The 

4th Armored 

Division in the 

Encirclement of 

Nancy 

by 

Dr. Christopher R. GabeE 

April 1986 
FOREWORD 

In 1944, the 4th Armored Division played a central role in 

one of the more remarkable campaigns in American military 

history-Third Army’s pursuit across France, which was capped 

off by the encirclement and capture of Nancy. In the course of 

this campaign, the 4th Armored Division practiced a mode of 

warfare that has since become known to the Army as AirLand 

Battle. Inasmuch as the encirclement of Nancy is one of the 

few historical examples that shows American mechanized forces 

waging war in accordance with the tenets of AirLand Battle, 

anyone seeking a deeper appreciation of today’s doctrine would 

do well to study this campaign carefully. 

The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy 

originated at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College as an introductory class for a course on modern divisionlevel operations. It is a companion piece to The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September--December 1944, published in 

February 1985. 

d 

LOUIS D, F. FRASCHR 

Colon& Infantry 

Director, Combat Studies Institute 

CSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed 

in this CSI publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. 
r 

bY 

Dr. Christopher R. Gabe I 

April 1986 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Gabel, Christopher R. (Christopher Richard}, 1954 - 

The 4th Armored Division in the encirclement of Nancy. 

“April 1986,” 

Bibliography: p. 

1. World War, 1939-1945 - Campaigns- France - Nancy 

Region. 2. United States. Army. Armored Division, 

4th - History. 3. Nancy Region (France) -History. 

1. Title. II. Title: Fourth Armored Division in the 

encirclement of Nancy. 

D762.N28G33 1986 94oS4’12’73 88-6om7 
FIGURES 

1. W.S. armored division, 1944 ........................... 1 

2. Armored division attachments ........................ 3 

3. Task organization, CGA, 28 August 1944 ............. 4 

MAPS 

1. 4th Armored Division’s pursuit across France, 

August1944 . ..~.................................... 7 

2. The closing of the Lorraine gateway . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

3. XII Corps’ plan to enveIop Nancy (modified) . . . s . . . . . 11 

4. 4th Armored Division’s encirclement of Nancy, 

11-14 September 1944 . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 13 

5. Consolidation of Nancy, E-17 September 1944 , . *. . . 17 

6. German counterattacks, M-25 September 1944 . . .“. . . . 20 

7. 4th Armored Division’s static defense, 

26-29 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . I.. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 

8. 4th Armored Division’s operations, 

lo-29 September 1944 . ..l.........,...,........I... 24 

. . . 

111 

----- 
The Lorraine campaign of 1944 was the most costly and 

least productive of the U.S. Third Army’s World War II campaigns. Although the protracted conflict in Lorraine was indecisive, a number of instructive division-level operations took place 

during the fighting. One was the encirclement of Nancy conducted by the 4th Armored Division in September 1944. In one 

month, the 4th concluded an exhilarating pursuit across central 

France, crossed a major river, performed a classic armored penetration, and consolidated its gains with a skillful active defense. 

During that one month, the 4th Armored Division vividly illustrated many lessons of division-level combined arms warfare 

that still apply today. 

As it was configured in 1944, the 4th Armored Division was 

a relatively light, but powerful, formation (see figure 1). Fourteen of the U.S. Army’s sixteen armored divisions, including the 

4th, each had an aggregate strength of just under 11,000 officers 

and enlisted men, 263 tanks, and 54 artillery pieces. The division’s major fighting elements were its three tank battalions, 

three battalions of armored infantry, and three battalions of 

armored field artillery. 

CCA ccs CCR 

I ASLT 

Figure 1. U.S. armored division, 1944 

Each tank battalion within the armored division consisted 

of one company equipped with M-5 Stuart light tanks and three 

companies with M-4 Sherman medium tanks. Both the light and 

medium tanks were fully developed, proven designs with good 
2 

mobility and a favorable power-to-weight ratio and were especially prized for their mechanical reliability. However, the general 

purpose 75mm guns carried by most M-4s and the antiquated 

37-mm pieces mounted on the Mbs were outclassed by the highvelocity 75-mm and 88-mm guns found on the German tanks of 

the day. Nonetheless, through superior teamwork and tactical 

mobility that allowed the Shermans to fire at the flanks and 

rear of the German tanks from close range, the 4th Armored 

Division established a favorable kill ratio over German armor. 

The division’s three field artillery battalions each possessed 

three firing batteries armed with the M-7 self-propelled 105mm 

howitzer. Even though the M-7 was a hastily improvised design 

that carried inadequate armor, it was a highly effective weapon 

that combined two superb subsystems: the famous 10Bmm howitzer and the rugged chassis of the versatile Sherman tank. 

Three rifle companies armed with semiautomatic and automatic weapons made up each of the armored division”s three 

infantry battalions. All the infantry rode to battle in M-3 halftracks, but 1944 doctrine insisted that the riflemen dismount to 

fight. This was undoubtedly wise, for the half-track carried only 

minimal armor. 

Other major elements of the armored division were its mechanized cavalry squadron armed with light tanks and d armored 

cars, an engineer battalion, and the division trains. In addition, 

units from corps and army pools were usually attached to the 

armored division on a semipermanent basis (see figure 2). For 

the 4th Armored Division, these generally included a tank destroyer battalion armed with M-189 (76-mm self-propelled guns), 

an antiaircraft artillery battalion, a battalion of 155mm howitzers, three quartermaster truck companies, a quartermaster gasoIine supply company, and an engineer treadway bridge company. Above and beyond these elements drawn from corps and 

army pools, the 4th Armored Division occasionally borrowed one 

or more infantry battalions from adjacent infantry divisions. 

This was because the three organic armored infantry battalions 

were often inadequate for the armored division’s needs. 

The commanding general of the 1944 armored division exercised command and control over the fighting battalions through 

three task force headquarters designated Combat Command A 

(CCA), Combat Command B (CCB), and Reserve Command. 

These commands possessed no organic fighting troops of their 

own but were allotted the combat and service support assets re 

quired to accomplish their individual missions. The CCA and 
TRDY BR 

TRK 

Figure 2. Armored division attachments 

C&3 headquarters each had about twelve officers and eighty 

enlisted men, enough to provide full staff functions for the combat command. In keeping with its intended role as a nontactical 

reserve, the Reserve Command had only three officers and five 

enlisted men. However, in some cases, an armored division commander would upgrade his Reserve Command to a status coequal to a combat command by assigning additional headquarters personnel to it. The 4th Armored Division, however, 

did not do so and, in battle, rarely employed its Reserve Command on independent missions. 

Unlike some other armored divisions, the 4th never assigned 

elements to the combat commands on a fixed basis, preferring 

instead to retain a high degree of flexibility in its task organization (see figure 3). Typically, however, a combat command 

might consist of one troop from the cavalry reconnaissance 

squadron, one or two armored field artillery battalions supplemented with additional 155-mm howitzers, an antiaircraft artillery battery, a tank destroyer company, an engineer company, 

and combat command trains. These forces would be further subdivided among two or three battalion-sized columns or task 

forces, each including tanks, infantry, and artillery and each 

controlling its own maintenance and supply services. Thus, the 

4th Armored Division’s technique of task, organization emphasized flexibility and provided for the close integration of the 

arms and services at the company, troop, and battery level. 

_. _ --- 

- - 
4 

CCA 0 4 

TF 

ABRAMS ( 

I 

MEDIUM 

Figure 3. Task organization, CCA, 28 August 1944 

The doctrine under which the 4th Armored Division operated 

in 1944 cast a rather specific mission for armored forces. According to the 1944 version of FM 17-100, Armored Command 

Field Manual, The Armored Division: 

The armored division is organized primarily to perform missions 

that require great mobility and firepower. It is given decisive missions. 

It is capable of engaging in most forms of combat but its primary role 

is in offensive operations against hostile rear areas.1 

,..,............~.............~.........................l 

The most profitable role of the armored division is exploitation . . . 2 

To the 4th Armored Division, these doctrinal tenets were 

deepIy engrained articles of faith. It is no exaggeration to say 

that the 4th had a distinct personality characterized by aggressiveness and teamwork. As a group, the division believed that 

the 4th’s proper place was deep in the enemy rear. One tank 

commander, long accustomed to operating behind German lines, 

remarked, “They’ve got us surrounded again, the poor bastardsY3 

To the 4th Armored Division, the primary tank weapon was 

t.he machine gun, which became the weapon of choice when the 

division engaged in aggressive exploitation and pursuit. 

The personality of the 4th Armored Division was a true reflection of its commander’s character. Major General John S. 
5 

Wood took over the division in 1942 and trained it for two years 

before he led it into battle, This unusually long association between commander and unit fostered a high degree of rapport 

within the division and assured a continuity of effort from 

training to combat. 

Wood was known to his contemporaries as “P” Wood, the 

“P” standing for “Professor.” The distinguished British military 

analyst Basil H. Liddell Hart once referred to “IX’ Wood as 

‘“the Rommel of the American armored forces.“* Like the legendary German field marshal, Wood’s superiors ad to restrain 

him rather than prod him into action. He preferred to bewilder 

his opponent through the “‘indirect approach” rather than to 

bludgeon him with brute force. Wood habitually commanded 

from the front, as did Rommel, utilizing a light liaison aircraft 

to personally channel mission-type orders from corps headquarters directly to his far-flung, fast-moving columns. Wood 

justified his frequent and prolonged absences from division headquarters by saying, “If you can’t see it happen, it’s too late to 

hear about it back in a rear area and meet it with proper force.,,j 

Wood was an aggressive commander who always strove to 

knock the enemy off-balance through daring, violent action and 

then keep him off-balance with unrelenting pressure in unexpected areas. He did not, however, expend the lives of his men 

freely. Wood never forgot that his soldiers were sons, brothers, 

and fathers of loved ones back home, and he weighed every 

tactical decision on the grounds that the lives of his soldiers 

were an investment that demanded an appropriate military 

return. 

During his long tenure as division commander, Wood was 

able to staff his division with many like-minded officers. Foremost among these were his two combat commanders, Colonel 

Bruce C. Clarke and Brigadier General HoImes E. Dager. A 

younger officer cast in the “P’, Wood mold was the division’s 

premier tank battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Creigbton 

W. Abrams. 

Major General Wood was close in temperament and military 

philosophy to his army commander, Lieutenant General George 

S. Patton Jr. In fact, the bead of the tactical air command that 

supported Third Army once noted that Wood frequently “outPattoned” Patton. However, in the chain of command between 

Wood and Patton stood the commander of the XII Corps, Major 

General Manton S. Eddy, who was a wholly different type. Eddy 
6 

had earned the right to command the XII Corps with solid performances at the head of the 9th Infantry Division in North 

Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. By background and temperament, 

he was methodical and thorough rather than flashy and daring. 

Eddy did not mix well with Patton and Wood, nor did the officers of the 4th Armored Division hold him in high regard. Wood 

openly criticized Eddy’s methodical style, and he believed that 

Eddy’s overcautious methods resulted in lost opportunities that 

could only be redeemed later through unnecessarily hard 

fighting. 

Wood’s disagreements with Eddy eventually had serious re 

percussions, but the 4th Armored Division began its combat career so positively that such disagreements were easily forgotten. 

The division landed in France thirty-six days after D-day and 

was quickly earmarked to participate in Operation Cobra, the 

U.S. First Army’s attempt to break out of the Normandy beachhead. On 28 July, after a carpet bombardment and an infantry 

attack had created a gap in the German lines near Saint-M, 

the 4th and three other armored divisions broke through. “‘It 

was like old home week at Fort Knox,” wrote the division p,ublic 

relations officer.6 With the 4th Armored Division leading the 

newly activated Third Army into Brittany and then eastward 

into the heart of France, the breakout became a pursuit (see 

map 1). 

During the ensuing drive across Franee, Wood pushed his 

division hard and never gave the Germans an opportunity to 

forge a new defensive line. The 4th operated in two combat commands, each of which was divided into two to four task forces. 

In keeping with the fluidity of the situation, Wood reconfigured 

the combat commands about every three days. Frequently, task 

forces were formed, and mission-type orders were issued over 

the radio. Wood dispensed with phase lines, zones of advance, 

and secure flanks as the 4th drove deep into France. 

A German defender unfortunate enough to find himself in 

the path of the 4th Armored Division in August 1944 first had 

to deal with the fighter-bombers of the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), which maintained constant patrols in advance of 

Wood’s armored columns. Army Air Force liaison officers riding 

in the lead tanks called out targets for the fighter-bombers and 

kept the ground troops informed as to what lay ahead of the 

column. The 4th Armored Division reciprocated for this close 

cooperation by making every effort to rescue downed pilots and 

by sharing “liberated” booty with the XIX TAC. 
LEGENQ 

---- ALLIED FRONT LINE. 24 JULY 

LUU ALLIED FRONT LINE, 1 SEPTEMBER 

0 190 MILES 

SCAI F 

-.I 

Map 1. 4th Armored Division’s pursuit across France, August 1944 
8 

Behind the fighter-bombers came the division’s light liaison 

aircraft, from which the combat commanders guided their columns around obstacles and strongpoints. Medium tanks usually 

led the columns, because experience had shown that the medium 

tanks could generally cut through any resistance encountered. 

Self-propelled artillery placed well forward in the column and 

ready to fire at the first sign of a target engaged any defenders 

too strongly emplaced for the medium tanks to dislodge. Engineers also accompanied the leading elements to remove obstacles. The 4th learned to travel the secondary roads, because the 

Germans tended to concentrate their obstacles and ambushes 

along the main highways. 

The month-long pursuit demonstrated that the major logistical problem in a war of movement was fuel supply. Ammunition 

expenditures and battle casualties were relatively low, and a 

week’s worth of rations could be carried on the combat vehicles 

themselves. Supply trucks were overloaded by 50 percent or more 

to keep up with the demand for gasoline. Clearly, the safest 

place for the combat command trains to travel during the pursuit was right behind the combat elements in the ‘%acuum” 

created by the tanks, infantry, artillery, and aircraft. Wood also 

took medical and maintenance detachments out of the division 

trains and added them to the combat command trains so these 

services were immediately available to the leading elements 

The 4th Armored Division capped off a pursuit of some 700 

miles with a crossing of the Meuse River on 31 August in typical “P” Wood fashion (see map 2). Light tanks from CCA raced 

into the town of Commercy and seized its bridge intact before 

the startled defenders could detonate the charges emplaced on 

the span or even remove the canvas covers from the breeches 

of their antitank guns. 

Unfortunately, the 4th Armored Division’s arrival on the 

borders of the Lorraine province coincided with the onset of a 

theaterwide gasoline shortage. Dry gas tanks halted the division 

with the German frontier only seventy air miles away. Although 

disappointed at being stopped in midstride, Major General Wood 

had every reason to be proud of his command. For an entire 

month, the 4th Armored Division had waged a campaign that 

suited its doctrine, training, and personality to perfection. From 

the time of the Cobra breakout to the crossing of the Meuse, 

the division tanks ran over 1,000 miles on their tracks, and the 

overburdened supply vehicles that had kept the advance going 
Map 2. The closing of the Lorraine gateway 
10 

logged 3,666 miles. During the pursuit, the 4th sent 11,000 prisoners to the rear, while losing only 1,100 total casualties itself. 

