GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and 

Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release

on Delivery

Expected at

2:00 p.m., EDT

Wednesday, 

June 9, 1999

COMBATING TERRORISM

Observations on Growth in 

Federal Programs

Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, National Security 

Preparedness Issues, National Security and International 

Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss our prior work and observations on 

federal efforts to combat terrorism, especially those to prepare for and 

respond to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear (CBRN) weapons or devices.1 As you know, the President’s fiscal 

year 2000 budget requested about $10 billion to combat terrorism. 

According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), about 

$1.4 billion of that amount was for dealing with “weapons of mass 

destruction.” Over the past 3 years we have evaluated and reported on a 

number of issues concerning federal programs and activities to combat 

terrorism. A list of related GAO reports and testimonies is attached to this 

statement. 

My testimony will focus on three issues. First, I will briefly describe the 

foreign- and domestic-origin terrorism threats, as we understand them 

from intelligence analyses, and discuss some issues surrounding the 

emerging threat of CBRN terrorism. Second, I will provide our 

observations on the growth in federal programs to provide training and 

equipment to local “first responders”—police, fire, and emergency medical 

services—and the expansion of federal response elements and teams to 

deal with a possible CBRN terrorist attack. Finally, I will discuss some 

steps the executive branch has taken to better manage federal efforts to 

combat terrorism and some opportunities we see for additional focus and 

direction.

Summary U.S. intelligence agencies continuously assess both the foreign and 

domestic terrorist threat to the United States and note that conventional 

explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for 

terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons 

than conventional explosives, although the possibility that they may use 

chemical and biological materials may increase over the next decade, 

according to intelligence agencies. Agency officials have noted that 

terrorist use of nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the 

consequences could be disastrous. Although the intelligence agencies 

1 For purposes of this testimony, I will use the term CBRN instead of the more common but less precise 

term weapons of mass destruction. While some agencies define weapons of mass destruction as 

chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons, others define it to include large conventional 

explosives.
Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

agree on these matters, we have observed many conflicting statements and 

views in public documents and testimony about the CBRN terrorism threat. 

In addition, there is an apparent disconnect between the intelligence 

agencies’ judgments and the focus of certain programs. 

Since 1996, the number of federal programs and initiatives to combat 

terrorism have grown significantly. According to OMB, funding has also 

increased from about $6.5 billion in fiscal year 1998 to about 

$10 billion requested for fiscal year 2000. At the same time that the federal 

government has created several potentially overlapping programs to train 

and equip local first responders to prepare for possible CBRN terrorist 

attacks, federal agencies have also expanded the number of federal 

response teams, capabilities, and assets. 

The executive branch has taken some important steps toward improving 

the way it manages and coordinates the growing, complex array of 

agencies, offices, programs, activities, and capabilities. For example, OMB 

has issued two governmentwide reports—one in 1998 and one in 1999—on 

funding levels and programs to combat terrorism. In addition, in December 

1998, the Attorney General issued a classified 5-year interagency plan on 

counterterrorism and technology. The Attorney General is also 

establishing a National Domestic Preparedness Office at the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to try to reduce state and local confusion 

over the many federal training and equipment programs to help them 

prepare for terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons. While these are 

important positive steps, we see opportunities to improve the focus and 

direction of federal programs and activities to combat terrorism. For 

example, a governmentwide strategy that includes a defined end state and 

priorities is needed, along with soundly established program requirements 

based on assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack. In addition, 

a comprehensive inventory of existing federal, state, and local capabilities 

that could be leveraged or built upon is warranted before adding or 

expanding federal response assets. Without these fundamental program 

elements, there can be little or no assurance that the nation is focusing its 

investments in the right programs and in the right amounts and that 

programs are efficiently and effectively designed and implemented. 

Background Under Presidential Decision Directive 39 (June 1995) federal efforts to 

combat terrorism are organized along a lead agency concept. The 

Department of Justice, through the FBI, is the lead federal agency for crisis 

management of domestic terrorist incidents and for pursuing, arresting, 
Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

and prosecuting the terrorists. For managing the consequences of 

domestic terrorist incidents, state and local authorities are primarily 

responsible. If federal assistance is requested, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency for consequence 

management. FEMA coordinates this federal support through the Federal 

Response Plan, which outlines the roles, responsibilities, and emergency 

support functions of various federal agencies for consequence 

management. The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 

Protection, and Counterterrorism at the National Security Council is 

charged with coordinating the broad variety of relevant policies and 

programs, including such areas as counterterrorism, preparedness, and 

consequence management for CBRN terrorist incidents.

The Foreign- and 

Domestic-Origin 

Terrorism Threat in the 

United States

Terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and 

the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 have elevated concerns about 

terrorism in the United States. Previously, the focus of U.S. policy and 

legislation had been on international terrorism abroad and airline 

hijacking. Intelligence agencies continuously assess the foreign and 

domestic terrorist threats to the United States. The U.S. foreign 

intelligence community, which includes the Central Intelligence Agency 

and others, monitors the foreign-origin terrorist threat to the United 

States.2

 In addition, the FBI gathers intelligence and assesses the threat 

posed by domestic sources of terrorism.

What is important about these assessments is the very critical distinction 

between what is conceivable or possible and what is likely in terms of the 

threat of terrorist attack. While concerns about terrorist use of CBRN 

weapons were heightened by an apocalyptic sect’s use of a nerve agent in 

the Tokyo subway in 1995, terrorists are still reportedly more likely to use 

conventional weapons. According to the U.S. intelligence community, 

conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice 

for terrorists, at least partly because chemical and biological agents are 

more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable. 

2 The intelligence community includes the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the 

National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency and other offices within the 

Department of Defense and the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department 

of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department 

of State, and such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President or 

jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned.
Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

On average, from 1992 through 1998, there were fewer than four terrorist 

incidents in the United States each year, according to FBI statistics. 

Figure 1 provides FBI data on the number of terrorist incidents in the 

United States during the 1992-98 period, none of which were CBRN 

attacks.3

Figure 1: Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1992-98

Source: FBI.

The intelligence community reports that some foreign-origin groups and 

individuals of concern are showing an increasing interest in using chemical 

and biological materials. The FBI also reports an increasing number of 

domestic cases involving U.S. persons attempting or threatening to use 

such materials. Agency officials have noted that, although the 

3 FBI defines a terrorist incident as a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the 

criminal laws of the United States, or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 

population, or any segment thereof.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

consequences could be disastrous, the terrorist use of nuclear weapons is 

the least likely scenario.

Issues Surrounding the 

Emerging CBRN Terrorism 

Threat

Statements made in testimony before the Congress and in the press by 

various officials on the issue of making and delivering a terrorist chemical 

or biological weapon sometimes contrast sharply. On the one hand, some 

statements suggest that developing a chemical or biological weapon can be 

relatively easy. For example, in 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency 

Director testified that chemical and biological weapons can be produced 

with relative ease in simple laboratories, and in 1997, the Central 

Intelligence Agency Director said that “delivery and dispersal techniques 

also are effective and relatively easy to develop.” Similarly, an article by 

former senior intelligence and defense officials noted that chemical and 

biological agents can be produced by graduate students or laboratory 

technicians and that general recipes are readily available on the internet. 

On the other hand, some statements suggest that there are considerable 

difficulties associated with successfully developing and delivering a 

chemical or biological weapon. For example, the former Deputy 

Commander of the Army’s Medical Research and Materiel Command 

testified in 1998 that “an effective, mass-casualty producing attack on our 

citizens would require either a fairly large, very technically competent, 

well-funded terrorist program or state sponsorship.” More recently, in 

March 1999, the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for 

Nonproliferation testified that “the preparation and effective use of 

biological weapons by both potentially hostile states and by non-state 

actors, including terrorists, is harder than some popular literature seems to 

suggest.” 

We are reviewing the scientific and practical feasibility of the terrorist 

chemical and biological threat for the Senate Committee on Veterans 

Affairs; the Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee; and 

the House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on National 

Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations. Specifically, we are 

examining the ease or difficulty for a non-state actor to successfully obtain 

chemical and biological agents, process the materials, and make and 
Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

deliver chemical and biological weapons that can cause mass casualties.4 

We plan to issue our report later this summer.

We have also observed a disconnect between intelligence agencies’ 

judgments about the more likely terrorist threats—particularly the 

chemical and biological terrorist threat—and certain domestic 

preparedness program initiatives. For example, the Department of Health 

and Human Services’ (HHS) fiscal year 1999 budget amendment proposal 

for its bioterrorism initiative included building—for the first time—a 

civilian stockpile of antidotes and vaccines to respond to a large-scale 

biological or chemical attack and expanding the National Institutes of 

Health’s research into related vaccines and therapies. Specifically, the 

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 

(P.L. 105-277) included $51 million for the Centers of Disease Control and 

Prevention to begin developing a pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpile for 

civilian populations. 

HHS’ legislatively required operating plan discusses several chemical and 

biological agents selected for its stockpiling initiatives. These agents were 

selected because of their ability to affect large numbers of people (create 

mass casualties) and tax the medical system. We observed that several of 

the items in HHS’ plan did not match individual intelligence agencies’ 

judgments, as explained to us, on the more likely chemical or biological 

agents a terrorist group or individual might use.5 HHS had not documented 

its decision making process for selecting the specific vaccines, antidotes, 

and other medicines cited in its plan. Thus, it was unclear to us whether 

and to what extent intelligence agencies’ official, written threat analyses 

were used in the process to develop the list of chemical and biological 

terrorist threat agents against which the nation should stockpile. Further, 

we have not seen any evidence that HHS’ process incorporated the many 

disciplines of knowledge and expertise or divergent thinking that is 

warranted to establish sound requirements to prepare for such a threat and 

focus on appropriate medical preparedness countermeasures.

4 We recognize that some biological agents are communicable and would not necessarily need to be 

weaponized to cause mass casualties.

5 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

Growth in Federal 

Funding, Programs, 

and Initiatives 

Federal funding of efforts to combat terrorism has increased rapidly. 

According to OMB, funding to combat terrorism has increased from about 

$6.5 billion in fiscal year 1998 to about $10 billion requested for fiscal year 

2000. Overall, the number of agencies, offices, and initiatives to combat 

terrorism has also grown substantially.6 Specifically, since 1996, we have 

observed growth in federal funding and programs to provide training and 

equipment to local first responders and, concurrently, growth and potential 

overlap in federal response elements and teams to deal with a possible 

CBRN terrorist attack. The federal response elements and assets have 

been established to support state or local incident commanders to manage 

the consequences of a possible CBRN terrorist attack. 

Proliferation of Federal 

Programs to Train and 

Equip First Responders

We have observed a proliferation of programs and initiatives across several 

agencies to provide training and/or equipment to local first responders for 

dealing with the consequences of a CBRN terrorist attack. On the surface, 

it appears to us that there is potential for duplication and overlap among 

these programs. The fiscal year 2000 budget request proposed $611 million 

for training, equipping, and exercising cities’ first responders in preparation 

for a potential terrorist attack and for strengthening public health 

infrastructure.7 Table 1 summarizes some aspects of selected federal 

training and/or equipment programs available to state and local agencies to 

build or enhance their CBRN response capabilities.

6 See Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

7 HHS requested $230 million for fiscal year 2000 for its bioterrorism initiative, which included 

strengthening the public health infrastructure.
Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

Table 1: Selected Federal CBRN Consequence Management Training and/or Equipment Programs

Source: GAO.

Further information on these federal programs and activities is in 

appendix I.

Some local officials we spoke with during our examination of DOD’s 

Domestic Preparedness Program viewed the growing number of CBRN 

consequence management training programs as an indication of a 

fragmented and possibly wasteful federal approach toward combating 

terrorism. Similarly, multiple equipment programs were causing 

frustration and confusion at the local level and were resulting in further 

complaints that the federal government is unfocused and has no 

coordinated plan or defined end-state for domestic preparedness. For 

example, in the Domestic Preparedness Program, the separation of the 

DOD and HHS equipment packages required local officials to deal with 

two federal agencies’ differing requirements and procedures. Since the 

HHS equipment program is offered through a contract with unmatched 

federal funds, the cities had to meet certain requirements, including 

developing a concept of operations plan for Metropolitan Medical 

Agency What program provides Target audience

Department of Defense (DOD) Training: CBRN response with focus on 

chemical, biological, and nuclear. 

Equipment: Provides each city up to 

$300,000 in equipment on 5-year loan.

Police, fire, hazardous materials technicians, 

and medical and emergency management 

responders in the 120 most populous cities.

Department of Justice Training: Explosives, incendiary, chemical, 

and biological (not radiological or nuclear) 

response.

Equipment: Provides equipment grants. 

Police, fire, hazardous materials, and 

medical and emergency management 

responders in the 120 largest urban 

jurisdictions.

FEMA Training: Emergency management and 

hazardous materials response, including 

those related to terrorist incidents.

Fire, medical, hazardous materials 

technicians, and other emergency 

responders.

Department of Energy Training: Nuclear and radiological response 

in emergencies. 

Responders in communities close to nuclear 

facilities.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Training: Chemical, biological, and 

radiological hazardous materials response, 

with new focus on terrorist “weapons of 

mass destruction” incidents.

Federal, state, and local hazardous 

materials technicians.

HHS Equipment: Contract grants include funds 

for equipment and items for medical 

response to CBRN incident.

Emergency medical responders in 27 cities 

that also participate in DOD’s Domestic 

Preparedness Program.

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Training: CBRN incident, with focus on 

medical response. Training to be provided 

under contract with HHS.

1,100 nonfederal National Disaster Medical 

System hospital staffs.
Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

Response Systems that fits into a local area’s overall medical response 

system. The DOD equipment loan program required a different process. 

Other equipment initiatives, such as the Department of Justice equipment 

grant program, could add to the local government officials’ perception of 

an unfocused federal strategy. 8

Growth in Federal CBRN 

Response Elements

At the same time federal training and equipment programs for first 

responders has grown, the number of federal response elements that can 

deal with various aspects of managing the consequences of a CBRN 

terrorist attack has also expanded and increased. Individual agencies’ 

initiatives include adding teams or capabilities that can identify and analyze 

various chemical and biological materials or agents; contain or handle the 

weapon, device, or area of an incident; and provide medical support or 

response for dealing with potential casualties of an incident. We have 

pointed out that the growth in these capabilities and assets has not been 

based on soundly established requirements or a comprehensive inventory 

of existing federal, state, and local assets that could be leveraged. State 

and local officials have raised concerns about the increasing number of 

federal response elements being formed. In our view, the emergence of 

more federal response elements and capabilities will increase the challenge 

for the federal government to provide a well-coordinated response in 

support of a state or local incident commander.9

DOD has established several new response elements in addition to those 

that have been or would have been called upon in the past to respond to 

potentially dangerous chemical or biological threats or incidents. Among 

the pre-existing response assets are the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, 

which has four teams in two U.S. locations and the Army’s 52nd Explosives 

Ordnance Disposal Group, which includes many units located throughout 

the country and has personnel specially trained to respond to CBRN 

incidents. In 1996, the Marine Corps created the Chemical Biological 

Incident Response Force located at Camp LeJeune, N.C., to provide a 

medical and decontamination response to CBRN incidents. In addition, the 

8 We have work underway for congressional requesters to examine various issues associated with the 

multiple federal programs and facilities to train and equip first responders to manage the consequences 

of a CBRN terrorist attack. 

9 We have completed a governmentwide review of the preparedness of the many federal response 

assets to work together and with state and local officials, and our report will be available before the end 

of this month.
Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act required DOD to establish a Chemical-Biological 

Rapid Response Team for domestic incidents. 

More recently, DOD has created National Guard Rapid Assessment and 

Initial Detection (RAID) teams in 10 states to respond to CBRN incidents. 

Potentially, up to 54 RAID teams are planned. The RAID teams’ mission is 

to provide assistance to local and state authorities in the event of an 

incident involving chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons. 

They are to (1) help assess the situation, (2) advise civilian responders as to 

appropriate actions, and (3) facilitate the identification and movement of 

federal military assets to the incident scene. We reviewed the roles and 

missions of the RAID teams and expect to release a report this month.

As mentioned earlier, HHS has established Metropolitan Medical Response 

Systems with trained and equipped local emergency teams in 27 cities that 

also participate in the DOD-led Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic 

Preparedness Program. HHS requested fiscal year 2000 funding to include 

25 more cities in its program. In addition to the 27 locally-based medical 

response teams (with more to be established), HHS has established four 

specialized National Medical Response Teams, three of which are 

deployable in the event of a terrorist attack involving a chemical or 

biological weapon. These 27 Metropolitan Medical Response Systems and 

4 National Medical Response Teams are in addition to HHS’ 24 Disaster 

Medical Assistance Teams that deploy to provide medical support for any 

type of disaster, including terrorism. HHS is further expanding its response 

capabilities by creating a national stockpile of millions of doses of 

vaccines, antidotes for chemical agents, antibiotics for other diseases, and 

respirators. 

Another federal response element that appears to be growing is federal 

laboratories with capability to analyze chemical and biological agents. The 

Army, the Navy, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have 

had laboratory capabilities to analyze chemical and biological agents. In 

addition, HHS has plans to establish regional laboratories, and the FBI is 

establishing a mobile laboratory capability. Both the FBI and EPA have 

forensic laboratories, although there are some differences in capabilities, 

and the FBI is looking into using existing facilities rather than creating a 

specialized laboratory for CBRN cases.
Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

Some Steps Taken, but 

Opportunities Remain 

to Improve 

Management of 

Crosscutting Programs

The executive branch has taken a number of important steps to improve 

management and coordination of programs to combat terrorism. 

Nevertheless, we have pointed out several areas in which fundamental 

program elements are missing while program growth continues.

Steps Taken Toward 

Improved Management and 

Coordination 

I will highlight four executive branch efforts that represent important steps 

toward improved management and coordination of the growing programs 

and activities to combat terrorism. First, OMB has started to track 

spending by federal agencies to combat terrorism. In December 1997, we 

reported that key federal agencies with responsibilities to combat 

terrorism spent about $6.7 billion in fiscal year 1997 for unclassified 

terrorism-related activities and programs and noted that precise funding 

information was unavailable for various reasons.10 That report led to 

legislation (National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998) 

requiring OMB to establish a system for collecting and reporting 

information on executive agencies’ spending and budgets for combating 

terrorism. We believe that the OMB reports on governmentwide spending 

and budgeting to combat terrorism are a significant step toward improved 

management and coordination of the complex and rapidly growing 

programs and activities. For the first time, the executive branch and the 

Congress have strategic oversight of the magnitude and direction of federal 

funding for this priority national security and law enforcement concern. 

The 1999 report provided additional analysis and more detailed information 

than the 1998 report on budgeting for programs to deal with CBRN 

weapons. For example, the 1999 OMB report identified the funding (budget 

authority) for the CBRN portion of combating terrorism to be about 

$1.23 billion in fiscal year 1999 and $1.39 billion in the fiscal year 2000 

budget request.

Nevertheless, OMB officials told us, as we noted in our December 1997 

report, that a critical piece of the budget and spending picture is missing—

threat and risk assessments that would suggest priorities and appropriate 

countermeasures. These officials noted—and we agree—that risk 

10 Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and 

Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).
Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

assessment is key to (1) knowing whether enough or too much is being 

spent, (2) judging whether the right programs are being funded, and 

(3) determining whether apparent duplication is good or bad. We have not 

fully evaluated the processes or methodologies the executive branch 

agencies used to derive the information in the 1998 and 1999 OMB reports. 

As a result, we cannot comment on whether or to what extent the reports 

reflect the best possible estimate of costs associated with programs and 

activities to combat terrorism. The reports, however, do not clearly or 

explicitly describe any established priorities or duplication of efforts as 

called for in the legislation.

A second step toward improved interagency management and coordination 

was the Attorney General’s December 1998, classified 5-year interagency 

plan on counterterrorism and technology crime. The Conference 

Committee Report accompanying the 1998 Appropriations Act for the 

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 

Agencies required the Attorney General to develop the plan in coordination 

with several agencies. The plan includes goals, objectives, and 

performance indicators and recommends that specific actions be taken to 

resolve interagency problems and issues it identified and assigns relative 

priorities to the actions. The classified plan represents a substantial 

interagency effort and was developed and coordinated with 15 federal 

agencies with counterterrorism roles. The plan, however, generally does 

not link its recommended actions and priorities to budget resources, 

although it states that the agencies hope to improve the link between the 

plan and resources in subsequent updates. The plan also does not have a 

clearly defined end state that would be useful to establish requirements and 

priorities.

A third step was the Attorney General’s proposed establishment of a 

National Domestic Preparedness Office to coordinate the programs and 

other federal support for state and local governments. The purpose of the 

office is to coordinate Justice programs with those of other federal 

agencies to enable state and local first responders to establish and maintain 

a crisis and consequence management infrastructure capable of responding 

to a conventional and unconventional terrorist attack. The office, under 

the leadership of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would address 

planning, training, equipment, exercises, research and development, 

intelligence and information sharing, and health and medical service needs 

at the federal, state, and local levels. The office has commissioned a local, 

state, and federal interagency board to establish, maintain, and update a 

standardized equipment list for use by the interagency community in 
Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

preparing state and local jurisdictions to respond to a terrorist incident 

involving a weapon of mass destruction. The office is intended to reduce 

state and local confusion over the multitude of federal training and 

equipment programs and response capabilities by providing “one stop 

shopping” for state and local agencies. We understand that this office has 

not been formally approved.

Finally, in Presidential Decision Directive 62, issued in May 1998, the 

President designated a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 

Protection, and Counterterrorism. While this coordinator is not to direct 

agencies’ activities, he is responsible for integrating the government’s 

policies and programs on unconventional threats to the homeland and 

Americans abroad, including terrorism. He is also to provide advice in the 

context of the annual process regarding the budgets for counterterrorism. 

We understand he has established a number of interagency working 

groups, but we have been unable to obtain any further information on these 

groups’ responsibilities and accomplishments. 

Opportunities to Enhance 

Program Focus and 

Direction

Notwithstanding these important steps taken by the executive branch, we 

continue to see opportunities to better focus the nation’s investments and 

efforts to combat terrorism. In November1998, we concluded that the 

many federal CBRN consequence management training, equipment, and 

response initiatives could benefit from a coordinated, integrated approach 

with a defined end-state.11 We also recommended that the National 

Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism 

actively review and guide the growing number of consequence 

management training and equipment programs and response elements to 

ensure that individual agencies’ efforts (1) leverage existing state and local 

emergency management systems and (2) are coordinated, unduplicated, 

and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end state. More recently, 

we have noted that rapid program growth, particularly in domestic 

preparedness programs and public health initiatives, has occurred in the 

absence of soundly established requirements based on assessments of the 

threat and risk of terrorist attack involving CBRN. A critical piece of the 

equation in decisions about establishing and expanding programs to 

combat terrorism is an analytically sound threat and risk assessment using 

valid inputs from the intelligence community and other disciplines. Threat 

11 Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and 

Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).
Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

and risk assessments could help the government make decisions about 

how to target investments in combating terrorism and set priorities on the 

basis of risk; identify unnecessary program duplication, overlap, and gaps; 

and correctly size individual agencies’ levels of effort. Without adequate 

assessment based on sound input, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 

have confidence that the government has properly shaped programs and 

focused resources to combat and prepare for this complex, emerging 

threat.

Conclusions The executive branch has taken a number of steps toward improving the 

overall management and coordination of the complex, growing array of 

agencies’ and offices’ efforts to combat terrorism. Nevertheless, we see 

opportunities to improve the overall focus of the nation’s efforts to combat 

and prepare for terrorist incidents. There is a need to reconcile conflicting 

statements about the CBRN terrorism threat and the lack of connectivity 

between intelligence judgments and program initiatives. There is also a 

need for a governmentwide strategy with a defined end state and priorities, 

soundly defined requirements based on valid assessments of the threat and 

risk of terrorist attack, and a comprehensive inventory of existing 

capabilities and assets. In the absence of these fundamental program 

elements, there has been significant growth in federally funded 

consequence management training and equipment programs for first 

responders and in federal teams, assets, and capabilities to deal with 

possible CBRN terrorist incidents. Without these program elements, there 

is little assurance that the nation is investing in the right programs and in 

the right amounts.

Major contributors to this testimony are Stephen L. Caldwell, Davi M. 

D’Agostino, and Robert L. Pelletier.

Madam Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

happy to answer any questions at this time.
Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 
Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 
Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

Appendix I

Information on Selected Federal Training and 

Equipment Programs for First Responders ApIenxdi

The following summarizes some aspects of selected federal consequence 

management training and equipment programs designed for state and local 

first responders to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) terrorist incidents.

• Department of Defense (DOD): In the Defense Against Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Act, (Title XIV, P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996)—

commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act—the Congress 

authorized DOD to develop and conduct first responder training 

focusing on terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons. In designing 

the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program, DOD 

targeted the 120 most populated U.S. cities to receive this training. 

Courses are to be delivered to experienced city trainers so they can train 

rank-and-file first responders. The 5-year loan agreement governing the 

provision of CBRN items and equipment associated with the program 

requires the cities to repair, maintain, and replace the equipment. DOD 

plans to transfer responsibility for its domestic preparedness training 

and equipment program to the Department of Justice by the end of fiscal 

year 2000.

• Department of Justice: Through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996, the Congress authorized a second terrorism-related 

consequence management training program for firefighters and 

emergency medical personnel. This program, developed in conjunction 

with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is 

administered by the Office of Justice Programs. The target audience for 

this program overlaps with but is not identical to the target audience for 

DOD’s Domestic Preparedness Program. In fiscal years 1998 and 1999, 

the Congress appropriated $103.5 million to make chemical/biological 

equipment permanently available to first responders through the Office 

of Justice Programs. The Department of Justice also is establishing a 

Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Other 

Justice-funded centers and training venues related to combating 

terrorism are at universities, such as Texas A&M and Louisiana State 

University, and at Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nevada Test Site.

• FEMA: Through its National Fire Academy and Emergency Management 

Institute, FEMA offers training and issues basic course materials. 

FEMA and its National Fire Academy have long-standing resident and 

nonresident training programs in emergency management and 

hazardous materials. FEMA requested about $31 million for fiscal year 

2000—a $13-million increase over fiscal year 1999 funding. Of the 

$31 million, $29 million is to provide grants and assistance related to 

training, planning, and exercises for state and local responders.
Appendix I

Information on Selected Federal Training 

and Equipment Programs for First 

Responders

Page 18 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): EPA’s Environmental 

Response Team provides training to federal, state, and local hazardous 

materials technicians that addresses radiological, biological, and 

chemical hazards. EPA is adding training to its course that deals with 

CBRN weapons.

• DOE: DOE sponsors training in how to respond to incidents involving 

the release of nuclear or radiological substances. The training is made 

available primarily to communities in which nuclear facilities are 

located.

• Health and Human Services (HHS) and Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA): The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act authorized 

funds for DOD to assist the Secretary of HHS in establishing 

Metropolitan Medical Response Systems to help improve local 

jurisdictions’ medical response capabilities for a CBRN incident. HHS’ 

Office of Emergency Preparedness has been establishing Systems with 

trained and equipped local emergency teams in 27cities that also 

participate in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici domestic preparedness training 

and equipment program. VA is involved in training through a contract 

from HHS. Specifically, HHS is contracting with VA to train 1,100 nonfederal National Disaster Medical System hospital staffs to deal with 

CBRN situations, according to VA officials.
Page 19 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 
Page 20 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181 
Page 21 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181

Related GAO Products ApendxIi

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist

Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Efforts to Reduce Russian Arsenals

May Cost More and Accomplish Less Than Expected (GAO/NSIAD-99-76, 

Apr. 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for CounterterrorismRelated Activities (Fiscal Years 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 

Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires

Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the

Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National

Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces 

Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

(702012) Letr
Page 22 GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181
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