AVOIDING VIETNAM: THE U.S. ARMY’S

RESPONSE TO DEFEAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Conrad C. Crane

September 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-100-8

ii
FOREWORD

As American operations against terrorism spread

around the globe to places like Afghanistan and the

Philippines, an increasing tendency has been for

commentators to draw parallels with past experience in

Vietnam. Even soldiers on the ground have begun to speak

in such terms.

Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the Army’s response to that

defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary

to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to

learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that

Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with

counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars.

While that process eventually produced the powerful force

that won the Persian Gulf War, it left an Army with force

structure, doctrine, and attitudes that are much less

applicable to the peace operations and counterterrorism

campaign it now faces.

Dr. Crane asserts that the Army must change in order to

operate effectively in the full spectrum of future

requirements, and it is time to reexamine the war in

Vietnam. His study also draws attention to the service’s

“Lessons Learned” process, and provides insights as to how

the experience gained in Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM should be analyzed and applied.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

study as a contribution to the defeat of global terrorism and

the transformation of the Army.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute

in September 2000 after 26 years of military service that

concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S.

Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the

Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and

published articles on military issues in such journals as The

Journal of Strategic Studies, The Journal of Military

History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian, as well as

in a number of collections and reference books. He holds a

B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy along with an M.A.

and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the

U.S. Army War College. He currently holds the General

Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research at the U.S. Army

War College.

iv
SUMMARY

There is a commonly accepted maxim that military

defeat is the best teacher for an army. But historian Edward

Drea has noted “The way an army interprets defeat in

relation to its military tradition, and not the defeat itself,

will determine, in large measure, the impact an

unsuccessful military campaign will have on that

institution.”

His conclusion is borne out from the American

experience in Southeast Asia. While the French Army made

a very frank assessment of its performance in Indochina

that improved its counterinsurgency capabilities for future

wars, the U.S. Army’s process for analyzing failure was

quite different. While a series of Vietnam studies by

high-ranking officers focusing on branch performance and

tactical innovations was completed in the early 1970s, the

Army’s primary emphasis quickly returned to the future

European battlefield. Army involvement in counterinsurgency was first seen as an aberration and then as a

mistake to be avoided. Instead of focusing on the proper

synchronization of military and political tools with

objectives necessary for success in low intensity

unconventional conflicts, the Army continued to

concentrate on mid to high intensity conventional wars.

Shaped to a great extent by the work of Colonel (Retired)

Harry Summers, the American Army’s lessons from

Vietnam were far different from the French. While the

resulting policies helped produce victory in the Persian Gulf

War, they have left a service with a structure, doctrine, and

attitude that are still not conducive to involvement in low

intensity conflicts or “Operations Other Than War.”

In hindsight, the Army that won in the Persian Gulf

deserves credit for avoiding the common mistake of

preparing to fight the last war instead of the next one.

However, enemies like Saddam Hussein are becoming

v
increasingly rare, if not extinct, and the time has come for

the Army to look more carefully at Vietnam, which seems

more relevant for our current campaign against terrorism.

Global missions in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM are

evoking increasing comparisons with past experience in

Southeast Asia. As distasteful as the proposition may seem,

to truly be a Full Spectrum force, the Army must be

prepared to deal with all aspects of a conflict resembling

that lost war. This will necessitate reforms in training,

doctrine, and force structure, as well as service acceptance

of smaller-scale contingency missions including

counterinsurgency and some degree of nation-building.

The American Army can no longer run away from

Vietnam. For it has found us in Afghanistan, Colombia, and

the Philippines.

vi
AVOIDING VIETNAM: THE U.S. ARMY’S

RESPONSE TO DEFEAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.

President George Bush, 19911

Many of my generation, the career captains, majors, and

lieutenant colonels seasoned in [Vietnam], vowed that when

our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce

in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the

American people could not understand or support.

General Colin Powell, 19952

Immediately after their failure in Indochina, the French

Supreme Command, Far East, prepared a candid appraisal

of their performance. The results were published in 1955 in

three volumes, summarizing lessons dealing with

politico-military concerns, countersinsurgency in general,

and tactics. General Paul Ely, Commander-in-Chief,

Indochina, described his study as “a collective selfappraisal.” He intoned “We must review the causes of our

failures and of our successes to ensure that the lessons

which we bought so dearly with our dead not remain locked

away in the memories of the survivors.” He defended his

candor by arguing, “An Army with a long history is

sufficiently well-endowed to be able to hear the truth.”

Based on 1,400 reports written by officers of all ranks, the

volumes dwell heavily on the need for pacification and

political action at the village level, properly coordinated

with all military actions. Assessments were indeed candid,

and provided clear lessons for the French Army to apply in

future counterinsurgencies such as in Algeria. The French

clearly aimed to learn from their mistakes and to do better

next time.3 And they did. The fact that the nation eventually

lost the war in Algeria should not detract from the fact that

1
the French Army’s counterinsurgency performance was

much improved.

This example would seem to support the common maxim

that military defeat is an army’s best teacher, as it

eliminates incompetent leaders and practices, promotes

innovative reforms, and forces deficiencies to be fixed.

However, historian Edward Drea has noted that such

generalizations overstate the case. He writes, “The way an

army interprets defeat in relation to its military tradition,

and not the defeat itself, will determine, in large measure,

the impact an unsuccessful military campaign will have on

that institution.”4

This conclusion is borne out from the American

experience with defeat in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army’s

assessment of its Vietnam failure was quite different than

that of the French. While a series of Vietnam studies by

high-ranking officers focusing on branch performance and

tactical innovations was completed in the early 1970s, the

Army’s primary emphasis quickly returned to the future

European battlefield.

Army involvement in counterinsurgency was first seen

as an aberration and then as a mistake to be avoided.

Instead of focusing on the proper synchronization of

military and political tools with objectives necessary for

success in low intensity unconventional conflicts, the Army

continued to concentrate on mid to high intensity

conventional wars. Shaped to a great extent by the work of

Colonel (Retired) Harry Summers, the American Army’s

lessons from Vietnam were far different from the French.

While the resulting policies helped produce victory in the

Persian Gulf War, they have left a service with a structure,

doctrine, and attitude that are still not conducive to

involvement in low intensity conflicts (LICs) or “Operations

Other Than War.” Contrary to President Bush’s assertion

that opened this monograph, success in Operation DESERT

STORM reinforced the Vietnam syndrome for General

Powell and his army.

2
Unlike the French evaluation, the majority of the

Vietnam studies produced by the Department of the Army

in the 1970s were composed by general officers, with an

obvious aim to tout the accomplishments of their organizations. Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland, who

was concerned about the lack of authoritative accounts

about the war in Southeast Asia in the Army’s historical

library, and wanted interim reports available for

operational planners to consider, initiated the project.

Though the tone of the resulting monographs is very

upbeat, they are also filled with many astute criticisms of

the Army’s performance in Vietnam. They recognize the

“lack of understanding throughout all ranks on the nature

of insurgent wars and of that in Vietnam in particular” that

Americans brought to the conflict, and the difficulties this

caused as soldiers and their leaders experienced steep

learning curves.5 They also chronicle the problems caused

by 12-month rotations and a divided chain of command,

though the emphasis is on the positive accomplishments of

U.S. forces. Most of the studies were composed before the

fall of South Vietnam, though there were some exceptions,

most notably General Donn Starry’s Mounted Combat in

Vietnam, which was written by a task force of Vietnam

veterans at the Armor School from 1973-76.6

Force Structure and Training: Refocusing on

Europe.

By the time the majority of the Vietnam studies had been

completed in late 1973, the Army was out of Southeast Asia

and preoccupied with the lessons of a far different war in the

Middle East. On July 1 of that year, General William E.

DePuy took command of the Army’s new Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC). For the first time the

responsibility for service research, doctrine, and training

was consolidated under a single commander. In Vietnam

DePuy had served as the Military Assistance Command

Vietnam (MACV) J-3 and commander of the 1st Infantry

3
Division, but he saw nothing there to change his conviction

that “the principal and directed mission of the Army” was to

fight in Europe. While at MACV he had urged General

William C. Westmoreland to persuade the Marines to

abandon their Combined Action Platoons in favor of large

unit operations, criticizing their “counterinsurgency of the

deliberate, mild sort.”7

By 1976, DePuy and a selected team of writers had

produced a pragmatic new Field Manual (FM) 100-5,

Operations, which aimed to integrate how the Army

procured, trained, and fought under a concept called “Active

Defense.” Influenced primarily by the perceived lessons of

the 1973 Mideast War and close connections with the

Germans and Tactical Air Command, DePuy produced a

manual that focused on high intensity conflict in Europe

and aimed to “expunge” the bitter experience of Vietnam. In

his oral history he emphasized that he aimed to combine the

weapons data from the Arab-Israeli War with tactics drawn

from “the very unique environment of NATO” to create a

unifying concept for all American doctrine.8

While the new manual was his most significant

contribution to the Army, its tenets were never really

accepted by the majority of officers. Critics said that it

placed too much emphasis on the defense and “winning the

first battle,” ignored the psychological dimension of

warfare, and focused too narrowly on Europe. The manual

did succeed in making the officer corps care about doctrine,

however, and it led to a “renaissance of professional

discourse” on how the Army should fight that has continued

to the present.9

DuPuy did not ignore the Vietnam experience entirely.

He was very impressed with the battle seasoning obtained

by the Navy through the Top Gun training program that

began in 1969, and he gave the responsibility for developing

a similar Army effort to his deputy chief of staff for training,

Major General Paul Gorman. Gorman developed the

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System and a Core

4
Instrumentation System that were eventually installed at

the vast exercise area at Fort Irwin, California in the Army’s

version of Top Gun. In accordance with DuPuy’s focus, the

National Training Center concentrated on readying units to

face Soviet heavy forces. The preparation units received at

the National Training Center in combating a mechanized

Soviet-style opponent in realistic conditions proved a key

element in the swift victory over Iraq, as did the overall

“Training Revolution” in the Army that Gorman’s

initiatives helped spawn.10

While the new FM 100-5 was being conceived at

TRADOC, Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams

commanded a force undergoing a traumatic transition.

Facing a significant drawdown, the shift to an all-volunteer

armed force, and a desire for ethical reform from the rank

and file of an officer corps who believed the Vietnam war had

weakened service integrity, Abrams’ primary goals were to

establish an active force structure that maintained 16

division flags while also increasing the readiness of reserve

components. His subordinates later claimed that he also

had a long-term vision to ensure that no president could

ever again fight another Vietnam without mobilization, but

that is not clear from available documents. In fact,

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger considered the

Army Chief of Staff the epitome of the “good servant” who

always deferred to civilian control of the military.11

Whatever his intent, Abrams and his staff began to

integrate reserves into the force structure so that no major

deployment would be possible without them, not only

ensuring that these units would be available in a major

conflict, but also that any president desiring to employ large

forces would have to garner the necessary political backing

from a country unified enough to support the call up of the

reserves required to sustain the operation. Though Abrams’

motivation might be unclear, some of his gifted

subordinates fully realized the limitations the new force

structure would place on the Executive Branch, though they

were careful not to admit that publicly until a decade later.12

5
The initial effectiveness of this approach could be seen in

the debates over the reserve deployment for DESERT

STORM. However, so much of the Army’s support structure

is in the reserves now that even current operations in the

Balkans require such augmentation, and that fact did not

limit presidential initiative and instead has caused

considerable strain in often-deployed reserve units. This

problem with contingency support is exacerbated by a force

structure that is still designed to deploy whole divisions,

such as in a Fulda Gap scenario to stop a Soviet onslaught.

The division support command is not robust enough to

sustain subordinate brigades on separate operations in

different locations, as is often required by peacekeeping or

counterinsurgency contingencies that do not need a force as

concentrated as for a mid or high intensity war.

Problems in deploying and maintaining heavy brigades

has led the Army Chief of Staff, General Erik Shinseki, to

pledge a transformation of the Army over the next decade.

This could signify that the Army is finally moving away

from a configuration designed to engage the Warsaw Pact

on the plains of Europe. However, the memories of

overwhelming success in DESERT STORM are still fresh,

and many critics remain suspicious of the Army’s

intellectual commitment to change.13

Adjusting the support structure mix will also be difficult,

since for some the idea that the Army needs to maintain a

“political check and balance” over the Executive Branch’s

ability to commit troops overseas has become a key objective

of the current Total Force policy. However, changing the

active/reserve balance for support forces will be essential to

meet future contingencies.14

Doctrine: The Influence of On Strategy.

Abrams died in September 1974, leaving his successors

to continue his force structure realignment and to wrestle

with the new doctrine. For the Army, memories of Vietnam

were more to be avoided than contemplated, until Colonel

6
(Retired) Harry Summers’ influential book, On Strategy,

appeared in the spring of 1981. Produced for the Strategic

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and adopted

as a text by that institution and the U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College (CGSC), it quickly became the

prism through which the Army viewed Vietnam.

Inside the frontispiece of the 1982 version issued by

CGSC, a short note from Major General Jack Merritt,

Commandant of the Army War College, explained:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of “On Strategy: The

Vietnam War in Context,” the culmination of a US Army War

College study effort to draw strategic lessons from our

Vietnam experience.

Using Clausewitzian theory and the classic principles of war,

the book attempts to place the Vietnam war in domestic

context as well as in the context of war itself. Its central thesis

is that a lack of appreciation of military theory and military

strategy (especially the relationship between military

strategy and national policy) led to a faulty definition of the

nature of the war. The result was the exhaustion of the Army

against a secondary guerrilla force and the ultimate failure of

military strategy to support the national policy of containment

of communist expansion.

Intended neither as a history of our Vietnam involvement nor

as a definite account of the war, the purpose of the book is to

provoke and stimulate military strategic thinking so as to

better prepare us to meet the challenges that lie ahead.15

On Strategy, with its mix of Clausewitzian and Jominian

analysis of our involvement in Southeast Asia, has indeed

inspired much lively debate within the military. Summers’

work helped revive interest in the study of Clausewitz at our

military schools and establish policies that influenced the

development and employment of the force that won

DESERT STORM, though he reinforced the Army’s

aversion to unconventional wars and may have also helped

inspire the current perceived crisis in civil-military

relations. Despite its Clausewitzian veneer, the book is

7
really a more traditional Jominian approach to the war, and

it greatly oversimplifies the North Vietnamese strategy of

dau tranh to support a conclusion reinforcing the Army’s

preference for conventional warfare.16

Summers’ influence was already apparent by 1982,

when the debate over the active defense produced a new FM

100-5 emphasizing “AirLand Battle.” While the manual’s

predecessor had ignored any enduring principles of war or

specific military philosophers, the new version incorporated

ideas from Sun Tzu, Basil H. Liddell-Hart, and Karl von

Clausewitz. It was still based most heavily on traditional

Jominian principles, however, as evidenced by its lengthy

discussions of “combat imperatives,” as well as an appendix

on the principles of war. In recognizing the importance of an

operational level of war between tactics and strategy, and

the need to integrate battles and campaigns together to

achieve political goals, the 1982 manual reflected a key

lesson of On Strategy, that without an operational link

strategic failure could still result from tactical success.

While the new FM 100-5 still focused on high intensity

conflict, it did envision worldwide contingencies.17

Though the primary sponsor of the new manual was

Starry, DePuy’s successor at TRADOC, another key player

was Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer. In

his previous job as deputy chief of staff, Meyer had critiqued

and helped edit early versions of On Strategy, and he had

taken to heart Summers’ call that military leaders had a

responsibility to ensure that civilian leadership knew all

the imperatives of military operations. In brutally frank

testimony to Congress and the president, he warned that

the “hollow army” of 1980 could not carry out its missions,

and he helped guide the initial stage of the Carter-Reagan

defense build-up that would resuscitate American military

forces.

Dr. Michael Perlman at the Combat Studies Institute

believes that Meyer, who sponsored formal publication of

Summers’ book, also used On Strategy and its lessons as

8
justification to further push the Army away from

counterinsurgency and the legacy of Vietnam, and toward

the powerful conventional force that could carry out the new

AirLand Battle doctrine. Meyer expressed his vision in a

1980 White Paper that pictured a strong, mobile force

capable of maintaining strength in the decisive theater of

Central Europe, while also projecting power to meet threats

to American interests in other regions. He also espoused a

number of rules for the use of military force that his

successors would help develop into the Weinberger

Doctrine. By the time Meyer retired in 1983, the U.S.

military was well on the road to the force of DESERT

STORM. And On Strategy was not only a key component of

the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War

College, but at the National War College, Naval War

College, Air War College, and the Marine Corps Command

and General Staff College as well.18

Some critics such as Russell Weigley claimed that the

military’s adoption of Summers’ book and thesis was just an

attempt to prepare to refight the last satisfactory war,

World War II. Others have seen it as part of the desire of

American officers to retrieve “their professional legitimacy”

by avoiding any future wars like Vietnam. Whatever the

motivation, response to the book within the military was

overwhelmingly favorable. In his foreword to the 1982 Army

War College version, Merritt stated that, in his view, the

critical strategic analysis of On Strategy was “firmly on the

mark” and was supported by both the current leadership of

the Army, who had been commanders concerned with

tactical operations in Vietnam, as well as by retired general

officers who had been involved in war planning at the

highest levels.19

Such support is not surprising, since the book “adopts

much of the revisionist critique of the role in the war of the

media, the White House, the civilian secretary of defense

and his staff, and the antiwar movement.” While it does

chide the military for not accepting its own share of blame,

its praise of American tactical prowess allowed the 1980s

9
leadership to accept the book’s thesis and still “hold their

heads high.” The oft-repeated, and historically

questionable, opening quote of On Strategy, “You know you

never defeated us on the battlefield,” became a mantra of

pride throughout the Army.20

German General Gunther Blumentritt once observed

that giving the sophisticated philosophy of Clausewitz’s On

War to the military was like “allowing a child to play with a

razor blade.”21 To some degree the same can be said for the

American experience with On Strategy. While even

Summers’ worst critics generally agree that he has rejected

any “simple-minded stab-in-the-back theory which might

exonerate the American military from responsibility for

Vietnam errors,” unsophisticated readers often interpret

him that way, including, from my personal experience,

cadets at West Point, lieutenants and captains in Officer

Basic and Advanced Courses, and majors at CGSC.

Instructors at military schools have to work hard to

dispel such illusions, and that effort has fueled some of the

internal criticisms of Summers’ work. A few military

authors have taken exception to the conclusions of On

Strategy. William Darryl Henderson contended that those

who blame strategic shortcomings for failure in Southeast

Asia ignore the lack of cohesion within combat units that

had significant impact on operations and was at least an

equal contributor to our defeat.22

In The Army and Vietnam, Andrew Krepinevich claimed

that errors in training and doctrine were the main reasons

we lost. By failing to deal effectively with the insurgent

threat in South Vietnam, the Army accelerated the loss of

public support, which led to U.S. withdrawal before the

North Vietnamese did finally move to conventional

operations. Krepinevich asserts, “Thus the Army, in

fighting the war it was not prepared to fight, lost the

opportunity to fight the war it knew how to win.”23

Charles Brower argued that blaming civilian leadership

for unclear objectives is too simple. The national aim of an

10
independent, non-communist South Vietnam can be traced

back to Harry Truman, and Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ)

clearly and consistently echoed it. LBJ also provided

specific political guidance as to the means he was willing to

expend in pursuit of that goal.24

The fact that such internal dissent existed showed that

On Strategy achieved Merritt’s goal to provoke thought and

debate. Its influence also seemed apparent in military

journals, though in different ways. In the early 1980s,

Military Review, the professional journal of the U.S. Army

published by the CGSC, began to show an increased interest

in Clausewitz, though not in Vietnam. As the introduction

to a rare article on the war in Southeast Asia stated,

“Vietnam is such a nasty word in the American vocabulary

today that even military men are loath to look back on it for

lessons applicable to the future.” With its primary focus on

tactical and operational issues, Military Review did indeed

turn away from Vietnam and stay focused on beating the

Soviets.25

The strategic debate over Vietnam took place instead in

the pages of Parameters, the U.S. Army War College

quarterly. In a very positive December 1981 review of On

Strategy, General Bruce Palmer criticized Summers for

“denigrating counterinsurgency more than he intended,”

but praised him for providing “the strategic framework for

examining Vietnam from an even wider perspective.”

Palmer added, “More important, I hope it will revitalize the

U.S. Army’s abiding interest in the study of strategy.” The

book seems to have had that impact concerning Vietnam, at

least. Beginning in 1983, a series of articles by many of the

leading civilian and military writers on Vietnam, including

Summers, provided a lively and enlightening commentary

on the war’s strategic issues, and also inspired some

discussions about low intensity warfare, as well.26

By the time the Army’s revised FM 100-5 was published

in 1986, thousands of the nation’s best and brightest future

military leaders had been exposed to On Strategy in staff

11
college and war college curricula. The 1986 operations

manual began with the statement, “All military operations

pursue and are governed by political objectives,” reflecting

the influence of Clausewitz, and it stressed the operational

level of war throughout. It even included a special annex

explaining Clausewitzian “key concepts of operational

design” such as the culminating point and center of gravity,

the latter an idea stressed in Summers’ book. While the

manual’s focus remained on defeating the Soviets through

AirLand Battle, it did mention LIC, though only in one

small section, and there were only two passing references to

Vietnam.27

The decade of the 1980s did see some rebirth of interest

in counterinsurgency at military schools. When instructors

trying to resurrect appropriate courses at the CGSC went to

the Special Operations School at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, looking for supporting materials, they found that

the staff there had been ordered to throw away their

counterinsurgency files in the 1970s.28 The American

military under President Ronald Reagan’s administration

eventually did develop a new model for counterinsurgency

based on experience in El Salvador, emphasizing economic,

political, and psychological programs instead of active

military intervention.29 Despite these developments, an

Army officer conducting a detailed study in 1990 of his

service’s thinking and policies about counterinsurgency

came to the disappointing conclusion that “the Army has no

institutionally accepted Vietnam strategic critique that

adequately addresses the realities of revolutionary war.”30

The next FM 100-5, published in 1993, was broader in

scope. Initial drafts were heavily influenced by the victory in

DESERT STORM, downplayed LIC, and focused on hi-tech,

mobile war. The final version, however, was obviously

shaped by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the

Army’s search for a new mission. While still emphasizing

the lessons of DESERT STORM, it had a new chapter on

Operations Other Than War. The section on insurgencies

and counterinsurgencies was only three paragraphs long,

12
however, and the pertinent historical perspective of

American involvement was taken from El Salvador. The

vignette emphasized a U.S. interagency response, with the

military’s primary role being just to provide logistical

support to the El Salvadorian Armed Forces, that allowed

the indigenous government to withstand an insurgent

offensive and facilitate peace negotiations. Vietnam was

only mentioned briefly twice in the publication. The Army’s

manual FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict,

which was published at about the same time and has not

been superceded, does have a whole chapter on support for

insurgency or counterinsurgency that focuses on the Maoist

pattern of war and the application of AirLand Battle in LIC.

There is also a chapter on counterterrorism, though the

main focus of this tactical level manual is on peacekeeping

and contingency operations. Vietnam is not mentioned

specifically anywhere, though some tactical lessons seem

apparent.31

The current FM 3-0, Operations, which replaced 100-5,

reflects heavily the traditional reliance on the ideas of

Jomini and J.F.C. Fuller, with emphasis on “fixed

principles” like the Tenets of Army Operations and

Principles of War. There is a lengthy discussion of the

Elements of Operational Design that includes

Clausewitzian terminology, and the Prussian is quoted

twice, once to emphasize the importance of battles and

again to help explain the fixed principle of Objective. Sun

Tzu is mentioned once, but this is a manual dominated by

quotes from generals, not theorists.

Its treatment of counterinsurgency takes only one page,

and that emphasis is primarily on what support can be

provided to help hosts solve their own problems. DESERT

STORM and Balkan peace operations provide the most

historical examples. Vietnam is mentioned only twice. The

currently popular battle at Landing Zone X-ray is used to

illustrate close combat, and the United States is criticized

for providing so much military support to South Vietnam

that it “undermined Vietnamese government authority and

13
ARVN [Army of North Vietnam] credibility”!32 That seems a

unique perspective on the American involvement in the

war, but it does provide another sign of service reluctance to

engage in counterinsurgency.

Attitudes: Civil-Military Friction.

Vietnam did not just imbue the Army with a desire to

avoid counterinsurgency and nation-building. Some

commentators have claimed that the rift between the press

and the Service that resulted from media coverage of

Vietnam has developed into a harmful “culture of media

aversion” within the Army that seriously inhibits its ability

to communicate effectively. The post-war emphasis on

conventional warfare in Europe also stunted the growth of

the Army’s cultural intelligence for other regions, which had

important repercussions in places like Somalia. The

American de-emphasis on Southeast Asia was so deep and

rapid that the pool of military and national area and

language specialists had dried up by the time significant

efforts began to account for POW/MIAs there. That

deficiency has hindered the recovery efforts of organizations

like Joint Task Force Full Accounting.33

The influence of the Vietnam experience and the Army’s

view of it as shaped by Summers have also contributed to

what some contemporary critics call “the crisis in

civil-military relations.” Meyer’s campaign to make sure

that civilian leaders were aware of the “imperatives of

military operations” advocated by Summers culminated in

the promulgation of the Weinberger Doctrine in 1984,

designed to ensure that the nation would never be involved

in another Vietnam quagmire. Instead the military would

apply overwhelming force quickly in a campaign with clear

objectives and public support.

The experience in the Persian Gulf heightened those

expectations. Defense analyst Michael O’Hanlon has noted

that the “Powell Doctrine,” an evolution of the Weinberger

Doctrine summarized in the general’s opening quote of this

14
monograph, “can be read as a reason to stay out of any

conflicts except Desert Storm.” Other critics have savaged

the Weinberger-Powell doctrine as “an implicit rejection of

force as an instrument of policy” which is just not relevant in

today’s complex world.34

Andrew Bacevich has recently pointed out the irony that

the very success in DESERT STORM that reaffirmed the

yearning of Powell and his contemporaries for “selfcontained decisive conventional war, conducted by

autonomous, self-governing, military elites” also ensured

the demise of that concept by accelerating the blurring or

elimination of the boundaries between war and peace,

soldiers and civilians, and military and political spheres.35

Today, the propensity to question the military expertise

of civilian leaders has increased to the point where Richard

Kohn claims, “The U.S military is now more alienated from

its civilian leadership than at any time in American

history.” He and Russell Weigley have pointed to the issues

of intervention in Bosnia and gays in the military as

situations where the Joint Chiefs of Staff undermined

administration policies they disagreed with, rather than

carry out the will of their civilian superiors. Weigley argues

that a “series of vocal military objections to civilian policies”

have sometimes usurped choices that were for the civil

government to make.36

For contemporary critics, it appears that a military

“clinging to orthodoxy” has moved from Summers’ mandate

to articulate their principles and doctrines to civilian

overseers and the American public, to “blanket opposition to

missions that fail to conform to their own preferences and

priorities,” especially those that might lead to involvement

in messy insurgencies or unconventional warfare. Abrams’

creation of the mobilization “check and balance” on the

president’s ability to deploy military force can be

interpreted as the beginning of this trend. 37

Much of the current criticism is based on an idyllic view

of the history of American civil-military relations, especially

15
during World War II, and a downplaying of any differences

between the conduct of total and limited conflicts. However,

defenders of the military who argue that the only real

problem is “the growing disparity between the quality of

military officers and their civilian counterparts” are not

going to assuage critics’ fears about military arrogance or

alienation.38

It is ironic that the current book about Vietnam that has

replaced On Strategy in the role of reinforcing the penchant

of military officers who believe they should more

aggressively challenge the judgments of their civilian

masters was written by one of Professor Richard H. Kohn’s

graduate students. Then Major H. R. McMaster finished the

manuscript for Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert

McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led

to Vietnam while teaching in the History Department at

West Point. The popular book is on reading lists at most

professional military schools, and its author has been

invited to lecture the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on much

20-20 hindsight, McMaster strongly condemns the Joint

Chiefs for not standing up more forcefully to their civilian

superiors as the critical decisions were made committing

the nation to a flawed course in Southeast Asia that could

have been prevented. For him, “The “five silent men” on the

Joint Chiefs made possible the way the United States went

to war in Vietnam.”39

Conclusions.

