### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE February 4, 2000 Se ssion MICHAEL HOLMES v. JENNIFER L. WILSON, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wilson County No. 9792 John D. Wootten, Jr., Judge

No. M1999-01087-COA-R3-CV - Filed April 12, 2001

This is anapp eal fro m an ord er gr ant ing s umm ary j udgm ent to J enn ife r Wi lso n an d Ca r Ci ty, Inc. The case arises fr

om an automobile

collision between a vehicle driven by Mr. Holmes and a ve

hicle driven by Ms. Wilson while in the course and scope of her employ

ment with Car City. The

vehicle Ms. Wilson was driving had been purchased by Car City fr om Cumberland City Dodge on the day of the accident. The accident was caused by a mechanical fa

ilure, causing M

s. Wilson to lose control

. The trial court found

that the defenda

nts had made a reasonable inspection of the vehicle prior to the accident and granted summary judgment. Mr. Holmes appeals the standard of care applied by

the trial court and the sufficiency of the evidence that a re asonable inspection was performed. Be cause the defendants owed only the duty to make a reasonable inspection of

the vehicle, and the undisputed evidence estab

lishes that a reas

onable inspection

was made, we af

firm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed and Remanded
P ATRICIA J. C OTTRELL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which B EN H. C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S. and W ILLI

AM C. K OCH , J R ., J. joined. Larry L. Roberts, Na

shville, Tennesse

e, for the appell

ant, Michael Holme

s. Lora A. Bar

kenbus, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jenn

ifer L. Wilson, e

t al.
OPINION This case arises fr

om an automobile co

llisi on on I-40 near Lebanon, Tennessee be tween a vehicle driven by Ms. Wilson and a vehicle driven

by Mr. Holmes. Ms. Wilson was an employee and agent of Ca

r City, Inc., driving a 1986 Old smobile owned by

Car City from

Cookeville to Nashville at the time of the accid ent. Car City , Inc. is a midd

le-man wholesale

r of used cars in Nashville. Car City purchases cars traded in to new car dealers in outlying areas and then, in turn, sells the vehicles to

retail used car

businesses. The c

ar driven by

Ms. Wilson was purchased by Car2

Cit y, through its agent

Scott Munson, from Cumberland City Dodge in Cookeville, Tennessee, and was being driven to Nashville for re-sale.
At the time of the purchase, Mr. Munson visually inspected the veh

icle, listened to

the car and test drove the car. He did not notice or detect any defec ts or problems with t he vehi cle. Mr. Munson has approximately eight years of e xperience in buying and

selling used cars as a wholesaler. The car also underwent another test drive from the dealership to the interstate en tra nce ramp by Denny Harris. Mr. Harris has mechanical experience in rebuildi ng clutches, br akes and motors. However, he is not a certified mechanic. During the few blocks he drove the vehicle, he did not notice any problems or defects with the vehicle.
At the on-ramp to I-40, Ms. Wilson took over driving the Oldsmobile, aft er switch ing vehicles with Mr. Harris. Ms . Wilson proceeded to drive the vehic

le approxima

tely 50 m iles to Lebanon, Tennessee without any problems. Then, she lost control of the veh icle, crossed the median, and struc

k the car driven b

y Mr. Holmes.

She testified in he

r deposition as fol

lows: Q: Why don’t you just go ahead and tell me in y our own words how the accident occurred?
A: Okay. We were

driving down the i

nterstate and the car vee

red off to the lef

t. So I tried to get it back u p on th e road . I coul dn’t. It woul d not t urn at all. I had n o control. All I remember is going thr ough the grass median, coming upon the other side of the interstate. And Ilooked through th

e passenger w

indow up front, and

all Icould see coming

at me was a jeep that didn’t have a top on it. And all I remember was thinking I’m going to die and he’s going to die, too. Q: Did you have any idea why you could not control the car? A: No, ma’am. Q: Just prior t o the wheel a llegedly coming off, did y ou notice the car driving strangely at all or any ki

nd o f problem with the car? Was it driving rough or unstable?
A: No ma’am. Q: So, then, as far as you

know, or from

what you believe, the axle suddenly broke with no warning whatsoever? A: Yes, ma’am.
Mr. Holmes, who was dr

iving the vehicle

Ms. Wilson collided with, sued Ms. Wilson, Car Cit y, Inc. and Bill Chism d/b/a Car City for the negligent ac

ts of Ms. Wilson while in

the course

and1 Due to the death of Bill Chism, the plaintiff entered an order o f voluntary non-suit without prejudice against

him but main tained the ca uses of action against M s. Wilson a nd Car C ity.

2 Mr. Baugh serves as t he Chairman and Chief Executive O fficer of Centurion Produc ts; the Chairman of the Bureau of Aeronaut

ics for the State of Tennessee; Nation al Direct or of Experi

mental Ai

rcraft Associat

ion; Dir ector of the Division of W arbirds of A merica. Additionally, his father was a mechanic and he ha s grown up fixing cars. He also enjoys resto ring airplane s and antiqu e vehicles as a hobby.

3 The car was not

retained by t

he defendants af

ter the accident and was, therefore, not avai lable for inspection. In fact, it had nev er been insp ected by M r. Baugh o r anyone else connected to this case. 3 scope of her

emp loym ent wit h Ca r Ci ty. 1 Mr. Holmes alleg ed that he suffer

ed injuries due to M

s. Wilson failing to properly control her vehicle, negligently driving her vehicle a cross the median into oncoming traffic, speed

ing, failing to

keep a proper lo

okout for other ve

hicles and gene

rally driving her vehicle in a negligent, careless, hazardous and dangerous ma nner. The defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment asserting that the accident was caused by a broken axle, not any negligent operation of the vehicle by Ms. Wilson, and that the car had been reasonably

inspected prior to her driving it from Cookeville. Mr. Holmes opposed the motion and argued that the wheel coming off the car was the consequence, not the cause, of the accident. The trial court denied summary judgment because there

existed a disputed f

act as to whether the broken axle caused Ms. Wilson to lose control or whether the a xle broke as a resu

lt of her neglig

ence in losing control of the car. Sub seq uen tly, the defen dan ts filed another motion for summary judgment, including the deposition of a

witness to the accident whom they had located since the first motion. John T. Baugh, Jr. was driving behind Ms. Wilson and saw the accident and wha t happened to Ms. Wils

on’s vehicle prior to the accident. Mr. Baugh was presented as possessing substantial expertise in automobile and aircraft mechanics. 2 He is not in any way connected to any of

the parties in this case. He testified that he was familiar w

ith what happened

mechanically

to the car. He stated the accident happened because the axle broke and slid out of place, causing the wheel to fall off. 3 This sentthe car out of control, colliding with onc oming traffic.

He was unequivoc

al in stating that

Ms. Wilson was driving safely and that she tried to maintain control of the car after the wheel c ame off. He state

d that a driver would have no notice that the axle was sliding out until the wheel separated from the car. He also stated

that by the time the wheel came off and the car started sliding,

the driver was e

ssentially “a passenger” and there was nothing she could do.
Mr. Baugh testif ied that as he was drivi ng along t he interstate , Ms. Wilson was fifty to seventy-five

feet in front of him. He first noticed that the left rear tire of the car she was driving was two inches outside the fender. As he continued to

watch, he saw the wheel “ease on out,” and when the wheel left the housing, the car fell down, skidded across the median, and into oncoming traffic. “The wheel finally came away from the car, attached

with the axle. It brought the axle with it, which means it turned

loose in the rear of the car. And there’s a gear back there called a pinion gear. And4

that obviously

failed or let go

and let this axle come

loose.” He also

testified that the

pinion gear is enclosed in the sealed d ifferentia l housing.
Mr. Holmes was unable

to offer any

evidence to reb

ut this testim

o ny, and apparently does not dispute on appeal that Ms.Wilson lost control of the car because the rear axle came loose and the left rear wheel suddenly fell off. In their seco

nd motion for summar

y judgment,

supported by the deposition of Mr. Baugh, the defendants asserted that the collision was caused by a defective la tent condition and that the vehicle was reasonably inspected prior to the accident. Mr. Baug h, whom even Mr. Holmes describes as having consid erable expertise

in automobile and aviation mechanics, was asked in his deposition, “If a person

had jacked that car up in a garage before the g ear failed inside the differential housing, would just

looking at the differential and the rear axle have told you whether or not there was a problem inside that?” He answered, “No way, no visib le cue at all.” He later clarified that answer: Q: Now, you

said before if the automobile that Miss Wilson was driving had been inspected before this

accident that there would have been no visible way to tell that this was going to

occur; is that rig

ht?
A: Well, that’s my

opinion. There’s

no way to look at the axle, even on my car. Lay down on the ground and look at it, there’s no way to tell visually

. To clarify that, if you looked up and saw a crack in thehousing or saw a plug where they putthe grease in was leaking. I mean, it’s not uncommon, I guess, where you go get them grea sed at that someone cou ld spot so mething.
But that’s a sealed housing. It has sealed bearings on ea

ch end that retai

n the grease throughout

that system tha

t’s in the back. If there was a crack, y ou would lose the grease. Then somebody

would see that t

here’s bee n a drip in the driveway. Not necessarily a drip, but a pretty g ood puddle.
But if you lost it on

the highway

, if this cracked on the highway, and you lost all the grease, you still wouldn’t know it. You would b e driving a long until it failed, because you would have metal against metal. So it’ s a possibility this thing could have happened way back up the road somewher e, lost its grease from a crack, or failure is another word for it. I don’t know. Yes, the re i s an oth er wa y. When its on – if it’s on j acks or up on a lift , a mechanic can take and pull back and forth on the wheel to see if there’s any – w e cal l it slop

– but any play

. And if there’s play in it, in that [pinion] gear, then that’s not visu al. That’s only b

y feeling . And a qualified m echanic could do

that.4 Mr. Holm es cites severa l cases from other jurisd ictions dea ling with th e duty o f a seller of a u sed veh icle to

a mem ber of the public. Hembre e v. Southhard , 339 P.2 d 77 (O kla. 195 9); Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc. , 139 P.2d 706 (Wash. 1943); Foley v. Harris on Ave. Motor Co. , 883 P.2 d 100 (M ont. 199 4); Jones v. Ramey Chevr olet Co. , 9 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 19 40); Kopischke v. First Cont inental Cor

p. , 610 P.2d

668 (M ont. 1980). Th ese cases deal with the s ale of a used car by a used car dealer to a consumer who is a member of the general public.

5 Ess ent ial ly, the pinion gear, inside a sealed housing and not vis

ible, failed, pro

bably due to lack of lubricant. If the gre

ase normally in the housing had leaked because of a cra ck, it may have been possible to see the crack or a puddle of grease. However the cra ck could have developed and the grease run out during the fifty mile drive on the interstate. The witness

made it clear that even the inspection of th

e car on a l ift by a certified mechanic, however, would not have reve aled any defect if the defect develop

ed during the tri

p, which was also a

likely possibility. The court granted the defendants’ moti

on for summary judg

ment and found tha

t the accident oc

curred after t

he axle broke, that this was an unforeseeable mechanical failure, and that the defendants made a reasonable inspection of the v

ehicle prior to dr

iving it.
Mr. Holmes appeals t

hi s decision asserting that the court applied the wrong duty of care owed by the defendants, that the evidence is insufficient to establish the defenda nts performed a reasonable

inspection, and

that the evidence is insufficient to establish the defect was latent. For the reasons below, w

e affirm.
I. A trial court’s grant of

a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law that we review de novo without a presumption of correctness. Goodloe v. State , 36 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tenn. 2001); Mooney v. Sneed

, 30 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000). We must determ ine whether there is no genuine a

nd material fact

ual issue, and, the

n, whether the mov

ant is entitled to jud

gment as a matter of law. Id . In making this determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor, affir ming the summary judgment only when the facts and inferences permit a reasona ble person to reach but one conclusion. Id

. II.
A plaintiff’s first burden in a negligence act ion is to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care and breached that duty. Rice v. Sabir , 979 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998). The nature and scope of

a duty in particular circumstances is a question of law to be decided by the court. Blair v. Campbell

, 924 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. 1996).
Mr. Holmes argues tha

t Car City should

be held to the standard applicable to sellers of used cars to the public, and also argues that we should adopt the higher standard used in some other states rather than that appare

ntly established in

Tennessee. 4 Car City and Ms. Wilson, however, assert that inthis case Car City was the purchaser, not the seller, of the car. Therefore, they argue, the standard for used car dealers, which is based upon the superior knowledge of a business selling used cars to5 In Patton , the purchas ers of a used vehi cle were suin

g for rescis sion of thei r purchase and other

remedies relating to thei

r b usiness t

ransaction;

it was not a

tort case. Nevertheless, the standard,

or duty of care,

of a used car dealerto inspect a vehicle it sells, as establi shed in Patton, is deri

ved from the dealer’s superior kn owledge and capa bility to inspect

the vehicl

e for safet

y as well as

performance. That

duty is appli

cable to used car deal

ers regardles s of whether the cause of act

ion sounds in t

ort, contract

or otherwise.

6 Mr. Holmes des cribes such an i nspection as not

requiring a deal

er to disasse

mble a car or to conduct sophisticat

ed tests . “All

that wou

ld be requi

red is t hat the dealer bri

efly v isuall y inspec t the par ts tha t are es sentia

l for safety . . . and to ph ysically manipu late those pa rts when nece ssary.” 6 the ordinary consume

r or general pub

lic, does not a

pp ly to the defendants in the fact situation presented herein. Instead, they assert that the standard

of care to be ap

plied to them is that a

pplicable to ordinary drive

rs who operate ve

hicles on public str

eets and highways

. Tennes se e has established the duty of care applicable to used car dealers. In Patton v. McHone, 5 822 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), this court held:
used cars are more likely to have mechanical defects than new ones and that used

car dealers are in a better

position to discover

these defects th

an their average customer. Whileused car dealers are not insurers of the car s they sell, they hav

e the duty to make a reasonable ins

pection of a vehic

le to discover defects or

conditions that cou

ld render the car defective or dangerous.
The duty to inspect, however, does not extend to the discovery of latent defects that could not be discovered during a reasonable inspection. Therefore, used car dealers are not required to disassemble the entire car or to examine e ach of its component parts. In the absence of

actual knowledge of

a defect, a use

d car dealer is e

ntitled to rely on a test drive or on the validity of a current safety inspection sticker.
Id . at 614 (citations omitted).
Mr. Holmes asserts that the duty established in Patton v . McHone is dictum and that we should adopt a standard requiring used car dealers to conduct “a reasonable, brief visual a nd/or testing inspection.” 6 We are not convinced that the standard

espoused by Mr. Ho

lmes is, in practical application, greatly different from the Patt on requi rement that dealers “make a reasonable inspection of a vehicle to

discover defects or conditions that could render the car defective or dangerous.” Mr. Holmes primarily o bj ects to an interpretation of Patton suggesting that a te st drive constitute

s a reasonable

inspection. However, the facts in this case indicate that, in addition to the test drives conducted on this vehicle, other inspections were made.
We need not determin

e whether those i

n spec tions, along with the test drives, were

reasonable under Patton or the standard espoused by Mr. Holmes, howev

er, because

Car City was not a used car retailer who sold a car to an or dinary customer;

instead, it was a

purchaser. It had just bought7

th e Oldsmobile involved in the accident, intended to sell it to a used car retailer, and w a s transporting it to Nashville. Thus, the question is what duty did the Car City employees have before theytook the car onto th

e public highways?

It is the same

duty other

drivers have when operating a vehicle on public

highways. Generally, those who operate vehicles on public highways have a duty to take the care reasonably necessary to protect other users of the highways from foreseeable harm. The duty of a driver using the public highways “arises from obligations imposed on every manto refrain from a

cts whichhe mayreasonably expect to result in injury.” Alexander v. Walker , 15 Tenn. App. 388, 393 (1932). In Alexander, this court applied that general standard to a lessor of cars for “temporary hire,” stating:
One who lets automobiles for use in publ ic m ust exercise ord inary care to av

oid letting a machine with defects which may injure persons coming in contact with it notwithstanding the fact

that an automobile

is not per se

a dangerous instrumentality; butthis duty does not re st upon contract of

bailment but arise

s from obligations imposed on every man to refrain from acts which he may reasonably expect to result in injury. . . . We intend only t

o hold that he must ex

ercise reasona

ble diligence to know the condition of his machines before letting them into the hands of drivers for use on the highways.
Id . (citations omitted).
“The law requires the driver of a motor vehicle to exerc ise ordi nary or reasona ble care to avoid injury to the persons or property of others lawfully using the highway.” Smith v. Fisher , 11 Tenn. App. 273, 279 (1929). Ordinary care is “[t]hat degree of care which an ordinarily prude ntand competent

person engaged i

n the same line of b

usiness or endea

vor should

exercise under similar circumstances.

. . . [and] must be viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, as shown by the evidence in the case.” B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY , 1097-98 (6th ed. 1990). See also Roberts v. Robertson County Bd. of Educ. , 692 S.W.2d 863, 869-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
With regard to the con

dition of a vehicle

operated on publi

c highways,the generally applied rule is that the owner or operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to see that it is in a reasonably safe condition before operating it on a public highway. 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 260 at 95 (1969); Phillips-Buttorff

Mfg., Co. v. McAlexander , 15 Tenn. App. 618 (1932). An owner of a vehicle has a duty to maintain the vehicle in a reasonably safe condition. Foley v. Harrison Ave. Motor Co. , 883 P.2d 100, 103 (Mont. 1994). One driving a strange car f or the first time ow

es a duty to the publi

c to see that th

ere are no obviou s defects in its mechanism which may cause injury to others. 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 260 at 99.8

InTennessee, there is no liability of a drive r of a vehicle fo

r damages result

ing from a mechanical failure “due to a latent defect of which he had no knowledge and of which he would not have acquired knowledge in the exercise of due care.” Williams v. Pritcha rd , 43 Tenn. App. 140, 143, 306 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); Sloan v. Nevil , 33 Tenn. App. 100, 112, 229 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949). Ina more recent op inion, this court af

firmed the continu

ing validity of this standard in a c

ase where an employer-owner and an employ ee-driver defended

a negligence action, in part, on the basis the accident was caused by a defec tive power steering

gear, which was a la tent def

ect that a reasonable inspection would not have disclosed. See Parker v. Prince , 656 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). The trial court instructed thejury that the defendants must prove “that the truck was in

good mechanical condition and [the accident happened] because of some latent defect in the steering mechanism, unknown to the driver and owner and one which could not have been discovered in the

exercise of rea

sonable care and reas

onable inspections.” Id . at 398. The court further charged:
That is, if the steering me

chanism had previously

functioned prope

rly and sudd

enly and without warning f

ailed to function,

the failure does

not, in the absence of knowledge of the defect or on such reasonab

le inspections as w

ould have led one i

n the exercise of due diligence to discover it, impose liability upon the owner. Id. at 398 . The trial cou rt, however, concluded the latent defect part of the jury c harge with an instruction that the doctrine of latent defect should beconsidered wi th caution. Id . at 398. On appeal, this court held tha t this charge wa

s error, holding

, “A defense ba

sed on ‘latent def

ect’ is a perfectly valid defense and is entitled to be considered by the jury in the same light as any other defense.” Id. at 398. This standard is consistent with the gen era l statement of the majority view that, “Where ordinary care is exercised, the mere fact that an injury results because of some defec tinthe vehicle does not establish the negligence of the operator, as where the operator is excusably ignorant of the defects . . .” 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 260 at 97; Williams v. Pritcha rd , 306 S.W.2d at 48; Lively v. Atchley , 36 Tenn. App. 399, 403, 256 S.W.2d 58, 5 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 52); Coppedge v. Blac kburn , 15 Te nn. App. 587, 596, (1932). As with other actions involving allegations of negligence, the ultimate test is whether the injuries were

reasonably fore

seeable by someone using due care under the circumstances. See Dillard v. Vanderbilt Univ. , 970 S.W.2d 958, 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (if the injury could not have been reasonably foreseen, no duty to prevent it arises.)
III. Summary judgment

is a ppropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, t

ogether with the

affidavits, if

any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and the movi ng party is entitled to a judg

ment as a matter of

law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Bain v. Wells , 936 S.W.2d 61 8, 622 (Tenn. 1997) ; Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995); Byrd v. Hall , 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993). Thus, the su mmary judg

ment herein should be affirmed if th

e undisputed fac

ts reasonably support only one conclusion - that Ms. Wilson7 There is no evidence the car was defective before it le ft Cumberland Dodge. We cannot draw any inference

that had a f

urther i nspection been conducted, a ny defect would ha

ve been discove

red. 9 and Car City are entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. McCall v. Wilder , 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d at 26. The cause in fact of the accident herein was the loss of a

rear wheel, which, the undisputed proof shows, happened b

ecause the differential housing likely cra cked, causing the

pinion gear to failand to let the axle come loose. Mr. Holmes no long er contends that anything other than the wheel coming off was the immediate cause of the accident.
When faced with defendant’s seco nd moti on for summary judgment, Mr. Holmes had the burden of producing evidence to contradict the allegations that a defective latent condition had led to the sudden loss of the wheel and that the vehic le had been rea

sonably inspe

cted prior to

its being driven on the interstate. Mr. Holmes was required to set forth specif

ic facts, not legal conclu

sions, to establish disputed issues that are material to the resolution of the case. Byrd , 847 S.W.2d at 215. A disputed fact is material for summary judgment purposes if it must be decided in

order to resolve a substantive claim or defense underlying the summary judgment motion. Id

. Mr. Holmes produced n o evidence rega

rding how or why the

housing cracked

, because there was no inspection of the c ar after the ac

cident. The eyew

itness, knowledge

able in mechanics, stated that it is impossible to know

whether the housi

ng cracked bef

ore or after Ms.

Wilson drove the car on the interstate. Mr. Holmes has produced no evidence that the defect actually existed at the time the Car City

employees inspected and test drove it. He merely argues that if there had been certain indications of

the problem (e.g., a visible crack in the housing), a more thorough examination of the car could p

ossibly have reve

aled them. Those a

llegations are no

t sufficient. 7
Because defendants o

wed only theduty to exerc ise ordinary

care, including

the duty to exercise due care to

discover defects, the only remain ing question is whe

ther the inspectio

ns and test drives performed on the vehi cle prio r to its being driven on the interstate were reasonable. There is no dispute about the inspections and test drives conduc

ted and no dispute th

at Ms. Wilson drove the car for approxim

ate ly fi fty miles on the interstate, with no indication of a problem, before the wheel fell off.
In Alexander , the court held that there was no proof o f n eglect of the duty to inspect, and therefore no liability, because there was proof plaintiffdrove the car approximately “two and oneh alf miles before the accident happened;” there was “no proof the automobile was defec tive or shimmiedbefore it left

the garage;” an

employee of defe

ndant “examined

the car and fille

d it with oil and gasoline before it was let to Mr. Courtney and [said] that it was in good condition;” and “others who drove the car immediately before the accident said there was nothing the matter with it and it was in

good condition.” 15 Tenn. App. at 393-94. The facts before us are similar. Mr. Munson, listened to the eng ine and visually ins

p ected th e vehicle. The car driven by Ms. Wilson10

had also been driven a short distance by Mr. Munson and Mr. Harris and approximately fifty miles by Ms. Wilson before this accident occurred.
Mr. Holmes argues that the inspections and test drives performed by the Car City employees were not reasonable under the circumstances, but his only basis for that assertion is that there was no inspection or observation performed by a “qualified person.” Mr. Holmes relies on Mr. Baugh’s statements that if the car were put up on a lift, someone who worked at a place which greases cars could spot a crack in the housing or a leaking plug, if one existed. In addition, he stated that if the car were on a lifta qualified mechanic could check for “play” in the pinion gear by pulling the wheel back and forth. We do not think that the duty to make a r

easonable inspe

ction, which can c

onsist of a test drive, req

uires such measur

es. We decline to

hold that a driver

about to ta

ke a used c ar, even a newly-acquir

ed used car, on th

e public highways i

s re quired to first have the car inspected onlifts by a certifie

d mechanic. Havi

ng refused to so c

onclude, we must ne

cessa ril y find that the inspection by the Car City employees, including the test drives, was reasonable.
Because the undisputed proof establishes that the defendants did not breach theduty of care they owed the plaintiff, summary judgment was proper as a matter of law.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment

for the defendants. Costs

of this appeal ar

e taxed to Mr. Holme

s.

___________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE