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NUCLEAR SECURITY: CAN DOE MEET FACILITY

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS? (PART II)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 22, 2004

Serial No. 108–237

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DAN BURTON, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

DIANE E. WATSON, California

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

J. VINCENT CHASE, Chief Investigator

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 22, 2004 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Garman, David, Under Secretary, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy; and Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office

of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of Energy .. 052

Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.

General Accounting Office, accompanied by Jonathan Gill, Senior Analyst, Natural Resources and Environment; and Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on Government Oversight ......................................... 13

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Brian, Danielle, executive director, Project on Government Oversight,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 32

Garman, David, Under Secretary, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy, prepared statement of ................................ 54

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 7

Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.

General Accounting Office, prepared statement of .................................... 16

Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance

Assurance, Department of Energy, prepared statement of ....................... 67

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

(1)

NUCLEAR SECURITY: CAN DOE MEET FACILITY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS? (PART II)

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Duncan, Kucinich,

Maloney, Ruppersberger, Tierney, and Watson.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; J.

Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert Briggs, clerk; Will

Knight, intern; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member;

and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations

hearing entitled, ‘‘Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (Part II)’’ is called to order.

This is our third hearing on Department of Energy [DOE] efforts

to secure the Nation’s far-flung nuclear weapons complex against

the threat of terrorism. Previous testimony described substantial

institutional, technical and fiscal challenges faced by efforts to develop and implement the strengthened security standard called the

design basis threat [DBT].

The General Accounting Office [GAO] reported it took too long to

formulate the new DBT, that it fails to capture some elements of

the threat, and that the lack of a Department-wide strategy means

implementation will take longer and cost more than planned. Nevertheless, witnesses pointed to tangible progress toward consolidation of nuclear material and strategies to deny even determined

terrorists any access to weapons components.

But we did not hear testimony on the status of physical security

enhancements at the five sites outside the active weapons complex

managed by the Department’s Office of Energy, Science and Environment [ESE]. As the DOE National Security Administration

[NNSA] succeeds in hardening current weapons production facilities and labs, ESE sites could pose increased risk as the next tier

of soft targets for terrorists following the path of least resistance.

While recent consolidation of DOE-wide security policy and oversight functions offers the prospect of consistent DBT implementation, GAO today reports ESE sites face some unique challenges

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keeping pace with their NNSA counterparts. Reassessment of the

risk that highly enriched uranium or plutonium at ESE sites might

be fabricated into an improved nuclear device could render current

security plans inadequate. Any revision to the DBT could trigger

a time-consuming reassessment of all security plans. Already, the

pace and cost of security strategies seem so uncertain that one site

requested no funding at all for DBT implementation this fiscal

year.

The good news is the stringent requirements of the new DBT appear to have transformed possession of special nuclear materials

from a prestigious credential to a serious liability. Facilities now

have a powerful incentive to blend down or consolidate dangerous

stocks. But complex management structures, jurisdictional stovepipes and the resultant lack of clear lines of authority for clear

DBT-related activities create unique barriers to strengthening security at ESE sites. And answering the vexing question ‘‘How much

security can we afford?’’ becomes even more difficult when evaluating the cost/benefit yield of capital improvements and security enhancements at decommissioned facilities DOE hopes to close sooner

than later.

We are grateful for the time and expertise made available to the

subcommittee today by representatives from the Department of Energy, the General Accounting Office, and the Project on Government Oversight. We particularly appreciate the patience and forbearance of our DOE witnesses who agreed to forgo their customary place on the first panel. Their forbearance and willingness

to listen will allow them, and us, to engage in more meaningful and

constructive dialog.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. With that, I welcome all our witnesses and now turn

to the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich. I appreciate your presence

here today, Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, and thank you for holding this important hearing.

Terrorist threats to all of our Nation’s nuclear assets are both

real and constant. According to the report of the 9/11 Commission

released last week, we now know that Khalid Sheik Mohammad

proposed using planes to attack 10 U.S. targets, including unidentified nuclear power plants. To think that millions of Americans

could be affected by a terrorist attack at a nuclear power plant is

indeed a startling and sobering notion.

It has been nearly 3 years since the tragic events of September

11. Since that time, the U.S. military has entered into Afghanistan

and Iraq; the U.S. Congress created the Department of Homeland

Security and the U.S. Northern Command has worked with them

to coordinate homeland defense missions; security has been increased at our Nation’s borders and airports; even protective barriers and security measures are being installed around this Capitol.

Yet, the Department of Energy continues to lag behind the rest of

the Government in its terrorism preparedness measures, especially

at DOE facilities containing nuclear weapons and category I special

nuclear materials, the most sensitive assets in the DOE inventory.

This is the third hearing that this subcommittee has held on the

implementation of the design basis threat, which guides security

measures at DOE nuclear sites, and we continue to hear the same

problems over and over: Why did it take the Department 21

months to develop a new design basis threat plan and why is it

taking DOE so long to implement the plan?

According to the General Accounting Office, serious improvements must be made at each of DOE’s category I nuclear sites in

order to meet the 2006 DBT implementation deadline. I also understand that because of concerns raised by the subcommittee and by

GAO, the May 2003 DBT is currently under review again, and protection strategies and guidelines may need to be altered once more.

Meanwhile, the level of protection at our Nation’s nuclear sites

may be inadequate.

Where is the Department’s sense of urgency? The lengthy DBT

review process, the lack of coordination among DOE offices, sites

and contractors, and the lack of funding needed to implement the

DBT is just unacceptable. While I understand that the consolidation, transportation, reinforcement, and protection of nuclear assets

located at multiple sites are logistically difficult and time-consuming, we simply cannot afford any more delays.

I am hopeful that Secretary Abraham’s announcements last

month, that these scattered assets will be consolidated in just a few

modernized and highly secure sites, and that DOE is examining

ways to create elite Federal forces to provide enhanced security

around them, will be in effect. This cooperation among sites, strategic thinking from Department leadership, and emphasis on efficiency must continue not just for the latest DBT plan, but also for

long-term interagency projects such as the proposed nuclear waste

repository.

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My colleague, Congresswoman Shelley Berkley of Nevada, has

introduced H.R. 2926, the Nuclear Waste Terrorist Threat Assessment and Protection Act, which would require a terrorist threat assessment of the Yucca Mountain project before it is approved. That

project, as you know, involves 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear

waste transported from 131 sites nationwide through 43 States in

as many as 360 congressional districts for the next 30 to 40 years.

Certainly, any part and parcel of that route could be a terrorist target, and it is important that DOE and Congress continue to work

together to protect our nuclear assets.

And, in effect, Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully suggest that

until there is an appropriate design threat basis with respect to the

movement of such nuclear waste, and until there is an appropriate

way of securing that waste to protect against potential terrorist attacks, that nuclear waste should not be moved. Mr. Chairman, I

hope that we will finally get some clear answers to some of these

problems at DOE which have left our Nation’s most sensitive nuclear facilities vulnerable to terrorism.

I want to thank the Chair again for his continued leadership on

this issue. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time the Chair would turn to Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your holding this hearing and your continued focus on the safety of our nuclear weapons complex and our nuclear material.

Last year I had the opportunity to travel with our chairman to

several of our U.S. nuclear weapons storage facilities or nuclear

material storage facilities, and the need for security improvements

was very evident, and DOE needs to make security enhancements

a priority.

One of the most troubling things in this discussion is we are not

just talking about timeframes and can all of the security enhancements be done in a sufficient time. We are also discussing the issue

of whether or not the design base threat, the goal, the target that

we are trying to achieve has been set at a high enough mark so

that we can all be confident that these facilities and these complexes will be secure.

In an issue where we have an ability to have no margin of error,

it is essential that we make certain that we set a high enough target and that we diligently pursue it. I have wondered often, as we

have sat through these hearings and I have participated with the

chairman in the tours, as to whether or not we have been reluctant

to use certain types of weapons systems to protect these facilities

that at many times we have deployed for national monuments such

as the Washington Monument. In looking at what is our design

base threat, what we are willing to do to protect these facilities, I

think we have been far too timid. And I appreciate the information

that we are going to receive today from the people who have the

responsibility for making certain that we keep these facilities safe.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time, I would ask unanimous consent that all members

of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in

the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

At this time we would recognize our panel. We have Robin

Nazzaro, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Jonathan Gill, Senior Analyst, Natural Resources and Environment; and also we have testimony from Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on Government Oversight [POGO].

If anyone else may be testifying, I would ask them to stand up.

If it is just the two of you, as well as Ms. Brian, we will ask you

to stand, raise your right hands, and I will swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our witnesses have responded in

the affirmative.

Before taking testimony, Ms. Watson, welcome. If you would like

to make a statement, we would enjoy that.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. I just

have a few observations that I would like to share with you, and

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based on the vast amount of critical assets entrusted to the Department of Energy, I am particularly concerned with the Department

sites that contain nuclear material, and their vulnerability to attack. As a member that represents Los Angeles, an area of the Nation we have learned that was a potential target for the September

11 attacks, I want to assure that we are doing everything possible

to protect all our nuclear facilities, not only in that area, but

throughout the country. I am particularly concerned with the

length of time it will take to execute the design basis threat implementation plan. Given the current security environment, it is imperative that all vulnerable sites have no security glitches. And I

want to be confident that our Nation does not get harmed again by

any entities that sit right in our own backyards. All facets of law

enforcement, in conjunction with the Department of Energy, should

be mindful of possible sites of terrorist attack and be confident that

all preventative measures have been taken to protect the citizens

of this country.

As we speak, I think the Director of the Homeland Security is

in Los Angeles, and a few months ago, as we had a panel that laying out plans should there be a threat, I saw where they used the

word ‘‘traditional.’’ Well, what we have done traditionally is not

what we should be doing now and in the future, so I hope we can

come up with creative ways to address securing these facilities.

Think out of the box.

So I look forward to hearing from the panel, and thank you very

much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you, Ms. Watson.

We will start hearing testimony. Ms. Nazzaro.

STATEMENTS OF ROBIN M. NAZZARO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL

RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JONATHAN GILL, SENIOR

ANALYST, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT; AND

DANIELLE BRIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

Ms. NAZZARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work

on physical security at the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy, Science and Environment [ESE]. ESE is comprised of nine offices, including the Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear

Energy, Science and Technology; and Science, which have sites that

contain category I special nuclear material.

On April 27, 2004, we testified before this subcommittee on several key aspects surrounding DOE’s development and implementation of the 2003 design basis threat. Specifically, we noted that

DOE had been slow to develop DBT implementation plans and the

budgets to support these plans. As a result, the Department’s deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal

year 2006 was probably not realistic for some sites.

Subsequently, you asked us to examine in more detail the issues

that could impede ESE’s ability to fully meet the threat contained

in the new DBT. After reviewing ESE’s efforts to implement the

May 2003 DBT at sites containing category I special nuclear material, we continue to be concerned about whether DOE can meet its

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fiscal year 2006 deadline for full implementation of the DBT. ESE

sites that contain category I special nuclear material have developed plans for implementing the DBT. However, we believe there

are four issues that will make it difficult to implement these plans

in a timely fashion.

First, ESE sites approved their implementation plans in February 2004, before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his guidance on which sites had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities.

ESE security officials told us that confusion exists about how or if

this guidance applies to their sites. They are working with officials

from DOE’s Office of Security to resolve this confusion. However,

the Director of DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance

Assurance agreed that additional guidance will be necessary to resolve this confusion. Consequently, the assumptions in the plans

may no longer be valid and the plans may need to be revised,

which could be very costly.

Second, the ESE implementation plans are based on the May

2003 DBT. As you mentioned, DOE is now reexamining that DBT

and may revise it. Consequently, if the DBT is changed in a way

that increases security requirements, some ESE offices may have

to revise their implementation plans to reflect these changes.

Third, the plan for one ESE site is underfunded. Officials in the

Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology told us that for

one site no DBT implementation funding had been requested for

fiscal year 2005, even though the site recognized that it needed to

substantially increase its protective forces to meet the new DBT.

Finally, ESE faces a number of complex organizational issues

that could make DBT implementation more difficult. I will give you

three examples here. For the Office of Environmental Management

to fully comply with the DBT requirements in fiscal year 2006, one

of its sites will have to close and de-inventory two facilities, consolidate excess materials into remaining special nuclear materials facilities, and move material, which the National Nuclear Security

Administration’s Office of Secure Transportation will transport to

another site. Because the cost to close these facilities and to move

the materials within the site are borne by the Office of Environmental Management’s program budget, and not by its safeguards

and security budget, obtaining adequate funding could be difficult.

At an Office of Science site, a building that contains category I

special nuclear material is managed and protected by the Office of

Science, while the material itself belongs to the Office of Nuclear

Energy, Science and Technology. This office is currently planning

to move the material and process it. After processing, the material

will no longer have to meet the protection requirements for category I special nuclear material; however, accomplishing this task

will require additional security measures, the planning and funding for which will have to be carefully coordinated with the Office

of Science.

The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology sites face

similar issues. For example, the Office of Environmental Management currently owns all of the category I special nuclear material

stored at one of the Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology sites.

Environmental management is currently planning to have the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Secure TransporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:55 Dec 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97131.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tation transport this material to several other locations by the end

of January 2005. The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology also needs to consolidate two of its sites into a single national laboratory, which will, among other things, ensure that it

has an adequate number of protective forces. If the special nuclear

materials are not moved and this consolidation is not achieved, the

number of protective forces at this site may not be adequate.

Because of the importance of successfully integrating multiple

program activities with security requirements, we continue to believe, as we recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a Department-wide, multi-year, fully

resourced implementation plan for meeting the DBT requirements

that includes important programmatic activities such as the closure

of facilities and the transportation of special nuclear materials.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. We would

be happy to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nazzaro follows:]

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Mr. TURNER [assuming Chair]. Thank you.

Ms. Brian.

Ms. BRIAN. As we prepared this testimony, it was striking to

hear members of the 9/11 Commission last week come to the conclusion that no policymakers were aware that terrorists might hijack commercial aircraft and fly them into buildings. In fact, however, POGO had released to the public an internal NORAD e-mail

which showed that NORAD had developed a scenario in April 2001

of a commercial airliner being hijacked and flown into the Pentagon, just 5 months before terrorists hijacked a commercial airplane

and flew it into the Pentagon. This scenario was rejected at the

time by the staff of the Joint Chiefs as being ‘‘unrealistic.’’

I feel certain that if a future devastating attack were to take

place at one of the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons facilities, policymakers would again claim that no one knew that a terrorist could have attacked one of these facilities and created an improvised nuclear device, a nuclear detonation. Your hearings have

been laying the groundwork to make it harder for them to make

this claim.

In January 2004, DOE Secretary Abraham, Deputy Secretary

McSlarrow, and Oversight Director Podonsky began a dialog with

POGO regarding our recommendations for security upgrades. Since

then, we have been cautiously optimistic the DOE may be turning

the corner. The Secretary’s May 7th speech further reassured us.

This is the first time a DOE secretary has recognized and admitted

the problems and the extent of the changes necessary to provide

adequate security in the weapons complex.

POGO believes Secretary Abraham and Deputy Secretary

McSlarrow are sincerely concerned about the state of security in

the complex; however, these officials have a limited time in office.

We are not sanguine that the agenda outlined by the Secretary

will become a reality. He will need to fight the weapons complex

bureaucracy and its contractors, who are professionals at preserving the status quo.

And I wish I shared the optimistic of Chairman Shays when he

was talking about the improvements at NNSA sites. I actually received a call last night, at about 11, from Los Alamos, where I

learned that the site that we are all familiar with, TA–18 at Los

Alamos, which is at the bottom of a canyon and everyone has

agreed needs to be de-inventoried immediately, well, it turns out

NNSA has essentially capitulated the responsibility of doing that

back to the contractor at Los Alamos and waiting to hear from the

contractor on their plans to move it.

One particular problem that appears to be a complex-wide phenomenon is the huge amount of overtime the guards are working.

Some security officers at Y–12 are working up to 90 hour weeks.

We have an internal Wackenhut document where the Y–12 security

manager threatens to fire an officer whose doctor temporarily limited the officer’s work schedule to only a 55 hour week after knee

surgery. The security officer was forced to ask his doctor to retract

this limitation or he would be fired. How can anyone claim with a

straight face that people who are working 90 hours a week are

alert enough to protect nuclear materials against a terrorist attack? While I know this hearing is focused specifically on EnvironVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:55 Dec 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97131.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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mental Management, Science and Nuclear Energy sites, I think

this phenomenon of dramatically overworking the protective forces

deserves the committee’s immediate attention.

One disappointment of the Secretary’s speech is that he did not

address the security problems and lack of mission at Argonne West

and Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,

the nuclear energy facilities that contain tons of highly enriched

uranium and plutonium that are attractive to terrorists. There is

no mission-related need for this large quantity of special nuclear

materials for either of these sites. The cost of protecting these materials is huge: $40 million a year. Two years ago, when Independent Oversight tested the security at Argonne West, where the majority of this material resides, they found security unsatisfactory.

In other words, the facility was unable to protect adequately the

tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Since then, Argonne West has had even more problems, according to sources at

the site as well as in Washington.

For example, POGO has been told that Argonne West spends

more money to protect the 7 to 8 tons of unneeded special nuclear

material than it does on the program. However, there is a fear at

the site that if DOE moves this unneeded material to a more secure location, the site might be shut down. Furthermore, POGO

has been told by multiple sources that the guard force at Argonne

West is 50 percent undermanned. In the last few weeks, another

10 percent of their guard force quit. Recently, Argonne West needed $1 million for quick security upgrades, but Headquarters Nuclear Energy refused them these funds. This is $1 million. It is not

a lot in the DOE budget. Despite the required security upgrades

after September 11, the increased DBT in spring 2003 and the

Headquarters directive of April 5, 2004, to go to a denial strategy

because of IND concerns, Argonne West has the same inadequate

tactical response plan that they had before September 11.

Argonne West is also having serious problems developing a new

site security plan; they haven’t been able to develop a credible vulnerability assessment, they haven’t performed computer simulations for security plans, limited scope performance tests, or full-up

force on forces for several years. I recommend this subcommittee

turn some of its attention directly to Argonne West. If this facility

cannot protect the material, the material should be moved to a

more secure location.

While similar security inadequacies exist at Idaho National Engineering Lab, there are at least plans to de-inventory the category

I materials from this site by the end of 2005. The problem, however, is that the plan is to move these materials to Argonne West.

Similarly, Hanford, an environmental management site, is scheduled to be de-inventoried of all its category I materials by the end

of 2005, which is a good thing, as they recently failed a force-onforce run by Independent Oversight, even after September 11 upgrades.

Savannah River, another EM site, stores huge quantities of plutonium. As far as we can deduce, Savannah River does not suffer

from the security failures we have uncovered at these other sites,

as well as at most of the NNSA sites. The ongoing problem at Savannah River, however, is a history of unfulfilled promises to build

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an underground storage facility for the plutonium. Most of the plutonium at Savannah River is currently being stored in an old reactor building that was never meant to be a plutonium storage facility.

We have not developed sources at Oak Ridge National Lab, the

final science site with category I materials, which stores large

quantities of uranium–233, so we can’t comment on their security.

Thank you again for asking me to testify and for sticking with

this issue. I believe it is some of the most important work you will

do in the Congress, and this subcommittee has been absolute leaders in taking on this very important job.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brian follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Thank you for your testimony and for your information on an issue that our chairman has been a leader in, in raising

the awareness level. I also serve on the Armed Services Committee.

I know that Chairman Everett, of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, is similarly concerned, and fellow Iowan Dave Hobson, chairman of Energy and Water, has also been responding to Chairman

Shays’ interest in making certain that this not be an issue, as we

had heard in the testimony, of money.

One of the things that concerns me, as I said in my opening

statement, is we do not have the option for any margin of error

here. This is something that needs to be approached with the highest level of diligence, not the minimal level of diligence. Money is

not an impediment or issue; it really is an issue of what the request is. When we have a definition of what is needed, there isn’t

anyone who would not make certain that all resources are provided

to make certain that we have the protection level that we need for

these resources that could be so deadly.

Ms. Brian, as you said, one of the things that I think is most important here in these discussions is this is not theoretical. We know

every day, and we can read the papers every day, that there are

terrorist threats to our country and that these materials, being

very deadly in their potential, would be a high value target, would

be a likely target, and that our need to provide security for them

should be of the greatest level of diligence. When I hear issues of

the process of discussion whether a design base threat is high

enough or whether or not we can meet 2006, it is very disturbing

to me, because it seems to me as if this should be an issue of the

design base threat being of the highest level. There shouldn’t need

to be a discussion of is it high enough; we shouldn’t be asking do

we have the capability to even get it higher. Are we constrained,

either by science or technology, not to reach even higher; not do we

bureaucratically believe we have taken into consideration what we

need.

And for the timeframes for 2006, our threat is now. So when I

traveled with Chairman Shays to a few of the facilities under the

control of DOE, of course, there was the discussion of the issue of

the contract forces that were guarding the facilities, whether or not

they had the resources necessary, whether they were receiving the

support necessary. And there were the discussions, Ms. Brian, as

you had said, of whether or not some of these facilities were insufficient just in design of themselves, and that materials needed to be

relocated.

But in looking at the issue of we need to do this now, the question came up, of course, of, well, what is the coordination between

DOD and DOE. What do you see as the process of we have the design base threat and we are looking at how do we achieve it

through 2006, but what do you see in DOE, in their efforts to say

if we have a gap, if we have a need that is not being filled, where

else can we get those resources now so that we are not just sitting

through 2006 in a state of vulnerability?

Ms. NAZZARO. DOE did take some initial steps after September

11th, and we reported on that last year when we were here, as far

as adding additional guard forces, increasing perimeter security.

We think that these steps were appropriate. We would also say

37

that the sites are well defended right now and that they have

taken some immediate steps. However, we certainly feel more can

be done, and we certainly raised the concern that the design basis

threat did not adequately portray the level of risk that potentially

was threatening DOE facilities, particularly those that had special

category I nuclear materials.

Mr. TURNER. In your answer you are talking about their internal

efforts.

Ms. NAZZARO. Right.

Mr. TURNER. But in listening to the discussion that we had while

we were at some of these facilities, it did seem to me as if the discussions of the design base threat or the potential for protecting

the facilities was limited based upon what DOE had within its control, and that there had not been adequate thought of to what extent do we need to go outside of DOE, to what extent do we need

to work in conjunction with DOD to see how we can supplement,

again, with my view of we cannot have any margin of error here,

and supplement what we are doing; that bureaucratic wall of within DOD versus DOE and DOD protecting the American people. But

that had not been coordinated. Do you have thoughts or views on

what their efforts could be to better work together?

Mr. GILL. Mr. Turner, all of the sites have a variety of memoranda of understanding and agreement with local law enforcement,

FBI, FAA, and their higher level contacts as well, which I am sure

DOE can talk about. But in their planning, they expect these attacks would be fast, they would be violent, and the sites would

have to reply with what they have on hand. I think there are some

problems with getting external responders into some of the sites

because, as the subcommittee is aware, the guard force that works

within the material access areas, where the special nuclear material is stored, are specially cleared and are enrolled in human reliability programs and they are very sensitive positions. So there is

a real fear, for example, that a responding fire truck could be in

fact a Trojan horse, that terrorists could actually use some external

response as a way to gain access to the sites.

So, from our experience in talking to sites, it has been very limited. There are agreements there, but in actual attacks they probably wouldn’t have time to be implemented.

Ms. BRIAN. Just to supplement that, our understanding, working

with some of the special forces people who are trained in evaluating these kinds of attacks, they are usually over within 3 to 5 minutes. So we really do have to rely on the forces there to combat the

terrorists.

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate your perspective. I still am concerned

that there is not enough coordination and that, either onsite or external to the site, that the full options of the coordination have not

been pursued. I appreciate your perspective that they are working

in concert and that these attacks may occur quickly, but I do sense,

whenever you begin down the process of questioning on the relationship between DOD and DOE, that there is not enough coordination. I appreciate your recognition that there is coordination and

that they are working together, but I do fear that is an option that

is not pursued as diligently as it could be.

38

Ms. BRIAN. If I might add in terms of the issue of coordination,

I think perhaps a more immediate concern is the coordination between the labs and the leadership at Headquarters. I think that

what you have is some real direction from Headquarters and from

the Secretary’s Office, and once it trickles down to the labs, it is

sort of like rice pudding or something, nothing really happens.

Ms. NAZZARO. We would share Ms. Brian’s concern in that regard, as far as coordination within DOE. That is certainly a first

place to start. You may also want to raise the question with the

DOE witnesses today. As they revisit the design basis threat,

which is based on an intelligence community document, you may

want to question as to what kind of coordination they are doing in

developing the new DBT.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That kind of dovetails

right into my question.

On May 7th, the Department of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham a series of new security initiatives. What enhancements are

the DOE using now that differs from before? Enhancing these new

initiatives, what is DOE doing?

Mr. GILL. We are very positive on the initiatives in that they

demonstrate a commitment, leadership, and an understanding of

the issues. In terms of things that are brand new, I am not sure

that there is all that much that wasn’t going on at some level before. Efforts such as technology department, and the various cyber

security issues, those have been around for a while. Reexamining

the DBT, that is something new. I think there are some things that

have emerged since September 11, and primarily those have to do

with protective forces. And as Ms. Brian said, they have been working extraordinarily long hours, their training has suffered, and

those issues have been on the table for a while, but they now have

new urgency. And having previewed Mr. Podonsky’s testimony on

what they plan to do with the National Training Center and related activities, I think we view that as a very positive and needed

activity. But the initiatives, on the whole, are a mixture of things

that have been on the table for a while, and other things that were

known about for a while but have assumed new urgency since the

events of September 11th.

Ms. WATSON. I was concerned by Ms. Brian’s report that there

are people working unbelievable hours, and to do something about

that I would hope would be the first step, because as I look at

homeland security, I don’t look at the land, I look at the people on

the land. And should they not be capable, the man who had knee

surgery, it doesn’t make sense, they ought to have rotating teams.

So I don’t know if you care to be more specific at this time, and

maybe you don’t have the specifics, but what are some of those

changes that they are highlighting at the current time, and do they

fit in with what has been reported to us?

Ms. NAZZARO. As to things that have happened since the Secretary’s announcement, I would say mostly what they have done is

identified what issues could impact the implementation of the DBT,

what issues could impact their security, and mostly they have been

studying these issues.

39

Ms. WATSON. Well, you know, what I am hearing is that we are

kind of bogged down. You know, when you don’t want to deal with

something, you study it. How can we move in? I don’t think we

have a whole lot of time, and every time we heighten the color

coded alerts, they say you need to be alert, but go on about your

everyday business. Well, that is for the general public. For Government, we need to be doing something now. Post-September 11 I

heard, and I am sure my colleagues did too, that they were going

to use planes in buildings. Well, how ridiculous that seemed, that

should have been a clue to kind of look in and see what the feasibilities are.

So I am just kind of concerned that we are studying, studying,

studying, but we are not moving, moving, moving. And the people

who feel that we are their enemy are planning, planning, planning,

and I do feel attacks are imminent. So we have to move. We can’t

move with the sluggishness of bureaucracy.

I am not aiming that at you, I am just kind of relieving some of

my frustration.

Ms. NAZZARO. Well, we share your concern, and one of the early

concerns we had was that it took them 2 years to even develop a

design basis threat after September 11th. At the hearing in April

we did raise a concern that we felt that a lot of the initiatives were

to develop plans, and we didn’t see implementation yet. However,

we also want to point out that we would like DOE to do it right.

We had major concerns with the design basis threat as it was developed in May, and so we do think that this is a positive step to

be revising that, but we would like to move beyond plans as well.

And as Mr. Gill mentioned, we did preview Mr. Podonsky’s statement, and we are concerned with the statement. They are saying

that some of these initiatives would take anywhere from 90 days

to a number of years.

Ms. WATSON. Well, in response—you don’t even have to respond—we don’t have that kind of time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I would like to go down another avenue:

the issue of the 2-years and why it took 2 years, and some of the

reasons for that. And I want to focus on the area of intelligence and

the fact that you feel, at this point, and one of the reasons that,

I think in your report, it took 2 years was because of lack of coordination with the intelligence community.

Now, do you feel that the intelligence community has not been

able to get their act together in order to help the Department of

Energy as it related to the postulated threat?

Mr. GILL. We did not evaluate the quality of the intelligence or

the quality of the postulated threat. We believe that was beyond

our capability. What we noted was that the Department of Energy

has traditionally used the postulated threat, which is a product of

the intelligence community plus the security organizations of the

Department of Energy, NRC, and other Government organizations,

for the basis of their design basis threat. There is no question that

the development of the postulated threat was delayed for a number

of months, primarily for two reasons: (1) because of Afghanistan

and planning for Iraq put other demands on the intelligence comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:55 Dec 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97131.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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munity, and (2) there were sharp debates among the participants

in the postulated threat over terrorist capabilities. If you read the

postulated threat, you will see that the sole point of disagreement

in the postulated threat were the capabilities of terrorists.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let us get to the bottom line. We have a

9/11 Commission that is making a lot of recommendations right

now. Whatever department you are in, wherever we are, the bottom line is national security. And it seems to me that you cannot

develop a postulated threat or a plan unless you are working very

closely with the intelligence community.

Now, No. 1, the intelligence community has to get their act together, and that is one of the subjects that is being dealt with right

now with the 9/11 Commission and some other committees that are

looking into that. But when it comes down to the issue and the

threat of terrorism, you have to, in my opinion, have the intelligence community involved and giving you information, because

there is also a lot of flexibility and a lot of new information that

is coming.

At this point, we need to have more information and work more

closely with the intelligence community in order for DOE to be able

to protect the facilities from a nuclear attack? I mean, the postulated threat talks about the terrorists and identifying who they are,

whether there have been thefts of certain materials, all of those different issues. I don’t see how you can do one without the other. So

my question what do you feel needs to be done within the intelligence community in order to get that information to DOE so that

they can do what they need to do to protect our nuclear facilities.

Long question, but it is important.

Mr. GILL. Yes, sir. We really are not able to address what the

intelligence community needs to do; we did not look at that in detail. What I can say about it is that we believe there was a general

undercurrent of dissatisfaction regarding the postulated threat

within the Department of Energy. I think the subcommittee has

looked at this issue as well, and there are some questions about the

applicability and the quality of the postulated threat, and whether

in fact that was an adequate document on which to base the design

basis threat on.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But from what you have seen, how can you

have one without the other?

Ms. NAZZARO. Well, you can’t have one without the other. And

historically DOE has based its design basis threat on the postulated threat. But this year there was a difference between the two

documents, and that is why we say there is a continuing disagreement, obviously, between DOE and the intelligence community as

what the level of threat actually is. As to their current level of cooperation and coordination with the intelligence community, DOE

might be in a better position to let you know whether they are getting cooperation.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You know, one of the biggest issues right

now, after September 11, is the issue of integration, is that so NSA

communicates with CIA, CIA with FBI. I mean, Department of Energy needs to be at the table because of what it represents and how

it deals with our national security. So I would suggest that we

refocus on where we are with respect to the intelligence community

41

helping DOE, because it is just one component. Whether or not it

is a nuclear facility or it is an office building or airplane, whatever

it is, it is all national security, and I think we are getting caught

up in our bureaucratic issues, and especially with DOE. I see in a

report that DOE had a problem themselves of finding where they

even needed to go, and it took 2 years, because of the bureaucratic

debates that were going on, that they couldn’t come to a conclusion

themselves. Now, how they cannot come to an assessment or look

at the postulated threat without getting all of the information from

the intelligence community is beyond me.

Let me ask this one question. As a result of the 9/11 Commission, there is a suggestion that you have one person who oversees

all of the intelligence community, and that would include the Department of Defense, all of the different areas. Do you think that

by having that one person—because I notice here you have budgetary issues too—that would oversee all of budget, that would help

pull all of this? Because DOE is a part of the intelligence threat

because of what it represents, especially in the nuclear area. Do

you have any opinion on that?

Ms. NAZZARO. We did not assess that, but I will say GAO, in general, supports coordination of efforts to avoid overlap and duplication, and so I would say in general, yes, we would agree with that

statement.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Thank you very much.

Ms. BRIAN. Congressman, if I could just add with regards to your

concerns, I would hate, however, as obviously the point that you

are making, I would hate DOE to get a pass in saying that their

failures are because they aren’t getting good enough intelligence. I

mean, I think the reality is once the intelligence came to them,

they did not hit the ground running at all. And, in fact, what we

find is in the beginning, in fact, the real issue, they were arguing

against the DBT that was indicated by the postulated threat because they didn’t want to spend that much money on it. So I think

there are multiple layers of problems.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I agree. There are no passes to be had.

There needs to be integration on both sides of the aisle.

Ms. WATSON. Would you yield for a moment?

Another question. Tom Ridge, as I mentioned, is out in California. What role does he play in terms of looking at all the various

departments, heightening the alert, and having certain things happen? I am not clear on how this all gets coordinated. My colleague

just asked about intelligence. It seems to be just each department

does their own thing. There has to be collaboration. So can you respond, any one of you?

Ms. NAZZARO. Well, there certainly has to be collaboration, and

the Department of Energy was involved in the development of the

postulated threat; they were one of the parties that helped in the

formulation of that. So there is coordination and there is the collaboration of the various departments. However, as to what came

out of the postulated threat, there was a disagreement; the Department of Energy did not agree with it and they did develop their

own design basis threat, in accordance, which we had a problem

with.

42

Mr. GILL. I am not sure how much the Department of Homeland

Security have really added to Department of Energy Security in

that DOE has had a mature security organization for years while

Homeland Security is new. The single most visible and expensive

impact DHS has is when DHS changes the national threat warning

level. The DOE equivalent, their security condition measures,

change according to the national level. So, for example, at the national current level we are at, DOE is at what they call SECON

3. They move to SECON 2, when the national level moves to orange level. It has a profound impact on DOE operations and costs

them an enormous amount of money per day to implement those

additional measures.

Ms. WATSON. We folded a lot of the various funding sources into

and under Tom Ridge when we were formulated the Department

of Homeland Security. Do you know if these various departments

had their budgets cut in order to put money into Homeland Security? And to address the question that was raised a minute ago,

should there be one person at the top to see that this coordination

gets done? I would have thought that would have been Tom Ridge’s

job.

Mr. GILL. I am not sure about that one. What I can say is that

the Department of Energy Safeguard and Security budget has

grown substantially over the past several years, so DOE has not

been losing money to Homeland Security. DOE has had real budget

growth.

Ms. WATSON. But I do know that the various departments did

take a portion, depending on what kind of services and tasks were

put under Homeland Security. So I don’t hear what the coordination is and if all these departments are talking and sharing with

each other.

Ms. NAZZARO. I believe for the Department of Energy those were

research capacities that were transferred to Homeland Security, it

was not their security budget. Security forces were not transferred

to Homeland Security.

Mr. GILL. There were some research capabilities at Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, that are now part of Homeland Security.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Ruppersberger, actually, Ms. Watson had not

exhausted her time beforehand, so if you have additional questions.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. No, I am fine.

Mr. TURNER. OK. Then we will go to Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. Brian, how are you? Thank you once again for coming to

Newburyport, MA recently to address a group up there.

Ms. BRIAN. It is a gorgeous town.

Mr. TIERNEY. It is, thank you.

I thank the other witnesses for being here this morning.

Let me ask a question. I am looking at the GAO report and the

three reasons why the Department of Energy departed from the

postulated threats assessment, and I would like to go over each one

and have all the witnesses speak to how reasonable they think

these reasons were.

43

One of the reasons the officials said that they deviated was because they believe the postulated threat applied only to threats

that handled completed nuclear weapons and test devices. How

reasonable was it for them to have reached that conclusion, Ms.

Nazzaro?

Ms. NAZZARO. We disagreed with that assessment, and what we

felt was that the Department did not do an adequate job of justifying why they were differentiating between sites that had nuclear

weapons and those that had nuclear materials.

Mr. TIERNEY. And did you ever get to form an opinion as to why

they had made that conclusion as opposed to what I know later in

your report it indicates you thought was clearly in the postulated

threat?

Ms. NAZZARO. No, we have not, and we understand that is part

of the reason why DOE has accepted our recommendation to revisit

the design basis threat.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Brian.

Ms. BRIAN. We agree with the GAO that the threat of an improvised nuclear device should really be the standard of whether a site

should be reaching the highest levels of security, and not whether

there is a full-up weapon there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, their second reason was that they believe

that the higher threat levels contained in the postulated threat

represented the worst potential worldwide terrorist case over a 10-

year period. How were they off the mark on that and why do you

think that they were off the mark?

Ms. NAZZARO. Again, we did not assess the adequacy of the DBT.

What we were concerned was that they did not provide any justification as to why they were deviating from the intelligence community’s input and why they came up with their own assessment.

And, again, they are revisiting the DBT and I would assume that

this is another issue that they are taking into consideration.

Mr. TIERNEY. I don’t mean to put you on the spot, but I look at

these reasons or excuses and they don’t seem to be very well founded, at least the way that you have laid them out here. If we are

being frank, are saying that we think they just gave us somewhat

of a reason that hit them on the top of the head, that they just decided to go their own way and had no justification for why they did

it other than that they found some expedience in doing that?

Ms. NAZZARO. Well, our concern was that there was no justification for these deviations other than that we understand there were

serious concerns over budget, as to whether they would have

enough money to be able to implement the new design basis threat.

However, that has been disputed by the Department of Energy.

Ms. BRIAN. I would respond to that comment that actually these

facilities represent the worst possible vulnerability, really, that is

housed in the entire country, and so we would want them to be facing the worst possible threat in order to protect against that potential vulnerability.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I won’t go around. I just note that the last reason they gave for it was they just didn’t really think that this was

anything more than a guide, a reference guide, which I think clearly is specious. I think that this committee ought to be a little concerned that the Department of Energy is throwing out those reaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:55 Dec 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97131.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
44

sons for not following something as serious as the postulated threat

and getting to a DBT that makes some sense there.

I understand, however, the budgetary problems, and I know that

at one point the Secretary submitted a rather large budget to protect some of these nuclear facilities, and the Office of Management

and Budget overruled it. And I think that we ought to take a look

at that also in terms of what my colleague mentioned a little earlier, as to just who is going to make these decisions on the Department of Homeland Security issues in terms of the budget. If we are

not going to have one person that can override the Office of Management and Budget, how are we going to get a national security

posture here that really does identify what our threats are and

what our risks are, and prioritizes them and makes sure that our

resources get there? And if we are going to have Department of Energy people identifying them, or at least be encouraged to identify

them, they ought not to be held back by the fact that they don’t

think they are going to get the money or they are going to be overruled. And I think that is probably where a lot of this comes into

play.

So to what extent do you as witnesses think that the budgetary

concerns affected the implementation of the DBT? Do you think

that was the overriding concern or do you think it was only one of

several concerns?

Ms. NAZZARO. I would say we certainly think that was an overarching concern, that they looked at the extent to which they could

implement the design basis threat. We feel the design basis threat

should identify the threat, then DOE can decide what level of risk

they are willing to take if they can’t fund the whole thing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, it would seem to me that you at least go for

all of it and what it is going to cost, and then fight like heck for

the money.

Ms. NAZZARO. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. And then if you don’t get the money, then you may

have to scale back or whatever.

Ms. NAZZARO. Then you scale back and decide where you want

to take risks, where you can logically take a risk, but at least accept and acknowledge that you are taking a risk.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am concerned here that there are some politics

involved here, that we have only got so much money because we

are running this deficit that is outrageous, and then trying to back

everybody in to not complain too much and just bring themselves

within those numbers, and I think that is a serious, serious danger

in this country.

Ms. Brian, do you want to add something to that?

Ms. BRIAN. My one comment at the time when that happened

with OMB, I think the dynamics were slightly different, and what

you had was a Department of Energy that was reporting to the

Congress that everything was fine, security was good, and then out

of the corner of their mouth they go to OMB and say, but we need

this critically important money right now. And I think they were

really speaking out of two sides of their mouth at the time, and at

least I think we are getting some change in that DOE is not pretending that everything is all right anymore.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

45

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. I will yield.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Just one question on this issue of budgeting. Do you have an opinion whether or not the fact that DOE was

having budgetary problems because more resources are being put

into homeland security and the money just isn’t getting filtered

back? That seems to be a pattern in a lot of departments right now.

Do you have an opinion as it relates to DOE?

Ms. NAZZARO. I would have no basis to make that assessment.

Ms. BRIAN. Nor I.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. I yield back.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Let me just run through a number of questions the subcommittee

would like to have answered. This is for primarily Ms. Nazzaro or

Mr. Gill, but, Ms. Brian, jump in at any time.

How optimistic are you that the ESE will make the 2006 deadline for DBT implementation?

Ms. NAZZARO. We do not feel that is realistic at this point because of a number of factors that we mentioned this morning, primarily that they are revisiting the DBT. ESE has made plans to

implement the May 2003 DBT. If that DBT changes, particularly

raises the level of security requirements, they will have to revise

their plans. And, again, we are pushing back implementation.

Mr. SHAYS. How would you evaluate the ESE efforts to implement security criteria under the new DBT?

Ms. NAZZARO. At this point, they have developed plans, they

have put money in the 2005 budget request, with the exception of

one department, so they are moving forward.

Mr. SHAYS. How can ESE reduce the time it will take to implement the new DBT?

Ms. NAZZARO. Our one major concern is that they do not have a

structured coordinated plan, and we think that could be a significant implementation factor given the number of organizations that

are involved and need to be coordinated. So we would like to see

a fully resourced, structured, strategic plan that would also include

NNSA.

Mr. SHAYS. So would that be the same answer to this question:

What do you think it is going to take for ESE to reach full compliance with DBT?

Ms. NAZZARO. Yes, I would say that is probably one of the primary factors.

Mr. SHAYS. Why is it important for DOE to report regularly on

DBT implementation?

Ms. Brian, I would like you to respond to this as well.

Ms. NAZZARO. Well, one of our concerns certainly is whether the

implementation will be fully funded, and I think the funds are

going to come from the Congress. So we feel that they need to be

reporting to you on the progress they are making, the adequacy of

those plans, and the funds that they need to support the plan.

Ms. BRIAN. In addition, I think the fact that they have to report

means it remains on the priority list of things that they are worryVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:55 Dec 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\97131.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing about, knowing they have to come back and answer to you, and

I think that is why it is critically important.

I also wanted to make one point in the earlier questions you

were asking. We believe there are some sites that can’t ever meet

the DBT and that need to be de-inventoried and closed down. I

don’t mean closed down, but de-inventoried of the category I materials, rather. And there is just real hostility——

Mr. SHAYS. Please give me an illustration.

Ms. BRIAN. Lawrence Livermore. They are not going to be able

to, where it stands now, meet the DBT, and we believe they need

to take the category I materials out of that facility. Another example is TA–18. And they were already told to do it and they still are

not doing it.

Mr. SHAYS. What should be DOE’s top security priority?

Ms. NAZZARO. Well, at this point, we believe that they should revisit the DBT because we want them to do it right. We don’t want

them to just take May DBT and say this is what we planned, and

let us plan for implementation. We want to make sure that what

they are putting in place is the right plan. But we also believe that

once they have that plan in place, that there needs to be a department-wide fully resourced coordinated plan.

Ms. BRIAN. I can give you three top priorities. They need to move

the materials at Oak Ridge to a bermed underground facility, they

need to de-inventory TA–18, and get the materials out of Lawrence

Livermore.

Mr. SHAYS. How would you evaluate ESE’s organizational structure?

Ms. NAZZARO. Right now, as far as the category I special nuclear

materials, there is a lot of confusion. We have sites where the site

is managed by one entity within the organization and yet there are

materials that are owned by another entity. As Ms. Brian mentioned, one of the strategies that we have proposed in the past is

to consolidate materials, move materials to other sites. That is

going to require the Office of Secure Transportation. So there certainly are some problems with implementation. The other issue is

that they still don’t all know who the DBT is going to affect; there

is still a lot of confusion as to the Deputy Secretary’s memo as to

who it applies to.

Ms. BRIAN. I think the biggest problem is there isn’t a will at the

site level. I think someone needs to go down there and pick these

people up by their shirt collars and shake them and tell them to

do it tomorrow, or yesterday, frankly.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like the professional staff to now ask a question.

Mr. CHASE. Ms. Nazzaro, one of the issues that GAO raised was

the issue of problems with ESE’s organizational structure. Were

you referring to issues dealing with a centralized security office?

And if you were, can you expand on that?

Ms. NAZZARO. We did not make a recommendation, but as we

were going through the last couple months, when you asked us to

look at ESE, that certainly came to mind as an option, that because of the convoluted organization, particularly with regard to

the category I special nuclear materials. It seemed like that would

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be a prudent structure, to have a centralized security force comparable to NNSA’s security force.

Mr. CHASE. Did you have a discussion with ESE about that?

Mr. GILL. We have not directly discussed that issue with ESE.

We have talked with senior members in the Department, senior officials in the Department that have indicated that is a possibility.

There have been some planning efforts to do diagrams of, say, like

a matrixed security organization for the entire ESE family of program offices.

Ms. BRIAN. I am not sure there is really even a reason to have

a distinction between the NNSA sites and the ESE sites, I think

there should be a centralized security within the system. And we

also have been advocating for a long time that independent oversight function outside the Department and be able to be checking

on how it is going on inside the system.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask regarding improvised nuclear devices, I

will refer to them as INDs. Why did DOE issue IND vulnerability

guidelines after the new DBT was released?

Mr. GILL. The guidelines for INDs are actually part of the May

2003 DBT. A special annex in the 2003 DBT established a team to

go out and look at sites IND vulnerabilities. That team took some

time to meet, gather data and analyze that data, and issued their

report in April 2004. It was a several month period that they did

this investigation.

Ms. BRIAN. I would add that I don’t think we would be talking

about INDs today if this subcommittee wasn’t taking the leadership in starting to require people to address the concerns,

Mr. SHAYS. How will the addition of IND guidelines affect DBT

implementation plans?

Ms. NAZZARO. Well, at this point there is still not total clarity as

to what those guidelines mean. Some of the sites still don’t feel

that they know whether the DBT applies to them or not, and so

that is going to impact the development of their plans and the ultimate implementation of the DBT. Even the Office of Oversight has

said that further guidance is needed.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask this question. What is the root cause

for the security issues raised by the recent inspections of Argonne

National Lab West and Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory sites?

Mr. GILL. Mr. Chairman, Argonne West, if you go by the OA inspection reports, which they had three in as many years, has shifted responsibility from a variety of program offices. There is currently not a Federal safeguard and security manager at that site;

it is managed by the University of Chicago, where across the street

INEEL is managed by a division of BWXT and has an onsite Federal safeguards and security manager. So even though the two sites

are immediately adjacent to each other, they are managed as two

different sites. The solution to that, and the Department of Energy

has actually put that into motion now, is to consolidate those two

facilities under a single contract with a single contractor into the

Idaho National Laboratory. And then, too, that would firmly be a

part of NE, Nuclear Energy Science and Technology. When they

can consolidate that, that will provide a solution to some of their

issues, their primary issues for security.

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Mr. SHAYS. I would be interested to know, Ms. Nazzaro, what

statements Ms. Brian has made that you might take issue with or

qualify. During the course of her responding to questions, was

there anything she said that you would have taken issue with or

just want to qualify?

Ms. NAZZARO. Probably the only thing that comes to mind, because we certainly agree that DOE needs to take some action with

consolidating materials, possibly even moving them from some

sites, even consolidating within sites, one area that we don’t see

problematic right now is Mr. Podonsky’s shop. Regarding the recommendation that be moved outside of DOE, we don’t see a concern as far as independence or a lack thereof.

Ms. BRIAN. If I could just elaborate on my point there. That has

been a longstanding concern of ours, not because of the work of

that office currently. My concern is that Mr. Podonsky is not always going to be the head of that office and Secretary Abraham is

not always going to be the Secretary of that office. So at the moment I don’t think we do have the problems that we saw in the

past from that office and that I am afraid we are going to see in

the future. Right now I think it is working very well, but I am worried about when you have independent oversight, but they are not

really independent, they are right inside working for the Secretary.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, is your comment basically, given the existing

personnel, it works, but you are not sure under different personnel

it might not work as well? Is that your point?

Ms. BRIAN. Well, when you look structurally at how it is set up,

it is really not independent; I mean, the budget is based on the

Secretary’s discretion. That is right. And historically it hasn’t

worked as well.

Mr. SHAYS. So the answer is yes. In other words, it is working

now only because you have confidence in the people.

Ms. BRIAN. That is right.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate

yours and Chairman Shays’ hard work on this very important issue

in calling these series of hearings.

Chairman Shays said in his opening statement—I was at another

hearing, so I did not get to hear it, but he says, in answering the

vexing question how much security can we afford becomes even

more difficult when evaluating the cost-benefit yield of capital improvements and security enhancements, and he is talking about decommissioned facilities, but it made me think back to a comment

that came a few days after the original September 11 tragedies. I

was eating out with former Congressman Sonny Callahan and several other Members, and Congressman Callahan was a senior

member of the Appropriations Committee, and he said that he estimated we would spend a trillion and a half dollars over the next

5 years on security measures that we wouldn’t otherwise have

done. And nobody really challenged him, including me, but I

thought at the time that was awfully high. But since then I have

begun to wonder, because just a few weeks ago Federal Express,

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just one company, I know they are a big company, but they told

me they had spent $200 million since September 11 on security improvements. And when you start thinking about all that the Federal Government has spent, all that the State governments, the

city governments, county governments, all the private companies,

I mean, it has just got to be a mind-boggling figure.

And I assume that none of you have a figure on exactly how

much we have spent on security in the almost 3 years since September 11 at these five facilities, but I would appreciate it if you

would get those figures for me, if you would ask those facilities how

much they have spent on security enhancements and improvements since that September 11 incident, at the five facilities that

we are emphasizing in this hearing. If I am wrong, if somebody has

those figures, now—do any of you have those figures?

Ms. NAZZARO. The only number we have is what is in the fiscal

year 2005 budget for ESE; they are asking for $397 million.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, that wouldn’t be what I am asking.

Ms. NAZZARO. Are you asking for money spent since September

11th.

Mr. DUNCAN. You know, former Governor Gilmore, who chaired

the Commission on Terrorism, on the threat and what to do about

it, after extensive investigation into the threat, he sent a cover letter on the report, a cover letter to the President, and he said there

will never be a 100 percent guarantee of security for our people,

the economy and our society. We must resist the urge to seek total

security; it is not achievable and drains our attention from those

things that can be accomplished. And I remember reading a few

months ago, in the National Journal magazine, and I think almost

anyone familiar with that magazine would say it is one of the most

nonpartisan publications that you could come up with, and they

said in this article that we are many thousands of times more likely to be killed by a car wreck or cancer or a heart attack than we

are to be killed by a terrorist event, and that we are more likely

to be struck by lightening than killed by a terrorist.

And I am not saying that we shouldn’t do anything about it; we

need to do as much as we possibly can, especially at nuclear facilities. On the other hand, at the Federal level, we always have a

tendency to overreact to any problem because every agency or department always wants more money, and so they shout very loudly

about the problem they are dealing with and the contractors that

deal with that department or agency always put pressure on for

more money. And yet I remember the Wall Street Journal had an

editorial after we passed the farm bill, and they said it was ridiculous that we had renamed it the Farm Security Act, and they

pointed out that almost every department and agency in the Federal Government was using the threat of terrorism and the word

security as a means of getting more money for whatever department or agency.

All I am saying is this, I go back to what the chairman said, the

vexing question of how we evaluate the cost-benefit yield and so

forth. And it is a difficult question. I remember hearing on NPR

News one morning a few months after September 11, and they said

the new Department of Homeland Security, which was just a few

months old at that time, already had some figure like 3,782 devices

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or security-type measures; and I know going through those must

have been an extremely difficult job.

But how do we achieve that balance? You know, Government has

to do many other things besides fight terrorist or the security

threat, and I am assuming that while things can always be better

and you always can do more and you always need to seek improvements, I am assuming that security is much better and much improved in the almost 3 years since September 11. Ms. Brian might

not, but would all of you agree that we have gotten a little something for all the money that we have spent and all the time and

attention that has been devoted to it? I mean, I would be shocked

if you would tell me that security is not much better now than it

was at the time of September 11.

Ms. NAZZARO. I would say it is not even across the DOE sites.

DOE did take immediate steps after September 11th, and as security levels changed from red, yellow, orange, DOE has reacted appropriately and changed their SECON levels, which brought on

more guard forces and changed the access to the facilities. Our concern is that, with the current DBT, we feel that they have not identified really what the risks could be. What we would like to see is

that they develop a DBT that accurately portrays the risk and then

they make a determination of changes needed. If it’s funding constraints or whatever the constraints may be, that should be identified. It may be the technology isn’t there.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, you are not really answering exactly what I

asked. You are giving a good answer, but what I am asking is are

you telling me that none of these five facilities that we are emphasizing, are you telling me they haven’t greatly increased security

since September 11, 2001? Because when I go out and visit Oak

Ridge, which is not in my district, but which is just a few miles,

half the people that work at Oak Ridge live in my district, and they

tell me all kinds of things that they have done in regard to security

since September 11 to greatly increase it. And you are sitting here

telling me that these facilities have not greatly increased security?

Mr. GILL. Mr. Duncan, at any DOE site, there are more guns,

guards, and gates there than there were prior to September 11.

There has been more money spent and DOE, for example, in fiscal

year 2005, they will spend well over $1 billion on security out of

a $21 billion budget. The Department of Energy has increased its

security measures, but there have been some negative aspects of

those too, and primarily, as people have talked about today, in

terms of protective force overtime, and lack of training. But whereas DOE sites have increased their measures, how do those measures help mitigate a greatly increased design basis threat. At some

places they might be able to meet the threat today; at other places

it is either unknown or they have a considerable way left to go.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I will say this. It is not just a bunch of untrained guards that have increased security, I mean, all the people

at the highest levels. I know this is true at Oak Ridge. Now, honestly, I don’t know about these other facilities, but I would be

greatly surprised if it is not the same at these other facilities. The

leaders at those facilities have spent a lot of time and given a lot

of attention to security-related matters since September 11, 2001,

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and those are some of our most brilliant people that we have in the

country.

Mr. GILL. I share that feeling with you, that as we visited sites

and we went to 10 different places over a couple of years, including

Y–12, twice, we never had any question about peoples commitment.

We believed that people were doing as good a job as they could

with the resources they had.

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask one last question, since I was interested

in the money and you did come up with this figure of a little over

$1 billion out of the $21 billion. What would have been that comparable figure if you had been asked that question at a hearing

prior to September 11, 2001? Are we spending twice what we were

then, three times, four times? Do you have any kind of estimate?

Mr. GILL. I don’t, and I would have to defer to DOE for those

exact numbers. The funding has increased. NNSA’s safeguard security funding, for example, has gone, over the past couple of years,

from about $500 million a year to over $700 million. ESE’s has

been a little bit different because they have been in the process of

closing some facilities. I don’t have an exact number on hand, but

especially within NNSA it has been substantial.

Mr. DUNCAN. And those have been years of 2 to 3 percent inflation, too, so a lot of the agencies have not received huge increases.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. BRIAN. Congressman, if I could just respond to the concerns

you had about funding, Mr. Duncan. Actually, our recommendations would be saving money rather than costing more money; that

often spending money on security is money down the drain, and

that by consolidating the number of facilities that you have to protect at the highest levels, you don’t have to have that many facilities across the country, reduce the number of facilities. Those that

remain open without category I materials would dramatically reduce the funding need for security in the future.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Before we close this panel, I will ask if any member of the panel

has anything else they would like to add in closing. If not, then we

thank you for your testimony today, and we will turn to panel two,

which will include David Garman, Under Secretary, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy; and Glen

Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of Energy.

Gentlemen. In this committee we do swear in our witnesses, so

I would ask you if you would stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TURNER. Please note for the record that the witnesses responded in the affirmative, and we also note that several members

of your staff who are present who might be called on by you to add

additional information did stand and take the oath.

We will start with Mr. Garman.

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STATEMENTS OF DAVID GARMAN, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. GARMAN. Thank you. I would like to thank the chairman, the

subcommittee, and the General Accounting Office for their attention to the subject of this hearing. We welcome this oversight; it

adds tremendous value to our efforts to ensure that we are taking

the security of our sites as seriously as possible, and, to put it

bluntly, this is an area where failure is not an option. And, at the

same time, I agree with what has been said here this morning, we

are not yet where we need to be with respect to security. So, again,

Mr. Chairman, to you, your staff, and to the General Accounting

Office, our thanks.

Of course, in the time since this subcommittee held its last hearing on this matter, Secretary Abraham announced 14 security initiatives to further enhance security across the DOE complex. These

initiatives are detailed in the testimony submitted by Mr.

Podonsky, so I need not comment on them further other than to

say that NNSA, ESE, and the Office of Security and Safety Assurance are working diligently to implement them. It is safe to say

that at no time has security been taken as seriously at DOE as it

is being taken today and, given the events of September 11, that

is as it must be.

In a prior hearing you heard from the Director of NNSA, so I will

focus on the sites managed by the rest of the Department, which

we refer to as Energy, Science and the Environment [ESE]. As you

know, we have category I quantities of special nuclear material at

five of the ESE sites under my line management authority: Hanford, the two sites in Idaho, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River. While

the category I special nuclear material at each of these sites is securely housed in robust storage facilities, we are continuing our efforts to further consolidate or eliminate that material.

Turning now to the specific recommendations in the GAO report.

The first recommendation involved evaluating the cost and effectiveness of existing security conditions. Every ESE site has been

operating at an enhanced level of security since September 11, and

at the time GAO was collecting data for its report, we had not yet

analyzed the added benefits of the security enhancements implemented under the various security conditions [SECON] levels.

Since that time, we have conducted vulnerability assessments at

the five ESE sites possessing Cat I special nuclear materials and

found that the enhanced security measures do provide additional

security against covert introduction of large vehicle bombs and

other infiltration into the site. However, we continue to refine our

manpower-intensive approaches to security.

The second, third, and fourth GAO recommendations involved

the re-examination of the May 2003 design basis threat. As has

been mentioned this morning, on May 6, 2004, the Deputy Secretary directed that such re-examination be undertaken with particular emphasis on the GAO recommendations. ESE is actively

and fully participating in this effort, and Mr. Podonsky’s testimony

provides further details on that point.

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The fifth and sixth GAO recommendations pertain to the implementation of the 2003 design basis threat. We have now prepared

implementation plans for each of the ESE sites possessing category

I special nuclear material. These plans have been reviewed and approved by the respective program offices; they are currently under

review in the Office of Security. These are aggressive plans designed to bring all sites into compliance with the May 2003 DBT

by the end of fiscal year 2006. This will be a challenge, but that

remains our goal. Fiscal year 2004 and 2005 funding has been

identified, and it is our intent that the fiscal year 2006 budget we

will propose to OMB will be sufficient to complete all necessary actions by the end of fiscal year 2006.

The Deputy Secretary’s classified memorandum of April 5, 2004,

did direct a change in protection strategy for some storage locations

at some of our facilities, and I know that is a matter of concern to

GAO. Vulnerability analyses are still underway that will likely require us to make some adjustments. Nevertheless, the Secretary’s

goal that we fully implement the DBT by the end of fiscal year

2006 remains in place.

You might ask is this a moving target, and how will we chase

it? I would respond that this is an iterative and continuing process.

I know the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the NNSA Director

and I, as long as I serve as Acting Under Secretary, will remain

engaged in this issue, which leads me to the final GAO recommendation concerning quarterly reporting, corrective actions,

and the identification of high risk sites. I will assure you that I will

personally review the quarterly reports, and will take actions to ensure that we are making progress against our goals.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will stop and welcome any questions

you might have either now or in the future. I am mindful of the

fact that this is not a single hearing, but a process of continuing

oversight, so I will look forward to working with you, the subcommittee and staff in the future.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garman follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. PODONSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. I too want to echo Mr. Garman’s thanks for holding

this hearing on this very important subject, and also thank you for

inviting me to testify once again.

Since my last appearance before you on April 27, the Secretary

has announced 14 security initiatives. These are initiatives that

are tangible expressions of the Secretary’s commitment to the security of the special nuclear material and other national security assets entrusted to the Department. I address these initiatives and

the actions we are taking to respond to them in more detail in my

written statement.

I would like to take this opportunity to highlight some of the

steps we have taken and some of the immediate plans we are implementing to make these initiatives a permanent part of the security in the Department of Energy.

We have begun to review our design basis threat. A multi-discipline team has been formed and our Office of Intelligence has

also already completed and delivered to that team a recent intelligence data that will assist them in ensuring that the DBT reflects

current intelligence community understandings of the terrorist

threat. By August 6th, the team will be prepared to present recommendations to the Secretary regarding any need changes to the

DBT or to its implementing guidance.

Our cyber security teams and our systems, like everyone’s, are

under constant attack from the Internet. We are committed to finding and correcting our vulnerabilities to such attacks before anyone

else can discover them. Under the Secretary’s Red Teaming and

Cyber Security Initiative, we are aggressively attacking our own

systems and reporting the results to responsible managers. Under

this initiative, our Cyber Security Oversight Office has already

completed a Red Teaming assessment of one major site, and has already begun an assessment of another. These efforts will assist us

in understanding exactly how attractive a target we represent, how

we might be attacked in the future, and let us make any adjustments necessary to continue effective cyber operations in spite of

these ongoing attacks.

We are very focused on consolidation of special nuclear material.

If we can achieve a significant level of consolidation, we can be

more efficient in both operations and security. A few months ago

the Department formed a Consolidation of Materials Task Force to

identify opportunities to relocate and consolidate special nuclear

materials. They have already compiled and consolidated a list of

excess material, a difficult and necessary step toward a comprehensive consolidation plan. In August, they will issue a report identifying short-term, which is 1 year, and long-term, beyond 1 year, options for consolidation and relocation. We are making progress in

this area, but the balancing of programmatic cost and risk against

security-related cost and risk is especially difficult. While everyone

wants to see this effort finalized and implemented, we must allow

adequate time to prepare a comprehensive plan that is prudent and

affordable.

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The Department has been concerned for some time that our Federal and contractor security experts were approaching retirement

more quickly than new personnel could be recruited and trained.

NNSA commissioned a group called the Chiles Commission, to recommend solutions within the NNSA Federal work force. That

March report has identified a number of actions to address these

issues with the NNSA Federal work force. The Secretary has directed that recommendations be considered for implementation

among the remainder of the Federal security work force and applied as appropriate to contractor security workers as well. In support of this effort, our National Training Center, in Albuquerque,

has been tasked to identify course and curriculum development actions that could provide better professional training for security

specialists and managers. Their proposal is due on June 30th of

this year.

I believe that the Department has not been as effective as it

needs to be in deploying security technology to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of our protection efforts. This is not to say

that we have not fielded some very useful technologies in the past.

We have made innovative use of robot safes for S&M protection,

special designed security doors, infrared devices, pressure sensitive

intrusion sensors, and many more. Today we are working on activated denial system using non-legal levels of microwave energy

that would make it impossible for adversaries to remain in the

area, providing a great assistance to our implementing a denial

strategy.

We are developing acoustic detective systems to improve our ability to inspect vehicles and large containers, and we are working

with DOD to utilize some of their technology to produce beyondthe-fence early warning sensors that will scan areas beyond our perimeters to provide early warning of an attack. We are also investing in remotely controlled weapons that can be positioned in critical areas and operated by personnel located in hardened shelters

where they are less susceptible to adversary fire. We continue to

work on improved chemical agent countermeasures such as chemical agent detectors, chemically hardened patrol vehicles, and

chemically hardened protective force ready rooms.

Since I last appeared before you, our Independent Oversight Office has completed three special reviews covering protective force

management and capabilities, security lock and key programs, and

security incident reporting programs. While these reviews began

some time ago, they will influence many of the actions taken to address the Secretary’s initiatives, particularly increasing training

and standards for the Department’s protective forces to an elite

force and the increased use of keyless security entry systems and

other technologies.

The Department is committed to real progress in every area of

this security program. And, Congressman Watson, we are being

more innovative and we are thinking out of the box now. But words

and commitments are easy. Action is what counts. Today I have

briefly described not only our plans and commitments, but also real

actions taken and real progress made. I am confident that these,

although significant, are just the beginning. Secretary Abraham

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has provided us with a vision for the future and expects us to make

that vision a reality.

With me today, who I had stand up at the swearing in, I have

the Director of Security, Marshall Combs; I have the Director of

Oversight, Mike Kilpatrick; I have the Office Director that was responsible originally for helping put the design basis threat together, who also co-chaired the special annex team, Larry Wilcher;

and also Senior Physical Scientist Advisor, Dick Donovan.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:]

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Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky.

We will go through a 10-minute questioning period.

It strikes me, when you look at the title of this hearing, ‘‘Nuclear

Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements?’’, that we

would not likely have a hearing that says DOE, too much security?

So when we talk about the fact that at these particular facilities,

that there is no margin for error, and that the support that you

have for increased security is overwhelming, we want to make certain that if we are going to err, we err on the side of securing these

facilities too much to meet whatever might face them. And no one

is questioning DOE’s commitment to this issue; it certainly is an

issue of process and resources and decisionmaking.

Mr. Podonsky, I have a series of questions for you concerning

this process of security-making decisions. You mentioned the design basis threat and the current review process that you are going

through. Recognizing that the current design basis threat was written before you took over, the security policy functions, do you think

the current design basis threat is robust enough?

Mr. PODONSKY. First, Congressman, thank you for asking me

that question because, as you know, just 4 or 5 months ago, I was

the director of Independent Oversight. I am on the record as criticizing the process of the Department’s design basis threat. I am on

the record as also criticizing the level of protection for INDs versus

full-up weapons. Now that I am in charge of that policy organization, I would also tell you that we welcome the Secretary’s initiative to have us take another look at the design basis threat; that

was very necessary. In fact, I would tell you my policy organization, when it submitted its recommended design basis threat to the

Secretary, Secretary Abraham himself raised the level up a couple

of notches in terms of the numbers, without getting into specifics.

So I think it comes at a time that there needs to be an edited

process, not a long bureaucratic one, but in today’s threat that is

looming on all of us every day, our families, our loved ones, our coworkers, it is vitally important that we get to what is the right

level of protection that we need. And so the short answer would

have been yes, I think it needed to be more robust. The longer answer is the Secretary recognizes that, and that is why he is having

us take another look at this. And it is not just to review it and it

is not a bureaucratic sense; we have an interagency group that is

looking at other agencies. We have the intelligence briefings again,

as recently as last Friday. So this is very active, it is not just

standing there waiting for the next shoe to drop.

Mr. TURNER. I would like to also ask your thoughts, then, about

the issues that we are hearing about the strain on the security

forces, overtime, issues of training, equipment. Obviously we are

hearing the long work hours that affect effectiveness. Could you

speak to that?

