17-1319-cv 

Chen v. Corches, et al.

1 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a 

summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is 

governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s 

Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with 

this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic 

database (with the notation “Summary Order”). A party citing a summary 

order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 20th day of February, two thousand and eighteen. 

Present: 

 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 

PETER W. HALL, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR. 

 Circuit Judges.

Xin Chen, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

Ronald I. Chorches, Trustee, Dow Corning 

Corporation, Hemlock Semiconductor Corporation, 

Richard M. Coan, Trustee, James J. Tancredi, 

Judge, Jie Xiao, Debtor, 

 Respondents-Appellees. 

 

For Petitioner-Appellant: Brian K. Condon, Condon & Associates, PLLC, 

 Nanuet, NY 

For Respondents-Appellees David Austin, (for Ronald I. Chorches), Law Office 

of Ronald I. Chorches, Wethersfield, CT; Patrick M. 

Fahey, Eric Goldstein (for Dow Corning 

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Chen v. Corches, et al.

2 

Corporation & Hemlock Semiconductor 

Corporation), Shipman & Goodwin LLP, Hartford, 

CT; Tim Miltenberger (for Richard M Coan), Coan, 

Lewendon, Gulliver & Miltenberger, LLC, New 

Haven, CT; Sandra Slack Glover (for James J. 

Tancredi), Assistant United States Attorney, 

United States Attorney’s Office for the District of 

Connecticut, New Haven, CT 

 

 

 Appeal from a decision entered April 18, 2017, and final judgment entered 

April 19, 2017, in the District of Connecticut (Underhill, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court’s decision and judgment are 

AFFIRMED. 

 Appellant Xin Chen filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district 

court, requesting the court order the recusal of Bankruptcy Judge Tancredi from all 

pending matters relating to her. The district court denied that petition. This is Xin 

Chen’s appeal of that denial. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history, the arguments presented on appeal, and 

the district court’s rulings which we reference only to explain our decision. 

 We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a petition for writ of 

mandamus. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309 

(1989) (“[W]e have required that petitioners [for a writ of mandamus] demonstrate a 

‘clear abuse of discretion,’ or conduct amounting to ‘usurpation of [the judicial] 

power.’” (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953); De 
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Chen v. Corches, et al.

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Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)) (third 

alteration in original)). 

A judge must disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned” or “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). “[T]he test to be applied is an 

objective one which assumes that a reasonable person knows and understands all 

the relevant facts.” In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1995) 

(quotation marks omitted). “‘[J]udicial rulings alone’ the [Supreme] Court [has] 

observed, ‘almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion’ and 

‘can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or 

antagonism required’” for recusal. Id. at 644 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (first alteration in original)). 

 The district court properly denied Xin Chen’s petition, and we affirm for 

substantially the same reasons the district court recited in its April 18, 2017 

written opinion. As that court noted, Xin Chen’s case does not present the “rarest 

circumstances” where an adverse judicial ruling implicated the degree of favoritism 

or antagonism required for recusal because Judge Tancredi considered the evidence 

presented in the first day of the hearing, when he entered the order prohibiting Xin 

Chen from traveling outside of the country, and soon thereafter he provided Xin 

Chen an opportunity to be heard. Based on Chen’s testimony, Judge Tancredi then 

vacated the travel order and ordered the return of her passport. While Xin Chen 

also asserts that Judge Tancredi’s order prohibiting her travel showed that he had 
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already decided the ultimate issue in the proceeding—whether her divorce from Jie 

Xiao was a sham divorce—we disagree. That Jie Xiao conducts business in and 

frequents China was only one of multiple reasons Judge Tancredi concluded Xin 

Chen should briefly be prohibited from travelling outside of the country. The travel 

order also pointed to Xin Chen’s transfer of a significant amount of money to her 

parents in China after the bankruptcy case had been filed. Judge Tancredi’s 

mention of Jie Xiao’s connection to China in the travel order and his questions 

regarding Xin Chen’s citizenship at the hearing would not cause a reasonable 

person, knowing and understanding all the relevant facts, to question Judge 

Tancredi’s impartiality. See In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 45 F.3d at 643. 

We have considered Xin Chen’s remaining arguments and find them to be 

without merit. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment and decision and order are 

AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk