GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Defense, 

Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives

September 1999 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Challenges Associated 

With Implementing the 

Joint Tactical Radio 

System

GAO/NSIAD-99-179

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-281641 Letter

September 9, 1999

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) is consolidating various service-unique 

radio acquisition programs into the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). 

Through this consolidation, DOD expects to acquire JTRS units to replace 

all of its current radio inventory, avionics upgrades, appropriate satellite 

terminals, and personal communications systems. Although total program 

costs have yet to be determined, DOD officials estimate it could cost 

billions to replace about 200 types of radios, with a replacement potential 

of over 750,000 existing units--also known as legacy systems. The JTRS 

program’s key objectives are to achieve cost savings, improve performance, 

and provide an interoperable communications system that enables joint 

and coalition forces to work together. 

The former Subcommittee Chairman requested that we evaluate the JTRS 

acquisition strategy and management plans. As agreed with his office, we 

(1) determined the status of the JTRS program, including DOD 

development plans and (2) identified challenges program officials will face 

in implementing the JTRS acquisition strategy.

Results in Brief The JTRS program is in a start-up stage. DOD has directed the services to 

stop development of new radio-based programs but has granted a limited 

number of waivers to meet near-term requirements because JTRS 

products1

 are not yet available. DOD is currently developing a JTRS

1

JTRS products are a combination of hardware and software developed from and compatible with the 

JTRS architecture.

Letr
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architecture2 and detailed refinements to its preliminary acquisition 

strategy. DOD is scheduled to reach a major decision point in October 2000, 

when it is expected to approve the architecture and major revisions to the 

current acquisition strategy. The revised acquisition strategy is expected to 

define JTRS products, provide cost estimates for them, and allow 

development of an estimated total program cost. Following this, the 

services are expected to finalize their plans to replace existing radios with 

JTRS products. DOD then expects the services to begin procuring JTRS 

products with JTRS Joint Program Office support.

DOD must successfully address three key challenges to achieve its program 

objectives. These challenges are (1) completing a plan to develop key 

technologies not available from commercial sources or other DOD radio 

programs and integrating these new technologies into JTRS products; 

(2) defining an architecture that will be acceptable to commercial industry, 

be valid across a wide range of operating scenarios, and be useful to the 

services in developing plans to replace existing radio systems; and 

(3) defining interoperability requirements and establishing a strategy to 

procure and test products that meet these requirements. 

We are recommending that DOD focus on establishing the scope of JTRS 

interoperability requirements and developing a more structured technical 

and architecture development process. 

Background The primary impetus for the JTRS program came from congressional and 

DOD concerns about the inability of service radios to adequately work with 

one another and the cost of buying and maintaining these radios. The 

Secretary of Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1999-2003 directed 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), in coordination with the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, to define DOD-wide 

requirements for digital, modular, software-programmable radios. This 

guidance also directed the Assistant Secretary to establish a joint program 

for a family of radios that would consolidate similar programs under 

2

DOD defines an architecture as “a framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the 

elements of the subject force, system, or activity.” The JTRS Joint Program Office describes its 

proposed JTRS architecture as a technical architecture that would define (1) the functional entities and 

their interrelationships, (2) the physical implementation of the JTRS architecture, and (3) the 

framework for waveform/application developers. A waveform is a plot of an electrical quantity’s 

amplitude versus time. 

Letr
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development by the services such as the Army’s Near-Term Digital Radio 

(NTDR), the Navy’s Digital Modular Radio (DMR), and the Air Force’s 

Airborne Integrated Terminal Group (AITG).

In response to this directive, DOD officially established the JTRS program 

in September 1997.3

 In December 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Technology (A&T) appointed the Army as the program’s 

lead service and acquisition executive and directed that a joint program 

office be established to manage the development of an evolutionary 

architecture and perform management functions. The Army established a 

special task force for the JTRS program until the Joint Program Office was 

established in October 1998.

 The program’s objectives, established by DOD, focus on providing a family 

of digital, modular, software-programmable radios that would allow 

military commanders to communicate with their forces through voice, 

video, or data formats as needed. Radios would range in configuration from 

a low-cost joint tactical radio to a higher capability, joint multiband, 

multimode radio. This approach accommodates the services’ many 

individual requirements, including space and size, and the many different 

configurations—airborne, ground mobile, fixed station, maritime, and 

personal communications—in which the radios will be used. DOD’s 

underlying concept is that the radios could be programmed or configured 

to function in a number of modes and frequencies to fit a user’s specific 

needs. By combining functions and using common components, DOD 

believes the services will be able to reduce unit costs and the number of 

radios needed.

Current Status of the 

JTRS Program

The JTRS program is in a start-up stage. DOD approved a JTRS Joint 

Operational Requirements Document in March 1998. Although DOD has 

directed the services to stop development of new radio-based programs 

other than JTRS, it has granted waivers allowing the services to buy 

non-JTRS products to meet near-term requirements because JTRS products 

are not yet available. DOD is also developing a JTRS architecture and a 

detailed acquisition strategy that is expected to lead to a major program 

decision point in October 2000. 

3

The program was originally named the Programmable Modular Communications System. It was 

renamed in December 1997.
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Restrictions and Waivers on 

Acquiring Non-JTRS Radios 

The JTRS program consolidates radio development programs that were 

separately funded and directed by individual services. As acquisition 

executive, the Army has programmed $344 million in research and 

development funds for the JTRS program through fiscal year 2005. Joint 

Program Office officials said these funds will support development and 

validation of the JTRS architecture, provision of standard waveforms,4

establishment of a certification facility to validate that products comply 

with the approved architecture, and funding for technology insertion.

In an April 10, 1998, memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense (A&T) 

expressed concern about the services continuing with near-term radio and 

terminal development programs outside the JTRS program. He believed 

these efforts could waste resources by continuing the fielding of legacy 

systems and delay the earliest possible fielding of JTRS equipment. The 

Under Secretary of Defense (A&T) requested each service acquisition 

executive to minimize development of new programs. On August 28, 1998, 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I also expressed concern about 

continuing efforts to independently develop and acquire service-unique 

radios and terminals. He directed the services to suspend all efforts to 

develop and acquire any radio systems, including those with software 

programmable radio technology.

Congress has also voiced concern that the services are continuing to 

develop duplicative radio programs. The House Appropriations Committee 

Report on DOD Appropriations for 1999 directed that no more than

25 percent of funds appropriated for research and development of a tactical 

radio be obligated until the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I certifies 

in a report to Congressional Defense Committees that the development 

program (1) meets interoperability requirements, (2) does not duplicate 

other development efforts, and (3) is fully funded.5

 According to an official 

from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, this report 

was being processed in August 1999. 

No JTRS products have been fielded to date, and no date for such fielding 

has been scheduled. To meet near-term requirements in the absence of 

JTRS products, DOD has granted a limited number of waivers to the 

4

A waveform can include system-unique data on anti-jam characteristics, error control information, and 

timing information.

5

House Appropriations Report 105-591, DOD Appropriations Bill, 1999, p. 177.
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services to continue radio programs that meet immediate needs. As of June 

1999, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I had granted nine waivers. 

DOD documentation shows that the first three waivers addressed 

immediate service communication needs.

• The Army received permission to buy 174 NTDR units for its digitization 

program because it claimed the radios did not duplicate any other DOD 

program, provided a bridge to JTRS, met interoperability requirements, 

and were fully funded. The Army told us the radios would be used to 

meet current battlefield digitization requirements in the First Digitized 

Division; however, it has not requested funds to buy more of these 

radios for the First Digitized Corps. 

• The Navy was allowed to buy DMR’s to meet fielding requirements for 

its radio replacement program through fiscal year 1999 because JTRS 

products were not available to meet these requirements and these 

radios were not considered a competitor to JTRS.

• The Air Force received permission to buy AITG units (an ultrahigh 

frequency terminal) to meet communications and air safety 

requirements because JTRS products were not available.

The JTRS Program Manager said the other six waivers were to meet 

near-term requirements. These requirements include providing the services 

with “beyond line of sight” radio capabilities and reducing the number of 

radios required for special operations and close air support. He said that all 

waivers are temporary and that the services are required to resubmit 

requests before further procurement of these radios.

Development of JTRS 

Architecture and 

Acquisition Strategy

DOD is developing the JTRS in three phases. In phase one, the Joint 

Program Office awarded contracts to three consortia6

 to define to what 

level and how the JTRS architecture should be developed. In phase one, 

which ended in June 1999, the Joint Program Office reviewed products 

from the three consortia. In phase two, the Joint Program Office plans to 

conduct a competition for a single award to develop the architecture and 

demonstrate it in a laboratory environment. In addition, the Joint Program 

Office plans to conduct a market survey in this phase to determine industry 

readiness to produce JTRS compliant systems. The Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for C3I’s Major Defense Acquisition Program Overarching 

6

The three consortia are teams of multiple contractors and universities. Motorola, Boeing, and 

Raytheon lead one team each.
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Integrated Product Team7 will then review the JTRS program. The team is 

expected to recommend an acquisition strategy to the Under Secretary of 

Defense (A&T). 

At the October 2000 program decision point, the Under Secretary of 

Defense (A&T) is expected to provide guidance on the JTRS acquisition 

strategy and implementation. At that time, the Under Secretary of Defense 

(A&T) will

• review the JTRS architecture developed and validated by the JTRS Joint 

Program Office,

• analyze the results of the market survey of commercially available 

products and technology and the recommendations of the Overarching 

Integrated Product Team, and

• decide whether commercial technology is adequate for JTRS to proceed 

directly into production or whether additional research and 

development is required.

DOD and Joint Program Office officials anticipate that the decisions 

reached at the October 2000 major program decision point will provide the 

Army and the other services with an approved JTRS architecture that 

enables them to proceed immediately into production. DOD anticipates 

that this architecture will define JTRS products, enable preparation of 

product and total program cost estimates, and provide the services with 

sufficiently developed hardware and software prototypes that they can use 

to immediately procure JTRS products. 

The third phase will begin after the Under Secretary of Defense (A&T) has 

chosen a detailed acquisition strategy. This phase will consist primarily of 

service procurement actions in accordance with their implementation 

plans to replace legacy radio programs with JTRS products. DOD expects 

the commercial marketplace to provide competitively priced products that 

meet DOD requirements and are built to the JTRS architecture because the

7

The team provides assistance, oversight, and reviews as a program proceeds through its acquisition life 

cycle and resolve issues at the lowest level possible. The team comprises the program manager, the 

program executive officer, component staff, joint staff, Under Secretary of Defense (A&T) staff, and 

Office of the Secretary of Defense staff principals or their representatives assigned to a specific 

program.
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architecture will be based on open system standards.8 During phase three, 

the Joint Program Office is also expected to acquire JTRS 

architecture-compliant waveforms for service use, upgrade the 

architecture to keep it current with technology advances, and develop 

JTRS certification facilities.9

Congress has expressed concern that key decisions on the architecture, 

acquisition strategy, and interoperability should be accelerated. The House 

Appropriations Committee Report on DOD Appropriations for 2000 

directed DOD to provide a report to the Committee on its strategy for 

developing and fielding the JTRS by December 15, 1999. The plan is to 

address priority radios for replacement, cost of the development program, 

a development schedule, and estimated unit cost of production radios. 10

JTRS Program Faces 

Three Key Challenges

DOD faces three key challenges to successful realization of JTRS program 

objectives. First, despite DOD’s expectations of success, recent studies 

indicate that current commercial technology may not be available to fully 

support the replacement of existing service radios with JTRS products and 

may not support future JTRS requirements. Second, a single architecture 

that can become the commercial standard for software programmable 

radios will be difficult to achieve. Third, the JTRS Operational 

Requirements Document, although developed with input from warfighters, 

does not fully define interoperability goals for joint and coalition warfare 

operations. 

Commercial Technology 

Development May Not Fully 

Meet JTRS Requirements

DOD’s acquisition strategy and fielding plans for JTRS rely heavily on 

current commercial technology for initial fielding of JTRS products and 

rapid advancement of commercial technology to meet future JTRS 

requirements. DOD intends to leverage commercial technology as well as 

8

Open system standards are widely accepted and supported standards set by recognized standards, 

organizations, or the commercial marketplace. These standards support interoperability, portability, 

and scalability and are equally available to the general public at no cost or with a moderate license fee. 

An open system implements sufficient open standards for interfaces, services, and supporting formats 

to enable properly engineered components to be used across a wide range of systems with minimal 

changes, to interoperate with other components on local and remote systems, and to interact with users 

in a style that facilitates portability. 

9

As of June 1999, the Joint Program Office had not defined what these certification facilities would do.

10House Appropriations Report 106–244, DOD Appropriations Bill, 2000, pp. 214-215.
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technology being developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA) to support rapid technology insertion into the JTRS 

program. However, DOD may have difficulty in acquiring commercial 

technology to meet key JTRS requirements. In addition, it does not have a 

formal plan to develop technologies not available from commercial 

sources, integrate these technologies into JTRS products, and coordinate 

related DOD and service research programs with JTRS development plans. 

Our analysis of recent reports by the RAND Corporation and the National 

Research Council, our discussions with DOD laboratory and program 

officials, and service reports all show that the private sector is unlikely to 

meet all key JTRS military performance requirements and that DOD must 

have a well-defined development program to meet these unmet needs (see 

app. I). The private sector does not need all of the features included in 

military requirements and is unlikely to develop needed technologies 

without an established market. The private sector, for example, relies upon 

a fixed infrastructure for mobile communications, while the military must 

be able to operate without fixed infrastructure. The mobile infrastructure is 

a key requirement to Army development initiatives. A companion report 

said military and commercial users of wireless communications systems 

have very different requirements, including those for waveforms and signal 

processing.11 

According to the Joint Program Office, industry has also identified key 

technologies that are not required by commercial users. A November 1998 

Joint Program Office assessment of industry responses to its survey 

showed that military technology hardware and software requirements 

exceed commercial requirements, including those for antennas, 

information security techniques, power amplifiers, and network 

management. In their responses to the first architecture definition 

contracts, industry officials also identified significant hardware and 

software technology issues that must be addressed by the JTRS program.

Ongoing DOD and service research programs are developing technologies 

of potential use to the JTRS program that the private sector is not expected 

to develop and market in the near future. For example, DARPA began a 

comprehensive program in 1994 called the Global Mobile Information 

Systems, which focused on developing wireless network protocols, “smart” 

11Emerging Commercial Mobile Wireless Technology and Standards: Suitable for the Army?, the RAND 

Corporation (MR-960-A, 1998).
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antennas, and other radio technologies. Another DARPA technology 

program, called ULTRA COMM, is intended to reduce the logistical costs 

and size of next-generation communications systems and add operational 

flexibility. A third DARPA program, the Advanced Digital Receiver 

Technology program, was initiated to demonstrate technologies for 

software-defined radios. Finally, a fourth DARPA program, called the 

Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration, includes other radio and communications 

technology such as the Global Broadcast Service. This system is a 

space-based high data rate communication link providing information from 

the United States or other rear-echelon locations to military forces 

deployed in the field.

The services have also been allowed to continue software programmable 

radio research projects that could provide useful information to the JTRS 

program. For example:

• The Army is continuing development of the NTDR, which can identify 

network management problems and potential solutions. The Army is 

also establishing a wideband network radio project that can evaluate 

network protocols and software radios to deliver the high data rates that 

the Army has said it requires.

• In addition to its DMR program, the Navy has a High Data Rate Line of 

Sight waveform development project that is software programmable to 

improve battlegroup communications.

• The Air Force is currently leading development of a smart network radio 

as part of DOD’s Defense Technology Objectives. 

However, leveraging this experience may be difficult. DOD and service 

research programs are not adequately coordinated with JTRS development 

plans, reducing opportunities for the program to directly address 

technology needs not satisfied by the commercial marketplace. The Joint 

Program Office has begun initial studies of commercial and 

DOD-sponsored technologies. However, no formal process or technology 

development plan exists to monitor current commercial and DOD 

technology development efforts or to identify unmet technological 

requirements that will have to be met to satisfy all JTRS requirements. Such 

a plan is expected to be available in the near future, according to DOD. In 

commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that the Joint Program Office 

is preparing a JTRS Technology Master Plan and that this plan will provide 

a framework for focusing technology efforts such as those underway 

Department-wide.
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The Joint Program Office has also acknowledged the need for a closer 

working relationship with DARPA. Joint Program Office officials said their 

staff have limited, informal contacts with individual DARPA program 

managers and service technical staff because no formal mechanism is 

available to ensure the transition of relevant technology from DARPA to the 

Joint Program Office or the services. Joint Program Office officials told us 

they are in the process of approaching DARPA to establish a written 

agreement.

In addition, DOD does not have a process to manage the development of 

new technologies to meet JTRS requirements, integrate existing 

technologies to meet JTRS requirements, or ensure that technologies are 

mature before introduction into JTRS. In our work on best practices in 

managing advanced technology development, we found that maturing new 

technology before including it in products is one of the main determinants 

of success in commercial product development.12 This practice holds 

promise for DOD because immature technologies have been a main source 

of problems in developing weapon systems. However, budgetary, 

organizational, and other factors within DOD make it difficult to bring 

technologies to high readiness levels before including them in weapon 

systems. These factors encourage science and technology organizations 

such as DARPA to disengage from technology development too soon and 

weapon system managers to accept immature technologies. In technical 

comments to a draft of this report, DOD said that it is beginning to address 

these issues. According to DOD, the Technology Master Plan will provide a 

necessary first step toward establishing a clearly defined technology 

development and/or management plan.

A Single Architecture Will 

Be Difficult to Achieve

DOD expects to approve a single architecture for the JTRS program at the 

October 2000 major program decision point. It also expects industry to 

adopt the architecture for widespread use in the commercial market 

because the architecture will be developed by industry under DOD 

contract. DOD’s strategy is based on the assumption that a single 

architecture for software programmable radios based on open commercial 

standards is possible and will result in a commercial market from which 

the services could procure JTRS products. On the basis of our analysis of 

recent reports and studies, we believe that a single architecture based on 

12Best Practices: Managing Advanced Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System 

Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 1999).
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open commercial standards may not be universally adopted by industry 

and may not be technically possible, at least in the near term.

A 1997 National Research Council study, sponsored by DARPA, discussed 

the difficulties in achieving widespread consensus on standards in wireless 

communications. The study concluded: “For a worldwide operator, the 

management and coordination of diverse systems are complicated by the 

absence of any trend toward convergence toward a single standard in 

wireless communications.”13

According to the report, Europe, Japan, and the United States have 

different wireless technologies, and although new commercial technology 

may be developed, the commercial deployment of that technology is not 

ensured. Another National Research Council report said that in coalition 

warfare, U.S. partners would not necessarily adopt the same set of 

standards--even commercial ones--as those used by the United States.14

While commercial firms promise significant progress in software 

programmable radios within the next several years, standards and 

architectures in the private sector are now in a state of flux. 

DOD’s assumption that one architecture can meet all its requirements also 

may not be technically valid. Industry representatives cited the widely 

different size and power requirements of DOD’s radios, which range from 

small handheld units to base station radios, as “the single major roadblock” 

to development of a single architecture. For example, some processing 

could require more power than is practical for a handheld radio. 

Responding to industry representatives, a Joint Program Office official said 

that JTRS provides the focus and impetus necessary to converge on one 

architecture that covers the full range of requirements. 

In January 1999, a Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical 

Battlefield Communications made several recommendations designed to 

aggressively accelerate acquisition of JTRS products. The Board 

recommended that DOD instruct the Joint Program Office to stop its 

ongoing architecture development program and contract immediately for

13The Evolution of Untethered Communications, National Research Council (1997).

14Realizing the Potential of C4I: Fundamental Challenges, National Research Council (1999).
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development of multiple prototypes using architecture products already 

developed by the Software Defined Radio Forum.15 The Board expected the 

prototypes to be available 12 to 14 months after contract award. In its 

technical comments, DOD said the Board’s recommendation was rejected 

because it would have resulted in multiple, incompatible prototypes and 

would not have resulted in open systems. According to Joint Program 

Office officials, development of a single architecture that will result in 

compatible, open system prototypes is necessary. However, the Joint 

Program Office is not funding development of alternative architectures, 

should a single architecture prove unrealizable. Joint Program Office 

officials said they still expect to develop a single architecture that is 

flexible enough to allow multiple implementation configurations.

Also, in its technical comments, DOD said that developing an alternative 

architecture or making plans for an alternative would serve no other 

purpose than to encourage the supporters of legacy and non-interoperable 

systems. DOD also believes that developing an alternative architecture 

would totally undermine the current cooperation between government and 

industry and among industry participants. We disagree. First, as discussed 

above, a single architecture may not be universally adopted by industry and 

may not be technically feasible. We believe DOD could minimize risks by 

periodically assessing progress and preparing alternatives to meet 

identified risks. Second, if industry cooperation is as tenuous as DOD 

believes, the assumption that industry will accept the JTRS architecture as 

a standard is unrealistic.

Once approved, the Joint Program Office expects the JTRS architecture to 

provide a foundation on which the services can finalize implementation 

plans for replacing or supplementing existing radios with JTRS products. 

Joint Program Office officials told us they expect the approved JTRS 

architecture to define the products that will be available and their 

capabilities. In April 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense (A&T) requested 

that each service acquisition executive limit development of new programs 

and transition existing development programs for radio-based 

communications systems to a target single acquisition program. The JTRS 

Management Execution Plan states that one of the Joint Program Office’s

15The Forum is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to supporting the development, deployment, and use 

of open architectures for advanced wireless systems.
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most important responsibilities is developing and monitoring JTRS plans to 

replace or supplement existing radios with JTRS products.16 The Joint 

Program Office intends to incorporate service-prepared implementation 

plans into one DOD-wide plan that is based upon a single approved JTRS 

architecture. 

However, establishing effective implementation plans requires clear 

decisions on the scope of the JTRS program and cost-effective JTRS 

products. The services contend that effective implementation plans cannot 

be developed in detail without a clear determination of which systems will 

be affected by JTRS. DOD concurs with the services. In technical 

comments on a draft of this report, DOD said the difficulty facing the 

services, as they migrate to JTRS, is the uncertainty of knowing exactly 

when a desired capability will be available for incorporation into JTRS, as 

well as the costs to integrate JTRS-compliant systems into host platforms.

Furthermore, implementing a JTRS architecture, however sound and 

complete, will take considerable time because fiscal limitations are likely 

to limit the number and capabilities of JTRS products that can be bought in 

any single year. Thus, DOD’s goal of replacing its entire estimated inventory 

of 750,000 radios with JTRS products will likely take many years. For 

example, the Army, as of calendar year 1998, had estimated procurement of 

about 270,000 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 

(SINCGARS) radios, which have an expected lifetime of 20 years. Each of 

the services has stated that it would have to replace its legacy systems over 

time because of funding limitations. In its technical comments on a draft of 

this report, DOD also questioned the adequacy of existing funding for the 

JTRS program in the services. DOD said that while the services have 

planned for radio system procurements, they have assumed, in many cases, 

that they will be procuring “more of the same.” As a result, DOD said, there 

may be inadequate funding to cover the up-front engineering and testing 

necessary to integrate a new, JTRS-compliant radio system into a host 

platform.

Interoperability Goals Are 

Not Fully Defined

The JTRS Operational Requirements Document states that joint, combined, 

and coalition operations require interoperable command, control, 

communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities and that JTRS 

16The plan provides key details for operating the JTRS Joint Program Office and outlines individual 

service roles, relationships, and functions in the JTRS program.
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will provide radios to meet these needs. The Operational Requirements 

Document, which was developed with commanders in chief input, 

generally defines these requirements. DOD has begun an effort to further 

define interoperability requirements; however, at the time of our review, 

these requirements were not fully defined. In addition, the JTRS acquisition 

strategy does not adequately provide for procurement and testing of JTRS 

products in joint and coalition operations. 

DOD plans to address the interoperability issue by providing the services 

with standard JTRS waveforms that they can use in their JTRS hardware. 

According to DOD’s technical comments, the JTRS Operational 

Requirements Document defines the required waveforms, “need by” dates, 

and intended operating environments. However, DOD has not finalized the 

selection and prioritization of the waveforms and the many different 

variations needed to ensure interoperability. The Joint Program Office 

intends to use an initial set of waveforms (specified in the Operational 

Requirements Document) until the major program decision point in 

October 2000, when it intends to deliver waveforms according to 

commanders in chief priorities and the availability of commercial 

technology to support those priorities.

The JTRS Program Director said many complex questions must be 

answered before deciding which waveform modes to use in which JTRS 

radios. He said that JTRS radios must be compatible with existing radios, 

but this requirement has not been fully defined. He asked the joint staff for 

guidance on this issue, and in response, the joint staff sent a message to the 

commanders in chief and the services requesting they identify their 

detailed requirements. According to the joint staff message, a consolidated 

list of requirements is to be delivered for review by the Overall Integrated 

Product Team no later than August 30, 1999. 

Problems in achieving interoperability goals may also be expected because 

each of the services places higher priority on meeting its own rather than 

joint requirements. DOD management plans allow the services to control 

JTRS acquisition, testing, and fielding plans. The JTRS Management 

Execution Plan only allows the JTRS Program Manager to coordinate 

various service production programs to meet the operational requirements 

of each service. The plan also allows the Joint Program Office to use joint 

service research, development, testing, and evaluation funding only “in a 

manner that is most responsive to service/mission needs.” According to the 

plan, members of each service assigned to the Joint Program Office also 
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represent their respective service and articulate service technical and 

operational requirements. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our concerns 

about defining communications interoperability. DOD said it fully 

appreciates the requirement for the JTRS to be interoperable within the 

joint environment and fully supports the need for interoperability. 

According to DOD technical comments, the Joint Program Office will be 

the gatekeeper through which no service procurement may pass without 

demonstrating compliance with the JTRS architecture. We believe DOD 

will have difficulty in enforcing such a gatekeeper function. In previous 

reports we showed instances in which DOD was unable to override 

service-unique priorities to achieve interoperability and implement DOD 

architectures.17 These cases demonstrate that the services traditionally 

control acquisition programs and buy to meet service, not joint, 

requirements.

DOD also has not prepared a comprehensive joint test and evaluation 

master plan to guide service-level testing and to ensure that joint 

interoperability testing is conducted. Joint Program Office officials said 

they plan to establish an Integrated Product Team for interoperability 

testing. The officials said testing has been discussed with the Joint 

Interoperability Test Center, the Joint Spectrum Center, various service 

officials, and the Office of the Defense Operational Test and Evaluation. 

One official said the Joint Program Office intends to have the team produce 

a test and evaluation master plan to guide overall testing.

Conclusions The JTRS program was established as a joint program to achieve cost 

savings over existing radio systems, improve performance, and address 

well-known interoperability problems among service-unique radios. DOD 

issued instructions to the services to stop all current efforts to initiate any 

development and acquisition activity in service-unique radio and terminal 

programs. However, because JTRS products are not yet available, DOD 

issued waivers to the services, allowing them to continue procurement of 

other radios to meet near-term requirements. No date for fielding JTRS 

17Defense Management: Stronger Oversight of Joint Service Imagery Processing System Needed 

(GAO/NSIAD-91-164, July 1991); Defense Information Superiority: Progress Made, but Significant 

Challenges Remain (GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257, Aug. 1998); and U.S. Atlantic Command: Challenging 

Role in the Evolution of Joint Military Capabilities (GAO/NSIAD-99-39, Feb.1999).
B-281641

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products has been established. Thus, DOD will most likely continue to 

receive waiver requests from the services to meet near-term requirements 

while the JTRS Joint Program Office prepares a JTRS architecture and a 

detailed acquisition strategy. The Joint Program Office expects the 

architecture and acquisition strategy to be available for review and 

approval at a major program decision meeting in October 2000.

On the basis of the progress made by the JTRS program and of the 

challenges ahead, we are concerned that DOD is currently not well 

positioned to achieve its expectation that the private sector will be able to 

meet key JTRS requirements. However, we believe DOD can enhance its 

position. First, if military requirements cannot be fully satisfied by 

developments in the commercial marketplace, a detailed technology plan 

would help to better leverage commercial technology development and 

ongoing DOD research programs associated with programmable radios and 

integrate these technologies into the JTRS program. Such a plan could 

(1) identify specific technologies that could be extracted from various 

commercial and DOD sources for potential use in the JTRS program and 

(2) select technologies for focused development and integration in the 

JTRS program. DOD could also use the technology plan as part of the 

process to ensure that the requisite technology will be mature as the 

program develops. Such a plan could also set standards for assessing the 

maturity of key technologies. Second, current significant risk in DOD’s 

JTRS architecture development and its still-developing acquisition strategy 

could be reduced by incorporating alternatives, should a single 

architecture prove to be premature or not technically possible. Third, 

establishing interoperability as the top program priority would set the stage 

for program success. Identifying a minimum set of interoperability 

requirements is paramount for an undertaking as complex and extensive as 

JTRS. By knowing minimum interoperability requirements, DOD could 

determine what technologies need to be developed.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense

• develop a JTRS technology plan for approval at the October 2000 major 

decision point that (a) addresses the specific limitations of commercial 

and DOD technology in satisfying current and future JTRS requirements, 

(b) establishes standards for assessing the maturity of JTRS technology, 

and (c) coordinates relevant DOD research and development programs 

to focus on JTRS; 
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• establish specific milestones for assessing the commercial and technical 

feasibility of the single architecture approach and develop alternative 

architectures if indicated by the results of these assessments; and 

• identify, as a priority initiative, the precise requirements for 

interoperability among tactical radio communications systems.

Agency Comments and 

Our Response

In a general comment on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that it is fully 

supportive of JTRS and its projected capabilities, but did not agree with our 

recommendations. DOD stated that the draft showed a misunderstanding 

of the intent of the program in general and of the specific conduct and 

direction of the program. We disagree. Our report recognizes that the intent 

of the JTRS program is to consolidate various service-unique radio 

acquisition programs into a single, joint program with the objectives of 

lowering costs, improving performance, and improving interoperability in 

joint and coalition operations. We fully understand that DOD’s conduct and 

direction of the JTRS program is based on the fundamental concept that 

industry, not DOD, is developing the JTRS open systems architecture and 

that this architecture is expected to result in a commercial market from 

which the services can procure JTRS products. As our report points out, 

our key concern is how DOD should position itself to counter the 

significant risk of implementing this single architecture concept. In our 

opinion, DOD must successfully address the challenges we identified or 

run the risk of reaching the October 2000 major decision point without 

(1) clearly identified technology deficiencies and a funded DOD-approved 

plan to address these deficiencies, (2) an adequate architecture to guide 

JTRS development, and (3) fully defined interoperability requirements. 

Deficiencies such as these could result in wasted funds, loss of time in 

program development, and renewed service pressure to return to 

service-specific programs. 

DOD also made three specific observations concerning our 

recommendations. In our opinion, DOD’s comments regarding our three 

recommendations reflect greater similarity of viewpoints on the general 

direction in which JTRS is already moving than is indicated by the 

Department’s characterization of our report. Regarding our first 

recommendation, DOD said that although the Joint Program Office is 

developing a Technology Master Plan, its purpose is different than what is 

stated in our recommendation. However, DOD also states the Technology 

Master Plan will ensure that technology assessment is accomplished and 

that appropriate technologies are incorporated. The development of this 

plan--if not already consistent with the elements listed in our 
B-281641

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recommendation--could be made compatible with some modification. We 

also changed the language of the recommendation to emphasize that the 

Technology Master Plan should be prepared for approval at the October 

2000 major decision point and address specific limitations of DOD and of 

commercial technology in meeting current and future JTRS requirements.

In disagreeing with our recommendation to prepare alternatives, DOD 

commented that it is aware of the risks inherent in adopting a single 

architecture for JTRS and that it may or may not be consistent with similar 

commercial standards. The Department stated that by taking this approach, 

the Joint Program Office is “corroborating that the single architecture 

accepted by DOD in the procurement process is also valid in the 

commercial market place.” In this regard, DOD stated that the fundamental 

concept is that industry, not DOD, is developing the accepted open systems 

architecture. 

We believe that DOD’s response must be viewed in the context of the 

significant risks it is assuming. DOD’s intent that industry develop an 

architecture that is valid in the market place must be contrasted with the 

risks stated in our report—namely, that achieving widespread consensus 

on wireless standards will be difficult, and technical difficulties will 

surface. DOD’s point about the Joint Program Office’s recognition of risks 

does not address our concern that appropriate technologies may not be 

available to support the intended architecture unless DOD fully implements 

our recommendation that it develop a JTRS technology plan. Our 

recommendation is aimed at preparing alternative courses of action to 

address risks as they are recognized at periodic milestones leading to the 

October 2000 major decision point. Additionally, our recommendation is 

intended to better position DOD with alternatives to fall back on, thus 

mitigating potential adverse effects that DOD would experience should the 

single architecture not come to fruition. We changed the wording of the 

recommendation to emphasize that DOD should reassess the single 

architecture it proposes. This change makes the recommendation 

consistent with our proposal that DOD establish specific milestones and 

provide alternative courses of action.

While DOD indicated that it partially concurred with our third 

recommendation regarding improved interoperability, the Department 

presented a discussion essentially indicating concurrence.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. In addition, 

DOD provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
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Scope and 

Methodology

To determine the status of the JTRS program and future DOD development 

plans for the program, we interviewed appropriate officials in the JTRS 

program office; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; and 

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. We reviewed documentation 

establishing the program and its objectives and requirements. We also 

reviewed correspondence, cost and schedule data, and other documents 

relating to the JTRS program.

To identify challenges DOD faces in implementing its JTRS acquisition 

strategy, we analyzed data from DOD and appropriate commercial sources. 

To obtain this data, we interviewed appropriate officials in the JTRS 

program office; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; and 

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. We also interviewed some of the 

authors and analyzed multiple reports prepared by non-DOD organizations 

for DOD, its agencies, and the services assessing commercial technology 

for military missions. We then assessed what these experts said about each 

key performance parameter, specifically whether the experts determined 

that the technology needed to fulfill the requirement was commercially 

available or whether further development was needed under DOD 

sponsorship. The scope and methodology of our analysis of the various 

studies is further discussed in the introduction to appendix I. We visited 

DOD and service research organizations and laboratories and interviewed 

appropriate officials to discuss and assess their research programs, 

availability of relevant commercial technology for DOD purposes, and 

inclusion of relevant DOD and commercial technology into the JTRS 

program. We also visited the Atlantic Command and the Central Command 

to discuss user requirements for JTRS.

We performed our work from August 1998 to August 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to Representative John Murtha, 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations; Representative C.W. Bill Young, Chairman, and 

Representative David Obey, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on 

Appropriations; and other interested congressional committees. We are 

also sending copies to the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; 

the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable 

Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; and the Honorable F. Whitten 
B-281641

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

Peters, Secretary of the Air Force. Copies will also be made available to 

others upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Charles F. 

Rey at (202) 512–4174 or Robert R. Hadley at (202) 512-4340. Key 

contributors to this assignment were Subrata Ghoshroy and Raffaele Roffo.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Technology Challenges 

for JTRS

24

Appendix II

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

28

Tables Table I.1: Comparison of Independent Technology Assessments 25

Abbreviations

AITG Airborne Ingegrated Terminal Group

A&T Acquisition and Technology

C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DMR Digital Modular Radio

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System

NTDR Near-Term Digital Radio

ORD Operational Requirements Document
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix I

Technology Challenges for JTRS ApenxIdi

Table I.1 summarizes our analysis of several recent studies and reports 

published by recognized experts in the field of radio communications who 

individually concluded that the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) faces a 

number of technological challenges. We reviewed these studies and reports 

to determine if a consensus existed among the various experts about these 

technological challenges. We also interviewed some of the authors to 

obtain a better understanding of the issues. The point of reference for our 

analysis was the JTRS Operational Requirements Document (ORD), which 

describes the performance requirements of the Joint Tactical Radio. These 

requirements are classified in the ORD as either threshold (minimum) or 

objective (desired by the user), and some threshold requirements are 

further defined as a key performance parameter. A key performance 

parameter is a capability or characteristic that is so significant that failure 

to meet it can cause the concept or system selection to be reevaluated or 

the program to be reassessed or even terminated. We identified those ORD 

requirements that were highlighted in these reports, in addition to those 

that are already designated as key performance parameters, and matched 

the specific technologies that are needed to satisfy them. 

A brief description of each report follows. The National Research Council 

report titled “The Evolution of Untethered Communications,” was the 

outcome of a yearlong study sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA). The concept “untethered communications” 

includes both mobile and wireless operations. The primary focus of the 

study was to recommend to DARPA where to invest in information 

technology for mobile wireless systems. The RAND study was sponsored 

by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. RAND was tasked to 

recommend to the Army specific basic and applied research areas where 

progress was needed to address gaps between military requirements and 

presently available and emerging technologies. Overall findings of the 

study were published in a report titled “Fundamental Research Policy for 

the Digital Battlefield.” A companion report called “Emerging Commercial 

Mobile Wireless Technology and Standards: Suitable for the Army?” 

documented the results in detail. The Programmable Modular 

Communications Systems Guidance Document published by the 

Department of Defense provides a Systems Reference Model and rules for 

its use by the communications systems designer. The document identifies 

numerous technology issues that industry and government must address, 

which are cited here as appropriate. Finally, we highlight the viewpoint of 

industry regarding the deficiencies of commercial technology. We used the 

results of a Request for Information issued by the JTRS Special Task Force, 

which sought the opinions of industry and academia on the planned JTRS 
Appendix I

Technology Challenges for JTRS

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

acquisition strategy. In the Joint Program Office’s assessment, the 

respondents identified a number of technology hurdles and confirmed that 

JTRS requires significant military capabilities not applicable to the private 

sector. 

Table I.1: Comparison of Independent Technology Assessments

JTR ORD

requirements

Specific 

technology 

required to 

satisfy ORD

NRC report on 

wireless 

communications 

1997

RAND report 

1998

PMCS 

guidance 

document

1997

Industry 

viewpoint 

(JTRS JPO 

survey)

1998

Classification 

of the 

parameter in 

the ORD

2 MHz – 2 GHz multiband, 

multimode

Advanced 

antennas

X X -- X Key 

performance 

parameter (KPP)

Software programmable Filter technology, 

DSP

X X X X KPP

Multiple channels 

simultaneously

Co-site 

interference 

mitigation

X -- X X KPP

Load new modes and 

reconfigure capabilities via 

software, while in 

operation

Software 

definition of 

waveforms 

(portability)

-- -- X X KPP

Internal growth capability 

through modular, scalable 

open systems architecture

Open systems 

architecture 

X -- X X KPP

Provide networking 

services for connected RF 

networks and between 

different networks

Network protocol, 

management, 

mobility

X X X X KPP

Secure communications Programmable 

TRANSEC, 

COMSEC, 

INFOSEC

X X X X Threshold

Output power: milli-watts 

to tens of watts 2 MHz–2 

GHz

Broadband 

amplifiers

X X X X Threshold

2 Mbps data rate High-speed A/D 

converters 

X X X X Threshold

(Notes on next page)
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

Legend

X = Item is identified as a deficiency and requires further research and development

-- = Item is either not emphasized or not discussed in the study

A/D = analog to digital

COMSEC = communications security

DSP = digital signal processor

GHz = gigahertz

INFOSEC = information systems security

JPO = Joint Program Office

Mbps = megabits per second

MHz = megahertz

NRC = National Research Council

ORD = Operational Requirements Document

PMCS = Programmable Modular Communications System

RF = radio frequency

TRANSEC = transmission security
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions
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Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenxIdi

See pp.16-18

Note: GAO’s comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the end 

of this appendix.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5. 
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

See comment 6.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

letter dated August 10, 1999.

GAO Comments 1. Our recommendation is based on the recognition that there are 

limitations to the technology that can be provided by commercial 

developers and that these limitations need to be factored into an 

acquisition strategy. We believe that industry at large may not be capable of 

supporting all of the key JTRS performance requirements and that some 

unique technologies may not be available to satisfy all the requirements of 

the JTRS. DOD should have a plan to deal with that possibility. Therefore, 

we see no inconsistency between our recommendation and the intention 

and/or principles of the JTRS program. Furthermore, although DOD 

disagrees with our recommendation, it also comments that the Joint 

Program Office is in the process of developing a technology plan. 

According to DOD, this Technology Master Plan is expected to ensure that 

technology assessment is accomplished and that appropriate technologies 

are incorporated. By adopting such a plan, DOD would meet the intent of 

our recommendation, and if this plan is not already consistent with our 

recommendation, it could be made compatible with some modification. 

2. Although DOD states that its philosophy is for industry to provide the 

best possible solutions for the JTRS family of radios via an open systems 

architecture, DOD officials have acknowledged that DOD does not have 

adequate information today to make an evaluation of industry potential. As 

noted in our report, the Joint Program Office will conduct a market survey 

to determine industry’s readiness to produce JTRS compliant systems. In 

addition, our report identifies limitations of current and future commercial 

technology to meet key military performance requirements identified in 

several reports published by recognized experts in the field of radio 

communications. Our report also notes that DOD has research underway to 

provide necessary JTRS technology but that departmental and service 

research programs are not adequately coordinated with JTRS development 

plans. 

3. During our review, Joint Program Office officials told us they have only 

individual staff level contacts with DARPA but intend to approach DARPA 

officials to establish a more formal working relationship. 

4. Although DOD indicates nonconcurrence, its comments show 

recognition of the significant risks inherent in adopting a single 

architecture for the JTRS that may or may not be consistent with similar 
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-179 Defense Acquisitions

commercial standards. DOD’s comments also recognize that the JTRS 

architecture developed by the industrial consortia may not be consistent 

with industry norms. Our recommendation focuses on the development of 

a plan that includes such recognition.

5. DOD’s fundamental philosophy is that industry, not DOD, is developing 

the open systems architecture needed for JTRS. DOD states this 

philosophy is inherent in the Joint Program Office’s contract solicitations, 

evaluations, and selection process. DOD hopes this open systems 

architecture will be widely accepted by industry. However, DOD has no 

assurance that its expectations for the JTRS architecture to receive 

widespread industry acceptance will be achieved. DOD is requiring 

industrial participants in the JTRS architectural development effort to 

provide a plan that would ensure that the architecture is accepted by 

industry at large. According to DOD, these firms are committed to having 

the architecture accepted by the Software Defined Radio Forum, a formal 

industrial affiliation sponsoring the definition of software radio standards 

for industry and other standards bodies. 

However, our report pointed out the National Research Council discussion 

of difficulties in achieving widespread consensus on standards in wireless 

communications. Thus, the single consortia selected by the Joint Program 

Office to develop the architecture cannot be assumed to represent an 

industry-wide perspective, and the Software Defined Radio Forum may or 

may not accept the JTRS architecture and sponsor it to industry and other 

standards bodies. 

6. Although DOD only partially concurred with our third recommendation, 

actions such as the Army’s review of interoperability requirements and the 

establishment of a formal Integrated Product Team to review operational 

requirements are consistent with our recommendation.

(707370) Lert
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