Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Airland, 

Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST 

Wednesday, March 16, 2005 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Future Combat Systems 

Challenges and Prospects 

for Success 

Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director, 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

GAO-05-442T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-442T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul Francis at 

(202) 512-2811 or francisp@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-442T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Airland, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate 

March 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Future Combat Systems Challenges and 

Prospects for Success 

In its unprecedented complexity, FCS confronts the Army with significant 

technical and managerial challenges in its requirements, development, 

finance, and management. Technical challenges include the need for FCS 

vehicles to be smaller, weigh less, and be as lethal and survivable as current 

vehicles, which requires (1) a network to collect and deliver vast amounts of 

intelligence and communications information and (2) individual systems, 

such as manned ground vehicles, that are as complex as fighter aircraft. Its 

cost will be very high: its first increment—enough to equip about one-third 

of the force—will cost over $108 billion, with annual funding requests 

running from $3 billion to $9 billion per year. The program’s pace and 

complexity also pose significant management challenges. The Army is using 

a Lead System Integrator to manage FCS and is using a contracting 

instrument—Other Transaction Agreement—that allows for more flexible 

negotiation of roles, responsibilities, and rights with the integrator. 

FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within 

budgeted resources. Currently, about 91⁄2 years is allowed from development 

start to production decision. DOD typically needs this period of time to 

develop a single advanced system, yet FCS is far greater in scope. The 

program’s level of knowledge is far below that suggested by best practices or 

DOD policy: Nearly 2 years after program launch and with $4.6 billion 

invested, requirements are not firm and only 1 of over 50 technologies is 

mature. As planned, the program will attain the level of knowledge in 2008 

that it should have had in 2003. But things are not going as planned. Progress 

in critical areas—such as the network, software, and requirements—has in 

fact been slower, and FCS is therefore likely to encounter problems late in 

development, when they are very costly to correct. Given the scope of the 

program, the impact of cost growth could be dire. 

To make FCS an effective acquisition program, different approaches must be 

considered, including (1) setting the first stage of the program to 

demonstrate a worthwhile military capability, mature technology, and firm 

requirements; and (2) bundling its other capabilities into advanced 

technology demonstrations until they can be put into a future stage, which 

will provide guidance for decisions on requirements, lower the cost of 

development, and make for more reasonable cost and schedule estimates for 

future stages. 

FCS is the core of Army efforts to 

create a lighter, more agile and 

capable force: a $108 billion 

investment to provide a new 

generation of 18 manned and 

unmanned ground vehicles, air 

vehicles, sensors, and munitions 

linked by an information network. 

Although system development and 

demonstration began in May 2003, 

the program was restructured in 

July 2004, including processes to 

make FCS capabilities available to 

current forces. 

GAO has been asked to assess 

(1) FCS technical and managerial 

challenges; (2) prospects for 

delivering FCS within cost and 

scheduled objectives; and 

(3) options for proceeding. 
Page 1 GAO-05-442T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Army’s 

Future Combat Systems (FCS), a networked family of weapons and other 

systems. FCS is the centerpiece of the Army’s plan to transform to a 

lighter, more agile, and more capable force. It consists of an information 

network linking a new generation of 18 manned and unmanned ground 

vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions. FCS began system 

development and demonstration in May 2003. In July 2004, the Army 

announced a major restructuring of the program, including plans for 

transitioning FCS capabilities to current forces. Total costs of the 

restructured program have not yet been estimated but will be at least $108 

billion, in fiscal year 2005 dollars. The fiscal year 2005 budget provides 

$2.8 billion in research and development funds for FCS; the fiscal year 

2006 budget requests an increase to $3.4 billion. 

Today, I would like to discuss (1) the technical and managerial challenges 

of the FCS program; (2) the prospects for delivering FCS capabilities 

within cost and scheduled objectives; and (3) considerations on how to 

proceed. 

The FCS program faces significant challenges in setting requirements, 

developing systems, financing development, and managing the effort. The 

Army has set the bar for requirements very high. FCS vehicles are to be a 

fraction of the weight of current vehicles, yet are to be as lethal and 

survivable. Their light weight and small size are critical to meeting the 

other Army goal: more mobile forces that are easier to sustain in combat. 

For FCS-equipped units to see and hit the enemy first, rather than to rely 

on heavy armor to survive, the Army must develop (1) a network to 

collect, process, and deliver vast amounts of intelligence and 

communications information and (2) individual systems, such as manned 

ground vehicles, that have been likened in complexity to fighter aircraft. 

FCS is a development of unprecedented complexity for the Army. From a 

financial standpoint, the first increment of FCS—enough to equip about 

1/3 of the force—will cost at least $108 billion. Funding requests will run 

from over $3 billion per year to about $9 billion per year at a time when 

the Army faces the competing demands of sustaining current operations, 

recapitalizing the current force, and paying for modularization. Finally, 

because of the management challenge the program’s pace and complexity 

pose, the Army has turned to a Lead System Integrator to manage the 

entire effort and is making use of a contracting instrument known as Other 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-05-442T 

Transaction Agreement, which allows the parties to negotiate contract 

terms based on the program requirements and their needs. 

As restructured, the FCS strategy includes 4 additional years to reduce 

risk, increase the demonstration of FCS capabilities, and harvest 

successes for the current force. Even with these improvements, the FCS is 

still at significant risk for not delivering planned capability within 

budgeted resources. This risk stems from the scope of the program’s 

technical challenges and the low level of knowledge demonstrated at this 

point. The current schedule allows about 91⁄2 years from development start 

to the production decision. FCS is developing multiple systems and a 

network within a period of time that DOD typically needs to develop a 

single advanced system. The FCS has demonstrated a level of knowledge 

far below that suggested by best practices or DOD policy. Nearly 2 years 

after program launch and about $4.6 billion invested to date, requirements 

are not firm and only 1 of over 50 technologies are mature—activities that 

should have been done before the start of system development and 

demonstration. If everything goes as planned, the program will attain the 

level of knowledge in 2008 that it should have had before it started in 2003. 

But things are not going as planned. Progress in critical areas, such as the 

network, software, and requirements has been slower than planned. 

Proceeding with such low levels of knowledge makes it likely that FCS 

will encounter problems late in development, when they are costly to 

correct. The relatively immature state of program knowledge at this point 

provides an insufficient basis for making a good cost estimate. 

Independent estimates should provide more information but are not yet 

completed. If the cost estimate for FCS is no more accurate than 

traditional estimates, the impact of cost growth could be substantial, given 

the program’s magnitude. 

At this point, the FCS provides a concept that has been laid out in some 

detail, an architecture or framework for integrating individual capabilities, 

and an investment strategy for how to acquire those capabilities. It is not 

yet a good fit as an acquisition program. If FCS-like capabilities are to be 

made acquirable—for which the Army has made a compelling case—then 

different approaches for FCS warrant consideration because they offer 

building higher levels of knowledge and thus lower risk. One approach, in 

keeping with DOD acquisition policy and best practices, would be to set 

the first spiral as the program of record for system development and 

demonstration. To make such a spiral executable, it should meet the 

standards of providing a worthwhile military capability, having mature 

technology, and having firm requirements. Other capabilities currently in 

the FCS program could be taken out of system development and 
Page 3 GAO-05-442T 

demonstration and instead be bundled into advanced technology 

demonstrations that could develop and experiment with advanced 

technologies in the more conducive environment of science and 

technology until they are ready to be put into a future spiral. Advancing 

technologies in this way will enable knowledge to guide decisions on 

requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more 

reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future spirals. 

A decade after the cold war ended, the Army recognized that its combat 

force was not well suited to perform the operations it faces today and is 

likely to face in the future. The Army’s heavy forces had the necessary 

firepower but required extensive support and too much time to deploy. Its 

light forces could deploy rapidly but lacked firepower. To address this 

mismatch, the Army decided to radically transform itself into a new 

“Future Force.” 

The Army expects the Future Force to be organized, manned, equipped, 

and trained for prompt and sustained land combat. This translates into a 

force that is responsive, technologically advanced, and versatile. These 

qualities are intended to ensure the Future Force’s long-term dominance 

over evolving, sophisticated threats. The Future Force is to be offensively 

oriented and will employ revolutionary operational concepts, enabled by 

new technology. This force is to fight very differently than the Army has in 

the past, using easily transportable lightweight vehicles, rather than 

traditional heavily armored vehicles. The Army envisions a new way of 

fighting that depends on networking the force, which involves linking 

people, platforms, weapons, and sensors seamlessly together. 

The Army has determined that it needs more agile forces. Agile forces 

would possess the ability to seamlessly and quickly transition among 

various types of operations, from support operations to warfighting and 

back again. They would adapt faster than the enemy, thereby denying it 

the initiative. Agile forces would allow commanders of small units the 

authority and high quality information to act quickly to respond to 

dynamic situations. 

To be successful, therefore, the transformation must include more than 

new weapons. It must be extensive, encompassing tactics and doctrine as 

well as the very culture and organization of the Army. 

Background 

Army Transformation and 

the FCS Concept 
Page 4 GAO-05-442T 

FCS will provide the majority of weapons and sensor platforms that 

composes the new brigade-like modular units of the Future Force known 

as Units of Action. Each unit is to be a rapidly deployable fighting 

organization about the size of a current Army brigade but with the combat 

power and lethality of the current larger division. The Army also expects 

FCS-equipped units of action to provide significant warfighting capabilities 

to the overall joint force. The Army is reorganizing its current forces into 

modular, brigade-based units akin to units of action. 

FCS is a family of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, 

sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an information network. 

These include, among other things, eight new ground vehicles to replace 

current vehicles such as tanks, infantry carriers and self-propelled 

howitzers, four different unmanned aerial vehicles, several unmanned 

ground vehicles, and attack missiles that can be positioned in a box-like 

structure. 

The FCS Solution 
Page 5 GAO-05-442T 

Figure 1: FCS Increment 1 

The manned ground vehicles are to be a fraction of the weight of current 

weapons such as the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle, yet are to 

be as lethal and survivable. At a fundamental level, the FCS concept is 

replacing mass with superior information; that is, to see and hit the enemy 

first, rather than to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. 

Source: U.S. Army.

Use or disclosure of data contained on the page is subject to restrictions on title page 1

FCS System-of-Systems (SoS)

Manned Systems Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Non-Line 

of Sight Cannon

FCS Recovery and 

Maintenance

Vehicle Medical 

Treatment

Vehicle

Surveillance Vehicle

Infantry Carrier

Vehicle

Mounted

Combat System

Unmanned Ground Vehicles

Command and

Control Vehicle

Unattended Munitions

Non-Line of

Sight Mortar

Medical

Evacuation

Vehicle

AS OF 14FEB05

Recon and

Class III Class I Class II 

Class IV 

ARV-A (L)

(Manpackable) UGV

MULE

(Countermine)

MULE

(Transport)

Unattended 

Ground 

Sensors

Armed Robotic 

Vehicle (ARV)

NLOS LS

ARV RSTA

ARV Aslt

Intelligent 

Munitions

Systems

Small 
Page 6 GAO-05-442T 

The essence of the FCS concept itself—to provide the lethality and 

survivability of the current heavy force with the sustainability and 

responsiveness of a force that weighs a fraction as much—has the intrinsic 

attraction of doing more with less. The FCS concept has a number of 

progressive features, that demonstrate the Army’s desire to be proactive in 

its approach to preparing for potential future conflicts and its willingness 

to break with tradition in developing an appropriate response to the 

changing scope of modern warfare. If successful, the program will 

leverage individual capabilities of weapons and platforms and will 

facilitate interoperability and open system designs. This is a significant 

improvement over the traditional approach of building superior individual 

weapons that must be netted together after the fact. Also, the system-ofsystems network and weapons could give managers the flexibility to make 

best value tradeoffs across traditional program lines. This transformation 

of the Army, in terms of both operations and equipment, is under way with 

the full cooperation of the Army warfighter community. In fact, the 

development and acquisition of FCS is being accomplished using a 

collaborative relationship between the developer (program manager), the 

contractor, and the warfighter community. 

The FCS program was approved to start system development and 

demonstration in May 2003. On July 21, 2004, the Army announced its 

plans to restructure the program. The restructuring responded to direction 

from the Army Chief of Staff and addresses risks and other issues 

identified by external analyses. Its objectives include: 

• Spinning off ripe FCS capabilities to current force units; 

• Meeting Congressional language for fielding the Non-Line of Sight Cannon; 

• Retaining the system-of-systems focus and fielding all 18 systems; 

• Increasing the overall schedule by 4 years; and 

• Developing a dedicated evaluation unit to demonstrate FCS capabilities 

The program restructuring contained several features that reduce risk—

adding 4 additional years to develop and mature the manned ground 

vehicles, adding demonstrations and experimentation, and establishing an 

evaluation unit to demonstrate FCS capabilities. The program 

restructuring also adds scope to the program by reintroducing four 

deferred systems, adding four discrete spirals of FCS capabilities to the 

current force, and accelerating the development of the network. About 

$6.1 billion was added to the system development and demonstration 

contract and the Army has recently announced that the detailed revision of 

the contract has been completed. 

FCS Program Has Been 

Restructured During the Last 

Year 
Page 7 GAO-05-442T 

To develop the information on whether the FCS program was following a 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy and the current status of that 

strategy, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of 

Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training 

and Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; 

the Program Manager for the Unit of Action (previously known as Future 

Combat Systems); the Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator; 

and LSI One Team contractors. We reviewed, among other documents, the 

Future Combat Systems’ Operational Requirements Document, the 

Acquisition Strategy Report, the Baseline Cost Report, the Critical 

Technology Assessment and Technology Risk Mitigation Plans, and the 

Integrated Master Schedule. We attended the FCS Management Quarterly 

Reviews, In-Process Reviews, and Board of Directors Reviews. 

In our assessment of the FCS, we used the knowledge-based acquisition 

practices drawn from our large body of past work as well as DOD’s 

acquisition policy and the experiences of other programs. We discussed 

the issues presented in this statement with officials from the Army and the 

Secretary of Defense, and made several changes as a result. We performed 

our review from May 2004 to March 2005 in accordance with generally 

accepted auditing standards. 

The FCS program faces significant challenges in setting requirements, 

developing systems, financing development, and managing the effort. It is 

the largest and most complex acquisition ever attempted by the Army. 

The Army wants the FCS-equipped unit of action to be as lethal and 

survivable as the current heavy force, but to be significantly more 

responsive and sustainable. For the unit of action to be lethal, it must have 

the capability to address the combat situation, set conditions, maneuver to 

positions of advantage, and engage enemy formations at longer ranges and 

with greater precision than the current force. To provide this level of 

lethality and reduce the risk of detection, FCS must provide high singleshot weapon effectiveness. To be as survivable as the current heavy force, 

the unit of action must find and kill the enemy before being seen and 

identified. The individual FCS systems will also rely on a layered system of 

protection involving several technologies that lowers the chances of a 

Objectives, Scope, 

and Methodology 

The FCS Program Is 

An Unprecedented 

Challenge 

The Requirements 

Challenge 
Page 8 GAO-05-442T 

vehicle or other system being seen and hit by the enemy. To be responsive, 

the unit of action must be able to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world 

and be rapidly transportable by various means—particularly by the C-130 

aircraft—and ready to fight upon arrival. To facilitate rapid 

transportability on the battlefield, FCS vehicles are to match the weight 

and size constraints of the C-130 aircraft. The unit of action is to be 

capable of sustaining itself for periods of 3 to 7 days, depending on the 

level of conflict—necessitating a small logistics footprint. This requires 

subsystems with high reliability and low maintenance, reduced demand 

for fuel and water, highly effective weapons, and fuel-efficient engines. 

Meeting all these requirements is unprecedented not only because of the 

difficulty each represents individually, but because the solution for one 

requirement may work against another requirement. For example, 

solutions for lethality could increase vehicle weight and size. Solutions for 

survivability could increase complexity and lower reliability. It is the 

performance of the information network that is the linchpin for meeting 

the other requirements. It is the quality and speed of the information that 

will enable the lethality and survivability of smaller vehicles. It is smaller 

vehicles that enable responsiveness and sustainability. 

In the Army’s own words, the FCS is “the greatest technology and 

integration challenge the Army has ever undertaken.” The Army intends to 

concurrently develop a complex, system-of-systems–an extensive 

information network and 18 major weapon systems. The sheer scope of 

the technological leap required for the FCS involves many elements. For 

example: 

• A first-of-a-kind network will have to be developed that will entail 

development of unprecedented capabilities—on-the-move 

communications, high-speed data transmission, dramatically increased 

bandwidth, and simultaneous voice, data and video; 

• The design and integration of 18 major weapon systems or platforms has 

to be done simultaneously and within strict size and weight limitations; 

• At least 53 technologies that are considered critical to achieving FCS’ 

critical performance capabilities will need to be matured and integrated 

into the system-of-systems; 

• Synchronizing the development, demonstration, and production of as 

many as 157 complementary systems with the FCS content and schedule. 

The Development 

Challenge 
Page 9 GAO-05-442T 

This will also involve developing about 100 network interfaces so the FCS 

can be interoperable with other Army and joint forces; and 

• At least an estimated 34 million lines of software code will need to be 

generated (about double that of the Joint Strike Fighter, which had been 

the largest defense undertaking in terms of software to be developed). 

Based on the restructured program, the FCS program office initially 

estimated that FCS will require $28.0 billion for research and development 

and around $79.9 billion for the procurement of 15 units of action. The 

total program cost is expected to be at least $107.9 billion. These are fiscal 

year 2005 dollars. Since this estimate, the Army has released an updated 

research and development cost estimate of $30.3 billion in then-year 

dollars. An updated procurement estimate is not yet available. The Army is 

continuing to refine these cost estimates. As estimated, the FCS will 

command a significant share of the Army’s acquisition budget, particularly 

that of ground combat vehicles, for the foreseeable future. In fiscal year 

2006, the FCS budget request of $3.4 billion accounts for 65 percent of the 

Army’s proposed spending on programs in system development and 

demonstration and 35 percent of that expected for all research, 

development, test and evaluation activities. 

As the FCS begins to command large budgets, it will compete with other 

major financial demands. Current military operations, such as in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, require continued funding. Since September 2001, 

DOD has needed over $240 billion in supplemental appropriations to 

support the global war on terrorism. Current operations are also causing 

faster wear on existing weapons, which will need refurbishment or 

replacement sooner than planned. The equipment used by the current 

force, such as Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, is expected to 

remain in the active inventory until at least 2030. The cost to upgrade and 

maintain this equipment over that length of time has not been estimated 

but could be substantial. Also, the cost of converting current forces to new 

modular, brigade-based units is expected to be at least $48 billion. Further, 

FCS is part of a significant surge in the demand for new weapons. Just 4 

years ago, the top 5 weapon systems cost about $280 billion; today, in the 

same base year dollars, the top 5 weapon systems cost about $521 billion. 

If megasystems like FCS are estimated and managed with traditional 

margins of error, the financial consequences are huge, especially in light of 

a constrained discretionary budget. 

The Financial Challenge 
Page 10 GAO-05-442T 

The Army has employed a management approach that centers on a Lead 

System Integrator (LSI) and a non-standard contracting instrument, known 

as an Other Transaction Agreement (OTA). The Army advised us that it did 

not believe it had the resources or flexibility to use its traditional 

acquisition process to field a program as complex as FCS under the 

aggressive timeline established by the then-Army Chief of Staff. 

Although there is no complete consensus on the definition of LSI, those we 

are aware of appear to be prime contractors with increased program 

management responsibilities. These responsibilities have included greater 

involvement in requirements development, design and source selection of 

major system and subsystem subcontractors. The government also has 

used the LSI approach on programs that require system-of-systems 

integration. 

The Army selected Boeing as the LSI for the FCS system development and 

demonstration phase in May 2003. The Army and Boeing established a 

One-Team management approach with several first tier subcontractors to 

execute the program. According to the Army, Boeing has awarded 20 of 24 

first tier subcontracts, to 17 different subcontractors. The One-Team 

members and their responsibilities are depicted in table 1. 

The Management 

Challenge 
Page 11 GAO-05-442T 

Table 1: One-Team Members 

One-Team Member Responsibility 

Army Program Oversight and Insight 

Boeing/SAIC Program Management (including source 

selection), Development of System-ofSystems Common Operating Environment, 

System Integration 

General Dynamics Land Systems Manned Ground Vehicles 

General Dynamics C4 Systems Planning and Preparation Services, Sensor 

Data Management 

General Dynamics Robotics Systems Autonomous Navigation System 

General Dynamics Advanced Information 

Systems 

Integrated Computers 

United Defense, LP Manned Ground Vehicles, Armed Robotic 

Vehicle 

iRobot Corporation Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control Multifunction Utility/Logistics and 

Equipment Vehicle 

Lockheed Martin, Orincon Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance Sensor Fusion 

Austin Information Systems Situational Understanding 

BAE Systems CNI Ground Platform Communication 

BAE Systems IESI Air Platform Communication 

Computer Sciences Corporation Training Support 

Dynamics Research Corporation Training Support 

Honeywell Defense and Space Electronic 

Systems 

Platform Soldier Mission Readiness 

System 

Northrop Grumman Air Sensor Integrator, Class IV Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle, Logistics Decision Support 

Systems, Network Management, Training 

Support 

Raytheon Network Centric Systems Battle Command and Mission Execution, 

Ground Sensor Integrator 

Textron Systems Unattended Ground Sensors, Tactical and 

Urban Sensors 

Source: U.S. Army 

Boeing was awarded the LSI role under an OTA which is not subject to the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Consequently, when using an OTA, 

DOD contracting officials have considerable flexibility to negotiate the 

agreement terms and conditions. This flexibility requires DOD to use good 

business sense and to incorporate appropriate safeguards to protect the 
Page 12 GAO-05-442T 

government’s interests. The OTA used for FCS includes several FAR or 

Defense FAR Supplement clauses, many of which flow down to 

subcontracts. The value of the agreement between the Army and Boeing is 

approximately $21 billion. It is a cost reimbursement contract. 

Congress has incrementally expanded the use and scope of other 

transaction authority since first authorizing its use more than a decade 

ago. In 1989, Congress gave DOD, acting through the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency, authority to temporarily use other transactions 

for basic, applied, and advanced research projects. In 1991, Congress 

made this authority permanent and extended it to the military 

departments. In 1993, Congress enacted Section 845 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, which provided DARPA 

with authority to use, for a 3-year period, other transactions to carry out 

prototype projects directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems 

proposed to be acquired or developed by DOD. Subsequent amendments 

have extended this authority to the military departments and other defense 

agencies. Most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2004 extended the prototype project authority until 2008 and 

provided for a pilot program to transition some other transaction 

prototype projects to follow-on production contracting. 

According to program officials, under the LSI and OTA arrangement on 

FCS, the Army primarily participates in the program through Integrated 

Product Teams that are used to make coordinated management decisions 

in the program about issues related to requirements, design, horizontal 

integration and source selection. 

During the past year, the FCS underwent a significant restructuring, which 

added 4 years to the schedule for reducing risk, increasing the 

demonstration of FCS capabilities, and harvesting successes for the 

current force. Yet even with these improvements, the FCS is still at 

significant risk for not delivering planned capability within budgeted 

resources. This risk stems from the scope of the program’s technical 

challenges and the low level of knowledge demonstrated thus far. 

Our previous work has shown that program managers can improve their 

chances of successfully delivering a product if they employ a knowledgebased decision-making process. We have found for a program to deliver a 

successful product within available resources, managers should build high 

levels of demonstrated knowledge before significant commitments are 

FCS Remains At Risk 

of Not Delivering 

Planned Capability 

Within Estimated 

Resources 

High Levels of 

Demonstrated Knowledge 

Are Key to Getting Desired 

Outcomes 
Page 13 GAO-05-442T 

made.1 In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of 

knowledge can be described in three levels that should be attained over 

the course of a program: 

• First, at program start, the customer’s needs should match the developer’s 

available resources—mature technologies, time, and funding. An 

indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of the technologies 

needed to meet customer needs.2

• Second, about midway through development, the product’s design should 

be stable and demonstrate that it is capable of meeting performance 

requirements. The critical design review is the vehicle for making this 

determination and generally signifies the point at which the program is 

ready to start building production-representative prototypes. 

• Third, by the time of the production decision, the product must be shown 

to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and have 

demonstrated its reliability. It is also the point at which the design must 

demonstrate that it performs as needed through realistic system-level 

testing. 

The three levels of knowledge are related, in that a delay in attaining one 

delays those that follow. Thus, if the technologies needed to meet 

requirements are not mature, design and production maturity will be 

delayed. On the successful commercial and defense programs we have 

reviewed, managers were careful to conduct development of technology 

separately from and ahead of the development of the product. For this 

reason, the first knowledge level is the most important for improving the 

chances of developing a weapon system within cost and schedule 

estimates. DOD’s acquisition policy has adopted the knowledge-based 

approach to acquisitions. DOD policy requires program managers to 

provide knowledge about key aspects of a system at key points in the 

 1

GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves 

Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002); Best Practices: 

Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-162. (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999); Best Practices: Successful 

Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires Changes in DOD’s Environment. 

GAO/NSIAD-98-56. (Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1998). 

2

Technology readiness levels are a way to measure the maturity of technology. According 

to best practices, technology is considered sufficiently mature to start a program when it 

reaches a readiness level of 7. This involves a system or prototype demonstration in an 

operational environment. The prototype is near or at the planned operational system. 
Page 14 GAO-05-442T 

acquisition process. Program managers are also required to reduce 

integration risk and demonstrate product design prior to the design 

readiness review and to reduce manufacturing risk and demonstrate 

producibility prior to full-rate production. 

DOD programs that have not attained these levels of knowledge have 

experienced cost increases and schedule delays. We have recently 

reported on such experiences with the F/A-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, the 

Airborne Laser, and the Space Based Infrared System High. For example, 

the $245 billion Joint Strike Fighter’s acquisition strategy does not 

embrace evolutionary, knowledge-based techniques intended to reduce 

risks. Key decisions, such as its planned 2007 production decision, are 

expected to occur before critical knowledge is captured. If time were 

taken now to gain knowledge DODcould avoid placing sizable investments 

in production capabilities at risk of expensive changes. 

The FCS program has proceeded with low levels of knowledge. In fact, 

most of the activities that have taken place during its first 2 years should 

have been completed before starting system development and 

demonstration. It may be several years before the program reaches the 

level of knowledge it should have had at program start. Consequently, the 

Army is depending on a strategy that must concurrently define 

requirements, develop technology, design products, and test products. 

Progress in executing the program thus far does not inspire confidence: 

The requirements process is taking longer that planned, technology 

maturity may actually have regressed, and a program that is critical for the 

FCS network has recently run into problems and has been delayed. Figure 

2 depicts how the FCS strategy compares with the best practices 

described above. 

FCS Strategy Will Not 

Demonstrate High Levels 

of Knowledge Consistent 

With DOD Policy or Best 

Practices 
Page 15 GAO-05-442T 

Figure 2: Comparison of FCS Strategy with Best Practices 

The white space in figure 2 suggests the knowledge between best practices 

and the FCS program. Clearly, the program has a tremendous amount of 

ground to cover to close its knowledge gaps to the point that it can hold 

the design reviews as scheduled and make decisions on building 

prototypes, testing, and beginning production with confidence. 

Several other observations can be made from the figure: 

Source: U.S. Army and GAO (data); GAO (presentation).

Full system

demonstration 

Demonstrated knowledge

Stable design

Mature technology and

requirements

Production process maturity

2002 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2004

Desired level of knowledge

FCS preliminary design review

FCS critical design review

Start of

production

Start of FCS

production

Critical design review

Start of program

FCS full

system

demonstration

Years for FCS acquisition events

FCS acquisition event that has taken place

FCS acquisition event scheduled

Start of FCS program

Preliminary

design review
Page 16 GAO-05-442T 

• A match between mature technologies and firm requirements was not 

made at program start. 

• The preliminary design review, which ideally is conducted near the 

program start decision to identify disconnects between the design and the 

requirements, will be held 5 years into the program. 

• The critical design review, normally held midway through development, is 

scheduled to take place in the seventh year of a nine-year program. 

• The first test of all FCS elements will take place after the production 

decision. 

The FCS program entered system development and demonstration without 

demonstrating a match between resources and requirements, and will not 

be in a position to do so for a number of years. The Army now expects to 

have a reasonably well defined set of requirements by the October 2006 

interim preliminary design review. The Army has been working diligently 

to define these requirements, but the task is very difficult given that there 

are over 10,000 specific system-of-systems requirements that must 

collectively deliver the needed lethality, survivability, responsiveness, and 

sustainability. For example, the Army is conducting at least 120 studies to 

identify the design tradeoffs necessary before firming up requirements. As 

of December 2004, 69 remain to be completed. Those to be completed will 

guide key decisions on the FCS, such as the weight and lethality required 

of the manned ground vehicles. 

On the resources side, last year we reported that 75 percent of FCS 

technologies were immature when the program started in 2003; a 

September 2004 independent assessment has since shown that only 1 of 

the more than 50 FCS critical technologies is fully mature. The Army 

employed lower standards than recommended by best practices or DOD 

policy in determining technologies acceptable for the FCS program3

. As a 

result, it will have to develop numerous technologies on a tight schedule 

and in an environment that is designed for product development. If all 

goes as planned, the Army estimates that most of the critical technologies 

will reach a basic level of maturity by the 2010 Critical Design Review and 

 3

To achieve full maturity at TRL 7, the technology should be in the form, fit, and function 

needed for the intended product and should be demonstrated in a realistic environment. 

For a basic level of maturity at TRL 6, the technology is not necessarily in the form, fit, and 

function for the intended product. 

Requirements and Resources 

Gap 
Page 17 GAO-05-442T 

full maturity by the production decision. This type of technical knowledge 

is critical to the process of setting realistic requirements, which are 

needed now. In addition, a program critical to the FCS network and a key 

element of FCS’ first spiral, the Joint Tactical Radio System, recently 

encountered technical problems and may be delayed 2 years. We provide 

more detail on this program later. 

The FCS strategy will result in much demonstration of actual performance 

late in development and early in production, as technologies mature, 

prototypes are tested, and the network and systems are brought together 

as a system-of-systems. A good deal of the demonstration of the FCS 

design will take place over a 3-year period, starting with the critical design 

review in 2010 through the first system-level demonstration of all 18 FCS 

components and the network in 2013. This compression is due to the 

desired fielding date of 2014, coupled with the late maturation of 

technologies and requirements previously discussed. 

Ideally, a critical design review should be held midway through 

development—around 2008 for FCS—to confirm the design is stable 

enough to build production representative prototypes for testing. DOD 

policy refers to the work up to the critical design review as system 

integration, during which individual components of a system are brought 

together. The policy refers to the work after the critical design review as 

system demonstration, during which the system as a whole demonstrates 

its reliability as well as its ability to work in the intended environment. The 

building of production-representative prototypes also provides the basis to 

confirm the maturity of the production processes. For the FCS, the critical 

design review will be held just 2 years before the production decision. The 

FCS program is planning to have prototypes available for testing prior to 

production but they will not be production-representative prototypes. The 

Army does not expect to have even a preliminary demonstration of all 

elements of the FCS system-of-systems until sometime in 2013, the year 

after the production decision. 

This makes the program susceptible to “late-cycle churn,” a condition that 

we reported on in 20004

. Late-cycle churn is a phrase private industry has 

used to describe the efforts to fix a significant problem that is discovered 

 4

GAO, Best Practices: A More Constructive Approach is Key to Better Weapon System 

Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199 (Washington, D.C., July 31, 2000).

Late Demonstrations of 

FCS Performance Could 

Prove Costly 
Page 18 GAO-05-442T 

late in a product’s development. Often, it is a test that reveals the problem. 

The “churn” refers to the additional—and unanticipated—time, money, 

and effort that must be invested to overcome the problem. Problems are 

most serious when they delay product delivery, increase product cost, or 

“escape” to the customer. The discovery of problems in testing conducted 

late in development is a fairly common occurrence on DOD programs, as 

is the attendant late-cycle churn. Often, tests of a full system, such as 

launching a missile or flying an aircraft, become the vehicles for 

discovering problems that could have been found out earlier and corrected 

less expensively. When significant problems are revealed late in a weapon 

system’s development, the reaction—or churn—can take several forms: 

extending schedules to increase the investment in more prototypes and 

testing, terminating the program, or redesigning and modifying weapons 

that have already made it to the field. While DOD has found it acceptable 

to accommodate such problems over the years, this will be a difficult 

proposition for the FCS, given the magnitude of its cost in an increasingly 

competitive environment for investment funds. 

The Army has made some concrete progress in building some of the 

foundation of the program that will be essential to demonstrating 

capabilities. For example, the System-of-Systems Integration Lab—where 

the components and systems will be first tested—has been completed. 

Initial versions of the System-of-Systems Common Operating 

Environment, the middleware that will provide the operating system for 

FCS software, have been released. Several demonstrations have taken 

place, including the Precision Attack Munition, the Non-Line of Sight 

Cannon, and several unmanned aerial vehicles. 

The Army has embarked on an impressive plan to mitigate risk using 

modeling, simulation, emulation, hardware in the loop, and system 

integration laboratories throughout FCS development. This is a credible 

approach designed to reduce the dependence on late testing to gain 

valuable information about design progress. However, on a first-of-a-kind 

system like the FCS that represents a radical departure from current 

systems, actual testing of all the components integrated together is the 

final proof that the system works both as predicted and as needed. 

The risks the FCS program faces in executing the acquisition strategy can 

be seen in the information network and the manned ground vehicles. 

These two elements perhaps represent the long poles in the program and 

upon which the program’s success depends. 

Examples of Execution 

Challenges for Two Key 

FCS Elements 
Page 19 GAO-05-442T 

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and Warfighter Information 

Network-Tactical (WIN-T) are central pillars of the FCS network. If they 

do not work as intended, battlefield information will not be sufficient for 

the Future Force to operate effectively. They are separate programs from 

the FCS, and their costs are not included in the costs of the FCS. Both 

JTRS and WIN-T face significant technical challenges and aggressive 

schedules, that threaten the schedule for fielding Future Force capabilities 

and make their ultimate ability to perform uncertain. 

JTRS is a family of radios that is to provide the high-capacity, high-speed 

information link to vehicles, weapons, aircraft, and soldiers. Because the 

radios are software-based, they can also be reprogrammed to 

communicate with the variety of radios currently in use. JTRS is to provide 

the warfighter with the capability to access maps and other visual data, 

communicate on-the-move via voice and video with other units and levels 

of command, and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. 

JTRS can be thought of as the information link or network to support FCS 

units of action and the combat units on the scene that are engaged directly 

in an operation. In particular, its wideband networking waveform provides 

the “pipe” that will enable the FCS vehicles to see and strike first and 

avoid being hit. The WIN-T program is to provide the information network 

for higher military echelons. WIN-T will consist of ground, airborne, and 

space-based assets within a theater of operations for Army, joint, and 

allied commanders and provide those commanders with access to 

intelligence, logistics, and other data critical to making battlefield 

decisions and supporting battlefield operations. This is information the 

combat units can access through WIN-T developed equipment and JTRS. 

The JTRS program to develop radios for ground vehicles and helicopters—

referred to as Cluster 1—began system development in June 2002 with an 

aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and lack of clearly defined 

and stable requirements. These factors have contributed to significant 

cost, schedule, and performance problems from which the program has 

not yet recovered. The Army has not been able to mature the technologies 

needed to provide radios that both generate sufficient power and meet 

platform size and weight constraints. Changes in the design are expected 

to continue after the critical design review, and unit costs may make the 

radios unaffordable in the quantities desired. Given these challenges, the 

Army has proposed delaying the program 24 months and adding $458 

million to the development effort. However, before approving the 

restructure, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed a partial work 

stoppage, and the program is now focusing its efforts on a scheduled 

operational assessment of the radio’s functionality to determine the future 

Network 
Page 20 GAO-05-442T 

of the program. Consequently, the radio is not likely to be available for the 

first spiral of the FCS network, slated for fiscal year 2008, and surrogate 

radios may be needed to fill the gap. 

A second JTRS program, to develop small radios including those that 

soldiers will carry (referred to as Cluster 5), also entered system 

development with immature technologies and lack of well-defined 

requirements, and faces even greater technical challenges due to the 

smaller size, weight, power, and large data processing requirements for the 

radios. For example, the Cluster 5 program has a requirement for a 

wideband networking waveform despite its demanding size and power 

constraints. In addition, the program was delayed in starting system 

development last year because of a contract bid protest. Consequently, the 

Cluster 5 radios are not likely to be available for the first FCS spiral either. 

The Army has acknowledged that surrogate radios and waveforms may be 

needed for the first spiral of FCS. 

The WIN-T program also began with an aggressive acquisition schedule 

and immature technologies that are not scheduled to mature until after 

production begins. Backup technologies have been identified, but they 

offer less capability, and most are immature as well. In addition, the 

schedule leaves little room for error correction and rework that may 

hinder successful cost, schedule and performance outcomes. More 

recently, the program strategy was altered to identify a single architecture 

as soon as possible and to deliver networking and communications 

capabilities sooner to meet near-term warfighting needs. Specifically, the 

Army dropped its competitive strategy and is now having the two 

contractors work together to develop the initial network architecture. A 

plan for how to develop and field capabilities sooner is still to be 

determined. 

FCS includes eight manned ground vehicles, that require critical individual 

and common technologies to meet required capabilities. For example, the 

Mounted Combat System will require, among other new technologies, a 

newly developed lightweight weapon for lethality; a hybrid electric drive 

system and a high-density engine for mobility; advanced armors, an active 

protection system, and advanced signature management systems for 

survivability; a Joint Tactical Radio System with the wideband waveform 

for communications and network connection; a computer-generated force 

system for training; and a water generation system for sustainability. At 

the same time, concepts for the manned ground vehicles have not been 

decided and are awaiting the results of trade studies that will decide 

critical design points such as weight and the type of drive system to be 

Manned Ground Vehicles 
Page 21 GAO-05-442T 

used. Under other circumstances, each of the eight manned ground 

systems would be a major defense acquisition program on par with the 

Army’s past major ground systems such as the Abrams tank, the Bradley 

Fighting Vehicle, and the Crusader Artillery System. As such, each requires 

a major effort to develop, design, and demonstrate the individual vehicles. 

Developing these technologies and integrating them into vehicles is made 

vastly more difficult by the Army’s requirement that the vehicles be 

transportable by the C-130 cargo aircraft. However, the C-130 can carry the 

FCS vehicles’ projected weight of 19 tons only 5 percent of the time. In 

2004, GAO reported a similar situation with the Stryker vehicles. The 19-

ton weight of these vehicles significantly limits the C-130’s range and the 

size of the force that can be deployed5

. Currently, FCS vehicle designs are 

estimated at over 25 tons per vehicle. To meet even this weight, the 

advanced technologies required put the sophistication of the vehicles on a 

par with that of fighter aircraft, according to some Army officials. This is 

proving an extremely difficult requirement to meet without sacrificing 

lethality, survivability, and sustainability. Currently, program officials are 

considering other ways to meet the C-130 weight requirement, such as 

transporting the vehicles with minimal armor and with only a minimal 

amount of ammunition. As a result, vehicles would have to be armored 

and loaded upon arrival to be combat ready. 

The low levels of knowledge in the FCS program provide an insufficient 

basis for making cost estimates. The program’s immaturity at the time 

system development and demonstration began resulted in a relatively lowfidelity cost estimate and open questions about the program’s long-term 

affordability. Although the program restructuring provides more time to 

resolve risk and to demonstrate progress, the knowledge base for making 

a confident estimate is still low. If the FCS cost estimate is not better than 

past estimates, the likelihood for cost growth will be high, while the 

prospects for finding more money for the program will be dim. 

The estimates for the original FCS program and the restructured program 

are shown in table 2 below. 

 5

GAO, Military Transformation: Fielding of Army’s Stryker Vehicles Is Well Under Way, 

but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified, 

GAO-04-925 (Washington, D.C., August 12, 2004).

FCS Cost and Affordability 

Still to Be Determined 
Page 22 GAO-05-442T 

Table 2: Increased Cost from Original to Restructured FCS Program 

2005 BY$ (millions) 

Research and 

Development Procurement Total

Original 18,574 60,647 79,836a

Restructured 28,007b 79,960 107,967

Dollar increase 9,433 19,313 28,131

Percent increase 50.79% 31.84% 35.24%

Sources: GAO. 

a

Both the original and the restructured figures are for about 15 Units of Action (i.e., one-third of the 

current active force). 

b

Includes four originally deferred systems, a lengthened schedule, additional tests, and the addition of 

the four spirals. 

At this point, the FCS cost estimate represents the position of the program 

office. The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis 

Improvement Group will provide their independent estimates for the 

May 2005 Milestone B update review. It is important to keep in mind that 

the FCS program cost estimate does not reflect all of the costs needed to 

field FCS capabilities. The costs of the complementary programs are 

separate and will be substantial. For example, the research and 

development and procurement costs for the JTRS (Clusters 1 and 5) and 

the WIN-T programs are expected to be about $34.6 billion (fiscal year 

2005 dollars). 

In addition, by April 2005, the Army has been tasked to provide an analysis 

of FCS affordability considering other Army resource priorities, such as 

modularity. This will be an important analysis, given that estimates of 

modularity costs have been put at about $48 billion, and costs of current 

operations and recapitalizing current equipment have been covered by 

supplemental funding. 

As can be seen in table 3, substantial investments will be made before key 

knowledge is gained on how well the system can perform. For example, by 

the time of the critical design review in 2010, over $20 billion of research 

and development funds will have been spent. 
Page 23 GAO-05-442T 

Table 3: Annual and Cumulative FCS Funding and Planned Events and 

Achievements ($millions) 

Fiscal year 

Annual Research 

and Development 

Funding

Cumulative Research 

and Development 

Funding 

Planned 

Events/Achievements 

2003 

158.9 158.9 

 Systems development 

and demonstration Start 

2004 1,637.3 1,796.2 Program restructured 

2005 

2,800.8 4,597.0 

 Contract redefinitized 

Milestone B Update 

Updated cost estimate 

2006 

3,404.8 8,001.8 

 Requirements firmed up 

Interim preliminary 

design review 

2007 3,742.0 11,743.8 

2008 

3,682.3 15,426.1 

 System preliminary 

design review 

Interim critical design 

review 

2009 3,460.0 18,886.1 

2010 

3,181.5 22,067.6 

 Technologies reach 

basic maturity; system 

critical design review 

2011 2,690.7 24,758.3 Design readiness review 

2012 

1,949.6 26,707.9 

 Technologies reach full 

maturity 

Production decision 

2013 

1,412.0 28,119.9 

 Initial System-ofSystems demonstration 

2014 

1,169.0 29,288.9 

 Initial Operational 

Capability 

2015 901.0 30,189.9 

2016 

111.0 30,300.9 

 Full Operational 

Capability 

Source: U.S. Army. 

The consequences of even modest cost increases and schedule delays for 

the FCS would be dramatic. For example, a one-year delay late in FCS 

development, not an uncommon occurrence for other DOD programs, 

could cost over $3 billion. Given the size of the program, financial 

consequences of following historical patterns of cost and schedule growth 

could be dire. 
Page 24 GAO-05-442T 

For any acquisition program, two basic questions can be asked. First, is it 

worth doing? Second, is it being done the right way? On the first question, 

the Army makes a compelling case that something must be done to equip 

its future forces and that such equipment should be more responsive but 

as effective as current equipment. The answer to the second question is 

problematic. At this point, the FCS presents a concept that has been laid 

out in some detail, an architecture or framework for integrating individual 

capabilities, and an investment strategy for how to acquire those 

capabilities. There is not enough knowledge to say whether the FCS is 

doable, much less doable within a predictable frame of time and money. 

Yet making confident predictions is a reasonable standard for a major 

acquisition program given the resource commitments and opportunity 

costs they entail. Against this standard, the FCS is not yet a good fit as an 

acquisition program. 

That having been said, another important question that needs to be 

answered is: If the Army needs FCS-like capabilities, what is the best way 

to advance them to the point at which they can be acquired? Efforts that 

fall in this area—the transition between the laboratory and the acquisition 

program—do not yet have a place that has the right organizations, 

resources, and responsibilities to advance them properly. 

At this point alternatives to the current FCS strategy warrant 

consideration. For example, one possible alternative for advancing the 

maturity of FCS capabilities could entail setting the first spiral or block as 

the program of record for system development and demonstration. Such a 

spiral should meet the standards of providing a worthwhile military 

capability, having mature technology, and having firm requirements. Other 

capabilities currently in the FCS program could be moved out of system 

development and demonstration and instead be bundled into advanced 

technology demonstrations that could develop and experiment with 

advanced technologies in the more conducive environment of “preacquisition” until they are ready to be put into a future spiral. Advancing 

technologies in this way will enable knowledge to guide decisions on 

requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more 

reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future spirals. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have. 

Alternatives to 

Current FCS 

Acquisition Strategy 

Still Warrant 

Consideration 
Page 25 GAO-05-442T 

For future questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-

4841. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include 

Lily J. Chin, Marcus C. Ferguson, Lawrence D. Gaston, Jr., 

William R. Graveline, John P. Swain, Robert S. Swierczek, and 

Carrie R. Wilson. 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgements 

(120427) 
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