 

rendered by uncertified employees, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). ECF 1, 

Complaint ¶¶ 83 and 84.

• Escambia made, used, or caused to be made or used false records or

statements related to its false claims, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). Id. ¶¶ 85

and 86.

• Escambia unlawfully retaliated against Dr. Edler after she attempted to stop 

or report the ongoing frauds, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Id. ¶¶ 87–90.

Adding more headers to designate each of the three claims their own “Count” 

would fail to add significant clarity to the allegations. This is true in part because 

each claim is founded on the same transactions and occurrences. See F.R.C.P. 

10(b).

The FCA makes it unlawful to submit a false claim to the government, but it 

is also a violation of the FCA to make or use false documents in support of a claim. 

Escambia has done both. In fact, Defendant’s scheme to create false documents 
10

(false EMT and paramedic certificates) is at the heart of its false claims and the 

allegations and claims in the Complaint. 

Instead of training and certifying emergency services personnel, Escambia 

created fake records which created the false impression that proper certification 

had occurred when it had not. Complaint at ¶¶ 48–68, 72. Escambia not only 

permitted its uncertified employees to render emergency services, it also billed the 

government for the provision of those services. Id. at ¶¶ 76–77. 

In connection with those bills, Escambia lied and falsely certified that the 

billed services complied “with all applicable Medicare and/or Medicaid laws, 

regulations, and program instructions.” See Sample CMS Claim Form8, and Compl.

at ¶ 19, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1)–(2) (prohibiting false statements or 

misrepresentations of material facts concerning payment requests). Medicare only 

pays for emergency services rendered by persons credentialed in accordance with 

state law, and Florida requires the very training and certification many Escambia’s 

employees did not have. 42 C.F.R. § 410.41(b); Fla. Stat. § 401.27(1). Escambia’s 

claims for payment, knowingly made in reliance on the falsified training records, 

are each a false claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). And, because the falsified 

8 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Sample Claim Form, available at

https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMSForms/Downloads/CMS1500.pdf (last visited June 14, 2021).
11

training documents and certifications are “material” to Escambia’s claims, those 

documents also violate Section 3729(a)(1)(B).

The first two claims, violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and 

§ 3729(a)(1)(B) arise out of the same scheme, transactions, and occurrences. See

F.R.C.P. 10(b). As such, they need not be pleaded under separate headings. 

Unlike many FCA cases, here the facts underlying the false claims for

payment are inextricably bound with the false records or statements. The claims

for payment are false because of the County’s false certifications to Medicare that

it complies with Medicare’s laws, regulations, and program instructions. Compl. at

¶ 20.

As to the third claim, unlawful retaliation against Dr. Edler in violation of 31 

U.S.C. § 3730(h), the Complaint narrates how Dr. Edler learned of Defendant’s 

scheme, Compl. at 7–17, and how the county retaliated against her when the 

responsible people sought to hide their alleged crimes. Compl., ¶¶ 70, 79–81

(under subtitle “Escambia County retaliated against Dr. Edler”).9 The grouping of 

9 One of the then-alleged felons has since pled no contest to two 

misdemeanors. Exhibit 1, Stephen White Order of Judgment and Sentence. The 

others’ cases are pending. Exh. 2, Criminal Dockets for Stephen White (showing 

seventeen charges and plea of no contest for two misdemeanors); James Bonoyer 

(fifty-seven charges); Leon Salter (ten charges); Katherine Kenney (fifteen

charges).
12

these paragraphs under a subtitle gives Escambia adequate notice of this claim.

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23. 

Defendant’s Motion relies on cases with multiple defendants and many 

claims.10 In contrast, Dr. Edler has raised claims against a single defendant for false

claims, false statements, and its retaliation against her. The simple complaint poses 

no unnecessary burden on the litigants or judicial resources. In a recent case, a 

plaintiff sued five defendants alleging violations under 42 U.S.C § 1983, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985, and a state law conspiracy to commit First Amendment retaliation. Seals v. 

Leath, No. 3:19-cv-468-ALB-JTA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219240, at *17 (M.D. 

Ala. Dec. 18, 2019). Notwithstanding the greater complexity, that court considered 

and rejected the defendant’s “shotgun” motion to dismiss. Here, as in Seals, “[i]t is 

far from impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support 

which claims; indeed, it isn't even difficult.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

10 Tavantzis v. Am. Choppers, No. 6:14-cv-1519-Orl-40TBS, 2015 WL 6736753 

(M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2015) (more than twenty-five defendants represented by six law 

firms); Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1080 (11th Cir. 1996) (seven defendants

and claims under First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution); Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 

364, 366–67 (11th Cir. 1996) (six counts); U.S. ex rel. Lorona v. Infilaw Corp., No. 

3:15-cv-959-J-34PDB, 2019 WL 3778389, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2019) (five 

defendants, five counts); United States v. Choudhry, 262 F.Supp.3d 1299, 1306 (M.D. 

Fla. 2017) (10 defendants, 2 distinct kickback schemes); Weinerth v. Ayers, No. 2:10-

cv-170-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 4955836, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2010) (two 

defendants, federal allegations, and two factually and legally distinct state claims).
13

The real issue is whether this sole defendant is on notice of the claims against

it. Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 Fed. Appx. 597, 603 (11th Cir.

2008). See also Crispell v. Fla. Dept. of Children & Families, No. 8:11-cv-1527-T30EAJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116965, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2012) (rejecting 

“shotgun” characterization as the complaint sufficiently put defendant on notice of 

the claims against it).

Finally, by arguing that only the retaliation claim is implausible (see below), 

Defendant admits that the other claims are plausible, and sufficient to put it on 

notice of the claims against it.

IV. The Retaliation Claim is Plausible.

Defendant argues the retaliation claim (but not the rest of the Complaint) is

implausible. ECF 20 at 12–14. To grant Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion, this Court

must conclude that Relator’s retaliation allegations do not even “suggest” the

possibility that a jury could believe them to be true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

The Eleventh Circuit has not yet determined if the 2010 amendments to the 

FCA necessitate a change in the pleading standard which applies to FCA retaliation 

claims. However, that Court has twice noted the Fourth Circuit’s decision in U.S. 

ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines, Inc., 912 F.3d 190, 203 (4th Cir. 2018). See 
14

Hickman v. Spirit of Athens, Alabama, Inc., 985 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2021); 

Brown v. Morehouse Coll., 829 F. App’x 942, 945 (11th Cir. 2020).

11

Under Grant, 

to sufficiently plead a § 3730(h) retaliation claim and thus survive a 

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a 

“reasonable inference” of three elements: (1) he engaged in protected 

activity; (2) his employer knew about the protected activity; and (3) 

his employer took adverse action against him as a result.

Grant, 912 F.3d at 200 (holding the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b)

does not apply) (internal citation omitted).

The Complaint easily meets this standard here. The FCA protects an 

employee who takes “lawful acts . . . in furtherance of an [FCA] action . . . or other 

efforts to stop 1 or more violations of [the FCA].” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). The 

Complaint alleges several actions Dr. Edler took both to further this case and as 

part of her attempt to stop violations of the FCA. The Complaint also alleges that 

Defendant knew and then took adverse action against her as a result. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 

51-52, 56-57, 62-67, 70, 79–81.

11

 This Circuit’s District Courts’ decisions rendered after Hickman appear to adopt 

the standard expressed in Grant. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Michael A. Rehfeldt, Plaintiff, v. 

Compassionate Care Hosp. Gr. Inc., No. 5:19-CV-00304-TES, 2021 WL 2229057, at 

*5 (M.D. Ga. June 2, 2021); Briggs for use & benefit of United States v. Quantitech, 

Inc., No. 2:19-CV-01690-ACA, 2021 WL 461694 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2021).
15

A. The Complaint alleges Dr. Edler engaged in protected activity. 

Dr. Edler met with County leadership to report “protocol violations, 

insubordination, falsifying certifications, policy updates, employee files, and the 

work environment at public safety.” Compl. ¶ 47. She reported to county 

leadership, including to the County Commission, the exact training certification 

frauds at issue here. Compl. ¶¶ 49, 51–52, 56–57, 63–64.

She also attempted to stop the ongoing fraud by reporting these deficiencies 

to the Florida Department of Health which has the power to prevent Escambia’s 

non-certified employees from serving in a medical capacity. Compl. ¶¶ 61, 65. 

Preventing non-certified people from performing emergency medical services 

would have terminated the false claims for their work. 

B. Defendant knew of Dr. Edler’s protected activities.

Of course, Dr. Edler’s many internal complaints and attempts to stop the 

fraud were known by Escambia, but Escambia was also aware of her external 

efforts. Compl. ¶¶ 62, 66. 

C. Defendant retaliated against Dr. Edler.

The Complaint alleged Escambia began retaliating against Dr. Edler 

“immediately after Dr. Edler’s identification of criminal and civil violations.” 

Compl. ¶ 67. The harassment escalated from there. ¶¶ 70, 79–81.
16

Defendant’s argument that absent a firing, demotion, or suspension, there 

has been no actionable retaliation under the FCA is simply wrong. The statute 

prohibits “harassment” and “any other manner [of] discriminat[ion] against in the 

terms and conditions of employment[.]” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). “An employer 

undertakes a materially adverse action opening it to retaliation liability if it does 

something that ‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination.’” U.S. ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc., 

912 F.3d 190, 203 (4th Cir. 2018). 

The law also provides for the award of “compensation for any special 

damages sustained as a result of the discrimination[.]” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2).

“Damages for emotional distress caused by an employer's retaliatory conduct 

plainly fall within this category of special damages.” Hammond v. Northland 

Counseling Ctr., Inc., 218 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); accord Townsend v. Bayer Corp., 774 F.3d 446, 466–67 (8th Cir. 2014)

(affirming award of emotional distress damages); Webb v. Compath, Inc., No. 

5:03CV272-MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 8164786, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 20, 2005), rep.

and recc. adopted, 2005 WL 8164800 (N.D. Fla. June 21, 2005) (permitting 

retaliation damages for “damage to Plaintiff’s personal credit”).
17

Taken together, the allegations and the law make clear that the retaliation 

allegations meet the low bar of plausibility. 

If an employee’s actions, as alleged in the complaint, are sufficient to 

support a reasonable conclusion that the employer could have feared 

being reported to the government for fraud or sued in a qui tam action 

by the employee, then the complaint states a claim for retaliatory 

discharge under § 3730(h).

U.S. ex rel. Sanchez v. Lymphatx, Inc., 596 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).

Defendant’s fear of being sued is palpable in the Complaint and the fear was 

well grounded. Besides the financial costs of losing a FCA case, each individual 

involved in the falsification of training documents and the provision of substandard 

medical care are exposed to substantial personal jeopardy. Already, four of the 

individuals responsible for the scheme have been charged with felonies. Stephen 

White has pleaded no contest to two misdemeanors for falsifying the exact records 

at issue in this case. Exh. 1. In addition, after the Complaint was filed, the Florida 

Department of Health took action against the licenses of the individuals 

responsible for the frauds at issue here. There can be no doubt that the individuals 

responsible for the frauds Dr. Edler uncovered and attempted to stop had the 

motivation to act against her to protect not only the county but their own liberty 

and financial interests.
18

When viewing the complaint broadly and drawing all reasonable inferences in

Relator’s favor, the retaliation allegations state “enough facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].” Watts 

v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 545).

V. The Complaint Meets Rule 9(b)’s Particularity Requirement.

Defendant argues that the Complaint fails to meet Rule 9(b) ’s particularity 

requirement by failing: (A) to allege the false claims’ who, when, and how; (B) 

failing to identify specific claims; (C) failing to identify employees who lacked 

certificates, and (D) by using “upon information and belief” allegations (iv). ECF 

20 at 1, 8–11. Contrary to Defendant’s arguments, the Complaint meets the 

pleading standard set out in Rule 9(b). 

A. The Complaint pleads the who, what, and when.

The particularity requirement is satisfied where a complaint alleges “facts as 

to time, place, and substance of the defendants’ alleged fraud, specifically the 

details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who 

engaged in them.” U.S. ex rel. Matheny v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 671 F.3d 1217, 

1222 (11th Cir. 2012).
19

The Complaint lays out Defendant’s false claims in a readily understandable 

manner while providing sufficient detail to permit Defendant to formulate a 

defense. It alleges:

• Who: The sole defendant, Escambia County, and detailing activities of 

named management personnel, including those charged with felonies for 

falsifying and forging paramedic and EMT certifications. Complaint ¶¶ 

29–72.

• When: Before 2014 and through the present (¶ 28), and detailing 

incidents in 2014 (¶¶ 29–37), 2016 (¶¶ 38–39), 2017 (¶¶ 40–43, and 64), 

2018 (¶¶ 44–57, and 64), 2019 (¶¶ 58–68), and 2020 (¶¶ 70-73). 

• What/how: Detailing what the County did. ¶¶ 2, 29–72. 

B. The Complaint need not plead specific claims.

The Eleventh Circuit has never required a complaint to provide specific false 

claims submitted to the government; all it has required is that a complaint contain 

“some indicia of reliability” to support the allegation that false claims were 

submitted. See U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 

(11th Cir. 2002) (cited by Defendant). The relator’s problem in Clausen was not

that he failed to identify specific claims, but that he failed to explain why he 

believed such claims were submitted. Id. Indeed, the majority in Clausen criticized 

the dissent for suggesting that it was requiring any particular type of information to 

satisfy Rule 9(b). Id. at 1312, n.21. Clausen thus expressly rejected the idea that it 

was creating a laundry list of details that had to be included to satisfy Rule 9(b). It 
20

held Rule 9(b) requires the “circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” be 

pleaded with particularity, in order to (1) “protect defendants against spurious 

charges” and (2) give defendants notice of “the precise misconduct with which 

they are charged.” Id. at 1310 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Post-Clausen, the Eleventh Circuit refined its analysis of Rule 9(b) as it 

relates to False Claims Act (FCA) complaints. And as shown by the cases cited by 

Defendant, even where the Eleventh Circuit has dismissed complaints under Rule 

9(b), it has reaffirmed that identifying specific false claims is “one way”—but not 

the only way—to satisfy 9(b). United States v. HPC Healthcare, Inc., 723 F. App’x

783, 789 (11th Cir. 2018). In HPC Healthcare, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that 

relators need only plead “some indicia of reliability” that false claims were 

submitted. Id.

Providing exact billing data—name, date, amount, and services 

rendered—or attaching a representative sample claim is one way a 

complaint can establish the necessary indicia of reliability that a false 

claim was actually submitted. However, there is no per se rule that an 

FCA complaint must provide exact billing data or attach a 

representative sample claim. 

Under this Court’s nuanced, case-by-case approach, other means are 

available to present the required indicia of reliability that a false claim 

was actually submitted. Although there are not bright line rules, our 

case law has indicated that a relator with direct, first-hand knowledge 

of the defendants’ submission of false claims gained through her 

employment with the defendants may have a sufficient basis for 

asserting that the defendants actually submitted false claims. 
21

United States v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., 591 F. App’x 693, 704 (11th Cir. 2014)

(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Dr. Edler pleaded more than just “some indicia of reliability” here. She 

pleaded direct, first-hand knowledge of Escambia’s false claims and false 

statements. ¶¶ 16, 27, 28, 75.

Further, she alleged Medicare pays Escambia County approximately $4.6 

million per year for Escambia’s emergency transportation services). Complaint, 

¶¶ 76–78 (alleging CMS public data). See U.S. ex rel. Bingham v. BayCare Health 

Sys., No. 8:14-cv-73-T-23EAJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107220, at *12 (M.D. Fla. 

Aug. 14, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss where “the relator relies on information 

from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to allege that BayCare 

submitted claims . . . .”).

Detailed allegations regarding individual claims are not relevant to the 

circumstances here because the claims are tainted by external facts: EMTs and 

paramedics’ legally mandated certifications (or lack thereof). “A plaintiff must 

satisfy Rule 9(b) with respect to the circumstances of the fraud he alleges—but not 

as to matters that have no relevance to the fraudulent acts.” HMA, 591 Fed. App’x 

at 708–09 (emphasis added). See also U.S. ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 
22

1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (“there is no per se rule that a [False Claims Act] complaint 

must provide exact billing data or attach a representative sample claim.”). 

This makes sense because Medicare claims filed by ambulance providers

identify the provider (such as Escambia), the service date, the claim code, e.g. 

A0427 (emergency ambulance transportation with advanced life support), the 

amount it seeks, and certifies compliance with Medicare’s rules and regulations. 

But the claims do not identify employees who staff the ambulances.

12

The Complaint alleges these certifications are false because Escambia created

fraudulent documents attesting to training and certifications that never occurred. 

Complaint, ¶¶ 47–52, 56, 63–64, 72. Defendant is on notice of the nature of the 

fraud allegations against it without individualized claims data and that data would 

not materially enhance the pleading of the “circumstances of the fraud.” HMA, 591 

Fed. App’x at 708–09; U.S. ex rel. Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 59949, 2011 WL 2269968, at *8 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2011) (Persnell, J.) 

(“Rule 9(b) exists to prevent spurious charges and provide notice to defendants of 

their alleged misconduct, not to require plaintiffs to meet a summary judgment 

standard before proceeding to discovery.”).

12 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Sample Health Insurance Claim 

Form, CMS.gov, available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMSForms/Downloads/CMS1500.pdf (last visited June 14, 2021).
23

C. “On information and belief” allegations are acceptable.

“Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently . . 

. when specific ‘factual information [about the fraud] is peculiarly within the 

defendant’s knowledge or control.’” U.S. ex rel. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., 

Inc., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (allowing 

pleading based upon “information and belief” despite failure to identify a specific 

false claim). See also U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 

1314 n.25 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “a more lenient pleading standard” is 

appropriate under Rule 9(b) when “evidence of fraud [i]s uniquely held by the 

defendant” provided that “the complaint . . . set[s] forth a factual basis for such 

belief”) (internal quotation omitted).

Here, the information Defendant complains was not pleaded is “peculiarly 

within the defendant’s knowledge or control.” Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., 

2003 WL 22019936, at *3. Even the State of Florida asserts that it is beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Escambia concealed, covered up, destroyed, mutilated, and 

altered the true records.

Florida arrested four officials of the County’s Emergency Management 

senior management for falsifying EMT/paramedic certification. Compl. at ¶ 72. 

Public arrest records include the sworn affidavits of an FDLE investigator and a 
24

state judge’s approval.13 The below chart summarizes these charges that plausibly 

support the “information and belief” allegations and show the information is 

“peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge or control.”

Criminal Charges (Exh. 2)

Captain in 

Charge of 

Training,

Bonoyer

Section Chief 

/ paramedic 

supervisor,

Kenney

Deputy 

Chief of 

EMS Ops.,

Salter

Chief EMS 

Ops.,

White 14

Conceal information re medical 

transportation, Fla. Stat. 401.41(1)(c)

1 1

Official misconduct re false or fraudulent 

claims to procure or renew a certificate, Fla. 

Stat. 401.41(1)(d)

1 3 2 2

False statements, certifications, Fla. Stat

403.161(1)(c)

2

Forgery, Fla. Stat 831.01 or .02 19 5 3 6

Public servant falsify official documents, Fla. 

Stat. 838.022(1)(a)

22 5 3 8

Concealing, covering up, destroying, 

mutilating, or altering any official record or 

official document, Fla. Stat. 838.022(1)(b)

1 6

Obstruct, delay comm. involving govt. entity,

Fla. Stat. 838.022(1)(c) 

1 1

Racketeering, Fla. Stat. 895.03 1 1

13 A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may take judicial notice of 

adjudicative facts that can be accurately and readily determined from sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)–(b). See

Profit v. Rabon, No. 1:19-cv-129-MW-GRJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24794, at *1 

n.1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2020) (taking judicial notice of available public record 

pertaining to pending state charges).

14 Mr. White has since pled no contest to “Knowingly mak[ing] false or 

fraudulent claims to procure, attempt to procure, or renew a certificate, license, or 

permit. Fla. Stat. 401.41(1d).” Exh. 1. The others’ cases are still pending. Exh. 2.
25

Most of the charges involve § 838.022(1), hiding the alleged certification frauds.

Official Misconduct

(a) Falsifying, or causing another person to falsify, any official record 

or official document; 

(b) Concealing, covering up, destroying, mutilating, or altering any 

official record or official document, except as authorized by law or 

contract, or causing another person to perform such an act;

(c) Obstructing, delaying, or preventing the communication of 

information relating to the commission of a felony that directly involves 

or affects the government entity served by the public servant or public 

contractor.

Fla. Stat. § 838.022(1) (emphasis supplied). 

The Chapter 401 Medical Transportation charges are especially relevant 

because Florida requires ambulances staffed by “certified” personnel. Fla. Stat. § 

401.27(1). See 42 C.F.R. § 410.41(b) (requiring state-certified staff).

D. Identity of EMTs and paramedics are unnecessary for Rule 9(b).

It is unfortunate that the parties and this Court must spend time on an issue 

not really in dispute in this case—the identity of personnel whose false EMT and 

paramedic certifications tainted Defendant’s Medicare claims. The information 

may be useful to calculate damages, but it is unnecessary to alert the County of the 

circumstances of its frauds.

Further, county officials have been charged with not only forging and 

falsifying certification-related documents, but also concealing these records and 
26

documents. Defendant’s demand for the names it actively concealed is precisely 

the “impossible” information the Clausen court warned against. )

The dissent suggests we ask for all of this information, and thus “ask[] 

for the impossible.” To the contrary, this discussion merely lists some 

of the types of information that might have helped Clausen state an 

essential element of his claim with particularity but does not mandate 

all of this information for any of the alleged claims.

U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1312 n.21 (11th Cir. 2002).

As the case progresses, Defendant will doubtlessly assert factual defenses. 

One thing the Court can be certain of, however, is that Defendant will not assert, as 

a factual matter, that it never submitted claims to Medicare, or that all employees 

who provided services relating to these claims were properly certified. In fact, it

cannot, as the (former) Chief of EMS Operations has already pleaded no contest to 

charges of falsifying these very certifications. Exh. 1.

E. Rule 9(b) requires an “indicia of reliability,” not claims. 

The ultimate question is whether a relator’s allegations are “sufficient to 

explain why [the relator] believed [the defendant] submitted false or fraudulent 

claims for services rendered.” U.S. ex rel. Walker v. R & F Props. of Lake County, 

Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1360 (11th Cir. 2005). In Walker, the Eleventh Circuit upheld 

a complaint because it explained why the relator—an insider nurse—believed 

claims were submitted, even though she did not identify any particular claims. Id.
27

Walker, like the unpublished Hill15 and HMA16 decisions, was perfectly consistent 

with the prior Clausen decision, which recognized that a complaint could be 

upheld if it provided sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the allegation that 

false claims were submitted. Walker, 433 F.3d at 1360. Here, the Complaint more 

than sufficiently explains why insider Dr. Edler asserts that false claims were 

submitted: the required training was not done, the required certifications were 

falsified, and Medicare nevertheless paid millions of dollars for non-compensable 

services. See e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 27, 37, 39, 43, 48, 50-52, 56-57, 63-64, 72, 76-78.

VI. If necessary, Relator will move for leave to amend.

If the Court finds the Complaint deficient, Plaintiff should be allowed to

move for leave to amend. Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F. 3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001)

(directing that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires); see 

also Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 F. App’x 597, 603 (11th Cir. 2008)

(holding striking a complaint and requiring a more definite statement and not 

dismissal is the proper remedy for an impermissible shotgun complaint).

15 U.S. ex rel. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 27956, at *13, (11th .Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (relaxing 9(b) standard where 

details are in documents “exclusively within the defendant’s possession.”).

16 United States v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., 591 F. App’x 693, 704 (holding 9(b) 

pleading standard does not apply to “matters that have no relevance to the 

fraudulent acts.”).
28

Any proposed First Amended Complaint attached to a motion for leave to 

amend would add the below organizational and factual details:

• Public Disclosure: Detail Dr. Edler’s prefiling communications with Michael 

Biasello of this district’s U.S. attorney’s office around February 2020. 

Regarding any “publicly disclosed allegations or transactions” identified by 

this Court, that she “materially adds” to those disclosures by providing key 

insider information about the timing and operation of Defendant’s fraud, 

persons involved, steps taken to conceal the fraud, and documents which 

reveal the truth.17

• Shotgun pleadings: Break each cause of action into a separate heading with 

additional factual references and allegations.

• Particularity: Additional details regarding the actions of Wood, Salter,

Kenney, Bonoyer and the documents and training events they falsified,. 

• Retaliation: Further detail Escambia’s retaliatory acts including: 

o Treating Dr. Edler differently than similarly situated employees when 

it comes to providing legal defense and expense coverage and 

providing appropriate transportation.

o Meritless “harassment” charges and other retaliatory HR actions such 

as changing Dr. Edler’s working conditions, required hours, and 

responsibilities.

o Coordination between Escambia leadership and personnel with private 

citizens for the purpose of harassing Dr. Edler in public forums.

o Escambia’s pending termination of Dr. Edler.

17

 The Florida Department of Law Enforcement and a state court judge appear to 

agree that Dr. Edler possesses key non-public information about Defendant’s 

frauds. Her knowledge forms a component of the arrest affidavits/warrants 

detailing Escambia’s employees’ roles in the very frauds at issue here. 
29

• Knowledge: Allegations that Escambia overlooked training/certification 

deficiencies because it operated emergency services for the revenue.

18

VII. Conclusion

Escambia cannot credibly claim it is not aware of the nature of Relator’s

claims. To its credit, it hardly attempts to so argue. Rather, it identifies purported

technical deficiencies—and says that Federal Rules require more.

But the overarching question is not whether any particular piece of

information is or is not present; rather, the question for the Court is whether there

is enough information in the Complaint to put Escambia on notice of the nature of

plausible allegations against it. That answer, in short, is “yes.” 

18 Commissioner Jeff Bergosh explained why the County runs emergency 

services itself, rather than a private contractor: “It’s an enterprise fund for us.” He 

then repeated three times in the next minute: “It generates revenue for us,” and 

then summarized: “Our guys should be doing it because it generates revenue.”

ECTV, Oct. 15, 2020 BCC Regular Meeting, at 16:30–17:30 (Oct. 15, 2020),

https://escambiacountyfl.new.swagit.com/videos/87252.
30

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jonathan Kroner

FBN 328677

Jonathan Kroner Law Office

6001 N Ocean Dr., Ste. 806

Hollywood, FL 33019-4617

305.310.6046

jk@FloridaFalseClaim.com

Law Offices of Darth M. Newman LLC

Darth M. Newman

1140 Thorn Run Rd., #601

Coraopolis, PA 15108

412.436.3443

darth@dnewmanlaw.com

(admitted pro hac vice)

Attorneys for Qui Tam Plaintiff

LR 7.1 (F) Certificate of Word Count

I certify the LR 7.1 (F) word count of 7,699 words, and I relied on MS 

Word’s count for this certification.

/s/ Jonathan Kroner

Certificate of Service

I certify I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of

Court using CM/ECF on the date stamped above to be served on all counsel of

record.

/s/ Jonathan Kroner