DOES RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY HAVE A FUTURE?

Stephen J. Blank

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editors

1994
*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the Director of Research, Dr. Earl H.

Tilford, Jr., by calling commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN

242-3234.
FOREWORD

In 1854, on the eve of the Crimea campaign, Antoine Henri

Jomini wrote, "The Russian Army is a wall which, however far it

may retreat, you will always find in front of you." The political

unrest and economic disarray that followed the collapse of the

Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Communist Empire have

altered, but not crippled, the formidable strength of the Russian

military. While the forces of democracy and reform survived the

elections of December 1993, the very strong support generated by

ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky reminds us that the future

of Russia is far from determined.

In late January 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute, with

the cooperation of the U.S. Army Center of Military History,

hosted a Washington roundtable which addressed the impact of the

December 1993 elections. Scholars from the Army, academia, and

the strategic community met for a day of frank and sometimes

spirited discussion. Each scholar was asked to provide a formal

paper presenting his or her perspective on this subject. These

proceedings are offered because the Strategic Studies Institute

believes that Jomini's observations are as valid today as they

were 160 years ago.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

Russia's elections in December 1993 produced shock and

consternation at home and abroad. The rejection of reformers, the

high turnout for the Nazi-like Liberal Democratic Party of

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the low overall turnout reinforced

latent fears of a turn away from democracy and towards

confrontation with Russia's neighbors and international partners.

Further developments since then: a growing tendency to

concentrate power in the office of the President and/or the Prime

Minister, the projected economic merger with Belarus, the

aggressive foreign policy moves in 1993-94, increased

possibilities for ethnic war in Kazakhstan and Crimea, the

slowing of reform, and the exodus of reformers from the

government only further heightened Western apprehension about

Russia's future course.

Bearing these anxieties in mind, the U.S. Army War College

and its Strategic Studies Institute convened a roundtable

discussion in Washington, DC at the Center for Military History

on January 31, 1994. The rapporteurs at the roundtable presented

papers on the impact of the elections on the chances for

democracy at home, relations with the United States (particularly

military-to-military relationships), the stability of the Russian

Federation, civil-military relationships, and the countries of

Russia's "near abroad."

The roundtable organizers and speakers did not recommend

specific policy options or speak on behalf of any policy or

institution. Rather, their (and our) intention was to stimulate a

lively debate from which an assessment of future trends could be

derived and then presented to policymakers, scholars, and

colleagues throughout the defense and academic communities. In

this regard, the roundtable was quite successful. It more than

accomplished its objectives, even going beyond them in the

discussions that followed each paper. Those discussions grappled

with the problems of devising an appropriate strategy of

engagement with Russia and, to a lesser degree, its neighbors.

Stephen Blank of SSI assessed the impact of the elections on

Russian democracy. He argued that the outcome, where reformers

were dumped and 12 of 13 parties called for slowing if not ending

reform and for more aggressive policies abroad, indicated that

U.S. policy towards Russia had been greatly misconceived. Dr.

Blank also called attention to the fact that absent stable,

legitimate, and legally bound institutions, it is premature to

claim that Russia is both democratic and a status quo power.

He found the reformers guilty of the same "sin" as their

Bolshevik predecessors, namely the effort to revolutionize
Russian society from above in the service of an idea grossly at

variance with the realities of politics and socio-economic life,

namely neo-liberal economics. Although he clearly accepted the

need for massive reform in 1992, he found a lack of attention to

the problems of creating sound governmental institutions, without

which no reform, not to mention a revolution, could succeed. As a

result the reformers failed to create viable state agencies and

instead reopened the historic gap between the Russian state and

society. In effect, the bureaucracy has had to step in and try to

rule Russia in its own name and interest, giving rise to a

formation he labelled "Presidentialism."

This formation is essentially authoritarian. It is not bound

by law, but it is penetrated from top to bottom by criminality

and corruption, and also is inclined towards chauvinistic and

even imperial tendencies in its conception of Russian state

power. While calling itself democratic, it is actually reviving

older Tsarist and Soviet patterns of state building and

institutional development that impart a distinctly Russian

meaning to this term. Following Max Weber's description of late

Tsarism as a pseudo-constitutional regime, Dr. Blank contended

that real power is increasingly concentrated in the office of the

President or of the Prime Minister. These offices have

subordinated major state agencies directly to themselves,

exempting them from any legal or parliamentary accountability, a

trend that can only have profoundly negative implications for a

democratic outcome. Trends since then have shown that this system

tends to duplicate itself inasmuch as Prime Minister Viktor S.

Chernomyrdin has developed his own parallel apparatus or bloc in

the government and Yeltsin's policies increasingly appear to be

incoherent or at least uncoordinated.

Accordingly, a profound rethinking of the nature of Russia's

evolution, requirements in reform, and policies is warranted.

This rethinking not only applies to aid for reform and political

support for Yeltsin and a Russo-centric foreign policy; it also

involves reevaluating such issues as the stability of the

federation, the nature of civilian control over the military, the

future of U.S.-Russian military ties in a military heavily

influenced by Zhirinovsky's message, and Russian foreign policies

in the so-called "near abroad." Subsequent papers took up those

challenges.

Jacob Kipp's paper set forth the ideological message and

program of Zhirinovsky and the sources of his appeal to the

Russian people. That message is one of glorified statism and

racism; a kind of combination of Nazism and the worst excesses of

the Russian imperial tradition. But it is couched in terms of a

shared appeal to Russians based on Zhirinovsky's quite remarkable

ability to make himself the exemplar or embodiment of the

suffering of the Russian people at this time. Zhirinovsky

glorifies the Russian state tradition and identifies empire and

nationality with the state, making his message a lineal

descendant of earlier traditions in Russian political thought,
e.g., Nicholas I's Official Nationality, which dominated

political discourse for much of the 19th century.

At the same time, he makes that appeal in particularly

strong terms to the military whom he characterizes as the

personification of Russia's state tradition and as one of the

most, if not the most, aggrieved sector of Russian society. The

military and the common people, including Russians abroad,

threatened by a loss of empire and the accelerating anomie of a

society characterized by what Russians call Bespredel'--no

limits--are thus joined together with his person as the

embodiments of Russia. Essentially this appeal to what

Dostoyevsky called "the insulted and the injured" and "the

egotism of suffering" plays on the sense of victimization and

desire for revenge that now pervades much of the country; where

the humiliations of the last several years at the hands of

foreigners, intellectuals, or Jews (i.e., whoever can be so

characterized for purposes of political defamation and

stigmatization) have gone without redress until now.

More practically, Zhirinovsky has organized extensively

among the military; his ideology is especially pervasive among

younger officers and males who feel particularly aggrieved at the

loss of order in current Russian society. Accordingly, there is

good reason to believe that he enjoys widespread and organized

political support within the armed forces, a factor that makes

their loyalty to Yeltsin suspect. Both Kipp and Thomas Nichols

gave substantial evidence that the claim that one-third of the

armed forces voted for Zhirinovsky was a deliberate underestimate

of his strength among that group where he is busy both covertly

and overtly organizing for what can only be characterized as an

impending coup.

Zhirinovsky told David Frost in an April 1994 interview that

he won over 50 percent of the vote in December and the election

was "stolen" from him. Furthermore, he has had his party make him

"Fuehrer" for 10 years, reinforcing its organizational

similarities to the Nazi party. He has talked openly of a coup

and of his intention to force presidential elections earlier than

1996, as now scheduled. And he influenced the legislature to

grant amnesty to the coup plotters of 1991 and 1993, a move that

fundamentally delegitimized the state and government and exposed

Yeltsin's weakness to the world. At a time when military support

for Yeltsin is questionable to say the least, Zhirinovsky poses

the greatest threat to Russian democracy.

Should he come to power, his election would seriously

imperil if not undo the delicate web of bilateral U.S.-Russian

military contacts, lead to a militarization of issues stemming

from Russians' rights outside of Russia, and could provoke

military conflicts all along Russia's peripheries, if not civil

war in Russia itself. His ascension to power, or attempt to do

so, could therefore undermine all the fundamental principles upon

which U.S. Russian policy is based. Should that happen, we might
enter a realm in which purely political and economic tools by

which we have sought to assist and manage Russia's democratic

transition may no longer suffice or apply to Russia's conditions.

We would then have to consider seriously military responses to

the threats Zhirinovsky would pose to Russia itself and its

neighbors. That process would remilitarize the bilateral

relationship with unforeseeable and incalculable consequences.

Thomas Nichols' paper focused on civil-military relations.

He produced substantial evidence indicating how tenuous military

support for Yeltsin is and how well Zhirinovsky has capitalized

upon the military's disenchantment with reform. Nichols brought

together press reports and election evidence, as well as personal

interviews demonstrating that large sections of the officer corps

(which now comprises almost 50 percent of the military) still

show loyalty to a concept of the Russian state which is both

imperial and in some sense Soviet. This is not to say that they

are loyal to the Soviet military- political command system, but

rather to the territorial empire that was formed under Soviet

leadership and which that leadership identified with the state.

In other words, they seek a renewed imperial state, which, as

Russian tradition suggests, is the only way many of these people

and the right wing's supporters can conceive of the Russian state

and of Russia. This makes them receptive to Zhirinovsky's appeal,

which combines statism, imperialism, and the draconian social

morality of the earlier Soviet period. It is not a loyalty to the

Soviet order, especially after Brezhnev, but rather to a sense of

past glory and statehood, or political identity amid present

frustration and even degradation.

Therefore, it would appear that the loyalty of the military

to the government is deeply in doubt, a factor that makes any

prognosis for democracy and renunciation of imperial temptations

still more doubtful. In her paper on the stability of the Russian

Federation itself, Jessica Stern underscored the ways in which

Moscow has failed to decentralize its role as the center of a

vast imperium and create genuine, durable, and legally

institutionalized networks for the deconcentration of power. By

refusing to delegate powers, although it cannot provide basic

governmental services, stable economy, or law and order, Moscow

has provoked local organizations to take power. This trend is

reminiscent of 1917 when local organs of power, many of which

were Soviets, had no choice but to take power to maintain any

social order in their bailiwicks. The absence of binding laws and

the lack of popular support for the new constitution, itself a

blueprint for an authoritarian regime that is incapable of making

the government work, raise the danger of both local secession or

of coups at the center to make that power effective from the top

down. Either way, Russia's internal stability cannot be relied

upon; rather it is illusory. Stern's statistical findings suggest

that 39 of 89 provinces voted against the constitution, and, in

any case, as the amnesty crisis alluded to above shows, neither

the legislature nor the executive is concerned to rule by law.

Inasmuch as the state cannot provide basic economic services,
local authorities have often entered into cooperation with local

armed forces to take over responsibility for provisioning them.

That process is leading to the formation of local civil-military

ties, or even potential warlordism. Civil-military control from

Moscow could break down in some of these areas and lead to

political secession of provinces, especially those with large

non- Russian populations. This secession could also lead to

military localism and secession from the chain of command, an

event which would almost certaily plunge the region in question,

if not all of Russia, into the vortex of military conflict.

But it is not just the internal stability of the federation

which is open to question. There are about 25 million Russians in

the states around Russia, the so called "near abroad." As Ilya

Prizel observes, the election returns intensified those states'

fear that these populations could be mobilized as a fifth column

or as a pretext for aggression against them as in Sudetenland and

Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Poland in 1939. The use of these

minorities as pawns in the Russian power struggle at a time when

the gravest fears of Russia's development are pervasive only

further reinforces the general sense of insecurity that

characterizes the near abroad.

However, these states are themselves vulnerable because of

their failure, outside the Baltic, to reform economically and

provide sustainable bases for governing without prospective

ethnic crises of this sort. Therefore, there is no current

security alternative to the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) that is viable for these states except for their isolation

amid increasingly deteriorating circumstances, both domestic and

foreign. The Ukraine's current travails over the looming Crimean

secession, and the provocation of military incidents by Russian

sailors in the Black Sea Fleet, demonstrate the dangers to which

Prizel referred. In Ukraine, any further loss of civilian control

over the military combined with the playing of the ethnic card of

Russians abroad, either by Zhirinovsky or by those who seek to

coopt his message and support, could easily ignite a

conflagration between forces having nuclear weapons on their

soil. But even if there is no such conflict and the rivalry

between Moscow and Kiev remains purely economic-political,

Ukraine remains in the front line of the danger and is isolated

in Europe. This is because it failed to reform and overcome the

potential for ethnic and economic polarization in its domestic

politics, and because it has mishandled its security policies.

Despite the agreement of January 1994 to denuclearize,

Ukraine has yet to forge either workable political institutions

that can coexist with each other, a meaningful economic reform

plan, or a viable security concept that prevents it from being a

Russian client or satellite. Inasmuch as Ukraine is the true key

state in the region that determines whether a new Russian empire

will come about or not, its own internal instability at a time

when Russian appetites are growing and Russia's own crisis is by

no means overcome can only leave one with a sense of ever present
danger there, and, more generally, in the near abroad.

These conclusions are offered, not in a spirit of

partisanship, but rather, as we stated above, as the fruit of

disinterested analysis and sober reflection. They all point to

the need to rethink U.S. strategy and devise more comprehensive

and coherent forms of engagement with all the states in the

"post-Soviet space" before it is too late. And one should not

think that there is much time left to do so, especially given the

omnipresent threat of a coup against Yeltsin which could succeed.

In regard to Russia, the hour is late and the institutions

involved are naturally loath to change their modus operandi, but

the work is essential, the imperative is urgent, and history

won't wait.
CHAPTER 2

THE IMPACT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

ON RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY

Stephen J. Blank

In framing a government which is to be administered by

men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you

must first enable the government to control the

governed; and in the next place oblige it to control

itself.

James Madison

Introduction.

Russia's December 1993 elections produced shock,

consternation, and surprise at home and abroad. The results

highlight reformers' failure to create coherent or stable

governmental institutions as specified by Madison, a failure

having profound consequences. This analysis of the election's

impact upon democratization focuses on his criteria: control of

the government, control of the society. To grasp that impact we

must also dispel myths that impair our understanding of Russian

realities, address ourselves to those realities, and place them

in the context of Russia's ongoing political and institutional

history.

The first myth to be banished is that Russia's

intelligentsia and political elite, our main source of opinion on

Russia, are democrats as we understand the term. Far from being

thoroughly committed democrats, they reacted to the returns with

predictable hysteria, fear, disdain, and elitist contempt for the

masses who had spurned the elite's noble self-sacrifice for them

in taking power and creating mass poverty in a single stroke. The

election returns reconfirmed for them the masses' basically

uncivilized nature.1 Far too many 'liberals' and reformers are

ready now to throw out separation of powers and the rule of law

to save reform.2

 After the election many 'democrats' urged

Yeltsin to form an authoritarian government of corporate or

bureaucratic elites (following in Von Papen's example in 1932

Germany). That regime could only end as a bureaucratic despotism

because only leading office holders and their clients would

support it.3 This reaction displays the intelligentsia's

persistent undemocratic self-image as an elite called upon by

history to save the masses from their ignorance and savagery.

The U.S. reaction was no less predictable and signified a

continuing U.S. misreading of Russian reality. Although the

embassy had warned that the antidemocratic forces were gaining on

the reformers, those reports were disregarded in favor of

pietistic, poetry-laden speeches of how Russia was making
democracy flourish.4

 When one considers that Russian developments

like the election returns, the composition of the new cabinet,

and Russia's adroit Bosnian initiative in February 1994 all

surprised the Administration, the misreading of the election

returns can only be seen as part of a pattern of misconceived

policy or a second example of mythmaking. Those policies appear

to be based as much on wishful thinking as on anything else. A

third myth, that such an election is, as current political

science tells us, our most reliable indicator that democratic

consolidation is taking place, must go, too.5 Fourth, the

reaction abroad attributed the outcome almost wholly to

widespread economic distress, a conclusion that initially led to

U.S. pressure on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to relax

its policies and procedures for Russia, a shift that had

devastating consequences.6 Now the United States wants more

reform and more therapy although we cannot fund it and expect

Yeltsin to follow policies we or the fiscal institutions we

dominate recommend. This paradox reflects U.S. incomprehension

that our effort to create a liberal Russia when we lack the

resources to do so hurts precisely those who most need access to

global capital markets to make the transition.7

Russia's Political and Economic Crisis.

But for sophisticated observers of Russia the results were

not surprising. After all, we gave Ross Perot 19 percent of the

vote in 1992 and George Wallace 14 percent in 1968 during

enormous moral, political, and economic crises in American life

and they were in many ways not unlike Zhirinovsky. Nor can we

attribute this vote solely to economic distress due to Russia's

botched reforms. That myth merely restates the vulgar notion that

political action only reflects narrow economic motives. Rather,

the election shows a society in profound political and moral, and

economic crisis. The Yeltsin regime's failure to create viable

political institutions is as much to blame as are its economic

policies whose failures also stem from this mainly political

deficiency in state-making.

 To grasp the election's impact on democracy, we must also

start from basic political, institutional, and economic

realities. Reform's fate was sealed when 12 of 13 electoral blocs

advocated ending what they called shock therapy and a more

aggressive, even imperial national security policy.8

 When Prime

Minister Chernomyrdin proclaimed an end to reform and a reliance

on social protection and state investment on November 23, 1993,

i.e., before the vote, he read the public correctly.9 Similarly

President Yeltsin's observation that the public voted as much for

order and strong leadership is not far wrong.10 Zhirinovsky's

strong showing does not mean the 'end of reform' or signify that

reform's course will be slowed down. Had he not existed those

would still be the clear results of the election. In view of the

elite's limited commitment to democracy and true democratic

participation, it is a profound fallacy to believe it will bring
about democracy as understood outside Russia. In practice,

Russian democracy today means essentially what it or egalitarian

ideologies always meant, a bureaucratic oligarchy led either by a

strong bureaucrat--Yeltsin, today--or by a weak "Tsar." While it

offers egalitarian or democratic rhetoric and seemingly

democratic practices; it preserves the essence of bureaucratic

despotism.

Another misreading of Russia is that the entire country is

drowning in hardship. While this is true for far too many, it is

hardly the whole story. Average wages have outpaced inflation in

dollar terms, going from $8 a month in January 1992 to $87 in

November 1993. Retail sales (adjusted for inflation) climbed 4

percent through October 1993 and for some goods like sugar or

cars the rate of increase in consumption is much greater. More

people can buy what they want even if too many remain trapped in

dead ends.11 Similarly Russia has an $8 billion foreign reserve

surplus and a $14.3 billion trade surplus through September 1993.

Russian banks hold another $18 billion in declared foreign

currency deposits and Russian firms have as least that much

estimated in illegal foreign accounts.12 This capital flight

reflects skepticism about the future and a justified lack of

confidence in the government. Indeed, even the government itself

does not invest its money at home; it keeps the $8 billion

surplus abroad or in Russian banks.13 That policy hardly inspires

confidence at home or abroad but the figures show a rising

potential for capital formation and productive investment.

This is not to say all is well; that is not the case. But

the roof has not fallen in and need not do so. Indeed, it is as

likely as not that an entrepreneurial and professional middle

class will develop that in some sense will support capitalist

reform, even if only because it and the state are tied by

corruption. Corruption in Russia is hardly news, even if the

violent crime that accompanies it is. Those phenomena reflect the

demoralization and anomie that naturally stem from a breakdown of

socio-political control. In fact, the explosion of visible

corruption reflects democratization, for under Communism the

state drove out criminals and entrepreneurs, and incorporated

crime into itself.14 Similar phenomena took place in the early

New Economic Policy period and foreign observers believed then

that the end of communism was imminent. Moreover, opinion polls

and voting analysis confirm that generational, geographical, and

economic cleavages that reflect the support of new industries and

entrepreneurs for reform are real factors affecting Russian

politics.15 While there are far too many have nots; there are

also many haves.

Nevertheless the election returns show the government and

reformers to be in an impasse of their own making. Where shock

therapy or the big bang (i.e., massive economic reforms all taken

at once in accordance with Western prescriptions) has taken place

with uninterrupted reforms, economic restructuring has

accelerated and growth becomes possible. But where reform has
been disrupted, suspended, or slowed, as in Russia, the

socio-economic and therefore political crises are deeper, last

longer, and resist progress more.16 On the other hand, where

reform has cut deeper, the political opposition to its costs has

led to the return of Communist or socialist governments as in

Lithuania, Poland, and, in 1994, very likely Hungary. Thus,

further reform to impose monetary stability, cut subsidies to

value-subtracting industrial dinosaurs, and terminate inflation

risks mass unemployment and a political explosion. The payoff

only comes later. On the other hand, a brake on reform will not

alleviate suffering and will make it worse when reform must be

faced. In addition, a brake upon reform perpetuates all the

social disjunctions that give rise to Zhirinovsky-type phenomena.

Ukraine, which followed in the steps of Yeltsin's opponents,

exemplifies this catastrophe. Ultimately, reform is inescapable

since the costs of temporizing are unbearable. But its costs are

equally risky. And if one looks at economic prospects for Eastern

Europe; profound, intractable, and long-term problems remain

ahead.17

But rather then say shock therapy is the villain in the

play, it is more accurate to torpedo another myth, i.e., that

Russia, like Poland, went through shock therapy. While price

controls are ending and privatization has done well, essential

monetary stabilization has not taken place. Nor could it be

because of the political realities that the reformers so rashly

disdained. While ex-Finance Minister Fyodorov did his best to

restrain inflation, the state still subsidizes losers and

reinforces failure. Nor does it control the banking system.

Russia has experienced a series of alternating shocks in a

half-baked effort to impose shock therapy that has pushed

recovery further into the future and will increase the level of

suffering and dislocation from reform. Clearly the neoclassical

economists who made up the government and advised it from the

outside believed their professional dogma that homo economicus is

the same in La Paz as in Moscow and that by some miracle of the

market the state and politics could be eliminated from Russia.18

Consequently, Russia now pays for a political failure to control

monetary and industrial policy. This misreading of Russian

politics and the disdain for it by the reformers and outside

advisors like Jeffrey Sachs (who then washed his hands of Russia

saying that nothing could be done and now blames the IMF at every

opportunity)19 have been the main intellectual obstacles to a

viable government and a recovering economy. Shock therapy, once

tried, was abandoned, proving itself to be a disastrous failure

in Russia.

The main, seemingly economic, reason that price decontrol

and privatization have not contributed further to faster recovery

but have accelerated political unrest is the lack of monetary

control expressed in continuing subsidies to uncompetitive

producers. Ex-Deputy Prime Minister Egor T. Gaidar recently

acknowledged that these subsidies, e.g., to uncompetitive

agrarian producers, still continue.20 Despite two years of
supposed shock therapy, the largest item of state spending is

still the 9-10 percent of GDP to subsidize the dinosaurs that

costs more than education and defense combined, and demonstrates

that the government still cannot control the economy.21 Nor is

the Voennaia Ekonomika, the military economy, undergoing the

conversion that it needs and that would decisively democratize

and demilitarize Russia.22 Instead this sector still rightly

counts on bailouts and subsidies and eludes effective market, not

to say, state control. For instance, Mikhail Malei, a leading

lobbyist for this group, celebrated the new constitution because

the Security Council's 10 committees can substitute for the

ministries and bypass coalition debates.23 Subsidies and bailouts

are policy decisions that display reformers' inability to sustain

their ideology or see the need for coherent state institutions

and politics in Russia.

The current inflation not only reflected state policy's

internal incoherence, it led to the fall of the government in

1992. The new government remained divided throughout 1993.

Ministers fought publicly with each other either to subsidize

their constituencies or against inflation and subsidies, in all

cases with no control over the State Bank. As Steven Erlanger

reported for The New York Times,

His [Yeltsin's] decision to keep Yegor T. Gaidar, a

current First Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the

reformers, means the probable continuation of a

government so divided that it has been unable to pursue

a consistent economic strategy. After two years of

on-again, off-again policy that can scarcely be called

coherent, many Russian voters rebelled against this

instability of an uncharted transition to a market

economy.24

As if to confirm that assessment, Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin repeatedly ruled out shock therapy while Yeltsin

said Gaidar stays, a sure recipe for gridlock. Not surprisingly,

the first post-election cabinet meeting broke up because of

profound division over a new privatization program.25 Even now,

in April 1994, no new reforms have been undertaken although

Chernomyrdin, to his credit, has heretofore resisted the pressure

for further massive subsidies. Chernomyrdin unwittingly reflected

the reality. He stated, quite wrongly, that the government worked

harmoniously, and then noted,

But we have no particular contradictions. My job is to

take account of all opinions, weigh everything and make

the decisions. And this is what is important--the

government program has been adopted, and not one of my

colleagues had objections in principle. This is

essentially a model of coalition government as it were:

Its members adhere to different political positions but

work harmoniously.26
That explains why they all campaigned against each other in the

elections.

Here, on November 23, three weeks before the election,

Chernomyrdin rejected further "shocks," or mass unemployment and

showed that he had no understanding of modern bankruptcy or the

need to stop subsidizing the dinosaurs. Yet press reports claimed

the government intends a planned and consistent reduction in the

money supply, production subsidies, and the deficit to 5 percent

of GNP in 1994.27 These incompatible policies ultimately can only

be reconciled by the departure of Fyodorov and Gaidar and

bailouts for dinosaurs.

The current state of privatization reflects the paralysis of

state policy. While Deputy Prime Minister Chubais, its architect,

promotes the program's success, an essential aspect of success,

ending subsidies and allowing uncompetitive firms to go bankrupt,

languishes. One thousand firms are estimated to be insolvent, but

nothing has happened to them or their workers because they still

live off borrowed money and state credits. Since there is no

social or manpower policy to redirect labor to productive

enterprise, these firms continue to suck money out of the economy

and promote inflation. Moreover, a new government decree on

bankruptcies reserves for the State Property Committee most of

the decision-making for insolvent firms. Banks and other

financial institutions that are their creditors or have a direct

stake in their survival or restructuring, will have little say in

these matters. Thus, the lack of foresight about institutional

reform has rebureaucratized the economy and will allow firms to

use political connections to avert their inevitable demise.28

Finally, in his interview Chernomyrdin also admitted that

"strictly speaking, there was no real social policy in the past

year."29 He conceded that the reform program amounted to

privatization, decontrolling most but by no means all prices, and

otherwise, nothing. He thus confirmed the implications of the

decree on bankruptcy. Not surprisingly the voters repudiated the

regime.

The Institutional Roots of Russia's Crises.

Hence the government's failure, despite its victory over

Parliament in October 1993 must be seen as preeminently a

political one, i.e., failure to build viable coherent state

institutions, laws, and policies, not shock therapy as such. The

failure there was to propound a theory that cannot be implemented

even where optimum conditions for it exist. This theory cannot be

implemented because it cannot substitute the state for society as

it intends to do, and do so in a technocratic, "scientific"

manner. The result is the further weakening of social structures

and the recourse to a new bureaucracy and presidentialism to make

up for the lack of viable social supports for any policy.

Consequently, the current political crisis will intensify unless
state institutions become coherent, legitimate, and viable.

Otherwise no policy is possible from this legislature. Should

that happen the sole alternatives would be either a perpetual

political and economic crisis whose dimensions and outcome cannot

be predicted or the turn towards presidential authoritarianism

described below.

Economic reform is as essential as before to rationalize

production relations, create rational prices, continue

privatization, and most of all achieve monetary stability as a

precondition to real growth. However, institutional and

structural political reforms are equally necessary to extricate

Russia from its miseries. This failure to create a viable

political order bespeaks the reformers' failure to 'crown the

edifice' (the language of the reformers of the 1860s and chosen

deliberately here) of their revolution from above, Russia's

traditional form of pathbreaking political reform. Formerly

everyone understood the need for a uniquely peaceful revolution

to sweep away Communism and let a gale of 'creative destruction'

destroy the old order to rebuild a viable democratic order in

economics, politics, and security policy. Only now do observers

see how crucial is political leadership where there are few or no

"prerequisites for democracy."30

Political, institutional, and constitutional reform are at

least as important as economic reforms and may even need to take

precedence over them if the latter are to succeed.31 Reformers

committed to Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek were ill-suited

to the task because they faced an unresolvable contradiction. The

vast economic and political measures that must be undertaken and

the total institutional and cultural restructuring that must

coincide with them are intrinsically long-term undertakings and

are only possible by state action. Yet, if one is going to oust

the state and totally renew it all at once, the magnitude of the

challenge facing government can be accomplished, if at all, by a

revolution from above that is only achievable by the most

powerful and antidemocratic states.32

In Russia's case this was even more demanding an agenda

because there was no Russian state to take over and remodel as in

Central Europe. Before 1991-92 there was no Russian state or

governing institutions and the state itself had always came

second to the party. Consequently, on top of everything else, the

reformers had to create a state along with a market and they

never understood how crucial that task was to for the success of

a market economy. Contrary to classical liberalism, no market can

succeed without a functioning and organized government. Equally

important, the political reforms to expand democracy will quickly

throw up institutions like Parliament and nascent interest groups

who try to manipulate outcomes to suit their interests or control

them to gain power over the process and distort the "pure theory"

to which the government is adhering.33 As many analysts now

realize, political democratization, even when successfully

carried out, almost unavoidably wars with economic reform.
Governments at all levels must now account to people who demand

quick results and organize into rival interest blocs that bargain

and negotiate with other interests and the leaders of the new

expanded political arena. Thus,

The bargaining and compromise that are routinely

required to achieve policy agreement in pluralist

democracies imply a degree of incrementalism that

economists have attacked as entirely inadequate and

possibly detrimental to the needs of East European

economies.34

It logically follows, therefore, that Russia and its former

satellites require a strong lawful state to implement reform.

That state must enjoy a firm basis of popular authority, and a

well-trained, capable, honest, depoliticized, and, we may add,

law-abiding bureaucracy.35 The absence of precisely these forces,

i.e., of social supports for the regime from below, contributed

to the election results and tempts Yeltsin and his colleagues to

elbow Parliament aside and govern by decree. Indeed, Yeltsin said

as much in justifying a strong presidency, citing, inter alia,

the extraordinary weakness of executive and state discipline. His

only answer was a strong presidency, not the rule of law and a

strong Parliament to which government must be accountable.36

Until then no government can be legitimate, because essentially

there will be rule by decree or caprice. If democratic legitimacy

does not come primarily from "shared institutional guarantees for

competitiveness," it will not come at all. Reformers will

inevitably be tempted to rule undemocratically to impose their

reforms.37

The elections and the coups that unseated Parliament in

September-October 1993 tell us that Russia still remains stuck in

its unending and still unconsummated revolutionary crisis. No new

order can be discerned. Because they failed to create legitimate

new relationships and structures and espoused the simple-minded

idea that letting the market loose would automatically lead to a

self-regulating equilibrium, as postulated by neoclassical

economics, reformers neglected the need to build political

support, as was done in the Czech Republic by Vaclav Klaus, or to

build viable institutions. Instead, in good Russian style, they

made another revolution from above with a basically elitist

mentality and implications.

Towards Presidentialism.

Paradoxically the so-called "Chicago boys" sought to use the

state to make this revolution from above to remove the state from

the economy. They failed to understand that the fact of state

regulation cannot be an issue in 1993. Rather the quality and

direction of that intervention is at issue and is crucial. Thus,

the reformers fell into well-known traps of Russian and Soviet

institutional history. Each minister quickly became an advocate
for his ministry at the expense of others.38 Like Tsarist

ministers they soon publicly and privately complained about each

other. Furthermore, like good Tsarist bureaucrats, they and

Yeltsin have increasingly resorted to rule by decree to freeze

out Parliament. Since they also believe the masses to be little

better than ignorant savages, they became both increasingly

highhanded and flouted any concept of rule by law. In true

bureaucratic fashion they moved to depoliticize policy as much as

possible and convert it into essentially administrative fiats, a

long-standing Russian practice.39 Worse yet, the new government

succumbed quickly to corruption, without which the network of

crime across the state and military cannot exist, and which

quickly became a weapon of political intrigue within the

cabinet.40 But perhaps most debilitating for the rule of law, an

essential ingredient of consolidated democracy, was the

bureaucratic and rule-making proliferation that has occurred

since 1991. Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakray observed in

early 1992 that,

While acknowledging that there were (as of early 1992)

more than twenty structures in Russia in the defense,

security, and enforcement sectors operating without any

coordination, Yeltsin's young legal adviser maintained

this was probably a positive development, as the

competitive struggle would allow the more competent

institutions to prevail.41

One can see why Shakhray might favor this process, but it

brings a smile of recognition to the student of Tsarist or Soviet

institutional history, since this exactly replicates their

beliefs and practices.42 Such phenomena of intra-bureaucratic

competition were and remain autocrats' constant tactics to

preserve their power lest the bureaucracy become a

self-perpetuating oligarchy not answerable to them.

These processes also reflect society's weakness wherein the

state could try to take over more and more social functions. But

Shakhray's view also explicitly renounces any effort by the state

to control its own rule-making, defense, and security apparatus

by law. This failure has had predictable results. All these

agencies have since grown in number across the entire range of

government, and neither the government, the old Parliament, nor

the Constitutional Court has any conception of being bound and

ruled by law. This state of affairs only leads to divided and

paralyzed government, and is the quintessential institutional

basis for the primacy of the Russian autocrat to continue. In

this sense William Safire was probably not far wrong when he

suggested that Yeltsin, although he will never admit it, was the

election's real winner since he got his constitution with its

formidable presidential powers, a convenient whipping boy with

which to blackmail external audiences, i.e., Zhirinovsky, and it

greatly diminished his proteges, all of whom were already

thinking how they would run against him.43 Yeltsin has

assiduously divided his proteges against each other to preserve
his own undiminished prerogative. While this tactic helps him

retain ultimate power and authority, it works against a rule of

law state, coherence, and viable policies. But it does carry on

Russia's political tradition of centralized autocratic rule.

Indeed, if we look at policies before and after the election

we see the steady trend to centralize power in Yeltsin above and

beyond any public, institutional, or legal scrutiny. Yeltsin,

since October 1993, has pursued "untrammelled power" that removes

him from accountability to anyone or any organization.44 Today,

like a Tsar, he says he is only answerable to his conscience.45

We need not even look to the crisis of September-October 1993

that led to the forceful end of Parliament as an example. Yeltsin

had good reason to believe that his enemies there, Khasbulatov

and Rutskoi, were planning their own military coup before that,

thus justifying Yeltsin's preemptive strike of disbanding

Parliament in September.46 So too they provoked the open use of

force in Moscow on October 3-4. Clearly neither they nor Yeltsin

believe they were bound by laws or answerable to anyone.

Yeltsin's defense of the Constitution's broad presidential

prerogatives could have come from the mouths of any Russian

leader. He claimed first, that the constitution really did bind

him in important ways although he had shown earlier his readiness

to rule by decree; second, that he had more interest in social

stability than anyone else; and third, that the people themselves

acknowledged the need for strong leadership, not only his.47 But

he went on to say,

I won't deny that in the draft the president's powers

are really considerable. But what do you want? In a

country that is used to Tsars or "great leader," in a

country where clear-cut interests have not been defined

and normal parties are only just beginning to emerge,

in a country where executive discipline is

extraordinarily weak and where legal nihilism is

enjoying an unrestrained spree--in such a country,

should we place our stakes only or mainly on

Parliament? In six months, if not before, people would

be demanding a dictator. Such a dictator would be

found, let me assure you, possibly in the Parliament

itself.48

Similar quotations from any of his Tsarist or Soviet

predecessors could easily be found. But this one shows that

Yeltsin does not see that the point of a Parliament is to impose

executive discipline under law. Worse yet, Deputy Premier Oleg

Soskovets announced in November 1993 that since Yeltsin had

decreed the constitution into being he could, if displeased with

any clauses, amend or abolish them by decree as well.49

On the other hand the need for executive self-discipline is

clear. In Yeltsin's government, ministers routinely in public,

and even in foreign press conferences, denounce their colleagues

and their programs and demand that they resign.50 Can one imagine
a Deputy Prime Minister telling a newspaper interviewer three

weeks before a Parliamentary election, "I have categorically

parted with any hope that our leaders know where they're

going."?51 But Fyodorov did just that in mid-November 1993 when

he denounced the lack of a political or economic strategy and

lambasted his colleagues for being unprofessional and kept in the

dark about many decisions until they come out--another hallmark

of Russian autocratic practice.52 Since the election it has only

gotten worse with Chernomyrdin publicly calling on Gaidar and

Chubais to resign.53

Presidentialism: Its Nature and Content.

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that we see a trend to

concentrate power in Yeltsin personally or in his office that one

might label presidentialism. This trend has also been accompanied

by visible moves towards imperial restoration in the CIS, more

public espousal of Russian chauvinism by officials and political

analysts, and the military's growing role in politics. The latter

phenomenon is seen in the very interesting military events in the

Caucasus, increased suspicion that the military is not under

strategic control, the security concept of May 1993, and the new

military doctrine in November 1993.54 Should those trends

eventually predominate they would naturally doom Russian

democracy. But the trends towards an imperial and authoritarian

polarization of power in the person and office of the President

can also be seen in more purely domestic issues as recently

decreed. These trends predate the elections whose returns will

probably still be used to justify their acceleration since public

and state support for a tough line at home and abroad are clearly

quite strong.

Presidentialism stems from the government's failure to

control itself and society as Madison demands of state makers.

Only now have reformers begun to understand the need for strong

social supports to buttress economic or political reforms.

Foreign Trade Minister Glazyev ruefully concludes that the

reformers' hypothesis, that by eliminating large-scale state

regulation and privatizing the economy market mechanisms would

come into play and automatically ensure the economy's emergence

from crisis and economic growth, was misplaced.55 Instead the

reformers misread the economy's nature. Therefore, he concludes

that macroeconomic methods to prevent excessive growth in the

money supply (i.e., tough monetarist policies) only work "if

certain conditions for them exist at the microlevel, the most

important of them being the presence of a competitive market

environment and strict budgetary limitations on enterprises."56

This statement is the newest reflection of an old dilemma of

Russian reformers and revolutionaries--the society cannot support

their vision which then is either disfigured or becomes the

object of an authoritarian drive to impose that vision upon

recalcitrant reality. Usually the result is a perpetual crisis.

Glazyev now calls for an undogmatic evolutionary policy based on
real microlevel economic processes, but it probably is too late.

Instead presidentialist authoritarianism will be called upon to

create from the top down the institutional prerequisites for

successful reform.

The presidentialist contempt for the law and the desire of

strong-willed figures in authority to get on with reform against

obstructive Communist local legislatures (Soviets) has also

spread to the local level, reproducing autocratic tendencies

across Russia. Local governments of all stripes are bitterly

warring with the center over economic and political powers and

mimic the authoritarian and presidentialist trends.

Chechnya's radical nationalist president, Dudayev,

ousted the parliament in April 1993; that republic is

now close to civil war. Kalmykia's reformist president

Ilyuzhimov disbanded the parliament and vowed to

replace it with a much smaller, more "professional"

body. Yeltsin did not oppose Ilyuzhimov's actions,

although they were in clear violation of the RF

constitution. In Mordova, the conservative parliament

ousted president Guslyannikov and ignored Yeltsin's

demands that the president be reinstated. . . . The

disregard of RF laws in all three republics illustrates

the confusion over which law takes precedence: that of

the center or that of the constituent republics.57

However one defines the struggle over the stability and

constitution of the Russian Federation, it also obviously

comprises local and central governments' fights to polarize power

and authority in the hands of one man or center.58 At the same

time, Yeltsin and his followers wish to impose a federal

constitution on Russia that levels all republics and regions and

takes powers away from the former. Like any federal constitution,

this one arranges power from the top down, not the bottom up as

in a confederation, a historical anathema to Russian reformers

and statesmen.59 Presidentialist centralism, if it is successful,

means institutional centralism in politics, law, and economics,

Russian imperialism, and abets Zhirinovsky's or his allies' game.

Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhray claims that throughout

the entire current "transitional period" Russia will develop as

an asymmetrical federation. Although Krays and Oblasts will be

legally equalized with republics, "we will not be able to

overcome national specifics, including the republic form of

government in those regions where 15 percent of the Russian

federation population lives but which occupy 51 percent of

Russian federation territory."60 He also favors a superior

position for the Russian people and that other peoples accept the

notion that although they live in the Russian state it is an

ethnic Russian state, not a state of all the peoples. Russia is

at once an ethnic Russian state that affirms Russian

"constitutional nationalism"61 but at the same time legally binds

other inhabitants to be thus Russified as well. Shakhray's state
strips them of any meaningful political rights while being at one

and the same time ethnic and supra-ethnic. This sleight of hand

is not far from Lenin's thinking on this question.62

It is also necessary, I think, to take into account

such an important factor as the renewal of the process

of the formulation of the Russian [Russkaya, i.e.,

ethnic Russian] nation after an interruption of 76

years. Who are the Russians in Tatarstan, for example?

A part of the Tatar people or a part of the Russian

nation? Unless we understand that the process of the

formation of the Russian nation is going on and that it

is upon the self-awareness [samochuvstviya in Russian]

of the Russian nation that the self-awareness of all

the other nations and peoples of the Russian Federation

depends there could be very regrettable consequences in

store for us. . . . the right to self-determination up

to and including secession and formation of a separate

state is unrealizable in Russia. It is impossible to

create 150 ethnically pure states on one territory. And

having recognized this reality, we must bear in mind

that Russia is our common home and the Russian

Federation is the single form of self-determination of

all 150 Russian Federation peoples.63

Although Russia is an ethnic state, nobody else there can

have one. Only later does he recommend creating national cultural

autonomous entities for other peoples who have, of course,

already self-determined themselves as Russians. One also wonders

whether Shakhray's frank espousal of the state as an ethnic

political formation except for Russia which self-determines other

peoples within it as well would meet with Yeltsin's approval if

Tallinn, Vilnius, Riga, and Kiev used the same argument. Such

thinking, not all that far from Zhirinovsky's, has long since put

those states on their guard, an apprehension that the elections'

explicit rightward drift, has only further reinforced.

Shakhray's views also comport well with those of

officialdom, for example, Yeltsin's personal representative in

Sverdlovsk province, Vitaly Mashkov. He rejected the province's

claim to republican status by saying, Moscow "is not against a

territorial principle for the [administrative] division of

Russia, or against its involving the consolidation of the members

of the Federation. But this process should proceed from above."64

Similarly the head of the Presidential Department on Work with

Territories, Nikolai Medvedev, remarked that secession from

Russia was out of the question since 18 of 21 federated republics

are subsidized, and that it was a mistake to keep local

administration intact after October 1993. He stated that "no

reform will succeed without strong state power" and cited Chile

as an example of overcoming crisis "through dictatorship."65 It

is worth noting that those who supported and planned the August

1991 coup were the first to invoke Pinochet and Chile. That this

is being done again can only have the most ominous implications.
The trends that predated the election: divided government,

divided policy, presidentialism, a unitarian top-down approach to

state building, and concentration of powers, not their

separation; have been strengthened since then. To judge from

statements and actions of Yeltsin and his advisors the drift to

strong and at least quasi-authoritarian rule will likely

continue, and true to Yeltsin's past instincts he will try to

find common ground with the right and even Zhirinovsky. Thus his

press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, whom The Financial Times

describes as a "Mephistophelean figure," reacted to the outcome

by saying that much of the Fascists' and Communists' programs,

"quite corresponded to the social aspect of the president's

policies--that is the social policy of the state, patriotism,

making Russia great."66 Since Chernomyrdin had already publicly

admitted that there was no social policy, this statement has

interesting connotations. In like manner Yeltsin advisor Andranik

Migranyan, an outspoken advocate of the 'iron hand' stated,

The results show the people want authoritarianism and

not democracy, . . . Russia has no chance to have a

democracy now. There is only a choice between different

types of authoritarianism. . . . This parliament will

be as hostile to executive power as the previous

parliament.---[But] The parliament is a kind of

circus.67

Medvedev also insists upon strong central authority and "the

dictatorship of law."68 In the aftermath of the October violence

the Moscow police and authorities already showed their desire for

the strong hand by their attempts to suppress civil liberties and

beat up or harass Asiatic and Georgian foreigners. Similarly the

government has never really permitted the media the space it

needs freely to criticize it during the elections and tried to

forbid any critique of Yeltsin and the proposed constitution.69

Indeed, much evidence indicates that the media is regarded as a

prize of the state, not as an independent agency.70 Recently

still more insidious policies have come to the fore.

By far the most dangerous one was Yeltsin's subordination of

the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and

Police directly under his personal control, and the personal

subordination of the Mobile forces to Defense Minister Grachev, a

harbinger of Praetorianism.71 Apparently there will also be

ministries for Russians abroad, a clearly imperialist move. At

home, on December 17, 1993, immigration and border controls

sought by Zhirinovsky came into force restricting the movement of

peoples from former Soviet republics into Russia. The authorities

have also suddenly found the internal passport system,

autocracy's most obnoxious symbol, useful to preserve Moscow's

"Russianness." The immigration and border laws also demand

preferential hiring for Russians and can deport workers without

work permits, i.e., companies must pay monthly minimum wages for

permits. This decree arbitrarily reintroduces ethnic
discrimination into the labor market.72 Yeltsin also reintroduced

subsidized loans at below interest rates to producers of

agricultural machinery, relics of the old order and a

contradiction to a policy that was supposed to be phased out.

Chernomyrdin simultaneously signed two decrees restricting

Gaidar's Ministry of Economics from allocating export quotas or

granting centralized credits without his permission. While that

exemplifies bureaucratic politics, the decrees also made the

distribution of these quotas the prerogative of the two top men

in government, Chernomyrdin and his supporter Soskovets, men who

are already overburdened and who cannot supervise these decisions

adequately. These decrees also further politicized control over

export quotas and centralized credits, reinforcing potential

recipients' dependence on the political authorities.73

Yeltsin also decreed the amalgamation of all the

government's, Council of Ministers', Parliament's, and

Constitutional Court's own financial and economic services into

one body under his business manager. Thus he bypassed all

nonpresidential institutions and deprived them of any fiscal

independence while giving himself and his manager a tremendous

lever to force compliance with presidential policies. For

instance, all contracts to construct and maintain real estate

under these organizations' jurisdiction are now under his control

and can be leased only if this directorate concurs.74 This secret

decree makes a mockery of all branches of government's economic

independence, and freedom of assembly. It strongly attacks the

principle of separation of powers and severely breaches the

principle of parliamentary control of the purse. And it reminds

journalists of the Central Committee's supervision of state

offices. There is also a report that Chernomyrdin is

contemplating creating a new first vice premier to oversee the

power ministries (Defense, Interior, Intelligence). The

implications of any such move would be enormous. They betray a

suspicion of the military, a possible effort to downgrade the

Security Council that already supervises these ministries, and

the possible creation of a Minister of National Security, who

would certainly be chosen for his political loyalty.75

Yeltsin's own administration now totals 3500 people and has

taken over both the Kremlin and the old Communist Party's

offices.76 As Izvestiia noted, that staff is taking over more and

more state functions, including legislative and judicial ones.77

The policies listed above reflect that trend and the inertia of

the state bent on controlling both itself and society by

undemocratic methods since it cannot either use or more likely

abide other methods and their shortcomings. These policies, along

with Glazyev's observations above, also display reformers'

belated political education and failure to know what land they

lived in. They naively believed, like Chubais, "that our work

spoke for itself."78 Like Yeltsin they did not create a political

party because they believed they acted for the whole people, the

national interest, and were above selfish appeals to bail out

dinosaurs and other partial interests at the expense of the
people and state interests. They duly disdained mere "politics"

and parties, believing them merely vehicles for selfish

factionalism, a view that dates back to Ivan the Terrible and has

invariably led to autocracy. When Yeltsin says "all parties are

equal before the president," he may think he is following De

Gaulle, but he really is following ancient Russian tradition.

Even De Gaulle headed a party and would have been quite impotent

without its organized mass support. Without stable presidential

and opposition parties, the only alternative is authoritarian

rule through a bureaucracy emancipated from all social supports

and constraints, the logical outcome of Russian institutional

history. Today we can expect further pressure for that trend to

develop. The Parliament's first days shows the Communists to be

the best organized force and able to forge a working coalition

while the reformers are dispirited, divided, and with Gaidar's

resignation from the government, increasingly isolated.79 Those

factors offer the government more reasons to bypass Parliament.

Future Possibilities.

Now Yeltsin and his government are hoisted by their own

petard and confront a situation where no real parties articulate

and aggregate interests. Interests' lobbies which predated these

new parties do that. Most of Parliament's delegates represent

only themselves, as shown by their vote on salaries, and most

parties are essentially inheritors of the local tradition of

personality politics and lack of organization, also a hallmark of

prerevolutionary parties. Only the Communists have over 500,000

members and the reform parties cannot join together. Although we

are likely to see these groups' continuing fragmentation, a

cabinet reshuffle, and attempts in and out of Parliament to coopt

or neutralize Zhirinovsky and his allies; the one thing we are

not likely to see is effective parliamentary action or power.

It is likely, for example, that different economic lobbies

will seek directly to influence and contact executive branch

officials rather than act through Parliament because the latter

is so weakly organized and a minor player. In that case a form of

corporatism and interpenetration among them and state officials,

which to some degree replicates the Soviet and Tsarist pattern of

lobbies and factions each seeking direct access to the Tsar or

General Secretary, will ensue. That breeds disdain for and

neglect of vital horizontal institutions and the replication of

parallel but contending vertical chains of "family retainers"

with the corruption and factionalism inherent in that system.

Such politics both characterized previous autocracies and

facilitated autocracy as its practitioners sought to channel and

thereby limit the exercise of autocratic power.80 The

constitution will be increasingly a facade since the government

cannot govern by it and dare not submit itself to the rule of

law. Parliament cannot do otherwise either.

The bitterness engendered by the violence in October 1993
will probably intensify because Parliament and/or the government

may well be too Balkanized to act coherently for the national

interest. That national interest, we believe, means privatization

and monetary stabilization, as well as a social net for those

caught in the process, not bailouts for the dinosaurs. It also

means coherent institutional reform toward a genuine separation

of powers and rule of law. To bring this off in peaceful

conditions is hard enough, but given the mistakes in Russia to

date it will probably be years and many zig-zags before and if

Russia approaches European standards in either direction. Yet

delays in democratic transformations are warning signs that

trouble is ahead and that they may not be consummated.81

Presidentialism, by its absolute nature, tends towards

winner take all politics, strong but inflexible character, and

inability to play a truly representational role, and along with

other factors, will lead either to autocracy, dual power in a

struggle with a similarly inclined Parliament (as in 1992-93) or

to a breakdown of parliament and governance that may only be

reconciled by military intervention.82 Yeltsin has invited this

by his statement on December 22, 1993 that he will stay above the

rival parliamentary parties which "should be equal before the

president." More accurately this means they should be equally

weak and divided to give him a free hand to conduct what looks

like a Gaullist experiment in leadership.83 But while the

conscious model may be Gaullism, the deeper tradition is the

Russian autocrat standing above parties who seek to influence him

directly and whom he can manipulate only by playing one off

against the other.

The problem is that this mode of governance undoes both the

rule of law and coherent institution building, the sine qua non

of successful political transformation. In any case it will not

be democracy, but likely resemble the interwar successor states

in Eastern Europe where democracy was blocked and dictatorships

generally triumphed, or Russia in 1905-17 when the Duma, the

crown, and the government could not cooperate. Max Weber

felicitously termed this sham-constitutionalism,

Schein-konstitutionalismus, a facade of constitutional and

legitimate legal authority behind which went on the real business

of state.84 Unfortunately it was not stable then and survived

neither internal socio-political transformation nor war.

In today's desperate economy, overwhelming pressure towards

strident mass politicization, dubious control over the armed

forces, and where neighboring states are descending into an even

greater crisis than Russia's, it remains an open question whether

or how long this 'transitional period' and its accompanying

structures may survive. At the same time observers have no

confidence that any government can resist pressures from below

and truly turn back from the abyss. As Sergei Khrushchev writes,

there is no doubt that facing the threat of a general strike by

coal miners, oil workers, teachers, and doctors who have not been

paid for months, the government will pay off their debts and
restart the inflationary cycle.85 But an autocrat like

Zhirinovsky or more sober types could do just that. Thus

Yeltsin's presidentialism cannot inspire confidence in its

ability to control either government or society. The government's

viability, let alone democracy's durability, remains an open

question.

Choosing Between Authoritarianisms.

Many besides Migranyan see Russia's choices as either "mild"

or harsh authoritarianism. That choice also need not be between

Yeltsin and Zhirinovsky. Others could do just as well.86

Obviously that is no choice but without Yeltsin a mild

authoritarianism will be unchecked and perhaps uncheckable and

its future unknown. The situation is not unlike 1922-23 in the

USSR.87 Furthermore, democratization means installing legitimate

and long-lasting constitutions and institutions to immunize

Russia against the decisive influence of personality or of the

breakdowns on its periphery or in its neighborhood.

Here the international dimension enters the scene.

Zhirinovsky's victory intensifies the already growing fears of

revived Russian imperialism that we find across Eurasia. This

military-imperial trend of Russian policy not only threatens

Russia's neighbors but also Russia itself because Russia cannot

sustain an empire without undoing democracy, demilitarization of

its security policies, and fiscal stability. Yet along with

presidentialism those negative trends are making a steady

comeback. At the army's urging and at a ruinous cost to fiscal

stability and conversion of military resources to civilian

productive investment, Yeltsin scrapped plans to halve the army

and raised soldiers' salaries while exempting them from income

taxes. An army of 2 million men is now the goal since Yeltsin has

had to buy the army.88 But he increases neither his control nor

their respect for him by so doing, a potentially explosive

combination.89 Kostikov told ITAR-TASS that "undisputed emphasis

in foreign policy will be given to protection of Russia's

national interests and the rights of Russians and

Russian-speaking people--on the basis of pan-national

solidarity."90 At recent CIS meetings Russia tried to win special

status for the Russian diaspora in the members' states including

dual citizenship, and sought to create a special Russian state

office to oversee this process.91 This is the most explosive

foreign policy issue imaginable and it alarmed all CIS members.

But perhaps the most alarming move is the treaty that essentially

incorporates Belarus' and its economy into Russia's. This treaty

restores a ruble union, allows Belarus' central bank to issue

rubles at a 1:1 ratio with Russia's, grants it access to Russian

gold and hard currency reserves, and allows it to exchange rubles

for hard currency at Moscow's hard currency auctions. Moscow will

also transfer 1.6 billion rubles to Minsk at the 1:1 ratio

although Russia's currency trades at five times that value. It

also will charge below world market prices for energy to
Belarus.92 This destroys any hope of fiscal stability in 1994,

drove Gaidar and Fyodorov out of the government, cements renewed

imperial policy through an inflationary ruble union by giving

Russia control of Belarus' industry, and satisfies conservatives'

wishes. Russia is choosing empire and inflation over stability

and the market.93 Chernomyrdin openly linked the accord to

pressure on Ukraine to fall in line with it.94 This agreement

also accords with successful defense and heavy industrial efforts

to get new state subsidies from Yeltsin.95

This lurch to the right is partly a reaction to the

election. But presidentialism predated the reformers' unexpected

defeat. In October 1993, Yeltsin sought "unfettered" powers to be

"invulnerable" to legislative, judicial, or republican

challenges.96 As reformers' divisions became clear, Yeltsin

administration officials sought to place the executive branch in

an unassailable position and eliminate legislative and judicial

restraints on presidential power.97

The International Repercussions of Russia's Crisis.

The United States has tolerated all the imperial tendencies

in security policy and has minimized their negative

implications.98 Yet despite this forbearance, steady pressure on

Ukraine to denuclearize, and the crafting of a NATO policy

explicitly aimed at satisfying arrogant Russian demands, Russian

policy continues to run faster towards its appointment in

Samarra, e.g., the accord with Minsk. As numerous analyses of

Russia suggest, a benign security climate is essential to reduce

the military's role in overall security policy and to induce a

general ease and relaxation at home. Security abroad obviates a

need for internal enemies because any credible notion of an

internal enemy is tied to the visibility of an external one. Thus

the current world situation, more benign than any since 1870,

should limit military intervention in politics, the ability to

sustain an imperial policy, and authoritarian prospects. Yet that

is not happening. Purely internal developments are driving

Russian policy in those directions despite our forbearance.

The foregoing analysis suggests that the stress on elections

found in our political science does not suffice alone for

democratization.99 More is needed, e.g., separation of powers,

legitimate and democratic political institutions, and the rule of

law. As Dimitri Simes suggested, in early 1994, what we face is

the return of Russian history.100 Therefore we must restudy

Russian history (and not just the superficial version that seems

to be all Sovietologists remember from their education),

particularly its abiding institutional and political dilemmas and

learn from them. Close study of those trends will alert us to the

fact that terms like rule of law state, constitution, democracy,

in fact our whole political vocabulary, still mean something very

different in today's Russia than in the West. While contemporary

political science and analysis has much to offer, ultimately they
fail to give either full or true answers to what is happening in

Russia, the meaning of those events, or a way out.101 The same is

true for economics. After having formulated shock therapy, in

1992 Jeffrey Sachs publicly derided the reformers for not being

politicians but mere problem solvers, powerfully underscoring our

blindness to our ideas' impact in Russia.102

This fact alerts us to yet another relevant consequence of

Russian history. In few other places is the disjunction between

ideas, or what politicians think they are doing, so widely

separated from real developments and outcomes. Those who thought

they had ejected the state from the market by a radical

'scientific' revolution from above and abroad have unwittingly

paved the way for renewed authoritarianism and bureaucratic

despotism. If elections and at least seemingly democratic laws to

form capitalist markets sufficed, we could clearly say we have a

democratizing regime as the bulk of our neoliberal theory tells

us. Unfortunately that is not the case and opposing trends have

gained ground. Gaidar's and Fyodorov's resignation is the latest

sign of that trend. Our government may think Russia is

continuing, however imperfectly, to reform and quote Tiutchev

that one must believe in Russia. However historians, politicians,

and political analysts should generally prefer prose to poetry,

especially in Russia. In that case we might, with Gogol, observe

that Russia's troika is out of control and galloping madly into

the future. Russia surely has a rendezvous with destiny.

Unhappily it promises to be harder, more arduous, longer, and

more troubled than anyone can see.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 2

1. Fred Hiatt, "Russian Elite See Vote as Betrayal," The

Washington Post, December 21, 1993, A17; Margot Light, "Democracy

Russian-Style," The World Today, December 1993, p. 229.

2. Ibid., "'Democratic Organizations' Urge 'Enlightened

Authoritarianism'," Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central

Eurasia (henceforth FBIS-SOV), 93-243, December 21, 1993, p. 11.

3. "Gaydar Calls for Austerity, Admits Adjustment,"

FBIS-SOV, 93-246, December 27, 1993, p. 6.

4. Daniel Williams, "U.S. Focus in Russia Overlooked

Nationalism," The Washington Post, December 19, 1993, p. A33;

Robert D. Novak, "Reformers Overboard?" The Washington Post, January 20, 1994, p. A27; and for a bitter and probably correct

attack on U.S. policy, particularly Undersecretary Talbott, see

Steven Erlanger, "2 Western Economists Quit Russian Posts," The

New York Times, January 22, 1994, p. 4.

5. Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on

Democratic Transitions, Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1990, pp. 76-86; Samuel P. Huntington, The

Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,
Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 29.

Another fact that was lost sight of is, as Che Guevara observed,

that revolution cannot succeed against a government that, "has

come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or

not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional

legality."

 6. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Is Abandoning 'Shock Therapy' for

the Russians," The New York Times, December 21, 1993, pp. A1, 14.

7. Peter Reddaway, "Visit to a Maelstrom," The New York

Times, January 10, 1994, p. A17; Ann Devroy, "President to Urge

Yeltsin To Press Reform Agenda," The Washington Post, January 6,

1994, pp. A1, 18; Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, "A Capital-Starved

New World Order: Geopolitical Implications of a Global Capital

Shortage in the 1990s," Washington Quarterly, Vol. XIV, No. 4,

Autumn 1991, pp. 21-38.

8. "Can Russia Reform?" The Economist, December 11, 1993, p.

17.

9. "Chernomyrdin On Course of Reforms," Foreign Broadcast

Information Service Central Eurasia: FBIS Report (henceforth

FBIS-USR), 93-151, December 1, 1993, pp. 4-6.

10. Fred Hiatt, "Yeltsin Promises to Hold Course Despite

Election," The Washington Post, December 23, 1993, p. A14;

"Yeltsin Holds News Conference on Vote Results: Delivers Opening

Statement," FBIS-SOV, 93-244, December 22, 1993, p. 1.

11. "Chernomyrdin On Course of Reforms," p. 3-4; John Lloyd,

"Russia's Economic Prospects Start to Improve," Financial Times, January 7, 1994, p. 2; "Real Earnings Show Surprising Gain as

Output Falls," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press

(henceforth CDPP), Vol. XLV, No. 44, December 1, 1993, p. 7;

"Cruel To Be Kind," The Economist, December 11, 1993, pp. 23-24;

"Chubays Comments on Progress of Privatization," FBIS-SOV, December 1, 1993, pp. 43-44.

12. "Cruel To Be Kind," p. 24.

13. Sergei Khrushchev, "Economic Future in Russia," Brown

Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. I, No. 1, Winter 1993-1994, p.

163.

14. Michael Scammell, "What's Good for the Mafia Is Good for

Russia," The New York Times, December 26, 1993, p. E11.

15. "The 55th Parallel," The Economist, December 25,

1993-January 7, 1994, p. 62.

16. Leszek Balcerowicz, "Economic Development and Reforms in

the Partner Countries," NATO's Sixteen Nations, No. 5-6, 1993,

pp. 16-19.
17. Ben Slay, "The Postcommunist Economic Transition:

Barriers and Progress," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Bulletin,

(henceforth RFE/RL Bulletin), Vol. II, No. 39, October 1, 1993,

pp. 35-44.

18. Peter J. Stavrakis, "State-Building in Post-Soviet

Russia: The Chicago Boys and the Decline of Administrative

Capacity," Occasional Papers of the Kennan Institute for Advanced

Russian Studies, No. 254, Washington, DC, 1993, pp. 25-42.

19. Michael S. Lelyveld, "US Experts See Russia Near

Economic Collapse," Journal of Commerce, September 14, 1993, p.

1; Jeffrey Sachs, "The Reformers' Tragedy," The New York Times,

January 23, 1994, p. E17.

20. "Does Not Want To Head Government," FBIS-SOV, 93-228,

November 30, 1993, pp. 17-18; "Chernomyrdin's Team's Economic

Performance Assessed," FBIS-SOV, 93-240, December 16, 1993, p.

58.

21. "Cruel To Be Kind," p. 24.

22. Stephen Blank, Challenging the New World Order: The Arms

Transfer Policy of the Russian Republic, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, October 1, 1993, pp. 5-33.

23. Ibid.; "Military Lobbyist Views Military Production,"

FBIS-SOV, 94-003, January 5, 1994, p. 45.

24. Steven Erlanger, "A 'New' Russia: Yeltsin Needs

Consensus and Cash," The New York Times, December 23, 1993, p.

A8.

25. Margaret Shapiro, "Yeltsin Calls Vote Protest on

Poverty," The Washington Post, December 22, 1993, pp. A23, 26.

26. "Chernomyrdin On Course of Reforms," p. 6.

27. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

28. Lee Hockstader, "Nearly Half of Firms Sold Says Russia's

Top Privatizer," The Washington Post, December 29, 1993, p. A14;

"Chernomyridn's Team's Economic Performance Assessed," pp. 58-59.

29 "Chernomyrdin On Course of Reforms," p. 6.

30. Di Palma, p. 8.

31. Thomas R. Baylis, The West and Eastern Europe: Economic

Statecraft and Political Change, Westport, CT: Praeger

Publishers, 1993, pp. 183-188.

32. Ibid., p. 183.
33. Ibid., p. 175-186.

34. Ibid., p. 186.

35. Ibid., pp. 186-187.

36. "Yeltsin Defends Exercise of Presidential Powers," CDPP,

Vol. XLV, Vol. 46, December 15, 1993, pp. 5-6.

37. Di Palma, pp. 72-73.

38. Stavrakis, pp. 18-37.

39. Ibid.

40. "Democratic Party, Communist Party Agendas," FBIS-SOV,

93-228, November 30, 1993, p. 28.

41. Quoted in Stavrakis, p. 21.

42. Stephen Blank, The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's

Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924, Westport, CT: Greenwood

Publishing Group, 1994; George Yaney, The Systematization of

Russian Government 1705-1911, Urbana, IL.: University of Illinois

Press, 1973; and George Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian

Reform in Russia, 1861-1930, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois

Press, 1982.

43. William Safire, "Reading Yeltsin's Mind," The New York

Times, December 20, 1993, p. A19.

44. John Lloyd, Dmitri Volkov, "Yeltsin Seeks Unfettered

Powers for Presidency," The Financial Times, November 25, 1993,

p. 24; Justin Burke, "Rift Grows Among Russian Democrats,"

Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1993, pp. 1, 4; Dimitri

Simes, "The Return of Russian History," Foreign Affairs, Vol.

LXXIII, No. 1, January-February, 1994, p. 71.

45. Ibid.

46. Alexander Rahr, "Yeltsin and New Elections," RFE/RL

Research Report, Vol. II, No. 34, August 27, 1993, pp. 1-6.

47. "Yeltsin Defends Exercise of Presidential Powers," pp.

5-6.

48. Ibid.

49. Vera Tolz, "Constitution Could Be Reversed By Decree,

Official Says," RFE/RL News Briefs, Vol. II, No. 49, November 30,

1993, p. 2.

50. Fred Hiatt, "Russia's Irrelevant Chaos," The Washington
Post, September 18, 1993, p. A1; "Shokhin Says Internal Rifts

Hurt Trade Talks," FBIS-SOV, 93-230, December 2, 1993, pp. 9-10.

51. "Fedorov on Current Political, Economic Situation,"

FBIS-USR, 93-153, December 4, 1993, p. 34.

52. Ibid.

53. John Lloyd, "Yeltsin Sets Opposing Courses," The

Financial Times, December 24, 1993, p. 2.

54. Mark Smith, Pax Russica: Russia's Monroe Doctrine,

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies,

Whitehall Papers No. 21, 1993; "Osnovnye Polozheniia Voennoi

Doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Izlozhenie)," Krasnaia Zvezda,

November 19, 1993, pp. 3-8.

55. "Glazyev Calls for a More Realistic Reform Policy,"

CDPP, Vol. XLV, No. 46, December 15, 1993, pp. 13-14.

56. Ibid., p. 13.

57. Jessica Eve Stern, "Why Russia is Not a State,"

International Security, Forthcoming, Spring 1994.

58. Vera Tolz, "Thorny Road Toward Federalism in Russia,"

RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. II, No. 48, December 3, 1993, pp.

1-8.

59. Ibid.; "The Text of the Draft Constitution," CDPP, Vol.

XLV, No. 45, December 8, 1993, pp. 4-16.

60. "Shakhray Interviewed on Political Beliefs," FBIS-SOV,

93-231, November 18, 1993, pp. 11-12.

61. Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the

Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review, Vol. LI, No. 4,

Winter 1992, pp. 654-673.

62. Blank, The Sorcerer as Apprentice, Chapter 1.

63. "Shakhray Interviewed," p. 12.

64. "Urals Republic Abolished," CDPP, Vol. XLV, No. 45,

December 8, 1993, p. 24.

65. "Yeltsin Aide Comments on Secession Issue," FBIS-SOV, 93-234, December 8, 1993, p. 18.

66. John Lloyd, "Bitter Harvest of Disunity," The Financial

Times, December 15, 1993, p. 15.

67. Daniel Sneider, "Russians Spurn Reformers, Embrace

Authoritarianism," Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 1993,
pp. 1, 18.

68. "Further on News Conference," FBIS-SOV, 93-235, December

9, 1993, p. 33.

69. For example see Julia Wishnevsky, "Yeltsin 'Will not

Allow' Criticism," RFE/RL News Briefs, Vol. II, No. 49, November

29, 1993, p. 1.

70. Vitaly Korotich, "Press Freedom: New Dangers," Uri

Ra'anan, Keith Armes, Kate Martin, Eds., Russian Pluralism--Now

Irreversible?, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 140-146;

"Further Reaction to Yeltsin Edict on Media Organs," FBIS-SOV,

93-246, December 27, 1993, pp. 50-51.

71. Daniel Sneider, "Russia's New Parliament May Prove Just

as Problematic For Yeltsin," Christian Science Monitor, January

12, 1994, pp. 1, 18.

72. Leyla Boulton, "Yelstin In Bid To Appease Opponents,"

The Financial Times, December 19, 1993, p. 3.

73. "The Economy," CDPP, Vol. XLV, No. 46, December 15,

1993, pp. 17-18.

74. "Presidential Administration's Powers Reviewed,"

FBIS-SOV, 93-238, December 14, 1993, p. 62; "Yeltsin Takes

Economic Control of 'Power' Bodies," FBIS-SOV, 93-220, November

17, 1993, pp. 53-54.

75. "Plan for 'Watchdog' of Power Ministries Rumored,"

FBIS-SOV, 93-239, December 15, 1993, p. 65.

76. Celestine Bohlen, "Russia's Government Moves, But Seems

Unsure of its Path," The New York Times, January 7, 1994, pp.

A1-2.

77. Ibid.

78. Leyla Boulton, "Voters Reveal A Weariness With

Politics," The Financial Times, December 14, 1993, p. 2.

79. Steven Erlanger, "Russia's New Parliament Chooses Ally

of the Communists as Speaker," The New York Times, January 16,

1994, pp. 1, 5.

80. Stephen Blank, "The Formation of the Soviet North

Caucasus 1918-1924," Central Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1993,

pp. 13-32; see also the military's demand for "its own man in

Parliament," "Need for Military Representation in Parliament,"

Joint Publications Research Service Military Affairs (henceforth

JPRS-UMA), 93-045, December 22, 1993, pp. 7-8.

81. Di Palma, p. 153.
82. Ibid., pp. 217-218.

83. Jim Hoagland, "Man of the Year(s)," The Washington Post,

December 28, 1993, p. A15.

84. Richard Pipes, "Max Weber and Russia," in Richard Pipes,

Russia Observed: Collected Essays on Russian and Soviet History,

Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 151-176.

85. Khrushchev, pp. 163-164.

86. Had Lenin returned, chastened by illness and what he saw

during his idleness, he may well have shunned further revolutions

from above and left behind a milder form of Leninism, perhaps a

Yugoslav form (for argument's sake). But Stalin built on that

foundation and created a still more monstrous, even unimaginably

monstrous system on that basis.

87. Hoagland, p. A17.

88. "Defense Minister Grachev Holds News Conference: Details

Strength of Armed Forces," FBIS-SOV, 93-249, December 30, 1993,

p. 37.

89. "Yeltsin Said to Scale Back Plans to Slash Army's Size,"

The Washington Post, December 30, 1993, p. 18.

90. Leyla Boulton, "Yeltsin Pledges Tough Foreign Policy To

Please Nationalists," The Financial Times, January 4, 1994, p. 1.

91. Steven Erlanger, "Ex-Soviet Lands Rebuff Yeltsin On

Protecting Russians Abroad," The New York Times, December 25,

1993, pp. A1, 4.

92. John Lloyd, "Reformers Set for Opposition Role in

Russia," The Financial Times, January, 9, 1994, p. 1; John Lloyd,

"Russia To Incorporate Belarus Into its Economy," The Financial

Times, January 7, 1994, p. 1; "Reform Politicians Lose Spirit As

Old Ways Die Hard in Russia," The Financial Times, January 9,

1994, p. 2.

93. Ibid.

94. "Reform Politicians Lose Spirit," p. 2.

95. Ibid.

96. John Lloyd; Dmitri Volkov, p. 24.

97. Justin Burke, pp. 1, 4.

98. Williams, "U.S. Focus in Russia," p. A33.
99. For example, Huntington and Di Palma as well as the

large literature on comparative democratization in Europe and

Latin America.

100. Simes, pp. 67-82.

101. For an acknowledgement of this fact see John Armstrong,

"New Essays in Sovietological Interpretation," Post-Soviet

Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 1, April-June 1993, p. 173. For an

assessment that really propounds that Russia is reaching these

goals see Stephen Sestanovich, "Russia Turns the Corner," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1, January-February 1994, pp. 83-98.

102. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University, "U.S. Diplomacy Toward the Former

Soviet Union: Building a Strategic Partnership," Washington, DC,

December 1992, pp. 82-83. Sachs also observed that Russia's

reformers were proud they were not politicians but dealing with

the pressure from critics was a political task. At the same time

the perseverance of the military-industrial complex was a problem

since it particularized politics and made the government worry

about that interest rather than the people's interests. But while

this association was the most powerful interest group or faction

in Russia, "it is also reason to think that a top-down reform can

work."
CHAPTER 3

THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS AND THE

FUTURE OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS:

THE SPECTER OF ZHIRINOVSKY

Jacob W. Kipp

Introduction: The Russian Military.

In 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev embarked upon the process of

trying to revive the Soviet system by reinvigorating "real

socialism," his reform-minded advisors identified three distinct

sets of institutions/elites within the Soviet polity which might

serve as levers of change, i.e., the Communist Party, the KGB,

and the Armed Forces. Gorbachev and his advisors choose to focus

their hopes on the Party, since they believed the KGB to be

institutionally opposed to systemic reform and viewed the

military as a drain upon resources and a bastion of

conservatism.1

In the end, however, the Party, too, proved unreformable.

And in the 11 months leading up to the August Coup of 1991, as

the process of reform got out of control and Gorbachev vacillated

between repression and radical reform, conservatives in all three

institutions made common cause in an attempt to restore order and

central control. Rumors of coups and counter-coups abounded. In

the first instance, after November 1990 this was in open alliance

with Gorbachev in trying to suppress nationalist calls for

independence in the Baltic states, culminating in the

unsuccessful military crackdown in Vilnius, Lithuania, in January

1991. By that time, however, there were already signs of deep

political divisions within all three institutions, associated

with the emergence of an alternative power center in Moscow in

the form of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters within the

government of the Russian Federation. Gorbachev's drift back

towards the center and Yeltsin's victory in the democratic and

free elections for President of the Russian Federation in June

1991 gave a new cast to negotiations over a new union treaty. By

the summer of 1991 the opponents of reform in all three elites

were making common cause to restore order before the union treaty

could be signed. At the same time reformers within all three

institutions were rallying to Yeltsin's banner. There was a

distinct shift in the Armed Forces as Party control broke down

and politization threatened to undermine military

professionalism. Although senior military figures played leading

roles in plotting the August coup, others sided with Yeltsin and

the vast majority of the officer corps opted to stay out of the

struggle.

In the aftermath of the coup a purge of senior military

leadership and renewed efforts to push through military reform

coincided with the rapid and final disintegration of the Union
itself, leaving many analysts to fear that with the collapse of

the Soviet Union the successor states would be left with a

"masterless army." There were fears that it would also become a

hungry army and that its dissatisfactions would provide the spark

for civil war. Efforts to maintain a unified defense ministry to

direct a unified armed force for the Commonwealth of Independent

States proved only a stop-gap measure. In the meantime the

Russian government had embarked upon a series of reforms to

democratize the government, speed the marketization and

privatization of the economy, and open the society. By May the

Russian government had begun building a national ministry of

defense and armed forces. This attempt to re-nationalize the

Soviet Army went hand-in-hand with efforts to bring it home from

abroad, to reduce its size, and to reshape it to fit the needs of

a democratic state. At the same time, the Army was drawn into

fighting on the periphery of the old Soviet empire in Moldova,

the Caucasus, and Central Asia. For the last 18 months the

Russian Army has loomed as a key factor in domestic politics and

in Russia's relations with the "near abroad." This role proved a

particularly difficult challenge to the military when the

executive and legislative branches of government moved into

direct confrontation over the constitutional limits of each's

authority as they did in the late spring of 1993. By late summer,

soldiers were complaining that this political crisis would place

an unacceptable strain on civil-military relations, as each of

the sides tried to gain the military's support. In September,

Yeltsin brought the crisis to a head by adjourning the

parliament, calling for new elections for parliament and for a

referendum on the new constitutions, and removing his Vice

President. In October 1993, as the crisis reached its climax, a

pofessional military, which wanted to stay above domestic

political disputes, was drawn into armed struggle between Yeltsin

and his opponents in the White House. In putting down that armed

revolt the officer corps found itself in an awkward and

unpleasant position. A month after the suppression of the coup

President Yeltsin rewarded the officer corps with a new military

doctrine. But rumors about conflicts among even those who finally

supported the President, as they jockeyed for positions,

suggested an unstable situation with the military itself.2

Whether Russia's military would play king-maker in the

future, be content to be the power behind a civil government, or

would assume overt control remains a topic of domestic and

international speculation. In the scenario planning discussed in

the Yergin-Gustafson forecast of Russia's future, the military

occupies a key position in the resolution of the three key issues

confronting Russia in its transition period, i.e., building

democracy, a market economy, and a nation-state. In one scenario,

that of the "Russian bear," the military actually takes power.3

The outcome of the transition period will shape Russian policy

and thereby have a profound impact on the peace and stability of

Eurasia. In this context military-to-military contacts have

developed between the United States and Russian Armed Forces.
Military-To-Military Contacts.

Military-to-military contacts between the U.S. and Russian

Armed Forces were born from those developed with the Soviet Armed

Forces. While U.S.-Soviet military-to-military contacts between

the cold war adversaries can be dated as far back as the 1970s

and the Carter administration, they were disrupted by the Soviet

intervention in Afghanistan. Contemporary contacts began with

Gorbachev's strategic disengagement from Afghanistan and

developed under the leadership of Admiral Crowe, the Chief of

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief of the

Soviet General Staff. Initially, such contacts were part of the

confidence-building measures associated with winding down the

cold war and involved a wide range of activities from joint

conferences, talks, and exchange visits. This program was well

underway in late 1991 when the Soviet Union disappeared. A period

of hiatus followed, while new institutions appeared and the shape

of U.S.-Russian relations took form. By the summer of 1992, the

U.S. Joint Staff under General Powell was once again actively

engaged in developing a program of military-to-military contacts

with the Russian General Staff. The content of the program had

changed significantly. Democratic Russia was viewed as a partner

with whom it was possible to conduct a radically different type

of contact program. The mutually- agreed upon bilateral program

stressed contacts that would enhance professionalism, build

mutual confidence, contribute to downsizing and defense

conversion, and encourage the subordination of the military to

civil authorities within a democratic government. Russian

officers attended U.S. service schools. American and Russian

delegations visited schools, facilities and units. The planning

of joint staff exercises in the area of U.N.-mandated

peacekeeping activities has gone forward. The program has

encouraged military transparency in many areas. In short, a

bilateral program of cooperation and partnership has been

developed over the last year and a half.

Over the same period, military-to-military contacts have

also taken a multilateral form. U.S. military representatives

participated in North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

military-to-military contacts. In June 1993 General Grachev, the

Russian Minister of Defense, was an invited participant at the

opening of the Marshall Center for European Security Studies, an

effort by the U.S. Department of Defense and German Ministry of

Defense to support the efforts of Central and East European

states, including Russia, to develop effective civil-military

relations and national security, decision-making processes in

keeping with democratic societies. At the opening of the Center

then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin met with General Grachev and

discussed the possibility of conducting U.S.-Russian peacekeeping

exercises.4

NATO has further developed its military-to-military contacts

program in Central and Eastern Europe in conjunction with its
NACC initiative and intends to deepen those contacts, including

those with Russia. In October 1993 in the face of mounting

pressure for immediate NATO membership by several Central

European states, Secretary Aspin spoke of an alternative to

immediate membership, which he identified as "partners for

peace." Aspin spoke of all the states from the former Soviet bloc

and spoke of military-to-military contacts as an important part

of such relations.5 In January 1994 NATO embarked upon its own

Partnership for Peace and extended an invitation to Russia to

join in those activities. These will include closer military

cooperation and peacekeeping field exercises in 1994.6 The United

States had provided leadership in developing the concept of

Partnership for Peace as a device for contributing to increased

stability and peace in Central and Eastern Europe. The Russian

government, which was hostile to the rapid expansion of NATO into

Central and Eastern Europe, has said that it will look favorably

upon cooperation under the Partnership for Peace, and so the task

has emerged to coordinate the partnership initiatives with the

existing the U.S.-Russian bilateral program of military contacts.

On January 14, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin signed a joint

declaration heralding the achievement of "a new stage" in

relations between Russia and the United States characterized by a

"mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual

advantage, and recognition of each other's national interests."

The declaration also stressed that Moscow and Washington are

ready to "move forward on the path of openness and mutual trust"

in their relations and pledged to continue efforts to overcome

the division of Europe. Among the "urgent tasks" related to these

efforts are "preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and protection of

human rights and the rights of national and other minorities."7

Thus, in bilateral and multilateral forums

military-to-military contacts with Russia have developed in the

direction of partnership with the objective of enhancing peace

and security in Europe. Given the intensity of the conflict

between reformers and counter-reformers, the fate of democratic

reform and social transformation depends in good measure on the

role the Russian military will chose to play in the continuing

crisis. One road leads towards democratic consolidation, national

rejuvenation, and the construction of a vital civic society. The

other leads towards revived authoritarianism, national

chauvinism, and the risk of civil war, regional war and even

general war. Aid to Russia is an issue of historic proportions

and assistance in transforming the residual Soviet Armed Forces

into a Russian national army under elected civilian control is a

vital part of that process.

Military assistance in this case may be the best insurance

against militarism. A key to dealing with the military dimension

of this crisis is Western engagement of the Russian Armed Forces,

not as the old adversary, but as a new partner.

Military-to-military contacts should address those defense and

security problems that are our common legacy from the cold war.

The capital issue is not who won the cold war--in a profound
sense we all did by avoiding the threat of "absolute war" which

hung over our head for four decades--but who will win the peace.

Professional contacts, based upon mutual respect, are one of

the ways of undercutting the Russian officer corps' isolation,

frustration and fear. These contacts can be about problem

solving, finding ways in which the U.S. military can support the

processes of demobilization, military reform, defense conversion,

and the development of new military doctrine. Much benefit will

come from encouraging military professionalism and discouraging

political adventurism. While Russia's crisis is immediate, the

problem of integrating the new national armed forces into their

states and societies exists across Central and Eastern Europe and

in every one of the successor states from the former Soviet

Union. Progress has been substantial, if viewed against the

backdrop of four decades of cold war. Under the International

Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Russian and other

East European officers are being educated at American military

institutions. More such contacts, including American officers

attending Russian military schools, are in the process of

development. Exchanges of instructors between military academies

and our senior military colleges and universities are being given

serious consideration. These and other contacts are aimed at

mid-level officers, the professional center of gravity of each

army, and have high potential dividends for long-term

cooperation. These programs are designed to turn cold war

adversaries into partners. The process of military reform and

doctrinal development in Russia is turning the former Soviet

Armed Forces into a national armed forces. If this leads to a new

relationship, openness, cooperation, and professionalism will

play a key role. Russia's new military doctrine speaks favorably

of such military-to-military contacts which are seen as a prudent

investment in good will and are intended to make a democratic

outcome of Russia's transformation more likely.

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry in a recent speech at

George Washington University, given on the eve of his departure

to Russia, made a forceful argument for military cooperation with

Russia even in the face of the continuing instability there. In

that speech he noted that a successful partnership with a

democratic and open Russia did not exclude rivalry in some areas

and cited relations with France and Japan as cases of cooperation

and competition.8

Over the last few months, however, a number of dark clouds

have appeared on the horizon, calling into question the utility

and feasibility of U.S.-Russian military-to-military contacts.

The most conspicuous problems within the military sphere related

to the role of the Russian military in the "near abroad," i.e.,

the tendency of Russia to militarize political disputes over the

rights of Russian minorities in the near abroad, delays in the

withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in other successor states,

including the Baltic Republics (Latvia and Estonia), and the

ambiguous role that Russian troops played in such regional
conflicts as the civil war in Georgia or the question of General

Lebed and his Russian 14th Army in Moldova. The darkest cloud,

however, came with the December elections for parliament, which

exposed the weakness of Russia's reformers and raised the specter

of the statism, xenophobic nationalism and imperialism in the

strong showing of V. V. Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic

Party (LDP), especially among the military. The success of

Zhirinovsky's LDP has raised the prospect of a "worse case"

scenario for the outcome of Russia's crisis. In his recent speech

Secretary Perry noted, "Reality number two is a worse case

outcome and is possible, and we must be prepared for it." That

reality was a Russia emerging from its crisis as "an

authoritarian, militaristic, and imperialist nation, hostile to

the West."9

The December Elections and Their Aftermath.

The initial response in Russia and the West to Zhirinovsky's

electoral success could best be described as panic. Zhirinovsky

was close to gaining power. On December 13, Reuters quoted Egor

Gaidar, the leader of Russia's Choice, as saying that it would be

"an enormous danger not only for Russia but to all humanity if

there is the slightest chance that this man Zhirinovsky could

really become the president of Russia."10 Reformers issued calls

for an anti-Fascist coalition, to include Communists, to stop

him. Later, as the total composition of the new parliament became

clear, the assessments of the threat became more measured. While

talk of "Weimar Russia" and the rise of Fascism remained a common

interpretation of recent events, mature observers stressed the

mid-term dangers of Zhirinovsky using the electoral process to

gain that presidency as a vehicle for dictatorship and personal

rule.11 While in no way spreading panic about the

Liberal-Democrats' strong showing in the elections, Serge

Schmemann wrote in The New York Times that Zhirinovsky's

electoral success was one of "the latest symptoms of a nation in

the throes of a protracted revolution, ricocheting in all

directions as it searched for its final course."12

The results of the voting for party slates in Russia's

elections, in which his party got just under 25 percent of the

total vote cast, have once again given Zhirinovsky's name

notoriety in the West.13 Two and a half years ago when he got six

million votes and finished a remarkable third in the elections

for the presidency of Russia he was treated as an anomaly. He was

an extremist and a clown who got votes because he was a spoiler

and a symbol of broad discontent among the masses. He and his

Liberal-Democratic Party had appeared out of nowhere. By the late

fall of 1991 informed observers were saying that because of

rising discontent Zhirinovsky would have doubled his vote in any

new elections.

As it was, with the center of political gravity shifting to

the struggle between President Yeltsin and the Russian
parliament, he became the non-person of Russian high politics.

Some journalists refused to interview him because they did not

want to promote "the future dictator" or his party.14 No one

wanted to talk about the "Zhirinovsky Phenomenon" in the hope

that it would just go away. Zhirinovsky himself understood that

the only path by which the Liberal-Democratic Party could come to

power was through parliamentary elections, and already in 1992

began preparing for that eventuality. Zhirinovsky observed that

the "democrats" until August 1991 had assumed that they would be

in the opposition for an indefinite future period and had been

broken by their easy victory over the Putsch and the collapse of

the Soviet Union. He pledged not to repeat their mistakes and

devoted his efforts to preparing for the next elections whenever

they might come.15 He worked on the assumption that they would

come sooner rather than later. Yet, even up to the eve of the

December elections, until survey results began to hint at a

strong showing for Zhirinovsky, he was dismissed as a "harmless

clown." 16 Some opposing politicians devoted considerable efforts

to avoid being seen with Zhirinovsky on a television program.17

Alexander Yanov pointed out in an article in Novoye vremya in

1992 that Zhirinovsky was beyond the pale even for the

Red-Browns. "In fact, the position of Zhirinovsky in today's

Russia is the classic outsider, pretender, always appearing in

times of trouble literally out of nowhere--at that moment when

the forces struggling for power begin to loose public trust."18

Zhirinovsky himself stressed this role as outsider, first as a

Russian living in "non-Russian regions" of the Union and then as

"non-party" activist which prepared him for the role of

oppositionist.19

Zhirinovsky as Leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party.

What has made Zhirinovsky into this specter haunting

Russia's revolution? Why are he and his party so intolerable to

both the "democrats" and their national-communist opponents?

Answers to those questions may help to explain both the appeal of

his Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, and his political

isolation. The answer can to be found in his very opportunistic

program, which is blatantly imperial. To paraphrase Voltaire's

comment about the Holy Roman Empire, the Liberal-Democratic Party

of Russia is not liberal, democratic, a party, or about today's

Russia. It is a front for nationalist, chauvinist, elitist, and

imperialist ideas. At first glance, the designation

"liberal-democratic" seems a misnomer. Yet, Zhirinovsky's choice

of the terms liberal and democratic to describe his party is no

accident. It is, rather, a conscious piece of political will to

set his movement off from a host of other nationalist movements

that range from monarchist to communist. It makes it possible for

Zhirinovsky to treat the party as a tool of his personal search

for power and to use it as a "centrist" base.

In Zhirinovsky's hands liberal is an ahistorical category

designating his outsider status. This is a necessary condition
for his political success since it allows him to invoke a mythic

past before Soviet power and to place himself outside the

political process that brought about the current crisis. Liberal

in this regard is used by Zhirinovsky to invoke the idea that his

party stands in the center of the political spectrum, in which

the democrats and Communists occupy the extremes. The Party's

slogan "Through a pluralism of opinions to the Superiority of the

law," consciously invokes ties with Russian liberalism.20

Liberal and liberalism in its prerevolutionary meaning

carried a notion of moderate reform and westernization. Russian

liberals sought to build a civic society under law and were

hardly radical democrats. Moreover, conservative nationalists,

populists, and Marxists, who were at odds with one another on

almost every issue, were united in their rejection of liberals

and liberalism. Even the Christian existentialist N. Berdyayev

could write that liberalism was a thing of the past. "Liberalism,

democratism, parliamentarianism, juridical formalism, humanistic

morals are yesterday's history, for all these forms of thought

and life are based on the assumption that Truth is unknown and

that perhaps the Truth does not even exist."21 Liberals (and

liberalism) have been branded parts of a utopian dream,

disconnected from Russian realties. They were depicted as

compromisers, spouting noble sentiments but achieving petty

deeds.22 In short, liberal would seem to be the last term that a

charismatic leader would embrace to build a mass movement in

post-Soviet Russia.

But liberal-democrat serves Zhirinovsky's purpose very well

since it puts him and his followers outside of Soviet politics.

No group was subjected to more attack by the Communist Party than

liberals. No concept was more rejected than the idea of gradual

reform. Indeed, Western scholars in gauging the failures of

liberal bureaucrats, Zemstvo reformers, and Constitutional

Democrats have called attention to the disconnect between

backward Russia and the liberals' advocacy of individual freedom

within a civic society.23 For the liberal, the emancipation of

the individual and society from the oppression of an autocratic

state could only come through a state under law (Rechtsstaat).

But how one might create a Rechtsstaat in a multinational empire

proved an unsolvable dilemma. Indeed, the ideologues of the

Liberal-Democratic Party have invoked no less a liberal champion

than Pavel Milyukov, historian, leader of the Kadet Party and

Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government, to reject the

concepts of "popular consciousness and national consciousness in

favor of social consciousness," i.e., mass consciousness inside a

given political and social order.

The gradual development of the state of consciousness

according to the degree of the development of the

process is also included in the number of necessary

elements of social development. The carrier of this

consciousness is, of course, not all of the popular

mass. The Leading Historical Actors of the Epoch, i.e.,
the representatives of power and their advisors, are

these carriers.24

The importance of such leaders depends upon the degree to

which their ideas and actions correspond "to the conditions of a

given epoch." For Zhirinovsky, "statism" was, is, and will be the

most important aspect of Russian social consciousness. Here

Zhirinovsky and his party have broken with the liberal tradition

on one key point. His party, like Lenin's Bolsheviks in 1917,

was, even in 1991, ready to take state power into its own

hands.25

Zhirinovsky, State Power, and Empire.

Zhirinovsky has put that question of empire and state back

on the political front burner after the 75 year Soviet experiment

with a totalitarian solution based upon federalism in form and

empire in content. Zhirinovsky's program addresses the key issue

raised by Tolstoy, i.e., the relation of Russians to power

(vlast') and statehood (gosudarstvennost'). As he observed in his

address to the 3rd Congress of the Liberal-Democratic Party in

mid-April 1992: "Political parties are created, leaders come and

go, but our state must remain eternal [and] unshakable."26 His

vision of the state is centralized, authoritarian, and

expansionist. While speaking of reform and even a European model

"to go forward bravely towards a European model of society: a

free economy, the rights of the individual in first place, a

civic society," the road to be taken is quite different and is in

keeping with Russia's tradition of "revolutions from above."

"What is needed is a strict, centralized authority, otherwise no

reforms will be achieved." Zhirinovsky has no time for separation

of powers. "There must be one state, one president. But without a

centralized economy."27 Finally, there must be no challenges to

Russian sovereignty and authority. For Zhirinovsky Russia is the

empire. "For us the main [point] is the territory of our state.

Return to us the historical borders and name of the state--we

only want that!"28 He has no time for federalism and expects

"small nations" to accept their fate. Zhirinovsky speaks of

restoring Russia to the imperial frontiers of 1900, when Russia

included parts of contemporary Poland and Finland. He warns that

any change in Russia's historic borders can only end in war.29 In

this fashion the very acceptance of the dissolution of the Soviet

Union into sovereign successor states is an act of treason. The

Liberal-Democratic Party rejects the creation of the Commonwealth

of Independent States as an "illegal, anti-constitutional act."30

Party ideologues refer to Commonwealth as the "Countries of

Beggars and the Hungry" and a "public toilet."31

At the same time that he speaks of restoring Russia's

historic frontiers, Zhirinovsky, the Turkic specialist and child

of Kazakhstan, also has called upon Russia to expand to the

south. This "final thrust to the south" Zhirinovsky has

associated with a "final division of the world."32 This
geo-political coup is to be done as "shock therapy, suddenly,

rapidly, and effectively" and will end with Russia and India

sharing a common border. This would bring order from Kabul to

Istanbul, eliminate the "red, Muslim, Turkic, and Islamic

threats, and remove the threat of third world war."

The final "thrust" to the south. As I dream of it,

Russian soldiers will wash their boots in the warm

waters of the Indian Ocean and forever change to summer

uniform. . . . That any platoon of Russian soldiers

could bring order to any area. And even better that

that would not be necessary. We must pacify that region

forever.33

Zhirinovsky ties this expansion to the south to the question of

nationality policy and the survival of the Russian nation.

In post-Soviet politics the question of national sentiment,

i.e., the very definition of what it means to be a citizen of

Russia, has taken on great importance, and no one has been more

successful in manipulating Russian nationalism to his purposes

than Zhirinovsky. Rejecting Communist federalism as "a pretty

Bolshevik myth," Zhirinovsky's supporters oppose the idea of a

territorial state in which citizenship is a function of

residence. They reject a multinational, Russian Federation

(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya) in favor of a centralized Russia

(Rossiya) of one nationality (Russkiy) who share one culture and

language. In short, they reject a state based upon a civic

society in favor of an ethnic state.34 Non-Russians would be

russified and the Orthodox religion given "dominant position."

The new Russia this is a state under law, an

enlightened state, this is a powerful presidential

regime, a powerful, multi-party parliament, this is

legislation, which is for the ages, which we won't have

to change every ten years. This is a Constitution,

which respects everyone from infant to elder. This is a

unified symbol throughout the entire country--the

black, yellow, white flag, the state flag of Russia. It

must wave over all state institutions in every region

of our huge Fatherland. This is the country's anthem,

one anthem. This is the state language, the language of

inter-ethnic communication, Russian. This is a single

monetary unit--the ruble.35

Zhirinovsky's ideologues understand the force of such ideas in

the struggle for power and note the weakness of their Communist

and democratic opponents in trying to enlist Russian nationalism

in their cause.36

Those democrats who were responsible for CIS and the ensuing

reforms, according to the Liberal-Democratic Party's ideologues,

embraced radical reform and revolution in the interests of their

masters, the United States. Thus Egor Gaidar, the architect of
"shock therapy," and his supporters are labeled "comprador

democrats or more exactly false democrats." With its notion of a

national bourgeoisie in the service of foreign capital,

Zhirinovsky's use of the term is a throw-back to Marxian

criticism but from a nationalist perspective. As used by

Zhirinovsky, liberal has an elitist tone. One of his supporters

even spoke of "the noble Liberalism of Zhirinovsky."37 True

democrats are dedicated to Russia's national interests and are

the sworn enemies of the "comprador democrats," who would sell

out those interests by serving the United States. True democrats,

according to the Liberal-Democratic Party, form a natural

governing elite of the "serious, enlightened, honest,

intelligent, gifted, broad-minded, experienced, and competent."38

Thus, the struggle for power in Russia is depicted as among

corrupt party apparatchiks, corrupt democrats in the service of

foreign capital and the domestic mafia, and this noble elite.

Under these circumstances a multiparty system is an excess. In

its place, for the transition period there would be strict

centralization under the LDP to resolve economic problems.39

Zhirinovsky and State Capitalism.

The economic program of the Liberal-Democratic Party could

be described as a return to state capitalism under the banner of

a highly-efficient, socially-oriented economy, which would

embrace privatization and even private property. But it is a

program designed to protect the state structure and stability.

State-directed "industrialization" under Peter the Great, tsarist

reformers after the Crimean War, and Stalin serve as the model

for building a national economy and catching up with the West.40

This position, which owes more to Friedrich List than Karl Marx,

rejects "shock therapy" in favor of state-directed development so

that Russia can avoid becoming an economic colony within the

world market, i.e., the supplier of raw materials and an importer

of industrial goods. One model for such a course is imperial

Japan, where the state directed the gradual transformation of the

country into an industrial superpower. This has led S. F.

Dergunov, one of the ideologues of the LDP to posit the following

thesis regarding Russia's economic transformation:

[as capitalized in the original] THE ECONOMY OF THE

TRANSITION PERIOD OF THE FORMATION OF MARKET STRUCTURES

MUST OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF STATE PROGRAMS INVOLVING

THE CREATION OF COMPETITIVE SECTORS, MODERN

INFRASTRUCTURE, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE

ECONOMY. AN OBLIGATORY ELEMENT OF THESE PROGRAMS IS A

PLAN FOR THE GRADUAL, ORGANIZED CURTAILMENT AND

TRANSFER OF STATE PROPERTY INTO MARKET STRUCTURES--ITS

[property's] PRIVATIZATION.41

Dergunov states only two factors which would make this

program of state capitalism work. First, it is true to national

traditions--"for our country state programs are natural." Second,
it would require only minimal retraining for managers. The model

of state capitalism invoked here are "tough mobilization methods"

like those used in the relocation of industry in 1941.42 In this

manner the LDP's program in 1992 sought to build an alliance

between Communist managers of enterprises via state direction and

their personal enrichment via state-directed privatization. The

program promised to take privatization out of the hands of the

bureaucrat (chinovnik) and put it the hands of citizens. The

privatization program of the LDP calls for a 3 year process of

conversion of most enterprises into "self-financing" ventures and

a leasing arrangement with funds used to cover social programs.

The LDP program also calls for financing the privatization fund

run by the Russian State Bank. The fund would be divided evenly

the first year and then subsequently more would go to a

privatization fund to finance state privatization certificates on

which an annual dividend would be paid. The ownership of such

certificates would be confined to Russian citizens and Russians

living abroad to avoid the injustice of "foreign or shady

capital" buying up enterprises on the cheap.43 Playing upon the

economic chaos created by hyper inflation, the LDP places the

blame for declining production and collapse of many enterprises

on the Yeltsin's government's slavish behavior in the face of the

demands of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The LDP's answer to Gaidar's "Shock Therapy" was to declare:

"We do not need great shocks."44 The LDP's program calls for a

state-regulated program to stimulate production by using a

gradual conversion of the monetary system to a "non-cash,

convertible ruble" (beznalichnyy konvertiruemyy rubl')that would

exchange at 1 ruble to 1 dollar. This would be achieved by

restoring state control over the trading in foreign currencies

via the State Bank, which would control the buying and selling

of "non-cash, convertible rubles" and would effectively restore

the state's role in controlling exports and imports.45 For

Zhirinovsky and the LDP, state power is the critical instrument

in the process of national transformation and provides the

rationale for a particularly Russian version of state capitalism.

Nowhere is the uniqueness of this model more evident than in

their approach to the issues of land ownership and the peasant

question. Stability and order take on the greatest importance.

And in this sense stability comes from maintaining the link

between Russian national consciousness and the village. Russians

are, in this view, a colonizing people, and their forms of

landholding, especially the commune, are ways to preserve order

and prevent the emergence of a rural proletariat. Stability in

the post-Soviet village depends upon maintaining collective

ownership via the kolkhozy (collective farms) and sovkhozy (state

farms). Writing on the emancipation of the gentry's serfs in

1861, Zhirinovsky has quoted with favor the remark of the liberal

bureaucrat, N. A. Milyutin. Zhirinovsky fully supports the idea

of "N. A. MALYUTIN [sic]," when he spoke out in favor of

emancipation with land: "You want to make the peasants as free as

a bird (i.e., free them from serfdom but give them no land). We

want to make them free as a bird, but a bird that has a Nest."46
Stability is in the interests of the state supported emancipation

with land and the maintenance of communal agriculture to protect

the peasantry from "kulaks, blood suckers and generally more

prosperous people able to purchase their land from poor peasants

[bednyaki]."47 Today, this means maintaining collective farms to

prevent the appearance of a new landless agrarian class. It is

not an argument about economic rationality or efficiency, but a

social policy of stabilization and order that also reflects the

interests of the social strata composed of collective and state

farm managers.48

Thus, in Zhirinovsky's state capitalism the industrial and

agricultural managerial elite are to see their interests served

and to view Zhirinovsky as an ally, particularly if they seek a

special arrangement with the state to support their enterprises

or look to intervention to protect their products from foreign

competition. Recent survey research on the social groups who

tended to vote for Zhirinovsky has identified two such groups.

The first is middle-aged men from state enterprises in provincial

towns and cities. They are threatened by loss of their jobs as

their enterprises go bankrupt. These are men from the old Soviet

working class, who have lost security and have gained little or

nothing through the reforms. In their minds they remain Soviet

citizens. The second group is young men from 25 to 40 from large

cities, who are better educated and have been apolitical. What

seems to draw these supporters is Zhirinovsky's image on

television, an image of power and decisiveness.49 They are a

generation shaped by Perestroika and the collapse.

Zhirinovsky and the Nationality Question.

Zhirinovsky's views on the nationality question follow those

on the state. While declaring that he is not a chauvinist,

Zhirinovsky speaks of a state run for Russians and tells those of

other nationalities who do not like it to leave. A unitary

Russian state is his answer to the threat of anarchy. In place of

the existing federal system with attention to the rights of

national minorities, Zhirinovsky has proposed a return to a

provincial [guberniya] system of local government.50 Guberniya

was the tsarist term for province, and in imperial Russia it was

a unit of government run and directed by the central government

under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the

governors appointed by the Emperor. Thus, rejecting

Marxist-Leninist solution to the nationality question and the

Wilsonian version of national self-determination, Zhirinovsky

returns to the age of historic nations, whose power and authority

are manifest in their historical, political, economic, social,

cultural and, not least, military claims. The Russian Empire is

not a luxury but a means of national survival for a colonizing

people. "Russians everywhere become a national minority,

gradually being destroyed. This will be the slow murder of the

Russian nation. Because nowhere is there purely Russian

territory, nowhere . . . . If we follow such a path, then the
Russian nation will die."51

Zhirinovsky's claim to being at the forefront of post-Soviet

politics is bolstered by his fundamental breaks with the values

of the past. United with small bands of overt Russian Fascists,

such as A. P. Barkashov and the Movement "Russian national unity"

(Rescue natsional'noye edinstvo), Zhirinovsky has reconsidered

the role of Adolph Hitler, in history.52 When asked about his

evaluation of Hitler, Zhirinovsky cited a generational shift away

from those older Russians who hated the Fuhrer to a new

generation who look on National Socialism differently: "Today's

young people look on all that differently, some even to some

degree sympathize with the ideals of national-socialists."

Zhirinovsky did note that some extreme measures had harmed

Germans but concluded: ". . . but in general his ideology does

not contain anything negative in itself."53

Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democracy as National Socialism.

Ideologues of the Liberal-Democratic Party have gone much

further than the leader himself in claiming ties with Nazi

Germany and Hitler. Igor Minin has said that national socialism

forms the "third force" in Russian politics between Communists

and democrats, both of which have discredited themselves by their

hostility to the national idea. "The true carrier of the ideals

of national socialism is the national-patriotic movement," of

which the Liberal-Democratic Party will assume leadership. In

this fashion Zhirinovsky's party intends to coopt the rest of the

Russia right and to militarize it. The national-patriotic

movement will require its own paramilitary formations, like

Hitler's SA, called the Druzhina (guard) and organized into the

"Agitation and Propaganda Groups" (gruppa agitatsii i propagandy)

and the "Protection-Assault Groups (okhranno- shturmovaya gruppa)

for street operations during electoral campaigns (protection of

LDP meetings and the break-up of opponents' meetings). These

groups are to be organized "in each micro-district, block, and in

each factory" and be composed of 10-15 persons, including 1-2

experienced activists and several military."54

The same ideologists have also been very candid about the

Liberal-Democratic Party's foreign policy. The LiberalDemocratic Party's theorists look on the ties between the

internal political struggle and foreign policy and see a

symmetrical relationship between "national and antinational

forces in both cases." The LPD views "capital" as objectively

"antinational" and will use state control to limit such

tendencies by controlling investments and profits. This national

system of political economy "would seek to exclude the

possibility of foreign-trade tricks on the difference of internal

and world prices." In short, this would be a state dedicated to

national autarcky of a statist and militarized nature: "Of

course, all enterprises necessary for the functioning of the

state structures must be state property. For example, defense
industry enterprises, railroads, major enterprises under the

control of republics."55 It is, of course, a rejection of the

economic reforms of Yeltsin's democrats, which the LDP blame for

bringing nothing but inflation, unemployment, poverty, chaos, and

disorder. By rejecting Communism and democratic reform, the LDP

ideologists have positioned themselves as saviors with no

responsibilities for past failures or current problems. More

important, they present a convenient scape-goat upon which to

blame past and current problems. Egor Gaidar is persistently

caricatured in LDP literature as Yeltsin's "Jew."56 Gaidar, the

democrat, became Gaidar, the thief--the court Jew, using his

position for personal gain for himself and his clients. "And

Zhirinovsky achieved success because he presented himself as the

defender of the nation, ready to deal with its oppressors."57

Just as the LDP seeks to build a common front of nationalist

forces in Russia against anti-nationalist forces, i.e.,

communists and democrats, so it seeks to build similar

connections abroad. The key to this process is an international,

anti-Semitic alliance. The chief source of "subjective"

anti-national forces is "Zionism." Minin has asserted: "Zionism

has as its final goal the establishment of the economic and

political supremacy of Jewry in all the leading countries of the

world and is a direct result of the basic features of the

national character of the Jewish people." In this case, the LDP's

version of national socialism claims that it will practice a

"humane" policy towards "Jews" and confine its version of the

final solution for Zionists.58 Viewing the governments of the

United States, France, and Great Britain as tools of

international Zionism, the LPD ideologists will seek to reduce

contacts with those governments. They will also seek to

accelerate the emigration of Jews out of Russia and will reduce

the influence of Jews in the mass media by imposing

national-proportional representation on such positions. Indeed,

they view such proportional representation as the vehicle for

maintaining Russian hegemony in a centralized, multi-ethnic

state.59

A National-Socialist Foreign Policy.

In seeking to create an alliance against Zionism, the LDP

ideologists look to those capitalist countries which have

retained a government with a "national," as opposed to

cosmopolitan character. Not surprisingly this leads to a rather

ahistorical interpretation of contemporary German and Japanese

society and a search for nationalist allies in these societies.

We are speaking first of all about Japan and Germany.

Everyone knows the patriotism and faithfulness to

national values of the Japanese people. The Japanese

government maximally, to that degree allowed by

capitalism, has used the features of Japanese national

character and in its turn has adapted to them as much
as possible. Now it feeds off the fruits of its correct

strategy.

Germany has had a difficult fate. It is located in the

very center of Europe and that means in the very

epicenter of subjective anti-nationalist forces and as

a consequence 150 years of its history have taken place

under the influence of the continual struggle of the

German nation against these influences. We will not

discuss the details of this struggle or the mistakes

made by the Germans. What is important is that this

struggle did not end with the unification of the German

states but entered a new phase.

National socialism supports the maximum widening of

cooperation with the most nationalist governments, in

particular Japan and Germany. Only this cooperation can

bring good to our nation and help in the matter of

constructing national government.60

In short, the foreign policy objectives of Zhirinovsky's

movement can only be achieved by overthrowing the existing world

order and undermining the position of the United States in that

order. Race figures prominently in that foreign policy.

Ideologues of the Liberal-Democratic Party speak of the

yellowing, reddening, and blackening of the world's population

and even use the metaphor of a white Fay Wray in the hands of

King-Kong to describe the fate of the white race. This is,

according to the Liberal-Democrats a threat to that civilization

itself, which gives more than it receives, loosing both "its way

of life and its purity of blood," while undermining "other pretty

patriarchal civilizations of other peoples."61 Thus, the solution

is to challenge the dominant, cosmopolitan order represented by

the United States in the name of the development of "parallel

civilizations" with a single dominant power directing the

development of that civilization and its associated region.

In the end Zhirinovsky predicts the United States will fall

because of its own internal contradictions arising out of the

cosmopolitan character of its society. This crisis will force a

weak and divided America to give up its leading role in defending

the current world order and lead it to adopt its own version of

the final thrust to the south. "We say to the Americans: Stop in

time. We say to Bill Clinton: Do not repeat the mistakes of

Napoleon and Hitler. . . . America will also soon start to come

apart. Within it very many contradictions already exist. From

these many problems and inter-ethnic confrontations are

created."62

The Liberal-Democratic Party and the Army.

Given the conscious cultivation of National-Socialism, one

would expect that the Russian military, with its ties to the
historic victories of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht in what

most Russians still see as a "just war," would not be

particularly hospitable to Zhirinovsky and the Liberal-Democratic

Party. Indeed, the Party's Program in 1992 even challenged the

concept of a mass army based on conscription and called for "a

gradual abolition of universal conscription to a well-planned

transition to the formation of a professional army."63 Regarding

the future of the military, the LDP's Military Program pledges

financial support for a strong army and a security policy of

"sufficient defense" under Napoleon's slogan: "He who does not

want to feed his own army will end up feeding a foreign one." The

Program also speaks of "the gradual reduction of the level of

confrontation, disarmament on the basis of strictly parity

bases." It commits the Party to the creation of "deserved living

conditions for servicemen and their families." Moreover, the

statism of its ideology, which emphasizes empire and order, finds

strong support in the military because it opposes those actions

which lower the prestige of the Armed Forces, including the use

of the army to "resolve the problems of other countries," i.e.,

international peacekeeping, the internal use of the armed forces

within the country, and "the distortion of the fatherland's

military history, the conscious discrediting of the army in

public opinion, and the lowering of the honor and worth of the

defenders of the Fatherland."64

Zhirinovsky views the army as a potential ally in restoring

order, if it can be won over to the LDP. "I see such a Russia.

She will have the most powerful army in the world, strategic

rocket forces, our missiles with multiple warheads. Our space

combat platforms, our space ship 'Buran' and our 'Energiya'

missiles--this will be missile shield of the country."65 His

views are close to those Red-Browns, who dominated the editorial

policy of The Military-Historical Journal of the Ministry of

Defense during the tenure of General-Major V. I. Filatov in

1989-1991.66 He has stated: "The destruction of the army must

stop immediately. This is the last [institution] that we have

that has a unified, healthy power. It can stop the collapse of

the state, for the political forces of compromise have not

achieved mastery there."67

Zhirinovsky's approach to winning over the army is to create

a new unity between the army and the nation by mobilizing both

around a shared image of a "foreign enemy," and for all practical

purposes this is the United States as a power and Zionism as an

ideology. He is holding out to the army future glories through

which it will be reborn.

We need another border. We must either reach the shores

of the Pacific and Indian Oceans or cut ourselves off

from the south behind a 'Chinese wall.' . . . That

means there is only one variant. We must execute this

operation under the code name 'final thrust to the

south.'
Our army will accomplish this task. This will be the

means to revive the entire nation. This will be the

basis for the rebirth of the Russian Army. The new

armed forces can be reborn only as a result of combat

operations. The army can not gain strength in garrisons

and barracks. It needs a goal, mission. Such was the

mission-- counter the threat of German occupation, and

gave birth to red regiments and divisions, for the

struggle against the foreign invaders. Thus a powerful

Red Army made its appearance. Today a Russian Army must

be reborn, if it finishes with the fighters in Central

Asia, in the Caucasus, in Moldavia, if it executes the

operation to set up Russia's new borders in the

southern direction. All this will provide stimulus for

the development of the economy, transport,

communications, for the extraction of resources for

production, light industry, cheap labor, the

possibilities of building new main lines to Deli,

Teheran and Baghdad, new air lines, and new highways.68

At the Party's 3rd Congress many speakers addressed the

military and its fate. The LDP set out to use the politization of

the military to its own ends, seeking to discredit the government

and the current military leadership. It played upon the loss of

prestige felt by the officer corps. K. N. Popov spoke of a

collapse of discipline, tanks rusting in Siberia, warships unable

to put to sea, planes that could not fly. He criticized the

current military leadership as businessmen and not commanders.

The only hope was to spread the Party's ideas among "mid-level

officer corps, where many are sympathetic to our ideas."69 The

Party's propagandists were instructed to take their message into

the barracks and academies to gain support against a compromised

military leadership. So M. I. Musatov, Leader of the LDP's Moscow

Organization, reported at the Party Congress.70 V. I. Ivanov also

appealed to the officers and men of the Soviet Army, who with the

dissolution of the Union had been left to swear allegiance to new

masters.

We must remove this mark of shame from our army, an

undeserved mark but continually, assiduously applied.

We must declare publicly: you are not guilty of

anything and have nothing for which to blame yourself.

Your banner is not stained. You only obeyed orders. And

those who gave a second oath, let them think about what

troops, who are given other oaths, stand.71

The implications of this position were made clear in another

speech, when a naval officer spoke of the Party's efforts to

organize its own detachments within the armed forces themselves.

Captain 3rd Rank Yu. L. Savin, serving in St. Petersburg, also

spoke of a growing chaos and violence in the near abroad, the

popular inertia at home and governmental incompetence as they

affected the armed forces: "the troops will not go against the

people, but the troops will march against thugs (pogromshchiki).
Therefore, we, the St. Petersburg Organization, have created

self-defense detachments."72

The LPD's efforts in the military did pay off in the

December elections for Parliament, when one third of the military

voted for their slate of candidates.73 The actual number of

military personnel voting for LDP is hard to estimate. Various

figures regarding the percentage of military personnel in

specific units, branches of the armed forces and institutions

that voted for Zhirinovsky and the LDP have appeared in the

press. The more sensational ones have gotten the widest

attention: 87.4 percent of those who voted in Taman Motorized

Rifle Division and 74.3 percent of those who voted in the

Kantemirov Tank Division, two of the garrison divisions in the

Moscow Military District, went for Zhirinovsky, as did 72 percent

of the voters in the Strategic Rocket Forces, and 40 percent of

the Air Force. Among the students and staff of the Humanitarian

Academy, i.e, the renamed and supposedly reformed Lenin Political

Academy, 93 percent voted for the LDP.74 Since most of these

soldiers voted at civilian polling places, it is very difficult

to know on exactly what basis these figures were compiled. More

solid figures exist for the Russian garrisons in the "near

abroad" or in isolated communities within Russia proper. Helena

Fiedorcowa, writing for Polska zbrojna, reported: ". . . in

Tadjikistan Zhirinovsky received 43.4 percent of the votes of the

military electorate, in the garrisons of the Black Sea Fleet 19

percent, in Kaliningrad 29 percent, in the units stationed in

Georgia and Turkmenistan around 40 percent."75 President Yeltsin

gave the figure of one-third for the LDP vote within the armed

forces at a recent press conference and stated: "We are worried

about this and appropriate measures have been taken."76

On December 22, Yuriy Belichenko, writing in Krasnaya

zvezda, defended the large army vote for Zhirinovsky in the

following terms:

The Army voted for itself, for its own interests, which

certainly are not narrow, corporative, petty interests

but state interests. For a strong, united and

patriotically-oriented Russia. For politicians not to

drag it into their games in the future. For the Army to

be respected and socially protected. For worthy service

for its new recruits and a worthy life for its

veterans.77

Speaking more bluntly, General Valdimir Dudnik, chairman of

the Army and Society organization, which draws much of its

strength from the Humanitarian Academy, asserted: "the army has

bidden adieu to Yeltsin."78 Dudnik overstated the case. The bulk

of the military remain committed to Yeltsin as Commander in

Chief, but a political struggle is underway for the Army. And the

momentum seems to be in Zhirinovsky's favor.
Zhirinovsky as Charismatic Leader.

While the ideology and program of the Liberal-Democratic

Party are important as a guide to the popular appeal of the Party

and as some hint to its possible policies, should it come to

power, Zhirinovsky as leader and symbol has much to do with the

movement's success. There is no shortage of radical, Red-Brown

opponents to Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but Zhirinovsky has been able

to steal their thunder and emerge as the undisputed voice of the

opposition. Of course, the fact that other opposition figures

managed to discredit themselves, e.g., the Gang of Seven who in

August 1991 tried to save the Union by coup, or Khasbulatov and

Rutskoy who were defeated and discredited in October in their

struggle with Yeltsin, has made his task easier. But one should

not underestimate his appeal. In August 1991 he openly

sympathized with the Putsch and his political career seemed over.

In 1992 he sided with the parliamentary majority against

Yeltsin's government. In both cases temporary setbacks became the

basis for political recovery and expansion of his base of

support. Zhirinovsky's appeal has been the subject of analysis by

supporters and opponents. While many democrats underestimated him

in the elections of 1991 and 1993, others have considered him the

only serious, consistent, oppositional challenge to Boris

Yeltsin's leadership.79

Moreover, the LDP's propaganda cultivates an image of

Zhirinovsky as a "leader of a new formation." He is depicted as a

leader thrown up by the people, who is hated by those "democrats"

eager to sell the Russian nation into the slavery of foreign

capital. To his followers Zhirinovsky represents exactly the

antidote to the excess of democracy, i.e., disorders,

arbitrariness, the anarchy of production and a catastrophic

decline in the living standards of working people. In him they

see the basis for a "firm, intelligent, and powerful authority

[vlast']."80 Zhirinovsky is "ready to be a strict Papa."81

Typical of this view of Zhirinovsky is the portrait of

Zhirinovsky as "leader" drawn by I. S. Kulikova in a article

attacking the Mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatolyi Sobchak. Sobchak

is presented as unprincipled careerist, seeking power as an end

in itself. Zhirinovsky, who shares with Sobchak the distinction

of being a lawyer, followed a different road to politics.

Zhirinovsky began "with a program and its delineation first for

himself, of the concrete ways to save the motherland from the

impending crisis." Zhirinovsky rejected self-promotion and found

he could not trust other parties and so set out on the difficult

path of building his own movement, the Liberal-Democratic Party.

His ideas, according to Kulikova, were ones already proven abroad

and even in Russia before revolutionary excess drowned them in

1917. Zhirinovsky's appearance, indeed the "Zhirinovsky

Phenomenon," is depicted as "historical necessity, the

consequence of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization of our

much suffering society."82
Zhirinovsky's propagandists present him as a man from the

people, who understands their suffering and longing. As he has

declared at each campaign meeting, "I am one of you."83 He lives

in a two-room apartment and is an astrological Taurus.84 No one

put red carpets in his path. Rather as a Russian in Kazakhstan he

found his path blocked by what he called "colonialism in

reverse."85 He had to develop his skills as a fighter and expend

his energy in the process of entering into the political arena.86

He is depicted as the continual victim of distorted reporting

from the press, unfounded charges that he is a Fascist,

Communist, uses narcotics, or worked for the KGB.87 Reading this

propaganda, one is struck by two points: first, the utter naivete

of these presentations of the leader and, second, the calculated

cultivation of the leader's image as a cult figure, whose power

and appeal is vested in the masses themselves, who see in him the

embodiment of their collective experience. This is, in short,

meta-politics of the type seen in Weimar Germany--the politics of

the outsider who becomes the embodiment of the nation's hopes,

fears, and anger. It was a role that Boris Yeltsin played against

Mikhail Gorbachev after his exile from Kremlin politics. In

Zhirinovsky's case, however, the exile, in fact, played the role

of minor clerk, Gogol's Akakiy Akakievich, in service of

Brezhnev's stagnating order, where lawyers served the interests

of the Party-State order. In Zhirinovky's case his own model

seems to be that of the reformist bureaucrat, an N. A. Milyutin,

who has liberated himself from serving a capricious tsar and may

act in the interests of the state, which he understands and

represents.88 In the end, society is to be reshaped in the

interests of the state by reform from above.

Critics of Zhirinovsky divide into two broad camps: those

who dismiss him as a clown and see darker forces manipulating his

phenomenon and those who take Zhirinovsky's appeal seriously and

have tried to fathom the nature of his charisma. Those who see

Zhirinovsky as a tool focus on the dark forces in the old

Communist Party and KGB, who have sought to use him for their own

ends. Those who focus on his charisma do not deny the efforts by

such forces to use Zhirinovsky, but emphasize his emancipation

from their control. One of the most astute observers in this

regard is Alexander Yanov, a scholar and journalist who has

devoted considerable time to the study of Russian Fascism and

extreme nationalism. Yanov has described Zhirinovsky's position

in Russia as "the classic situation of the outsider, the

pretender, if favorable, who are always created in times of

trouble literally out of nowhere--at the moment when the forces

struggling for power begin to loose the trust of the public."89

Of all the Red-Brown leaders seeking power, no other has "the

Lumpen recklessness, unbridledness, amorality, tactlessness,

anti-intellectualism, and charisma" of Zhirinovsky.90 Yanov

describes Zhirinovsky as a late 20th century "Robin Hood," whose

foreign policy pronouncements are matters of practical politics.

He openly declared that he would embark upon nuclear blackmail of

the West once he came to power. This approach, which would seek
to end Russia's crisis by simple extortion of the West, would, as

Yanov points out, violate all the rules of international

politics. But for Zhirinovsky such an argument is irrelevant.

Rules are meant to be broken if this will enhance his drive for

power. In the area of nuclear deterrence this has special

relevance. "In distinction from conventional Russian and Western

politicians, he is prepared to risk mutual destruction." 91

(emphasis in original) This is more than simple blackmail and

represents a throw-back to the pre-nuclear era when a leader like

Hitler could speak of naked force and decisiveness in creating "a

completely new political universe." "This new universe exactly

reflects the situation of his country, a situation of total

collapse. He intends to thrust it upon the world."92 His universe

is a nightmare answer to Western claims of a new world order.

With nothing to loose, he is willing to threaten cities with

nuclear destruction in exchange for getting what he wants.

Zhirinovsky, born after the Great Patriotic War and during the

nuclear era, is unmoved by either the terrible losses of that war

or the even greater casualties his nuclear blackmail could bring

in its wake.

The electoral performances of Zhirinovsky and his party make

this more than a matter of Zhirinovsky's own unbridled ambitions

and fantastic projects. His new universe is one of a restored and

expanded empire, stretching into the Middle East and allied with

like-minded powers in Germany and Asia.

Yanov sees Zhirinovsky's electoral support coming from the

broad strata of Soviet society who were "Lumpenized" by the

totalitarian regime and left without status or protection by the

collapse of that regime. In an interview with Yanov, Zhirinovsky

openly admitted seeking a mass political base from these

de-classe elements of society upon which he can build an

electoral majority and reach power. When Yanov warned that such

an approach carried the risk that such forces, when they did not

get immediate satisfaction of their demands from his government,

would within hours turn up and devour it, Zhirinovsky answered,

"History will show."93 Zhirinovsky's universe invites comparisons

with Dostoyevsky's worst nightmares about marginalized and

superfluous men in a world without God or morals. His world is

populated by Raskolnikovs, Grand Inquisitors and Father

Karamazovs. Zhirinovsky in commenting on his birth in Kazakhstan

and the 18 years he spent there has referred to himself as "a

peripheral Russian" who felt this marginalization there and even

in Moscow, where he was admitted to the elite Institute of

Eastern Languages of Moscow University. Among the children of the

Soviet elite he was a gifted outsider. Throughout the Brezhnev

era of stagnation he served as a minor official until, as Yanov

observes, Perestroika created a market for his politics of anger

and frustration.94 Reading Zhirinovsky's autobiography one is

left with the impression that the early frustrations and burdens

of life strike a very responsive cord with many Russians of his

generation, who put up with so much, while others with better

access to power and privilege prospered. Zhirinovsky asserts that
his own sufferings prepared him for the struggle for power. Of

Gorbachev, Zhirinovsky wrote: "Gorbachev lived a sweet life. Why

did he destroy the country and could not do anything good? He was

weak, because he had everything. The son of the chairman of the

kolkhoz, that means the son of the estate owner (pomeshchik). He

lived like a little lord (barchonok) already then."95 The blows

that Zhirinovsky suffered have given the leader the will to

power.

This marginalization has contributed to his sentiment for

empire by conquest. The strong take what they can and the weak

suffer. It is the morality of the labor camp and a perverse

Hobbesian struggle for survival. In such a universe there are no

constraints. "Here for him the concepts of legitimacy, property,

or law do not exist."96 What does exist is the state. In this

regard the state holds all property and territory in its

interests. Once having held territory and possessing sufficient

power to enforce its authority, the state may claim back any

territories or peoples that were within its domains. Other

peoples either lack a state or have a state too weak to act in

defense of their interests. As Yanov observes, "This is simply

the logic of a gulag thief erected here in the ranks of state

policy."97 In an interview in a Lithuanian newspaper Zhirinovsky

stated:

The Baltic region is Russian land. I will shoot you. In

the border zone of Smolensk oblast' I will begin to

collect nuclear waste, and you, Lithuanians, will die

from radiation sickness. I will remove the Russians and

Poles. I am the lord, I am a tyrant. I follow in

Hitler's footsteps.98

Conclusion.

For the last 2 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union

Zhirinovsky has devoted his efforts to preparing his party for

upcoming elections. In the fall of this year, when Yeltsin moved

against the Parliament the LDP was ready to compete in

parliamentary elections and benefited from those preparations.

However, the ultimate prize is still Zhirinovsky's own election

as president. And whether those elections come in the spring of

1994 or in 1996, the point is that Zhirinovsky will be competing

for a powerful presidency that could give him the leverage to

initiate his foreign and domestic program. In assessing his own

chances for success, Zhirinovsky has declared: "Give me a billion

dollars, and I will become president of Russia."99 Given his

program and base of support, he is much closer to realizing his

objective today than he was only a few months ago.

Zhirinovsky is neither a Russian Hitler nor a simple

throwback to "Black Hundredism." He and his party are distinct

products of the Soviet system and its collapse. The chaos and

disorder of the last several years have created a climate of fear
and anger, which he has been quite astute in exploiting. That he

is a Russian statist, an imperialist, authoritarian, xenophobe,

and anti-Semitic is without question. But this mix is joined with

a vulgar charisma that gives him broad appeal to those seeking

order and security. Given his amorality and declared willingness

to engage in nuclear blackmail and take risks, his raise to power

would signal an end to any hope for a democratic Russia and the

prospects for a renewed era of confrontation with a Russian state

bent upon overturning the international balance of power and

reasserting its hegemony by conquest. Zhirinovsky in power means

war:

Let Russia successfully execute its final 'thrust' to

the south. I see Russian soldiers, assembling for this

final southern campaign. I see Russian commanders in

the staff headquarters of Russian divisions and armies,

drawing the line of march of the troop formations and

the final points of the march routes. I see airplanes

at airbases in the southern districts of Russia. I see

submarines cruising along the shores of the Indian

Ocean and assault ships approaching the shores along

which the soldiers of the Russian Army already march,

armored personnel carriers are moving, huge masses of

tanks move forward. [italics in the original] At last,

Russia completes its final military campaign. It once

and for all excludes war from the south for Russia, and

from the north it was already long ago impossible. To

the West they will understand this. And to the East

they will also understand this.100

We have heard the soliloquy of this self-proclaimed,

would-be tyrant but need not be slaves to his plots. The Army is

a key vehicle on his road to power and in the execution of his

plans. He is our sworn enemy. We can not afford to stand aside

and let those plots unfold. His final thrust for empire could

turn the next century into another nightmare of total war and

human suffering. To ignore this threat and to give up our efforts

to aid Russian democracy will only aid his cause. Our enemy is

not Russia, its people, or its Army. Rather, they are a

battleground. Just as we seek partnership with a democratic

Russia and support military-to-military ties to enhance

professionalism and the integration of the Army into an open and

free society, so we must oppose Zhirinovsky and his party.

Zhirinovsky is the most foul product of that revolt against

totalitarianism and empire now recasting Eurasia. We will master

this bastard child of revolution, or he will surely master us.

Military-to-military contacts are one way in which the West

can undermine the xenophobic chauvinism to which Zhirinovsky has

appealed in his struggle to gain influence within the Army. So

long as Russia remains committed to democratic reform, we should

continue these efforts. What is required at the present time is a

strategy of active engagement to bring bilateral and multilateral

efforts into a coherent whole so that they can have the greatest
influence on the views of Russia's mid-level officer corps, i.e.,

the center of gravity of the Armed Forces.

Partnership for Peace, by extending a hand to democratic

Russia, holds out the promise of a peaceful and whole Europe. At

the same time it also asserts that, should Russia and its Army

come under the sway of Zhirinovsky or others with his imperial

ambitions, then the West is prepared to look most closely at

using NATO to create a broader system of collective defense to

prevent the reassertion of Russian hegemony by force of arms in

Central and Eastern Europe.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 3

1. Conversation with Dr. Sergei Blagovolin, Moscow, IMEMO,

June 15, 1993.

2. Jacob W. Kipp, "The Politics of Military Doctrine:

Russia's Military Facing a Transition Period," FMSO Blue Cover

Study, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994 forthcoming.

3. Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafon, Russia 2010 and What It

Means for the World: The CERA Report, New York: Random House,

1993, pp. 141-157.

4. Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1993, p. A1.

5. The New York Times, October 22, 1993, p. A1.

6. NATO, "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government

Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held

at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994," Brussels,

Belgium: NATO Press Service, 1994, p. 3.

7. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 10, January 17, 1994.

8. Michael R. Gordon, "Perry Says Caution is Vital to

Russian Partnership," The New York Times, March 15, 1994, p. A4.

9. Ibid.

10. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 238, December 14, 1993.

11. Leonid Volkov, "'Muynkhen' g-na Zhirinovskogo. I nash

svami," Novoye vremya, No. 2, January 1994, pp. 14-15.

12. Serge Schmemann, "Russia's Elections: A Dose of

Invective," The New York Times, December 19, 1993, p. E3.

13.Serge Schemann, "Votes Born in Anger," The New York

Times, December 15, 1993, p. A-8.

14. Andrey Vandenko, "Sokol Zhirinovskiy," Novyy vzglyad, No. 38, 1992, p. 1.
15. Ibid.

16. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 237, December 13, 1993.

17. Argumenty i fakty, No. 45, November 1993, p. 5.

18. Alexander Yanov, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," Novoye vremya,

No. 41, 1992, p. 8.

19. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, Moscow:

LDP (Liber'no-demokraticheskaya partiya), 1993, pp. 48-49.

20. E. A. Kolkotin, "LDP - partiya tsentra," Liberal, Nos.

6-7, 1993, p. 14.

21. Lyudmila Saraskina and Larisa Piyasheva, "Rossiyskiy

liberalizm: Luchshe byt' svobodnym chem nishchim," Stolitsa, No.

46, 1992, p. 6.

22. M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, "The Liberal," in Tales from

M. Saltykov-Shchedrin, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House,

n. d., pp. 139-145.

23. George Fischer, Russian Liberalism, Cambridge, MA.:

Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 203-204.

24. "Samosoznaniye sotsial'noye i natsional'noye: S tochki

zreniya P. I. Milyukova," Liberal, No. 2, 1992, p. 21.

25. Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, p. 57.

26. V. V. Zhirinovsky, "Politicheskiy doklad i vystupleniya

predsedatelya LDP V. V. Zhirinovskogo," Liberal, Nos. 6-7, 1992,

p. 3.

27. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," p. 9.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Zhirinovsky, "Politicheshiy doklad . . . ," p.3.

31. Sergei Zharikov, "Vysshaya rasa," Sokol Zhirinovskogo, No. 2, May 1992, p. 13.

32. Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, p. 64.

33. Ibid., p. 66.

34. Aleksey Vinogradov, "Rossiyu Russkim," Sokol

Zhirinovskogo, No. 2, 1992, p. 7.
35. Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, p. 113.

36. Ibid.

37. Anatoliy Ivanov, "Blagorodnyy liberalizm Zhirinovkogo,"

Sokol Zhirinovskogo, No. 2, May 1992, p. 5.

38. Kolkotin, "LDP - partiya tsentra," Liberal, Nos. 6-7,

1992, p. 14.

39. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," p. 27.

40. A. Antropov, "Tri Industrializatsii Rossii," Liberal,

No. 2, 1992, p. 12.

41. S. F. Dergunov, "Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda,"

Liberal, No. 2, 1992, p. 13.

42. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

43. S. Zhebrovskiy, "Privatizatsiya cherez arendu

(Kontseptsiya privatizatsii v interesakh vsekh grazhdan,"

Liberal, No. 2, 1992, p. 9. Zhebrovsky drew up the economic

strategy that the LDP followed in the recent parliamentary

campaign and has been nominated by Zhirinovsky to be shadow

minister of economics. Zhebrovsky is a physicist by training,

taught at various technical institutes, and was a science editor

for Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, and Mir publishing houses before

joining the LDP apparatus. On Zhebrovsky's career and role in LDP

"shadow government" see: Izvestiya, December 18, 1993, p. 4.

44. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," p. 38.

45. "Ne svobodyye tseny na energoresursy, a gosudrstvennoye

regulirovaniye ekonomicheskoy deyatel'nosti (Kontseptsiya

stimulirovaniya vnutrennego proizvodstva)," Liberal, No. 2, 1992,

p. 10.

46. V. V. Zhirinovskiy, "O sud'bakh Rossii: Zemlevladenie i

krest'yanskiy vopros," Liberal, No. 2, 1992, p. 23. Zhirinovsky

seems unique among contemporary Russian politicians in his

invocation of statist reformism and its tsarist champions, i.e.,

Count P. D. Kiselev, N. A. Milyutin, S. Yu. Witte, and P A.

Stolypin. See Plekhanov, "Ya - odin iz vas," pp. 87-88.

47. Ibid., p. 23.

48. "Osnovye zadachi i tseli LDP," Liberal, Nos. 6-7, 1993,

p. 31.

49. Steven Erlanger, "Who Voted for Rightist in Russia?

Mostly Nervous Men, Poll Shows," The New York Times, December 30,

1993, p. A-4.
50. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," p. 17. The Perm

Organization of Zhirinovsky's Falcons (Sokoly), the youth

organization of the LDP, is reported to have proposed the

amalgamation of Perm and Sverdlovsk oblasts to create one

guberniya. They already have their candidate for the

governorship, a young medical student, and have laid out a

program to expel all Gypsies, Trans-Caucasians and Vietnamese

from the Guberniya and to restore law and order by introducing a

new criminal code and execution by firing squad. See: RFE/RL

Daily Report, No. 243, December 21, 1993.

51. Yanov, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," Novoye vremya, No. 41,

1992, p. 12.

52. Alexander Barkashov and the Movement of Russian National

Unity differ from Zhirinovsky in that the former is overtly

Fascist in its signs, symbols, and language. Their slogan

"Russian Order" (Russkiy poryadok), their symbol (crossed blades

over a swastika), and their creed of racism and anti-Semitism

leave no doubt about their program and direction. Barkashov

openly sided with Rutskoy and Khasbulatov in September 1993, his

followers in their black uniforms were to be seen around the

White House, and with the armed coup of early October and its

suppression he and his followers were driven under ground. In

December Barkashov was wounded in a drive-by shooting and then

arrested in his hospital bed. Zhirinovsky, on the other hand,

seeks to be embraced by them without making an overt commitment

to their program. Zhirinovsky, rather than rejecting all of the

Soviet period as a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy against the Russian

nation, has tried to build a link through the concept of state

and empire that knits Muscovite, Imperial, and Soviet Russia. His

imperial ideology in this regard is inclusive, even if it has to

hint at some points, such as his reappraisal of Hitler. On the

ideology of the Movement of Russian National Unity see: Azbuka

russkogo patriota, Moscow, Dvizhenie, "Russkoye natsional'noye

edinstvo," 1991; and Russkiy poryadok, No 2, 1992. On Barkashov's

fate see RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 2, January 4, 1994.

53. Vandenko, "Sokol Zhirinovskiy," Novyy vzglyad, No. 38,

1992, p. 1.

54. Igor' Minin, "Teoreticheskie osnovy

natsional-sotsializma," Sokol Zhirinovskogo, No. 2, 1992, pp.

10-11.

55. Ibid., p. 12.

56. Liberal, No. 6-7, 1992, pp. 8, 17, 29.

57. Leonid Pronskii, "Spiriticheskiy seans v Rozhdestvo:

Dukh Nikolo Makiavelli o rossiyskikh 'gosudaryakh'," Rossiya, January, 11, 1994, p 8.

58. Ibid., p. 11.
59. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

60. Ibid., p. 12. German radical right parties share this

view of the world. Gerhard Frey of the German People's Union

Deutsche Volksunion Party attended the 3rd Congress of the LDP

and is quoted in the LDP's organ, Liberal, as speaking with

admiration of the LDP's program and saying that his organization

"stands opposed to America's supremacy in the world and seeks

that Russia should be powerful and occupy a deserved place in the

world." (p. 7)

61. Andrey Arkhipov, "Novyy poryadok: Parallel'nye

tsivilizatsii," Sokol Zhirinovskogo, No. 2, 1992, p. 8.

62. Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, pp. 118-119.

63. "Platforma Liberal'no-Demokraticheskoy Partii," Liberal, No. 2, 1992, p. 2.

64. "Osnovnyye zadachi i tseli LDP," Liberal, No. 2, 1992,

p. 31.

65. Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, p. 112.

66. On the ideology of this group of civilians and soldiers

see: Jacob W. Kipp, "Perestroika and Order," Military Review, No.

12, December 1989, pp. 10-12. Filatov and Karem Rash after the

failure of the August Putsch joined the Red-Brown forces at Den' and Sovetskaya Rossiya. Filatov kept a semi-official position for

a time as editor of Situatsiya, the weekly newspaper of the

Internal Troops of the MVD and served on the editorial board of

Na boevom postu, the journal of the Internal Troops.

67. I. S. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," in E. A.

Kocherin, ed., Fenomen Zhirinovskogo in: Biblioteka Zhurnala

Kontrolling, Seriya "Tayny vlasti v organizatsiyakh," Vypusk 3,

Moscow: Kontrolling, 1992, p. 10.

68. Ibid., p. 70.

69. Liberal, No. 2, 1992, p. 6.

70. Ibid., p. 7.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. RFE/RL Daily Report, December 23, 1993.

74. Sovetskaya Rossiya, December 21, 1993, p. 1.

75. Helena Fiedorcowa, "Zyrinowski -- zonglovanie
obietnicami," Polska zbrojna, December 15, 1994.

76. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 245, December 23, 1993.

77. Krasnaya zvezda, December 22, 1993, p. 3.

78. Sovetskaya Rossiya, December 21, 1993, p. 1.

79. Unlike Speaker Khasbulatov and Vice President Rutskoy,

who both were Yeltsin allies in 1991, Zhirinovsky has been a

consistent opponent of Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

80. Ibid., p. 16.

81. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," p. 29.

82. Ibid., p. 6.

83. S. N. Plekhanov, "Ya - odin iz vas," in Kocherin,

Fenomen Zhirinovskogo in Biblioteka Zhurnala Kontrolling, Seriya

"Tayny vlasti v organizatsiyakh," p. 82.

84. One should not dismiss the fact that Plekhanov saw fit

to give Zhirinovsky's astrological sign as a piece of human

interest. As if in revolt from the objectivity imposed by formal

adherence to "scientific Communism," a long-suppressed,

underground interest in the occult has emerged as a popular mania

in Russia. Radio programs carry daily charts as do many

mass-circulation newspapers. The author remembers his first

interview with supporters of Boris Yeltsin in April 1990. In

addition to Yeltsin's objective qualities as a leader, they cited

two astrological charts, one for Yeltsin and one for Russia,

which supposedly confirmed a common fate, including a period of

challenge over the next several years and then a positive future

beginning in 1993.

85. Plekhanov, "Ya - odin iz vas," p. 84.

86. I. Kulikova, "Sobchak, k bar'eru," Liberal, No. 2, 1992,

p. 27.

87. Kulikova, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," p. 57.

88. The statist predilections of many reform bureaucrats in

19th century Russia is discussed in: W. Bruce Lincoln and Jacob

W. Kipp, "Autocracy and Reform: Bureaucratic Absolutism and

Political Modernization in Nineteenth-Century Russia,"Russian

History, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, 1979, pp. 1-21.

89. Alexander Yanov, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," Novoye vremya,

No. 41, 1992, p. 8.

90. Ibid., p. 13.
91. Ibid., p. 9.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., p. 10.

94. Ibid. Upon graduation he was sent to study for eight

months in Turkey, where "he got into some sort of trouble and

ended up in jail." This turn of events effectively ended his

career as an area specialist. Then he served in the military in

the Trans-Caucasian military district. On his return to Moscow he

worked for the Committee for the Defense of Peace and took night

classes in the Law Faculty of Moscow University. He became a

mid-level Soviet bureaucrat with frustrated ambitions and hatred

toward those who had ruined his chances. Of his six classmates at

the Institute of Eastern Languages Plekhanov states one was the

son of a general, one the son of a deputy minister of Foreign

Affairs, one the son of a senior official in the Central

Committee of the Party, one the son of a directorate in the State

Committee for Foreign Economic Ties. Plekhanov, "Ya - odin iz

vas," p. 85.

95. Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, p. 49.

96. Yanov, "Fenomen Zhirinovskogo," Novoye vremya, No. 41,

1992, p. 10.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., p. 12.

99. Ibid.

100. Zhirinovskiy, Posledniy brosok na yug, pp. 142-143.
CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Thomas M. Nichols

Introduction: An "Electoral Mutiny?"

Still reeling from the shock of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's

victory in the December 12, 1993 Russian elections, observers in

Russia and the West soon realized that Zhirinovsky had won not

only among a broad spectrum of Russians, but also decisively

carried the vote among perhaps the most important and

unpredictable segment of Russian society: the Russian Armed

Forces. This chapter seeks to identify the sources of

Zhirinovsky's popularity among the armed forces, to consider the

impact of that support on Russian civil-military relations, and

to examine military loyalties in the wake of the October 1993

attack on the Russian Parliament and the subsequent December

elections, which The Economist likened to "an electoral mutiny."1

As of this writing, it appears that the military is emerging

as a forceful broker in Russian politics, capable of altering

domestic and foreign policy priorities to suit its own values and

interests. Indeed, such fears are already being voiced by Russian

political leaders of various orientations. "I have a feeling,"

former CIS Commander in Chief Evgenii Shaposhnikov said after the

elections, "that today power structures [i.e., military and

security forces] are completely beyond presidential and

governmental control."2 Foreign Minister Kozyrev concurs; "The

armed forces," he told The New York Times, "have a foreign policy

of their own."3 Civilian defense analyst Sergei Rogov adds: "The

effort to build a civilian-led Defense Ministry has failed

miserably . . . For this I blame Yeltsin, who believes that

letting the military do what it wants is safer politically, so

the army is uncoupled from the weak Russian state."4 And several

Russian commentators have been unnerved by Defense Minister Pavel

Grachev's ostensibly joking remark made in response to a question

about what the military would do if the new Parliament amended

the recently revamped Russian military doctrine. If that happens,

Grachev said, "We shall amend the parliament."5

Before taking up these and other issues, it is important to

consider the scope of Zhirinovsky's victory among military

voters.

The LDPR and the Armed Forces.

In attempting to gauge military support for the Liberal

Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), one fact becomes clear from

the available evidence, however scattered or incomplete: the

military supported Zhirinovsky in numbers at least equal to, and

almost certainly much greater than, the support the LDPR found in
society at large. A complete accounting of the military vote in

the December election will never be available, since most

servicemen and officers voted at public (otkrytii) polling

stations, where their votes were tallied in the aggregate vote.

Nonetheless, even if the reported results from stations at

military facilities represent only 1-2 percent of the military

vote, they still tell an alarming story.6

Initial reports indicated that some two-thirds of the

Strategic Rocket Forces had voted for the LDPR, and The Economist

reported that Zhirinovsky had actually won 93 percent of the vote

at the "Russian Military Academy."7 When the votes were later

tallied more completely, the actual composition of the military

vote was even more disturbing. The Russian press has cited both

the Central Election Commission and the Ministry of Defense as

confirming that 72 percent of the SRF voted for the LDPR, with

the Communists taking 16.5 percent and Russia's Choice a distant

third with 5.8 percent; worse, the "academy" referred to was

actually the Humanitarian Academy, the successor to the old Lenin

Political-Military Academy.8

 The new academy was supposed to be

the foundation for a new breed of Russian officer, although

academy officials have admitted that this has proven to be a

difficult transition to make.9

In other regions, the LDPR seemed to do as well if not

better. A spokesman for the Central Electoral Commission said

that the LDPR "proved popular among servicemen in the Far East

and Baikal Military Districts," but he did not say how popular--a

revealing omission in itself.10 (Later reports claimed that

Russia's Choice came in fourth in the Far East District with 4.3

percent of the vote; the LDPR came in first with 19 percent, the

Communists next with 11.5 percent, and Civic Union third with 8.5

percent, the remainder apparently spread out over several smaller

parties.)11 The LDPR also came in first in voting among soldiers

serving in Georgia, with Russia's Choice second and the Party of

Russian Unity and Accord third. Again, however, no figures were

listed; one would assume that a close race with Russia's Choice

would have been reported with hard numbers in order to minimize

Zhirinovsky's victory. These numbers were obviously available,

since the authorities reported that voter turnout among Russian

soldiers in Georgia was 83 percent, with 80 percent approving the

new constitution.12

 Moscow television tried to put a better face on the

results, reporting a few days after the election that Russia's

Choice won "a number of battalions" of the Moscow Military

District, with Russian Unity and Accord second and the LDPR

third.13 But Sovetskaia Rossiia, citing figures from the Moscow

Times, claims that the final tally in the Moscow Military

District (reports of "some battalions" notwithstanding) actually

revealed a smashing victory for Zhirinovsky: 46 percent for the

LDPR, 13.7 percent for the Communist Party, and 8.5 percent for

Russia's Choice.14 The report goes on to claim that 87.4 percent

of the Taman division, and 74.3 percent of the Kantemir division
(supposedly, after the October events, the President's own

division) voted LDPR. The Russian Air Force, according to this

report, also gave the LDPR a commanding plurality of 40 percent,

compared with 11.5 percent for Russia's Choice, and 8.7 percent

for the Communist Party, although how the Moscow Times was able

to isolate the "Air Force" vote was unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has tried to minimize the

political damage done by the vote. The large military vote for

the LDPR presents a picture of the military that is quite

dissonant with the image favored by Grachev and others in the MOD

of an army that is pro-Yeltsin and pro-reform (and in foreign

affairs, nonaggressive). Even though there was some good news

(initial results indicate that some 70-80 percent of servicemen

voted for the new constitution), Russian journalist Pavel

Felgengauer has rightly noted that "evidently, the Defense

Ministry's current policy is to keep from the public, if

possible, the data on how the army voted on party lists."15

Elena Agapova, Defense Ministry spokesman, retorted that it

was "intolerable and irresponsible to draw conclusions to the

effect that servicemen voted only for the leader of the LDPR,"

especially since the majority of military men voted at public

stations and their votes are therefore unknown. Agapova was

apparently unaware of the tenuousness of her denial; after all,

if results at the restricted polls show a large LDPR victory and

results of military voting elsewhere are unknowable, then why is

it "irresponsible" to draw the statistically appropriate

conclusion? Agapova claimed that results of voting at restricted

stations "cannot reflect a true and complete picture of the

results of the ballot in the Armed Forces, as the number of

servicemen who voted at restricted polling stations constituted

less than 1 percent of the [military]."16 As in previous reports,

Agapova issued this denial without mentioning exactly which

results at the restricted stations were to be ignored, or exactly

what the numbers for each party were.

Even if the actual votes of the majority of servicemen are

difficult to find, military candidacies are not, and it should be

mentioned at this point that the LDPR managed to field more

military candidates for the Duma than any other party. Whether

this was because other parties shunned military candidates

remains unclear in most cases. As far as Russia's Choice was

concerned, military men were discouraged from running by retired

Col. Gen. Volkogonov, military adviser to Yeltsin and himself a

Russia's Choice candidate.17 This was in marked contrast to

remarks by Admiral Chernavin, commander in chief of both the

Soviet Fleet and the present Russian Fleet, and a candidate from

Civic Union, who was disappointed that there weren't more

military candidates, "because, of course, there must be

representatives in parliament who have first-hand experience of

[military issues]."18

In any case, of the 25 active-duty servicemen and officers
(and two semi-retired officers) who stood for office either from

single-member districts or on party lists, the majority (10) were

sponsored by independent voter groups.19 These independent

candidates were mostly enlisted men, all but one of whom came

from areas outside of Moscow or St. Petersburg. The next largest

group of military candidates, however (8), represented the LDPR.

All were enlisted men, except for Professor (and colonel) G.

Lukava, who is actually a former senior instructor from the Lenin

Political-Military Academy. Nor were these old men or senior

officers: the average age of the LDPR candidates (excluding

Lukava) was 43.7, and all are apparently enlisted men. Of the

other parties that fielded military candidates, the Russian

Movement for Democratic Reforms, led by Marshal Shaposhnikov,

included three other servicemen, while Civic Union had Chernavin

and one other senior officer listed; Russia's Choice, the

Democratic Party of Russia, and the Communist Party each had one

(although the Russia's Choice candidate was actually Volkogonov,

who is no longer an active-duty officer). As of this writing, no

information is available about which of these individual

candidates will serve in the Duma. However, the relatively large

number of military candidates running on behalf of the LDPR,

combined with the large margins for Zhirinovsky among military

voters, shows a clear pattern of support for both Zhirinovsky and

his party among Russian military personnel.

In the ensuing weeks after the election, Yeltsin's

government finally came to terms with the scope of Zhirinovsky's

victory. Presidential spokesman Vladimir Smirnov admitted that

"Most Russian servicemen voted for the Liberal Democratic Party .

. . Press reports on this are correct," even though Yeltsin

himself had claimed only days before that Zhirinovsky had

garnered only one-third of the military's votes. Smirnov laid the

blame for the vote on "current educational work in the Army,

which has reshaped the Communist doctrine into a

national-socialist one."20 Smirnov did not specify what kind of

"educational work" was being done with the troops, and he seemed

to imply that poor pay and harsh conditions in the military were

also to blame. But Zhirinovsky's showing may have been helped

significantly by political workers, and the price to be paid is

the disbanding of the political apparatus. On December 21, the

Defense Ministry decided "to substantially reorganize" the Main

Personnel Directorate (the former MPA). "The former political

propaganda bodies," according to Segodnia, "have been deemed

'unreformable' and a decision has been made to abolish them."21

The "question" of the Humanitarian Academy, the report continued,

is soon to be "resolved" as well. (It should be noted that this

is not the first time the former MPA has been slated for

disbanding, and whether this happens remains to be seen.)

In sum, the Russian government is faced with the hard fact

that the military supported the government's worst enemy at the

polls in even greater numbers than the population at large. All

previous assumptions of military loyalty must be discarded, by

political figures in Moscow as well as political analysts in the
West. Even some military commentators have argued that this is

effectively the end of any viable relationship between Yeltsin

and the Army; this "army salvo of voting slips," as Maj. Gen.

Vladimir Dudnik (head of the "Army and Society" group) has put

it, means that the military "clearly has said 'Goodbye' to

Yeltsin."22 A colonel serving on the General Staff has been even

more blunt: should the incumbent president "become unamenable to

[the military] for some reason or other," he said, then "Boris

Yeltsin's illusions about his power functions will be dispelled

at once."23

How did this situation come about? The events of the 1991

coup attempt and the apparent obedience of the military in the

1993 attack on the White House had convinced many Western

observers that the military was well in hand. Stephen Meyer, for

example, represented the complacency of many sovietologists in

early 1992 when he argued that the months prior to the 1991 coup

represented "the illusion of increased military institutional

influence in Soviet policy-making," and that the coup itself was

"merely one event in a long sequence of political shocks" that

served to "hasten" military reform.[emphasis original]24 One

might well wonder what military reforms were in fact "hastened"

by the coup; in December 1993, Marshal Shaposhnikov told the

Russian press that there had been "no substantial progress in

army reform," and this and other reports suggest that it is

reform, and not military influence, that has proven illusory.25

The outcome of the December election indicates not only that the

events of 1991 and 1993 were misinterpreted, but also that our

understanding of the basic orientation and loyalties of the

Russian (and Soviet) Armed Forces is essentially flawed.

Three factors need to be taken into consideration when

discussing the influence of Zhirinovsky and the future of Russian

civil-military relations. First, the Russian and other CIS

militaries still carry the strong imprint of seven decades of

Soviet control, and in particular of Soviet indoctrination.26

These military organizations are still staffed by officers who

cannot conceive of serving any state but the Soviet Union, and

still identify the Soviet imperial system as their "fatherland."

Second, the October 1993 attack on the Russian Parliament

divided military loyalties, and forced many officers (who were

suffering significant material deprivations under Yeltsin's

reforms) to reconsider their role in Russian political life. On

one hand, they had vowed to remain aloof from politics; on the

other, they were being used as an instrument of political force

against many men whom they viewed with some sympathy--in some

cases, as former comrades-in-arms.

Finally, much in Zhirinovsky's platform--such that it was--

appealed to men who had suffered the humiliation of finding

themselves in a crumbling, third-rate army after joining, long

ago, one of the two most powerful military organizations on the

planet. Zhirinovsky's call to humble the Baltic states, fight to
victory in Afghanistan, destroy Germany and Japan, reestablish

the Union (and then the Empire), all this and more found

resonance in a group of men who had sworn to lay down their lives

for a state that no longer existed and a cause that, until

Zhirinovsky appeared, seemed all but forgotten.

These issues are considered in more detail below.

The Persistence of the "Soviet" Officer.

One aspect of Russian civil-military relations that deserves

brief mention is the persistence of what may be thought of as the

"Soviet" officer. This is the professional officer who joined the

Armed Forces of the USSR, served in various areas of the old

Union and the former Warsaw Pact, and in general believed in the

rectitude of the Union and the ideals for which it stood:

internationalism, socialism, Marxism-Leninism. This might well be

called a kind of Soviet nationalism, and it provided a receptive

audience for Zhirinovsky's bizarre program of recreating the

Empire within the boundaries of the Soviet Union while settling

old scores with traditional Russian and Soviet enemies.

The attachment of these officers (who I believe represent

the majority of the CIS officer corps in Russia and elsewhere) to

the old Union was more visceral than intellectual, and the

present situation seems to them abhorrent--and temporary. As

Serge Schmemann of The New York Times put it, "At home, torn by

the breakup of the Soviet Union into forces with conflicting

loyalties and missions, many officers deplore the collapse of the

superpower they served and do not accept its dismantling as

final. The hammer and sickle still adorn the military's seal just

as the empire mentality prevails."27 This is more, however, than

just stung pride. "The military," one unnamed senior officer told

Argumenty i Fakty in November 1993, "lives by the idea of a

state. We are convinced," he continued,

that the breakup of the USSR into separate states,

executed contrary to the will of the people expressed

in the 17 March 1991 referendum, is a short-lived

phenomenon . . . And if the Union under any name is not

restored in the nearest future, the politicians will be

swept out. The Armed Forces will find the means to

"convince" them of this.28

When Argumenty i Fakty asked Major General Aleksandr

Vladimirov (now recently retired, but known as a reformist

officer since at least 1990) for his response to such comments,

he repeated a line heard from military reformers as early as

1991: "We need a purge of all enforcement structures, including

the military. Far from all generals and officers share democratic

values. Germany underwent denazification after the war; we, and

first of all the military, must undergo decommunization."29 Col.

Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov, once one of the most conservative
members of the USSR Armed Forces Main Political Administration

and now Yeltsin's military aide, said much the same thing in

September 1991: "Military reform began only in August of 1991,

with the departyization of the Armed Forces and the abolition of

the military-political organs; that is, when deideologizing [of

the army] began to take place."30

Some have suggested that this is little more than the

institutional imperative supposedly typical among military

organizations to seek a strong state that can provide the

military with resources, while others argue that this is merely

the resurgence of Russian imperial ambitions. But the rhetoric

and actions of the senior Russian officer corps do not bear

either of these hypotheses out. As Felgengauer has emphasized,

"The military believes there will soon be some sort of

reconstituted union. It's not just imperial nostalgia, and it

could be very dangerous."31 Then-CIS Commander in Chief

Shaposhnikov reflected a common line of reasoning among many

officers in early 1992 when he weighed in on the issue of

national military oaths in the new CIS. "It seems to me," he

said, "that the officer does not need to be tormented by any sort

of oaths today. He's already sworn an oath to the Soviet people.

And it's not the officer's fault if the people have come to be

called something else."[emphasis added]32

Moreover, little interest seems apparent in reviving a great

Russian empire; rather, the military seems to be seeking a

restoration of the Union, not the Empire. In September 1993 it

was leaked that Grachev had said during a September 14 internal

briefing that a decision had been made not to pull back to

Russia's borders, but to maintain old Soviet borders, especially

in Central Asia and the northern Caucasus.33 (This was

acknowledged publicly shortly thereafter by Andrei Nikolaev,

Border Troops chief, who told Krasnaia Zvezda that "on the

current stage [sic] the reliable protection of the borders of the

former USSR meets the common interests of the CIS member states

and the national interests of Russia."34)

It might have been expected that the inability of the

Russian officer corps to accept the demise of the Soviet state

would have led to greater military support for the successor to

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the reconstituted

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPFR). But the CPFR

ran an incoherent campaign, and what few clear messages its

leaders got across could not compete with Zhirinovsky's

uncompromising rhetoric. When asked after the election whether

the Communists would cooperate with the nationalist parties in

the new Duma, the leader of the CPFR, Gennady Zyuganov, gave this

muddled answer: "We have nothing in common with those who seek

expansion for Russia as far as the borders of the former Soviet

Union. . . . We do not wish to bring back the Russian empire, we

simply want to prevent the system of links which held together

the peoples of the Soviet Union from being scattered in the

wind."35 To an officer of the former Soviet Armed Forces, this
can only sound like the kind of meaningless equivocations heard

from CPSU officials in 1991 as the Union was falling apart.

The destruction of the Union is a passionate issue among the

officer corps, and this almost certainly increased Zhirinovsky's

support among the military. Consider the intense anger expressed

in Pravda by Russian Army Lt. Col. S. Rodionov in late 1992:

For some of us our Motherland is simply "THIS" country

[sic]. For me, and I know, not just for me alone,

"THIS" country is my Fatherland--the Soviet Union.

"THIS" people is my own, native Soviet people. We

Soviet officers, as before, see no division of it in

terms of nationalities. It is equally painful to us to

see losses among Armenians, or Azerbaijanis, or Ingush,

or Ossetians . . . It is precisely to crush this Soviet

attitude that the "democrats" send us off to kill. . .

. For this the Army has to be deprived of its Soviet

moral backbone. [emphasis original]36

Numerous other examples of this kind of attitude exist among

officers from Volkogonov (who has spoken of his "grief" over the

end of the Union), to Airborne Forces commander Lt. Gen. Evgenii

Podkolzin.37 Podkolzin claimed that he had "tears in his eyes"

when he had to hand over a Soviet unit to Kazakhstan (where he

himself was born); his men took it badly as well, even to the

point "where guys have refused to take off their striped shirts

and blue berets [the Soviet airborne uniform]," despite pleas

from their own parents that they return home.38 Other such

stories abound.39

These kinds of intense attachments should be less of a

surprise given the inability--or unwillingness--of the Russian

military to create new institutions to replace previous Soviet

institutions. Training and education remain steeped in Soviet

practices and beliefs; Defense Minister Grachev has admitted that

the persistence of Soviet institutions in the Russian Army "is an

anomaly that many ranking military men privately acknowledge,"

and Yeltsin himself complained in late 1992 that "up till now,

men have been drafted into the Army of the Soviet Union, not

Russia's."40

The October Parliament Attack.

Another wedge between Yeltsin and the military, one that

surely drove yet more servicemen into Zhirinovsky's arms, was

Yeltsin's October 1993 decision to use force against the

parliamentary opposition in the Russian White House. Earlier

reports that the military was quick to support Yeltsin in his

struggle with the Supreme Soviet (and his own vice-president) are

now clearly erroneous; as Schmemann reported, the events leading

to the attack "showed the generals to be far from united in their

loyalties or their views."
Their initial reaction when Mr. Yeltsin cracked down on

the Parliament was to shut off the Defense Ministry's

outside telephone lines and to declare neutrality. . .

. many reports have emerged of vacillation in the

military and of heated midnight debates on the eve of

the attack. Most startling was a recent interview in

which Mr. Yeltsin openly accused General Grachev of

wavering.

"My Defense Minister couldn't make up his mind," the

President said. "There was a time of uncertainty when

the troops did not arrive. Apparently he had been given

too much responsibility, and he doubted whether the

soldiers would follow his orders."41

Indeed, even before the attack against the

Rutskoi-Khasbulatov group, military officers in the Moscow area

were already voicing doubts about their earlier support for

Yeltsin. One poll taken in early 1993 found that 73 percent of

the officers of the Moscow Military District claimed that they

were "crazy to decide against storming the White House" during

the 1991 coup.42

These doubts surfaced forcefully during the debate within

the military high command over whether to support Yeltsin. An

unnamed "high-ranking General Staff officer" told Sovetskaia

Rossiia, in terms that revealed years of Soviet indoctrination,

that the order to attack was intuitively unacceptable to many

officers:

Deplorable as it is to admit, the edict split the army.

. . . The paradox is that we have stopped being the

people's army, and become, as the foreign press says,

government troops. When did we become government

troops?! . . . . The only hope is that our people will

be able to acquire a normal government that will

express the interests of the working people and not a

handful of the bourgeoisie. Then the Army will really

become a people's army. And we will serve in it with

pride, and I am confident that we will never permit the

shame and disgrace of October 1993. . .43

Several Russian sources, including Komsomolskaia Pravda and

Obshchaia Gazeta, claim that a number of generals were

sympathetic to Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, including the former

commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Col. Gen. Boris

Gromov; and Air Force commander, Petr Denikin. General Staff

personnel chief Valerii Mironov, and airborne commander Podkolzin

were also accused of supporting the rebels.44 Grachev denied any

such sympathies, noting that Rutskoi and Denikin are old friends

from their Air Force days, and that communications between the

two were nothing more than an attempt on Denikin's part to get

Rutskoi to give up. When asked on October 12 about Gromov's
loyalties, however, Grachev said only that there was "no

confirmation" of any communication between Gromov and the White

House leaders.45 Two weeks later, Gromov was made "assistant to

the deputy defense minister for the affairs of internationalist

servicemen," a slight demotion, but not a serious one. More

disturbing is that, as one General Staff officer told the Russian

press, among the "troika" of Grachev, Gromov and Deputy Defense

Minister Konstantin Kobets, Grachev is unpopular with the other

two and "Gromov has the greatest authority [among the army]."46

More recent reports continue to imply that Gromov and Mironov are

to be dismissed, and Mironov's directorate (personnel) is in fact

being downsized. Also supposedly "hanging by a thread" are

Denikin, Ground Forces commander Vladimir Semenov, Podkolzin, and

Leonid Kuznetsov, Moscow Military District commander.47

This inclusion of Kuznetsov among those whose loyalties are

in question would explain at least one strange postscript to the

events of October 3-4: the appointment of an Interior Ministry

officer, Gen. Kulikov, as commandant of the city of Moscow during

the state of emergency. This was a break with precedent, in that

only professional military officers had ever held that post, and

it prompted Komsomolskaia Pravda to ask: "Does the president

really not trust his own army?"48

Even in the field, there were scattered mutinies against the

order to attack the White House. Grachev himself has admitted

that there were attempts in various units to raise volunteers to

defend the Parliament. Specifically, the Defense Ministry has

acknowledged several events in which officers engaged in

insubordination, including incidents in the Humanitarian Academy,

the Frunze and Dzerzhinskii Academies, and at least three other

Moscow-area military units, including one air defense unit whose

colonel actually managed to raise 18 volunteers. The only

indication of violence involved a junior officer from a

Moscow-area unit who led 17 men to Moscow; when he was stopped at

a military checkpoint outside the city, he shot himself to death

and the others then fled.49 If there were other incidents, the

MOD has not admitted to them as yet.

In the end, despite the moral support for the

parliamentarians among several high-ranking officers, the calls

from Rutskoi and would-be "Defense Minister" Achalov for a mutiny

in the armed forces against Yeltsin may have been too much even

for those predisposed to sympathize with their cause. Grachev

seemed to warn the parliamentary group of this in a televised

press conference a few weeks before the attack. "The point has

come," he said, "where the army must not be made angry."

If they [Rutskoi and Khasbulatov] do not leave the army

in peace and it [the army] blows up, if the army is

provoked, there is not a single force that will be able

to restrain the army then. Not one. If the blood of

completely innocent people in Russia is shed, the army

will have its say. And it will have its say in a
decisive manner.50

He later excoriated Gen. Achalov personally, adding that he

and the others in the White House "are once again attempting to

make officers confront one another on the barricades." The result

of such a confrontation would be "not a series of local

conflicts, but the start of a real civil war."51

There have been both recriminations and rewards in the wake

of the October attack. Two results seem clear enough: one is the

damage done to the previously flexible relationship between

Yeltsin and Grachev, while the other is the obvious material and

political payoff to the military for its part in suppressing the

Rutskoi-Khasbulatov group. These are not contradictory outcomes;

Yeltsin may well resent Grachev's apparent indecision at the

moment of truth while nonetheless recognizing that deals were

made with the high command that he, as a president in an

untenable situation, must now honor.

There have been other signs of tension between the President

and the Defense Minister, none of which can inspire confidence

among the military. Nezavisimaia Gazeta claims that Grachev told

troops during a visit to Khodynskoe Field in Moscow (where many

of the soldiers involved in the October 4 action were later

based) that an order to go in earlier would have saved lives,

thus implying that the hesitancy was Yeltsin's, not the Army's.52

This account goes on to suggest that Yeltsin has retaliated by

awarding higher medals--and promotion to four-star general--to

Interior Minister Yerin in an attempt to dilute Grachev's

influence by setting him in opposition to Yerin. In any case, at

least one officer has claimed that Kobets was given command of

the actual operation to suppress the revolt (with Volkogonov as

his deputy) after discussions between Yeltsin and Kobets about

Grachev.53

Whatever the tensions between the President and the Defense

Minister, most observers agree that the attack on the White House

has boosted the high command's power in the Kremlin to

unprecedented levels. Interviewed by Moskovskoe Novosti, Col.

Dmitrii Kharitonov was explicit about the growth of the Army's

power: "Pavel Grachev has made the most of the 4 October victory.

At present no one doubts that it is the army that controls the

situation in the country. I think that as of now the period of

endless compromises has finished, and an era of order begins, and

it will be enforced by us, the military."54 General Staff officer

Col. Konstantin Ivanov concurred: "Never before have the power

ministers [security, military and interior] moved so close to the

helm of political power."55

Among the many results of this bargain, according to one

account, was a "win" for the "hawks" on the new military

doctrine, which is nothing less than a return to Soviet military

doctrine--including the notion of preemptive nuclear strikes.

Material resources for the military will also be increased in
1994; Kommersant-Daily has no doubt that the increase in defense

outlays to 8.2 percent of GNP is a direct result of the

"political renaissance the army is living through after the

October events."56 Grachev later confirmed that the military

would remain at 2.1 million men, rather than being reduced to the

target of 1.5 million set by the former parliament.57

Maj. Gen. Dudnik practically boasted of this renaissance on

Russian television a few weeks after the attack. After discarding

the idea of the military's political neutrality, Dudnik alluded

to the political and material payoffs demanded by the military

after October 4:

The idea that the army, the Soviet Army, the Army of

the Russian Federation, is outside politics is a false

one to begin with. The army never was, cannot be, and

never will be outside politics. This is the most

powerful, most sharp, and most decisive argument in

politics. The position being formulated now, that the

army is the guarantor of stability and social order for

the state, is a political one.

The army, he added, "never supports the weak; the army

always supports real power. . . . Second, it will support the

power that shows a real readiness to raise its status; third, it

will support the power which is ready to implement a moral

cleansing away of the dead weight it has inherited."58 (What kind

of "moral cleansing" was needed, or what it may involve, was left

unelaborated.)

While Dudnik's rather mercenary evaluation of the situation

may not reflect the full range of reasons the military has

distanced itself from Yeltsin, there is no question that the

suppression of the White House group carried a significant price.

This, however, raises a further question: Why, if Yeltsin was

apparently ready to meet that price, did the military abandon him

at the polls on December 12?

Zhirinovsky's Appeal Among the Armed Forces.

Certainly, the miserable living standards of service

personnel (and in society at large) account for a number of

protest votes, and it is tempting to ascribe Zhirinovsky's large

margin among the military to material deprivation. However,

several factors call this simplistic explanation into doubt.

First, it is clear that Yeltsin was dedicated to courting the

military with increased resources after October 4, and there

could be little reason for any serviceman to think that his lot

would be significantly better under Zhirinovsky. (As The

Economist report noted, Zhirinovsky's call to stop the conversion

of defense industries "may please some coup-minded soldiers. But

it would not provide them with any more money."59)
Also, it is important to consider the sources of political

rage among Russian servicemen. A major survey of military

attitudes that appeared in November 1993 in Argumenty i Fakty

said:

Despite the gravity of the accusations the military

levels at the government and Yeltsin personally, all of

this fades in comparison with the belief--common in the

military (especially among higher-ranking officers)--

regarding . . . [sic] betrayal of the interests of the

state--signing of the Belovezha agreements, which led

to the disintegration of the USSR [emphasis and

ellipses original].60

"One can forgive Yeltsin our pauper salaries, the poor

health of our children and wives, who are being evicted from warm

housing into what nearly amounts to an open field," one senior

officer recently withdrawn from the Baltics told the

interviewers, "but one cannot forgive when for no reason

whatsoever we give up the land our fathers and grandfathers

fought for, as well as our people living in those lands." If this

kind of opinion is at all representative of military attitudes,

then the bases of support for Zhirinovsky become clearer, and

more complex than a simple matter of housing or money. This

corresponds with findings by the All-Russian Central Public

Opinion Research Institute, which noted that the "backbone of the

LDPR electorate consists of the active, able-bodied section of

the population," whose "dissatisfaction with the reforms is most

likely caused not by the deterioration of its own material base

but by the growth of disorder and anarchy."61

Zhirinovsky's rantings have been well-publicized and need

not be reiterated here in detail, especially since they seem to

have little unifying theme except a generalized hatred. His

appeal may well lie in his incoherence; because he is all over

the political map, frustrated voters could find whatever they

were looking for. At times he sounds like an anti-Communist,

while at others he has said that communism forestalled Zionism in

Russia, and that the KGB is the only force that can save the

nation.62 (He has also promised to look into securing the release

of Communist generals Makashov and Achalov from Lefortovo). He is

virulently anti-American (he repeatedly refers to the Russian

Foreign Ministry as a nest of CIA spies), and boasts that the

LDPR sent volunteers to Iraq to fight for Saddam Hussein.

In short, Zhirinovsky is a kind of extreme Russian

nationalist, seeking to recreate the Soviet Union as a Russian

empire within former Soviet borders; the new, expanded Russia, he

says, will be a "fatherland" for all ethnic groups great and

small. He promises a return to the draconian public morality of

Soviet society (where only "good news" is reported by announcers

with "kind, Russian faces"), but one in which the underlying

racism and imperialism of the former Soviet empire are brought to
the surface and embraced, finally, as virtues. This amalgam of

Sovietism and fascism (of the same sort represented by the

ill-fated parliamentarians) has come to be referred to as the

"red-brown" axis.

It is important to note the congruence of military attitudes

with many of the goals of the so-called "red-brown" movement--

although I would argue that the military interest is more in the

"red" than the "brown." These attitudes are no doubt what led

many Russian officers to join Col. Stanislav Terekhov's

"Officers' Union," a pro-Soviet group that later made common

cause with the "National Salvation Front," a bizarre compact

between far-left Soviet Communists and far-right Russian

racists.63 This prompted repeated statements from Grachev warning

that the Army "stands behind the president," and that

pro-Communist officers must not be allowed to "split the army."64

To what degree Terekhov's group did split the army is unclear,

but in the end, Terekhov was not bluffing: he was later arrested

in one of the first acts of violence related to the Parliament

standoff, when he attempted to shoot his way through the gates of

the CIS Joint Command Headquarters. Terekhov, although a violent

extremist, was not alone in his beliefs. Shaposhnikov admitted in

early 1993 that after the collapse of the USSR, "there were

forces in Russia, in the Army and in the Commonwealth countries

who would have liked the Army" to recreate the Union "through

coercive methods."65

In any case, whatever the immediate loyalties of the officer

corps or the enlisted men, there was some sense among the

military as a whole that the "democrats" had gotten their just

desserts in the aftermath of the Zhirinovsky victory. As

Felgengauer pointed out, with some apprehension, after the

election:

. . . there have been no signs of panic among [officers

or enlisted men] following the publication of the

election results. Rather, there is some malicious joy

and satisfaction . . . Now, the strong factions of the

LDP and the Communist Party will evidently be able to

restrain somewhat those whom the army sees as 'radical

democrats.'66

"Many things in Vladimir Zhirinovsky's campaign monologues,"

he concluded, "have undoubtedly elicited a favorable reaction

from the Russian army's officer corps."

Even before the election, the anger among some members of

the military was palpable, and it was an anger that played

directly into Zhirinovsky's program. Resentment at the loss of

material privilege, combined with humiliation of the loss of

Soviet superpower status, led to a consequent hunger for revenge

against the "reformers" who had brought about the division of the

Soviet Armed Forces into what amounts to a series of Third World

national guards. Lt. Col. Rodionov described the feelings of many
of his fellow officers now serving in new CIS armies:

Officers are now faced with the cruelest of moral

choices: take the new oath or get lost. But there's

nowhere to go; the country that you love and to which

you swore an oath is gone. And you have a wife and

children to look after. . . . And so the former Soviet

officer mutters the words of the damned oath through

his clenched teeth, vowing his allegiance while hiding

his contempt.67

Rodionov claims identification with the USSR is so strong

among the Russian officer corps that Grachev's attempt to

introduce a new Russian oath in December 1992 was rejected

"unanimously," forcing Grachev himself to repudiate it publicly.

Like many officers, Rodionov does not trust Grachev's motives

(Grachev, says Rodionov crudely, "wants to plunge us all into the

crap [der'mo]"), and he accuses the Defense Minister of serving

those who would turn the Russian Army into the defenders of the

interests of the "nouveau riche."68 He adds a final warning to

the leaders of all of the CIS republics: "Do not think,

gentlemen, that they will forgive you for THIS [sic]. Abandon the

hope that trampled human dignity will turn into loyalty to your

regime."

Former Soviet officers have responded to the destruction of

the Soviet Union, the collapse of Soviet power abroad with a

reawakened and outraged sense of Soviet nationalism. Stung by the

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the loss of the Union,

Zhirinovsky's call to reestablish the Russian empire

understandably found resonance among men who had served the

Soviet empire. Moreover, these Soviet officers seems to share a

sense that Russian foreign policy since 1991 has been

dishonorable and even cowardly; most officers, according to the

Argumenty i Fakty report cited earlier, "do not accept Russia's

current foreign policy," and "many are still convinced that

Russia should have observed its treaty obligations with respect

to old friends in Cuba, North Korea and Iraq."

Even the new Russian military doctrine shows the influence

of a new, harder line in Eastern Europe; in a discussion of the

issue of NATO membership for former WTO members, military

commentator Maj.Gen. Gennadii Dimitriev sounded a warning that

could not have been expressed better by Zhirinovsky himself:

"Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and also Ukraine,

which are dreaming about entering NATO, should realize that if

they do that, they will immediately fall among the list of

targets for Russian strategic forces with all the consequences

this entails."69 In other areas, one might expect Zhirinovsky's

neo-imperialism to be well-received by troops who are now

fighting on formerly Soviet soil. Some reports, for example

indicate that the Defense Ministry is "extremely reluctant to

help Eduard Shevardnadze who, many people think, had a hand in

breaking up the Army as USSR foreign minister," and it should be
no surprise that a call to reestablish the Union would be

well-received by Russian soldiers fighting in Georgia for a man

they hate and a cause they do not understand.70

All of this is consonant with the analysis of the election

results in the population at large, which indicate that the LDPR

emerged clearly as the new "Soviet" party among middle and

lower-middle class voters:

VTSIOM [All-Russian Central Public Opinion Research

Institute] studies have shown that the LDPR electors

stand apart from the others in their irritation and

anxiety. Their misgivings primarily relate to Russia's

losing its great power status, which was enjoyed by the

USSR, and the weakness of state authority in the

country. Sociologists also claim that identification

with the 'Soviet people' is very essential for

Zhirinovsky followers.

All this suggests that the LDPR is recruiting its

allies from among the Soviet working class, in contrast

to the Communists, whose [voters] have moved out of the

working class by virtue of their age.71

In other words, voters who most strongly identified

themselves as Soviet, rather than Russian, tended to vote LDPR,

while many older and somewhat poorer voters returned to the

Communists. The Army rewarded both parties by giving, in most

cases, victory to the LDPR and second place to the Communists.

Conclusions.

If we accept that the majority (and probably the

overwhelming majority) of Russian military officers and enlisted

men voted for Zhirinovsky, and that they did so at least as much

out of a sense of humiliated national pride as out of "protest"

against current economic conditions, then what does this portend

for the future of Russian civil-military relations and for the

Russian political stability in the near future?

The most important fact of Russian political life for the

next 3 years is that Boris Yeltsin has vowed to finish his term,

which expires in 1996. This is not meant as an overly optimistic

assessment of Yeltsin's capabilities as president; indeed, it

could be well argued that Yeltsin's own indecisiveness and

incompetence created the October 4 standoff, and his detachment

from the political scene then allowed Zhirinovsky to grab the

spotlight and move to center stage. However, it is obvious that

Yeltsin is more committed to creating a docile and obedient

military than Zhirinovsky might be, even if he is at present

going about it in a rather desperate and haphazard way.

In fact, Yeltsin's attempt to manipulate key posts and units
in the military as he tries to outmaneuver Zhirinovsky and other

opponents may do more harm than any other interference with the

military in the next few years. Grachev and others are not above

the art of the deal, and they have learned from the October

events and the December election that deals are theirs for the

making when society is adrift and politics are chaos. Continued

tensions between Yeltsin and the new Duma (in which Zhirinovsky

and his coreligionists may well be able to form a majority in

alliance with the Communists and the Agrarian Party) will only

strengthen the political position of the Russian Armed Forces,

and encourage them to raise the specter of a divided army, of the

"army card" being played (even as they themselves are the ones

playing it).

This will almost certainly mean that Yeltsin will feel

forced to turn to the right in the near future. Actually, this

turn has already begun, as evidenced by the new Russian military

doctrine, a reassertive military presence in former Soviet

republics, attempts to reestablish Soviet borders (under the

guise of CIS borders) and the bloated Russian military budget

that was restored within weeks of the Parliament attack. In the

future, it may mean more vigorous diplomacy with regard to

Eastern Europe and NATO, slowed defense conversion, more rapid

military integration in the CIS, and a slew of other questionable

policies in which Yeltsin so far has shown little interest.

Zhirinovsky's success may also split the Ministry of

Defense, and has the potential to split the military overall as

well. Evidence suggests that Grachev, as Yeltsin's man in the

Defense Ministry, is becoming increasingly isolated among senior

colleagues whose political sympathies are with Rutskoi,

Khasbulatov, Zhirinovsky, Makashov, Achalov, and other bitter

Yeltsin foes. (Compounding the problem, of course, is the fact

that relations between Yeltsin and Grachev are not exactly warm

at this point, either.) As of this writing, rumors of a purge in

the Defense Ministry--a purge, as mentioned earlier, which would

ostensibly claim Gromov, Mironov, Denikin, Podkolzin and many

others--are beginning to circulate. This would be the expected

and understandable move on Yeltsin's part, but it could leave a

vacuum of leadership in the military that the increasingly

unpopular Grachev may not be able to fill. If that happens, the

pro-Zhirinovsky forces may abrogate the chain of command and seek

leadership elsewhere, a frightening possibility in the context of

further domestic violence.

There is also the possibility that Zhirinovsky may overplay

his military hand. He is, after all, the man who has called for

re-invading Afghanistan, and one may hope that it is only a

matter of time before Russian servicemen decide that Zhirinovsky

is merely another politician, and sillier than most at that.

The most likely prospect for the near future, however, is

that the military will seek to exploit tensions between the

President and the Duma. At the least, it is clear that Yeltsin
can no longer take military loyalty for granted. Russian

politics, and Russian civil-military relations will, for the next

2-3 years, be characterized by weakened civilian authority and

the constant suspicion of an emergent praetorianism among the

high command. Perhaps the last word here should go to Gen.

Beltchemko, deputy commander of Russian troops in the

Transcaucasus, who told the French journal Liberation in October

1993: "The Russian Army does feel stronger now; this is obvious.

Each political upheaval strengthens our position. We are the

defender of the motherland and the nation, as any army should be.

We are the true patriots, and we know the value of human life."72

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 4

1. "Russian reform: At risk," The Economist, December 25,

1993- January 4, 1994, p. 63.

2. "Russian reform: At risk," p. 63. Shaposhnikov himself

was a candidate for the Duma, but his party, the Russian Movement

for Democratic Reforms, failed to clear the 5 percent benchmark

for a seat.

3. Serge Schmemann, "An Army Adrift," Part III, The New York

Times, November 30, 1993, p. A12.

4. Schmemann, p. A12.

5. "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," Foreign

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-SOV-93-221, November 18,

1993, pp. 39-40.

6. American pollsters, it should be noted, routinely poll

less than 1 percent of the electorate during national elections,

with margins of error less than 4 percent. As long as it may

assumed that the people who voted at military polling stations

were generally representative of their comrades in the military

at large (as Russian government spokesmen now admit they were),

then a sample of 1-2 percent is significant indeed, especially

considering the lopsided margins reported at those stations.

7. "Russian reform: At risk," p. 63. The SRF press office

denied these numbers, arguing that 99 percent of missileers voted

in public stations, thus making their vote unknowable. "Missile

Forces Deny Reports of Pro-Zhirinovsky Vote," FBIS-SOV-93-248,

December 29, 1993, p 18.

8. This report, according to FBIS, appeared in the December

21, 1993 issue of Sovetskaia Rossiia, which turn cited the Moscow

Times. "More on Army Voting Patterns," FBIS-SOV-93-243, December

21, 1993, p. 14. A reporter for the Moscow Tribune later told me

that his interviews at a polling station near another Moscow

military school indicated somewhere between 70-80 percent of the

cadets' vote went to Zhirinovsky.
9. One senior officer of the academy told me in Moscow in

mid-1993 that wrenching the students away from the belief that

they still served the Soviet Union was proving to be one of the

academy's most difficult tasks. "They still think they are Soviet

officers," he said. "They have no idea what it means to serve

'Russia' rather than the Soviet fatherland."

10. "Zhirinovskiy Appears 'Clear Winner' in Far East,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-237, December 13, 1993, p. 61.

11. "More on Army Voting Patterns," p. 14.

12. "Servicemen in Georgia Back LDPR," FBIS-SOV-93-239,

December 15, 1993, p. 9.

13. "Military's Participation, Choices in Election Viewed,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-240, December 26, 1993, p. 5.

14. "More on Army Voting Patterns," p. 14.

15. "Support from Military Noted," FBIS-SOV-93-239, December

15, 1993, p. 46.

16. "Defense Minister Aide on Speculation About Army Vote,"

FBIS-SOV-93-241, December 17, 1993, p. 8.

17. "Yeltsin Aide on Army Participation in Politics,"

FBIS-SOV-93-234, December 8, 1993, p. 43.

18. "Admiral on Need for More Servicemen in State Duma,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-227, November 29, 1993, p. 48. There is little

evidence to suggest that Chernavin is himself very different from

his pro-Soviet colleagues; when noting the return of St. Andrew's

Flag to Russian ships, he denied that the change in ensigns was

motivated by shame for the old Soviet flag. "Soviet seamen," he

said, "bore it with honor and glory and won worldwide

recognition." The reason, then, for the change? "It is simply

that the emblems of the Soviet flag do not correspond to the

present Russian navy." See "I snova--Andreevskii flag," Krasnaia

Zvezda, July 25, 1992, p. 1.

19. These and following figures are taken from candidate

lists published in FBIS-SOV-93-220, November 17, 1993; 93-219,

November 16, 1993; and 93-234-S, December 8, 1993. These figures

correspond to the figures given by the Russian MOD (that is, 25

active-duty military men ran as candidates); I have assumed that

the appellation "serviceman" denotes an enlisted man, since

officers were listed with ranks specified.

20. "Official: Most Servicemen Voted for Zhirinovsky,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-246, December 27, 1993, p. 2.

21. "Reasons for Reorganization Viewed," FBIS-SOV-93-247,

December 28, 1993, pp. 10-11.
22. LTG Aleksei Smirnov, in this account, concurred,

claiming that Yeltsin no longer has any support in the Army.

"More on Army Voting Patterns," p. 14.

23. "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," pp.

39-40.

24. Stephen Meyer,"How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed:

The Politicization of the Soviet Military," International

Security, Winter 1991/1992, p. 6, and p. 6n.

25. "Grachev's Future Assessed," FBIS-SOV-93-249, December

30, 1993, p. 39.

26. I have discussed the effects of ideology on Soviet

civil-military relations at length in T. Nichols, The Sacred

Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security

1917-1992, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.

27. Serge Schmemann, "An Army Adrift," Part I, The New York

Times, November 28, 1993, p. 18.

28. "Article Examines Armed Forces View of Yeltsin,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-216, November 10, 1993, pp. 60-62.

29. Ibid., p. 63.

30. See "Voennaia reforma nachalas' tol'ko v avguste,"

Krasnaia Zvezda, September 25, 1991, p. 1.

31. Schmemann, Part I, p. 18.

32. "Vstrecha s Nazarbaevym vseliaet nadezhdy," Krasnaia

Zvezda, January 15, 1992, p. 1.

33. Serge Schmemann, "An Army Adrift," Part III, The New

York Times, November 30, 1993, p. A12.

34. "ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 16 Sep,"

FBIS-SOV-93-178, September 16, 1993, p. 2.

35. "Zyganov Rules Out Alliance With Nationalists,"

FBIS-SOV-93-249, December 30, 1993, p. 32.

36. "Sovetskaia armiia: tragediia raspada," Pravda, December

5, 1992, p. 2.

37. "Rossiiu spaset nasha neizbyvnaia liubov'," Krasnaia

Zvezda, June 12, 1992, p. 2.

38. "Airborne Commander on Peacekeeping, Status," FBIS-SOV92-200, October 15, 1992, p. 20.
39. Perhaps most revealing is that CIS officers in Russian

and elsewhere have continued to maintain that the oath taken to

the USSR is still valid and in force--suggesting that these

officers still see the Soviet Union as the state to which they

owe allegiance. As one senior Black Sea Fleet officer said after

a conflict aboard a submarine: "Look, why create difficult

conditions for people--people with access to weapons? . . .

Anyway, I have taken a blood oath of allegiance to Ukrainians,

Belarusians, Russians--I have pledged myself to all our peoples

and ethnic groups to protect and defend them." "Black Sea

Submarine Mutiny Reported," FBIS-SOV-92-098, May 20, 1992, p. 9.

See also "Iz obrashcheniia ofitserskogo sobraniia moskovskogo

garnizona," Krasnaia Zvezda, January 15, 1992, p. 1;

"Komanduiushchie vystupili protiv priniatiia ukrainskoi

prisiagi," Krasnaia Zvezda, January 11, 1992, p. 2.

40. "Grachev Discusses Military Reform," FBIS-SOV-93-003,

January 6, 1993, p. 24, and "Yeltsin Addresses Defense Ministry

Collegium, Discusses Military Reform," FBIS-SOV-92-227, November

24, 1992, p. 18.

41. Schmemann, Part I, p. 18.

42. "Poll Shows 73 percent Regret Not Storming White House,"

FBIS-SOV-93-028, February 12, 1993, p. 33.

43. "Staff Officer on 'Shame' of October Events,"

FBIS-SOV-93-243, December 21, 1993, p. 40-42.

44. "Military Doctrine May Trigger Defense Ministry Purge,"

FBIS-SOV-93-205, October 26, 1993, p. 41.

45. [Grachev] "Says Generals Backed Yeltsin,"

FBIS-SOV-93-195, October 12, 1993, p. 50.

46. See "Gromov Given Responsibility for Internationalist

Servicemen," FBIS-SOV-93-208, October 29, 1993, p. 42; and

"Article Examines Armed Forces View of Yeltsin," pp. 60-62.

47. "Generals Seen Imperiled," FBIS-SOV-93-247, December 28,

1993, p. 10.

48. "Papers Report Grachev Hesitant in Committing Army,"

FBIS- SOV-93-192-S, October 6, 1993, p. 24.

49. "Grachev Says Army Acted 'Resolutely, Bravely',"

FBIS-SOV- 93-194, October 8, 1993, p. 35.

50. "Grachev Holds News Conference on Yeltsin's Actions,"

FBIS- SOV-93-182-S, September 22, 1993, pp. 15-16.

51. "[Grachev] Reaffirms Support for Yeltsin,"

FBIS-SOV-93-182-S, September 22, 1993, p. 16.
52. "Yeltsin Tries to Counterbalance Grachev's Influence,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-195, October 12, 1993, p. 55.

53. "Staff Officer on 'Shame' of October Events," p. 40-42.

54. "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," p. 40.

55. Ibid.

56. "Defense Outlays Increased to 8.2 Percent of GNP,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-206, October 27, 1993, p. 45.

57. On December 31, 1993, Grachev told Krasnaia Zvezda that

the Army's reduction to 1.5 million men was "clearly at odds with

the scale of the tasks that [the military] is resolving;" a week

later, a report on National Public Radio confirmed that the 2.1

million-man figure was now official. See "Grachev Holds Meeting

With Journalists," FBIS-SOV-94-001, January 3, 1994, p. 38, and

"All Things Considered," National Public Radio broadcast, January

7, 1994.

58. "General Defends Political Role of Army,"

FBIS-SOV-93-201, October 20, 1993, p. 48.

59. "Russian reform: At risk," p. 63.

60. "Article Examines Armed Forces View of Yeltsin," pp.

60-62.

61. "Profile of LDPR Voters Outlined," FBIS-SOV-93-249,

December 30, 1993, p. 33.

62. "Ostankino Carries Zhirinovskiy Film," FBIS-SOV-93-237,

December 13, 1993, p. 16.

63. Shortly before the October attack, Terekhov represented

the Officers' Union at a "Congress of Soviet Nations" that called

for the restoration of the USSR. "Participants Demand Restoring

USSR," FBIS-SOV-93-181, September 21, 1993, p. 3.

64. See "Communists, nationalists rally against Yeltsin,"

The Boston Globe, February 24, 1992, p. 2; and FBIS-SOV 92-212,

p. 43.

65. "CIS Armed Forces Commander Shaposhnikov Interviewed,"

FBIS-SOV-93-017, January 28, 1993, p. 7.

66. "Support from Military Noted," p. 46.

67. "Sovetskaia armiia: tragediia raspada," p. 1.

68. Ibid.

69. "Expert Sees Hawks' Win on Military Doctrine," p. 39.
70. "Paper Launches New Feature on Military Issues,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-211, November 3, 1993, p. 36. William Odom has

argued that Shevardnadze's reliance on Moscow's help means that

"the Russian military has trapped the man whom they blame for

destroying the Soviet position in Central Europe." William Odom,

"Moscow's Two Foreign Policies," The Washington Post Weekly

Edition, December 13-19, 1993, p. 24.

71. "Composition of Zhirinovskiy Base Analyzed,"

FBIS-SOV-93-246, December 27, 1993, p. 13.

72. "General Outlines Russian Interests in Georgia,"

FBIS-SOV- 93-201, October 20, 1993, p. 7.
CHAPTER 5

RUSSIA'S CRISIS OF EVOLVING STATEHOOD:

THE IMPACT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION

AND OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Jessica Eve Stern

I would like to thank Deborah Yarsike Ball, Charles

Ball, Jerry Dzakowic, and Jeffrey Frankel for comments

on this chapter.

Russia is undergoing a crisis of evolving statehood. Its

faltering metamorphosis from authoritarian empire to law-based

federal state will profoundly affect not only Russian citizens,

but also Russia's neighbors to the west, south, and east. The new

Russian state is simultaneously losing control over the peoples

within its current geographical boundaries, and inappropriately

intervening in the affairs of the newly independent states. These

developments are likely to emerge as the most serious threats to

international security in the coming decade.

In December 1993, Russia held elections to a new two-chamber

parliament. Many Western observers hoped for the emergence of a

truly democratic society willing to implement a nonimperialist

foreign policy consistent with Western interests. Precisely the

opposite obtained. The victory of Nationalists and Communists in

the lower house of parliament has encouraged Yeltsin's government

to assert a far more aggressive policy toward the nations

Russians revealingly refer to as the "near abroad." Since the

election, Moscow's complaints about poor treatment of Russians

living abroad in the former Soviet republics have turned

increasingly to intimidation and threats. Russians' humiliating

sense that they were defeated in the cold war, and their desire

to recover the empire they lost, are increasingly likely to lead

to violence.

A referendum on a new federal constitution was also held in

December 1993. This constitution, which replaces the

Communist-era Russian constitution adopted in 1978, was passed by

a narrow margin in the nation over-all, but was rejected in over

a third of Russia's territorial units. Russia's electoral law

does not require that Russia's subjects approve the constitution,

so the text was adopted. The constitutional assembly's difficulty

in crafting a constitution acceptable to Russia's 89 "subjects"

(the term used for Russia's territorial units), and the

electorate's lukewarm endorsement of the text, do not bode well

for Russia's peaceful transition to a law-based state.

Yeltsin and the drafters of the newly adopted constitution

were strongly motivated by the desire to prevent the

disintegration of Russia, and the constitution they crafted

reflects this. The constitution gives the executive exceptionally
strong powers--not only over the parliament and the judiciary, as

has been widely noted, but over the periphery as well. It

attempts to ameliorate some of the most pressing center-periphery

ethnic, economic, and juridical tensions: It asserts the equality

of Russia's 89 subjects; affirms the supremacy of federal laws

over regional ones; and allows republics to maintain

constitutions. But Yeltsin may have gone too far in the direction

of a unitary state. There is a danger that the subjects will

rebel, for instance, by demanding concessionary bilateral

treaties that allow them greater control over budgets, taxes, and

regional laws. The result will be a patchwork of contradictory

legislation, which will deepen the budget deficit and exacerbate

Russians' immanent distrust of lawmakers and the law.

This chapter first discusses the evolution of ethnic tension

in Russia and its implications for Russia's territorial

integrity; next, it analyses the dangerous implications of

Moscow's uncertainty about the legitimacy of its current borders.

It then discusses juridical and economic impediments to the

evolution of a Russian state. I conclude that these four factors,

coupled with the absence of legal culture in Russia, make the

evolution of a law-based federal state in Russia unlikely in the

near future.

Russian history demonstrates that it is possible to maintain

state order without law--but order without law requires tyranny.

Under Communist rule, the party enforced order by terrorizing the

population into submission; the constitution and the law were

niceties to which leaders paid heed only when it served their

interests. Under post-Communist rule, the KGB no longer serves

its traditional order-enforcing function, and Russians' innate

disdain for the law inhibits the development of democratic

society. Two possible outcomes seem likely: increasing chaos or

authoritarian rule, probably the first followed by the second.

The West should pay closer attention to Russia's crisis of

evolving statehood for four interrelated reasons. First,

continued disintegration of the Russian state could ravage

Russia's already fragile economy, increasing the prospect that

Russia will succumb to forces whose policies could threaten

international security, including fascism, war-lordism, civil

war, or renewed attempts to expand militarily. Moscow's

increasingly aggressive policy toward the newly independent

states, especially toward Ukraine and the Baltics, could lead to

a war in which the West might be called upon to intervene.

Second, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are

located in some of the most volatile regions within Russia. If

Russia were to fragment, thousands of weapons and tons of toxic

materials could be inherited by new states with inadequate

safeguards, infrastructure, and minimal experience in controlling

borders--a situation potentially far more dangerous than the

breakup of the Soviet Union.
Third, central control of the armed forces is eroding.

Russian military leaders were reportedly split over whether to

support Yeltsin during his siege of the ousted parliament in

October 1993. Because of military leaders' indecision and

manpower shortages, the forces that were eventually used for the

assault on the White House had to be assembled from a number of

different divisions.1 Several military districts, including the

Volga and Ural Military Districts, were reportedly prepared to

support the ousted parliament in its confrontation with Yeltsin

in October 1993, although Grachev later played down the

significance of these reports.2 Support for Zhirinovsky was

higher among military personnel than among civilians, and

unconfirmed reports suggest that Zhirinovsky has met with Moscow

area military commanders to request their support for certain

parliamentary factions.3 A reported triple alliance among

regional commanders, regional administrators, and industry

leaders, together with reports that unit commanders are selling

weapons, sometimes to local police forces, to finance recruitment

of troops, does not bode well for Moscow's ability to reign in

renegade regions, or to control weapons exports.4

Finally and most importantly, a spontaneous privatization of

the former Soviet military is now under way. Troops increasingly

desperate for hard currency are selling their weapons abroad,

often with the assistance of organized crime. The Russian "mafia"

has reportedly infiltrated law enforcement agencies, commercial

banking, and the political and military leadership, especially

outside urban centers. Organized criminal networks are reportedly

now coordinated at the regional level.5 Yeltsin admitted last

year that mob activity has "acquired such scale and character"

that it threatens the future of the Russian state.6 The networks

established between military units and organized crime could

eventually lead to proliferation of materials used to manufacture

nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, or even the weapons

themselves.

Evolution of Ethnic Tensions in Russia.7

Ethnic Groups. Twenty-five million ethnic Russians live in

former Soviet republics outside the Russian Federation (RF).

Thirty million non-ethnic Russians (comprising over 100 ethnic

groups) live within the RF out of a total population of 150

million. Of these, Tatars are the most numerous, followed by

Ukrainians, Chuvash, Bashkirs, Byelorussians, Mordovans, and

Chechens.

The Russian Federation is comprised of 49 administratively

defined oblasts (provinces) and 6 similarly defined krais

(territories), 21 ethnic republics, 10 ethnic okrugs (areas), 1

ethno-religiously defined autonomous oblast, and 2 city-subjects.

(See Figure 1.) Many of the 21 republics pose grave threats to

the integrity of the RF by virtue of their escalating demands for

economic and political autonomy. They are peopled by Finno-Ugric
(Karelian, Komi, Udmurt, Mari, Mordvin); Caucasian (Adygey,
Chechen, Cherkess, Dagestani, Ingush, Karbardin); Mongolian

(Kalmuk, Buryat); Turkic (Altay, Bashkir, Balkar, Chuvash,

Karachay, Khakass, Tatar, Tuvan, Yakut) and Iranian (Ossetian)

peoples. Four religions are represented among them: the

Finno-Ugric ethnic groups are a mix of Eastern Orthodox and

Shamanist; the Caucasian and Turkic groups are predominantly

Muslim;8

 the N. Ossetians are Eastern Orthodox; and Tuvans and

the Mongolian group are predominantly Buddhist. Those ethnic

groups that profess Christianity tend to be the most assimilated

in Russia.9

 Contrary to popular conception, ancient, ingrained

animosity is not the motivating force behind ethnic nationalism

in Russia.10 In the Soviet Union, ethnic consciousness was

intensified by deliberate policies, including conflation of

ethnic and political divisions in the federal structure of the

state (both at the union and republic level); by intermittent

promotion of national cultures and languages; by preferential

treatment of ethnic minorities within their own autonomous
republics-- including ethnic quotas in regional administrations

and in higher education; by deportation of entire ethnic groups;

by arbitrarily combining groups with no common language into a

single autonomous republic, or by splitting single ethnic groups

into two or more ethnic regions; and by the practice of

identifying citizens by ethnic group on internal passports. The

government's essential role in politicizing ethnic groups is not

unique to Russia. Scholars note the decisive role of the state in

politicizing ethnicity among Muslim Chinese and among many of the

national groups in India.11

The creation of autonomous republics within Russia was

intended as an instrument of consolidation to crush separatism.12

The policy turned out to have serious drawbacks. Minorities that

were not granted their own autonomous republics were resentful.

Quotas that favored titular nationalities in republican

administrations resulted in the rise of "parasitic attitudes and

the diminishing prestige of productive work."13 National groups

living in ministates with their own political infrastructures

have been the most effective lobbyists for regional autonomy and,

in the case of Tatarstan and Chechnya, independence from the RF.

Stalin's most pernicious ethnic policy was his 1944 deportation

of seven ethnic groups from their native territories en masse:

the Volga Germans; the Kalmyks; the Crimean Tatars; and the

Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, and Balkars of the Northern Caucasus.

Robert Conquest estimates that the total number of people

dispatched into exile was approximately 1,250,000.14 Many

thousands of deportees perished en route.

Khrushchev's 1956 edict to allow most of the deported

nationalities to return created new problems, which were

aggravated by the Law on the Rehabilitation of the Repressed

Peoples passed by the Supreme Soviet in 1991. This law allowed

the deported nationalities to claim their former territories. The

conflict over land formerly held by Ingush on the territory of N.

Ossetia has become especially fierce. Russia's apparent

pro-Ossetian stance resulted in extraordinarily low support for

Yeltsin in Ingushetia in the April 1993 referendum, and in

Ingushetia's decision to hold a referendum on secession from the

RF.15 Russia's Choice, the party most closely associated with

Yeltsin, received only 1.5 percent support in Ingushetia,16 and

because less than the required 50 percent of the electorate

turned out to vote, the constitution failed in that republic.17

Yeltsin's later decree supporting the return of the Ingush to the

Prigorodnyi Raion of North Ossetia was strongly opposed by the

North Ossetians.18 Similar problems have arisen for other

deported nationalities, although no other conflict is as

violent.19

Will Russia's Borders Change?

Russia is simultaneously suffering disintegrative pressures

in some areas inside Russia and attempting reintegration with

other former union republics. Belarus's currency union with
Russia expected to be concluded in 1994 will make that country

once again essentially a Russian province. Russia has bases in

all former Soviet republics except Lithuania and Azerbaijan, and

is likely soon to reach agreement with all but Ukraine and the

Baltics about maintaining (or in the case of Azerbaijan,

reestablishing) those bases.20 Russian forces guard most of the

borders of the newly independent states; and Russian troops are

involved in "peace-keeping operations" in Georgia, Azerbaijan,

Moldova, and Tadjikistan. Russians' confusion about the

legitimacy of Russia's current boundaries and Russian troops'

involvement in regional conflicts in the "near abroad" are likely

to pose difficult questions for the makers of U.S. foreign policy

in the near future. Is Russia's interest in the newly independent

states the legitimate prerogative of a great power, or is Russia

abridging these new nations' rights to territorial integrity and

nonintervention, which are protected by the U.N. Charter?

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev claims that he is

concerned about the danger of "losing geopolitical positions it

took centuries to conquer."21 At a Foreign Ministry conference on

Russian foreign policy in January 1994, Kozyrev claimed that

defending the rights of the 25 million ethnic Russians living in

former Soviet republics is one of Russia's principal foreign

policy goals. He also said that it is necessary for Russian

troops to remain in the former Soviet republics to prevent forces

hostile to Russia from filling the "security vacuum." Were

Russian troops to withdraw, he said, these regions would

"inevitably be filled by other forces . . . in many cases

directly hostile to Russian interests."22 While the Baltic states

and Western countries strongly objected to Kozyrev's remarks,

many Russians applauded Kozyrev's courage in ceasing to kowtow to

the West.23 Russians' anxiety over loss of empire partly explains

Zhirinovsky's success in the December elections. Support for

Zhirinovsky was highest among military officers--some of whom

find Zhirinovsky's call for a "march to the south" appealing.24

While some former Soviet republics are acquiescing to or, in

some cases, inviting Russian intervention into their affairs,

parts of the Russian Federation are demanding increasingly more

independence. Although the December constitution received the

requisite number of votes to be adopted--over 50 percent of the

national electorate voted and a majority of those who voted

accepted the constitution--it was rejected in over a third of

Russia's regions, either because too few people turned out to

vote, or because too few voters voted in favor.25 Thus, if

Russian election law had required that 70 percent of subjects

ratify the constitution (such as provided for in Article 7 of the

U.S. constitution), the Russian constitution would have failed to

be adopted. Moreover, a significant fraction of the electorate

are believed to have supported the constitution out of deference

for Zhirinovsky, who repeatedly called on his supporters to vote

for it, in part to fend off attacks by Yeltsin.26 Zhirinovsky,

who plans to run for president, is apparently pleased with the

extraordinary powers of the president and the executive branch.
Legal Impediments to Creation of a Federal State.

The strongest impediments to the creation of a law-based

federal state are legacies of Russia's past, which have not been

reversed by the present constitution. Principal among these are

the lack of legal culture, incompletely defined property rights,

and the lack of understanding of the concept of public goods,

which for instance proscribes stealing from the state. Russia

inherited from its Soviet past a people with little or no respect

for the law. Soviet courts were given extraordinary leeway in

determining what constituted crime and in meting out punishment.

The first Soviet criminal code defined crime not as a breach of

the law but as any activity harmful to the state.27 Contrary to

the popular view that Stalin violated the norms of "Soviet

legality" when he carried out his appalling massacres, "his

actions were in fact well within the terms of Lenin's Criminal

Code," Richard Pipes argues.28 The idea that crime involved a

legal transgression was introduced in the revisions of the 1926

legal code issued in an attempt to protect citizens from future

abusive leaders. Citizens could still be found guilty of broadly

defined "counter-revolutionary" actions or omissions, even after

the legal code was revised.29

The idea of a law-based state, which was imported from the

West in the late 19th century, was considered bourgeois by the

Soviet leadership. The first open publication of a multivolume

collection of Soviet laws did not occur until 1980, and there

remained a significant body of law intended for internal

bureaucratic use only.30 The Brezhnev constitution contained

stronger guarantees of citizens' rights than does the U.S. Bill

of Rights, but Soviet citizens quickly learned that their legal

system provided little protection from government abuses in

practice. Vasily Vlasihin, head of U.S. legal studies at the

Moscow Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, explains:

True, all too many people in Russia think that once you

get the right statutes on the books, you automatically

create an operative rule of law. But Russians still do

not trust law itself: the old Russia saying, 'The law

is like the shaft of a wagon, it goes wherever you turn

it,' remain firmly embedded in the public

consciousness. This reality simply reflects the past

failure of the legal system to provide ultimate

protection to the people against government abuses.31

When Yeltsin was elected president in 1991, the operative

constitution was the 1978 Russian Republic constitution. This

highly flexible document was amended by over 300 oftenconflicting measures.32 The uncertain division of powers between

executive and parliament resulted in the "war of laws" of

1992-93, with each side vying to control fiscal, monetary, and

industrial policy. The regions took advantage of the tensions
between executive and parliament by accelerating their demands

for greater autonomy, as is discussed further below. The war of

laws and Yeltsin's final remedy in October 1993--dissolving the

parliament and subordinating the 1978 constitution to his decree-

-aggravated Russians' already deep distrust of lawmakers and the

law.

Many of the arguments for and against stronger central

government in Russia are reminiscent of the arguments between

American Federalists and anti-Federalists in the late 1780s. The

anti-Federalists considered central government and liberty to be

antithetical propositions. The American Revolution was against

authority--against Kings as Thomas Paine put it in Common Sense.

Seven of the 13 colonies printed their own money. The colonies

imposed interstate tariffs against one another and other

protectionist policies. Nine states had their own navies, which

periodically seized other states' ships. Benjamin Franklin wrote,

"we have been guarding against an evil that old states are most

liable to, excess of power in the rulers, but our present danger

seems to be defects in obedience in the subjects."33

Even though the United States began as 13 separate colonies,

and the new Russian state began as part of a larger empire,

Yeltsin's position with respect to the regions during the

constitutional deliberations was remarkably similar to that of

Benjamin Franklin and other Federalists toward the colonies. The

colonies saw themselves as independent, sovereign states and

delegated authority to the Continental Congress, the colonies'

single-body legislature, accordingly. The Continental Congress

had no power to impose federal taxes or to regulate interstate or

international commerce. Similarly, while Yeltsin's Constitutional

Assembly was deliberating, many of Russia's "sovereign" republics

asserted the supremacy of local laws; declared themselves

subjects of international law; and arrogated to themselves the

authority to delegate powers to the center. Many subjects were

conducting trade with non-ruble currencies, including dollars or

Chinese yuan; substituting locally produced goods such as bricks

or trucks for money; or printing "coupons" for intraregional

payments.34 At least 30 territories were withholding taxes from

the center, and many demanded to keep a greater share of export

earnings. In June 1993, five republics demanded of Finance

Minister Federov the exclusive right to levy taxes and to mint

their own currencies.35 Many regions, especially those located on

Russia's borders, established bilateral trading agreements or

free trade zones, often without Moscow's approval. Some regions

set up trading blocs with other regions or refused to allow goods

to be transferred outside their borders.

Yeltsin's advisors believed it was necessary to assert

control over the regions to stem the escalating disintegration of

the state, especially in light of the regions' weak support for

Yeltsin in his confrontation with the parliament in SeptemberOctober 1993. After the October parliamentary siege, Yeltsin

changed the composition of the constitutional assembly to reduce
the influence of the regions; sacked several especially defiant

regional administrators; encouraged regional soviets to disband

themselves; and decreed that elections for the new federal

parliament would be held in December 1993, and for local

parliaments later. He also greatly increased the power of the

executive in the proposed constitution as compared with the

previous draft accepted by the Constitutional Assembly in July

1993.

Many constitutional provisions address centrifugal pressures

in Russia: federal law is declared supreme throughout the

territory of the RF; republics are no longer referred to as

sovereign states; interregional tariffs are forbidden; and

non-ruble currencies are banned. The 1992 Federal Treaty, which

codified inequalities between ethnic republics and other RF

subjects and had been incorporated in the existing constitution

as well as an earlier draft of the new one, was removed from the

text presented to the electorate.36 Inequalities among Russia's

subjects contributed to at least 28 regions' decisions to declare

or consider declaring themselves republics beginning in 1993.37

The December constitution proclaims all 89 subjects equal, but in

one of its many internal inconsistencies allows only republics to

maintain constitutions (the other subjects are allowed charters)

and declares that in cases where the Federal Treaty does not

contradict the constitution, the Federal Treaty is still

operative.

There is a danger that the regions will ignore the

constitution which, although it gives them the semblance of

self-rule, is arguably a foundation for a unitary state. Article

11.3 proclaims that the state power of the subjects shall be

exercised by the government organs formed by them. Article 73,

similar to Article 10 of the U.S. Constitution, gives the

subjects residual powers; any power not explicitly given to the

center devolves to the regions. Articles 71 and 72 distinguish

areas under joint juridical control from those controlled by the

center alone. Article 76 declares supremacy of federal laws in

fields exercised in joint jurisdiction; and article 78.1 allows

the federal government to install representatives of federal

authority. Yeltsin has continued to remove and emplace not only

presidential representatives but also heads of regional

administration even after the constitution was adopted; article

78.1 may be the legal basis for his actions.38 Soon after its

adoption, several republican leaders demanded that the

constitution be amended to give them more autonomy-- necessary,

they argued, because of the ultranationalists' success in the

elections.39 Although Yeltsin would probably not use the powers

granted him by the constitution to mistreat the non-ethnic

Russian republics, his successors might.

A number of Russian republics have adopted their own

constitutions that clearly contradict the federal constitution.

Tyva and Bashkortostan adopted constitutions that contradict the

federal one even after the final draft had been published and, in
the case of Tyva, after the December draft had been adopted

nationwide. Tyva's constitution proclaims the republic's

authority to make decisions on virtually everything--including to

declare war; to change frontiers; and to suspend legislative and

government acts of the Russian Federation.40

Tatarstan, which along with Chechnya is one of the most

vocal opponents of central rule, signed a bilateral agreement on

mutual delegations of powers with Moscow in February 1994 that

allows it to maintain its constitution, even though the

republican constitution contradicts the new federal one

materially. This bilateral treaty, for which Tatarstan has been

lobbying for several years, sets a dangerous precedent for

Russia's future as a federal state. Although Tatarstan's demand

to decide unilaterally the share of locally raised taxes sent to

Moscow was denied, the federal government will reportedly receive

a relatively small share. Tatarstan President Shaymiyev admitted

that agreement with Moscow was possible only after Finance

Minister Boris Fedorov resigned, presumably because the Minister

objected to the financial terms of the treaty.41 The Tatarstan

Constitution declares the supremacy of local laws over federal

ones; forbids Tatar citizens from serving outside the territory

of Tatarstan; makes Tatarstan a sovereign state subject to

international law; and declares that Tatarstan controls its

domestic and foreign policies. It also gives the Tatar president

the power to conclude international treaties and to establish

diplomatic representation in foreign countries.42

An important question that arises is whether the new

constitution will squelch secessionist aspirations. Yeltsin's

claim that "this is not a constitution for secessionists," may in

principle be true. The text explicitly makes customary

international law and international legal norms a "component part

of the RF legal system," however, which leaves open the

possibility that republics will continue to demand greater

independence--or even to secede--based on the principle of

national self-determination.43

Questions of secession can only be decided by resolving the

tension between several fundamental but conflicting principles of

customary international law. On the one hand, the principle of

territorial integrity is fundamental to the concept of the modern

state. The United Nations Charter declares that any deliberate

disruption of territorial integrity is incompatible with the

purposes of the United Nations. Respect for this principle is

essential to peace among states. Under certain conditions,

however, other principles may take precedence over those of

territorial integrity and of noninterference. Among these are the

idea that consent is a necessary condition for legitimate

political authority, and the principle that all peoples have the

right of national self-determination.44 Both principles of

noninterference and of national self-determination are

fundamental United Nations norms and may be considered customary

international law.45 One scholar argues that when "the associated
right of a group to determine its political existence conflicts

with an existing state's right of noninterference, the right of

secession is paramount, so long as that exercise of

self-determination does not abridge the rights of other groups to

self-determination."46 Even if this view were accepted by the

Russian court (and the prospects for that are slim), the

difficulty lies in determining whose rights are most abridged:

the secessionist group, minorities within the secessionist unit,

the larger political unit, or other groups within the larger

political unit.

In 1991 the constitutional court determined that Tatarstan's

proposed referendum on independence was unconstitutional. The

court made this ruling on the basis of the existing 1977

constitution, but it also made use of international law. The

court ruled that the right of national self-determination does

not necessarily provide a legal basis for secession and that

other principles of international law--including the principle of

territorial integrity--must also be observed.47 At the time the

Tatarstan case was considered, the existing Russian constitution

did not include an explicit reference to international law.48

This is no longer case. Because the new constitution makes

customary international law a component part of the Russian legal

system, international legal norms can now be expected to play a

larger role in judicial proceedings. Moreover, the Tatarstan

decision does not necessarily preclude the possibility that the

observance of national self-determination might take precedence

over territorial integrity in future cases. Perhaps the most

interesting question is whether economic incentives (as distinct

from ostensible ethnic ones) will result in future separatist

claims.

Economic Tensions.

Russia is increasingly divided into rich and poor regions.

Those regions that have benefitted the most from economic reform

tend to be located in the North and the East. Average living

standards have increased in the North and the East, including the

oil-rich areas in the Urals, but declined in the center and in

the Northern Caucasus.49

Political geographers studying voting patterns in the former

parliament note that support for Yeltsin and economic reform

follows a similar pattern. Yeltsin's support in the parliament

was weakest below the 48th parallel, in the areas where living

standards are lowest.50 Yeltsin's support in the April 25, 1993

referendum was also weakest here.51 In the December elections,

support for the antireform parties (Liberal Democratic Party, the

Communist Party and the Agrarian Party) was reportedly strongest

below the 48th parallel, especially in the "rust belt" and the

"corn belt."52

The differing economic objectives of Russia's diverse
economic regions create strong centrifugal pressures. Areas rich

in exportable natural resources will be better off if commodity

prices are determined on a market basis, if the ruble is

competitively priced on foreign exchange markets, and if the

government stops subsidizing industry. Industrial regions favor

continued administrative pricing, over-valued exchange rates, and

continued subsidies for industry. A survey conducted by the

sociology departments of two Siberian universities suggests that

separatism has more supporters in resource-rich regions, such as

Krasnoyarsk Krai, and fewer supporters in subsidized regions,

such as Altai Krai.53 Distortionary trade policies, especially

export quotas and administrative pricing of commodities, could

exacerbate separatist tendencies in the resource-rich areas. This

is especially the case for parts of Siberia and the Far East,

whose most natural trading partners are Pacific Rim countries.54

It is not unprecedented for divergent objectives on the

issue of free trade or monetary policy to result in secessionist

aspirations. The United States provides two famous examples: the

1776 secession of the colonies from Britain; and the 1860 attempt

by the Southern states to secede from the Union. The 13 colonies

seceded from Britain because they believed themselves to be taxed

unfairly.55 The colonies concluded that they had no other

recourse to protect themselves from Britain's prejudicial

economic policies because they had no representation in

parliament. Some historians attribute the U.S. Civil War, in

large part, to what the South referred to as discriminatory

tariffs. The North favored tariffs on manufactured goods, while

the South favored free trade.

Moscow has handled the problem of conflicting regional

objectives by simultaneously subsidizing and protecting domestic

industry, and by negotiating deals with resource rich areas such

as Sakha, which wrested from Moscow the right to keep over half

its hard currency earnings from diamonds and to retain all

federal taxes collected on its territory in 1994.56 Special deals

such as tax concessions and subsidies flourished while Yeltsin

and the now-ousted parliament were competing for provincial

support. The republics in particular took advantage of the

executive-parliamentary rift to wrest concessions from the

center, resulting in what Ned Walker calls a "war of the

budgets," in which central authorities tried to "out-bid each

other in currying favor with the territories."57

Economic tensions are likely to be further intensified by

the new government's highly inflationary policies. Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin has declared his determination to fight inflation

and budget deficits by nonmonetary means--a policy that most

economists claim is doomed to fail. The inflation rate nearly

doubled in the first month after economic reformers Federov and

Gaidar resigned.58 State enterprises, often referred to as the

"state dinosaurs," are demanding seven trillion rubles to cover

their debts.59 First Deputy Economic Minister Jakov Urinson told

the Duma in February 1994 that the new government is "in a
critical financial position and will have to print vast

quantities of money to avoid financial collapse."60 Sergei

Shakrai warns that the fall of the ruble will lead to increased

interregional tensions and ethnic conflicts in 1994. The result

will be economic separatism and ultimately, reliance on primitive

interregional barter.61

Yeltsin's establishment of the Federation Council, which

provides each territory with two representatives, is likely to

worsen budgetary battles. The government is likely to find it

needs the Federation Council to hold the Duma (a more national

body dominated by anti-Yeltsin forces) in check. In the long run,

kowtowing to the territories' budgetary demands, although

politically expedient, will exacerbate economic tensions by

aggravating inflation and increasing the budget deficit.

Conclusion.

The new political regime, including the democratically

elected parliament and the new constitution, will not resolve

Russia's crisis of evolving statehood. On the contrary, the

December 1993 elections exposed the Russian state's tenuous

foundations. Four interrelated problems remain: ethnic tensions

among and within regions; Russians' desire to reestablish more

expansive borders; legal impediments to the creation of a federal

state within Russia's current borders; and center-periphery

economic tensions.

In drafting the December constitution, Yeltsin was faced

with the challenge of finding the precise balance in reigning in

the separatist regions: too little, and the regions will bankrupt

the center by refusing to contribute to federal coffers; too

much, and regions will rebel by demanding greater independence or

concessionary bilateral fiscal arrangements--with similar

results. The newly adopted constitution fails in the second

direction. It provides the Constitutional Court little with which

to protect the subjects from the national center; on the

contrary, the constitution lays the foundation for a unitary

state.

To create the legal culture essential to Russia's future

integrity, Yeltsin and his successors must make it clear that the

law takes precedence over immediate political objectives. First,

it is not enough to adopt a constitution: Russia requires a new

legal code to replace the often contradictory, Communist-era laws

currently on the books. Second, making federal and regional laws

consistent is essential to the creation of a law-based state in

Russia. Finally, the infiltration of organized crime into federal

and regional government damages not only the economy, but more

important, Russia's nascent legal culture. Reducing the influence

of organized crime must be one of Yeltsin's paramount objectives.

Ironically, the main threats to Western security now stem
not from Russia's strength, as was the case during the cold war

era, but from Russia's weakness. Two threats stand out: the

danger of "loose nukes" stemming from loss of central control,

and the possibility that Moscow will behave rashly in an attempt

to assuage Russians' humiliating sense of loss of empire. The

possible outcomes discussed in this chapter do not represent the

universe of possible futures for Russia, but they would impose

sufficiently grave costs and are of sufficiently high probability

that the United States ignores them at its peril. Sadly, U.S.

policymakers are doing just that. Analysis of Russia's internal

instability has been all but ignored at a time when the most

pressing item on the administration's agenda is to convince

Ukraine and Kazakhstan to send their nuclear weapons back to

Russia, under whose stewardship these weapons may be even more

threatening to Western security interests than they are now.

There is little the U.S. Government can do to influence

significantly Russia's future. Economic aid can only go so far

toward fostering democracy in a country where contempt for the

law is rampant. But policymakers can try to reduce the fall-out

for the West from Russian decay. Economic assistance should be

continued, but it should be made conditional on Moscow's

behavior, including both anti-inflationary economic policies and

peaceful relations with the newly independent states. And

assistance should be targeted to projects that directly affect

the West, such as dismantling or deactivating weapons located in

politically volatile regions in Russia; reducing the influence of

organized crime; and jointly developing nuclear emergency

response teams.

Two possible outcomes for Russia's future seem most likely:

increasing chaos or authoritarian rule, neither of which is in

the interest of Western security. It is important to face the

facts: Zhirinovsky's victory in the December elections may be a

harbinger of terrors to come. At the same time it is important to

maximize the probability of a third, more hopeful outcome. The G7

should be ready to provide a greater amount of aid to alleviate

foreign exchange shortages and to improve Russians' standard of

living, but only if Russia implements policies acceptable to the

West. Although the probability of a positive outcome in Russia

looks much lower than it did in 1992, the West should continue to

maximize that probability by supporting forces consistent with

the evolution of a law-based, democratic state.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 5

1. Stephen Foye, "Military Leadership Was Reluctant

Supporter of Yeltsin," RFE-RL Daily Report, October 6, 1993.

2. Stephen Foye, "Confrontation in Moscow: The Army Backs

Yeltsin--For Now," RFE-RL Research Report, October 13, 1993.

3. Stephen Foye, "Secret Zhirinovsky Meeting With Military

Leaders?" RFE-RL Daily Report, January 28, 1994.
4. J. Sapir, "Differences economiques regionales, transition

et politique de stabilisation en Russie," Revue d'Etudes

Comparatives Est-Ouest, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 5-56.

5. "Rossiiskaya Mafiya Sobiraet Dosiye," Izvestiya, January

26, 1994, p. 1.

6. Stephen Handelman, "The Russian 'Mafiya,'" Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 1994, p. 88.

7. This section is based on Jessica Eve Stern, "Moscow

Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?" International Security, Spring

1994.

8. Exceptions include Chuvash, who are Christian, and

Tuvans, who are predominantly Buddhist.

9. Ann Sheehy, "Russia's Republics: A Threat to Its

Territorial Integrity?" RFE-RL Research Report, May 10, 1993.

10. See Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the

Post-Soviet State," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p. 12.

11. See for example, Paul Brass, "Language and National

Identity in the Soviet Union and India," in Alexander Motyl,

Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, New York:

Columbia University Press, 1992; and Dru Gladney, Muslim Chinese;

Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic of China, Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1991.

12. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union,

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 247.

13. Victor Zaslavsky, "Success and Collapse: Traditional

Soviet Nationality Policy," p. 39.

14. Robert Conquest, The Soviet Deportation of

Nationalities, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, p. 54.

15. 2.3 percent of Ingush voters supported Yeltsin. For

referendum results, see Philip Smucker, "Russia; Regions Voted

for More Autonomy From Moscow," Financial Times, April 27, 1993,

p. 27. See also Ann Sheehy, "Ingushetia to Hold Referendum on

Secession," RFE-RL Daily Report, September 14, 1993.

16. "Results Analyzed by Region," FBIS-SOV-93-242, December

20, 1993, p. 2.

17. Ann Sheehy, "Elections and Referendum Boycotted in

Tatarstan," RFE-RL Daily Report, December 13, 1993.

18. Ann Sheehy, "North Ossetian Reaction to Yeltsin's Decree

on Ingush Refugees," RFE-RL Daily Report, December 15, 1993.
19. See Vera Tolz, "Russia's Kalmyk Republic Follows Its Own

Course," RFE-RL Research Report, May 21, 1993.

20. Stephen Foye, "General Staff Chief on Bases Outside

Russia," RFE-RL Daily Report, March 1, 1994. See also John Lloyd,

"Beware the Sickly Russian Bear," Financial Times, March 19-20,

1994, Section II, p. 1.

21. Suzanne Crow, "Kozyrev on Maintaining Conquests," RFE-RL

Daily Report, October 8, 1993.

22. "Kozyrev Stresses Need for Military Presence in

Baltics," FBIS-SOV-94-012, January 19, 1994, p. 8. After strong

objections from the West, Kozyrev denied that he intended his

remarks to be applied to the Baltic states.

23. Aleksei Bogaturov, "If there is No National-Democratic

Thinking in Russia, Somebody Had Better Come Up With it as Soon

as Possible," Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 29, 1993, p. 4. Cited

in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLV, No. 52,

1993, p. 3.

24. See Chapters 3 and 4 in this volume. See also "Weimar on

the Volga," Economist, December 18, 1993, p. 45; "Russian Reform:

At Risk," Economist, December 25, 1993, p. 63; and "Composition

of Zhirinovsky Base Analyzed, FBIS-SOV-93-246, December 27, 1993,

p. 13.

25. Biulleten' Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Kommissii

Rossisiiskoi Federatsii, No. 1, 1994.

26. "LDPR: Slagaemiye Pobedi," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February

17, 1994.

27. Richard Pipes explains that the antecedents of this

principle can be found in Imperial Law, as well in the law that

prevailed among 19th century peasants. Peter I issued the

following decree in 1714: "Many, as if in their self-defense,

claim that [an act] was not forbidden, not considering that

everything that can bring harm and loss to the state is a crime."

Richard Pipes, Legalized Lawlessness: Soviet Revolutionary

Justice, London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic

Studies, 1986, pp. 16, 22.

28. Ibid., p. 20.

29. Ibid.

30. Bruce L. R. Smith, "Constitutionalism in the New

Russia," in Bruce L. R. Smith and Gennady M. Danilenko, eds., Law

and Democracy in the New Russia, Washington: Brookings

Institution, 1993, p. 2.
31. Vasily A. Vlasihin, "Toward a Rule of Law and a Bill or

Rights" in Bruce L. R. Smith and Gennady M. Danilenko, eds., Law

and Democracy in the New Russia, p. 46.

32. "Preliminary Analysis of the Draft Constitution of the

Russian Federation," Washington: American Bar Association,

December 1993.

33. Preceding paragraph based on Isaac Kramnick,

"Introduction," in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John

Jay, The Federalist Papers, London: Penguin, 1987. Franklin cite,

p.17.

34. Dmitri V. Olshansky, "Alternative Scenarios of the

Disintegration of the Soviet Union," Potomac Papers, McLean, VA:

Potomac Foundation, 1993.

35. Ann Sheehy, "Deputy Premier Federov on Demands of

Republics," RFE-RL Daily Report, June 4, 1993.

36. The earlier draft, which the Constitutional Assembly

approved on July 12, 1993, referred to the republics as

"sovereign states," infuriating other subjects. For a detailed

discussion of the Federal Treaty and its ambiguities, see Ned

Walker, "Moscow and the Provinces: Economic and Political

Dimensions of Russian Regionalism, Eurasian Report, Vol. 3, No.

2, 1993.

37. The following territories declared themselves or

declared their aspiration to become republics in 1993:

Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Perm, Orenburg, Kurgan, Vologda, Amur,

Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg city, Primorski Krai, Stavropol,

Krasnodar, Rostov, Archangelsk, Tyumen oblast, including

Khanti-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets okruga, Krasnoyarsk Kray,

including Evenkiyskiy and Taymirskiy okruga, Omsk, Tomsk,

Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Irkutsk, Altai Krai, Amur, and Chita.

38. See "'Ural Republic President Fired" and "Yeltsin

Appoints Samara Oblast Representative," FBIS-SOV-94-012, January

19, 1994, p. 47; and "Yeltsin Dismisses Omsk Head for Exceeding

Authority," FBIS-SOV- 94-018, January 27, 1994, p. 31.

39. Ann Sheehy, "Sakha, Bashkortostan Presidents Want

Constitution Amended," RFE-RL Daily Report, December 17, 1993;

"Election Results Seen Bolstering Regions' Hand,"

FBIS-SOV-93-245, December 23, 1993, p. 11.

40. Ann Sheehy, "New Tuvin Parliament Elected," RFE-RL

Research Report, December 17, 1993.

41. John Lloyd, "Moscow Devolves Power to Tatarstan

Republic," Financial Times, February 17, 1994, p. 2.

42. These provisions appear in the following articles in the
order I have listed them: Article 59; Article 58; Article 61;

Article 89.3; and Article 111.9. "Constitution of the Republic of

Tatarstan," JPRS Report, FBIS-USR- 93-024, March 4, 1993.

43. U.N. Charter articles 1 and 55; the U.N. International

Covenant on Economics, Social, and Cultural Rights; U.N.

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries

and Peoples, U.N. GA Resolution 1514, U.N. Doc A/4684 (1960);

Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1975) International Court of

Justice 12 (holding application of principle of

self-determination and Resolution 1514 to Western Sahara

paramount).

44. "The Logic of Secession," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 89,

1980, pp. 802-824.

45. Ibid., p. 803.

46. Ibid.

47. Vedomosty RF, no. 13, item 671 (1991). Cited and

discussed in Gennady M. Danilenko, "International Law and

Rechsstaat," in Smith and Danilenko, eds., Law and Democracy in

the New Russia, p. 102.

48. In April 1992 the Declaration of the Right and Freedoms

of Man and Citizen, which incorporates international norms for

human rights, became part of the existing Russian constitution.

Ibid., p. 100.

49. Denis Shaw, "Russia's Division into 'Rich' and 'Poor'

Regions," Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 35, No. 5, 1992, pp.

323-325.

50. Elizabeth Teague, "North-South Divide: Yeltsin and

Russia's Provincial Leaders," RFE-RL Research Report 2, No. 47,

November 26, 1993, pp. 7-23.

51. Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, "The Geography of

the April 25 Referendum," Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 34, No. 8,

1993, pp. 481-496.

52. "The World Sends NATO Back to the Drawing Board,"

Economist, December 25, 1993-January 7, 1994, p. 62.

53. Vera Tolz, "Regionalism in Russia: The Case of Siberia,"

RFE-RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 9, February 1993, p. 5.

54. The material on economics above is based on

conversations with Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Frankel, and Jaques

Sapir.

55. Allen Buchanan, "Toward a Theory of Secession," Ethics

101, January 1991, pp. 322-342.
56. Ann Sheehy, "Yakutia to be Allowed to Retain Federal

Taxes in 1994," RFE-RL Daily Report, October 27, 1993; Vera Tolz,

"Regionalism in Russia: The Case of Siberia," RFE-RL Research

Report, Vol. 2, No. 9, February 1993, p. 7.

57. Edward Walker, "Moscow and the Provinces: Economic and

Political Dimensions of Russian Regionalism," to appear in

Eurasian Report, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1993.

58. Peter Passell, "Economic Scene," The New York Times,

February 17, 1994, p. C2.

59. Peter Passell, "Economic Scene," The New York Times,

February 17, 1994, p. C2. For further discussion of industrial

and agricultural regions' demands for subsidies, see Chapter 2 in

this volume.

60. John Lloyd, "Russia 'Must Print Money or Face Crisis',"

Financial Times, February 11, 1994.

61. Ann Sheehy, "Shakrai Warns Fall of Ruble Will Encourage

Separatism," RFE-RL Daily Report, January 25, 1994.
CHAPTER 6

THE UNITED STATES AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA:

A NEW COLD WAR OR A BALANCE OF POWER RECAST?

Ilya Prizel

John Lukacs in his controversial book The End of the

Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age,1

 observed that

despite the fact that much of this century was consumed by a

struggle between communism and pluralist democracy, the truth is

that the 20th century was not a century of universalist ideas,

but rather a century of nationalism. Universalist ideas, such as

socialism or Marxism, perished in August 1914 when Europe's

workers ignored their notions of class solidarity and took up

arms against each other in the name of nationalism. Although a

Bolshevik regime came to power in Russia, and in the aftermath of

World War II managed to expand to Central Europe and the Balkans,

the survival of all these regimes (in addition to coercion)

remained heavily dependent on their ability to co-opt and harness

the appeal of nationalism.

While ardent Bolsheviks, East European leaders ranging from

Poland's Wladyslaw Gomulka to Romania's Nikolai Ceausescu built

their legitimacy on the basis of their claims to being the

embodiment of their countries' nationalist agendas, the USSR's

record, given its multinational character, was far more complex.2

Nevertheless as the appeal of communism began to wane, Stalin

during the Zhdanovchina (1947-53) reversed his assessment of

Russian nationalism from absolute evil to absolute good,3 and

Brezhnev throughout his long stewardship, by tolerating

publications such as Molodaia gvardiia, attempted to reconcile

Russian nationalism with Marxist ideology, as a means to bolster

the regime's legitimacy.4 However, as Milovan Djilas, the

Yugoslav Stalinist turned dissident, observed, "communism could

strangle all anti-communist manifestations and could cope with

democratic and liberal feelings, but never with nationalist ones

. . ."5

While there was almost a universal attribution of the

collapse of the Soviet Union to its flawed economic model, or the

incompatibility of totalitarian regimes with an educated living

through the "third industrial revolution,"6 relatively little

attention was devoted to the fact that ultimately Bolshevism's

greatest failure was its inability to meet the aspirations of

nationalism. In Eastern Europe, especially as the perception of

the German threat receded, Soviet style communism was

increasingly perceived as a foreign imposition which was an

affront to these countries' dignity. In Russia itself Bolshevism

increasingly was characterized by Russian nationalists as a

foreign ideology which was "denationalizing" Russia. While

Western scholarship focused its attention on Russia's

westernizing dissidents such as Sakharov, Bukovsky, and Brodsky,

and while, during the Gorbachev era, much attention was paid to
the "liberals" in Gorbachev's retinue, relatively little

attention was paid to increasingly failing attempts by the Soviet

regime to harness Russian nationalism, and to the growing

challenge to the regime from the "Slavophile" camp. Although some

outstanding pioneering studies of Russian nationalism by scholars

such as Alexander Yanov, John Dunlop, Darrell Hammer, and Stephen

Carter7 were published in the West over the last 15 years, the

focus of western attention remained concentrated on the liberal

challenge to Bolshevism. Even, when a Russian nationalist such as

Solzhenitsyn did manage to capture the attention of the West, his

nationalist political agenda was dismissed as romantic and

anachronistic.

The CIS as Russia Writ Large.

It is noteworthy to observe that, with the sole exception of

the Baltics, it was in Russia where the question of participation

in the Union was raised first, and it was Yeltsin's highly

effective articulation of Russia's dissatisfaction with Russia's

place within the USSR that catapulted him to political

leadership. However, despite the westernizing liberals'

opposition to the dictatorial methods of the communist

nomenklatura, and despite the nationalist opposition to communist

"denationalization" of Russia, neither group contemplated the

disintegration of the Russian empire.

In fact when Russia's Boris Yeltsin, Ukraine's Leonid

Kravchuk, and Belarus' Stanislau Shushkevich met outside Brest

and decided to form the CIS, westernizing liberals rejoiced

seeing in its formation the remaking of the Soviet state along

democratic lines. As Andrei Kortunov noted, Russian liberals

(knowing the depth of the economic interdependence of the former

Soviet Republics and adopting Francis Fukuyama's notion of the

"End of History" where liberal economic interests shape national

policy) felt that the prospect of an actual disintegration of the

USSR was very remote. According to the liberal vision, the

Commonwealth founded in December of 1991 was going to mutate into

an entity similar to a "post Maastricht" Europe in which Russia

would inevitably be the senior partner. Analyzing the formation

of the CIS, Len Karpinsky, editor of the liberal Moscow News,

optimistically noted: "The treaty signed in Brest looks good

because it launches, at long last, the real process of

integration . . ."8 Galina Staravoitova, Yeltsin's advisor on

nationality affairs, echoed this view stating that "The Brest

agreement gives us the hope for a future confederation."9

The Russian National Idea and the Empire.

Similarly, Russian nationalists' rejection of the Soviet

Union in no way constituted a rejection of the Russian empire.

While there may have been "nativists" such as Igor Shafarevich10

who actually celebrated the demise of the Soviet Union seeing in

it an opportunity to free Russia from the burden of the empire,
others such as Solzhenitsyn welcomed the prospect of ridding

Russia of Central Asia--"the folly of Alexander II." However,

even Solzhenitsyn continued to assume that the fraternal links

among the East Slavic peoples of the USSR would continue to

exist.11 In fact the complaint of Russian nationalists against

the USSR was not a complaint against the empire, but rather a

complaint about the status of the Russians within that empire.

Since the October Revolution a substantial stream within the

Russian intellectual community perceived Bolshevism as an

"apocalyptic" imposition of an alien idea on Russia that reduced

the Russian people to "cannon fodder" for a universalist idea

with no regard for either the material or spiritual well-being of

the Russians.12 Thus, while the Soviet version of the Russian

empire may well have been rejected by both the Russian left and

right, the notion of the empire itself was far from rejected by

Russia's political class. Roman Szporluk in his path breaking

article, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism,"13 observed that there

is no correlation between the degree of "liberalism" and degree

of commitment to the preservation of the empire. Thus, while some

westernizers par excellence remained committed to the

preservation of the USSR, some extreme nationalists were

sufficiently Russocentric to support the idea of the

dismantlement of the empire. Furthermore, even among those whom

Professor Szporluk designated as "nation builders," few equated

the boundaries of "Russia" with those of the Russian Federation,

assuming that at the very least "Russia" would include Ukraine,

Belarus, the Caucasus, and much of Kazakhstan.

The concept of the "Russian idea" covers an extremely broad

specter of thinkers ranging from the moderate academician Dmitri

Likhachev,14 who is careful to distinguish patriotism from

xenophobia, to fascists such as Dmitrii Vasil'ev who seem to be

taking an ideological cue from German naziism; however, the

center of gravity of Russian nationalism did not shift very much

from its "slavophile" predecessors of the 19th century. The

eternal question as to whether Russia is European or Asian

continued to be debated on the pages of Samizdat and later in the

open with the same vigor as in the 19th century, and the powerful

link between Orthodox Christianity and Russian national identity

remained intact. Beyond these rather vague notions of

Russianness, Russian nationalists, much as their 19th century

predecessors, continued to believe that with the exception of

Poles, Finns, the Baltic peoples, and perhaps some other groups

with a highly developed sense of national identity, most groups

can be sufficiently Russified to create a Russian identity which

transcends the borders of Russia or even the areas where ethnic

Russians constitute a majority. In a sense the Russian

nationalists' attempt to mold a diverse people into a single

entity followed the pattern launched by France a few centuries

earlier, where a rather diverse collection of people was blended

into a single national entity through the centralization of a

cultural policy.

Given this generally nonracial, although paradoxically
anti-Semitic notion of the Russian identity, most Russian

nationalists paid scant attention to the fact that by raising

Russia's national agenda they were invariably raising the entire

national question of other national groups, even groups such as

the Ukrainians and Byelorussians whom the Russians perceived as

parochial branches of the Russian people. Most Russian

nationalists, while rejecting the Soviet Union, falsely assumed

that what held the polyglot people of the USSR was not the

universalist ideology of Marxism which the Russian nationalists

rejected, but rather the inclusionist nature of Russian

nationalism.15 Consequently, as Walter Laqueur pointed out, while

Russian nationalist intellectuals spent their energies seeking to

identify the culprits of Russia's spiritual decline, they

remained oblivious to the growing separatist turmoil in the

Caucasus, Ukraine, Tatarstan, and among other peoples with whom

the Russians perceived their link as insoluble.

Alain Besancon's prophetic observation that in the absence

of an "ideological magic" the colonial legitimacy of the Russian

empire will evaporate and the Russian empire will break up16 was

ignored by Russia's nationalist thinkers. Thus, the breakup of

the USSR was an event which the Russian nationalists, let alone

the Narod, had neither anticipated nor were psychologically

prepared to face. Even the various referenda in Ukraine, Belarus,

the Baltics, and other republics where Russians voted with

convincing majorities in favor of independence were presumed

(wrongly) by many Russians as a step to dismantle the hated

sclerotic Brezhnevism rather than a fundamental breakup of the

"lands of Rus'." Russia's political elite continued to treat the

overwhelming Ukranian vote in December 1991 in favor of

independence as a "misunderstanding." Even after the December

1991 Minsk summit, where the three leaders agreed to dissolve the

USSR and replace it with the CIS, upon his return to Moscow

Yeltsin construed this accord as an act of preservation of a

single "economic and strategic space" rather than an act of

dissolution. Although Russia's nationalists despised the role of

Russia within the Soviet Union, it was the Russian philosopher

(of Ukrainian origin) Alexander Tsipko who encapsulated the

inherent limitations even of a nonimperial Russian "nation

builder" when he noted that without Ukraine, "there can be no

Russia in the old, real sense of the word."17

In short, while Russian nationalists decried what they

perceived as Russia's inferior position vis-a-vis both the

"exterior" and the "core" of the Soviet empire, they did not

really question the fundamental legitimacy of the empire;

therefore the collapse of the USSR, and especially the "loss" of

what most nationalists perceived as the historic "lands of Rus"

was an event for which the Russian body politic was not

psychologically prepared, and initially could not internalize its

full implications. Much as their predecessors in the 19th

century, Russian liberals, while bitterly opposed to the

autocratic nature of the empire, never really questioned the

validity of the empire as such. As Roman Szporluk noted, for many
Russians it was the mighty Russian state that was the embodiment

of the Russian national idea.18 Therefore, when it became clear

that the Brest agreement was not a step toward a "more perfect

union" but rather a return of Russia to a position it occupied in

Europe before the reign of Peter I ("the Great"), a profound

crisis of national identity befell Russia--a process which is yet

to be resolved.

Liberals, while stunned by the disintegration of the USSR

and, indeed, finding it hard to accept Ukraine, Belarus, or

Kazakhstan as foreign countries, nevertheless, were resigned.

Despite the patent unfairness resulting from Stalin's truncation

of the territories of Russia, the process of disintegration could

not be reversed and Russia's national interest would be best

served by rapidly "returning Russia to the West" via a

continuation of Gorbachev's conciliatory policy. At the same

time, by pursuing a friendly policy toward the "Near Abroad," the

minority rights of the 25 million Russians "abroad" could be

secured. Even among the liberals, only a minority felt that the

disintegration of the USSR would finally free the Russians from

what John Dunlop called "the mentality of an oppressed minority."

Others saw in the breakup of the USSR the opportunity for Russia

finally to mature into a normal country which pursues its own

national interest.19

The New Russia and the CIS.

The speed and the depth of the change that occurred in

December 1991 forced Russia's foreign policy invariably by sheer

inertia not to change very much from that of the former Soviet

Union. The Gorbachev doctrines from the era of "New Thinking"

continued to be the official dogma of the Russian state.

Asserting itself as the successor of the USSR and operating under

the assumption that Russia was not threatened by the West, while

the new states were far too weak to be taken seriously, Moscow

continued to champion "universal human values," nuclear

disarmament, and possible rapprochement with Japan as the main

foreign policy goals of Russia. The foreign policy dominated by

westernizing liberals argued strenuously that Russia, shorn of

its empire had finally become a normal country that would readily

take its place among the civilized nations of the West. This

policy of strong affiliation with the West resulted in a very

rapid disassociation of Russia from its troublesome Third World

clients, as well as a reorientation of policy in favor of

supporting the existing international order.20 Kozyrev's initial

policy was strongly derived from a firm belief in economic

determinism and universal values, with historic and geostrategic

considerations playing a far more secondary role.

In terms of its relationship with the CIS, Russia's initial

policy toward the "near abroad" can be best described as

denial.21 The foreign ministry was slow in developing a coherent

attitude toward the new neighbors, while other political
institutions acted as if the change in the relationship between

Russia and its former empire was more apparent than real. Given

this state of mind, long after Ukraine and other republics

established their own armed forces, the Kremlin continued to

cling to the fiction of a common "defense space," refusing to

establish a Russian defense ministry or distinct Russian armed

forces. In economic terms Moscow continued to supply grossly

subsidized energy and minerals to the republics, even though

according to the Swedish economist Anders Aslund this subsidy

cost Russia between 10 and 15 percent of its gross domestic

product (GDP). Even more significantly Russia continued to allow

republican central banks to issue ruble denominated credits,

which allowed Ukraine and other republics to avoid the economic

contraction imposed on Russia following Yegor Gaidar's freeing of

prices in Russia, which contributed mightily to fueling inflation

in the Russian Federation. In fact, despite the growing violence

along the periphery of the Russian Federation and the growing

acrimony between Russia and the Baltic States and between Russia

and Ukraine, the Russian foreign ministry did not establish a

"near abroad" bureau within the ministry until May 1992.

This twilight relationship between Russia and its CIS

partners, whereby the newly independent states simultaneously

continued to draw heavily on Russia's meager resources while

assertively insisting on their independence, was soon challenged

from both the left and the right. To the liberal economists

clustered around Gaidar the situation where Russia allowed other

countries to issue ruble denominated credits meant that Russia

abdicated control over the sources of its money supply making any

anti-inflationary policy unattainable. To the nationalist

right-wing camp, the breakup of the Soviet army; squabbles over

the future of the Black Sea fleet; the loss of Crimea with its

historic symbolism to Russia; and the real as well as perceived

discrimination against Russian speakers in the Baltics, Western

Ukraine, and Central Asia; fueled a sense of resentment and

humiliation which will have to be redressed.

While both Russia's liberals and nationalists realized that

the current relationship with the CIS states is unsustainable,

the solutions offered by the two camps were radically different.

Liberals, many of whom by now mutated to a more statist-pragmatic

orientation, asserted that Russia cannot reverse the breakup of

the Soviet Union; however, it must retain very close and intimate

links to the CIS. To regain a position of centrality within the

CIS, liberal pragmatists argued that Russia must become a

political, cultural, and economic magnet which will draw the

other republics into the orbit of Russia. However, unlike the

initial policy where Moscow attempted to preserve the link with

its CIS partners via continued mass subsidies and insistence on

the fiction of "common economic and defense space," the new

approach of the liberals turned pragmatists was substantially

different. Led by people such as Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor

Shelov- Kovedayev, Alexander Shokhin, and others, this group

asserted that the only way that Russia can become a centerpiece
of the CIS is if it would manage to become a leader within the

group in economic and political terms by restructuring Russia. To

attain the needed restructuring, Russia must cut all its costly

links with other CIS states which, while impoverishing Russia, do

little to enhance its position within the Commonwealth. It was

under the influence of this group that Russia first ejected

Ukraine from the ruble zone and then proceeded to create a

financial system which is exclusively under Russia's control;

demanding that any other state that wants to participate in the

system abdicate its financial independence to Russia. Russia's

deliveries of subsidized energy, other minerals, and industrial

components were phased out and CIS states were required by Moscow

to pay nearly world prices. Russia's foreign policy doctrine

published in late 1992 overtly stated that Russia does not intend

to "pay for the development of relations (with the CIS states)

with unilateral concessions to he detriment of its own state

interest."22

As Sergei Karaganov, director of Russia's Council for

Foreign and Defense Policy, asserted, by following an

unpatronizing and enlightened policy toward the CIS countries

Russia will help both parties to identify their mutual interests

which is a prerequisite to any normal relationship. The notion of

"Russia first" among this group was so deeply ingrained that they

opposed integrative steps with such palliative countries as

Kazakhstan and Belarus, believing that integration of any sort

will result yet again in the transfer of resources from Russia to

the periphery.

This shift of policy by Moscow in spring 1992 had a profound

effect on the "correlation of forces" between Russia and its

"near abroad." All of the former republics of the USSR (with the

exception of the Baltics) started to run huge deficits in their

trade with Russia with the Russian ruble easily emerging as by

far the strongest currency. Republics of the former Soviet Union,

which initially sought to minimize the importance of their

relationship with Russia, soon discovered that Russia remains

vital to the new states' well-being. Ukraine's President Leonid

Kravchuk, who, in May 1992 predicted that Poland would soon

surpass Russia as Ukraine's trade partner,23 by early 1993

emphatically noted that Russia is vital to the survival of

Ukraine.

Despite the fact that Russia's foreign ministry by mid-1992

was finally developing a coherent foreign policy toward the

republics of the former Soviet Union, by that time other players

within the Russian body politic emerged with vastly different

agendas toward the "near abroad." On the one hand Soviet-era

industrialists led by the "Red director" Arkady Vol'skii

insistently argued for an economic reunification of the former

USSR as the means of salvation for the ailing CIS economy. The

Russian army, while withdrawing from the former Warsaw Pact

countries, undertook an increasingly aggressive (and at times

seemingly autonomous) policy in the former USSR. Russia's
Fourteenth Army led by General Alexander Lebed' defied the

government of Moldova and threw its weight behind the separatist

republic of Transdniester. In the deepening civil war in Georgia,

elements of the Russian army supplied the Abkhaz side with arms

and other means of support making the secession of Abkhazia

possible. In the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia's

army skillfully managed to play both sides against the other,

thereby installing a pro-Russian government in Baku while making

both sides depend on Russia as an arbiter.

Finally, Russia's right, which initially was too

shell-shocked to react forcefully to the Brest accords, regrouped

by challenging the validity of the CIS accord altogether. The

nationalist leaders of Russia, many of whom were former

nomenklatura apparatchiks, felt that the price of their effort to

come to terms with the West led to the demise of the USSR, a

price that turned out to be far too high. Along with traditional

Russian imperialists who made no secret of their desire to

reestablish "one and indivisible Russia" even if the means

necessary were to require violence, even moderate Russians became

increasingly responsive to what Fritz Stern referred to as the

"politics of despair." As Alexei Pushkov, currently deputy editor

of Moskovskiye Novosti, observed:

Russia inherited not only the USSR's seat in the UN

Security Council and the internal treaties signed by

Moscow--but the frustration and bitterness as well.

Russia alone gained nothing from the disintegration of

the Soviet Union. It lost lands joined to it by czars

dating to Peter the Great. The fall of the USSR left

Russia with shattered self esteem and a feeling of

humiliation. A fallen empire syndrome haunts Russia.24

(Emphasis in original)

Right wing politicians were quick to capitalize on this

sentiment. Nikolai Travkin, a founder of Yeltsin's Democratic

Russia who since joined the nationalists, observed that the

demise of the USSR was the worst calamity in Russia's

millennium-long history and that the birth of the CIS was a

defeat of Russia and a victory for Ukraine. Sergei Baburin went

further asserting that: "Either Ukraine will reunite with Russia

or there will be war."25 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the

Liberal-Democratic party, expanded his irredentist agenda to

include all territories controlled by the Russian empire in 1867.

Even Yeltsin's close associate, Sergei Shakhrai, sensing the

popular reaction to the breakup of the USSR conceded: "Our

national identity does not coincide with Russia's borders . . .

We have grown used to thinking on a union scale. With the breakup

of the Soviet Union our great nation feels cheated."26

In strict economic terms the policy advocated by Yeltsin's

young associates was the most suitable for Russia, given the fact

that any deepening of the relationship between Russia and other
former Soviet republics would entail an economic transfer from

Russia which Moscow could not afford; however, as liberal Russian

journalist Dmitrii Furman observed, Russia's policy toward the

CIS has by now attained a far larger symbolism, where a tolerant

policy toward the CIS versus an expansionist policy has become an

arena for struggle between liberalism and authoritarianism.

Furman noted that: "The fate of Russia's democracy will be

determined in the near abroad."27

Towards a Policy of Russian Self-Assertion.

The Russian elections of December 1993, which saw a sharp

swing toward the communists and nationalists, confirmed a trend

which was visible in Russia, as well as in the rest of Eastern

Europe, for more than a year. In economic terms Gaidar's "shock

therapy," which was never fully implemented in any event, saw the

collapse of Russian industrial output and rapid impoverishment of

much of the Russian population. Western aid, which was heralded

by the Yeltsin-Kozyrev team as the fruit of their pro-Western

policy, never approached the amounts of transfers promised by

President George Bush and the "Group of Seven," let alone the

amount to which the Russians assumed they were entitled. In terms

of foreign policy the accommodation with Washington increasingly

was perceived by ever larger segments of the Russian population

as one of capitulation to Western patronization and arrogance.

The West's insistence on sanctions against the pro-Russian Serbs,

while refusing to impose similar sanctions against the pro-German

Croats whose intrusion into Bosnia is no less blatant than that

of the Serbs, was perceived by Moscow's nationalists as a symptom

of orchestrated "Russophobia." The high-handed manner in which

Washington forced Moscow to cancel its rocket engine export deal

to India, at a time when the United States's own arms exports

were capturing an unprecedented share of the world arms market,

was seized by the opponents of Kozyrev's policy as yet another

proof of the West's duplicity when it came to dealing with

Russia. Yet perhaps nothing undercut more the West's credibility

in the Russian polity than the suspicion of Western acquiescence

to a policy of discrimination against Russian speakers in Estonia

and Latvia.

Economic hardship, along with a perception that the foreign

policy pursued by the Kremlin since 1988 had resulted in the

continuous marginalization of Russia with no visible benefits

whatsoever, led to an erosion of the meager political base which

the policy had enjoyed since August 1991. Several traditional

Russian notions which initially were the preserve of the Russian

right have become popularized to the point that they embody today

the consensus of the Russian polity. The traditional Slavophile

notion that Russia is a "civilization" rather then an ethnic

nation, and therefore not bound by the territories of the Russian

Federation, has become commonplace even among people who in the

past were considered liberals. While there are those among

Russia's nationalists such as Ksenia Mayalo who insist that
Russia is neither "Atlantist" nor "Eurasian"; the intellectual

center of gravity is shifting yet again to the "Eurasian" camp.

These thinkers consider themselves the moral heirs to the

"Slavophile" thinkers of the 19th century, and the Asia-oriented

intellectuals, who during the 1920s popularized the "Eurasian"

idea in emigration. The Eurasian idea is based on the following

principles:

• That Russia is a distinct multi-ethnic civilization--any

attempts to try to westernize Russia will at best reduce Russia

to a "poor relative" of the West, "another Romania albeit

larger," or at worst accentuate the fissures within that

civilization and lead to the breakup of Russia's cultural space

and possibly cause a civil war. Furthermore, Russia by virtue of

being a great power will receive the international recognition

that is its due. Elgiz Pozdnyakov writing in the Foreign

Ministry's publication, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn', emphatically

stated that "westernizers" are people to whom Russian traditions

mean nothing, and that Russia's role as a great power is

"genetic" and "inborn," and that only by retaining a strong

centralized state will Russia avoid becoming "an object of

history."28

• That an attempt to impose from above yet another western

model (this time liberal capitalism) will be no less disastrous

than the imposition of Marxism. Russia's historic power was based

on its being an "organic polity" to whom western individualist

traditions are alien and dangerous.

In terms of foreign affairs, the consensus appears to be

that it would be folly for Russia to attempt to play a global

role, and thus compete with maritime powers; however, Russia must

retain its status as a great power and that can be accomplished

if Russia will continue to insist upon a Great Power presence in

both Central Europe and the heart of Asia. To accomplish the goal

of remaining a great continental power, most "Eurasians" favor

retaining a tight grip on the territories of the former Soviet

Union as well as a substantial degree of influence in countries

littoral to the former Soviet Union: namely, Central Europe,

Turkey, Iran, the Subcontinent and China. Some exponents of the

"Eurasian" idea, such as Petr Savitsky and Shamil Sultanov, argue

that there is a fundamental incompatibility between "Eurasian

Spirituality" and "Atlantist Consumerism." Given this fundamental

schism, and their belief that the current world economic order is

structured to serve the insatiable appetite of "Atlantic

Consumerism," Russia ought not to side with the West in the

imminent clash between the West and Islam. In general "Eurasians"

seem to embrace Nikolai Karamzin's feeling that "By becoming

citizens of the world, Russians will cease being Russians." It is

noteworthy to observe that according to a sociological study

published by Obshchaya Gazeta, the foundation for Zhirinovsky's

support was frustrated Russian nationalism rather than a reaction

to impoverishment.29
While the views of the extremist "Eurasians" do not

represent the view of the majority of the Russian public, we are

clearly witnessing a mutation of Russian nationalism similar to

the three phase process envisioned by Alexander Yanov whereby

Russian nationalism moved from the first phase which was a

struggle against the Soviet Union, to a second phase of

"isolationism," and now is embarking once again on supporting

imperialist-militarism.30

Russia's New Objectives.

Zhirinovsky's geopolitical ideas of expansion to the Indian

Ocean continue to be rejected by the overwhelming majority of

Russia's political elite;31 however, after nearly 2 years of

turmoil and disorientation, Russian foreign policy has ceased to

be the purview of liberal "Atlantists" and has passed to the

hands of so-called Statist-Democrats (Demokraty- Derzhavniki). Dominated by men such as Lukin, Sobchak, Stankenvich, Arbatov,

Karaganov, and others, the underlying foundations of their

orientation are the following:

• While not anti-American, their belief is that Russia can

enter an intimate relationship with the United States only as a

client, therefore such a relationship is not acceptable to

Russia. Therefore, Russia will not be interested in membership in

either the European Union or NATO since such membership will only

accentuate Russian economic weakness and blunt its military

strength.

• Russia must insist on complete parity of rights with the

United States.

• It is not beyond the United States to try to utilize

Europe and the near abroad as leverage against Russia. Therefore,

Moscow must retain its sphere of influence.

• Russia's sole means to retain its status as a great

continental power is to reestablish a strong sphere of influence

in the CIS and its littoral countries.

• The independence of Eastern Europe and the new CIS states

can be accepted by Russia only if these states become bridges for

Russia to engage with the rest of the world, rather than an

anti-Russian cordon sanitaire moving from the banks of the Elbe

to the banks of the Bug (the Polish-Ukrainian border) or even the

Don (Ukrainian-Russian border). Therefore, any expansion of

Western security or economic multinational organizations is

counter to Russian interests.

• Russia is the sole power able (and willing) to maintain

order along its periphery. Russia will assert that right, with or

without the West's blessing.
• Russia's eagerness to accommodate the West led to the loss

of its external empire, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the

threatened integrity of the Russian Federation; only Russia's

willingness to assert itself again will preserve Russia's

integrity.

• Russia's borders consist of three layers: a) the current

political borders of the Russian Federation; b) the lands outside

the Russian Federation where ethnic Russians and Russian speakers

predominate; and, c) the Russian cultural sphere which

essentially covers the entire former USSR--in all these areas

Russia has an enduring right to assert its interests.

Even, Russian liberals such as Dmitrii Furman have now

accepted the notion that Russia will have to live through an

"authoritarian spasm" if it is to arrest the process of

continuous disintegration.

Given these new values, since the spring of 1993 Moscow's

foreign policy has undergone a profound reorientation in its

policy toward the rest of the Commonwealth and its former outer

empire. Russian foreign policy today reflects two doctrines in

terms of Russia's relationship with the former republics of the

USSR: Russia has adopted a notion of a "manifest destiny" whereby

Russia has a natural right to expand and reacquire the lost

"lands of Rus'"; in terms of its policy toward its former

satellites in East Central Europe, the Kremlin had revived the

Kvitisnisky Doctrine under which Moscow, during the last days of

the Soviet Union, insisted as a price for a Treaty of Friendship

and Good Neighborliness, a commitment by the Central European

countries not to enter into any alliance which Moscow might

perceive as "unfriendly" to the USSR. With the exception of

Romania, all other former Warsaw Pact countries spurned this

demand and signed treaties with the Russian Federation which

omitted this clause. Nevertheless, despite the scuttling of the

clause stating the Kvitsinsky Doctrine by Moscow following the

August coup, the same position was resurrected by the Kremlin

when the Visegrad group attempted to join NATO this winter.

Russia aborted that application by direct pressure on the NATO

states themselves. While the Russian Foreign Ministry was engaged

in a campaign to discourage NATO members from admitting the

Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians, Russia's Defense Ministry

published its own new doctrine which clearly placed the former

Warsaw Pact states within Russia's sphere, threatening to use

nuclear weapons against any state that possesses nuclear weapons

or is allied with states which possess such weapons.32

If there was a metamorphosis in the Kremlin's policy toward

Eastern Europe, a far more pronounced metamorphosis occurred in

Moscow's policy toward the former CIS states. During 1993 the

Kremlin moved from declaring unqualified recognition of

sovereignty of the CIS states to overt proclamation of a "Russian

Monroe Doctrine." Yeltsin's spokesman Vyacheslav Kostikov openly

declared that all members of the CIS will reintegrate with Russia
"once the prickly nationalist weeds are uprooted." Russia's

"westernizing" foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev reasserted that

Russia should cease to fear the words "sphere of influence" and

reassert its geopolitical interests in the former Soviet Union,

apparently including the Baltics.33

Even Yeltsin, who during the first year as the president of

the Russian Federation argued that Russia "does not want to be

anyone's older brother," reversed himself demanding that Russia

become "first among equals" within the CIS.

The watershed of Russia's CIS policy could be dated to the

December 1993 elections in Russia and the subsequent CIS meeting

in Ashgabad. Even before the meeting in late December, Yeltsin's

spokesman Kostikov made it clear that Russia's first foreign

policy priority is the Russian Diaspora. Kostikov told ITAR-TASS

that "Undisputed emphasis in foreign policy will be given to

protection of Russia's national interests and the rights of

Russian and Russian speaking people . . . on the basis of

pan-national solidarity."34 Presidential counselor Sergei

Stankevich declared that ". . . a process of bridging gaps is

clearly visible. Russia's historic task is the gradual historic

task of cultural and economic expansion into the new foreign

countries."35 It is noteworthy that Russia's new assertiveness is

not limited to the "new countries." The government of Finland was

startled this January when the Russian embassy in Helsinki handed

a note to the Finnish foreign ministry stating that the

participation of extreme right-wing parties in the Finnish

presidential elections violates the 1947 Paris Peace Agreement

between the USSR and Finland, an accord which strictly limited

Finland's independence. Moscow was clearly reminding Finland that

Russia has no intention of abandoning its sphere of influence.

Similarly, Russia let it be known that it would oppose Turkish

efforts to create a "Turkic Bloc" out of former Soviet republics

in Central Asia.

The emerging new relationship between Russia and other

member states of the CIS was formulated at the Ashgabad summit

conference convened in late December of 1993. Not only was

Yeltsin elected unanimously as the Chairman of the CIS, but

Russia managed to sign defense accords with several CIS members

and even traditionally reluctant Ukraine resumed military

contacts with Moscow.

Turkmenistan became the first CIS member to capitulate to

the Kremlin's demand that its ethnic Russian population be

granted dual citizenship, that of the Russian Federation as well

as that of the host country, while Belarus became the first CIS

state to agree to abandon its independent currency making the

Russian ruble the sole legal tender of that republic. It is

noteworthy that the Kremlin made no secret that the

Byelorussian-Russian relationship was a model for Russia's

relationship with the other CIS members.36 In the case of

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Russia forced the local governments to
turn over 20-30 percent of the shares in joint petroleum

exploration ventures with Western oil companies.37 As Izvestia

observed, the elections in Russia and the Kremlin's new hegemonic

policies in the "near abroad" have induced two parallel reactions

within the CIS: on the one hand all CIS leaders, fearing the

resurgence of aggressive Russian nationalism, have rallied around

Yeltsin; on the other, to check Russia's seemingly insatiable

expansionary appetite,38 the leaders of the CIS scrambled to

arrange more bilateral deals to check the growing power of

Moscow. Thus, Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev traveled to Kiev

to establish firmer links with Ukraine, while at the same time

raised the pursuing of an economic pact with Uzbekistan.

However, despite these efforts, few of the Commonwealth

leaders entertained many illusions about the new phase in

Russian-Commonwealth relations. In New Year's messages broadcast

on Moscow's Radio Mayak, one CIS leader after another declared

his fidelity to the CIS and to a closer relationship with

Russia.39

The reemerging links between Russia and the former republics

of the USSR led 22 percent of the Muscovites polled to believe

that all 15 republics of the USSR will reintegrate, while an

additional 39 percent expected "most" to reintegrate.40

Towards a New Relationship with the West.

Although the Russian leadership is aware that its

expansionism along its periphery will not go unnoticed by the

West, the prospect of a major western response thus far draws a

nonchalant response in Moscow. Foreign minister Kozyrev overtly

stated in an interview in Moskovskiye Novosti that if the West

thought that it would be better off dealing with a weak Russia,

it was in fact ignoring realities since pushing Russia to the

wall would merely hasten the rise of Russian nationalist

xenophobic reaction.41 Although Kozyrev did not say so

explicitly, it was clear from the tenor of his remarks that the

West will have to either accommodate Yeltsin's assertive foreign

policy or face the risk of dealing with a far more difficult

Russia. Another reason that the Russian leadership paid scant

attention to a possible Western reaction is the enduring Russian

belief that the areas in which Russia is expanding are of little

interest to the West, and given the inability (and more

important, unwillingness) of the West to fill the vacuum created

by the defunct USSR; the West actually tacitly supports Russian

reassertion along its littoral. As Alexei Pushkov of Moscow News

noted, the West needs Russia to remain a part of the "North"

rather than see it joining the "South," hence the West will not

object to Moscow's policy of confronting and checking the tidal

wave of instability emanating from the Islamic world.42

Clearly Russia has returned to its traditional policy of

asserting certain hegemonic rights on the Eurasian mainland. In a
sense 19th century history has repeated itself much as after the

Crimean War (1854-1855) when Russia reduced its global presence

yet continued to expand its influence along its periphery, seeing

in such expansion its sole means to preserve its status as a

great power and believing that the area of its sphere of

influence will serve as a vital outlet to Russia's antiquated

industry. Should the Western response to this wave of expansion

be similar to that of Victorian Britain, which through a

combination of alliances with regional powers and direct presence

managed to contain the Russian march to the south? Or, should the

West resign itself to Russian expansionism as a historic

inevitability?

First, it is obvious that Moscow's renewed expansion is an

adverse process for the world as well as for Russia itself. In

global terms Russian expansion is bound to renew tensions with

Pakistan, Iran, and most important, Turkey, where some Russian

nationalists advocate adopting the cause of the Kurds as a means

to tame Turkey's expansionist ambitions in what used to be Soviet

Central Asia.

In Central Europe, growing Russian ambition along with

regional ethnic turmoil is ultimately bound to induce a German

reaction. Whether this reaction takes the form of a Russo- German

"Cold War" or a Russo-German "condominium," the impact on these

Central European states will be adverse, since it will stymie

their transformation to normal post-industrial polities and

accentuate again the forces of ethnic tribalism in the region.

Finally, the reemergence of Russian expansion portends dire

consequences to Russia itself. Much of this expansion can be

accomplished only through the coaptation of the old

"nomenklatura" elites, and can only be done through the

resumption of resource transfers from Russia to its former

empire. To sustain this process will be possible only at the

price of aborting the process of democratization of Russia, thus

setting the stage for the reemergence of a Russian-led empire

which is inherently at odds with the international status quo,

and with the national interests of Russia's masses.

The Western Response.

The West's ability to respond to these developments is

limited but not insignificant. It is true that there is no clear

American interest in Central Asia and the Caucasus which will

sustain public support for a major economic, let alone military

commitment. Equally true is the idea that bringing Poland,

Hungary, the Czech and Slovak states into NATO is not feasible

given the certainty that the U.S. Congress will not endorse

deployment of U.S. troops east of the Elbe; without such a

deployment NATO's protection of these countries would be of

dubious credibility. Nevertheless, historic lessons should not be

ignored. Although Russia's statecraft is based on centuries of
relentless expansion against its neighbors, Russian imperialism

is qualitatively different than that of France in the 19th or

Germany in the 20th centuries. Russia always expanded against

political vacuums, and rarely challenged the existing

international order. Thus Russian expansion east was almost

always against weak and disorganized entities in the sparsely

populated areas of Siberia and Central Asia. In the case of

Europe, the core of the international system, Russia limited its

expansion to times when major vacuums occurred and even then in

the context of a coalition with other great powers, as it did in

1815 and 1945. In situations where it encountered major

resistance or approbation of other great powers, Russia

historically tended to avoid confrontation. Thus when faced with

Europe-wide opposition to its ambitions in the Balkans as

manifested in the San Stefano accord with Turkey, Russia

swallowed its pride and accepted the humbling terms of the

Congress of Berlin in 1878. Similarly, in 1944 when Finland sued

for peace with the USSR, the Finns were in no position to resist

any Soviet demand; however, the mere fact that the Finnish polity

exhibited a certain degree of cohesion and the knowledge that the

fate of Finland was of interest to the West persuaded Stalin not

to force upon that country the status of a satellite.

While the imperial urge will continue to dominate the

foreign policy formation of Russia, Moscow will continue to

temper that urge if it knows that it will run into a solid polity

on the ground and the approbation of the West. Thus, the response

of the West should follow a twin-track approach. First, the West

should make it clear to Moscow that it cannot have both

acceptance into the international community and imperial

expansion. The Munich declaration of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and

U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry warning Russia not to resume

its imperial drive will no doubt slow the momentum of Russia's

imperial assertiveness.43 A more important element of Western

policy to rein in the resurgence of Russian imperialism must be a

far bolder initiative to prevent countries along the periphery of

Russia from turning into "vacuums." While it is doubtful whether

the West can do much about highly Russified countries where the

old nomenklatura is deeply entrenched, such as Belarus or parts

of Central Asia, the situation is very different when it comes to

the Visegrad group, the Baltic States, Kazakhstan, and possibly

Ukraine. If these countries are to become "vacuums," this will

happen not because of an imminent Russian military threat but

because of inordinate economic turmoil which will delegitimate

the independent regimes and therefore permit Moscow to fish in

the turbulent political waters of economic collapse. We should

bear in mind that even in the "successful" economies of Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech lands, if the current IMF-inspired

policies are to be carried out to their logical conclusion,

unemployment will soar by the mid-1990s to 20 percent of the

labor force. In the absence of a social safety net it will be

difficult for these young democracies to survive such turbulence

without offering Moscow irresistible opportunities to meddle in

the internal politics of its neighbors. If the West is serious in
its desire to prevent the resurgence of Russian imperialism (and

thus spare itself enormous defense expenditures), the oppression

of the smaller states along Russia's rim, and the imposition of

an imperial cross on the backs of the long- suffering Russian

people, the course is clear. Instead of continuing with its

intellectual acrobatics about possible membership in NATO for

Central Europe, the West should adopt a genuinely stabilizing

economic policy for the region. This policy will have to entail

the following:

• As in the Marshall Plan, a significant economic transfer

must be made to enable these economies to upgrade their

infrastructure and establish a modicum of economic security.

Although such a policy might contribute to the region's

inflationary problem, I believe that the region's politics can

tolerate inflation far more easily than deepening unemployment.

• The region's economic problems will not show any

significant improvement unless the wealthy economies of the West

dramatically ease access to their markets. Again it is noteworthy

that the "German economic miracle" as well as the "Italian

economic miracle" were accomplished to a significant degree

because of the U.S. willingness to tolerate an overvalued dollar

and a massive inflow of European goods.

The United States should not, as Paul Wolfowitz noted, "make

its Central and European policy hostage to Yeltsin's success."44

However, the West, with the United States at the lead, should

make substantial investment in Russia's grass root organizations,

supporting small business, private agriculture, etc., while

eschewing Moscow's corrupt bureaucracy, if indeed our interest is

not to leave Russia's political arena to the "Red-Brown" alliance

capitalizing on the growing demoralization of Russian society.

The industrial West has basically two options, either to

make the economic investment to create a string of solid

political entities in the Baltics, Central Europe, and perhaps

Central Asia, or be prepared to face a new Russian resurgence to

the chagrin of the West, the littoral countries, and the Russian

people themselves.

A complacent reaction of "victor" in the cold war will

condemn us to the fate of post-World War II Britain, where former

glory blinded the polity to the challenges of the future.

ENDNOTES -- CHAPTER 6

1. John Lukacs, The End of the Twentieth Century and the End

of the Modern Age, New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1993, p. 5.

2. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Eastern Bloc: Unity and

Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

3. See Yves Hamant, "Soviet Ideology and the Russian
National Idea," in Michel Niquex, ed., La Pensee Russe, Paris:

1989.

4. Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Russian Nationalism and Soviet

Politics: Official and Unofficial Perspectives," in Robert

Conquest, ed., The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet

Future, Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1986.

5. Moskovskiye novosti, April 29, 1992.

6. See Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon, Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1988; also Martin Malia, "Z

[Martin Malia], "To the Statin Mausoleum," Daedalus, Winter 1990,

pp. 295-344; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Grand Failure,

Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990; Charles Gati,

The Bloc that Failed, New York: Scribner, 1989.

7. See Alexander Yanov, The Russian Challenge, New York:

Blackwell, 1987; John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall

of the Soviet Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1993; Stephen Carter, Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today,

Tomorrow, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

8. Moscow News, December 18, 1991.

9. Ibid.

10. Igor Shafarevich, "Rossiya naedine s soboi," Pravda, November 2, 1991.

11. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Kak nam obustroit' Rossiiu,"

Literaturnaia gazeta, 1990.

12. See, Dunlop, The Rise of Russia, and Yanov, The Russian

Challenge.

13. Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism,

"Problems of Communism, July/August 1989.

14. Dimitri S. Likhachev, The National Nature of Russian

History, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

15. Ibid.

16. Alain Becanson, "Nationalism and Bolshevism in the USSR"

in Conquest, The Last Empire, p. 11.

17. Quoted in Vera Tolz and Elizabeth Teague, "Russian

Intellectuals Adjust to Loss of Empire," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 3, February 21, 1992.

18. Roman Szporluk, "History of Russian Nationalism,"

Survey, Vol. 24, No. 3, Summer 1979.
19. Dimitri Simes, "Russia Reborn," Foreign Policy, Winter

1992.

20. See Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy

Alternatives," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993;

Andrei V. Kortunov, "The Soviet Legacy and Current Foreign Policy

Discussions in Russia," Russian Littoral Project Working Paper

No. 4, University of Maryland, College Park, and the Johns

Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, May 1993; also

Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, New York: Routledge,

1993, Ch. 8.

21. See Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives";

Kortunov, "The Soviet Legacy"; Dimitri Simes, "The Return of

Russian History," Foreign Affairs, 1994, Vol. 73, No. 1.

22. Moskovskiye novosti, December 2, 1992.

23. Zycie Warszawy, May 15, 1992.

24. Alexei Pushkov, "Is Yeltsin Becoming a Dictator?"

Christian Science Monitor, December 31, 1993.

25. Izvestia, May 26, 1992.

26. Daniel Sneider, Russian Nationalities Decry Loss of

Greatness," Christian Science Monitor, July 14, 1992.

27. Quote by Elizabeth Teague, "The CIS: an Unpredictable

Year," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 7, 1994.

28. Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "Rossia velikayai derzhava,

"Mezhdunarodnia Zhizn', January 1993.

29. Andrei Lipsey, "Liberalismus and His Guard," Obshchaya

Gazeta, January 21, 1994, p. 7.

30. Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Right: Right Wing

Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR, Berkeley: Institute of

International Studies, University of California, 1978.

31. See Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Poslednyi brosok na iug, Moscow, "LDP," 1993.

32. For the text of the doctrine see Voennaia mysl', May

1992.

33. Reuters, January 18, 1994.

34. Leyla Boulton, "Yeltsin Pledges Tough Foreign Policy to

Please Nationalists," Financial Times, January 4, 1994.

35. Richard Boureaux, "In Russia the Empire Strikes Back,"

Los Angeles Times, November 7, 1993.
36. Radio Moscow, January 17, 1994; reported by the BBC

Summary of World News, January 19, 1994.

37. Financial Times, January 21, 1994.

38. See Izvestia, December 26, 1993.

39. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 3, 1994.

40. Agence France Press, December 29, 1993.

41. Moskovskiye Novosti, October 21, 1992.

42. Alexei Pushkov, "Is Alliance with West Feasible?" Moscow

News, February 26, 1992.

43. Quentin Peel, "Russia Urged to Curb Ambition," Financial

Times, February 7, 1994.

44. Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 1994.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK is Associate Professor of Russian and East

European Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He is the

author of numerous studies of Soviet/Russian nationality,

foreign, and military policies. He is the editor, along with

Jacob Kipp, of The Soviet Military and the Future, Greenwood

Publishing Group, 1992, and of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin

as Commissar of Nationalities, 1917-1924, Greenwood Publishing

Group, 1994.

JACOB W. KIPP is Research Coordinator at the Foreign Military

Studies Office of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College. He has edited and written numerous works on Tsarist,

Soviet, and Russian military history, thought, and policies. Most

recently he coedited The Soviet Military and the Future,

Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992, with Stephen Blank, and is the

author of a forthcoming article on Zhirinovsky that will appear

in Foreign Affairs. Dr. Kipp is also the editor of the journal,

European Security.

THOMAS M. NICHOLS is Assistant Professor of Government at

Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. He is the author of

several works on the Soviet and Russian military, the most recent

being, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet

National Security, 1917-1992, Cornell University Press, 1993.

ILYA PRIZEL is Associate Professor of Government at the Nitze

School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins

University. He has written many articles and books on Soviet

foreign policy in Latin America and Eastern Europe after

Communism (co-authored with Andrew Michta of Rhodes College), and

is currently working on a study of the development of national

identities and self-consciousness in Russia, Ukraine and Poland.

JESSICA EVE STERN is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for

Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, Livermore, California. Her most recent publication is

"Moscow Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?" in the Spring 1994 issue

of International Security.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR., is the Director of Research at the

Strategic Studies Institute. A former Air Force officer and

professor at the Air Command and Staff College and Airpower

Research Institute, Dr. Tilford has written many works on U.S.

military history and is the author of Crosswinds: The Air Force's

Setup in Vietnam, Texas A&M University Press, 1993.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editors

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Institute Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Kay L. Williams

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Cover Design

Mr. James E. Kistler