Mr. PODONSKY. This concerns us as well, and a big part of this

is part of the clearance process, getting the right security force on

board, the numbers. But, Congressman, what we really think, it

means that we need to have increased training; we have to have

more technology applied. And let me just talk about technology. If

we had more technology applied today—and there is technology on

the shelf. This is not stop and study it, these technologies are

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there—we can apply technologies, both developed for DOD as well

as technologies developed in DOE, and help become force multipliers. For example, if you indulge me, I would like to give you an

example. If we have a security member that is in a hardened position, that member, according to military doctrine, would be able to

fight off a higher number, say seven or eight, attackers. If they are

not in a hardened position, it becomes a shootout. And we think applying technology, increased weaponry will help reduce the strain

on the existing force, because right now we are going forward with

my army is bigger than yours. And SSA, our newly created office,

what we want to impress upon the Department is not that my

army is bigger than yours, my army is more technically qualified,

competent with equipment, and trained properly, so we don’t necessarily need the larger numbers of security forces, but a much

more modern security force, an elite force, as the Secretary referred

to in his May 7th announcements.

Mr. TURNER. Now getting to my favorite pet issue of the coordination between DOE and DOD. I appreciate your comments about

additional technology equipment barriers that are being provided

to the security forces. We frequently, in this discussion, hear the

issue of gates, guns, and guards, and what would be the adequate

sufficient number; and then the issue arises, as you have been discussing, of what technology would be appropriate to both make

them more effective, safer, and lower the overall burden.

And recognizing that the security forces that are there are highly

trained and are doing an excellent job at what they have been

asked to do, it does strike me, whenever we look at this or whenever we have toured one of the facilities or discussed one of these

facilities, that there does appear to be a limit as to what these security forces would be permitted to have with respect to equipment

and technology, and that there is equipment and technology that

would be available to DOD that would not be available to these security forces. Could you comment on that?

Mr. PODONSKY. One of the initiatives that we are moving out

post-haste on is on the technology. There was an initiative that the

Secretary called the Blue Sky technology project that Ambassador

Brooks and I are teaming up on. Where we are moving out specifically is that my Security Office that Mr. Combs is director of has

for many years utilized the laboratories for development of technologies. We are moving out to develop a, I don’t want to call it a

center of excellence, the Department uses that term too frequently

and oftentimes is not a center of excellence at all, but we are moving out to develop a program where we put this technology, deploy

it at sites right now. We are looking at technology being deployed

at Pantex and at Y–12 as we speak. Technology has to be in the

field to help the security forces today; not tomorrow, today. And we

have the technology and we are applying that.

And I keep on coming back to the training as well. The training

in the department for the security forces, as well as the white collar security professional, has been abysmal for the last 15 years.

There hasn’t been enough focus on that. Now, you may ask, well,

why would we wait to train? Well, we have to train the security

forces and the security managers to do their jobs, what they get

paid to do, but we need to raise the bar in their training, we need

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to combine that with the technology so that would help improve immensely those security forces, it will improve the overtime issues.

It is all linked together. God forbid we call it a strategic plan.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Podonsky, I appreciate your comments in answering my question concerning training and technology, and I

know we don’t want to go into, in this type of forum, a great deal

of detail, but at the same time I remain concerned about the coordination between DOE and DOD, and the aspect of my question that

you did not respond to is the issue of equipment. There is equipment that is not available to the security forces that is available

through DOD. Isn’t that correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. I believe there is some to that, yes.

Mr. TURNER. And that is where my concern comes, because I do

believe that in this process of the design base threat, that there are

bureaucratic walls where people do not allow themselves to pursue

options because they would exceed the authority of the security

forces that are there or the issues would be outside of the control

purview of DOD. And I would just encourage you in that process

not to look at those walls as impediments, but as opportunities.

Mr. PODONSKY. Congressman, if I might comment. You are correct, there needs to be better coordination between all the executive

branch agencies in this regard, and both the legislative arm of Government as well as the executive branch is going to have to hold

me back from kicking down those walls, because we don’t believe

in my SSA office that we have any time given to us. There is no

error of margin allowable, and we have to move out. And I give

credit to the Secretary. I have served seven secretaries, and this

secretary has been very aggressive in security matters, and none

like I have ever seen before. I am not a political, I am a career person, and I fervently believe that with the attention of this committee and a few other committees, as well as the attention of this

Secretary, we will be able to break those barriers down, and not

just through talk, we are going to do it through action, and we

have already begun.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. As you address these various areas of concern, how

are you going to affirm the effectiveness? Do we have to wait for

an attack? Will you simulate various threats and attacks? How are

we going to know if these new methods are going to be effective?

Mr. PODONSKY. Congresswoman Watson, currently we have an

Office of Independent Oversight, and the operative word is independent; it does not have any financial connections to the other

parts of the Department. Yes, it does report to the Secretary

through my office, and that is an office that I ran for 20 years. And

we have written about the performance of the Department on every

subject, environment, safety, health, safeguard security, cyber security, emergency management; and all of those reports are very pronounced in terms of the actions that the Department must take.

We will continue in a very robust fashion to have that office test

all the sites, Mr. Garman’s sites and Ambassador Brooks’ sites.

We do not pull our punches, and if you are exposed to any of our

briefings or any of the results of those inspections, you will see that

we are extremely critical where we need to be on the Department.

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Oftentimes the Department corrects the problems, and then there

are times that it does not correct the problems, and for the last at

least 12 years I have been coming up to Capitol Hill, briefing the

various subcommittees on the results of those inspections.

What we have just completed right now in post-September 11 is

a nationwide review of all of the protective force, because we wanted to, as you said in our last hearing, think out of the box. What

are these protective forces thinking? What is the morale? How are

they dealing? How are they going to deal when real bullets fly, as

opposed to just laser tag. And so we just finished that report; we

are going through that now, and we are going to be sharing that

with the 200 secretaries and the deputy secretary. And that, we

also believe, will contribute to what I was just saying before with

Congressman Turner, to the training as well as the technology,

how do we make these security forces better to protect the resources that they have at their command.

Ms. WATSON. Certainly we have the oversight, but we don’t always get all the information, and I have taken on the role in my

district, since I represent the largest city in California, and California has a lot of strategic ports, to carry information back to the

people that are going to be involved and they have a responsibility

too should there be an attack or whatever, but I don’t feel that we

really have had an opportunity to provide that oversight.

So I would like to hear from you how would you place what you

feel are the real problems that we need to go after here, at this

level, in terms of the whole system, the whole threat? How would

you rank the problems that we should address?

Mr. PODONSKY. Well, again, this is my personal and professional

opinion.

Ms. WATSON. That is what I am asking for.

Mr. PODONSKY. OK. And I would just say that it is long overdue

that both the executive branch and the legislative arm of Government work hand in glove to oversee the security of the United

States. Now, we have done that through the creation of Homeland

Security; we have done that through recognition that the intelligence community needs to work better together with the FBI, etc.

And I am not qualified to talk about all those on a professional

level other than my personal opinion. What I have seen is there is

a human factor problem, and that is we in this country sometimes

have a short memory, Congresswoman, about all that happened on

September 11. Right after September 11, we were all very wrapped

up on what we needed to do, and over time we tend to forget that

it is someplace else. And what we see everyday in the news and

what is happening in Afghanistan and Iraq is very real. We have

a war going on, and in order to protect cities like yours that you

represent, there needs to be a check and balance on what the local

authorities are doing in concert with the Federal Government, and

there needs to be more of a collegial working together to solving

the problems.

I realize that doesn’t give you any specificity, but it is a beginning. And right now I don’t think that we have that same drive

universally around the country to fight terrorism except when it is

right in front of us right that moment, and we should be prepared

now, which is why the oversight of DOE, and I again compliment

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Secretary Abraham, he puts a lot of confidence in the oversight

function and he puts a lot of confidence in the security operation

that he has just now created, SSA, to make a difference and to

move the ball forward in all these areas that are needed that we

heard this morning from both GAO and from the executive director

of POGO.

Ms. WATSON. Well, maybe, Mr. Chairman, this committee should

ask for the Secretary to give us an update on priorities and if there

is a line item for budget going to be required. I am very compelled

about the lack of trained staff, for instance, and the cost of training

and vetting those who have been identified. And, you know, these

processes do take time. Do we have time to meet the need? And

so maybe we better, Mr. Chairman, this is very good, but maybe

we better know where we are in terms of addressing these critical

points.

With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady very much and appreciate her important questions and her participation as well.

Mr. Podonsky, I would like you, and then I am going to ask the

professional staff to make sure we ask some questions that we need

to get on the record. How would you compare security at the weapons sites versus the non-weapons sites? What represents the bigger

challenge for us?

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Chairman, to answer your question, I would

need to say that both ESE and NNSA both have category I, category II special nuclear material. The difference lies in a very pronounced difference, and that is NNSA has full-up nuclear weapons;

ESE does not. However, ESE does have other challenges, and that

is the reduction and closure of some of their sites. So where do they

spend the money? For example, would they spend money on infrastructure, for example, a perimeter intrusion detection system for

a site that was closing? I would think not. But then they still need

to protect the material that they have. So the challenge that both

Ambassador Brooks and Acting Under Secretary Garman face are

very similar in terms of providing the appropriate security for the

types of sites that they have, but I would say there are a lot of similarities, even though their missions are vastly different.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

At this time I will ask Mr. Chase, of our staff, to ask some questions.

Mr. CHASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Garman, in your oral statement you said that it was

your intention to monitor closely the implementation plans which

are currently still under review. Understanding that, what challenges do you anticipate facing when you go about implementing

these plans?

Mr. GARMAN. Of course, we will have the first of these implementation plans for the quarter ending June 30th, and they will be

available prospectively. The problems that we are going to face is,

of course, that in some areas vulnerability assessments at some

sites have not yet been completed. Those sites would in fact include

Argonne East and Brookhaven National Lab.

We are in a new situation where I don’t believe we will ever

reach what I would call security nirvana, where we can sit back,

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relax, and say we have arrived. We are always going to be testing

the system. We are always going to be trying to find where there

are new threats, new vulnerabilities that we can uncover, and this

is going to be a long and ongoing process.

The difficulty we have with ESE sites is that, in fact, a fundamental difference with the NNSA sites that have ongoing responsibilities for stockpile stewardship, many of our sites are trying to

work themselves out of business. We are trying to consolidate the

material, move it off the site, prepare the site for long-term legacy;

and, as pointed out, you have to make a choice: do I want to spend

$10,000 per linear foot for an intrusion protection system or do I

want to quickly consolidate those materials or down-blend them,

eliminating the threat altogether? That is where we are going to

have the tussles, and that is where we need to be engaged.

The conflicts that I foresee between Mr. Podonsky’s office and

some of our online managers will be on this question of, and it has

been stated here elegantly several times, how much security is

enough, particularly if you are talking about a site that you are

trying to close down more quickly. And if the perception is that you

are taking financial resources to provide security that could at the

same time be used to expedite or accelerate the cleanup of the site,

therein we will have a conflict, and we are just going to have to

work through those conflicts.

We have been able to do a good deal of special nuclear material

consolidation at Mound, Rocky Flats, West Valley, Savannah River,

but we obviously have a lot more to do.

So I would say that is the fundamental conflict I think we will

see.

Mr. CHASE. As you know, the target date for implementation of

the 2003 DBT is fiscal year 2006. GAO has indicated, I have heard

this from folks at DOE, that fiscal year 2006 is probably not reasonable. Do you have any thoughts on that? When do you really

think we are going to fully implement these plans?

Mr. GARMAN. We will know more as I see and review the implementation plans, but the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have

made it very clear to me that they believe fiscal year 2006 is what

we need to be aiming for. That is certainly the requirement that

I am going to place on the line managers reporting to me. As we

review the quarterly assessments and understand where we are

against those goals, we will have a better sense going forward. Obviously, there are some factors that I am concerned with outside

our control. For example, will we receive in a timely way resources

we ask for in the fiscal year 2006 budget, or will that be subject

to continuing appropriations under what I think will be lower fiscal

year 2005 levels? That is unknowable at this point, and it certainly

is an element outside of my control or our control, but those are

things that could have a bearing on our ability to meet that goal.

Also, Mr. Podonsky and his folks and others, from our Inspector

General, are testing us, and we welcome this, trying to uncover

new vulnerabilities that will teach us something we just don’t know

today, and that could have an impact. But right now I am not

ready, or willing, to let our line managers off the hook for meeting

the Secretary’s guidance to meet these goals at the end of fiscal

year 2006.

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Podonsky, I realize that you gave an answer, and

I am not quite sure I really could tell you what you told me, so I

want to come back. Which site, the nuclear or the non-nuclear,

present the greatest threat, and why?

Mr. PODONSKY. I understand the confusion in my answer, because I was answering my question, not yours. I would say that

ESE has a tremendous challenge because of the areas that Mr.

Garman just mentioned in terms of closure and the like, as well as

NNSA has challenges for their sites. So I don’t think, Congressman, that I could give you Garman’s group or Brooks’ group as

being the greater challenge from our perspective. My oversight

group has found an equal number of problems at both sets of sites.

And having said that, we do feel that both organizations are attempting at various levels to fix those problems. There is a long

way to go, I would say, at both organizations, both ESE as well as

NNSA.

Mr. SHAYS. What is your biggest nightmare when you think

about either these weapons or non-weapons sites?

Mr. PODONSKY. My biggest concern would be, from all the years

of inspection, would be the weapons sites, with a footnote. We do

have concerns on what a terrorist may or may not do with the materials that are within the borders of Mr. Garman’s sites.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have strong feelings in the work that you do

about the need to close down some sites?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir, I do. I think that the Department could

in fact take a serious look, and I know it is doing that in some sectors, of whether or not the footprint of the Department needs to be

the size that it is now. So the consolidation of material is the first

piece where we are identifying nuclear materials as excess that

should be gotten rid of, and the consolidation of material that can

be done on individual sites, and then perhaps the next step really

should be whether we do need all the sites that are in the current

DOE, that would be both NNSA and ESE.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, the fact is you know we don’t need those sites.

Mr. PODONSKY. In my opinion we don’t.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. But you have been around for how many

years?

Mr. PODONSKY. Twenty years in August.

Mr. SHAYS. And your job is to anticipate what terrorists might

do and have the antidote to it, correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. My job? Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And so one of the factors in doing that is consolidating the footprint of a particular site, getting rid of some of the obstructions, which may mean a reduction in people in some instances, but in the other instances it would actually be the elimination of some sites, correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Is it fair to say that by having too many sites—I am

not going to ask you specifically which ones you would say were too

many, but by having too many sites, that it makes us more vulnerable?

Mr. PODONSKY. We clearly increase our vulnerabilities by having

more targets out there.

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Mr. SHAYS. And is it also true that if you were to reduce the

number of sites, that you could be more focused on the ones that

were left?

Mr. PODONSKY. I think common sense would lead you to that

conclusion.

Mr. SHAYS. Common sense would, and that is why I am almost

reluctant to ask it, because it is so obvious. But it is a fair statement to say that we are not yet spending all the resources we need

to protect the sites that we have to the level that you believe we

should protect them, correct?

Mr. PODONSKY. We are not there yet.

Mr. SHAYS. So if we had less sites, ultimately there would be a

short-run increase in expenditures in some cases because we would

have to consolidate, maybe build a little differently in other sites,

tear down, so there would be some cost, but in the long run, if we

consolidate, it would promise significant savings plus added security. Is that a statement you could agree with?

Mr. PODONSKY. From my perception, yes. But I must qualify one

piece. I am not intimately familiar with all the programmatic aspects of the missions that are at all these sites, so that would also

have to be part of the consolidation consideration.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Garman.

Mr. GARMAN. I just wanted to seek a point of clarification. Is the

chairman talking about DOE sites generically or sites with nuclear

material? Because therein lies the difference. Consolidation is part

and parcel of what the ESE strategy is for dealing with this problem: consolidate the nuclear material at a smaller number of sites.

That doesn’t necessarily mean we want to eliminate certain sites.

We have some sites, such as the National Renewal Energy Laboratory, that doesn’t house nuclear material of any consequence, and

I certainly wouldn’t want them to be alarmed that we were talking

about a site consolidation or elimination.

Mr. SHAYS. I think that is a fair point to make. I think in terms

of base closings, we have 19 National Guard units that do artillery

that we have testimony that they are just not needed, and yet we

have overworked men and women in Iraq because of the skills they

possess which are needed in Iraq. And I then think if someone told

me that I had to have five offices in my district instead of the two

I have, I could do that, but I would have to hire half as many people with twice as many sites.

And so what I want to do is bring to the level of dialog ultimately—we won’t do it at this hearing—and that is when it is irresponsible for us to have so many sites both in our defense and so

many sites in terms of our energy needs and what you, Mr.

Garman, are responsible, and in terms of Mr. Podonsky, that these

sites make us more vulnerable if they are not well protected. And

having seen a few of them, I have seen old buildings that need to

be torn down that don’t have any use, I have seen the encroachment of the general public to these sites, and I was thinking, you

know, the President doesn’t have a lot of time to think about these

things, so he is really trusting other people to do it for him. And

then I realize there are political repercussions, but, you know, national security may dictate that we have people who are fairly outspoken, who say, you know, we need to do this.

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Is there anything, Mr. Garman, that you would like to put on the

record that we didn’t put on the record?

Mr. GARMAN. Only the notion, and I certainly agree with this notion of consolidating materials. And we are going to need the help

of Congress to do that. And also to dispose of materials. Plutonium

disposition is a chronic problem in the Department, and it is something that we have been working on for a long time, and we will

be working on it for a long time; down-blending highly enriched

uranium. Consolidating materials, obviously, at a smaller number

of sites means bringing materials such as highly enriched uranium

and plutonium into sites and adding to the burden that those sites

carry, which has political implications; it is why States and sites

often fight us when we try to do consolidation efforts, because they

say don’t bring any more plutonium to our site. And so we will

need the help of Congress to do this.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you do need the help of Congress to do it, but

we need to make sure that the folks that work in the bureaucracy,

and I don’t mean that in a bad way, but that work in our Government are telling us what we need to do. And I have been in public

life now 30 years, and I am well aware of if you don’t force the

question, you give us the capability to deny knowledge, and then

we are not held accountable. And so it just strikes me that we just

need to make sure we have as honest a dialog as we can have. Put

the burden on us, then the burden is on us.

Any other comment you want to make, Mr. Garman?

Mr. GARMAN. No, sir, other than to again express our thanks.

You make us sharper by doing this, and we need this.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, thank you. Thank you.

Mr. Podonsky, any comment?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir. I appreciate that opportunity. I would

just like to make a comment about the Secretary’s initiatives. We

have heard in testimony today that a lot of these initiatives, my

terms, are retreads of the past, and some of that may be true; some

of these initiatives maybe have been underway in different points.

But again I want to emphasize never before have I seen at this

agency such enthusiasm and focus to improve security as those 14

initiatives that the Secretary put forward. So I want to make sure

that is clearly noted by the committee, that this is not just a retread, it is about action, and it is not about the department of

plans anymore, it is a department of action.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I would like to ask you a question.

I do want to make sure that the Secretary’s May 7th initiatives

don’t go unnoticed, and I would like to have a little dialog about

it. One, it is, I think, a very positive step, and we appreciate it.

How are we going to track the security initiatives? How will we go

about doing that?

Mr. PODONSKY. We have set up a number of project teams that

are looking at the milestones in the project plans for each one of

these initiatives, and each one of these initiatives are supposed to

be reported monthly to the Deputy Secretary in terms of the

progress, and the Deputy Secretary has committed to get those

briefings on a monthly basis. So this is going to be done by the existing corps of Federal employees, and it is a cross-representation

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of both Mr. Garman’s organization, Under Secretary Brooks, as

well as my own.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me, how did SSA get involved in the development of these initiatives?

Mr. PODONSKY. Quite a few months ago, Under Secretary Brooks

and myself were asked, before Mr. Garman was put into the acting

position, if we could come up with some out-of-the-box thinking of

some initiatives to improve safeguard and security throughout the

complex, and between our two organizations we gave the Secretary

a menu of areas to look at, and the Secretary personally selected

those 14 that he came up with, and we all supported those as real

and something that was doable.

Mr. SHAYS. Was there anything left out that you wish had been

included?

Mr. PODONSKY. No, sir. In fact, there was only one thing that I

wish I didn’t include.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, what was that?

Mr. PODONSKY. That was the Federalization of the guard force,

because that has brought on more questions than I envisioned.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Garman, how are the security initiatives affecting ESE sites?

Mr. GARMAN. We are a full partner in the implementation of

these. Tasking memorandum have been developed and sent out.

Working groups are developing programs of action and milestones.

Cyber security testing is underway, including at our sites. As Mr.

Podonsky said, there are monthly reports tracking progress that

are shared with me. ESE is actually leading one of the working

groups involved in the consolidation of materials. And the Deputy

and Administrator Brooks and I meet on a weekly basis, actually

twice weekly, to go over some of these and other items that we

have in common.

Mr. CHASE. Very quickly, Mr. Podonsky, in your written testimony, you made reference to the Chiles Commission report which

was commissioned by Ambassador Brooks as it relates to the

human capital expertise issue. Is there anything in that commission report that could be applied to ESE?

Mr. PODONSKY. Absolutely. Admiral Chiles’ commission talks

about the security training and qualifications of both the Federal

staff as well as the protective force, and the findings in that report,

while originally focused on NNSA, clearly Mr. Garman and his

staff will be able to glean some golden nuggets out of that, as we

in SSA are also taking out and taking very seriously, as I talked

about in my testimony, in terms of the National Training Center

in Albuquerque, so that we can raise the bar and the availability

of training across the board for both uniform services as well as for

the white collar security professionals.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there anything else either gentleman would like to

put on the record?

Mr. GARMAN. Thank you, there is one item, and I will have to

review the transcript to be sure of this, but at one point during the

prior testimony I thought I heard the GAO witness, Ms. Nazzaro,

suggest that there were ESE sites that were not subject to the

DBT, or something along those lines. And I may have misheard it,

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but I think what she was referring to was the DBT annex related

to IND. I will review the transcript and try to be——

Mr. SHAYS. Well, why don’t we just have someone just real quickly put that on the record. Do you want to just step up?

Mr. GARMAN. The only clarification I want to make is that all

ESE sites are subject to DBT.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, and that is fine. And we all concur with that.

Mr. GARMAN. OK. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Anything, Mr. Podonsky?

Mr. PODONSKY. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And I would just put on the record thank you for

waiting to take the second panel and just note for the record that

the first panel has listened to your statements, so I appreciate that

as well, so it works both ways.

And I thank both of you, and at this time this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:25, the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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