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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 Case No. 5:20-cr-28-MW/MJF

v.

MARGO DEAL ANDERSON, et al.,

 Defendants.

________________________________/

DEFENDANT ANDERSON’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS

Defendant, Margo Deal Anderson, moves to dismiss Counts 2 through 7, 9 

through 14, 15, 17, 21 and 25 in the Second Superseding Indictment pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, and says:

I. WORLDCLAIM

Honest Services Wire Fraud

The wire transmission charged for Count 21 did not further the charged 

scheme to defraud.

A wire transmission in furtherance of the charged scheme to defraud is an 

essential element of honest services wire fraud. A wire transmission is “in 

furtherance of” a scheme if the wire transmission is “incident to an essential part of 

the scheme” or a “step in the plot.” United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1163

(11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989)); see also 

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United States v. Jones, 676 F. Supp. 2d 500, 515-16 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (explaining 

that it is use of the mail to execute the scheme, not the scheme itself, that is the 

offense, and dismissing mail fraud count based on innocent mailing of insurance 

claim).

The Second Superseding Indictment charges Anderson with agreeing to 

accept a thing of value from WorldClaim in exchange for “permitting” WorldClaim 

to have City business. As pled, the alleged implied agreement was pro bono 

WorldClaim services in exchange for a City contract. ECF No. 214 – Second 

Superseding Indictment ⁋⁋ 62-63, 89, 141. Notably, the Second Superseding 

Indictment does not charge Anderson with an offense for accepting anything of 

value. 

The apparent fruits of the charged scheme were WorldClaim’s securing City 

business and, potentially, WorldClaim’s receiving payment from the City. See 

Adkinson, 158 F.3d at 1163 (“A mailing [wire transmission] furthers a scheme when 

‘the mails are used prior to, and as one step toward, the receipt of the fruits of the 

fraud.’ ” (internal citation omitted)). The wire transmission associated with 

Anderson’s receipt of legitimate insurance proceeds for hurricane damage sustained 

to her property was not in furtherance of the charged scheme. It was neither

incidental to an essential part of the charged scheme, nor a step in the plot of the 

charged scheme.

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Therefore, Count 21 fails to state an offense and should be dismissed.

II. EROSION CONTROL SERVICES (“ECS”)

False Statements

The false statements charged for Count 25 are not disproven by Anderson’s 

alleged knowledge.1

 

A statement only violates § 1001(a)(2) if it is literally false. See United States 

v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1132 (11th Cir. 2004) (“For a conviction to be 

sustained under § 1001(a)(3), it is imperative that the ‘writing or document’ be 

‘false.’”); see also United States v. Tantchev, 916 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A 

statement that is literally true cannot support a conviction under § 1001(a)(2)[.]”). 

In United States v. Craigue, the indictment charged a violation of § 1001(a)(2) 

as follows:

[Defendant stated] that McKenna and Erickson were not employees of 

the defendant or his business, specifically, when the Officer asked him 

whether McKenna and Erickson were employees of his company, the 

defendant stated, “I’ve always treated them—they would come and go 

as they please, so I would always treat them as not employees,” when, 

in truth and in fact, as the defendant then and there knew, McKenna and 

Erickson were employees and not subcontractors.

United States v. Craigue, 539 F. Supp. 3d 245, 248 (D.N.H. 2021). The court

assumed true that the individuals were employees, determined that this truth did not 

1

 Anderson denies the knowledge attributed to her in Count 25 but recognizes

this is not the time to dispute the allegations.

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“necessarily disprove” the truth of the charged statement that defendant treated the 

individuals as “not employees,” and dismissed the false statement charge. Id. at 248-

49 (collecting circuit court decisions upholding “dismissal of indictments charging 

false statement offenses where the government alleges a falsity which fails to ‘track’ 

the statement alleged to be false”).

If the statement in paragraph 145(b)2 is accepted as true for purpose of the 

motion, it does not necessarily disprove the truth of the statement in paragraph 

144(b)3

. ECF No. 214 – Second Superseding Indictment ⁋⁋ 144, 145. The truth of 

these statements are not mutually exclusive. Anderson could have “interacted with 

David ‘Mickey’ White through [middleman] City Manager Michael White shortly 

after Hurricane Michael” but not have been “introduced to David ‘Mickey’ White 

until December 2018 or January 2019.”

2 “ANDERSON interacted with David ‘Mickey’ White through City Manager 

Michael White shortly after Hurricane Michael and requested David ‘Mickey’ White 

to have ECS clean up her private residence.”

3 “ANDERSON was first introduced to David ‘Mickey’ White in December 

2018 or January 2019, when volunteers were used to clean up various streets 

designated by Lynn Haven as needing some attention and clean-up.”

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The same can be said that the truth of the statement in paragraph 145(a)4 does 

not necessarily disprove the truth of the statement in paragraph 144(a)5

. ECF No. 

214 – Second Superseding Indictment ⁋⁋ 144, 145. Anderson could have known 

that “ECS had been contracted by Lynn Haven to conduct debris removal and 

repairs” but been “unaware of the role of [ECS] in the post-Hurricane Michael cleanup of Lynn Haven.” Anderson is not alleged to have stated that she was unaware of 

ECS’s contract; she is only alleged to have stated that she was unaware of ECS’s

“role” in a substantial post-hurricane cleanup operation. The fact that the City had 

a contract with ECS does not necessarily mean that ECS was performing the 

contracted-for work or that Anderson was aware of the work being performed by 

ECS. Further, the concept of ECS’s “role” in a cleanup operation consisting of City 

staff and local and out-of-state contractors is not synonymous with a discrete task or 

scope of work ECS may have performed or been contracted to perform.

Therefore, Count 25 fails to state an offense and should be dismissed.

4 “ANDERSON was aware that ECS had been contracted by Lynn Haven to 

conduct debris removal and repairs in the City of Lynn Haven after Hurricane 

Michael.” 

5 “ANDERSON was unaware of the role of Erosion Control Specialists (ECS) 

in the post-Hurricane Michael clean-up of Lynn Haven . . . .”

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Federal Funds Theft

Count 17 tracks the language of § 666(a)(1)(A) and charges all potential 

theories in the conjunctive but fails to allege essential facts of Anderson’s knowing 

participation in a scheme to defraud. 

 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted all theories (e.g., embezzle, steal, and so 

forth) under § 666(a)(1)(A) as resting on a scheme to defraud and vacated a 

conviction based on an indictment’s lacking essential facts of the charged scheme to 

defraud. See United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1261-65 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(analyzing sufficiency of pleading a § 666(a)(1)(A) under conjunctive theories to 

“embezzle, steal, obtain by fraud and without authority convert to her [defendant’s] 

own use, and intentionally misapply” as a scheme to defraud and vacating conviction 

because indictment failed to contain essential facts of the scheme to defraud). 

The Second Superseding Indictment differs from the Schmitz indictment6 in 

that it alleges essential facts of a scheme to defraud but is akin to the Schmitz

indictment in that it fails to allege essential facts that Anderson knowingly joined 

and participated in a scheme that encompassed the alleged cleanup of her property. 

See United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he indictment must 

state some fact specific enough to describe a particular criminal act, rather than a 

6

 The indictment challenged in Schmitz was attached to Anderson’s motion to 

dismiss the original indictment. ECF No. 49-1 – Anderson Motion to Dismiss.

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type of crime.”). For example, the factual bases for Anderson’s alleged knowledge 

and participation are not apparent. They may be tied to countersigning checks, 

signing off on check registers, or something different. As pled, however, Count 17 

lacks essential facts of the alleged scheme to defraud that is specific to the charge in 

Count 17. 

Therefore, Count 17 lacks specificity and should be dismissed. 

III. JAMES FINCH BUSINESS INTERESTS

Finch–Anderson–Barnes Conspiracy

Count 1 is duplicitous because it improperly joins two conspiracies in the 

same count. 

A cornerstone of a single, unified conspiracy is interdependence amongst coconspirators. United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1998); see also 

United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 57 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The necessity for drawing 

this distinction [between single or multiple conspiracies] derives from our interest, 

clearly our duty, in jealously protecting those accused from the possible transference 

of guilt to others accused.”). The fact that conspiracies share the “same goal” does 

not mean they share a “common goal.” United States v. Chandler, 376 F.3d 1303, 

1320 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Count 1 charges Anderson with participating in a “Finch business interest” 

conspiracy with James Finch and Antonius Barnes in violation of § 1349. As pled 

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and after the Government’s election, the charged conspiratorial agreements 

encompasses (i) an alleged agreement between Finch and Barnes to influence 

Barnes’ performance of official acts and (ii) an alleged agreement between Finch 

and Anderson to influence Anderson’s performance of official acts. ECF No. 214 – 

Second Superseding Indictment ⁋ 124. However, no allegations suggest the separate 

alleged agreements shared a common goal greater than themselves. 

There is no allegation that Anderson knew of the alleged Finch-Barnes 

agreement. There is no allegation that the alleged Finch–Barnes agreement was 

dependent on, facilitated by, or furthered by Anderson. The alleged goal of 

influencing Barnes’ performance of official acts “was an end upon itself.” Chandler, 

376 F.3d at 1321. The same can be said of Barnes regarding the alleged FinchAnderson. These alleged agreements are independent and, if anything, constitute 

independent, disconnected alleged conspiracies.

Therefore, Count 1 is duplicitous and should be dismissed or, alternatively, 

the Government should be compelled to elect and pursue a single alleged conspiracy.

Honest Services Wire Fraud

Counts 2 through 7 and 9 through 14 fail to identify the quid pro quo 

exchange(s) required for a violation of §§ 1343 and 1346. 

This is, in part but not entirely, a renewal of Anderson’s argument made to 

the Superseding Indictment. ECF No. 138 – Anderson Motion to Dismiss. In

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McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that honest services 

fraud required a quid pro quo exchange. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 

2355, 2371 (2016). Although the parties agreed to apply the § 201(b) definition of 

bribery in McDonnell, Anderson has located no circuit court decision that held a 

non-quid pro quo exchange sufficed for honest services fraud. In United States v. 

Silver, the Second Circuit interpreted McDonnell to hold that the quo component 

required an official to identify, at the time of the quid pro quo exchange, a focused 

and concrete matter on which the official agreed to perform an official act. United 

States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538, 553, 556-57 (2d Cir. 2020). In other words, §§ 1343 

and 1346 do not criminalize a donor providing, or an official accepting, things of

value with the open-ended intent to perform an official act on an undefined matter 

at some indefinite time in the future. 

First, the same “Finch business interest” quo is alleged as the matter for all 

counts. However, a Finch business interest is not a focused and concrete “question, 

matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” on which Anderson could agree or 

promise to perform an official act. The Finch business interest matter could never 

come before the City for a decision. Instead, it’s more akin to a policy goal like 

“Virginia business and economic development” that the McDonnell Court stated 

could not suffice as the requisite quo. Although an official act quo is generally a 

question of fact, this was one of the few matters that the Supreme Court determined 

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could not constitute an official act quo as a matter of law. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 

2369. This alone is a basis to dismiss the counts for failure to state an offense.

Next, within the collective of Finch business interests, there are alleged

matters that could potentially qualify as the requisite quo. Namely, the 17th Street 

ditch project, the Half-Cent Surtax project, and, to a lesser degree, City business for 

hurricane recovery. However, because these more focused and concrete matters

span many years and were not all foreseeable at the outset of charged offenses, they 

cannot conceivably all be part of the same quid pro quo exchange. A single quid pro 

quo exchange may consist of multiple quids and quos (e.g., “this for these” or “these 

for these”), but all the quos encompassed by the exchange must be focused and 

concrete matters at that time. For example, the initial alleged quid pro quo exchange 

had to exist no later than the October 2017 wire transmission for Count 4 (and likely 

earlier) and could not have included hurricane recovery matters that did not arise 

until a year later from an October 2018 hurricane. Thus, imbedded in the Second 

Superseding Indictment are more than one alleged quid pro quo exchange, but these 

different exchanges, which are the heart of the offenses for honest services fraud, 

have not been alleged with sufficient specificity and cannot be ascertained from the 

Second Superseding Indictment.

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Therefore, Counts 2 through 7 and 9 through 14 fail to state an offense (no 

focused and concrete matter), lack specificity (unidentifiable or commingled quid 

pro quo exchanges), and should be dismissed. 

Federal Program Fraud

Count 15 fails to identify the City “business, transaction, or series of 

transactions” required for a violation of § 666(a)(1)(B).

There appears to be a circuit split concerning § 666(a)(1)(B)’s required nexus 

between an agent’s prohibited receipt of a thing of value and the agent’s intent to be

influenced or rewarded in connection with the principal’s business, transaction, or 

series of transactions. The most recent decisions read the statute to require a quid 

pro quo exchange of any act, including non-official acts. See United States v. 

Hamilton, -- F.4th --, 2022 WL 3593974, at *3-8 (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2022); United 

States v. Lindberg, 39 F.4th 151, 165-77 (4th Cir. 2022). This is consistent with the 

Supreme Court having described § 666(a)(1)(B) with the same “in exchange for” 

language attributed to quid pro quo exchanges. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 

52, 57-58 (1997) (describing § 666(a)(1)(B) in dicta as prohibiting “transfers of 

personal property or other valuable consideration in exchange for the influence of 

reward” (emphasis added)). But admittedly, multiple circuits appear to have found 

the contrary. 

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The Eleventh Circuit has used the phraseology that § 666(a)(1)(B) does not 

require a quid pro quo exchange. In a prior filing, Anderson took that at face value.

However, a closer reading reveals that the court had defined the term “quid pro quo”

to include an official act, and the legal argument and decision turned on whether § 

666(a)(1)(B) was limited to official acts. United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 

1184-95 (11th Cir. 2010) (defining term “quid pro quo” to be an official act quid pro 

quo and clarifying broad use of the defined quid pro quo term by “expressly 

hold[ing] there is no requirement in § 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) that the government 

allege or prove an intent that a specific payment was solicited, received, or given in 

exchange for a specific official act, termed a quid pro quo” and finding that “the 

government is not required to tie or directly link a benefit or payment to a specific 

official act” (emphasis added)). Whether section 666(a)(1)(2) requires at least a nonofficial act quid pro quo appears to still be an open question and not addressed by 

subsequent Eleventh Circuit decisions citing McNair. The analysis in Hamilton and 

Lindberg and the “in exchange for” reference by the Supreme Court in Salinas

should be persuasive. 

For purposes of this motion, however, the distinction should not matter. The 

Supreme Court previously indicated that the official act(s) tied to a particular bribe 

or unlawful gratuity need be identified and proved. Because again, receipt of a thing 

of value without a nexus to an official act does not violate § 201. United States v. 

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Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1999) (“The [§ 201’s] 

insistence upon an ‘official act,’ carefully defined, seems pregnant with the 

requirement that some particular official act be identified and proved . . . . When, 

however, no particular ‘official act’ need be identified, and the giving of gifts by 

reason of the recipient’s mere tenure in office constitutes a violation, nothing but the 

Government’s discretion prevents the foregoing examples [not violations of § 201] 

from being prosecuted.”).

Notwithstanding the nexus required by § 666(a)(1)(B), the official’s intendedto-be influenced or rewarded act should be identified and pled. Count 15 includes 

factual allegations that implicate potential City business items or transactions from 

four different categories that may or may not be a basis for Count 15. ECF No. 214

- Second Superseding Indictment at ⁋ 49 (alleging acts associated with Half-Cent

Sales Tax project); ⁋⁋ 70, 72, 73, 75, 79 (alleging acts associated with hurricane 

debris disposal); ⁋ 74 (alleging acts associated with 17th Street Ditch project); ⁋ 82 

(alleging acts associated with approval of a plat for a Finch-owned development 

company).7

 Count 15 identifies the alleged thing of value receive by Anderson but 

fails to allege a link to an identifiable act (i.e., the business, transaction, or series of 

transaction).

7 These acts are limited to the one-year time period specified for Count 15. 

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Therefore, Count 15 fails to state an offense, lacks specificity, and should be 

dismissed.

Wherefore, Defendant, Margo Deal Anderson, requests that the Court: 

A. Dismiss Count 1 or, alternative, compel an election of a single 

conspiracy; 

B. Dismiss Counts 2 through 7, 9 through 15, 17, 21, and 25; and

C. Such further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 

 Dated this 12th day of September 2022. 

/s/ Anthony L. Bajoczky, Jr. 

W. Robert Vezina, III

Florida Bar No. 329401

Anthony L. Bajoczky, Jr.

Florida Bar No. 96631

Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A.

413 East Park Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

850-224-6205

rvezina@vlplaw.com

tbajoczky@vlplaw.com

rhodge@vlplaw.com

Counsel for Defendant,

Margo Deal Anderson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been 

served electronically via the CM/ECF System on this 12th day of September 2022. 

/s/ Anthony L. Bajoczky, Jr. 

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