United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking

Minority Member, Committee on

International Relations, House of

Representatives

February 1996 PROMOTING

DEMOCRACY

Progress Report on

U.S. Democratic

Development

Assistance to Russia

GAO/NSIAD-96-40

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270026 

February 29, 1996

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

As requested, we reviewed U.S.-funded democracy programs of the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID); the U.S. Information

Agency (USIA), including projects funded by USIA’s annual grant to the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED); the Department of State; and

the Department of Defense (DOD). This report focuses on democracy

projects in Russia and addresses whether such projects were meeting their

developmental goals and contributing to political reform from fiscal years

1990 through 1994. To make this assessment, we examined projects in six

areas: independent media, trade union development, political party

development, rule of law development, electoral support, and civil-military

relations. We also inquired into State and USAID views on the future of the

U.S.-funded democracy program in Russia.

Background The United States has for many years funded various USIA broadcasting,

educational, and visitor programs in the former Soviet Union to promote

democratic ideas. Beginning in the mid-1980s, NED, a U.S.-funded

nongovernmental organization, provided small grants to dissident groups

throughout the former Soviet Union and funds for journals, videos, and

other materials that were distributed in Russia and elsewhere. In 1990, NED

began funding political organizing and trade union development work by

three of its core institutes.1

 In fiscal years 1990 and 1991, NED, in part

through these core institutes, spent about $3 million for activities in or

directed toward Russia. Democratic development assistance to Russia

increased during fiscal year 1992, after the Soviet Union dissolved. From

fiscal years 1992 to 1994, the U.S. government, excluding USIA, provided

over $64.2 million in democratic development assistance to Russia, of

which $57.3 million was provided by USAID, $5.8 million by NED, and

$1.1 million by the State Department for a DOD program. USIA was unable to

provide specific funding information for its activities in Russia because

1

NED provides grants to four core institutes: the Free Trade Union Institute, The International

Republic Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and the Center for International Private

Enterprise. NED also has a discretionary grant program through which it provides small grants to

other prodemocracy and human rights organizations.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

they were funded under a regional project. Appendix I provides detailed

information about U.S. democratic development assistance to Russia from

1990 to 1994.

The democracy assistance program in Russia seeks to capitalize on the

historic opportunity to build democracy in place of a centralized

Communist system. The U.S. program is meant not only to demonstrate

U.S. political support for democratic reform in Russia but also to help

create and nurture the full range of democratic institutions, processes, and

values. U.S. efforts seek to increase the responsiveness and effectiveness

of the Russian government, as well as the ability of Russian citizens to

influence decisions affecting their lives. Toward that end, U.S. assistance

provides support to independent media, democratic trade unions,

reformist political parties, and other nongovernmental organizations. It

also supports the Russian government’s efforts to enhance election

administration and election laws, strengthen the courts and other legal

institutions, promote civilian control of the military, and improve the

quality of public administration.

Results in Brief U.S.-funded democracy projects have demonstrated support for and

contributed to Russia’s democracy movement. Organizations and

institutions at the center of the democratic reform process have been

identified and supported, as have thousands of Russian activists working

at these organizations at the national, regional, and local levels. Those

assisted include prodemocracy political activists and political parties,

proreform trade unions, court systems, legal academies, officials

throughout the government, and members of the media.

The democracy projects that we reviewed, however, had mixed results in

meeting their stated developmental objectives. Russian reformers and

others saw U.S. democracy assistance as generally valuable, but in only

three of the six areas we reviewed did projects contribute to significant

changes in Russia’s political, legal, or social system. USAID and USIA media

projects largely met their objective of increasing the quality and

self-sufficiency of nongovernment or independent media organizations,

although the weak economy continues to threaten the sustainability of an

independent media. U.S. efforts to help develop a democratic trade union

movement and improve Russia’s electoral system also contributed to

systemic changes, although more needs to be done. However, projects in

the areas of political party development, rule of law, and civil-military

relations have had limited impact. Our analysis indicated that the most

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

important factors determining project impact were Russian economic and

political conditions. Project implementation problems contributed to the

limited results achieved from the rule of law project.

State and USAID officials acknowledged that democratic reforms in Russia

may take longer to achieve than they initially anticipated.

Democracy Projects

Have Had Mixed

Results

Independent Media The U.S.-funded independent media program in Russia has helped raise

the quality of print and broadcast journalism and contributed to Russia’s

movement toward an independent, self-sustaining local television

network. USAID’s Internews project, USIA’s grant to the Russian-American

Press Information Center (RAPIC), and a number of small grants awarded to

Russian nongovernmental media organizations by NED and the Eurasia

Foundation have strengthened independent media by donating equipment

and broadcast materials to hundreds of local television stations, teaching

reporting skills to print and broadcast journalists, and providing training in

business and marketing to media managers.

According to the State Department, the growth of independent media in

Russia began in 1990 during the Soviet era with the official abolition of

press censorship. The new openness created a conducive environment for

independent news reporting, as print and broadcast media, both still

largely state-owned at the time, frequently aired views highly critical of the

Communist government. Currently, print and broadcast media in Russia

represent a wide range of opinions. Most operate unhindered from the

Russian government and many are privately owned.

Russian and U.S. officials said that the principal threat to media

independence in Russia today is the weak economy. For many media

organizations, advertising revenues are insufficient for continued survival,

forcing them into bankruptcy or joining larger affiliates, thereby curtailing

their independence and capacity to produce their own programs.

According to U.S. and other observers, many print and broadcast outlets

also face pressure from local political authorities or from organized crime,

in large part due to their dire financial situations.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

Internews Network has developed an active working relationship with 200

of the approximately 500 over-the-air broadcasters that currently operate

in the countries of the former Soviet Union,2

 the majority in Russia. The

technical assistance, training, and programming that Internews provided

enabled some local stations to become commercially viable, according to

U.S. officials and Russian participants. These officials and participants

also said that Internews has helped many stations that have not achieved

full commercial viability by providing enough support to forestall

bankruptcy, signing into sponsorship arrangements, or becoming affiliates

of larger networks. (See app. II.)

Electoral Support The USAID-funded election administration project, implemented by the

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES),3

 has made

important contributions to addressing the legal, institutional, and

procedural shortcomings evident during Russia’s December 1993 national

elections. For example, it assisted in the development of Russia’s Voting

Rights Act—which was enacted into law during November 1994—and

other legislation governing elections for the State Duma (the lower house

of the Russian Parliament). Russia now has a permanent and more

independent election commission, voting rights, and Duma election

procedures that are based in law. This improved the situation prevalent in

December 1993, when national elections were held by presidential decree,

the Central Election Commission (CEC) chairman was appointed by the

President, and the electoral process and administrative apparatus were

holdovers from the Communist era. IFES has also worked with the CEC to

develop electoral training and voter education programs to help ensure

that electoral procedures are properly carried out and to increase the

public’s knowledge and participation in elections.

Nonetheless, IFES officials believe that more progress can be made in

electoral reform; for example, legislation governing elections for the upper

chamber of passed. Also, newly passed laws and procedures had yet to be

applied and tested to ensure that shortcomings of the December 1993

elections, such as lack of ballot security and inadequate transparency of

vote counting and election results, would not be repeated. (See app. III.)

2

Internews officials initially estimated that 3,000 local television stations operate in the former Soviet

Union, but many of these stations broadcast to no more than a few apartment buildings united by a

cable. They later told us that 500 over-the-air broadcasting stations are currently operating in the

former Soviet Union.

3

In late summer 1995, IFES changed its name to the International Foundation for Election Systems.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

Trade Union Development

and Workers’ Rights

Trade union development assistance in Russia, implemented through USAID

and NED grants to the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI),4 has helped

increase the size and effectiveness of democratic trade unions. Using NED

funds, FTUI provided important equipment and training for the first

independent, non-Communist unions that arose in the late 1980s, that

backed Boris Yeltsin and other reformers, and that played a key role in the

breakup of the Soviet Union. Since then, FTUI’s support for democratic

unions, funded by USAID and NED, has helped increase the quality of

Russian unions through an extensive education program. It has also

assisted in forming regional and national union confederations and has

helped increase the public’s and government’s knowledge of worker and

union issues. In addition, by using funds, first from a NED grant, and then a

USAID rule of law contract, FTUI has financially supported efforts to address

worker’ rights issues through Russia’s court system.

Although FTUI has helped form or strengthen new democratic unions, it has

been hampered by the continued influence of the successors to the official

Communist trade unions, the inexperience and isolation of democratic

unions, the apathy of Russian citizens, and the weakness of the economy.

During the Soviet era, the Communist trade unions were inseparable from

the party and state apparatus. According to U.S. and Russian officials,

these old unions remain the largest in Russia, retain many of their assets

from the Soviet era, and are therefore less dependent than the democratic

unions on collecting dues. They also still exert control over many workers

through their continued ability to dispense social welfare benefits in some

locations.

FTUI has directly supported the largest of the independent labor unions,

including Sotsprof (about 300,000 members), the Confederation of

Maritime Workers, and the Independent Miners’ Union of Russia (about

90,000 members each). Some Russian union leaders we met emphasized

that the new independent unions give workers a voice, providing them an

alternative to reactionary or nationalist political groups as the difficult

economic situation in Russia continues. (See app. IV.)

Political Party

Development

U.S.-funded political party development programs in Russia, implemented

through NED and USAID grants to the National Democratic Institute (NDI)

and the International Republican Institute (IRI), have not significantly

strengthened reformist national political parties, either organizationally or

in terms of increased membership or performance in elections. From 1990

4

FTUI’s funding is $7.7 million through 1997 from USAID and $5.3 million through 1995 from NED.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

through 1992, NDI and IRI used about $956,000 in NED funds to help the

anti-Communist Democratic Russia Movement establish a printing facility

and disseminate literature. They also conducted civic education and

grassroots organizing programs for Russians at the national and local

level. Since 1992, USAID has awarded NDI and IRI a series of grants with a

combined value of $17.4 million to conduct programs in Russia through

1997. USAID documents state that the overall purpose of these grants is to

assist reformist political parties strengthen their organizations and their

role in elections, Parliament, and local government.

NDI and IRI have developed relationships with many party officials and

provided extensive training and assistance. However, because of the

inhospitable environment in Russia for political party development, the

institutes have had only minimal success in helping to strengthen reformist

national political parties, either in their organization or in their election

performance. Reformist parties—as demonstrated by their showing in the

December 1993 and 1995 elections and by their difficulties in local

elections—have been unwilling or unable to form coalitions, build national

organizations, or convince large segments of the Russian public to support

their political message. In the spring of 1995, USAID, anticipating the poor

showing by reformist parties in the December 1995 parliamentary election

and additional problems for reformists in the June 1996 presidential

election, counseled NDI and IRI to direct more of their resources to working

with grassroots nongovernmental organizations. (See app. V.)

Rule of Law U.S.-funded rule of law activities conducted under the Democratic

Pluralism Initiative5

 have contributed to incremental improvements in

reforming Russia’s legal and judicial institutions, and they are beginning to

help build a grassroots constituency for legal reform. Through an

interagency transfer to the State Department and a grant to the American

Bar Association, USAID supported Russia’s limited reintroduction of jury

trials and its first steps toward establishing an independent judiciary, as

well as commercial law training for the Russian high arbitration court.

By the end of 1994, jury trials were operating in 9 of 89 regions in Russia,

and the government had enacted legislation intended to increase the

independence of the judiciary and to make many other reforms in the

5

USAID’s rule of law project dealing with commercial law reform (the International Reform and the

Informal Sector project) was not included in our review because it was part of USAID’s economic

restructuring and financial project and not part of the Democratic Pluralism Initiative, and the

Department of Justice’s rule of law program was not included because it had not begun at the time of

our fieldwork.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

criminal justice system. However, the widespread reintroduction of

adversarial jury trials was often not occurring as scheduled because the

Russian Federation and the regional governments did not fund their

implementation adequately, citing budgetary constraints. By the end of

1994, Russian judges were only beginning to assert their independence

from other branches of government.

In late September 1993, USAID awarded a $12.2 million, comprehensive rule

of law project to ARD/Checchi to continue support for these reform efforts

over a 3-year period, expand them to develop other Russian legal

institutions, and encourage grassroots constituencies for legal reform. The

project aimed to assist in the development of Russian legal institutions by

supporting curriculum changes in Russian law schools, including the

addition of commercial law courses and new substantive and procedural

code reforms into the curriculum, establishing continuing education for

bar associations, providing training to all judges of commercial law courts,

and strengthening the new Constitutional Court and the role of the defense

counsel in criminal cases. The contractor began to provide assistance in

these areas in late 1994 and early 1995.

As part of its contract, ARD/Checchi also awarded a $500,000 subcontract

to FTUI to support efforts to address workers’ rights issues through

Russia’s court system, and it is managing a $2-million small grants program

to support U.S. and Russian nongovernmental organizations’ activities to

promote the rule of law. As of May 1995, five grants had been awarded

under this program.6

ARD/Checchi was slow to initiate its core project activities. According to

USAID officials, the approximately 1-year delay in starting the project was

due partly to the inability of U.S. embassy and USAID officials to respond to

the contractor’s proposed action plan and to clearly articulate what they

expected of the contractor. In addition, it took some time for the

contractor to (1) establish contacts and design projects with Russia’s

historically closed legal institutions and establish an office in Moscow,

(2) become familiar with USAID’s administrative procedures, (3) and

negotiate and award contracts and grants to other nongovernmental

organizations. It is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of the

contractor’s efforts to support reform of the core legal institutions;

however, officials from USAID, the State Department, and the Russian

government said that systemic changes in Russia’s legal institutions will be

6

NED and the Eurasia Foundation also provide small grants to U.S. and Russian organizations that aim

to promote the rule of law in Russia.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

a long-term process, given that the needs in this area are vast and

complex. (See app. VI.)

Civil-Military Relations U.S. assistance projects intended to strengthen civilian control of the

Russian military, including the International Military Education and

Training (IMET) program and a USAID-funded Atlantic Council project, had

not made much progress in addressing their goals, primarily due to a lack

of interest by the Russian government.7

 U.S. embassy data shows that from

1992 through 1994 the IMET program brought 37 civilian and military

officials,8

 primarily from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, to

the United States for training. However, according to the U.S. official

responsible for managing the program, civilian candidates have been

chiefly mid-level bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who are

not likely to advance to positions of authority. He indicated that the

Ministry of Defense is leery of the program and has limited the

participation of Russian military officers. The Atlantic Council’s 2-year,

$626,500 grant from USAID, started in 1992, was hindered by the Council’s

inability to identify and select Russians to participate in its training

programs.

According to DOD, the IMET program is primarily a long-term effort to

influence the younger, promising officers of foreign militaries who will rise

to positions of prominence during their careers. However, evidence

indicates that little progress had been made in identifying and selecting

promising officers who are likely to rise to positions of prominence,

apparently because the Russian government was unwilling to fully use the

IMET program.

U.S. embassy officials told us that the Russian military retains firm control

of its sphere of operation and that few in-roads have been made to exert

greater civilian control. According to one embassy official, even the

Russian Parliament has limited detailed knowledge of the military budget.

Uniformed officials are also predominant at the Russian Ministry of

Defense. U.S. embassy officials said that political circumstances in Russia

7

Program management for the IMET program is divided between the State Department and DOD. The

Secretary of State is responsible for the program’s general direction, and he also recommends funding

levels for congressional approval and allocates approved funds to each country. The Secretary of

Defense is responsible for planning and implementing the program, including administration and

monitoring, within established funding levels.

8

DOD said that the number of participants published in its annual Congressional Presentation

Document is gathered indirectly and may vary somewhat from the number provided by the U.S.

embassy, but that the embassy count is more accurate.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

make the implementation of a U.S. civil-military program in Russia very

difficult. There is general antagonism to Western assistance from some

quarters of the government and some suspect that civil-military assistance

is designed to further weaken Russia militarily. Also, deep cuts in defense

spending have made the process of greater civilian control in the Ministry

of Defense more complex, as significant hiring of civilian employees is

unlikely, especially with the large numbers of currently unemployed

military officials. (See app. VII.)

State and USAID

Views on the Future

of U.S. Democracy

Assistance in Russia

When USAID began providing democratic development assistance in Russia,

it did so without conducting needs assessments or developing a country

strategy, as it was under considerable pressure to implement projects

quickly. Instead, USAID relied on unsolicited proposals that largely

replicated democracy assistance programs underway in Central and

Eastern Europe, using many of the same contractors and grantees.

State and USAID officials now believe that democratic reforms in Russia

may not be as easily or quickly consolidated as they had originally hoped.

They are now focusing less on assisting national institutions and

short-term political events, such as elections, and are emphasizing more

long-term development of local, grassroots organizations capable of

building a popular consensus for democratic reform. According to these

officials, this means that it may be desirable for the United States to

continue democratic development activities in Russia after assistance in

the economic reform arena has ended.

Agency Comments USAID, USIA, and DOD generally agreed with our report, but they suggested

minor changes that were incorporated where appropriate. State said that

we should have discussed how the Department of Justice’s rule of law

program and DOD’s exchange program conducted under the Cooperative

Threat Reduction program contribute to democratic development. We

agree that law enforcement assistance can contribute to democratic

development; however, the Department of Justice’s project had not begun

at the time of our fieldwork in Russia. (We are currently evaluating this

project as part a review of U.S. anticrime assistance to the former Soviet

Union.) According to DOD, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is

not democracy-related, although it does occasionally fund some

democracy-related activities.9

9

Promoting Democracy: Foreign Affairs and Defense Agencies Funds and Activities—1991 to 1993

(GAO/NSIAD-94-83).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

NED agreed with our general conclusions but said we should have included

projects by the Center for International Private Enterprises in our review

because the Center’s projects also helped build a constituency for free

market democratic reforms. Although the Center’s projects may have

contributed to democratic reforms, the primary focus of the Center’s

projects was to promote privatization and promarket reforms, two areas

outside the scope of our review.

NED also provided us with written comments of NDI and IRI, two of NED’s

core institutes that have operated in Russia primarily as USAID grantees.

Both NDI and IRI indicated that the development of reformist political

parties in Russia may take many years. NDI said that its programs have

produced positive results and that by their nature, these programs are

often long-term investments in individuals, institutions, and processes. IRI

said its approach has been to help those Russians dedicated to democracy

begin to build democratic parties up from the grass roots. However,

evidence indicates that little progress had been made toward the

development of reformist political parties despite NDI and IRI’s efforts.

Comments from State, DOD, USAID, USIA, NED, IRI, and NDI are reprinted in

appendixes VIII through XIV, respectively.

Scope and

Methodology

We used the State Department’s definitions to determine which assistance

programs were democracy-related. These programs included civic

education and organization, civil-military relations, human rights training,

election reform, media training and development, and legislative, rule of

law, political party, trade union, and public administration development.

Our scope was limited to an evaluation of projects in the areas of

independent media, rule of law, political party development, trade union

development, electoral assistance, and civil-military relations.

We interviewed numerous U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C.,

who manage and coordinate their agencies’ democracy assistance to

Russia, specifically, officials from the State Department, USAID, DOD, and

USIA. We also met with NED officials and officials from NDI, IRI, FTUI, IFES,

Internews, ARD/Checchi, the American Bar Association, and the Eurasia

Foundation. We reviewed (1) agencies’ strategy papers, program

documents, project evaluations, and budget data and (2) grantees’ internal

documents, such as trip reports, and their official reporting to the U.S.

government on the status and impact of their projects. We also verified the

scope of work of some nongovernmental organizations—both Russian and

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

American—that received selected small grants from the Eurasia

Foundation and NED.

We visited five Russian cities, in addition to Moscow and 

St. Petersburg—one north of St. Petersburg, two in the Black Sea region,

and two in southwest Siberia. While in these cities, we met with U.S.

embassy and agency officials who manage and coordinate democracy

projects, as well as in-country staff of USAID and USIA contractors and

grantees who implement the projects. In addition, we interviewed Russian

government officials in the presidential administration, government

ministries, and the State Duma to obtain their assessment of

U.S.-sponsored democracy projects. We also interviewed numerous

Russians who received U.S. training, technical assistance, and financial or

material donations, including judges, legal administrators and

practitioners, political party organizers, activists and candidates for local

elections, union leaders and members, station managers, broadcast

technicians, print journalists, election officials, and representatives from

women and youth groups. Also, we attended a number of meetings,

seminars, and training sessions held or organized by the U.S. contractors

or grantees to observe their activities.

We did not evaluate USAID’s public administration and nongovernmental

organization support projects. We also did not evaluate the University of

Maryland’s and the Harvard Institute for International Development’s legal

reform activities because they are sponsored under USAID’s Economic

Restructuring Project rather than its democracy initiative, although we

recognize the link between these programs. We did not review the

effectiveness of democracy-related USIA and USAID exchange and visitor

programs due to the difficult and time-consuming task of locating

individual program participants.

We conducted our review between March 1994 and September 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and

Defense, the Administrator of USAID, the Director of USIA, the President of

NED, and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the appropriate

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others

upon request.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
B-270026 

Please call me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix XV.

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

U.S. Democratic

Development

Assistance to Russia

(Fiscal Years 1990 to

1994)

18

Appendix II 

Independent Media

22

Internews Helps Strengthen Local Independent Television 23

RAPIC’s Support for Print Media 25

Small Grants to Media Organizations 25

Appendix III 

Electoral Assistance

27

Numerous Problems Evident During December 1993 Elections 28

IFES Has Contributed to Some Improvements 29

Appendix IV 

Trade Union

Development and

Workers’ Rights

30

Early Support for Independent Trade Unions 31

FTUI’s Contribution to Independent Trade Unions 32

Appendix V 

Political Party

Development

37

Reformist Parties Did Poorly in December 1993 Elections 38

Reformist Parties Remain Weak 39

Russian and U.S. Views on Political Party Assistance 41

Appendix VI 

Rule of Law

45

Support for Jury Trials and an Independent Judiciary 45

Limited Support Thus Far for Other Russian Legal Institutions 47

Assistance to Civic Organizations 50

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Contents

Appendix VII 

Civil-Military

Relations

51

IMET Program 51

Atlantic Council Program Limited 53

Appendix VIII 

Comments From the

Department of State

54

Appendix IX 

Comments From the

Defense Security

Assistance Agency

56

Appendix X 

Comments From the

U.S. Agency for

International

Development

58

Appendix XI 

Comments From the

United States

Information Agency

60

Appendix XII 

Comments From the

National Endowment

for Democracy

63

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Contents

Appendix XIII 

Comments From the

International

Republican Institute

66

Appendix XIV 

Comments From the

National Democratic

Institute for

International Affairs

71

Appendix XV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

83

Table Table I.1: Estimated Obligations for U.S.-Funded Democratic

Development Assistance in Russia,a

 Fiscal Years 1990-94

19

Abbreviations

CEC Central Election Commission

DOD Department of Defense

FTUI Free Trade Union Institute

IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IMET International Military Education and Training

IRI International Republican Institute

NDI National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

NED National Endowment for Democracy

RAPIC Russian-American Press Information Center

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USIA U.S. Information Agency

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix I 

U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to

Russia (Fiscal Years 1990 to 1994)

U.S. democracy assistance to Russia includes projects funded or

implemented by a number of agencies, including the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID); the Department of Defense (DOD); and

the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) through its annual grants to the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Table I.1 summarizes these

programs.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix I 

U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to

Russia (Fiscal Years 1990 to 1994)

Table I.1: Estimated Obligations for U.S.-Funded Democratic Development Assistance in Russia,a Fiscal Years 1990-94

Dollars in Thousands

Agency FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Total

USAID

Democratic Pluralism

Initiative

$3,376 $13,268 $35,368 $52,013b

Eurasia Foundationc 300 2,300 2,600

Exchanges and trainingd 2,681 2,681

Subtotal 3,376 13,568 40,349 57,294b

DOD

International Military

Education and Training

153 471 471 1,095

USIA/NED

National Democratic

Institute

165e 238e 100 32 535

International Republican

Institute

50e 326e 77f 84 537

Free Trade Union Institute 350g 1,000g 1,420g 1,482 1,046 5,298

Discretionary grants 382 512 280 483 808 2,465

Subtotal 947 2,076 1,877 2,081 1,854 8,835

Total $947 $2,076 $5,406 $16,120 $42,674 $67,224b

aFunding is reported as obligations, except for Eurasia grants, the International Military Education

and Training (IMET) program, and NED grants, which constitute grant totals for the fiscal year.

Activities funded by all organizations may extend into subsequent fiscal years.

bFigures do not add due to rounding.

cOnly includes democracy-related Eurasia grants, such as those related to media, the nonprofit

sector, and governmental reform.

dThis figure is the portion of USAID’s exchanges project used to support democracy projects.

eAlthough these funds were primarily for activities in Russia, a portion was used for activities in

other former Soviet republics.

f

Estimated amount from a regional grant that covered three republics of the former Soviet Union.

gFor fiscal years 1990 through 1992, the Free Trade Union Institute figures include funds for all

programs throughout the former Soviet Union. Its fiscal year 1990 figure also includes funds for

activities in the Baltic States.

Source: USAID, DOD, and NED.

As indicated in table I.1, the majority of USAID democracy-related funding

in Russia involved grants awarded under its Democratic Pluralism

Initiative for the New Independent States. Major activities funded by USAID

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix I 

U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to

Russia (Fiscal Years 1990 to 1994)

in Russia under this initiative include efforts to develop and strengthen

independent media, new democratic trade unions, reformist political

parties, laws and legal institutions, election processes, local government,

nongovernmental organizations, and civilian control of the military. Some

activities under this initiative are implemented through transfers from

USAID to other agencies, such as to USIA for journalist training and to State

for rule of law activities. Other USAID democracy-related activities in Russia

not part of the initiative include funding for the Eurasia Foundation, which

awards small grants for media, public administration, and other projects,

and an exchange program USAID uses to support all its assistance projects.

DOD shares program management for the IMET program with the State

Department. The Secretary of State is responsible for the program’s

general direction, and he also recommends funding levels for

congressional approval and allocates approved funds to each country. The

Secretary of Defense is responsible for planning and implementing the

program, including administration and monitoring, within established

funding levels.

NED provided about $8.8 million from its annual USIA grants for

democracy-related activities in Russia from fiscal years 1990 through 1994.

Of that amount, about $6.4 million was spent on activities implemented by

three of NED’s four core institutes—the National Democratic Institute, the

International Republican Institute, and the Free Trade Union

Institute—which have also received significant USAID funding. This figure is

somewhat overstated because the Free Trade Union Institute’s figures for

fiscal years 1990 through 1992 include funds for all of its activities in the

former Soviet Union; based on the data available, we could not estimate

the amount of funds that were spent on activities in Russia.

The remaining NED funds were for its small grants program, which from

fiscal years 1990 through 1994 included 64 grants ranging between $10,000

and $100,000 in support of human rights, civic education, public advocacy,

and media projects. NED’s fourth core institute, the Center for International

Private Enterprise, spent about $572,000 in Russia from fiscal years 1992

through 1994, primarily for grants to governmental and nongovernmental

organizations that seek to promote privatization and promarket reform.

Other USIA programs in Russia currently involve a wide variety of exchange

programs and educational and cultural activities, many of which are

intended to directly support Russia’s transition to democracy. USIA told us

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix I 

U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to

Russia (Fiscal Years 1990 to 1994)

it does not maintain specific country funding information because its

activities were funded under regional projects.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix II 

Independent Media

The purpose of the U.S.-funded independent media program in Russia is to

ensure the quality and self-sufficiency of nongovernment or independent

media organizations so that the Russian people have access to truthful

information and a forum for open expression. U.S. media projects seek to

raise the reporting skills of journalists, provide training in business and

marketing to media managers, donate equipment and broadcast material,

and facilitate sharing of news information. We reviewed USAID’s 3-year,

$4.9 million grant to Internews Network; USIA’s 3-year, $600,000 grant to

the Russian-American Press Information Center (RAPIC); and a number of

small grants awarded to Russian nongovernmental media organizations by

NED and the Eurasia Foundation. Overall, we found that the independent

media program has helped expand and raise the quality of news reporting

throughout the Russia Federation. Nonetheless, independent media in

Russia remains insecure, as the difficult economic environment limits

advertising revenue while political intimidation against the media

continues to be exercised by some regional and local authorities.

The growth of independent media in Russia began in 1990 during the

Soviet era with the official abolition of press censorship.1

 The new

openness created a conducive environment for independent news

reporting, as print and broadcast media organizations, still largely

state-owned at the time, frequently aired views highly critical of the

Communist government.2

 Currently, most media organizations operate

unhindered by the Russian government and many are privately owned. The

principal threat to media independence in Russia today is the weak

economy,3

 according to U.S. and Russian officials and State Department

reporting. For many organizations, advertising revenues are insufficient

for continued survival, forcing them into bankruptcy or into joining larger

affiliates, thereby curtailing their independence and capacity to produce

their own programs. Print and broadcast organizations also face pressure

from local political authorities or from organized crime. Media

organizations are susceptible to such pressure because of their dire

financial situations and because many occupy city-owned premises,

receive subsidies, or depend on government-owned enterprises for

supplies.

1

This information is drawn from the State Department’s human rights reports on Russia from 1990 to

1994.

2

Freedom of speech was briefly curtailed during the failed pro-Communist coup in August 1991, and

again in late 1993 during the standoff between President Yeltsin and the Parliament of the Russian

Federation.

3

The U.S. government supports Russia’s macroeconomic policy reforms through USAID’s Economic

Restructuring Project. This project was outside the scope of our review.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix II 

Independent Media

Media coverage of the conflict in Chechnya was remarkably open, as

views highly critical of the government were aired by both state and

privately-owned television stations and newspapers. Nonetheless,

according to the State Department’s 1994 Human Rights Report, the

Russian government limited access by journalists to some areas of the

conflict, claiming the need to protect military secrets and ensure

journalists’ safety.

Internews Helps

Strengthen Local

Independent

Television

The purpose of the Internews project is to aid in the establishment of an

independent, self-sustaining television news network to facilitate

alternatives to state-owned television. The project is part of a regional

grant that also includes activities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,

Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Project components include (1) journalist and

management training programs; (2) equipment procurement;

(3) production and distribution of a weekly news program utilizing news

reports from local stations; (4) production of public affairs documentaries;

and (5) acquisition and distribution of low cost, quality programming to

participating stations to raise viewership and advertising revenue.

Our review of the Internews project indicates that it has made a significant

contribution toward achieving its purpose. Internews is the only

organization of its kind operating in the former Soviet Union to assist

fledgling local independent television stations. The technical assistance,

training, and programming that Internews provides have helped some

local stations to become commercially viable, according to U.S. officials

and Russian participants. According to Internews officials, Internews has

also helped many stations that have not achieved full commercial viability

by providing enough support to forestall them from entering bankruptcy,

signing into sponsorship arrangements, or becoming affiliates of larger

networks.

Of the 500 over-the-air broadcasters that currently operate in the former

Soviet Union,4

 200, the majority in the Russian Federation, have an active

working relationship with Internews. At the national level in Russia,

privately owned broadcast companies, such as NTV and TV6, have

emerged and challenged the dominance of the state-owned national

broadcasting companies. While the state-owned companies are only

minimally supervised by the government, the privately owned broadcast

4

Internews officials initially estimated that 3,000 local television stations operate in the former Soviet

Union, but many of these stations broadcast to no more than a few apartment buildings united by a

cable. They later told us that 500 over-the-air broadcasting stations are currently operating in the

former Soviet Union.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix II 

Independent Media

companies nonetheless provide competition and diversity to state

broadcasting, particularly in Moscow and other large urban centers.

According to State Department and Internews officials, television stations

at the regional level, some of which were once part of the central

broadcasting system of the Soviet-era, now operate more or less

independently. They can choose affiliation to one of the state or private

national networks and can use material from these networks or produce

their own local programming. The ability of these stations to produce their

own local programming provides diversity to news and information, which

traditionally has been Moscow-centric. According to Internews, the

greatest hindrance to the development of independent local television is

the unstable economic situation. Additionally, all local stations depend to

some extent on local political authorities.5

The Internews project has helped strengthen local independent television

stations through the following activities.

• Conducting over 60 training programs in journalism, station management,

advertising, and other commercial survival skills to over 2,000 station

personnel and journalists. Russian participants told us the training

sessions were very beneficial and were state-of-the-art. They said the

training was hands-on and relevant to running a modern, commercially

viable television station.

• Providing grants of video equipment to stations that either lack or have

outdated video technology and making available production equipment

free of charge to support Russia’s indigenous documentary film industry.

• Organizing a network of over 110 independent television stations

throughout Russia and neighboring countries, which helps pool limited

programming resources.

• Coordinating production of Local Time—a weekly half hour news

program. This program is distributed to any interested local station and is

estimated to reach an audience of 100 million people in five countries. As

of April 1995, Internews had produced over 110 episodes, with over 40

local stations in Russia alone contributing stories from their regions.

• Producing several docudramas—What If—on topical legal and political

issues, including commercial law, civil law, privacy rights, and private

property rights.

• Acquiring and distributing quality Western and domestic documentary

programming to over 170 Russian stations free of charge to attract viewers

5

According to Internews officials, broadcasting is also potentially susceptible to national government

control due to the government’s monopoly of transmission facilities.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix II 

Independent Media

and advertisers—thereby increasing the economic viability of these

stations during this transition period.

• Linking more than 20 regional independent stations in a computer-based

electronic mail network for purposes of editorial coordination and

information exchange.

As the Internews project was about to end at the time of our fieldwork,

USAID awarded a new $10 million, 3-year consortium grant to Internews

and RAPIC to implement a media partnership program. The program will

place U.S. media organizations in association with Russian counterparts to

facilitate the transfer of U.S. management expertise, training, equipment,

and other resources. However, it was too soon to determine the

effectiveness of this project.

RAPIC’s Support for

Print Media

The objective of the RAPIC grant, which is funded by USIA, is to develop a

stable, profitable press in Russia. Elements of RAPIC’s program include

(1) management training workshops, (2) journalist training seminars,

(3) establishment of regional centers to serve as information

clearinghouses, and (4) sponsorship of press conferences to provide a

forum for an exchange of ideas. Our review of this grant indicates that

RAPIC’s regional centers have helped strengthen the print media in the

regions they serve. The centers provide training to Russian journalists,

access to wire services and on-line data bases, and serve as a meeting

place for print and broadcast journalists and a forum for press

conferences on a variety of topics, including politics, economics, science,

and the arts. According to U.S. officials and Russian journalists we met

with at RAPIC centers in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Novosibirsk, the

quality of journalistic reporting has increased notably, especially among

the small, regional newspapers. These officials credited the training

journalists received and the access to new sources of information by RAPIC

for the improved reporting. They told us that while the quality of

journalism in Russia is still in need of improvement, newspapers are

reporting news in a more objective fashion.

Small Grants to Media

Organizations

The Eurasia Foundation and NED provided small grants, ranging from

$10,000 to $110,000, to Russian and U.S. nongovernmental organizations

for institutional training and budgetary support to Russia’s grassroots

media organizations. They also financed specific media projects that

provide a prodemocracy angle to Russia’s economic and political reform

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix II 

Independent Media

process. Some of the grants funded by the Eurasia Foundation were made

to

• Freedom Channel, for a three-part television series on the dangers and

remedies of hyperinflation;

• Duke University, for several projects of the Commission on Radio and

Television Policy, including production of a media policy guidebook and

an exchange program;

• Freedom Channel, in conjunction with Persona, an independent Russian

television production company, for the development and broadcast of

programming related to economic reform and prodemocracy topics such

as conflict resolution and freedom of speech;

• Globe Independent Press Syndicate, for the “Freedom Link Computer

Network” that provides international sources of information to regional

newspapers in Russia by electronic mail; and

• KSKA Anchorage, for a training program on radio and television

production, basic journalism and communication, and business practices

for managers and reporters from radio and television in the Russian Far

East.

Some of the grants funded by NED went to

• New Times, for a series of articles exposing the threat of Russian

nationalists, fascists, and other extremist organizations and increasing the

appeal of democratic solutions to Russia’s problems;

• Panorama, for the research, publication, and the maintenance of a

database on political organizations and political personalities throughout

the former Soviet Union;

• Express Chronicle, an independent Russian-language weekly newspaper

published in Moscow that specialized in human rights reporting;

• Globe Press Syndicate, for a syndication service that provided small

regional newspapers with prodemocracy news and more varied and

detailed information about political, economic, and social changes taking

place in Russia; and

• Freedom Channel/Persona, a joint American and Russian television

project, for the production of prodemocracy documentaries on such topics

as conflict resolution and freedom of speech.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix III 

Electoral Assistance

The United States helped Russia improve its election administration

through a USAID grant to the International Foundation for Electoral

Systems (IFES).1

 This 3-year, $10.7 million regional grant enabled IFES to

work in any country of the former Soviet Union, provided it has U.S. and

host country approval. In Russia, the IFES project objectives were to help

make elections free and fair and increase public participation. IFES

conducted a pre-election technical assessment in Russia in June 1993. It

subsequently served as a key advisor to Russia’s Central Election

Commission (CEC) prior to the December 1993 elections. Since then, IFES

has been working to help Russian organizations rectify many of the legal,

institutional, and administrative shortcomings made evident during the

elections.

IFES has made several important contributions to improve Russia’s

electoral administration structure, including contributing to passage of

Russia’s Voting Rights Act in November 1994 and more recently legislation

governing elections for the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian

Parliament). These laws establish a permanent and more independent

election commission, as well as voting rights and Duma election

procedures based in law. This situation compares favorably to the

situation in December 1993, when elections were held by presidential

decree, CEC members were appointed by the President, and the electoral

process and administrative apparatus were holdovers from the Communist

era. IFES has also worked with the CEC in developing electoral training and

voter education programs to ensure that electoral procedures are properly

carried out and to increase the public’s knowledge and participation in

elections.

Nonetheless, despite these efforts, IFES officials believe that more needs to

be done to ensure that future elections in Russia will be free and fair. As of

our review, legislation governing elections for the upper chamber of

Parliament or for regional and local political bodies still had to be passed.

Moreover, newly passed laws and procedures still had to be applied and

tested in practice. Countrywide local elections held in 1994 raised

concerns about future national elections, as these elections were marked

by many irregularities and low voter participation.

1

In late summer 1995, IFES changed its name to the International Foundation for Election Systems.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix III 

Electoral Assistance

Numerous Problems

Evident During

December 1993

Elections

IFES provided advice and equipment and coordinated international

observers for the CEC prior to the 1993 elections but did not have much of

an impact on how the elections were administered. According to U.S.

officials and IFES reporting, the elections displayed several shortcomings.2

For example, the CEC lacked independence, particularly from the

presidential administration. Presidential decrees continually undermined

CEC decisions, and after the election it was the presidential administration,

rather than the CEC, that controlled the ballots and first announced the

election results.3

 There were also problems stemming from ballot security,

incomplete and inconsistent election regulations, insufficient election

commodities and technology, and inadequate oversight of campaign

finances.

IFES’s limited impact was due to the difficult political circumstances in

which the elections were held and the short period of time available to

address shortcomings in the electoral system. The December 1993

elections were called in September 1993, in the midst of a violent standoff

between the executive and legislative branches. No legally established,

independent apparatus existed in Russia to administer national elections,

as President Yeltsin simply appointed the CEC by decree, while leaving

intact 88 regional, district, and local commissions that were holdovers

from the Soviet era. Such commissions remained closely tied to local

political and administrative bodies, themselves little changed since the

Soviet era.4

 As IFES pointed out in its technical assessment published in

November 1993,5

 Russia’s election administration system suffered from

numerous problems on the eve of the December 1993 elections, including

weak mechanisms to protect against ballot and electoral fraud and a

Russian populace with no experience in multiparty voting.

2

The elections were selection of a new Parliament and approval of a proposed constitution.

3

Many observers believe that the Constitutional referendum was invalid due to insufficient voter

turnout. According to U.S. officials, complete protocols for all local polling sites were never made

available to the CEC and may have been destroyed.

4

The electoral apparatus that was used to supervise the mostly one candidate, one party elections that

were held during the Soviet era remained mostly intact after the collapse of communism, as no

national elections were held in Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union until December 1993, with

the exception of the April 1993 national referendum. As a result, the election system had no grounding

in Russia’s new legal system and strong ties remained between officials in local electoral commissions

and in other political or administrative bodies.

5

“Elections in Russia: A Technical Assessment,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 

Nov. 10, 1993

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix III 

Electoral Assistance

IFES Has Contributed

to Some

Improvements

Since the 1993 elections, IFES has worked to ensure the CEC’s independence

and strengthen Russia’s election administrative processes. Examples of

IFES project activities follow:

• Providing advice and written commentaries on electoral legislation and

other election-related initiatives. In November 1994, Russia passed a

Voting Rights Act, which established the CEC and the regional commissions

as permanent, legal bodies and ensured political balance in the

appointment of commissioners. Since the passage of the act, a new CEC has

been appointed. The act reflected IFES’s recommendations and included

provisions on ballot security, publication of election results, regulations on

campaign financing, and mechanisms to improve oversight of local

commissions. Its advice and comment were also reflected in recently

passed legislation governing elections to the State Duma and to draft laws

on presidential elections, public referenda, and local elections.

• Helping design and institute a training program for election officials and

poll workers to ensure the application and enforcement of new legislation.

• Organizing conferences with CEC, State Duma members, presidential

administration officials, and political party leaders to discuss the role of

the CEC and the rights and responsibilities of political parties under the

new election laws.

• Holding roundtable discussions on such topics as ballot security, polling

procedures, grievance adjudication, and reporting election results.

• Assisting in the establishment of an electoral archive in order to create an

institutional memory of elections in Russia.

• Designing and implementing a national voter education program in

conjunction with the CEC, Ministry of Education, and the media, to provide

voters with nonpartisan election information.

CEC officials indicated they value their collaboration with IFES and hope it

continues. Although they believe they have made progress in improving

Russia’s electoral administration system, they said it would take the

experience of holding many elections before elections would run

smoothly. U.S. and IFES officials also agree that more work is needed to

improve electoral administration, including the passage of additional

electoral legislation and assurances that such legislation will be

appropriately applied. For example, despite the activities and

accomplishments of the CEC and IFES, local elections held throughout

Russia over the past 18 months have not fared well. According to IFES

officials, the winners of these elections regularly included the heads of

local administrations—who were often responsible for the organization of

the elections.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IV 

Trade Union Development and Workers’

Rights

U.S. financial support for the development of democratic trade unions and

support for workers’ rights in Russia was provided through NED and USAID

grants to the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) of $5.3 million for activities

from 1990 through 1995 and $7.7 million for activities from 1992 through

1997, respectively. The purpose of U.S. support of democratic trade unions

is to give workers a means of participating in the new political and

economic environment. According to program documents and U.S. and

Russian officials, if workers are not given a voice during this transitional

period and believe that free markets and democracy only work to their

disadvantage, then they could pose a threat to social peace and political

and economic development.

Trade union development assistance in Russia has helped increase the size

and effectiveness of democratic trade unions. FTUI provided important

support for democratic trade unions early in their existence, at a time

when unions were challenging the Soviet system. The first independent,

noncommunist unions in the former Soviet Union arose in the mining

regions of Siberia in the late 1980s. These unions backed Boris Yeltsin and

Democratic Russia and other reformist groups and played a key role in the

breakup of the Soviet Union. FTUI supported these unions by providing

them with equipment and training in Russia and the United States. FTUI’s

support for democratic unions since the breakup of the Soviet Union has

helped increase the quality of Russian unions through an extensive

education program. It has achieved some success in increasing the size of

some unions, assisting in the formation of regional and national union

confederations, and increasing the public’s and government’s knowledge

of worker and union issues. It also financially supports increasingly

effective efforts to address workers’ rights issues through Russia’s court

system.

FTUI’s efforts to help form or strengthen new democratic unions,

nonetheless, have been hampered by the continued control the successors

to the official Communist trade unions have over workers, as well as by

the inexperience and isolation of democratic unions, the apathy of Russian

citizens, and the weakness of the economy. The old official unions remain

the largest unions in Russia. During the Soviet era, they were inseparable

from the oppressive party and state apparatus and until the final years

were the only unions allowed. They retain many of their assets, and so are

less dependent than the democratic unions on collecting dues. They also

still exert control over many workers through their continued ability to

dispense social welfare benefits in some locations. The old official unions

have been less receptive to reform; for example, they supported the

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IV 

Trade Union Development and Workers’

Rights

leaders of Parliament in their efforts during the fall of 1993 to overthrow

President Yeltsin.

Early Support for

Independent Trade

Unions

The independent Soviet workers’ movement began as a mass movement in

the summer of 1989. With NED funding from 1990 through 1992, FTUI

established relationships with and provided financial and other support for

the most important independent or democratic unions in Russia, including

the Independent Miner’s Union, the Seafarer’s Union, and Sotsprof.

Initially, mine workers were the largest source of independent trade union

activity in the Soviet Union, with independent miners’ unions generally

aligning themselves with the new government of the Russian Republic, led

by Boris Yeltsin. During the miners’ strike in the spring of 1991, miners

repeated demands first raised in 1990 for radical changes in Soviet

political and economic life, including the resignation of top Soviet leaders,

and forced the government to cede power from Moscow to republic-level

coal ministries.

Following the 1989 strikes, FTUI provided the Independent Miners’ Union

and other independent unions with equipment, training, and technical

advice and brought independent union leaders to the United States for

training. Officials we met with representing some of Russia’s first

independent or democratic unions, which today comprise the largest

democratic unions, told us they greatly appreciated and benefited from

FTUI’s support during the early days of their unions’ existence. At the time

of our review, many of the early union leaders who were supported by FTUI

were working in the government, where, according to union officials, they

were attempting to get the government to address labor issues.

According to State Department reporting, the growth in independent trade

unions occurred as the Soviet Union’s Supreme Soviet and later the

Russian government passed laws that formally established the right to

strike, improved the legal conditions for independent trade unions, and

provided for the right of workers to form or join trade unions. However,

increases in the size and number of independent trade unions were slowed

by an economy in crisis; legal harassment and physical violence related to

union organizing activities, including threats and intimidation from

enterprise management, who, according to free union officials, had the

passive support of nonindependent union officials and local politicians;

and official trade unions maintaining effective, day-to-day control over the

social insurance fund, from which it dispersed benefits such as workers’

vacations and sick pay. Independent union leaders considered the

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IV 

Trade Union Development and Workers’

Rights

continued control of the insurance fund by official trade unions the biggest

obstacle to establishing independent unions.

FTUI’s Contribution

to Independent Trade

Unions

Beginning in 1992, FTUI’s direct support for unions, education, outreach

and information dissemination, and legal assistance programs have made

varying contributions to the development of new, democratic labor unions.

However, two of FTUI’s activities—specifically the research activities of the

Russian American Foundation for Free Trade Union Research and a grant

to a human rights organization for a media project—did not make

significant contributions to either trade union development or workers’

rights.

Direct Support for Unions FTUI’s NED-funded direct support for unions includes training union

organizers, subsidizing the salaries of staff and organizers, and providing

equipment. After early successes with the Independent Miners’ Union from

1990 through 1992, FTUI’s assistance for union organizing slowed during

1993, as FTUI staffers were focused on starting their USAID-funded program

and the Russian director of the organizing activities became ill. However,

during the first quarter of fiscal year 1994, FTUI-assisted organizers

participated in 40 registration campaigns, helping organize over 3,000 new

members for various unions in five different regions. Currently, these

organizers are focused on training a cadre of Russian organizers to work

directly with unions. In addition to providing training for union organizers,

FTUI directly supports unions by paying the salaries of Russian staffers or

interns at several national trade union structures who have, among other

things, helped organize unions in several regions, advised unions on draft

legislation, and devised wage provisions for tariff agreements. According

to FTUI, the efforts of one intern to revise the charter of the Independent

Miners’ Union directly led to the doubling of that union. In addition, FTUI

has spent up to $20,000 per quarter since 1991 on donations of computers,

fax machines, and other office equipment for the Independent Miners’

Union and other unions. We observed FTUI-donated equipment at the

headquarters of a regional affiliate of the miners’ union in Siberia and

found that it was in good working condition; officials described it as

essential to their operations.

FTUI has directly supported the largest of the independent labor unions,

including Sotsprof (about 300,000 members), the Confederation of

Maritime Workers (about 86,000 workers), and a regional affiliate of the

Independent Miners’ Union of Russia (about 95,000 members). According

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IV 

Trade Union Development and Workers’

Rights

to FTUI and U.S. officials, the independent labor movement grew to

between 3 million and 5 million workers by late 1994, out of a total

workforce of 60 million to 75 million, the large majority of which belonged

to unions. About 2.2 million members of the independent labor unions are

part of the Mining and Metallurgy Union, which broke away from the old

official trade union in 1993; this union has received FTUI’s help in its reform

efforts since then.

According to State Department human rights reports, growth in the

democratic workers’ movement during 1991 and 1992 resulted in several

hundred union-like organizations forming across Russia; however, most

were small and served more as workers’ associations and did not appear

to carry out traditional labor activities. A FTUI official told us that many of

the unions that FTUI helped register over the past few years were not true

trade unions because of their small size. Under Russian law, organizations

can register as unions with membership as small as 15 people.1

 At the time

of our visit, FTUI was beginning to explore ways of helping these small

organizations become larger, viable unions.

In 1994, the majority of Russian workers still belonged to the old official

union, the successor to the Soviet-era Communist union center, even as

the membership declined from 65 million to 50 million. Despite the loss of

members, the old official union retained its historical influence with the

government and enterprise management, as well as many of the privileges

and control mechanisms that existed in the Soviet era.

The decision of the Mining and Metallurgy Union to split from the old

official union raises an issue of whether FTUI should work with this union

to facilitate additional splits. FTUI generally opposes working with the

former Communist party unions because it believes these unions are not

reformable and any relationship could undermine its work with proreform

unions. FTUI believes it is more effective to build new union structures

rather than attempt to reform the old official unions, as these unions are

led by enterprise managers and former Communist party functionaries.

Additionally, FTUI officials said that the Mining and Metallurgy Union is

unique in supporting reform and still has a long way to go in changing the

way it operates. A U.S. embassy official we spoke with was sympathetic to

FTUI’s position; however, this official believed there may be some

opportunity for FTUI to facilitate splits within the old official Communist

union.

1

We asked this official to provide us with data on the number and membership of trade unions that

FTUI helped register. The official was unable to do so because its Moscow office had been destroyed

by fire.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IV 

Trade Union Development and Workers’

Rights

Despite FTUI’s position against working with the old official union, since

1992 FTUI has provided the American Federation of Teachers with $160,000

to, among other activities, help members of the old official union

democratize their affiliated unions or to form or join independent trade

unions. However, FTUI officials recognized many obstacles to getting more

unions to break away from the official trade union. In commenting on this

report, USAID said that it fully supported FTUI’s opposition to working with

the official trade union. USAID believes that FTUI’s strategy of building new

union structures is the appropriate course of action.

Education FTUI helped independent trade unions to improve their operations through

an extensive education program for union leaders and members. This

program was implemented by FTUI in 1991 and 1992 with NED funding.

Since 1993, the education department of the Russian-American Foundation

for Trade Union Research and Education, an organization FTUI created

with USAID funding, has managed this project. From 1992 through 1994,

about 15 seminars and conferences were held in about 8 cities, covering

issues such as collective bargaining, protecting workers’ rights in the

courts, and union organizing. Union members we met praised FTUI

educational seminars and conferences, particularly those focusing on legal

issues such as how to favorably resolve employer-employee disputes.

Outreach and Information

Dissemination

FTUI’s outreach activities—funded by USAID and NED—entail frequent trips

by FTUI staff to various parts of Russia to meet union leaders, introduce

them to FTUI programs, and provide informal consultations. According to

project documents and independent union officials, these activities

resulted in the formation of cooperative relationships between Russian

unions and international confederations and in independent unions

forming regional and national confederations. For example, FTUI staff

facilitated the formation of the Confederation of Maritime Workers, which

includes the dock workers, seafarers, and port workers unions. The

confederation has a combined membership of about 86,000.

FTUI also provides information to the public and government on union and

labor issues. For example, a labor newspaper is published by the Prologue

Society with funding from FTUI through its NED grant that has reached a

circulation of 60,000 and is distributed throughout most of the country. Its

readership includes members of the Parliament and the Kremlin, where,

according to an FTUI official, articles from the newspaper are included in

President Yeltsin’s daily news clippings. While union members we met

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IV 

Trade Union Development and Workers’

Rights

were divided on the usefulness of the paper’s coverage, the leader of the

Independent Miners’ Union said the newspaper plays a key role in his

union’s media campaign.

Using USAID funds, FTUI also provides public information through the

Russian-American Foundation for Trade Union Research and Education.

The foundation has press correspondents in about 36 locations who write

articles for local papers. The foundation distributes press releases to two

Russian news agencies and reports and press clippings on trade union

activities to trade unions throughout the country. It also uses its material

on a popular radio program and a television program.

With funding from USAID, FTUI supports the Glasnost Defense Fund in its

production of a twice weekly radio program on workers’ rights and free

trade unions. The Glasnost Defense Fund is a major human rights

organization in Moscow that focuses on press freedom. The Fund selected

five large industrial cities—four in Russia and one in Kazakhstan—to tie

into a electronic mail network. However, the Fund director told us that

only a minor portion of the half hour show is spent on worker and union

issues because listeners are more interested in other issues of local

concern. He said the activity contributes more to an independent media

than to union development because it attempts to make local broadcast

stations less reliant on central authority for material and more responsible

for their own operations.

Research The Russian-American Foundation for Trade Union Research and

Education initially had problems managing its research component,

though some improvements were evident by late 1994. Foundation

research is supposed to inform unions of the economic, social, and legal

aspects of the workers’ movement to help unions better represent their

interests at the national and local levels. However, FTUI officials told us

that during 1993, the foundation’s first year, little research was actually

done because many of the researchers assisted the foundation’s former

director in trying to form a political party, not in doing research. Moreover,

FTUI officials told us that what little research had been completed had to

be edited extensively because it was too theoretical. Nonetheless, after the

foundation’s director was replaced and more of the research and writing

were done on a contract basis, a number of practical brochures on union

organizing and management were finally published. One brochure, entitled

“Legal Bases for Negotiating and Collective Bargaining”, went through two

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IV 

Trade Union Development and Workers’

Rights

printings due to high demand. FTUI funded these brochures and the

foundation’s other research activities from its USAID grant.

Legal Assistance Using NED and USAID funds, FTUI supported two labor law centers that have

helped improve access to the legal system for trade unions and their

members. USAID’s rule of law project first identified the potential for these

centers through a USAID-funded needs assessment. In early 1994, FTUI began

establishing the centers using $195,000 received from NED. In August 1994,

FTUI provided about $465,000 (USAID rule of law funds) in grants to the

centers to cover their operational costs. One of the centers is part of the

Russian-American Foundation for Trade Union Research and Education in

Moscow and the other is based in Yekaterinberg.

The two centers, which together have 8 full-time lawyers, supplemented by

volunteer work from law students, successfully litigated about half of the

50 cases they had brought to court at the time of our review. Most of the

cases involved violations of workers’ rights, such as illegal firings or

breach of bargaining agreements.

In addition to providing pro bono litigation services, the centers support

unions by participating in collective bargaining negotiations and in the

foundation’s educational programs and by providing unions with materials

on legal issues. According to the State Department, independent trade

union officials were increasingly aggressive in pressing their cases in the

Russian courts during 1994, with increasing rates of success. Union

officials told us that the legal aspects of union organizing and management

was especially important, and they praised the services provided by the

FTUI-supported law centers.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

U.S.-funded political party development programs in Russia had not

significantly strengthened reformist national political parties, either

organizationally or in terms of increased membership or performance in

elections. The U.S. government has supported the development of political

parties in Russia through NED and USAID grants to the National Democratic

Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI). From 1990

through 1992, NED provided $956,000 to NDI and IRI to help the

anti-Communist Democratic Russia Movement establish a printing facility

and disseminate literature. NED’s funding also enabled NDI and IRI to

conduct civic education and grassroots organizing programs for Russians

at the national and local levels. In addition, NED provided NDI and IRI

$200,000 to monitor the April 1993 national referendum and to send

Russian party leaders to the United States for training.

Beginning in 1992, USAID awarded NDI and IRI a series of grants that totaled

about $17.4 million to conduct political party development programs in

Russia through 1997. According to USAID documents, the overall objective

of these grants was to help reformist political parties strengthen their

organizational structures and their role in elections, Parliament, and local

government. The grants were also intended to strengthen reformist parties

indirectly by providing support to civic organizations and encouraging

them to work with parties and by monitoring elections and promoting

public participation in politics. NDI and IRI held numerous seminars and

training activities for party leaders in Moscow and for activists in over 20

cities and regions, prior to the April 1993 referendum and the

December 1993 national elections. Nonetheless, reformist political parties

performed poorly in the December 1993 elections.

In Russia’s inhospitable environment for political party development, NDI

and IRI were able to develop extensive relationships with party officials

and provide training and assistance. However, despite the institutes’ work,

reformist parties have been either unwilling or unable to form broad-based

coalitions or build national organizations and large segments of the

Russian public have not been receptive to their political message.

NDI and IRI officials acknowledge that the Russian environment is difficult

for political party development; however, they believe that their programs

are important for furthering Russia’s democratic development. NDI and IRI

noted that the development of a strong multiparty system has been made

more difficult by Russia’s lack of democratic traditions, the Communist

party’s 70-year hold on Russia (a far longer span than in Eastern Europe),

and the public’s general aversion to any organization characterized as a

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

“party.” While NDI and IRI officials agreed that the environment is less than

conducive to reform, they do not see this as a reason not to pursue

political party development.

In commenting on this report, USAID agreed that strengthening Russian

political parties has been difficult. It said that consequently, since 1994 it

has attempted to focus NDI’s and IRI’s programs by exclusively targeting

them on six cities each.1 USAID believes that these targeted programs are

having greater impact than earlier national efforts.

USAID officials cautioned that expectations should not be too high and that

its assistance would likely have only a minimal impact on the performance

of the democratic parties during the December 1995 parliamentary

election and the June 1996 presidential election. In early 1995, USAID

foresaw a poor electoral showing by the reformist parties in Russia in the

upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections and counseled NDI and

IRI to direct more of their resources to working with grassroots

nongovernmental organizations, thereby supporting the overall shift of the

U.S. democracy program to developing a democratic civil society.

Reformist Parties Did

Poorly in December

1993 Elections

From 1991 through 1993, NDI and IRI held multiparty seminars and

single-party consultations throughout Russia. These seminars provided

information on party organization and campaign techniques, and

participants were given training videos and reference materials on U.S.

parties and campaigns. For example, from late 1991 (with NED funding)

and through 1992 and 1993 (with AID funding), IRI conducted party

training in 19 cities from northern and western Russia to eastern Siberia.

NDI provided training for the day-to-day organizers and managers of

democratic political parties in Moscow and the regions.

Despite these efforts, the December 1993 parliamentary elections, called

just months after a violent standoff between President Yeltsin and

Parliament, proved to be a disappointment for democratic and reformist

parties.2

 In the State Duma, the lower house of the Parliament, the Liberal

Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhironovsky (which is neither liberal nor

democratic) did best with 23 percent of the popular vote, and Russia’s

1

In its response to our draft report, IRI said that its programs are targeting nine cities.

2

This conclusion and the following discussion are derived from (1) our discussions with U.S. and

Russian officials and political activists; (2) “Russian Politics: The Calm Before the Storm,” Michael

McFaul, Current History, October 1994; and (3) “Background Memo on Russian Politics,” prepared by

the International Republican Institute, June 1994.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

Choice, the liberal reformist bloc headed by former prime minister Yegor

Gaidar and nominally allied with President Yeltsin, was second with only

16 percent. In total, nationalist and Communist blocs won a plurality and

outpolled proreformist blocs by 9 percent. Although Russia’s Choice

gained the most seats of any party3

 (66 party list and single mandate

seats), reformist parties as a group won only 112 seats, not enough to

control the 450-seat State Duma.

Election observers cite a variety of reasons for the poor showing of the

reformist parties. These parties had been declining in cohesion since the

breakup of the Soviet Union in August 1991, principally because President

Yeltsin postponed calling elections for a new Russian Parliament, leaving

intact the Parliament that had been elected in 1990 during the Soviet-era.

Without elections to focus their activities, Democratic Russia and other

groups that had played such a large role in the collapse of communism

failed to take the steps necessary for transitioning from opposition

movements into political parties that could succeed at the ballot box.

Democratic groups also declined in popularity from 1991 through 1993, as

they were associated with the economic hardship being experienced.

Consequently, the successors to the Communist party of the Soviet Union,

the Communist and Agrarian Parties of Russia, staged somewhat of a

resurgence. Numerous far-right, nationalist movements, such as the

Liberal Democratic Party, also increased their organizational and popular

strength during this difficult period of economic and social transition.

According to numerous observers, the reformist parties made many

strategic and tactical errors during the December 1993 elections, thereby

compounding their weaknesses. For example, although Russia’s Choice

ran with the Democratic Russia Movement, the reformists still ran as four

separate parties or blocs, thereby splitting their votes. Also,

notwithstanding NDI’s and IRI’s efforts, these parties pursued a

Moscow-focused campaign strategy. They failed to reach out to or build

regional organizations and to present clear, convincing campaign

messages.

Reformist Parties

Remain Weak

Since the 1993 national elections, NDI and IRI have continued working with

party activists throughout the country, encouraging the formation of

coalitions and teaching organizational and campaign techniques. However,

the situation for reformist parties since the December 1993 elections has

3

The largest group of candidates elected were not affiliated with any political party. Independent

candidates won 127 seats in the State Duma.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

only marginally improved. Some of them—such as Russia’s Choice,

Yabloko, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES), all

participants in NDI and IRI programs—now recognize the need and have

taken some steps to build national organizations. However, according to

U.S. and Russian officials, these reformist parties’ organizational presence

outside of Moscow remains weak, and they did not made significant gains

in local elections that took place across Russia over the last 18 months.

They remain Moscow-centered, highly fractionalized, and separated more

by personal ambition than ideology.

NDI and IRI officials acknowledged that reformist parties have remained

weak, but they said that the institutes’ training programs since 1993 have

increased the organizational capacity of some parties. An IRI official said

that during 1994 and 1995 it trained about 3,000 party activists, many of

whom returned for advanced training. This official told us that IRI’s

approach has been to help those Russians begin to build democratic

parties up from the grass roots, the necessary ingredient for a strong

national organization. He said that Russia’s reformist parties have

persisted in their efforts to build their organizations and field candidates

despite the unpopularity of their free market message and historical

negative view of “party” (a harsh memory from the days of Communist

party control).

According to an NDI official, in 1995 NDI observed markedly different

behavior among parties with which it was working. NDI observed that the

parties were targeting communication to voters based on demographic

and geographic information from the previous elections; conducting

research on voter attitudes through focus groups and polling; contacting

voters through small meetings, coalitions with civic groups, door

knocking, and leaflets; and relying on party activists who considered party

organizing their full-time job. NDI also said that although a formal

democratic coalition had not emerged for the December 1995 elections,

there had been considerable coordination of candidates in single-member

districts. NDI attributed this coalition building to its round table

discussions on cooperation held in December 1994 and April 1995. NDI

noted that coalition members in one city pledged to nominate one joint

candidate in each single-member district for the December 1995

parliamentary elections.

Evidence, however, suggests that successful coalition building has not

taken place at the national level. For example, due to personality conflicts,

the two large pro-reform election blocs of 1993, Yabloko and Russia’s

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

Choice, had split into 11 different parties and movements by the

December 1995 parliamentary elections.

Russian and U.S.

Views on Political

Party Assistance

According to many Russian political activists and some U.S. officials,

political party training will ultimately affect the development of Russia’s

political parties only at the margins. The Russian political activists said

that viable reformist political parties may only emerge after more than a

decade, and their development will depend mostly on efforts to build a

democratic civil society. That is, even if NDI and IRI can teach reformist

parties how to campaign and organize effectively, they will only win

elections when the Russian people are receptive to a reformist, democratic

political message. U.S. officials said that the program can have an impact,

although the impact will be narrow in scope due to the size and

complexity of Russia and its politics. According to these officials, IRI and

NDI projects are not expected to significantly influence the development of

national political parties in Russia.

According to NDI and IRI, although their party development programs are

likely to affect Russia only at the margins, their services are in high

demand and they do have a visible impact on numerous individual party

officials or candidates who use their advice. Despite the difficult

environment for political party development, NDI and IRI have developed

contacts with thousands of democratic activists throughout Russia,

regularly holding seminars and consultations and providing information

and other materials. Numerous Russian officials and activists in several

cities who had participated in NDI and IRI programs praised NDI and IRI

training for increasing their knowledge of campaign techniques, bringing

reformist parties together, and encouraging people who had never

participated in politics to become political activists and candidates. They

also said that NDI and IRI written materials were an effective means of

communicating practical experience and that they wanted more, rather

than less, assistance. Among these officials and activists were leaders of

Russia’s Choice and the Social Democratic party, State Duma deputies

from reformist parties, and an official at the Kremlin responsible for

parliamentary affairs.

Nonetheless, NDI and IRI have had mixed results in getting Russians to use

their campaign techniques. Some Russian political activists cited examples

of how they could adapt certain techniques to their campaigns; for

example, one candidate told us that he followed NDI’s suggestion and

developed a political map to target his campaign literature to people most

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

likely to vote for him. Senior IRI and NDI officials stressed that their

techniques are being used in Russia. They cited as examples reformists

who won elections using local phone banks and door-to-door canvassing,

despite initial reluctance by some.

Many Russian political activists, however, told us that the training was not

always applicable to Russia. For example, they said that some U.S.

political or campaign practices such as phone banks and door-to-door

canvassing cannot be fully used or were unsuccessful in Russia because of

technological and cultural factors. An IRI official in Russia told us that he

realized some U.S.-style campaign techniques would not work in Russia

and that he was working to make IRI activities more relevant to the

Russian context.

Civic Education A number of participants in NDI’s and IRI’s political party and civic

advocacy programs indicated that to better promote democracy in Russia,

the United States should support more civic education activities. The

political party participants spoke favorably of U.S. support for sending

Russians to the United States for training but said that NDI, IRI, or other

U.S. nongovernmental organizations could work at schools or other

Russian institutions to teach Russians the principals of self-government,

the responsibilities of citizenship, and the benefits of democracy in

general. Such efforts may convince Russians to support reformist parties’

message, complementing ongoing NDI and IRI efforts to improve

organization and campaign techniques of these parties.

Further, many participants told us that NDI’s and IRI’s civic advocacy

seminars provided them with information on creating coalitions of civic

organizations and attracting people, particularly women, to social

movements that could influence government. However, they also told us

that the United States could better support civic groups by helping them

address issues of broader social concern such as crime, drugs in school,

and women’s unemployment.

According to IRI officials, the goal of IRI’s civic advocacy program is to help

these groups see the importance of being involved in the political process.

However, while IRI sponsors political events such as candidate debates or

women-in-politics seminars, it does not sponsor events on local civic

issues such as crime or drugs in school. According to IRI, an indicator of its

success in the civic advocacy area is that many of its trainees become

candidates for national and local offices. For example, following a

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

February 1994 women-in-politics seminar, four women decided to run for

the City Duma in their home town—three won.

NDI officials told us that their civic advocacy programs have promoted

coalitions among civic groups and enhanced communication between

these groups and political parties and local governments. For example, in

preparation for the December 1995 parliamentary elections, NDI conducted

programs in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinberg, and Nizhnii Novgorod

on ways that civic groups could voice their interests, such as through

sponsoring candidate forums and debates, distributing candidate

questionnaires, and providing volunteers and resources to campaigns. For

purposes of our review, however, we included these activities as political

party development. We were told by Russian political activists that many

organizations participating in these civic advocacy programs served as

political bases/organizations for local politicians who were running for

office, not as traditional civic organizations. According to one of these

activists, he decided to use civic organizations as a political base when he

saw that the Russian public has an “allergy” to any organization

characterized as a “party.”4

According to USAID officials in Moscow, civic education in schools is the

one area where the USAID democracy portfolio is lacking but such a

program would be very costly or too diffuse in a country as large as Russia

and could offend Russian nationalist sensitivities. Instead, USAID is funding

informal civic education activities through nongovernmental

organizations. For example, from June 1993 through July 1995 the Eurasia

Foundation, a USAID grantee, provided about 100 small grants to U.S. and

Russian nongovernmental organizations in the areas of legal reform,

conflict resolution, democratic institution building/civic education, and

nongovernmental organization development. In addition, USAID is

encouraging NDI and IRI to place less emphasis on their party training

programs and more on their work with civic organizations. USAID has also

started a $5.5 million project that provides funds for the institutional

development of Russian nongovernmental organizations.

NED and one of its core institutes, the Center for International Private

Enterprise, are also funding informal, and to a lesser extent formal, civic

education activities. From fiscal years 1990 through 1994, almost all of

NED’s discretionary grants funded nongovernmental organizations in the

4

NDI officials told us that their civic advocacy program included many types of civic organizations,

ranging from those that serve primarily as a political base for politicians to those that are traditional

civic organizations. However, they could not identify how much of their resources go toward

supporting traditional civic organizations.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix V 

Political Party Development

areas of human rights, civic education, public advocacy, and independent

media. For example, in 1994, NED sponsored an international conference in

Russia on civic education and financially supported the publication of

weekly articles for civics instructors in a leading Russian teachers’

newspaper. The Center for International Private Enterprise also gave a

small grant that was used to develop a civic textbook on economic and

democratic reform.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VI 

Rule of Law

U.S.-funded rule of law activities conducted under the Democratic

Pluralism Initiative1

 thus far have had a limited impact on reforming

Russia’s legal and judicial institutions and are only beginning to help build

a grassroots constituency for legal reform. Through grants to the State

Department and the American Bar Association, USAID supported Russia’s

limited reintroduction of jury trials and its first steps toward establishing

an independent judiciary.

In September 1993, USAID awarded a $12.2 million, comprehensive rule of

law contract to ARD/Checchi. This contract was designed to continue

these efforts in Russia over a 3-year period,2

 and expand them to

strengthen the laws, legal structures, and civic organizations that provide

the necessary operating framework for democratic, market-oriented

societies. Specifically, ARD/Checchi provided funds for an assessment of

Russian legal needs and used this information to develop an action plan

for USAID’s rule of law project. ARD/Checchi also designed and started to

implement activities that would support the development of Russia’s legal

institutions, and it awarded subcontracts and subgrants to

nongovernmental organizations for voter education prior to the

December 1993 elections, legal assistance for trade unions, and the

development of civic organizations. This project’s core program was not

implemented for about a year due to problems related to the process of

designing the program and poor contractor performance.

Support for Jury Trials

and an Independent

Judiciary

Two USAID funded projects contributed to incremental changes in the

Russian criminal justice system and judicial institutions from 1992 through

1994. With USAID funding, the State Department and the American Bar

Association implemented two small projects that were designed to help

increase the independence of the judiciary and support Russia’s

reintroduction of jury trials. The reintroduction of jury trials in Russia is a

major reform initiative, both substantively and symbolically. Russian legal

reformers hoped that the reintroduction of jury trials would lead to a more

open and fair adversarial courtroom procedure. Jury trials would replace

the Soviet-style system in which, according to State Department human

rights reports, criminal procedures are still weighted heavily in favor of

the prosecution, and defendants are expected to prove their innocence

rather than the prosecutors prove their guilt.

1

USAID’s project dealing with commercial law reform, the IRIs project, was not included in our review.

2

This contract includes an option for extending the contract for 2 more years at an additional cost of

$9.945 million.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VI 

Rule of Law

Beginning in May 1992, the U.S. embassy’s political office used USAID funds

to support a Russian-sponsored jury trial initiative and establish contacts

with Russian legal reformers. Under two agreements with USAID, the State

Department received $200,000 for rule-of-law activities in Russia. Using

these funds, the U.S. embassy’s political office provided funds for

seminars, including one held in 1994 at which U.S. and Russian experts

evaluated the preliminary results of the jury trial initiative and discussed

future steps in U.S.-Russian cooperation. The office also provided travel

funds for experts who would design publicity materials associated with

jury trials and the new Russian constitution.

According to USAID officials, the State Department’s small project was not

designed to be long running or sustainable. Instead, it was designed to act

as a bridge and establish contacts for a larger USAID project. USAID officials

told us that the early years of State’s project were very successful but that

the activity was no longer needed. USAID stopped funding this activity in

March 1995.

Beginning in mid-1992, the American Bar Association provided technical

assistance for Russia’s judicial restructuring and reintroduction of jury

trials. The American Bar Association operated under a 2-year regional

grant that totaled about $3.2 million, of which about $950,000 was used for

assistance to Russia. Activities included holding three training workshops,

held in Russia and Washington, D.C., that covered judicial restructuring,

constitutional reform, and jury trial advocacy for criminal defense

attorneys; providing immediate assistance in circulating and commenting

on 12 draft laws within the United States, including the draft labor code,

draft constitution, and draft law on state support of small business; giving

equipment to Russian legal institutions; hosting exchange visits between

Russian and American judges; and developing a bench book to guide

judges during jury trials.

By the end of 1994, jury trials were operating in 9 of 89 regions in Russia,3

and the government had enacted legislation intended to increase the

independence of the judiciary. However, although the former Supreme

Soviet and the present Parliament, with the active encouragement of the

President’s staff, enacted many legal reforms through 1994, both the

Russian and regional governments did not adequately fund their

implementation. As a result, the widespread reintroduction of adversarial

trials with juries was not occurring as scheduled because many court

3

In the 80 regions without jury trials, criminal cases at the district and regional court levels were tried

by a panel consisting of 1 judge and 2 lay assessors. In these 80 regions, criminal procedures were

those under the Soviet-style system.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VI 

Rule of Law

rooms had not been renovated, many judges had not received necessary

training, and funds were not available to pay for jurors’ stipends. Despite

the government’s long-term efforts to reform the judiciary, at the end of

1994 judges were just beginning to assert their independence from other

branches of government.

By September 1995, expansion of the jury trial initiative or further

improvements in the criminal justice system appeared to have minimal

support from the Russian government. According to the State

Department’s human rights report, the limited progress that Russia had

made was undercut by two decrees issued by the President of the Russian

Federation in June 1994. In his desire to combat increasing crime,

President Yeltsin signed two decrees that contradicted constitutional

rights to protection against arbitrary arrest and illegal search, seizure, and

detention.4

 Further, according to a USAID official, the Russian government

did not fund the expansion of jury trials to the planned five additional

regions. Moreover, the Russian government official that was pushing

reforms in the criminal justice system left the government in late summer

of 1995.

Limited Support Thus

Far for Other Russian

Legal Institutions

Although the ARD/Checchi contract funded many projects, its primary

focus was to strengthen core Russian legal institutions. The contract was

to include judicial training programs; law school support, including adding

commercial law courses and new substantive and procedural code

reforms into the curriculum; legal information programs; public and

professional legal education; support for the Constitutional Court; and

training for the procuracy, which in Russia includes the functions of

prosecutor, investigator, attorney general, ombudsman, and consumer

affairs. ARD/Checchi was also to have assumed primary responsibility for

supporting the reintroduction of jury trials.

Our review showed that the contractor’s efforts in these core areas had

little impact during the first year because of problems related to the

interagency approval process for the contractor’s work plan, the

complexity and enormity of the contractor’s tasks, and poor contractor

performance. ARD/Checchi took about a year to start implementing its

core legal reform activities as finally approved by the USAID mission.

ARD/Checchi required several attempts to draft an action plan that was

acceptable to USAID and the U.S. embassy interagency working group on

4

The decrees gave law enforcement authorities power to detain suspects without charge and without

access to a lawyer for 30 days, and to conduct warrantless searches and seizures.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VI 

Rule of Law

the rule of law. According to a USAID official, the interagency working

group contributed to the delay as it did not have a clear idea of what it

expected from ARD/Checchi.

ARD/Checchi’s progress was further slowed by its organizational and

personnel problems and unfamiliarity with USAID’s contract, procurement,

and program requirements. According to USAID officials, ARD/Checchi’s

assessment team did an excellent job analyzing Russia’s legal situation and

identifying key institutions and officials; however, the contractor was

ineffective in translating that information into deliverable assistance

during the first year.

The ARD/Checchi project was also hampered by limited support from the

USAID mission in Moscow, which was struggling to implement the entire

Russian assistance program and was preoccupied with the December 1993

parliamentary elections. According to USAID officials, the mission was

understaffed during the initial program phase and had little technical

expertise to manage such a complex contract. Thus, ARD/Checchi, as well

as other contractors, was largely left to its own devices to implement its

projects. USAID officials told us that during the first year, USAID was

preoccupied with assisting the Russian State Duma on commercial law

activities and trying to manage the approximately 200 contractors and

grantees starting work on USAID programs. As a result, USAID was unable to

provide effective oversight and assistance to the contractors at the start of

the projects.

A complicating factor for the rule of law program in general, and

ARD/Checchi in particular, was the need to forge working relationships

with Russia’s historically closed legal institutions. Although the U.S.

embassy’s political office had established contacts within the presidential

administration, ARD/Checchi spent most of its time during its first year

establishing contacts with other legal institutions such as the Academy of

Jurisprudence, the Supreme Commercial Court, the Procuracy Training

Institute, state law academies, leading Russian law schools, and the

Constitutional Court. ARD/Checchi officials told us that identifying the key

administrators and reformers and establishing effective working

relationships within institutions was a complex and time-consuming task.

Further, according to a USAID official, ARD/Checchi spent a good deal of

time negotiating subcontracts with organizations unfamiliar with having a

subcontractor relationship with USAID.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VI 

Rule of Law

The USAID mission in Moscow attributed the delay in developing an action

plan to (1) the preoccupation of government counterparts during the

government crisis during the fall of 1993, (2) the difficulty in designing

programs for nonreformed Russian government institutions, and (3) the

lack of experience of ARD/Checchi’s first chief of party in project

management. The USAID mission believes that the interagency approval

process did not contribute to delays in the project.

We noted a significant increase in activity under ARD/Checchi’s work plan

starting in the last quarter of 1994 through the first half of 1995. After a

change in the management of ARD/Checchi’s Moscow office management

in late 1994, ARD/Checchi began to provide training programs, equipment,

and reference materials to Russia’s core legal institutions. For example, it

provided

• training to Supreme Commercial Court senior faculty by faculty of the

National Judicial College in Nevada;

• case management and computer training, reference materials, and

equipment to the Commercial Court to meet its expanding caseload;

• training programs on bench trials and judicial ethics;

• curriculum expansion, information system modernization, and trial

advocacy workshops at Russia’s first rank law schools;

• training and computer hardware and software to the St. Petersburg State

University Law Faculty in the use of legal database and electronic mail to

promote the flow of legal information to the legal community;

• educational films for judges, jurors, and the public on jury trials and the

construction of a mock court room for the training of judges from general

jurisdiction courts; and

• training programs for senior level trainers and teaching equipment

upgrades at the Procuracy Training Institute.

In August 1994, USAID awarded the American Bar Association a

$2.5 million, 2-year grant, of which $700,000 is budgeted for its project in

Russia. Under this grant, the bar association is assisting Russian lawyers’

associations in strengthening their institutions, establishing new

associations, and developing continuing legal education programs.

It is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of ARD/Checchi’s core legal

reform efforts and the latest American Bar Association project since they

had only started in late 1994 and early 1995. However, USAID, State

Department, and Russian government officials told us that systemic

changes in Russia’s legal institutions will be a long-term process.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VI 

Rule of Law

Assistance to Civic

Organizations

ARD/Checchi’s contract also included a component designed to encourage

grassroots efforts to promote the rule of law. In early 1995, ARD/Checchi

started a $2-million small grants program, which will provide small grants

to Russian organizations and their U.S. partner organizations that are

pursuing legal reform or providing legal services. ARD/Checchi had not

awarded any small grants at the time of our fieldwork in Russia, but in

March 1995, ARD/Checchi awarded five grants (totaling $475,000) in the

areas of environmental law, community legal assistance and legal

education, tax law reform, women’s rights, and freedom of information.

Further, as part of its USAID-funded needs assessment for the rule of law

area, ARD/Checchi identified the potential and recommended the funding

for a legal assistance/workers’ rights project. In August 1994, ARD/Checchi

awarded a subcontract of about $465,000 to the Free Trade Union Institute

for this project.5

 Through this subcontract, USAID’s rule of law project has

financially supported increasingly effective efforts to address workers’

rights issues through Russia’s court system. (See app. IV for more

information on this project.)

USAID, through the Eurasia Foundation and a nongovernmental

development project, and NED have also provided grants to human rights

and other nongovernmental organizations. These grants directly and

indirectly contribute to the rule of law program by developing long term

relationships with Russian grassroots organizations that are working to

increase transparency and accountability in government and influence the

reform process by safeguarding human rights and the right to political

dissent.

5

FTUI used NED funding for limited project activities before signing the USAID subcontract.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VII 

Civil-Military Relations

U.S. assistance to strengthen civilian control of the Russian military has

included the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program

and a USAID grant to the Atlantic Council. Neither program has had much

impact, primarily because they have not affected significant numbers of

Russian decisionmakers due to a lack of interest by the Russian

government.

U.S. embassy officials told us that the Russian military, rather than

civilians, has retained firm control of its sphere of operations. One official

said that the Russian Parliament has limited detailed knowledge of the

military budget and has to rely on the intelligence services to learn

information of military activities. Similarly, uniformed officials are

predominant at the Russian Ministry of Defense. The U.S. embassy

officials said that political circumstances in Russia make the

implementation of a U.S. civil-military program in Russia very difficult.

Some quarters of the government are generally reluctant to accept

Western assistance and suspect that civil-military assistance is designed to

further weaken Russia militarily. Additionally, the need for deep cuts in

defense spending renders the process of greater civilian control in the

Ministry of Defense more complex, as significant hiring of civilian

employees is unlikely, especially in light of large numbers of unemployed

military personnel.

IMET Program In June 1992, the Department of Defense (DOD) began implementing an

IMET program in Russia, a program which is jointly managed by the State

Department and DOD.

1

 The IMET program is a world wide grant training

program that, among other objectives, seeks to promote military rapport

between the United States and foreign countries and promote better

understanding of the United States, including its people, political system,

and institutions. In Russia, the program aims to foster a stable, cooperative

relationship between U.S. and Russian armed forces and provide expertise

to guide the military’s transition under a democratically elected

government. Under the Expanded-IMET component, the program also seeks

1

The Secretary of State is responsible for the program’s general direction, recommends funding levels

for congressional approval, and allocates approved funds to each country. The Secretary of Defense is

responsible for planning and implementing the program, including administration and monitoring,

within established funding levels.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VII 

Civil-Military Relations

to promote civilian control of the military and democratic orientation of

the military along Western lines.2

Funding for the IMET program in Russia has grown from $153,000 in fiscal

year 1992 to $471,000 in fiscal year 1994. According to a DOD official, about

one-third of the total for these years was spent on Expanded IMET courses.

From 1992 through 1994, according to information provided by the U.S.

embassy, the IMET program for Russia brought 18 mid- and senior-level

military officers from the Ministry of Defense and 19 civilian officials,

primarily from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the United States for

education, training, and observation tours.3

 The military officers generally

attended mid- and senior-level military colleges or participated in

observation tours, and all but one civilian official attended defense

resource management courses in Monterey, California.

According to U.S. embassy and DOD officials, Russia’s Ministry of Defense

has not fully used the IMET program since 1993, sending few military

officers to the United States for training in 1994. The ministry generally

will not allow any Russian officer to study at a given location alone, which

limits Russia’s participation at U.S. military colleges. According to a DOD

official, the Secretary of Defense recently encouraged the Russian Minister

of Defense to increase Russia’s military participation in the IMET program,

but the Russian government has not responded to this encouragement.

According to an IMET program document, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

has shown much greater support for the IMET program. However,

according to a U.S. embassy official who manages the program, the

ministry thus far appears to have nominated civilian candidates who are

chiefly mid-level bureaucrats and not likely to advance to positions of

authority.

An embassy official told us that it is too early to determine whether the

IMET program is successful and that the embassy views the program as a

long-term effort that may not yield results for 10 to 20 years. In

commenting on this report, the State Department stated that there has not

been enough time to track the careers of civilians who participated in the

2

The IMET program provides instruction and training in military skills and U.S. military doctrine to

foreign military and related civilian personnel on a grant basis. The Expanded-IMET component offers

courses in such areas as defense resource management, military justice, civil-military cooperation, and

human rights.

3

According to DOD, the numbers of IMET participants provided by the Defense Security Assistance

Agency and published in the annual Congressional Presentation Document are gathered indirectly and

may vary somewhat from the numbers provided by the embassy. DOD said that the embassy provides

the more accurate participant count.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VII 

Civil-Military Relations

expanded IMET program, and DOD also emphasized that the IMET program is

a long-term effort. DOD said that the IMET program has not had sufficient

time to make an impact. We agree with DOD that the IMET program is a

long-term effort; however, we assessed the progress that had been made in

identifying and selecting promising officers who are likely to rise to

positions of prominence. We found that the major factor inhibiting this

process was the unwillingness of the Russian government to fully use the

IMET program.

Atlantic Council

Program Limited

The Atlantic Council received a 2-year $626,500 grant from USAID in 1992

for a civil-military relations project.4

 The project’s goal was to encourage

the integration of the Russian military establishment into society, opening

it up to greater supervision from, and closer working relationships with,

democratically elected civilian leadership of the executive and legislative

branches and with the press and public at large. The council intended to

conduct a series of training seminars in both Russia and the United States.

According to a USAID-funded evaluation, the program suffered delays from

the outset and failed to fulfill its planned activities due to poor planning,

lack of in-country staff to process potential participants, tight timelines,

and an underestimation of Russian political sensitivities.

During the first year of the grant, the council conducted a 2-day seminar in

Russia on the U.S. defense budget process. In the second year, the council

sponsored or cosponsored four seminars in Russia, including (1) a

journalism seminar on covering defense issues in a democratic society,

which was cosponsored with the Russian-American Press and Information

Center and attended by journalists from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus and

(2) seminars on national security decision-making, civil-military relations,

and the Partnership for Peace program for Russian government officials.

4

This project covered Russia and the Ukraine.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of State

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix VIII 

Comments From the Department of State

See p. 9.

See p. 9.

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IX 

Comments From the Defense Security

Assistance Agency

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix IX 

Comments From the Defense Security

Assistance Agency

Now on p. 8.

See p. 8.

Now on p. 8.

Now on p. 51.

See p. 8.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix X 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix X 

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated December 7,

1995.

GAO’s Comment 1. The agency’s suggested technical corrections have been incorporated in

the report where appropriate.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XI 

Comments From the United States

Information Agency

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XI 

Comments From the United States

Information Agency

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XI 

Comments From the United States

Information Agency

The following are GAO’s comments on USIA’s letter dated December 6, 1995.

GAO’s Comments 1. The agency had not provided these figures as of February 14, 1996.

2. As stated in our draft report, we did not review the effectiveness of

democracy-related USIA and USAID exchange and visitor programs due to

the difficult and time-consuming task of locating individual program

participants.

3. Our report presents the cost and results of this project.

4. USIA’s Bureau of Broadcasting was outside the scope of our review.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XII 

Comments From the National Endowment

for Democracy

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XII 

Comments From the National Endowment

for Democracy

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XII 

Comments From the National Endowment

for Democracy

The following are GAO’s comments on NED’s letter dated November 28,

1995.

GAO’s Comments 1. The primary focus of the center’s projects was to promote privatization

and market reform, two areas outside the scope of our review.

2. Technical corrections and wording changes offered by NED were

incorporated in the report text where appropriate.

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIII 

Comments From the International

Republican Institute

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIII 

Comments From the International

Republican Institute

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIII 

Comments From the International

Republican Institute

See comment 4.

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIII 

Comments From the International

Republican Institute

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIII 

Comments From the International

Republican Institute

The following are GAO’s comments on IRI’s letter dated November 22, 1995.

GAO’s Comments 1. We visited seven cities in Russia, including two of IRI’s target cities 

(St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk). In Moscow and other cities, we met with

political activists who had attended programs in other IRI target cities as

well.

2. IRI examples have been incorporated into the report. However, while

IRI’s efforts may have helped some candidates win in local elections, its

project thus far has been unsuccessful at its primary objective of

developing reformist political parties. In contesting the 1995 parliamentary

elections, the reformist parties again failed to form either a national

coalition or national party structures.

3. IRI examples have been incorporated into the report. At best, however,

IRI has had mixed results in getting Russians to use its campaign

techniques.

4. We have deleted from our report the discussion on IRI’s efforts to make

its program sustainable.

5. During our discussion with CEC officials, including the Vice Chairman,

they did not mention IRI’s observer report as making a significant

contribution to improving Russia’s election law.

6. We have modified the report to reflect IRI’s interpretation that its

program will have an impact at the margins.

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

See comment 5.

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

See comment 6.

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

See comment 9.

See comment 10.

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

See comment 11.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

The following are GAO’s comments on NDI’s letter dated November 27, 1995.

GAO’s Comments 1. The report has been modified based on updated USAID financial

information.

2. The draft report stated that the $200,000 was for election monitoring and

sending Russian party leaders to the United States for training.

3. NDI examples have been incorporated into the report. At best, however,

NDI has had mixed results in getting Russians to use its campaign

techniques.

4. Despite these coordination efforts, the evidence obtained during our

review suggests that successful coalition building had not taken place at

the national level. For example, due to personality conflicts, two of the

largest proreform political parties, Yabloko and Russia’s Choice, had split

into 11 different parties and movements by the December 1995

parliamentary elections.

5. The result of this training, when measured against performance of

democratic reformist parties during the 1995 parliamentary elections, must

be considered a major disappointment. Reformist political parties neither

formed a national coalition or a national party structure. In addition,

reformist parties apparently did not benefit from NDI’s training. For

example, the Democratic Choice of Russia—the leading proreform party

in the 1993 election and an NDI client—failed to reach the 5 percent

threshold for gaining party representation in the Parliament and the 1993

election in the State Duma.

6. Many organizations participating in the civic advocacy programs

actually serve as a political base/organization for local politicians who are

running for office, rather than as traditional civic organizations. Thus, we

continue to view these programs as political party development.

7. While interest in political party training continues to exist, the

effectiveness of such training in the current political environment is

questionable. Many Russian political activists took the longer term view

that civic education would make a more important contribution to

promoting democracy in Russia.

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XIV 

Comments From the National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

8. Although the outcome of elections should not be held as the sole

indicator, it is one indicator to assess the impact of political party

development assistance. Unless parties are successful at increasing

political representation, they are unlikely to attract the necessary financial

and public support to grow and prosper.

9. In measuring party development, we believe it is appropriate to

emphasize party performance over individual candidate performance.

Moreover, in the December 1995 parliamentary elections, the performance

of reformist parties at both the party and individual level was again

disappointing.

10. We have modified the report to reflect NDI’s interpretation that its

program will have an impact “on the margins.”

11. We have deleted from our report the discussion on NDI’s efforts to

make its program sustainable.

Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Appendix XV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Louis H. Zanardi

Judith A. McCloskey

Patrick A. Dickriede

Todd M. Appel

Jose M. Pena, III

(711129) Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-96-40 Promoting Democracy
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100