Major General Wood hoped to carry the pursuit into Germany as soon as gasoline again became available. The division’s cavalry squadron, running on gasoline siphoned from the 

rest of the division’s vehicles, reported that the Lorraine gateway was still open. Only five days passed between the crossing 

of the Meuse and the resumption of the advance, but that was 

enough time for the Germans to bar the way. The Germans 

sent two depleted but still dangerous mechanized infantry divisions, the 3d and 15th Panzergrenadier, from Italy to Lorraine, 

where they assumed positions along the Moselle River on either 

side of Nancy. The 553d Volksgrenadier Division, reinforced by 

a regiment drawn from German air force personnel, secured the 

city itself. Moreover, the German High Command reactivated 

the Fifth Panzer Army’s headquarters for the express purpose 

of attacking Third Army in its open southern fi’ank. 

On 5 September, with gasoline once more flowing into Third 

Army’s fuel! tanks, Patton ordered Eddy’s XLI Corps to seize 

Nancy with the 80th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions in 

preparation for an expIoitation to the Rhine River. Eddy, in 

turn, instructed the 4th Armored Division to hurdle the MoselIe 

with the same type of surprise attack that had carried it across 

the Meuse. For once, it was “P” Wood who argued against the 

audacious course of action and suggested instead a more methodical operation. He recognized that the Moselle, though only 150 

feet wide and 6 to 8 feet deep, was a formidable obstacle. He 

also understood the difference between snatching an intact bridge 

on the dead run and forcing a river crossing against an enemy 

who had had a week to take defensive measures, Wood’s misgivings were borne out when the 3d Panzergrenadier Division 

handily repulsed a crossing of the Moselle mounted by the 86th 

Infantry Division on 5 September. 

Having been repelled north of the city, Eddy decided to 

make the area south of Nancy the corps’ main effort (see map 

3). He ordered the 35th Infantry Division and 4th Armored Division to envelop Nancy from the south, because German resistance would be weaker there than in the north. Wood again 

objected to the corps’ plan. He pointed out that the Moselle River 

was the only natural: obstacle to contend with north of Nancy, 

whereas in the south, the 4th Armored Divi;sion wauld have to 

cross as many as seven tributaries and canals to gain the rear 
Map 3. XII Corps’ plan to enveiap Nancy (modified) 
12 

of Nancy. Therefore, Wood directed his staff to prepare an alternate plan that showed the entire division crossing north of the 

city. 

Wood’s objections led Eddy to modify the corps’ plan once 

more. The 35th Division and the bulk of the 4th Armored Division would still make the main effort south of Nancy, but the 

80th Division would also attempt another crossing north of the 

city. CCA of the 4th Armored Division would stand by in corps 

reserve, ready to ‘exploit an opportunity on either wing. This 

loophole eventually enabled Wood to carry out the operation 

north of Nancy that he preferred. 

On 11 September, the XII Corps crossed the Moselle River 

(see map 4). Against stiff opposition from the 15th Panzergrenadier Division, the 35th Division established an infantry 

bridgehead south of Nancy. CCB, leading the 4th Armored Division’s main effort, chose not to wait for heavy bridges to be 

constructed. Instead, the lead tanks improvised a crossing of 

the drained canal flanking the Moselle, forded the river, and 

established contact with the 35th Division while engineers constructed bridges behind them. 

Defending the sector were elements of the 553d Volksgrenadier and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions. A battalion-sized battle 

group sent to counterattack the CCB bridgehead was trapped 

and wiped out. Advancing in two columns, CCB located gaps 

between the overextended German forces and rapidly exploited 

them. Poor roads, rather than German resistance, praved to be 

the main impediment to CCB’s drive toward the rear of Nancy. 

Three days after crossing the Moselle, CCB crossed the Meurthe 

River and approached the Marne-Rhin Canal, which was held 

in some force. The 4th Armored Division’s forward command 

post, the Reserve Command, and the division trains followed 

CCB. German resistance and the depletion of the division’s 

bridging equipment delayed CCB’s crossing of the canal for two 

days, but Major General Wood had no intention of losing the 

initiative. For all practical purposes, Wood had already shifted 

the division’s main effort to CCA, north of Nancy. 

CCA, under Colonel Clarke, consisted of D Traop of the divhsion reconnaissance squadron, a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion, an infantry battalion borrowed from the 80th 

Division, three artillery battalions, and a reinforced engineer battalion. Clarke originally planned to cross the Moselle on his 

own, but when the 80th Division secured a bridgehead at Dieulouard on 12 September, one day after CCB crossed the river 
Y n YP 

Map 4. 4th Armored Division’s encirclement of Nancy, 1 I-14 September 1944 

I . . 
14 

farther south, Wood quickly ordered CCA to use the infantry 

crossing. D Troop was the first CCA unit to reach the bridges 

late that night, but a corps control officer would not allow the 

cavalry to cross until all friendly artillery could be notified that 

American armor was entering the bridgehead. 

The 80th Division had employed a careful deception and 

concealment plan to mount its successful crossing of the Moselle, 

but the Germans were not deceived for long. At 0100 on 13 

September, the 3d Panzergrenadier Division hit the Dieulouard 

bridgehead with a strong counterattack, causing the corps control officer to reconsider his decision to hold back the cavalry. 

When German infantry and assault guns had pressed to within 

rifle range of the bridges, the control officer finally sent D 

Troop across the Moselle. The cavalry’s light tanks broke up 

the counterattack and drove forward until fire from the German 

assault guns halted them. 

By daylight on 13 September, it was not at all clear that 

CCA should use the threatened Dieulouard bridgehead after all. 

The commanders of the XII Corps, 80th Division, 4th Armored 

Division, CCA, and 37th Tank Battalion convened near the 

bridges to arrive at a course of action. When the generals couId 

not reach a decision, Colonel Clarke asked Lieutenant Colonel 

Abrams what he thought CCA should do. Pointing to the far 

shore, Abrams said, “That is the shortest way home.“’ “Get 

going!” ordered Clarke.7 Under heavy German shelling, Abrams’ 

tanks led CCA across the Moselle at 0800 on 13 September. 

CCA did not enter the Dieulouard bridgehead to defend it. 

Clarke’s mission was to execute a deep attack, with the objective 

for the day being Chateau-Salins, some twenty miles distant. A 

tank-heavy task force led the way, followed by an infantryheavy task force. A third task force, consisting of engineers, 

the borrowed infantry battalion, and the combat command trains 

laden with supplies for seven days, brought up the rear. It took 

more than five hours for the combat elements to cross the 

Moselle bridges, by which time the leading tanks had shouldered 

aside the Germans containing the north face of the bridgehead. 

CCA drove north through the gap thus created and then swung 

east toward Chateau-Salins. D Troop of the cavalry squadron 

moved out to cover the left flank, and a company of light tanks 

was detached to protect the right. CCA picked up speed as the 

battle for the bridgehead was left behind. As the advance accelerated, Clarke exercised command and control from a liaison 
15 

aircraft flying overhead. The frontage of the main column was 

twenty-two feet-the width of the pavement on the Chateau-Salins 

highway. 

CGA met little opposition as it knifed into the German rear 

areas. Road blocks, tank detachments, and antiaircraft emplacements were quickly knocked out by the guns of the lead tanks 

or the self-propelled artillery traveling near the head of the column. At one point, Abrams’ tanks literally collided with an unsuspecting German infantry force marching along the road in 

formation. The Shermans roared straight through the German 

column, blazing away with every gun as the enemy infantry 

scrambled for cover. 

The head of the CCA column reached high ground west of 

Ch&eau-Salins at 1700 and established a 360-degree defensive 

perimeter. Combat elements closed on the bivouac throughout 

the night. The combat command trains, which had bivouacked 

separately, arrived the next morning (14 September) and replenished the fighting forces. CCA’s thrust to Chateau-Salins represented a penetration of twenty miles and had so far yielded 

354 prisoners taken and 12 German tanks, 35 vehicles, and 5 

guns destroyed. CCA’s losses on 13 September were twelve dead 

and sixteen wounded. 

The obvious course of action for CCA to pursue on 14 September was to capture Chateau-Salins, a road center of some 

importance. However, Chateau-Salins was a rather large town, 

and the volume of artillery fire coming from its vicinity indicated that it was held in force. More important, Major General 

Wood, who was in radio communication with Clarke, recognized 

that CGA had broken cleanly through the Germans defending 

the Moselle. In today’s terminology, CCA had penetrated to 

operational depth. Wood responded accordingly by directing CCA 

to exploit weakness rather than attack strength. Over the radio, 

he ordered Colonel Clarke to bypass Chateau-Salins and drive 

south to the vicinity of Arracourt, cutting the German kines of 

communication to Nancy in the process. From Arracourt, CCA 

was to link up with CCB, which had reached the Marne-Rhin 

Canal that same day. In effect, CCA would be dropping its communications with Dieulouard, passing behind the enemy elements defending Nancy, and reestablishmg lines of communication with the 4th Armored Division near Arracourt. 

CCA began its raid on the afternoon of 14 September. Once 

more, Colonel Clarke boarded his liaison aircraft and directed 
16 

his columns along the undefended side roads. The ground was 

firm, the countryside rolling and open, the roadnet good, and 

German opposition minimal. CGA overran rear echelon and reserve troops who believed that the Americans were still safely 

contained at Dieulouard. In one encounter, a CCA task force 

overtook and dispersed a column of the 15th Panzergrenadier 

Division that was marching to oppose CCB. The day’s advance 

netted a further 400 prisoners and cost the Germans 26 armored 

vehicles, 136 other vehicles, and 10 88-mm guns. CCA sustained 

a total of thirty-three casualties and lost two medium tanks. 

At 1900, CCA began drawing into a perimeter defense 

around Arracourt. Clarke instructed his artillery to fire all night 

into every crossroad and town within range, which served to 

harass any Germans attempting to undertake countermeasures 

and to confuse the enemy as to CCA’s location and intentions. 

In addition, Clarke sent out patrols to the south as far as the 

Marne-Rhin Canal, where they encountered reconnaissance elements from CCB. 

On the morning of 15 September, CCA fanned out to begin 

a four-day campaign of destruction behind German lines (see 

map 5). Clarke sent raiding parties to the limits of artillery 

range and pressed his reconnaissance troop even farther to the 

east, Armored infantry outposted the main roads and captured 

large numbers of the German troops falling back from Nancy. 

CCA sent a battalion-sized task force to help CCB cross the 

Marne-Rhin Canal on 16 September, reuniting the division. Only 

the Reserve Command at Luneville remained on the south bank 

of the canal. 

WA’s raids and ambushes around Arracourt resulted in the 

capture of another 1,000 German troops and the destruction or 

capture of 8 tanks, 16 large-caliber guns, and 232 vehicles. CCA 

lost only three killed, fifteen wounded, and four tanks destroyed. 

More important, CCA’s raid across the 553d Vdksgrenadier Division’s rear prompted the 553d to withdraw from Nancy, allowing 

the 35th Division to occupy the city on 15 September against 

little opposition. 

To the officers of the 4th Armored Division, there was no 

question as to the reunited division’s next move. The obvious 

path of action was to exploit the advantage immediately and 

keep the enemy on the run. The road to Germany was open. 

Colonel Clarke, for example, proposed an immediate advance to 

Sarrebourg as soon as he reached Arraeourt. The Germans 
SCALE 

s 
18 

feared just such a move, for they had no reserves with which 

to block an armored advance eastward from Arracourt. 

Major General Eddy, the corps commander, believed otherwise. He rejected Clarke’s proposed Sarrebourg operation because 

Sarrebourg lay outside the corps’ zone, which swung northeast, 

not east, from Nancy. Moreover, the XII Corps had made no 

provisions to support a continued armored advance. The two 

XII Corps infantry divisions were not available for a drive to 

the east, because the Germans at Nancy and Dieulouard had 

not collapsed and fled when the 4th Armored Division cut behind them. In fact, the 3d Panzer-grenadier Division was reinforced in its attacks against the 80th Division in the Dieulouard 

bridgehead, effectively cutting the route that CGA had taken to 

Chateau-Salins. And when the 553d Volksgrenadier Division 

withdrew from Nancy, it simply fell back to the readily defended 

high ground northeast of the city and dug in. Finally, even 

Major General Wood had to admit that the volume of supplies 

reaching the 4th Armored Division was not sufficient to sustain 

a full-scale armored exploitation. 

Instead of launching the 4th Armored Division on a renewal 

of the great pursuit, Eddy diverted this weapon of exploitation 

to assist the infantry in consolidating the ground around Nancy. 

No sooner had CCA reached Arracourt than Eddy ordered 

Clarke to relinquish the infantry battalion borrowed from the 

80th Division, and on 17 September, Eddy directed CC& to pass 

behind CCA and relieve some of the pressure on the Dieulouard 

bridgehead. CCB encountered a fully prepared enemy near 

Chateau-Salins on ground that CCA had easily occupied four 

days earlier. The 35th Division, the only infantry formation that 

might have supported an armored exploitation, was sent instead 

to clear the high ground northeast of Nancy. 

Major General Eddy expected that the XII Corps would be 

able to resume its general offensive on 18 September, with the 

4th Armored Division and the 35th Division attacking in eolumn. Bad weather forced a postponement until 19 Septemberfive days after CCA had reached Arraeourt. In fact, the attack 

was never launched, for the Arracourt springboard had become 

an endangered salient. The XII Corps and the 4th Armored Division had lost the initiative. 

Major General Eddy’s decision to consolidate before pressing 

on toward Germany may have strengthened the XL1 Corps’ foothold across the Moselle, but it also proved to be a godsend to 
19 

the Germans. As CCB had already discovered, the German First 

Army utilized the time to concentrate reserves around ChateauSalins, thus blocking one of the principal avenues to the east. 

In an even more ominous development, the Fifth Panzer Army 

began assembling forces for a major counteroffensive against 

the XII Corps’ right flank. When General Basso von Manteuffel 

took command of the Fifth Panzer Army on II September, his 

force consisted of a headquarters and no troops, but while Eddy 

paused to consolidate, Manteuffel acquired two panzer corps 

headquarters, the badly depleted but battlewise 11th Panzer Division, and the 111 th and 113th Panzer Brigades. The panzer division boasted a wealth of experience but had virtually no tanks, 

whereas the panzer brigades possessed the newest tanks and 

fresh crews but had undergone little unit training, as evidenced 

by their lack of tactical skill (see map 6). 

General Manteuffel’s orders were to roll up Third Army’s 

right flank with a massive counterblow; however, the 4th Armored Division’s sudden thrust to Arracourt forced the Germans 

into a series of premature, piecemeal attacks strung out over 

twelve days. The first of these, mounted by the 111th Panzer 

Brigade, fell on the 4th Armored Division’s Reserve Command 

and the XII Corps’ reconnaissance group at Luneville on 18 

September. It took reinforcements from both the 4th and 6th 

Armored Divisions to drive the attackers off. Wood and Eddy, 

believing the Luneville engagement to be only a local counterattack, proceeded with their plans for the next day’s corps offensive, Reports of increased German activity throughout the night 

of 18-19 September, however, forced them to delay their attack. 

In reality, the Fifth Panzer Army had simply bypassed Luneville and was moving north to strike at CCA’s exposed position 

around Arracourt. The battle that resulted was one of the largest 

armored engagements ever fought on the Western Front. 

CCA held Arracourt with an extended tank-infantry-engineer 

outpost Iine supported by tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery. 

At 0800 on 19 September, company-sized elements of the 113th 

Panzer Brigade penetrated the outposts on the east and south 

faces of CCA’s salient. Two tank destroyer platoons and a medium tank company engaged the panzers in a running fight that 

extended into the vicinity of CCA’s headquarters, where a battalion of self-propelled 105mm howitzers took the panzers under 

point-blank fire. The Germans discovered that the fog, which 

gave them tactical surprise and protected them from U.S. aircraft, worked to their disadvantage by negating the superior 
SCALE *. 

Map‘6. German counterattacks, 18-25 September 1944 
21 

range of their tank guns. As the fighting surged back and forth 

through the fog, CGA’s tanks and tank destroyers utilized their 

mobility to outmaneuver and ambush the larger panzers. By 

early afternoon, the German attack had stalled, and the inadequately trained panzer brigade lacked the ability to restart it. 

At that juncture, Colonel Clarke unleashed two medium tank 

companies on a sweep that took the panzers in flank and rear 

and drove the survivors back to their starting point. According 

to the Germans, the panzer assault of 19 September cost them 

fifty precious tanks and accomplished nothing. 

From 20 to 25 September, the Fifth Panzer Army fed the 

111th Panzer Brigade and the understrength 11th Panzer Division into a series of attacks against the Arracourt position. 

Each assault followed the pattern set on 19 September. The panzers attacked under the cover of morning fog, only to be disorganized by CCA’s mobile defense and driven off by armored 

counterattacks in company or battalion strength. Major General 

Wood reinforced CCA with additional tank, infantry, and cavalry elements, and whenever the weather permitted, aircraft of 

the XIX TAC added to the collection of smoking panzer hulks. 

On 24 September, the pattern of the Arracourt battle 

changed. The action shifted north to Ch&teau-Salins where the 

559th Vdksgrenadier Division of the German First Army nearly 

overwhelmed CCB until U.S. fighter-bombers routed the attackers. The next day, Third Army received orders to suspend 

all offensive operations and to consolidate gains. In compliance 

with corps orders, the 4th Armored Division reverted Lo a positional defense on 26 September (see map 7). CCA withdrew five 

miles to more defensible ground, and CCB, relieved at Ch&teauSalins by the 35th Division, linked with CCA’s right. The Fifth 

Panzer Army, by now down to twenty-five tanks, pressed its 

attacks unsuccessfully for three more days until clearing weather 

and increased American air activity forced the Germans to suspend their faltering counteroffensive altogether. 

In the defensive actions fought around Arracourt, the 4th 

Armored Division claimed 281 German tanks destroyed, 3,000 

Germans killed, and another 3,000 taken prisoner. The 4th sustained only 626 casualties in all, but the pressure of two continuous months in combat gradually rendered the division ineffective. Combat fatigue and noncombat casualties mounted alarmingly as the weather deteriorated and individuals surpassed the 

limits of their endurance. Also, weapons and equipment were 
“P’ ,/’ 

0 5 10 MILES 

SCALE / 

/ 

Nlap 7. 4th Armored Division’s static defense, 26-29 September 1944 
23 

wearing out. Finally, on 12 October, the division was pulled out 

of the line for a month of rest and refitting. 

When the 4th Armored Division reentered the battle in 

November, the Lorraine campaign had devolved into a brutal 

war of attrition mired down in mud and bloodshed. A brilliant 

episode in the annals of the 4th Armored Division had come to 

an end. 

From the perspective of the 198Os, an analysis of the 4th 

Armored Division’s operations around Nancy inevitably suggests 

that AirLand Battle doctrine is not really a new concept at all 

(see map 8). Rather, a strong case can be made for the assertion 

that Major General “P” Wood practiced AirLand Rattle in 1944. 

Consider, for example, a comparison between the 4th Armored 

Division’s operations and the tenets of AirLand Battle as listed 

in the 1982 version of FM 100-5, Operations: initiative, depth, 

agility, and synchronization. 

Initiative was clearly a quality that both Wood and his division possessed in abundance. Wood and his subordinates were 

continually urging the higher commanders to exploit opportunities-they saw the possibilities, not the obstacles. An example 

of this was the enthusiasm with which small units passed over 

the Moselle and then drove deep behind German lines with a 

minimum of detailed supervision. Wood’s ability to control the 

division with fragmentary orders and general guidance indicated 

the faith he placed in the initiative of his subordinates. 

The 4th Armored Division certainly waged war in depth. 

As a unit, the 4th shared the belief that its proper function 

was to raise havoc behind enemy lines. CGA’s classic deep attack from Dieulouard to Arracourt scattered German reserves, 

overran depots, and severed lines of communication while incurring a minimum of friendly casualties. The machine guns on 

CGA’s rampaging tanks did as much to pry the Germans out 

of Nancy as did a frontal attack mounted by an entire infantry 

division and supported by corps artillery. 

The 4th Armored Division demonstrated both physical and 

mental agility. Physical agility meant maintaining an offensive 

pace that precluded effective enemy countermeasures. It also 

meant never willingly standing still to be counterattacked. When 

on the defensive at Arracourt, the 4th showed agility by avoiding 

set battles, wresting the initiative from the attacker through 

mobile small-unit actions, and then counterattacking in force to 
Map 8. 4th Armored Division’s operations, lo-29 September 1944 

. . ,. ._ ^ 
25 

drive him back. The smoothness with which the division reconfigured its combat commands and task forces was another sign 

of physical agility. 

The 4th Armored Division was mentally agile as well. To 

Major General Wood, plans and orders were simply the foundation on which operations could be shaped while they were in 

progress. Witness the flexibility with which Wood shifted CGA 

to the Dieulouard crossing site and then converted its breakthrough into a deep attack to interdict German lines of communication at Arracourt. Such mental agility robbed the enemy of 

his options and forced the Germans into premature countermeasures. 

Synchronization was also a hallmark of 4th Armored Division operations. Intensive emphasis on combined arms during 

training led to the closest of coordination in battle among the 

arms and services at the company and battalion level. This 

highly effective teamwork extended to the division’s close relationship with the XIX Tactical Air Command. Timely, violent 

execution by all elements was a byword to the 4th Armored 

Division philosophy, as was the exploitation of the shock that 

such synchronization creates. 

Thus, the 4th Armored Division clearly anticipated today’s 

AirLand Battle tenets and, in September 1944, provided a practical, small-scale demonstration of deep battle and operational 

maneuver. This is not to suggest that “P” Wood simply ran the 

4th according to a set of principles of war. Rather, Wood demonstrated the validity of an idea expressed in 1898 by a renowned 

British historian: “The rules of war only point out the dangers 

which are incurred by breaking them.“8 

Certainly, it is not the intent of this study to portray the 

encirclement of Nancy as a flawless operation. There was, for 

example, a distinct absence of synchronization within the XII 

Corps. Eddy’s failure to translate 4th Armored Division’s advantage into a decisive victory indicates clearly that a deep attack 

conducted without follow-on forces to consolidate gains leads 

only to a limited victory at best. Operational maneuver is a 

corps and army concern, even when it is spearheaded by a single division. 

The poor synchronization that plagued the XII Corps in Lorraine was actually due in part to the 4th Armored Division itself. Consider the occasions when corps and division commanders worked at cross-purposes. One such instance arose when 
26 

Eddy wanted to envelop Nancy from the south, but Wood managed to have CCA conduct the northern envelopment that he 

had preferred all along. Another instance came when the 4th 

Armored Division planned an exploitation east from Arracourt, 

even though the corps’ objectives lay to the northeast, not to 

the east. Finally, Wood expected Eddy’s infantry divisions to 

support a continuation of the 4th Armored Division’s advance, 

whereas Eddy chose instead to send armored elements back to 

help the infantry consolidate gains. Hindsight suggests that 

Wood was more often correct than Eddy in such confrontations, 

but a fundamental q &ion remains unresolved: at what point 

should the initiative of the division commander give way to the 

corps commander’s intent? Major General Wood’s growing exasperation with Eddy, aggravated by his physical and mental fatigue, eventually led to Wood’s relief from division command on 

3 December. 

The 4th Armored Division, however, never lost the “P” Wood 

flair. Throughout the rest of the war, Wood’s aggressiveness, 

initiative, and flexibility continued to distinguish the division’s 

operations, In its accustomed place at the head of Third Army, 

the 4th Armored Division went on from Lorraine to break the 

siege of Bastogne, crack the Westwall, and cross the Rhine 

River. In March 1945, the division finally took its version of 

the blitzkrieg into Germany itself, 

The exploits of the 4th Armored Division in World War II 

earned it a Presidential Unit Citation. With forgivable hyperbole, Lieutenant General Patton once remarked that the achievements of the 4th were “unequalled in the history of warfare.“9 

It is perhaps ironic that the soldiers of the 4th Armored Division never chose an official motto for their unit. As Major General John S. Wood once said of his men, “‘They shall be known 

by their deeds alone.“l” 
27 

NOTES 

1. U.S. War Department, FM 17-100, Armored Command Field Manual, The 

Armored Division (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 

2. 

2. Ibid., 68. 

3. Kenneth Koyen, The Fourth Armored Division from the Beach to Bavaria 

(Munich, Germany: Herder-Druck, 1946), 13. 

4. Hanson W. Baldwin, Tiger Jack [a biography of John S. Wood] (Fort 

Collins, CO, 1979), 18. 

5. Ibid., 27. 

6. Koyen, Fourth Armored Division, 15. 

7. Hugh Fvl. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, U.S. Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. 

Army, 1950), 86. 

8. George F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War 

(reprint; Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1968), 516. 

9. Baldwin, Tiger Jack, 132. 

IO. Richard W. Smith and I?] Pelz, Shoulder Sleeve Insignia of the U.S. Armed 

Forces, 1941-1945 (N.p., 1981), 73. 

88-2203-12102-2 June 1988 
- Dr. Christopher R. G&e1 - 

Dr. Christopher R. Gabel is an associate 

professcrr at the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We received his 

bachelor’s degree at The Pennsylvania State 

University and earned M.A. and Ph.D. degrees 

in history at The Ohio State University. Nis 

graduate studies focused on the doctrine of the 

U.S. Army in the interwar and World War II 

periods. He is the author of a CSI special 

study, The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, 

September-December I944 (February 1985) and 

Leavenworth Paper No. 12, Seek, Strike, and 

Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in 

World War II (September 1985). 

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Missions 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 19’79 as a department-level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions: 

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of 

the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active 

Army and Reserve Components. 

2. Prepare and present instruct.ion in military history at USACGSC and assist 

other USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction. 

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent 

for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program 

of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system. 
U.S. Army cbnmand and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas