United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

June 1996 COMBAT AIR POWER

Assessment Of Joint

Close Support

Requirements and

Capabilities Is Needed

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-45

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-262230 

June 28, 1996

Congressional Committees

Over the next 6 years, the military services plan to spend more than $10.5 billion on aircraft and

other weapons to improve their formidable existing close support capabilities. These plans,

however, come at a time of reduced defense budgets, force structure reductions, and questions

about the affordability of future defense modernization programs.

This report (1) discusses the aggregate capabilities of the military services to provide close

support and the extent to which those capabilities continue to be modernized and enhanced

and (2) evaluates the processes the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess mission needs,

capabilities, and modernization proposals for the close support mission. This report contains a

recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that could improve DOD’s requirements generation

process.

This review was part of our broader effort to assess how DOD can better adapt its combat air

power to meet future needs. We are addressing this report to you because of your

responsibilities for the issues discussed and your interest in the subject.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
B-262230 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
B-262230 

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Executive Summary

Purpose Close support weapons fire on targets close to U.S. ground forces and, as a

result, are likely to influence the outcome of a battle. The military services

have significantly improved the capability of their close support weapons

since the 1980s and plan to spend more than $10.6 billion on further

improvements between fiscal years 1996 and 2001. These plans however,

come at a time of reduced defense budgets, defense downsizing, and

questions about the affordability of future defense modernization

programs. This report (1) discusses the aggregate capabilities of the

military services to provide close support and the extent to which those

capabilities continue to be modernized and enhanced; and (2) evaluates

the processes the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess mission

needs, capabilities, and modernization proposals for the close support

mission. This review was part of GAO’s broader effort to assess how DOD

can better adapt its combat air power to meet future needs.

Background The services have developed a large number of weapons that can be used

for close support. Some were developed specifically for the close fire

mission, while others were developed as multi-role weapons that can also

perform interdiction, reconnaissance, or air-superiority missions. Systems

that can provide close support include Army and Marine Corps cannon

and rocket artillery and attack helicopters; Navy, Marine Corps, and Air

Force fixed-wing aircraft; and naval guns on surface ships. These systems

can be used against a variety of close support targets, such as enemy

troops; tanks and other fighting vehicles; artillery; fortifications;

command, control, and communications systems; air defenses; and tactical

logistical support units.

Close support is needed in a broad range of combat situations. Therefore,

the close support system of choice will vary based on the specific mission

at hand, threat environment, time of day, weather conditions, and

proximity to forces needing support. Artillery can be fired at night and in

all weather conditions. Attack helicopters can attack targets beyond the

reach of close support artillery. Fixed-wing aircraft have greater speed and

range than attack helicopters and can fly at high altitudes to avoid air

defense systems. The effectiveness of each system also varies against

specific types of targets.

In addition to the wide range of circumstances in which close support may

be needed, several other factors account for the extent of close support

capability in the force. First, title 10 U.S.C. and DOD Directive 5100.1 spell

out the broad missions for each of the services. To carry out these

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Executive Summary

missions, each service acquires some organic close support capability

independent of the other services. For example, the Army acquires

artillery and attack helicopters not solely on the basis of its close support

mission but also on the basis of its broader responsibility “to defeat enemy

land forces.” Second, under DOD’s assignment of functions to the individual

services, all four services have a primary responsibility for conducting

close air support (CAS)—the fixed- and rotary-wing air component of close

support. Third, some systems used for close support missions have been

assigned multiple roles and therefore have not been developed solely on

the basis of close support requirements. Finally, because close support

needs may arise unexpectedly, each service seeks a certain degree of

independence in its capabilities since there is no assurance that other

services’ weapons can be made available to respond in time.

Results in Brief Collectively, the services’ current mix of weapon systems constitutes a

formidable joint close support capability. Nevertheless, the services plan

to invest more than $10.6 billion over the next 6 years in weapons

upgrades and enhancements to further add to this capability. Whether

these investments represent the most appropriate, cost-effective mix of

weapon systems to meet close support missions is unclear because each

military service has continued to propose enhancements to its capabilities

without adequate consideration of the capabilities of its other weapons or

those of other services.

DOD’s current assessment processes do not yield the information that the

Secretary of Defense needs to weigh the merits of service-generated

weapons acquisition and modernization proposals for the close support

mission. The services generate their proposals from a service rather than

joint perspective and frequently consider only weapons in the same

general category in seeking potential solutions to identified deficiencies.

Nor do the Department’s assessment processes enable the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, to provide effective military advice to the Secretary of

Defense on the services acquisition and modernization proposals for close

support. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has only

assessed modernization proposals involving major weapon systems rather

than the full range of weapons used for close support. Moreover, its

assessments have been heavily influenced by service-generated analysis.

Although a joint warfighting capabilities assessment (JWCA) process was

instituted in 1994 to support the JROC in its recommendations to the

Chairman, a separate assessment of the close support mission has not yet

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Executive Summary

been made. Without a comprehensive assessment of joint mission needs

and existing capabilities for close support, the Chairman cannot provide

the independent military advice the Secretary needs in deciding which

systems should be funded, in what quantities they should be procured, and

what priority should be assigned to competing proposals.

Principal Findings

Services Plan to Further

Improve Their Close

Support Capabilities

Since the mid-1980s, the Army has increased its close support capabilities

by adding the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and the Multiple Launch

Rocket System to its inventory. The Apache can locate and engage targets

from long distances at night, and the MLRS can fire 12 rockets nearly

simultaneously at targets up to about 32 kilometers. The Navy and Marine

Corps have added improved targeting capabilities on F/A-18 and AV-8B

aircraft, making a portion of these aircraft capable of navigating and

identifying targets at night. The Air Force has added limited night

capability to the A/OA-10 and has designated some F-16 aircraft to provide

CAS. Some of these aircraft are equipped to navigate and engage targets at

night.

Over the next 6 years, the Army plans to spend nearly $5.5 billion to

develop and field more modern artillery, aviation, and target acquisition

systems. Over the same period, the Marine Corps plans to spend about

$3.2 billion to remanufacture AV-8B aircraft, install night targeting

capability on AH-1W Supercobra attack helicopter, and develop a

lightweight towed 155-millimeter howitzer. The Air Force plans to spend

over $547 million to upgrade the target acquisition and night operations

capabilities of about 620 fixed-wing aircraft for CAS. While some of these

upgrades may also enhance capabilities in other mission areas, some, such

as the upgrades to the Air Force A/OA-10s, are designed specifically to

improve close support capabilities.

A Comprehensive

Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and

Existing Capabilities Is

Needed

DOD has not determined the appropriate number and type of weapons it

needs for the joint close support mission. The lack of an overall

assessment of joint close support mission needs and existing capabilities

has allowed the services to individually improve their close support

capabilities without adequately considering the potential contributions of

their other weapons or those of other services. In May 1994, the Air Force

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Executive Summary

decided to modify its A/OA-10 and some F-16 aircraft rather than procure a

new aircraft solely for CAS. However, it made this decision without

considering whether attack helicopters and artillery could satisfy some or

most of the CAS requirement. In its submission to the Commission on Roles

and Missions of the Armed Forces, the Army acknowledged that the added

firepower of rockets, artillery, and attack helicopters had “substantially

reduced the need for fixed wing fire support.” Improvements to artillery

and attack helicopters now permit the Army to engage targets that could

formerly only be attacked by fixed-wing aircraft.

In May 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

noted that the current requirements determination and acquisition system

has resulted in individual services prematurely endorsing new weapon

systems without looking at other alternatives. Although DOD’s acquisition

system calls for the JROC to provide assessments to the Secretary on major

modernization programs, 9 of 12 modernization programs proposed for

close support were not assessed because they are not considered major

acquisitions. The JROC recently expanded its review process to include

some non-major systems.

In 1994, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the JWCA process

to provide insight into issues involving joint warfighting requirements and

plans for recapitalization for selected joint missions areas. These

assessment were expected to support the JROC in developing its

recommendations on joint requirements to the Chairman. JWCA working

group members are drawn from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

military services, and regional combatant command staffs.

Under the JWCA process, assessment of joint close support needs and

capabilities was initially split between the ground maneuver and joint

strike assessment working groups, with the ground maneuver working

group responsible for integrating the results of the two assessments.

However, according to joint staff officials, this latter group encountered

difficulties in organizing its effort and after more than a year it was

re-chartered before making any recommendations. Renamed the Land and

Littoral Warfare JWCA, the working group is expected to include

assessment of joint close support mission needs and capabilities.

While the anticipated assessment could improve the information available

to the Secretary of Defense to weigh acquisition and modernization

proposals for close support, questions remain over how the working group

will interpret the scope of its work. For example, it is unclear what priority

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Executive Summary

the working group will give to the close support assessment and whether

the assessment will include the full range of weapon systems that can be

used for this mission. It is also unclear whether the working group will

address the question of sufficiency—the mix and quantity of systems that

are needed for the overall close support mission. Moreover, it is unclear

how the working group intends to overcome the problem of being too

heavily dependent upon service-generated analysis.

Recommendation To assist the Secretary of Defense in determining whether and which

proposed enhancements to close support systems should be funded, and

in what quantities and priority, GAO recommends that comprehensive

cross-service assessments of overall joint close support mission needs,

existing close support systems, and planned enhancements be made on a

routine basis. Such assessments might be made within the context of the

JWCA process although alternative mechanisms might be explored.

To be useful to decisionmakers, these assessments should include a

determination of which existing capabilities should be retained,

modernized, or retired and in what quantities to ensure full joint

capability. They should be broad enough to encompass all close support

capabilities—not just major weapon systems—and service-generated

analysis should be supplemented by other analytical support, where

independence is critical. Because some systems have multiple roles, the

assessments need to recognize the contributions of these systems to these

other missions.

Agency Comments DOD said that it partially concurred with GAO’s recommendation. DOD also

said that, as part of the JWCA process, it was currently assessing the

requirements and capabilities needed to win the close battle and that it

would assess current and future weapons necessary for each service for

the close battle during a future phase of its deep attack weapons mix

study.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Contents

Executive Summary 4

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

Services Have Developed Diverse Close Support Systems 12

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 16

Chapter 2 

Services Plan to

Further Improve Their

Close Support

Capabilities

19

Some Close Support Capabilities Have Improved Significantly 19

Services Plan Extensive Modernization of Close Support

Capabilities

21

Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive

Assessment of Joint

Close Support Mission

Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

24

Other Services’ Capabilities Have Not Been Adequately

Considered

24

The JROC Has Exercised Only Limited Oversight of Close

Support Acquisition Programs

25

Air Force-Army Debate Over CAS Illustrates Need for

Comprehensive Assessment of Requirements

28

Conclusion 29

Recommendation 30

Agency Comments 30

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 32

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 34

Related GAO Products 36

Tables Table 1.1: Inventory of Systems Used to Provide Close Support 14

Table 2.1: Service Plans and Projected Costs for Modernizing

Close Support Capabilities, Fiscal Years 1996-2001

21

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Contents

Abbreviations

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATHS Automated Target Hand-off System

CAS Close Air Support

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

IDM improved data modem

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JWCA Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment

LANTIRN Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infra-Red for Night

MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

R&D research and development

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

As the experiences in Panama, the Persian Gulf War, and Somalia have

illustrated, U.S. military forces can quickly be exposed to the dangers of

close combat. To be successful, U.S. ground troops engaged in close

combat with enemy forces need capable close support—firepower against

hostile targets that present an immediate and serious threat to U.S. ground

forces operating close to enemy forces. In executing close support, the

actions of supporting and supported forces must be closely coordinated

and integrated to avoid fratricide.

Close support is delivered primarily by mortars, artillery, fixed-wing

aircraft, attack helicopters, and naval guns. CAS—the air component of

close support—is provided by Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force

fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Close support targets generally

include enemy troops, tanks, fighting vehicles, fortifications, mortars, and

artillery; they may also include enemy command, control, and

communications systems; air defenses; and tactical logistical support

units.

Services Have

Developed Diverse

Close Support

Systems

The services operate a large number and variety of close support systems

capable of engaging similar targets, including five types of artillery, four

types of attack helicopters, five types of fixed-wing aircraft, and 5-inch

naval guns on cruisers and destroyers. One aircraft was developed

specifically for the close support mission, while others are considered

multi-role assets that can also be used for other missions, such as

interdiction, reconnaissance, or air superiority. The effectiveness of the

individual weapons depends in part on their specific capabilities and the

availability of target acquisition; command, control, communications and

intelligence systems; and logistical support.

According to DOD officials, the systems that have been developed provide

the services with complementary capabilities that provide flexibility to

joint force commanders. Several factors account for the growth of close

support systems across the services. First, title 10 U.S.C. and DOD Directive

5100.1 spell out the broad missions for each of the services. To carry out

these missions, each service acquires some organic close support

capability independent of the other services. For example, the Army

acquires artillery and attack helicopters not solely on the basis on its close

support missions but also on the basis of its broader responsibility “to

defeat enemy land forces.” Second, under DOD’s assignment of functions to

the individual services, all four services have a primary responsibility for

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

conducting CAS.

1

 Third, some systems used for close support missions can

perform multiple roles and therefore have not been developed solely on

the basis of close support requirements. Fourth, changes in equipment and

doctrine, such as the development and use of Army attack helicopters as

maneuver units, have greatly altered the complexity and scope of

warfighting operations, including close support. Finally, because the need

for close support may arise unexpectedly, each service seeks a certain

degree of independence in its close support systems since there is no

assurance that other services’ weapons can be made available to respond

in time.

Table 1.1 shows the inventory of service assets that can be used for close

support missions that existed in fiscal years 1990 and 1994 and the

inventory projected for fiscal year 2001. Some of the assets shown also

perform other missions such as interdiction, reconnaissance, or air

superiority in addition to providing close air support.

1

Prior to 1993, the Army had not been assigned CAS as a primary responsibility.

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Inventory of Systems Used

to Provide Close Support Inventory

System Service FY 1990 FY 1994 FY 2001a

105 mm towed howitzers Army/USMC 774 522 450

155 mm towed howitzers Army/USMC 1,171 894 822

155 mm self-propelled Army/USMC 1,932 1,884b 1,684b

8 inch self-propelled Army/USMC 1,134 624b 0

MLRS launchers Army 279 459 726

Total artillery 5,290 4,383 3,682

AH-1J/T/W USMC 118 170 169c

AH-1F/S Cobra Army 1,034 677 379

AH-64 Apache Army 602 738 758

OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Army 0 175 546

Total attack helicopters 1,754 1,760 1,852

F/A-18 Navy/USMC 332 1,165 1,017

A-6E Navy/USMC 337 181 0

AV-8B USMC 169 200 174

F-16d Air Force 1,613 741 825

A/OA-10 Air Force 639 381 366

Total fixed-wing

aircraft 3,090 2,668 2,382

aThese figures are DOD projections.

bThe Marine Corps no longer maintains self-propelled howitzers.

cThese are AH-1W Supercobra models.

dThe Air Force considers all F-16s CAS-capable, and a majority of F-16 units have CAS as one of

several assigned missions.

Close support is needed in a broad range of combat situations. Therefore,

the system of choice will vary based on the specific mission at hand, threat

environment, time of day, weather conditions, and proximity to forces

needing support. The strengths and limitations of the various categories of

systems are described below.

Artillery Artillery is used to provide close support for maneuver forces; counterfire

to attack enemy artillery, mortars, and air defense systems; and

interdiction fire to disrupt, delay, and destroy enemy forces that are not

yet in contact with friendly forces. Artillery can be fired at night and under

all weather conditions. The Army operates 105-millimeter towed,

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

155-millimeter towed and self-propelled, and 8-inch self-propelled

howitzers and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), a mobile rocket

artillery system capable of firing 12 rockets that carry various munitions.

The Army plans to retire its 8-inch howitzers in the near future. The Marine

Corps uses the 155-millimeter towed howitzer for all combat missions. The

maximum effective range of artillery is between 14.9 kilometers for

105-millimeter and 30 kilometers for 155-millimeter howitzers with

rocket-assisted projectiles, and 32 kilometers for the MLRS. According to

some Army and Marine Corps ground force commanders, artillery is a

reliable and responsive close support weapon system.

Attack Helicopters Attack helicopters can destroy tanks and other armored vehicles with

precision-guided missiles. They can also engage and suppress enemy

troops and artillery with rockets and cannon fire. A majority of Army and

Marine Corps attack helicopters can identify and engage targets at night,

but their capabilities are limited by adverse weather. Attack helicopters

can (1) be based near ground forces; (2) loiter and be refueled and

rearmed close to the area of close combat; (3) be used to identify targets

and control the fires of other CAS aircraft, mortars, and artillery; and

(4) engage targets well beyond the range of artillery. In the Persian Gulf

War, Army attack helicopters successfully conducted combat operations

up to 315 nautical miles behind enemy lines. The Army currently operates

three types of attack helicopters—the AH-1F/S Cobra, AH-64 Apache, and

OH-58D Kiowa Warrior—and the Marine Corps operates AH-1W

Supercobras. The helicopters can be used for fire support or as maneuver

units. Their effectiveness can be limited by adverse weather, air defenses,

and the inability to deliver heavy bombs.

Fixed-Wing Aircraft Fixed-wing aircraft are able to engage a variety of close support targets

depending on the ordnance they carry. However, because these aircraft

can carry heavier weapons, they are most appropriately used against

hardened targets. Fixed-wing aircraft have greater speed and range than

attack helicopters and can fly at high altitudes to avoid air defense threats.

However, they have more difficulty in identifying and acquiring targets and

providing accurate strikes from higher altitudes. Currently, only about

60 percent of fixed-wing aircraft used by the services for CAS are able to

operate at night. Fixed-wing aircraft effectiveness can also be limited by

adverse weather.

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

The services currently use several aircraft to perform CAS—Air Force

A/OA-10s and F-16s, Navy F/A-18s and A-6Es, and Marine Corps F/A-18s

and AV-8Bs. Of these aircraft, only the A/OA-10 was designed specifically

for CAS functions. Some of these aircraft are also capable of carrying out

interdiction, reconnaissance, and air superiority missions.

Naval Guns The Navy currently operates 5-inch, 54-caliber guns on cruisers and

destroyers for ship self-defense and ship-to-shore fire support of Army and

Marine Corps ground forces. These guns, like artillery, are able to fire at

night and in all weather. Accuracy of naval gunfire is difficult to control

because of the movement of ships in the water and the wide dispersion of

unguided 5-inch projectiles at extended ranges. Consequently, according

to Navy and Marine Corps officials, naval gunfire must be used judiciously

to avoid fratricide. The Navy’s current 5-inch guns can engage targets to a

maximum range of about 13 nautical miles.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

This report (1) discusses the aggregate capabilities of the military services

to provide close support and the extent to which those capabilities

continue to be modernized and enhanced and (2) evaluates the processes

the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess mission needs,

capabilities, and modernization proposals for the close support mission.

Although ground forces can use a number of direct-fire weapons systems

for close support, such as tank guns, machine guns, and missiles, we

focused our review on the primary weapons used for close support:

artillery, attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and naval guns.

We reviewed DOD’s and the services’ requirements generation process and

our previous reports on the acquisition process. We obtained information

from the Joint Staff on the development of the JWCA process. We also

determined the number of close support modernization programs that had

been reviewed by the JROC and obtained documents from the council

pertaining to these programs.

To assess the capabilities and characteristics of existing close support

systems, we reviewed technical manuals, doctrinal publications, and

service documents and held discussions with users in operational units.

We discussed capabilities, force structure, and operational issues with

officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chief of

Naval Operations, the Offices of the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff,

and Marine Corps Headquarters located in Washington, D.C. We also

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Chapter 1 

Introduction

reviewed service and joint close support doctrine with officials from the

Air Force’s Air Combat Command, the Army’s Training and Doctrine

Command, and the Air Land Sea Applications Center in Hampton, Virginia;

the Naval Doctrine Commander, Norfolk, Virginia; and the Marine Corps’

Combat Development Command in Quantico, Virginia.

To gain an understanding of how operational units plan for and use close

support, we observed (1) a Marine Corps fire support exercise at the Air

Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California; (2) Navy close air

support training at the Naval Strike Warfare Center, Fallon, Nevada; and,

(3) Air Force CAS and Army fire support training at the Joint Readiness

Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and, at the National Training Center,

Fort Irwin, California. We interviewed additional personnel including

officials of the 18th Air Support Group at Barksdale Air Force Base,

Louisiana, and its detachment at Fort Polk and the 57th Air Wing at Nellis

Air Force Base, Nevada, and its detachment at Fort Irwin. Representatives

of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, provided us

with documentation on the use and employment of field artillery and

supporting systems.

Active Army and Marine Corps infantry, artillery, and aviation units

provided operational perspectives on the performance and use of close

support, deficiencies and requirements, and training. We visited the

headquarters and units of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, Fort

Stewart, Georgia; III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; XVIIIth Airborne

Corps and 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 101st

Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 2nd Marine Expeditionary

Force and 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and the

2nd Marine Air Wing at Marine Corps Air Stations, at Cherry Point and

New River, North Carolina.

To obtain the perspectives of unified commanders, we interviewed

officials from the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command,

and Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air

Force Base, Tampa, Florida. We also received written comments regarding

close support from the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S.Pacific

Command, and the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Korea.

In reviewing some of DOD’s planned modernization programs, we

developed information and issued separate reports on the Navy’s plan to

upgrade guns on surface ships for the naval surface fire support mission

and on the Army and Marine Corps plan to develop a lightweight

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 1 

Introduction

155-millimeter howitzer. These and our other recent reports on weapon

systems used for close support are listed on the last page of this report.

This list also includes references to two earlier reports that discuss DOD’s

weapons acquisition process.

We performed our review between June 1993 and October 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

Services Plan to Further Improve Their

Close Support Capabilities

Collectively, the services’ current mix of weapon systems constitutes a

formidable joint close support capability. Since the early 1980s, the

services have significantly improved their close support capabilities, and,

between fiscal years 1996 and 2001, plan to spend more than $10.6 billion

to further improve existing capabilities. Of that amount, almost $5.5 billion

will be used to upgrade AH-64 Apache helicopters, radars, and fire support

vehicles, and to develop the Crusader 155-millimeter field artillery system.

Other improvements include upgrades to Air Force A/OA-10s and some

F-16s for the CAS role, installing night targeting systems on Marine Corps

AH-1W Supercobra attack helicopters, and remanufacturing Marine Corps

AV-8B with improved capability to identify and acquire targets, especially

at night.

During this period, the Army fielded the Apache attack helicopter, MLRS,

and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). It also improved fire control

systems for these weapons. The Navy improved the night navigation and

attack capabilities of its F/A-18 aircraft. The Marine Corps made

improvements in the night attack capabilities of some AV-8B aircraft and

began using the M-198 155-millimeter howitzer. The Air Force retained the

A/OA-10 for CAS and equipped some F-16 aircraft with navigation and

targeting systems to perform CAS at night.

Some Close Support

Capabilities Have

Improved

Significantly

Some close support capabilities have improved significantly since the

1980s. In the mid-1980s, the Army began fielding the AH-64 Apache attack

helicopter. The Apache is able to fire laser-guided Hellfire missiles against

armored targets at long ranges, carries a 30-millimeter cannon, and can

locate and engage targets at night.

In 1983, the Army began fielding the MLRS primarily to destroy enemy

artillery and rocket launchers. In 1990, the Army began fielding ATACMS, a

long-range precision-guided missile fired from MLRS launchers. The range

of ATACMS is triple that of conventional MLRS rockets and cannon artillery.

Even though ATACMS is not used specifically for close support, it provides

the Army with the capability of destroying targets that could ultimately

influence the close battle. Each MLRS launcher can fire two ATACMS. In 1993

the Army began fielding its M109A6 155-millimeter Paladin self-propelled

howitzer. The Paladin is a major modification of existing M109A2/3

howitzers, which the Army fielded in the 1970s. Unlike other self-propelled

howitzers, the Paladin is equipped with a fire control system that allows

each howitzer to locate and orient itself, making it more effective than

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

Services Plan to Further Improve Their

Close Support Capabilities

unmodified and older self-propelled or towed howitzers. The Army plans

to field approximately 890 Paladin systems by the end of fiscal year 2000.

The ability of the Air Force to provide CAS has also improved over the past

decade. Even though the Air Force lost longer range CAS aircraft by retiring

the A-7s in the early 1990s, it now employs A/OA-10s and multi-role F-16s

for CAS. The A/OA-10, specifically designed for CAS, is able to carry a large

amount of ordnance, can loiter in the battle area for up to 1.7 hours, and

was designed to survive light air defenses at low altitudes. F-16s have

greater speed and are able to engage targets from higher altitudes than

either A/OA-10 or A-7 aircraft. In addition, some F-16s are equipped with

Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infra-Red for Night (LANTIRN)

systems, which allow F-16 pilots to navigate and identify targets at night.

The Marine Corps has also improved its close support capabilities. It

reduced its artillery force structure by nearly 50 percent since 1988 by

retiring its 155-millimeter and 8-inch self-propelled howitzers that had

been used for general support, and the 105-millimeter towed howitzers

that had been its primary direct support weapon. The Marines now use the

M-198 155-millimeter towed howitzer for both direct and general support.

The M-198 provides more range and lethality than 105-millimeter howitzers

and is easier to transport than the self-propelled howitzers it replaced. The

Marine Corps also upgraded its AV-8B Harrier aircraft used primarily for

CAS. The AV-8B is capable of vertical/short takeoff and landings and can

perform CAS, interdiction, and air-to-air operations. In the early 1990s, the

Marine Corps installed night capability on 66 of the day-attack version of

the AV-8Bs and installed both night capability and an air-to-ground radar

on an additional 28 day-attack aircraft. The Marine Corps is

remanufacturing 72 day-attack aircraft into radar/night attack aircraft. The

final projected inventory includes 36 day-attack, 56 night-attack, and 99

radar/night-attack aircraft.

The Navy has improved close support capabilities by installing navigation

and targeting forward-looking infrared pods on F/A-18s. These pods will

enable it to locate and engage targets at night.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

Services Plan to Further Improve Their

Close Support Capabilities

Services Plan

Extensive

Modernization of

Close Support

Capabilities

Between fiscal years 1996 and 2001, the services plan to spend more than

$10.6 billion to improve a number of weapons systems that can be used for

close support. Some of these weapons can also be used for other combat

missions, such as interdiction, reconnaissance, and air superiority. Table

2.1 shows the specific modernization plans and projected costs.

Table 2.1: Service Plans and Projected

Costs for Modernizing Close Support

Capabilities, Fiscal Years 1996-2001

Dollars in millions

Modernization plans Service R&D Procurement Total

AV-8B

Remanufactured

Marine Corps

92.8 2,191.8 2,284.6

250 F-16 Block 40

CAS upgrades

Air Force

80.3 189.7 270.0

373 A/OA-10 CAS

upgrades

Air Force

52.1 225.1 277.2

AH-1W Modificationa Marine Corps 529.0 215.0 744.0

AH-64D Longbowd Army 28.9 3,148.7 3,177.6

Lightweight

155-millimeter

howitzerd

Army and

Marine Corps

126.2 99.8 226.0

Crusader Field

Artillery Systemd

Army

1,977.5 b 1,977.5

Upgrades to

counterbattery radars

Army

71.0 125.4 196.4

Bradley fire support

team vehicle

Army

55.2 85.0 140.2

Fielding of M109A6

Paladin howitzerd

Army

349.7 349.7

Upgrades to MLRSc Army 116.5 704.7 821.2

Naval surface fire

supportd

Navy

204.2 b 204.2

Total 3,333.7 7,334.9 10,668.6

Source: Our analysis of service data.

aIncludes service life extension program for 75 percent of existing force.

bProcurement will not commence until after fiscal year 2001.

cThese upgrades include an extended range rocket.

dGAO reports on these systems are listed on the last page of this report.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

Services Plan to Further Improve Their

Close Support Capabilities

The Army is in the process of modifying AH-64 Apaches with several

systems, including a Longbow millimeter wave radar and a

radio-frequency Hellfire missile. The millimeter-wave radar is able to

detect, classify, and prioritize stationary and mobile targets, a capability

that the current Apache radar does not have. The Army believes that the

Longbow Apache will significantly increase its attack helicopter

capabilities. It plans to begin fielding the Longbow Apache in fiscal year

1997. The radio-frequency Hellfire is a version of the existing missile that

incorporates a seeker for locking onto targets. It will provide pilots with a

capability to fire self-guiding missiles at targets at longer ranges than the

current missile.

Another development that will improve the Army’s capability to perform

close support in the future is the Crusader, a self-propelled 155-millimeter

field artillery system that is intended to achieve ranges of up to 50

kilometers—20 kilometers more than the current family of 155-millimeter

self-propelled artillery. In addition, the Army expects Crusader to be more

mobile, lethal, and accurate than existing howitzers. The Army plans to

field Crusader in fiscal year 2005.

Other planned Army improvements include (1) upgrading the fire support

team vehicle used to carry personnel responsible for coordinating artillery

fire and CAS for infantry units to a Bradley chassis, (2) upgrading MLRS

launchers to improve response time and developing an extended range

MLRS rocket that can hit targets up to 50 kilometers, and (3) upgrading

counterbattery radars used to detect the location of enemy artillery.

The Air Force plans to improve its fixed-wing CAS capabilities, by

providing, among other things, night capability and a digital data-burst

communications system, known as the improved data modem (IDM), to its

A/OA-10 aircraft. IDM will allow CAS pilots to receive more accurate and

timely targeting information from ground-based and airborne forward air

controllers who are responsible for controlling CAS strikes. In addition, the

Air Force plans to upgrade 250 F-16 Block-40 aircraft with an improved

data modem, night vision goggles, compatible cockpit lighting, and

modified LANTIRN navigation and targeting pods.

The Navy is continuing to improve its F/A-18s. It is in the process of

installing a more capable radar on F/A-18Cs and plans to incorporate the

radar on F/A-18E/F models. The Navy is also planning to improve its ability

to provide naval surface fire support from surface ships.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 2 

Services Plan to Further Improve Their

Close Support Capabilities

The Marine Corps is in the process of upgrading its AH-1W Supercobra

attack helicopter for night capability as part of a three-phased upgrade

program. The night targeting system includes a targeting forward looking

infra-red system and a laser-designator rangefinder that will enable pilots

to employ precision-guided munitions, such as Hellfire missiles, and

designate targets for other close support systems. The Marine Corps

process of remanufacturing day-attack AV-8B aircraft to radar/night-attack

aircraft will improve their ability to identify and acquire targets at night. In

addition, the Marine Corps has finished developmental testing of the

Automated Target Hand-off System (ATHS), which is expected to become

available in January 1997. ATHS is similar to the Air Force’s IDM and will

allow ground-based and airborne forward air controllers to send targeting

information digitally to CAS pilots.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

DOD’s current assessment processes do not yield the information that the

Secretary of Defense needs to weigh the merits of service-generated

weapons acquisition and modernization proposals for the close support

mission. The services generate their proposals from a service rather than

joint perspective and frequently consider only weapons in the same

general category in seeking potential solutions to identified deficiencies.

Nor do the Department’s assessment processes enable the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, to provide effective military advice to the Secretary of

Defense on the services acquisition and modernization proposals for close

support. Unless comprehensive assessments of joint mission needs and

existing capabilities for close support are conducted on a routine basis,

the Chairman cannot provide the strong independent military advice the

Secretary needs in deciding which service proposals should be funded, in

what quantities they should be procured, and what priority should be

assigned to competing proposals.

Other Services’

Capabilities Have Not

Been Adequately

Considered

Proposals to acquire and modernize close support weapons have not been

based on a comprehensive assessment of joint close support requirements

and capabilities. Instead, the services have advanced proposals based on

their authority to organize, train, and equip for their broad roles and

functions. Based on this perspective, the services have focused on unique

mission needs or unique weapons system capabilities.

Within any single service, competition among weapons systems is

generally limited to a single category of weapons, such as attack

helicopters, artillery, or fixed-wing aircraft. Although the services

routinely conduct detailed analyses of deficiencies in their specific combat

capabilities, potential solutions are normally limited to consideration of

weapons in the same general category.

For example, in 1993, the Marine Corps conducted a mission area analysis

of fire support requirements and established a requirement for a

lighter-weight 155-mm towed howitzer to replace the current 155mm

towed howitzer, the M-198, to improve ground- and air-mobility of artillery.

While this mission analysis included a general discussion of the role of

mortars, attack helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and naval gunfire systems,

it did not consider non-artillery solutions to address the deficiencies. The

study did not examine whether close support systems used by other

services could be used or adopted by the Marine Corps.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

Similarly, in May 1994, the Air Force decided to upgrade existing A/OA-10,

and F-16 aircraft for the CAS mission as a more cost effective solution to

procuring a new aircraft solely for CAS. In reaching this decision, the Air

Force did not consider whether the growing capabilities of Army attack

helicopters and artillery could mitigate the need for all or some of the

proposed upgrades.

The JROC Has

Exercised Only

Limited Oversight of

Close Support

Acquisition Programs

The JROC—a senior advisory body to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff—is responsible for validating service-generated mission needs and

weapons acquisition proposals. However, the JROC’s oversight of close

support systems has not included the full range of weapons used for close

support but rather has been limited to oversight of major acquisition

programs. Moreover, although a new process for assessing joint

warfighting capabilities was introduced in 1994, a separate assessment of

joint close support needs and capabilities has not yet been made.

JROC Reviews Have Been

Limited to Major

Acquisition Programs

As outlined in its charter, the JROC is expected to

• review and approve the military need for all potential major defense

acquisition programs;

• assess joint warfighting capabilities;

• assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs; and,

• assign joint priorities among major programs meeting valid requirements.

In overseeing the requirements generation process and in determining

mission need, the JROC is expected to emphasize the need to reduce

parallel and duplicate development efforts. The JROC’s charter also states

that, in conducting reviews of military needs and acquisition programs, it

should emphasize the need to eliminate unnecessary duplication in service

programs.

Although the JROC’s charter would appear to warrant and encourage

comprehensive cross-service assessments of warfighting requirements and

capabilities, we found that JROC assessments have been limited. Until

recently, the JROC has not included reviews of weapons acquisition

programs other than those considered to be major programs.1

 Because the

majority of modernization programs fall outside the major program

1

A major defense acquisition program (MDAP) is a program with estimated research, development,

test, and evaluation expenditures of more than $300 million (FY-1990 dollars), or procurement

expenditures of more than $1.8 billion (FY-1990 dollars), or other program designated as a MDAP by

the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

definition, most service initiatives have not been subject to the Council’s

assessment. Only 3 of the 12 close support modernization programs that

we reviewed—the Air Force’s F-16 CAS modernization program, the Army’s

AH-64 Apache Longbow upgrade program, and the Army’s Crusader field

artillery system—were classified as major programs and thereby subject to

JROC examination. The other 9 programs, with estimated costs totaling

$5.2 billion for fiscal years 1996 through 2001, were not reviewed.2

We also found that JROC has relied heavily on narrowly focused

service-generated assessments of needs and alternative solutions in

making its determinations on the validity of requirements. The

Commission on Roles and Missions noted in its 1995 report that this high

reliance on service staff analysis runs counter to the intent of the

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to

increase Joint Staff independence.

Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessments

Offer Promise but May Be

Too Narrow

The JWCA process was established in 1994 in conjunction with a broader

interpretation of the JROC’s charter that included assessments of joint

warfighting capabilities. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy

guidance, the JWCA process is intended to support the Chairman’s need for

assessments made from a joint warfighting perspective. By examining

each of the services’ capabilities in specific joint mission areas, such as air

superiority, surveillance and reconnaissance, and fire support, the JWCA

working groups expect to gain insight into issues involving joint

warfighting mission needs and the services’ plans for modernizing forces

in support of those requirements. The JWCA assessments, which are to be

made on a continuous basis, are intended to support the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing independent advice to the Secretary of

Defense on the services’ acquisition and modernization proposals.

Until recently, assessments of the close support mission had been split

between the ground maneuver and joint strike assessment areas, with the

ground maneuver working group assessing ground-based close support

along with other ground maneuver functions, and the joint strike group

assessing CAS capabilities along with other strike functions such as

interdiction. The ground maneuver working group was to have been

responsible for integrating the two assessments for purposes of evaluating

overall close support capabilities, requirements, and modernization

proposals. However, the ground maneuver working group spent more than

2

Based on a broader interpretation of its mandate, the JROC recently began including some additional

service plans and programs in its assessments, although it remains unclear to what extent JROC’s

assessments will be broadened.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

a year organizing its task and was reorganized before it had produced any

recommendations. In late 1995, this group was renamed the Land and

Littoral Warfare JWCA.

Although the JWCA charged with assessing close support should

theoretically provide improved understandings of joint warfighting

requirements and existing capabilities, the results thus far have been

disappointing. For example, this JWCA has yet to address the types of

capability and the number of weapons needed to meet joint close support

requirements; the types, capabilities, and number of close support

weapons currently operated by the services and their joint effectiveness;

and the effectiveness and affordability of alternative force mixes.

According to its director, the Land and Littoral Warfare JWCA has just

begun an assessment of the services’ close support capabilities and

requirements with a goal of influencing the Chairman’s Program

Recommendations for fiscal year 1998. This JWCA working group hopes to

be in a position to recommend which systems, among the various ones

proposed by the services, should be developed and/or modernized for the

joint close support mission. The working group will develop assessment

models based on the strategy and scenarios of the current Defense

Planning Guidance.

While the anticipated assessment could improve the information available

to the Secretary of Defense to weigh acquisition and modernization

proposals for close support, questions remain over how the working group

will interpret the scope of its work. For example, it is unclear what priority

the working group will give to the close support assessment and whether

the assessment will include the full range of weapon systems that can be

used for this mission. It is also unclear whether the working group will

address the question of sufficiency—the mix and quantity of systems that

are needed for the overall close support mission. Moreover, it is unclear

how the working group intends to overcome the problem of being too

heavily dependent upon service-generated analysis.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

Air Force-Army

Debate Over CAS

Illustrates Need for

Comprehensive

Assessment of

Requirements

The continuing debate between the Air Force and the Army over the role

of fixed-wing aircraft for CAS illustrates the need for a broader assessment

of requirements and capabilities. While both services acknowledge that

the Army’s need for fixed wing CAS has diminished, DOD has not

determined how many and what mix of aircraft are needed. This is

important because the Air Force plans to spend about $547 million to

upgrade 623 fixed wing aircraft specifically for CAS. An assessment of

overall close support requirements and capabilities may identify what

quantity of fixed-wing aircraft are needed to carry out CAS.

Improvements in Other

Weapons Have Reduced

Requirements for

Fixed-Wing CAS

In its submission to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed

Forces, the Army acknowledged that the added firepower of rockets,

artillery, and attack helicopters had “substantially reduced the need for

fixed wing fire support.” The Air Force told the Commission that the

number of fixed-wing CAS sorties flown to support ground troops has

declined significantly since the Korean War. Moreover, the Air Force

expects the demand for fixed-wing CAS to further decline as attack

helicopter capabilities improve. The Air Force stated that attack and scout

helicopters operating in close coordination with ground units are the

optimum team for CAS and that fixed-wing aircraft should only be used for

emergency back up. The Air Force suggested that the Army could provide

its own close air support with attack helicopters and that the Army should

be assigned CAS as a primary mission. The Air Force also proposed that its

CAS role be downgraded from a primary to a collateral function. In

connection with this proposal, the Air Force favored eliminating A/OA-10

aircraft from its inventory.

The Army recognized that the need for fixed-wing CAS has declined over

time but opposed the Air Force’s proposal to downgrade Air Force CAS

responsibilities. The Army noted that while the need for fixed wing CAS has

declined, it remains an important capability especially in early entry

operations, under circumstances when close support targets exceed the

range of land-based systems, and/or when special munitions, such as

heavy and/or precision-guided bombs, are required. An Army roles and

missions official told us that the Army is more concerned that the Air

Force retain primary responsibilities for CAS than it is about what kinds of

aircraft the Air Force intends to use. While the Army supports CAS as a

primary function of the Air Force, it considers the types and quantities of

the aircraft to be the prerogative of the Air Force.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

In December, 1994, following a change in the Air Force Chief of Staff, the

Air Force reversed its September 1994 position and told the Commission

that it believes that fixed-wing CAS is still required and that it therefore

intends to retain primary CAS responsibilities and the means to execute

them. As a result, the Air Force is now committed to retaining A/OA-10

aircraft and to modernizing A/OA-10 and F-16 aircraft for the CAS role.

Although the Air Force had planned to retire all of its A/OA-10s as early as

fiscal year 2002, it now plans to maintain 316 of these aircraft in its force

structure through fiscal year 2028.

Budget Implications of

Fixed-Wing CAS Debate

Could Be Significant

A broad assessment of joint CAS requirements leading to recommendations

on the appropriate numbers, types, and mix of fixed-wing requirements

could result in substantial budgetary savings depending on the outcome of

the assessment. In 1994 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that

about $1.9 billion could be saved over 5 years if the Air Force retired all

A/OA-10 aircraft. Similarly, the Air Force told the Commission on Roles

and Missions of the Armed Forces that if it retired all of its A/OA-10s, it

could save approximately $5.8 billion in procurement, RDT&E, operation

and maintenance, and other indirect costs between fiscal years 1995-2001.

The potential loss of the A/OA-10s would force the Army to rely more on

its attack helicopters for CAS than it has in the past. If the Air Force

eliminated its A/OA-10s, its multi-role F-16s would become the Air Force’s

primary CAS aircraft. Accordingly, any assessment of fixed-wing CAS

requirements would need to consider the impact that increased use of

F-16s for CAS would have on the capability of this aircraft to conduct other

missions, such as interdiction.

Conclusion Collectively, the services’ current mix of weapon systems constitutes a

formidable joint close support capability. Nevertheless, the services plan

to invest about $10.6 billion over the next 6 years in weapons upgrades

and enhancements to further add to this capability. Whether these

investments represent the most appropriate, cost-effective mix of weapon

systems to meet close support missions is unclear because each military

service has continued to propose enhancements to its capabilities without

adequate consideration of the capabilities of its other weapons or those of

other services.

Moreover, the Department’s assessment processes do not enable the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide effective military advice to the

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

Secretary of Defense on the services acquisition and modernization

proposals for close support. The JROC has only assessed modernization

proposals involving major weapon systems rather than the full range of

weapons used for close support. Moreover, although a joint warfighting

assessment process was instituted in late 1994 to support the JROC in its

recommendations to the Chairman, a separate assessment of the close

support mission has not yet been made. Unless comprehensive

assessments of joint mission needs and existing capabilities for close

support are conducted on a routine basis, the Chairman cannot provide

the independent military advice the Secretary needs in deciding which

systems should be funded, in what quantities they should be procured, and

what priority should be assigned to competing proposals.

Recommendation To assist the Secretary of Defense in determining whether and which

proposed enhancements to close support systems should be funded, and

in what quantities and priority, we recommend that comprehensive

cross-service assessments of overall joint close support mission needs,

existing close support systems, and planned enhancements be made on a

routine basis. Such assessments might be made within the context of the

JWCA process although alternative mechanisms might be explored.

To be useful to decisionmakers, these assessments should include a

determination of which existing capabilities should be retained,

modernized, or retired, and in what quantities to ensure full joint

capability. They should be broad enough to encompass all close support

capabilities—not just major weapon systems—and service-generated

analysis should be supplemented by other analytical support, where

independence is critical. Because some systems have multiple roles, the

assessments need to recognize the contributions of these systems to these

other missions.

Agency Comments DOD partially agreed with GAO’s recommendation but stated that (1) the

land and littoral warfare JWCA is conducting a comprehensive assessment

of the fire support requirements and capabilities for the close battle;

(2) the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)—together

with data from the JWCA and other DOD studies—provides leaders with the

information they need to make the determinations cited in our report; and,

(3) the assessments currently underway and planned are sufficiently broad

in scope, and diverse in sources of analytical data to ensure that service

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Chapter 3 

A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close

Support Mission Needs and Existing

Capabilities Is Needed

parochialism is held in check and the necessary degree of purity of data

and process is being preserved.

We recognize the JWCA process as a positive approach that may lead to

improved assessment of existing close support capabilities and

service-generated requirements. We continue to believe, however, that to

be of most use to decisionmakers, the assessment process must deal

directly with the issue of sufficiency—that is, the mix and quantity of

systems needed to ensure full capability. Accordingly, we believe that

ongoing and future assessments should include recommendations on

which close support systems should be developed, modernized, retained,

or retired.

Based on our discussions with members of JWCA working groups, we are

not as optimistic as DOD that service influence over the requirements

generation process is being held in check. The Commission on Roles and

Missions of the Armed Forces recently concluded that DOD’s current

management processes allow the services to develop and field weapons

without a DOD-wide assessment of the need for these weapons. Thus, the

Commission appears to support our contention that service-generated

analyses of requirements should be routinely challenged by

service-independent analyses of DOD-wide requirements.

The full text of the DOD’s comments appears in appendix I.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director

Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director

Richard J. Price, Assistant Director

Anton G. Blieberger, Evaluator-in-Charge

Robert H. Goldberg, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office R. Gaines Hensley, Assignment Manager

Connie W. Sawyer, Jr., Senior Evaluator

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
Related GAO Products

Navy Aviation: AV-8B Harrier Remanufacture Strategy Is Not the Most

Cost-Effective Option (GAO/NSIAD-96-49, Feb. 27, 1996).

Army and Marine Corps M198 Howitzer: Maintenance Problems Are Not

Severe Enough to Accelerate Replacement System (GAO/NSIAD-96-59, Dec. 27,

1995).

Longbow Apache Helicopter: System Procurement Issues Need to Be

Resolved (GAO/NSIAD-95-159, Aug. 24, 1995).

Naval Surface Fire Support: Navy’s Near-Term Plan Is Not Based on

Sufficient Analysis (GAO/NSIAD-95-160, May 19, 1995).

Army Armored Systems: Advanced Field Artillery System Experiences

Problems with Liquid Propellant (GAO/NSIAD-95-25, Nov. 2, 1994).

Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to be Reassessed

(GAO/NSIAD-95-9, Nov. 21, 1994).

Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change

(GAO/NSIAD-93-15, Dec. 1992).

Major Acquisitions: DOD’s Process Does Not Ensure Proper Weapons Mix

for Close Support Mission (GAO/NSIAD-92-180, Apr. 17, 1992).

(701013) Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-96-45 Combat Air Power
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