According to Starry, the only positive aspect of the

Army’s experience in Vietnam was that the failure was so

miserable that it encouraged the acceptance of widespread

institutional change; “to do something new and different

was very acceptable.”40 Many of the reformers who

developed AirLand Battle doctrine and the force to apply it

were motivated by a sense of indignation and

embarrassment about losing in Southeast Asia. Out of that

defeat the Army developed a new doctrine, force structure,

16
and attitude designed to win an “anti-Vietnam,” highintensity conflict with the Soviets in Europe, which proved

more than adequate to overwhelm Iraq.41

However, even while the AirLand Battle concept was

being developed, some military officers saw the drawbacks

of such a narrow focus. In a prescient 1977 article decrying

the Army’s neglect of unconventional warfare, Lieutenant

Colonel Donald Vought quoted Starry justifying his

approach with “After getting out of Vietnam, the Army

looked around and realized it should not try to fight that

kind of war again.” That mind-set has not served the service

well in peace operations, and might have more serious

consequences in the future.42

A number of recent studies have suggested that the

North Vietnamese experience has much to offer for those

seeking an asymmetric strategy to employ against the

United States. Some of this may already be occurring in

Colombia, where some commentators are arguing that the

United States is again trying to push a war of tactics against

a strong insurgent force because of a lack of strategic and

operational knowledge. In addition, our training of

Colombian government forces has demonstrated how

“lamentably little” American soldiers know about

counterinsurgency, a result of losing our institutional

memory from Vietnam.43

These skills need to be relearned quickly. Despite

doctrinal and institutional preferences to have host nations

fight their own battles and solve their own problems,

American forces are deeply involved in counterinsurgencystyle operations in Afghanistan. They are carrying out

counterguerrilla and stability operations, ranging from

combat patrols to rebuilding schools.44 The comparisons

with Vietnam are evident to frustrated soldiers on the

ground.

The commander of a recent operation there explained,

“The reason it’s so frustrating and aggravating is because

the enemy is not fighting. We’re trying to find him, and he’s

17
trying to avoid us. So any time we go out, he fades away. It’s

just like Vietnam. Any time he finds a weak spot, he flows in

like water.” Similar observations have been made about

guerrillas in the Philippines, who have been compared to

the Viet Cong in their ability to melt into the local populace.

A local commentator noted “Abu Sayef will disappear into

the towns and cities until the heat is off. Then they’ll

reorganize and start their terrorism campaign again.”45

One of the oft-repeated current justifications for the

utility of ground forces in a modern campaign is that their

presence will force the enemy to mass, thus providing a

better target for long-range precision strikes. But the North

Vietnamese did not concentrate in response to large

American ground formations, and neither has Al-Qaeda.

Smart enemies will force pursuers to find them and dig

them out. Ground forces are necessary for close combat, not

as decoys.

In hindsight, the Army that won in the Persian Gulf

deserves credit for avoiding the common mistake of

preparing to fight the last war instead of the next one.

However, enemies like Saddam Hussein are becoming

increasingly rare, if not extinct, and the time has come for

the Army to look more carefully at Vietnam, which seems

more relevant for our current campaign against terrorism.

As distasteful as the proposition may seem, in order to truly

be a Full Spectrum force, the Army must be prepared to deal

with all aspects of a conflict resembling the lost war in

Southeast Asia. That will necessitate reforms in training,

doctrine, and force structure, as well as service acceptance

of smaller-scale contingency missions, including

counterinsurgency and some degree of nation-building.46

The original Vietnam studies might be a good place to

start to inform this process and would assist General

Shinseki in his quest to transform the force. Though not as

revealing as their franker French counterparts, they

contain many relevant insights. For example, Starry’s

evaluation of mounted combat from 20 years ago highlights

18
the same problems with mines that we face today in the

Balkans and Afghanistan.47 Other volumes emphasize the

importance of joint and multinational operations, even in

low-intensity conflict.

Some of the most relevant critiques come from Colonel

Francis Kelly’s monograph, U.S. Army’s Special Forces

1961-1971. He emphasizes that in Vietnam the Army could

not concentrate primarily on just the military consequences

of its actions, only concerning itself with political

implications later on. Historically, commanders were used

to being allowed to pursue their tactics and operations

without any interference from politicians back home, but, as

Kelly writes, “In Vietnam military decisions were viewed in

terms of the political consequences they might have, a

situation to which the average military professional was

unaccustomed.”48

The Army is still uncomfortable with the highly charged

political atmosphere of a Bosnia or Haiti mission, but that is

the future we must face. It may be a bad sign that the

current FM 3-0 lacks the same obvious references to

Clausewitzian philosophy as its predecessors, for the links

between war and politics and the necessity to properly

identify the nature of a conflict that the French and

Summers argued were overlooked or misperceived in

Southeast Asia must be understood by even the “average

military professional” today.

The American Army can no longer run away from

Vietnam. For it has found it in Afghanistan, Colombia, and

the Philippines.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Ann McDaniel and Evan Thomas, “The Rewards of

Leadership,” Newsweek, March 11, 1991, p. 30.

2. Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey,

New York: Random House, 1995, p. 149.

19
3. V. J. Croizat, trans., Memorandum RM-5271-PR, A Translation

from the French: Lessons of the War in Indochina, Volume II, Santa

Monica, CA: RAND, 1967, pp. 25-26.

4. Edward J. Drea, “Tradition and Circumstance: The Imperial

Japanese Army’s Tactical Response to Khalkin-Gol, 1939,” in Colonel

Charles R. Shrader, ed., Proceedings of the 1982 International Military

History Symposium: The Impact of Unsuccessful Military Campaigns on

Military Institutions, 1860-1980, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of

Military History, 1984, p. 134.

5. See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army

Special Forces 1961-1971, Washington, DC: Department of the Army,

1973, pp. iii, 163-164.

6. General Donn A. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam,

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1978, pp. iv-vi.

7. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 175; Lieutenant Colonel Romie L.

Brownlee and Lieutenant Colonel William Mullen III, Changing an

Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired,

Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Military History Institute, 1979, pp. 187-192.

8. Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to be Done: General William

E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988; Brownlee and

Mullen, Changing an Army.

9. Herbert, Deciding What Has To Be Done.

10. Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The US

Army in the Gulf War, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993,

pp. 20-23.

11. Interview of Lieutenant General Donald Coles by Lieutenant

Colonel Albin G. Wheeler and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald E. Craven,

and Interview of General James G. Kalergis by Lieutenant Colonel Tom

Lightner, both in “The General Creighton Abrams Story” files, The

Papers of Creighton Abrams, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army Military

History Institute; Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton

Abrams and The Army of His Times, New York: Simon and Schuster,

1992, pp. 350-368. Sorley is convinced that Abrams intended to limit

presidential power, but that objective is not mentioned in contemporary

documents or interviews in the Abrams Papers at the U.S. Army

Military History Institute. Interpretations that the true motivation for

20
the new force structure was purposefully concealed from civilian

decisionmakers or that the justification was only created after the fact

to preserve current policy are both troubling.

12. Ibid.

13. Steven Lee Myers, “Army is Restructuring with Brigades for

Rapid Response,” New York Times, October 13, 1999, p. A13; on the

strains caused by reserve deployments, see Reserve Forces Policy

Board, Reserve Component Programs, Washington, DC: Office of the

Secretary of Defense, March 2000, p. xxvii; Myers, “Military Reserves

Are Falling Short in Finding Recruits,” New York Times, August 28,

2000, p. 1; Marsha Low, “Military Reserves Fall Short,” Detroit Free

Press, September 11, 2000; Myers, “Fallout in Texas From Bosnia

Duty,” New York Times, September 15, 2000; David Foster, “More

Missions For Part-Time Soldiers Strain Lives At Home,” Boston Globe,

September 23, 2000, p. 4; Deborah Martinez, “Reserve Ranks Dwindle

As Number of Deployments Increases,” Corpus Christi Caller-Times,

September 24, 2000; “U.S. Leans Too Heavily on Guard, Reserves,”

Austin American-Statesman, October 11, 2000, p. 10.

14. Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, Study Report,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999, p. 12. For more on the

adjustments necessary to the active/reserve combat support and combat

service support force structure, see Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and

Crises: Army Roles and Missions In Smaller-Scale Contingencies

During the 1990s, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

2001; and Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While

Pursuing a Global War Against Terrorism, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

15. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War

in Context, Carlisle Barracks. PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March

23, 1982, pp. ii, iv. Summers served on the Strategic Assessment Group

headed by Colonel Edward Astarita that recommended to Abrams that

the Army limit its involvement in the Third World to basically low-key

military visits and disaster relief. David E. Johnson, “Wielding the

Terrible Swift Sword: The American Military Paradigm and

Civil-Military Relations,” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Olin

Institute for Strategic Studies, available on-line at http://data.fas.

harvard.edu/cfia/olin/pubs/no7.htm.

16. In 1994, the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict at

Texas Tech University held a conference sponsored by the U.S. Army

Strategic Studies Institute to examine the content and legacy of On

Strategy. While recognizing its important influence on the Army,

21
attendees from around the world had very little good to say about

Summers’ theoretical or historical accuracy. Though the book remains

on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s recommended reading list and those of

many other military educational institutions, it is no longer taken

seriously by academic historians, and, if considered by them, is usually

seen as a period piece to illustrate “ a view popular in certain segments

of the military in the immediate post-war period.” Communication by

author with Professor George Herring, Visiting Professor at the

University of Richmond, January 17, 2001.

17. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The

Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC

Historical Office, June 1984; Department of the Army, FM 100-5,

Operations, Washington, DC: HQDA, August 20, 1982. The American

principles of war really come from the work of J. F. C. Fuller. However,

the spirit of such guidelines is in keeping with the Jominian approach

historically pursued by the American Army.

18. Romjue, pp. 30-33, 61; James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, pp. 197-205; telephone interview with

Dr. Michael Perlman, Combat Studies Institute, December 15, 1994;

John P. Lovell, “Vietnam and the U.S. Army: Learning to Cope with

Failure,” in George K. Osborn, et al, eds., Democracy, Strategy, and

Vietnam: Implications for American Policymaking, Lexington, MA:

Lexington Books, 1987, p. 136; Summers, “The Army After Vietnam,” in

Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., Against All Enemies,

Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 366; Johnson.

19. Russell Weigley, “Reflections on Lessons from Vietnam,” in

Peter Braestrup, ed., Vietnam as History, Washington, DC: University

Press of America, January 1984, p. 115; A. J. Bacevich, “The Use of

Force,” Wilson Quarterly, Vol. XIX, Winter 1995, p. 56; Summers, On

Strategy, pp. vii, 1.

20. Lovell, pp. 136-137. The official history of the People’s Army of

Vietnam claims it never really lost on the battlefield, either. If we are to

believe it and Summers, we are left with the incongruous image of a war

in which neither side lost a battle. The Military History Institute of

Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, Merle L. Pribbenow, trans., Lawrence:

University Press of Kansas, 2002.

21. Michael I. Handel, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991, p. 5.

22
22. James Fetzer, “The Vietnam War of Harry G. Summers, Jr.” The

Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter, Vol.

XX, March 1989, p. 15.; Lovell, p. 137.

23. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 262-268.

24. Colonel Charles F. Brower IV, “American Strategy in the

Vietnam War, 1965-68,” lecture given in March 1992 to Naval War

College Senior Course, Newport, RI.

25.. For examples of articles on Clausewitz, see Colonel Thomas

Vaughn, “Clausewitz and Contemporary American Professionalism,”

Military Review, Vol. LXII, December 1982, pp. 39-44; Patrick M.

Cronin, “Clausewitz Condensed,” Military Review, Vol. LXV, August

1985, pp. 41-49. Quote is from the introduction to Lieutenant Colonel

Forrest Kleinman, “The Lost Lesson of Vietnam,” Military Review, Vol.

LX, August 1980, pp. 62.

26. General Bruce Palmer, book review of On Strategy, Parameters,

Vol. XI, December 1981, pp. 91.

27. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington,

DC: HQDA, May 5, 1986.

28. Based on recollections of Dr. Steven Metz, now of the Strategic

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, of his work with Major

Robert Leight at the Command and General Staff College in the late

1980s.

29. Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of

American Capability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, 1995.

30. Michael J. Brady, “The Army and the Strategic Military Legacy

of Vietnam,” MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, 1990. Major Brady is also very critical of the flaws in On

Strategy.

31. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington,

DC: HQDA, June 14, 1993; Department of the Army, FM 7-98,

Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, Washington, DC: HQDA,

October 19, 1992.

32. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, Washington, DC:

HQDA, June 2001. Quote is on p. 9-16. George Patton and Ulysses

23
Grant are quoted three times, and Dwight Eisenhower, Frederick the

Great, and Napoleon twice.

33. Sean Naylor, “Why the Service Can’t Get Its Message Across,”

Army Times, July 8, 2002, p. 15; “Infantry Chief: Cultural Intel Must

Improve,” Army Times, November 20, 2000; interview by author with

Mr. James Coyle, Casualty Resolution Specialist, J-25, Joint Task Force

Full Accounting, Da Nang, Vietnam, June 27, 2002.

34. Kitfield, p. 203; O’Hanlon, as quoted in Lawrence F. Kaplan,

“Yesterday’s Man: Colin Powell’s Out-of-Date Foreign Policy,” New

Republic, January 1, 2001; Jeffrey Record, “Weinberger-Powell

Doctrine Doesn’t Cut It,” Proceedings, October 2000, p. 35.

35. Bacevich, “A Less than Splendid Little War, “ Wilson Quarterly,

Vol. XXV, Winter 2001, pp. 92-93.

36. Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military

Relations,” National Interest, Spring 1994; Weigley, “The American

Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to

Powell,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. LVII, October 1993

Special Issue, pp. 27-58.

37. Bacevich, “The Use of Force,” p. 63.

38. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civilian Control: A National

Crisis?” Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 6, Autumn-Winter 1994-95, pp. 83.

39. H. R. McMaster, Direliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, New York:

HarperCollins, 1997, p. 330. For discussions of the book’s flaws and

influence, see Eliot Cohen’s review in National Interest, Issue 51, Spring

1998, pp. 103-108; and Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, “The Gap:

Soldiers, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding,” National

Interest, Issue 61, Fall 2000, pp. 29-37.

40. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, New York: Little,

Brown, and Company, 1993, p. 46.

41. To be fair to the Army, it must be noted that the Vietnam

experience affected the rest of American political and military

leadership in a similar fashion, creating a preference for quick,

conventional victories obtained with overwhelming force, and a

reluctance to get involved in protracted “small wars” and nation

building. For a recent provocative discussion of this process, see Max

Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American

Power, New York: Basic Books, 2002.

24
42. Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Vought, “Preparing for the Wrong

War?” Military Review, May 1977, p. 32.

43. Brad Roberts, Asymmetric Conflict 2010, Alexandia, VA:

Institute for Defense Analysis, November 2000; Steven Metz and

Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy:

Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001; Tom Marks, “U.S. Forces In

Colombia Involved In More Than The War On Drugs,” Army Times,

January 22, 2001, p. 54. Marks notes that the counterinsurgency skills

being learned in battle by Colombian forces are no longer taught in U.S.

service schools.

44. David Isby, “Where To Go From Here?” Washington Times, July

19, 2002, p. 22.

45. Peter Baker, “GIs Battle “Ghosts” in Afghanistan,” Washington

Post, May 16, 2002, p. 1; Donovan Webster, “It Only Looks Like

Vietnam,” New York Times Magazine, July 21, 2002, p. 32.

46. The necessary reforms in force structure and attitudes are

discussed in more detail in the two Crane studies mentioned in Note 14.

47. Starry, p. 223.

48. Kelly, p. 163. The more recent official histories are also excellent

sources for study, such as Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The

Early Years, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985;

and William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media,

1962-1968, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.

25
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell