-.11■110h.

ern',

IHIM% ■IfRIOII

11111•

HATOONAL DEFENSE UNOVERSITY

STRATEGIC FORUM

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NUMBER 65, MARCH 1995

Great Power Restorationists

make gains in the Russian Duma

by Jim Brusstar and Ellen Jones

Conclusions

Politicians advocating restoration of Russia as

a great power strengthened their position in the

December 1995 Duma elections. Although communist and nationalist gains fell short of the

two-third majority needed to override a presidential veto, these groups (who are united in

their suspicion of Western intentions) now

enjoy a solid majority in the new lower house.

By contrast, parties advocating integration

with Western security systems suffered significant losses, even though they had muted the

pro-Western components of their programs.

The dominant role of great power restorationists in the new Duma will increase pressure

on the Yeltsin regime to assume a more assertive

stance vis-a-vis the West.

The most important consequence of the parliamentary election is its impact on the election

that really counts: the presidential race. The

main beneficiary of the strong conservative

showing is Communist Party leader Gennadiy

Zyuganov, who emerged as the strongest challenger to both President Boris Yeltsin and the

still-disunited reformists.

Great Power Restorationist Victory at the Polls

The new Duma which began its session on

January 16th is considerably more nationalist in its

orientation than the one it replaced. Communist and

nationalist parties--deeply divided on some domestic issues but united in the idea that Russia must be

restored as a great international power—significantly

strengthened their position, from 39% in the old

Duma to 62% in the new one. These great power

restorationist deputies share many common national

security goals, such as reintegration of some of the

other Soviet successor states and strengthening the

armed forces. They also share a strong suspicion of

Western, particularly U.S., intentions toward Russia.

The strong showing of the mainstream Communist

Party (which advocates restoration of the USSR and

won 157 of the 450 Duma seats) is symptomatic of the

shift in political alignments in the new Duma.

At the same time, parties advocating Russia's

integration with Western security systems were

soundly defeated. Such groups controlled a quarter

of the seats in the old Duma; in the new one, they represent only 15%. For instance, in 1993, the proWestern Russia's Choice party came in second in the

party list race and did well in the single seat races,

winning 76 seats in all. In the most recent election,

Choice won less than 4% on the party list vote (failing

to break the 5% barrier), garnering only nine seats in

the new Duma—not enough to form their own faction.

Centrist parties also fared poorly, mirroring their

modest results in the 1993 election. Most significantly, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's "Russia is

Our Home" party received only 10% of the vote,

despite its advantages as the incumbent party in control of major electronic media and patronage and at

least some tinkering with voting results (i.e., in

Chechnya).

Yeltsin staffers and party spokesmen tried to
Distribution of Seats in the Duma

Party Party

List

Vote*

Great Power Restorationists**

Party

List

Seats

Single Total

Seat Seats

Winners

Communist Party 22.3 99 57 156

LDPR (Zhirinovskiy) 11.2 50 1 51

Agrarian Party 3.8 20 20

Communist/Working Russia 4.5 1 1

KRO (Lebed) 4.3 5

Derzhava 2.6

Others 5.8 45 45

Subtotal: 54.4% 149 129 (61.8%) 278

Centrists***

Russia is our Home 10.1 45 10 55

Other Centrists 15.1 28 28

Subtotal: 25.2% 45 38 (18.4%) 83

Parties Advocating Integration

With Western Security System@

Yabloko 6.9 31 14 45

Others 8.8 24 24

Subtotal 15.7% 31 38 (15.3%) 69

Political Affiliation Unknown ---- 20 (4.4%) 20

* An additional 4-5 percent is comprised of votes against all parties and

spoiled ballots.

** All but a handful of great power restorationists joined one of four hardline

Duma factions: Communist (149 members); Agrarian (35 members); LDPR

(51 members); People's Power (38 members). One joined Russia's

Regions, which represents politicians from across the political spectrum.

Several are unaffiliated.

— Ten additional single seat winners joined the Chernomyrdin faction, with

a total of 65 members. An additional 13 centrist deputies joined Russia's

Regions. Five are unaffiliated.

@ One additional single seat winner joined the Yabloko faction, which currently has 46 members. Nine reformist deputies joined Russia's Regions.

Fourteen remain without factional affiliation.

This chart is based on an assessment of the policy preferences of

each of the 450 deputies.

Shift in Distribution of Duma Forces

1993-1995

39.4 61.8

NM Great Power Restoration = Western Integration

E

j

 Centrists CI Affiliation Unknown

This chart is based on an assessment of the policy preferences of

each of the 450 deputies.

PAGE 2 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES STRATEGIC FORUM #65, MARCH 1996

buffer the negative public relations consequences of

the vote by pre-election statements stressing their

modest expectations. Nevertheless, 90% of the electorate voted for groups running in explicit opposition

to the Government's policies—an underiiable rejection of the President's and Prime Minister's policies.

Reform-minded commentators and officials have

also tried to portray the election not as a victory for

conservative forces, but a defeat for "democrats,"

who bungled their chances of victory by refusing to

unite. Nine percent of the party list vote went to parties that support integration with Western security

systems but failed to gain the 5% minimum needed to

acquire a share of the party list seats. In fact, however, candidates on the opposite end of the foreign policy spectrum—great power restorationists—suffered

even more from the failure of conservative forces to

unite: 21% of the party list vote went to communist

or nationalist parties that failed to make the 5% cutoff.

Limits on the Duma's Role

The implications of the great power restorationist

victory in the Duma are more limited than would be

the case in a political system with a strong legislature.

Most constitutional authority in Russia is concentrated in the executive branch. For instance, Yeltsin is not

constitutionally obliged to change anyone in the

Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, as a result of

his opponents' victory.

Nor can the Duma move forward with its own

legislation without Yeltsin's assent. Conservative

forces would need a reliable two-thirds majority to

override a presidential veto. Even then, they would

need support from the upper house (Federation

Council), which must also muster a two-thirds vote—

a development made unlikely by the fact that this

body is no longer directly elected but instead consists

of the top executive and legislative leader of each

province. Because the majority of provincial administrators are Yeltsin appointees, Yeltsin currently controls around a third of the upper house membership,

casting considerable doubt on the Federation

Council's ability to override a presidential veto.

This near-monopoly of power by the President

means that great power restorationists, even though

they enjoy a solid majority in the new lower house,
STRATEGOC FORUM #65, MARCH 1996 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PAGE 3

have only limited ability to translate their policy preferences into action.

The Election's Real Impact

Still, the Duma will surely become a center of

public pressure on the Yeltsin regime to decrease

cooperation with the West. The already-strong

Russian consensus against NATO expansion probably will harden. The prospects for START II (at least

in its current form) ratification are even bleaker, particularly in light of the upcoming presidential elections (now scheduled for June 16th). In addition, the

new Duma likely will be somewhat more receptive to

larger defense budgets and to measures to expand

military conscription.

Moreover, great power restorationist forces likely

will try to exploit what they will surely depict as a

popular mandate to push for reintegration of some of

the other Soviet successor states. Communist leaders,

who campaigned on the promise to denounce the

Belovezh Forest agreement dissolving the old Soviet

Union, likely will renew their effort to have Russia

officially renounce this agreement. Although this

move has no legal force, it will be seen in Russia as a

direct slap at Yeltsin—the only signatory to the

Belovezh agreement still in office.

The President, who is determined to hang onto

power, has seen the handwriting on the wall and is

now trying to steal the thunder of the great power

restorationists by adopting some elements of their

approach to national security. Yeltsin has already

shifted further to the conservative end of the political

spectrum, in a desperate effort to coopt the populist

issues that catapulted his hardline opposition to victory in the legislative elections.

The most obvious example of Yeltsin's attempt to

burnish his patriotic credentials is the replacement of

Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev—architect of the

now-discredited pro-Western foreign policy—with

Yevgenniy Primakov, who occupies the moderate end

of the great power restorationist spectrum. Primakov

has already embarked on a series of visits to the other

former Soviet republics, to underline Moscow's new

stress on ties with these states.

The Primakov appointment has been accompanied by a number of anti-reform changes on domestic

issues—such as the removal of economic reformer

Anatoliy Chubais and the installation of hardliner

Nikolai Yegorov to head the presidential staff—and a

string of populist promises to pay back wages to

workers.

Implications for the Presidential Elections

The most important consequence of the parliamentary election is its impact on the election that really counts: the presidential race. In effect, the Duma

election was a surrogate presidential primary. The

election made clear that no candidate openly espousing reformist views, such as integration with Western

security systems, has much hope of winning in the

presidential elections. The election also demonstrated the depth of nationalist and communist sentiment

in the country, providing momentum for the parties

on that end of the political spectrum.

The main beneficiary of the strong conservative

showing in the Duma elections is Communist Party

leader Gennadiy Zyuganov. Zyuganov's constituency is fragmented among those espousing a return to

Soviet-style socialism and more moderate forces.

Moreover, Zyuganov's claim to the Communist banner is not uncontested; several other Communist

politicians (both within Zyuganov's own party and

from more extremist communist groups) have indicated an interest in competing in the presidential

race.

Nonetheless, the Communist Party's undeniably

strong showing at the polls in December have

enabled Zyuganov to take major steps toward consolidating his position as the communist standardbearer. On February 15th, the Communist Party

Congress unanimously endorsed his candidacy for

the presidency. In addition, several other leftist

groups, including Viktor Anpilov's unreconstructed

communists, have endorsed Zyuganov.

James H. Brusstar, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Ellen Jones, from the Defense

Intelligence Agency, are speciailists in Russian security policies, decision-making procedures, and constitutional developments. This paper is a result of their research concerning the Duma and presidential elections. For more information contact James H. Brusstar at (202) 287-9219 ext. 525; Fax (202) 287-9475; Internet: brusstarj@ndu.edu.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do

not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the

Department of Defense, or any other government agency.
PAGE 4 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES STRATEGIC FORUM #65, MARCH 1996

Similarly, the respectable showing of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) has kept

alive the presidential hopes of its colorful leader—

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Zhirinovskiy's party had

slipped badly in the polls since the December 1993

elections, when the party had garnered 23% of the

party list vote. Many Moscow political pundits were

predicting a dismal LDPR showing in 1995, perhaps

even a failure to break the 5% cutoff in the party list

race. In fact, however, Zhirinovskiy's party came in

second in the party list vote, capturing 11% of the

vote—a clear loss from 1993, but not a rout. The

LDPR's electoral success, however modest, has bolstered Zhirinovskiy's presidential pretensions.

Retired General Aleksandr Lebed, by contrast,

received a partial setback to his presidential aspirations. Lebed, a charismatic figure who catapulted

himself to national prominence in 1994 with a highly

publicized attack on Yeltsin and Defense Minister

Pavel Grachev, handily won his single seat race in

Tula. However, his party—the Congress of Russian

Communities (KRO)—made a disappointing showing, winning only 4.3% of the party list vote.

Although Lebed remains one of the top four or five

contenders in terms of popularity and voter trust,

KRO's discouraging performance was a major blow

to his hopes to use the group to provide the grassroots organization and financial resources his bid for

the presidency will need.

Similarly, the lackluster performance of moderate

reformer Grigorii Yavlinskiy's party was a blow to the

latter's presidential ambitions. Yabloko was able to

muster only 7% of the party list vote (down from 8%

in 1993). Although Yavlinskiy remains among the top

presidential contenders in public opinion surveys, his

party's modest showing in the Duma election have

deprived him of the momentum he needs to unite

reformist political forces behind his candidacy.

The parliamentary elections also provided a

deathblow to the presidential aspirations of several

other would-be contenders, whose parties fared

badly in the polls. One notable example is former

Vice President and ex-general Alexander Rutskoy,

who failed to win a Duma seat. His Derzhava

party, which had hoped to capture up to 10 or 15%

of the Duma vote, won only 2.6% of the party list

vote, finishing 11th in a field of 43.

Finally, the modest performance by Chernomyrdin's party was a setback for those political

insiders who see the prime minister (not Yeltsin) as

the "party of power's" most viable presidential

nominee. This surely was a major factor shaping

Yeltsin's decision—announced on February 15th—

to seek re-election, and Chernomyrdin's decision to

support Yeltsin.

The bottom line is that all presidential hopefuls

will have to either adjust their message to embrace

the conservative themes that dominated the parliamentary elections or unite with other political parties in order to attract additional voters. Yeltsin's

main campaign strategy seems to be that of recreating himself as a populist and patriot, but it remains

to be seen whether voters will buy the new image.

The Communists already have a conservative message which will play well with many voters in June,

but they have little hope of capturing the presidency unless they can convince other leftist and nationalist candidates to withdraw their candidacies in

favor of a single communist-patriotic figure, like

Zyuganov. Meanwhile, on the other end of the

political spectrum, Russia's struggling reformers—

hampered by an increasingly discredited message—remain as divided as before.

The STRATEGIC FORUM provides summaries of work by

members and guests of the Institute for National Strategic

Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These

include reports of original research, synopses of seminars and

conferences, the results of unclassified war games, and digests

of remarks by distinguished speakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk

Editor - Jonathan W. Pierce

nclu NDU Press publications concerning

national security include the Strategic

Forum, the McNair Paper monograph

series, NDU Symposium proceedings,

and NDU Press books. For information call (202)

475-1913, or DSN 335-1913. Our Home Page is

HTTP://WWW.NDU.EDU. Our Internet Web Server

is http://www.ndu.edu/cgi-bin/wais.pl.

PRESS