United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1995 PEACE OPERATIONS

Effect of Training,

Equipment, and Other

Factors on Unit

Capability

GAO/NSIAD-96-14

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260148 

October 18, 1995

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman

The Honorable Norman Sisisky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

The Honorable James V. Hansen

House of Representatives

This report discusses the effect of training, equipment, and other factors related to the

capability of U.S. military forces to conduct peace operations and retrain for combat. We

prepared the report at the request of the former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services. The

information in this report should be useful to your Subcommittee in its deliberations on the

impact of peace operations on the military.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine

Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available

to others on request.

If you or others have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has become increasingly

involved in peace operations.1

 As requested by the former Chairman and

Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO examined

(1) how the services incorporate peace operations into their various

training programs, (2) what effect peace operations have on maintaining

combat readiness, and (3) whether the services have the weapon systems

and equipment they need for these operations. GAO did not assess whether

the United States should participate in peace operations.

Background According to the President’s February 1995 National Security Strategy, the

primary mission of U.S. military forces is to deter and, if necessary, fight

and win conflicts in which the most important interests of the United

States are threatened. The National Security Strategy and other defense

planning documents also require U.S. forces to be capable of performing

other missions such as peace operations. While skills required for peace

operations overlap with those required for war, there is increasing

recognition within the Department of Defense (DOD) that some special

peace operations training is needed to successfully conduct these

missions. The May 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions,

for example, states that peace operations are integral to the roles of all

services and that these operations warrant appropriate training and

equipping.

Results in Brief Commanders of ground combat units differ on when special peace

operations training should be provided. Some commanders include

aspects of peace operations in standard unit training. Other commanders

prefer to maintain an exclusive combat focus until their units are formally

assigned to a peace operation. In this case, the amount of notification

before deployment to a peace operation becomes an important factor.

Aviation, naval, support, and special operations forces perform similar

tasks in peace operations and in war and therefore do not need as much

special training.

Participation in peace operations can provide excellent experience for

combat operations, but such participation can also degrade a unit’s

1

For the purpose of this report, peace operations include everything from low-intensity peacekeeping

operations, such as military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement operations. In addition

to peace operations, DOD continues to participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it

has done for many years. A broader term, “operations other than war,” encompasses all of the above

activities.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

war-fighting capability. The extent of degradation depends on a number of

factors, such as the type of peace operation, the type of unit participating,

the length of participation, and the opportunities available for training in

theater. It can take up to 6 months for a ground combat unit to recover

from a peace operation and become combat ready. The recovery period

for aviation units is relatively short compared with that for ground forces.

Participation in peace operations may interrupt naval training schedules,

but there is little difference in the naval skills required for peace

operations and for other operations.

Determining whether the services have the appropriate weapon systems

and equipment for peace operations is an ongoing process taking place

primarily at the service level. The services have identified specific

requirements in three areas: (1) force protection, (2) equipment for

military operations in built-up areas, and (3) nonlethal weapons. Except

for the recent withdrawal operation from Somalia, few nonlethal weapons

have been used to date in peace operations.

Principal Findings

Commanders Differ

About When to

Provide Peace

Operations Training to

Ground Combat

Forces

Since the end of Operation Desert Storm, DOD has provided a number of

education and training opportunities to military personnel to prepare them

for participation in peace operations. The opportunities can be divided

into three categories: (1) institutional training and education conducted at

service schools and war colleges, (2) specialized staff training for

personnel likely to plan for and lead a multinational peace operation or the

U.S. military contingent in such an operation, and (3) standard unit

training conducted at home stations and at service training facilities. DOD

and non-DOD organizations have issued a number of reports focused

particularly on institutional and specialized staff training for peace

operations.

At the unit level, training for the unique aspects of peace operations is

conducted at home stations and at service training facilities. Military

officials believe that well-trained and disciplined Army, Navy, Air Force,

and Marine Corps units have the majority of skills required for peace

operations, but most officials agree that some additional training is

needed, particularly for ground combat units. While most of the basic

tasks may be the same as those needed in combat, the tasks may be

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

performed differently because of different operating conditions and rules

of engagement.

Commanders of ground combat units likely to participate in peace

operations differ on when special training should be provided. Some of

these commanders have incorporated some peace operations training into

standard unit training because they believe this approach ensures they will

be prepared for their mission, even if they receive little advance notice. In

addition, they believe that many tasks and conditions associated with

peace operations are the same ones their units will encounter on the

future battlefield of war. Other commanders, who do not include peace

operations training in standard unit training, believe that preparing for a

worst-case, combat-oriented scenario is the best preparation for these

operations. They believe that any special peace operations training should

be provided after notification of participation.

When peace operations training is not included in standard unit training,

the amount of notification before deployment becomes an important

factor. When units are identified in advance for an operation—such as

traditional peacekeeping operations in the Sinai or in Macedonia—special

training has been provided prior to deployment. When operations result

from developing world conditions, initial deploying units have had little

time for special peace operations training. For example, initial forces

deploying to Haiti in 1994 received less than 1 month’s notice, as did initial

Army and Marine units that deployed to Somalia in 1992.

It is difficult to assess the effect that receiving or not receiving peace

operations training can have on a unit’s ability to carry out its mission. A

number of factors are involved in such an assessment, and information

available to date has been mostly anecdotal. However, a number of senior

military officials have concluded that familiarizing military personnel with

the types of conditions they may encounter in a peace operation increases

confidence, reduces the likelihood of incidents that may cause political

embarrassment to the United States, and makes sense given the likelihood

of having to respond to one of these operations.

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Executive Summary

Participating in Peace

Operations Can

Enhance and Reduce

a Unit’s Combat

Capability

Each peace operation differs in terms of its effect on a unit’s combat

capability. A number of variables determine the extent to which peace

operations affect combat capability. These include the type of unit

participating, the skills used or not used, the length of participation, and

the in-theater training opportunities.

Some operations provide excellent experience that can improve the ability

of various types of military units to operate in combat scenarios. For

example, the tasks performed by some aviation, naval, ground support,

and special operations forces in peace operations are very similar to what

they could expect to do in a combat operation. As a result, participation in

these operations has enhanced their capabilities, in many cases. According

to a Marine Corps commanding general, the skills at greatest risk for

atrophy during a peace operation are technical skills that are not

employed in the operation and maneuver skills that require close

coordination and integration. (Maneuver skills involve employment of

forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or

fire potential, to achieve a mission.) In the 1994/95 Haiti peace operation,

for example, there was no need for artillery, air defense, or Tube-launched,

Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missile fire. Military personnel from

these specialties who deployed to Haiti and performed staff, security, and

other miscellaneous functions found that their technical skills for

operating artillery and providing air defense and TOW missile fire were

adversely affected. Even light infantry forces that do not have the

opportunity to fully employ their skills in an operation face combat skill

degradation if they have no opportunity to practice.

According to DOD, the greatest impact of participating in a peace operation

comes from removing a unit from its normal training cycle. This problem

can be exacerbated if a unit is separated from its basic combat equipment,

as has been the case with the U.S. forces participating in the Macedonia

peacekeeping operation.

The Secretary of Defense and others in DOD have stated that it is difficult

to estimate the amount of time required to restore a unit’s combat

effectiveness across the full range of missions after a unit participates in a

peace operation. Army commanders generally estimate a range of 

3 to 6 months to fully restore a unit’s war-fighting readiness after a peace

operation. Marine Corps recovery time generally has been less because its

role in peace operations has been of shorter duration than the Army.

Maneuver and collective skills require the greatest attention once

participation in a peace operation is completed. While aviation and naval

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

forces are less affected by peace operations than ground forces, some time

is required to restore their combat proficiency, albeit significantly less

time than for ground combat forces.

DOD Is Identifying

Equipment Needs for

Peace Operations

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and DOD

research organizations have been cooperating to identify equipment and

technology requirements relevant to peace operations. The three broad

classifications of requirements are (1) protection for personnel in armored

and unarmored vehicles against mines and rocket-propelled grenades;

(2) new systems to enable the military to fight in urban areas; and

(3) options other than lethal force to discourage, delay, or prevent hostile

actions by prospective opponents. These requirements also have

applicability for combat operations. The Navy and the Air Force are not as

involved in identifying technological requirements for operations other

than war because they tend to perform the same types of operations

during peace as they do in war.

Previous operations demonstrated the vulnerability of U.S. military

vehicles to land mines and rocket-propelled grenades. In response, the

Army, and to some extent the Marine Corps, have taken steps to enhance

the protection of vehicles by procuring an armored HUMVEE that will

enhance protection against some mines, testing armored tiles that can be

installed on Bradley Fighting Vehicles to help protect against

rocket-propelled grenades, and contracting for an armored security

vehicle to be used by military police.

Operations other than war will increasingly involve operations in built-up

urban terrain. A November 1994 Defense Science Board task force report

identified required capabilities for military operations in built-up areas and

recommended integrating existing and new technologies under

operational doctrine developed specifically for such operations. The Army

and the Marine Corps are cooperating in studying urban warfare

technology and identifying particular equipment needs.

Ongoing research and development efforts into a number of nonlethal

systems may enable U.S. forces, particularly ground forces, to minimize

civilian casualties, avoid unnecessary property damage, and help protect

U.S. personnel. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is developing a draft

policy on the use of nonlethal weapons. In the interim, the Army and the

Marine Corps have been identifying appropriate systems and purchasing

them commercially or working with laboratories to develop or acquire the

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Executive Summary

equipment. In preparation for its February 1995 operation to protect the

withdrawal of U.N. forces from Somalia, the Marine Corps acquired and

trained personnel to use nonlethal systems. Marines used sticky foam,

aqueous foam, and road spikes as obstacles and barriers and brought with

them, but did not need to use, a variety of nonlethal munitions.

Recommendations This report contains no recommendations.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with a draft of this report. DOD’s comments appear in

appendix I.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Present Policy Requires U.S. Forces to Be Prepared for Peace

Operations

10

Peace Operations Present Unique Challenges to U.S. Military

Forces

10

DOD and Non-DOD Studies Have Identified Education and

Training Needs

11

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 11

Chapter 2 

DOD Provides

Education and

Training

Opportunities for

Peace Operations

14

DOD Provides Institutional and Specialized Staff Training for

Peace Operations

14

Unit Training Provides Key Capabilities for Peace Operations

Missions

16

Ground Combat Commanders Differ on When to Provide Peace

Operations Training

18

Notification Time Is Key in Providing Training 25

Assessing Impact of Peace Operations Training Is Difficult 26

Chapter 3 

Participating in Peace

Operations Can

Enhance and Reduce

a Unit’s Combat

Capability

28

Variety of Factors Affect Combat Capability 28

Recovery Period Is Longest for Ground Combat Forces 33

Chapter 4 

DOD Is Identifying

Equipment and

Technology

Requirements

40

Force Protection Requirements 40

Equipment for Military Operations in Urban Areas 40

Nonlethal Weapons 41

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 48

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 50

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Contents

Table Table 3.1: Phases Involved in a Unit’s Return to Combat

Readiness

34

Abbreviations

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CINC Commander in Chief

CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center

DOD Department of Defense

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MFO Multinational Force and Observers

TOW Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

U.S. military forces are engaged in a number of missions that are different

from most of those of the Cold War period. The U.S. defense strategy calls

for the maintenance of military forces that are flexible enough to

accomplish diverse missions. Peace operations are among these missions.1

Within the last 5 years, U.S. combat units have participated in peace

operations in locations such as Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti, the

Sinai, and northern and southern Iraq.

Present Policy

Requires U.S. Forces

to Be Prepared for

Peace Operations

According to the President’s February 1995 National Security Strategy, the

primary mission of U.S. military forces is to deter and, if necessary, fight

and win conflicts in which the most important interests of the United

States are threatened. Nevertheless, to support the administration’s

strategy of engagement, the United States has adopted a defense strategy

that calls for the maintenance of robust and flexible military forces that

can accomplish a number of missions. The National Security Strategy and

other defense planning documents have identified peace operations

among the missions that U.S. military forces must be prepared to

undertake. According to these documents, U.S. forces deployed to these

operations should be provided with sufficient capabilities to fulfill their

assigned missions. In many cases, this may require specialized training.

Peace Operations

Present Unique

Challenges to U.S.

Military Forces

According to the May 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and

Missions, peace operations warrant appropriate training and equipment

because of the often unique characteristics of these operations. The report

also states that the difficulty of these operations cannot be

underestimated. For example, in peace operations, the enemy is no longer

easily identified approaching in a tank or an armored personnel carrier.

Also, military tasks common to both war and peace—such as patrolling or

escorting convoys—may have a fundamentally different purpose and be

conducted in a vastly changed environment. Finally, the use of

overwhelming and decisive force, the central tenet of U.S. war-fighting

doctrine, often has little relevance to peace operations.

DOD is still coming to terms with the unique challenges associated with

peace operations. As part of this effort, the Army recently published a new

field manual to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and

1

For the purpose of this report, peace operations include everything from low-intensity peacekeeping

operations, such as military observer duty, to high-intensity peace-enforcement operations. In addition

to peace operations, the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to participate in humanitarian and

disaster relief operations, as it has done for many years. A broader term, “operations other than war,”

encompasses all of the above activities.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

conducting these operations. Similarly, the Marine Corps is revising its

Small Wars Manual concerning experiences the naval services have gained

in operations other than war since the end of World War II and is

developing a handbook to assist commanders who may be participating in

peace and foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

DOD and Non-DOD

Studies Have

Identified Education

and Training Needs

DOD is increasingly recognizing the importance of providing education and

training for peace operations, particularly at the institutional level. Within

the last year, a number of DOD and non-DOD reports have been published

that identify and assess the education and training opportunities DOD

provides for peace operations and for additional operations other than

war. For example, in September 1994 the DOD Inspector General issued a

report on specialized military training for peace operations and a catalog

of peace operations training activities that identify and discuss various

U.S. and international peace operations training programs, primarily at the

institutional level. The report identifies gaps in three areas where U.S.

preparation for peace operations could be enhanced in the near term:

(1) U.N. observer training; (2) use of existing U.S. and foreign training

programs and educational opportunities; and (3) staff and interagency

training, particularly joint task force training for peace operations. A

February 1995 report prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Strategy and Requirements) by a non-DOD organization provides

additional detail concerning training and education requirements for peace

operations, assesses current programs in the U.S. military, and

recommends strategies to enhance preparedness for such missions.

In April and May 1995, a two-phase conference and follow-on exercise on

peace and humanitarian operations sponsored by the I Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the U.S. Department of State, was

conducted at Camp Pendleton, California. A summary report highlights the

policy, strategy, and operational issues that resulted from the conference.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee

on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services,

asked us to examine (1) how the services incorporate peace operations

into their various training programs, (2) what effect peace operations have

on maintaining combat readiness, and (3) whether the services have the

weapon systems and equipment they need for these operations. We did not

assess whether the United States should participate in peace operations.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To determine how the services incorporate peace operations into their

institutional, staff, and unit training programs, we reviewed training plans,

lessons learned from recent operations, and published DOD and non-DOD

reports on peace operations training. We concentrated our efforts on unit

training and supplemented information already available on institutional

and staff training. We visited the home bases of various Army, Navy, Air

Force, and Marine Corps units that participated in peace operations and

talked with personnel about the training they received. We also talked

with officials and personnel at various advanced-level training facilities,

such as the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Combat

Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), to obtain an understanding of the peace

operations training provided. To understand the U.S. Atlantic Command’s

role in preparing joint forces for peace operations missions, we talked

with command representatives and reviewed relevant documentation.

To determine the impact of peace operations on combat readiness, we

reviewed the experiences of combat, support, and special operations

forces who participated in Operations Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Able

Sentry in Macedonia, Deny Flight in Bosnia, and Provide Comfort in

northern Iraq. We also obtained some information on the experiences of

Army and Marine Corps personnel who had participated in the 1992-93

Somalia peace operations and the impact that these operations had on the

units’ ability to return to combat readiness. We visited the home bases of

units that had participated in peace operations, and to the extent possible,

visited actual operations, such as the one in Macedonia. We talked with

and obtained documentation from personnel attached to the Army’s 10th

Mountain Division (Light), II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF), and

units from the 1st Armored and 3rd Mechanized Infantry Divisions in

Europe concerning the extent of combat skill atrophy after participating in

peace operations and the effort required to return to combat readiness. We

visited Air Force units at their home bases and at their deployed locations

in Aviano, Italy, and Incirlik, Turkey, near Operations Deny Flight and

Provide Comfort. We talked with and reviewed documentation from

military commanders concerning the combat proficiency of their units

after participating in peace operations and their plans for restoring full

war-fighting capabilities. We discussed the effect of Navy participation in

Caribbean peace operations with representatives of various elements of

the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and examined documents describing the impact of

peace operations on Navy training cycles.

To determine whether the services have the weapon systems and

equipment they need for these operations, we examined reports by DOD

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 1 

Introduction

agencies and documents from the military services involved in identifying

technological requirements. We discussed the involvement of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense in identifying new technologies and also

examined a draft policy statement on the use of nonlethal weapons. I MEF

officials from Camp Pendleton, California, and from the Marine Corps

Combat Development Center in Quantico, Virginia, provided us with

information concerning their experiences in obtaining, training with, and

using nonlethal systems and equipment during Operation United Shield,

protecting the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Somalia.

Our review was conducted at Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine locations,

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and component and unified command

headquarters within the United States and Europe. We contacted by

telephone any relevant organizations we did not visit, such as the 25th

Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; the Multinational

Force and Observers (MFO), Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and the Army

Dismounted Battlespace Battle Laboratory at Fort Benning, Georgia. In

many cases, we received written responses to our questions. We did not

address the financial impact on the services as a result of participating in

peace operations. This issue was addressed in a previous GAO report.2

 We

also did not report on the participation of reserve forces in peace

operations. While we did some limited examination of reserve component

participation in peace operations, the training provided for these missions

was not significantly different than training for standard reserve missions.

Except in a few cases, the number of reserve component forces

participating in these operations was relatively small.

Our review was performed from November 1994 to September 1995 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

2

Peace Operations: DOD’s Incremental Costs and Funding for Fiscal Year 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-95-119BR,

Apr. 18, 1995).

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 2 

DOD Provides Education and Training

Opportunities for Peace Operations

Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, DOD has provided a variety of

education and training opportunities to military personnel to prepare them

for participation in peace operations. Each service has a different

approach to training its forces for peace operations. The services and the

regional Commanders in Chief (CINC) have exposed at least some of their

personnel to basic operating concepts through institutional training and

education, specialized staff training, and unit training. At the unit level,

peace operations training primarily involves ground combat forces.

Commanders of major ground combat forces differ on when peace

operations should be provided; some commanders include aspects of

peace operations in standard unit training, and others prefer to maintain

an exclusive combat focus until they are advised that their units are about

to deploy to a peace operation. Naval and aviation forces perform similar

tasks in peace operations and in war.

DOD Provides

Institutional and

Specialized Staff

Training for Peace

Operations

Each of the services conducts a number of comparable courses at training

facilities and schools in which peace operations are addressed as part of a

progressive program of military training and education. The services’

officer and noncommissioned officer courses, command and staff colleges,

war colleges, professional schools for particular military specialties (e.g.,

infantry, amphibious warfare, and military police), and joint military

education programs all include some discussion of peace operations in

their curriculums, often as part of a broader discussion of operations other

than war. Since DOD and non-DOD organizations have issued a number of

reports on this subject, we are brief in describing DOD initiatives in this

area.

Historically, the Army and the Marine Corps have had the greatest

involvement in peace operations. They have developed and implemented

the widest variety of programs on peace operations as part of their

institutional training and education. The Army provides peace operations

training and education at a variety of institutions such as the

• Army War College;

• Command and General Staff College;

• Army Infantry School;

• Combat Training Centers;

• U.S. Military Observer Group;

• Army Peacekeeping Institute; and

• School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 2 

DOD Provides Education and Training

Opportunities for Peace Operations

Peace operations initiatives in the Marine Corps include peace operations

programs at the Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and Staff

College, and the Marine Corps Basic School. In addition, at the recent

peace and humanitarian conference and staff exercise held by I MEF and

the Department of State, the following recommendation was made

concerning improvement of professional military education:

Humanitarian assistance and peace operations require new ways of thinking and planning.

Identifying an enemy, finding centers of gravity, and applying overwhelming force do not

translate directly, and so, do not necessarily fit neatly into traditional operational planning.

There may not be a direct military threat. In order to prepare military officers for future

humanitarian operations, professional military education should increase emphasis on

• operations other than war case studies,

• humanitarian assistance operation wargaming and situational exercises, and

• role-playing scenarios.

The services and regional CINCs recognize that a key element in the

successful execution of a peace operation is the training of the

commanders and staff who plan and lead the operation both at the service

and the joint task force levels. Consequently,

• regional CINCs have conducted workshops and seminars to prepare their

staffs for leading peace operations in their areas of responsibility;

• the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute held a peace operations training

program, at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for

command level personnel serving on the staffs of Unified Commands,

which was attended by interagency, Joint Staff, potential joint task force

commanders, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

• the Army’s Battle Command Training Program and the Center for Army

Lessons Learned provided mobile training teams, training support

packages, and operational lessons to prepare staff prior to a peace

operation deployment;

• the Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups, under CINCs, Atlantic Fleet

and Pacific Fleet, will provide, starting with a pilot planned for

November 1995, a 5-day class on peace operations for Naval Expeditionary

Force staff officers and senior noncommissioned officers; and

• the Partnership for Peace program, utilizing peace operations training as a

venue for military-to-military contact, sponsored a 3-week seminar and a

large peace operations field exercise that included representatives from

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 2 

DOD Provides Education and Training

Opportunities for Peace Operations

the U.S. military and from Ministries of Defense and General Staffs of

other Partnership for Peace countries.

Unit Training Provides

Key Capabilities for

Peace Operations

Missions

Unit training is conducted at home stations and at training facilities to help

prepare units for their missions. Unit level training for peace operations

primarily is an issue involving ground forces—principally infantry and

mechanized infantry units. Naval and aviation forces, and other ground

forces such as special operations, logistics, and military police units train

similarly for peace operations and for war. However, even these forces

have to adapt to the different conditions and rules of engagement they

encounter in these operations.

The extent of additional preparation needed for peace operations depends

on the type of operation and the type of forces assigned to participate.

Some types of military forces adapt more easily to peace operations. For

example, support units providing food and supplies to troops participating

in the Somalia peace operation performed the same functions they would

in a more traditional combat operation but in a less centralized fashion

because forces were spread out over 21,000 square miles. They also had

additional responsibilities because they had to provide most of their own

security.

The tasks an infantry unit performs in a peace operation may be similar to

the tasks it would encounter in combat, but they may be performed

differently because the operating conditions, including rules of

engagement, will be different. The peace operation in Haiti, for example,

required that infantry units conduct mounted and dismounted patrols day

and night, perform cordon and search, carry out reconnaissance, and

provide security. These tasks are typically performed in a combat

operation. However, in Haiti the night patrols were conducted under full

illumination, as a show of presence, rather than in a more stealthy manner,

as is the case in war. Further, in the cordon and search operations, before

the military entered a building, occupants were given an opportunity to

leave peacefully, and searches were conducted with limited inconvenience

to the populace. This procedure reduced the level of violence and

collateral damage that is likely to occur in war.

DOD and non-DOD studies and our own work on this subject indicate that,

even though there can be considerable overlap between skills required for

peace operations and those required in war, personnel assigned to peace

operations missions need some degree of additional preparation.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 2 

DOD Provides Education and Training

Opportunities for Peace Operations

Increasingly, military officials have recognized that peace operations pose

a different set of challenges for the military, particularly ground forces.

The Army’s peace operations field manual states that units selected for

these duties may be required to perform tasks that may be different from

their wartime tasks and that training will be required. Military officials

have noted that forces must learn to adjust to the unique rules of peace

operations, such as restrained use of force. In addition, special training is

needed to sensitize forces to local conditions, cultures, and laws, since

ground forces will have extensive contact with the local populace and with

government and nongovernment organizations.

While aviation forces perform similar tasks in peace operations and war,

they, too, have to adjust when participating in peace operations. As a

result of the shoot down of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters

participating in Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey in April 1994, the Air

Force has increased training requirements for many of the Air Force units

participating in peace operations. For example, to better prepare for peace

operations missions, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

crews are undergoing (1) increased and improved study of the rules of

engagement, including situational exercises, prior to deployment;

(2) better predeployment training, including a certification briefing for

their squadron commanders demonstrating their readiness for flying in the

specific area of responsibility; and (3) increased training at the deployed

location, including another formal, documented certification process. In

addition, the Air Force has issued guidance for (1) fighter combat crew

training to incorporate theater-specific rules of engagement and

situational training into academic, simulator, and flying training; (2) major

commands to develop a standard training program on theater orientation;

and (3) the fielding of a computer-based aircrew visual identification

training program.

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Ground Combat

Commanders Differ

on When to Provide

Peace Operations

Training

Some Commanders

Incorporate Peace

Operations Into Standard

Unit Training

Traditionally, Army and Marine Corps units begin training for the unique

aspects of peace operations after the units have been notified of their

participation. However, several commanders of major combat forces in

the Army and the Marine Corps have incorporated some peace operations

training into standard unit training. They have done so for several reasons.

First, they believe that as infantry, their units likely will be the ones tasked

to respond to peace operations. Second, they believe that regular training

for some peace operations tasks and conditions reduces the preparation

time needed prior to deployment and allows their units to focus on more

mission-specific requirements. Third, the commanders believe that they

will encounter some of the peace operations tasks and conditions, such as

the media, refugees, and civilian communities, on future complex

battlefields. Following are descriptions of the training approaches of U.S.

Army, Europe, units, the 25th Infantry Division (L), and I MEF.

U.S. Army, Europe The major Army combat units in Europe—the 3rd Infantry Division

(Mechanized) and the 1st Armored Division—have incorporated peace

operations tasks as a regular part of their collective training events

because of current involvement and likely future involvement in peace

operations. In addition, U.S. Army, Europe, officials stated that the

training used for peace operations is also part of what is required to

operate successfully on complex battlefields. Peace operations training is

incorporated both at home stations and into rotations at the Army’s CMTC.

1

In 1993, U.S. Army, Europe, incorporated a peace operations training

module into each of its maneuver battalion’s annual 21-day CMTC rotations.

This module, which lasts 2 to 5 days, is mandatory for all U.S. Army,

Europe, units. CMTC utilizes a complex battlefield environment to test a

battalion’s ability to accomplish missions under two separate U.N.

mandates—peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping missions

tested in the module include establishing, operating, and reinforcing

1

CMTC, in Hohenfels, Germany, is one of the Army’s four combat training centers. It provides

advanced combined arms training for Europe-based heavy forces in a low- to high-intensity combat

environment.

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observation posts and checkpoints and securing convoy operations. Peace

enforcement missions include, for example, monitoring the separation

zone between belligerent parties, attacking and defending. As of

October 1994, 20 U.S. Army, Europe, maneuver battalions had completed

the module, and many battalions have gone through the program twice.

U.S. Army, Europe, has identified the following critical tasks as

fundamental to peace operations:

• conduct patrols,

• establish/operate observation posts,

• set up/operate checkpoints,

• plan for media,

• conduct liaison/negotiate,

• escort a convoy,

• react to an ambush,

• respond to indirect fire,

• establish lodgment,

• provide command and control,

• conduct mine clearance, and

• secure a route.

CMTC uses these critical tasks in its rotations and suggests that U.S. Army,

Europe, leaders also use them to prepare and train for peace operations

and evaluate unit readiness. In addition to identifying tasks and missions,

CMTC developed a Peacekeeping Operations Mission Training Plan to

(1) assist units in home station training, (2) serve as a training readiness

standard for assessing how well a unit performs its mission essential tasks,

and (3) establish a foundation for predeployment training for units tasked

to support a U.N.-sponsored peace operation. The training plan combines

the previously identified tasks with corresponding training and evaluation

outlines.

25th Infantry Division (L) According to 25th Infantry Division (L) officials, the Division Commander2

believed that incorporating some peace operations training in standard

unit training can enhance combat skills and capabilities, since troops will

likely encounter many of these tasks and conditions on complex future

battlefields. Further, the Commander believed that by preparing for peace

operations in advance, the Division can focus on more mission-specific

requirements once tasked to respond to a peace operation. The

2

The Commander of the 25th Infantry Division (L) at the time we conducted our work assumed

another position within the Army. The discussion in this section concerns the period of time when he

was the Commanding General.

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Commander regularly included the following elements in the 25th Infantry

Division (L)’s battalion and brigade exercises: civilians on the battlefield,

interaction with nongovernmental organizations, the media, coalition and

U.N. forces, and use of crowd control measures.

From January to April 1995, the Division participated in the Haiti peace

operation with the primary mission of maintaining a stable and secure

environment. The Division had about 7 weeks’ notice of its deployment

and spent about 3 of those weeks planning for the mission.

Representatives went to Haiti to obtain a clear understanding of the

mission and the operating environment. The Division also worked closely

with a representative from the Center for Army Lessons Learned to gain

additional perspectives on the operating environment and training needed,

coordinated with the 10th Mountain Division (L), and received assistance

from a JRTC Mobile Training Team.

The remaining time was devoted to mission-specific training and other

deployment requirements. According to Division officials, each infantry

battalion spent about 7 days on weapons qualification/close quarters

combat training, 10 days on situational exercises, and 6 days on leader

training. Combat support and combat service support units spent

approximately 10 days on specialized training for Haiti. Finally, equipment

and order preparation, deployment briefings, and loading of equipment on

the ships consumed the remaining time. In its training, the Division

concentrated on 31 tasks that had been identified through mission analysis

and coordination with 10th Mountain Division (L) and Center for Army

Lessons Learned representatives. Each task was instructed in the

classroom, discussed in relation to the rules of engagement and the uses of

graduated responses, and then the task was practiced under field

conditions in hands-on situational training exercises. Tasks included day

and night patrols, checkpoint operations, convoy operations, civil

disturbance, military operations in urban terrain, and political rallies

security.

The Division had not previously participated in a peace operation;

however, one of its brigades had completed a peace enforcement rotation

at JRTC3

 a few months earlier, and the other brigade had just completed an

internal evaluation exercise that included operations other than war tasks.

3

JRTC, Fort Polk, Louisiana, is one of the Army’s combat training centers. It provides advanced

combined arms and joint training for Army and Air Force contingency forces, located principally in the

United States, in a low- to mid-intensity combat environment. Commanders can choose between a

combat-oriented or a peace enforcement exercise for their units. To date, there have been two peace

enforcement exercises at JRTC, one in 1993 and the other in 1994.

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According to Division officials, both experiences provided a good base

from which to add other mission-specific peace operations training and

significantly contributed to their successful performance in Haiti.

Based upon his experiences in Haiti and the training received at JRTC, the

Commander articulated a 5-pronged training strategy that would more

extensively integrate the tasks and conditions of operations other than

war into standard unit training for light Army infantry units. He directed

most of his points to the training conducted at Army combat training

centers, in particular JRTC. They are as follows:

• Integrate operations other than war factors into conventional training.

• Periodically participate in a peace enforcement rotation at an Army

combat training center.

• Integrate a 1-or 2-day optional peace enforcement package into the

leadership training program at Army combat training centers.

• Integrate peace operations into a program of instruction at the command

and general staff college and at the war college.

• Dedicate some operations other than war training for leaders in the

following areas: intelligence, coalition logistics, measures of effectiveness,

negotiation skills, country team relations, nongovernmental organizations,

U.N. agencies, media management, and psychological operations.

I Marine Expeditionary Force The I MEF Commanding General at Camp Pendleton, California, believes

that standard unit training may need to address some aspects of peace

operations that differ from more traditional combat operations, such as

the employment of nonlethal systems and equipment. Incorporation of

those aspects can be done, he believes, without degrading the combat

capability of U.S. military forces and may in fact enhance combat

capabilities, based on his past participation in peace operations. While the

General believes that the most effective training for peace operations is

training centered on basic Marine fundamentals, he also believes that

operations other than war are here to stay and that the U.S. military needs

to be able to respond effectively to them.

The General was tasked with forming the command element of a

Combined Task Force to secure the withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers from

Somalia. Operation United Shield, which began in February 1995, involved

the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit—Special Operations Capable (which

at that time was forward-deployed in the Persian Gulf), command staff

from I MEF, and certain other Air Force, Navy, and Army personnel.

Standard training in combat and operations other than war prepared the

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forces for this operation. However, when it became clear that unarmed

hostile elements in Somalia could pose a substantial threat to withdrawing

U.N. forces, the I MEF Commander trained his forces while en route to

Somalia to use nonlethal systems and equipment to provide a graduated

response capability. (Ch. 4 provides detail on nonlethal systems and

equipment.)

As part of its regular training for operations other than war, I MEF has

conducted an exercise in each of the last 2 years, called Emerald Express,

to test, validate, and refine a concept of operations for conducting

emergency humanitarian relief and peace operations. The 1994 exercise

was computer-generated; the 1995 exercise included a two-phase

conference preceding a joint task force-oriented staff exercise. According

to I MEF officials, the Emerald Express exercise will enable I MEF to meet

its required mission as the joint task force for a peace or humanitarian

operation in the U.S. Central Command operating area and will support a

number of longer-term efforts, such as a Commander’s handbook for

humanitarian assistance and peace operations.

The 1995 conference and exercise resulted in a number of

recommendations. In the area of preparedness and training, the summary

report states that disciplined and adaptable military forces are well-suited

to meet the demands of most missions. Nevertheless, the report states that

humanitarian assistance and peace operations require certain skills that

justify increased training emphasis, even though the military currently

trains in most of these areas. In particular, the report recommends that the

military bolster skills in military operations in built-up (urban) areas,

crowd control methods, and negotiating.

Some Commanders

Provide Peace Operations

Training Upon Notice of

Deployment

Some commanders in the Army and the Marine Corps prefer to place

exclusive emphasis on combat-oriented training. They believe that this

training is the best preparation for peace operations, particularly given the

potential that violent scenarios may erupt that will require more

combat-oriented skills. They also believe that peace operations-specific

training can be provided to forces after they have been notified of their

participation in such an operation. Following are descriptions of the

training approaches of the 10th Mountain Division (L) and II MEF.

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10th Mountain Division (L) The Commander of the 10th Mountain Division (L)4, which deployed to

Haiti from September 1994 through January 1995 and participated in the

Somalia peace operation in 1992 and 1993, stated that standard Army

training is the best preparation for peace operations. He believes that

many combat tasks are also applicable to peace operations. During unit

training at home stations and at Army training facilities, the 10th Mountain

Division (L) focused on combat training.

When tasked to respond to a peace operation, the Division has provided

mission-specific training, time permitting, during the period prior to

deployment. The Division received formal notification of its Haiti tasking

approximately 30 days prior to deployment. Based on initial operational

plans, the Division was to make a forced entry.5

 Therefore, preparatory

training had a combat-orientation. It then assembled a group of officials

from the U.S. Atlantic Command, the Army, and other U.S. government

organizations to help prepare the Division for its mission. In early

August 1994, the Division Commander issued training guidance in

preparation for the Haiti mission, including tasks for particular emphasis.

These included

• convoy and convoy security,

• security of nongovernment/private volunteer organizations,

• cordon and search,

• embassy security,

• noncombatant evacuation operations,

• aviation deck qualification (to operate from aircraft carriers),

• air assault,

• strike force operations,

• port security, and

• military operations in urban terrain.

The Division had about 15 days for training once it had analyzed its

mission, built a mission training plan, and accomplished the myriad of

other tasks required to deploy. The tasks were rehearsed through the

combined joint task force and maneuver forces and then carried out in

company level live fire exercises, day and night, involving combined arms,

AC-130s, and Cobra gunships. According to Division officials, the objective

4

During our field work, the Commander retired from the Army. The discussion in this section concerns

the period of time when he was the Commanding General.

5

Due to the last minute agreement reached between the Carter/Nunn/Powell delegation and Lieutenant

General Cedras, Haiti’s military dictator, the landing was executed under peacetime rules of

engagement.

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was to tune the force to the roughest situation that might be encountered,

such as a night fire fight in downtown Port-au-Prince. The soldiers and

leaders would then be ready for whatever might happen.

Some Division units trained to a limited extent on peace

operations-specific conditions during this period, such as dealing with the

local populace, crowd control, use of cayenne pepper spray and riot

control gear, and specifics concerning the cultural environment. Because

of the limited preparation time, however, units primarily stressed standard

combat skills. According to Division personnel we interviewed, the

Division’s previous peace operations experience in Somalia was key to its

ability to deal with some of the challenging peace operations-specific tasks

it undertook in Haiti. However, in a written response to us about

predeployment training, one brigade official stated that crowd control and

country training (e.g., culture and language) should have been stressed

further during predeployment training.

II Marine Expeditionary Force In recent peace operations, Marine forces have provided initial force

presence and then were replaced by other forces, usually Army, that

remained for a longer time period. As a result, some Marine commanders

believe that Marine forces may not need as much special peace operations

training as does the Army. The Commanding General, II MEF, believes that

standard Marine training should maintain a strong combat focus rather

than include additional peace operations tasks. Furthermore, he believes

that standard Marine training already includes some of the tasks Marine

personnel may perform in a peace operation, such as noncombatant

evacuation operations, military operations in urban terrain, and crowd

control, and that more mission-specific training should be provided after

notification of deployment.

In a case recently with one of his units, the limited notification time

prevented much training prior to deployment, but the unit did have time

once in theater to train to special requirements. Specifically, in the

summer of 1994, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Marine Division and other

Marine forces were tasked to respond to worsening conditions in Haiti.

With no more than 3 weeks to prepare, the battalion focused on

high-priority training requirements and on other necessities such as

ensuring all personnel had required immunizations. The battalion

conducted additional training en route and in the Caribbean area of

operation. According to battalion officials, the additional training time was

beneficial, particularly since the unit had received limited predeployment

training. The training included a noncombatant evacuation exercise, a

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tactical recovery of aircrew and personnel, live fire and maneuver training,

and some training in civil disturbance and crowd control techniques.

Notification Time Is

Key in Providing

Training

Units Deploying to

Long-Standing

Peacekeeping Operations

Receive Several Months of

Advance Training

When units are identified well in advance for an operation, special training

has been provided. Units involved in long-standing peacekeeping

operations, such as in Macedonia and in the Sinai, have received extensive

predeployment training. These units are notified from 4 months to 1 year

before their deployment and obtain about 3 months’ training depending on

the type of unit and its function in the operation.

Since July 1993, the U.S. Army, Europe, has regularly supplied between

about 300 and 500 Army personnel, on a 6-month rotation, to support

Operation Able Sentry in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This

U.N. operation requires deployed units to monitor the border areas of

Macedonia, with Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro and report any

development that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia

or threaten its territory. Of the five deployments since June 1993, four

involved mechanized infantry units and one involved an infantry unit. A

mechanized infantry unit typically devotes a majority of its time training

with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Since Operation Able Sentry requires

basic infantry skills, the mechanized infantry units train significantly

differently for this operation than they would for a combat operation

involving their Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

Units deploying to the Sinai as part of a 6-month rotation to the MFO

typically are light infantry units based in the United States. Their primary

mission in the Sinai is to observe and report all military activities in the

area of operations to all parties to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and

Israel. Some of the tasks MFO infantry battalions perform as part of the

mission, and for which they obtain training, include

• conducting vehicle patrols,

• establishing and occupying temporary observation posts, and

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• observing and reporting (1) incidents and possible violations and

(2) navigation of ships through the Strait of Tiran and within the Gulf of

Aqaba.

Training Time Is

Sometimes Limited for

Short-Notice Deployments

When operations result from developing world conditions, initial

deploying units may not have time to conduct special training prior to

deployment. For example, the Marine Corps battalion that deployed to

Haiti in August 1994 received 3 weeks’ notice. Units from the Marine

Corps’ I MEF and the Army’s 10th Mountain Division (L) received fewer

than 3 weeks’ notice before deploying to Somalia in 1992. Initially

deploying units to the 1994 humanitarian operation in Rwanda received

less than 2 weeks official notification of their participation. Under these

circumstances, units tasked to the Haiti and Somalia peace operations

focused on ensuring that priority combat skills and capabilities were

practiced before deployment. They tried to obtain additional training 

en route to the operation and/or in the operating theater. A June 1995

interim report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned confirms that with

little advance notice, units designated for a peace operation spend most of

their time executing their deployment standard operating procedures and

have little time left for special training.

Assessing Impact of

Peace Operations

Training Is Difficult

It is difficult to assess the effect that receiving or not receiving peace

operations training can have on a unit’s ability to carry out its mission in a

peace operation. A number of factors are involved in such an assessment,

including the nature of the operation and the unit’s prior peace operations

experience, if any. In addition, measures of success for a peace operation

are not easily identified. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, for

example, has provided after-action reports and lessons learned, based on

anecdotal information, concerning the positive effect of providing training

in the unique aspects of peace operations. However, there is little evidence

that links the lack of specific training to the failure to perform a task or to

respond effectively to a particular situation.

Despite this difficulty, a growing number of military and nonmilitary

officials are acknowledging that some training in operations other than

war should be incorporated into standard unit training for units likely to

perform these missions because the time may not be available prior to

deployment. The Director of the Army Peacekeeping Institute, for

example, stated that he believes a well-trained and disciplined unit is the

best foundation upon which to prepare for a peace operation, but he

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stated that he also firmly believes that additional peace operations specific

training is needed and that it cannot be delayed until the unit is alerted for

a mission. Other Army and Marine Corps officials with whom we spoke

said that familiarizing military personnel with the types of conditions they

may encounter in a peace operation, on a regular basis, increases

confidence, may benefit combat capabilities, and reduces the likelihood of

incidents that may cause political embarrassment to the United States.

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Capability

Combat skills can atrophy if not used or practiced repeatedly. Each peace

operation offers unique conditions that may affect combat capabilities

differently, depending upon the nature and duration of the mission and

other variables (such as the type of unit involved and skills employed).

These variables also affect the amount of time needed to recover

war-fighting skills after a peace operation. The recovery period is longest

for ground combat forces. According to various senior military

commanders who participated in peace operations, the erosion of combat

proficiency can be alleviated by (1) selecting units with the most

applicable skills for a peace mission, (2) limiting the length of the

deployment by rotating forces if necessary, and (3) providing quality

in-theater training opportunities.

Variety of Factors

Affect Combat

Capability

According to DOD, readiness for combat is the highest priority for U.S.

military forces in order for them to fight and win the nation’s wars, should

deterrence fail. Forces engaged in a peace operation could be called upon

either during or shortly after the operation to redeploy to a higher

intensity conflict where combat skills will be critical to mission success

and the survival of individual service men and women.

Each peace operation differs in terms of its effect on a unit’s combat

capability. Some operations provide excellent experience that can improve

the ability of various types of military units to operate in combat

scenarios; others may benefit only certain types of units. The following

variables determine the extent to which peace operations affect combat

capability and the time needed to recover from a peace operation:

• type of unit,

• skills used/not used,

• length of participation, and

• in-theater training opportunities.

Peace Operations Have

Varying Impact on Military

Units, With Ground

Combat Units Most

Adversely Affected

Of the ground combat forces, mechanized infantry, armored units, and

units that are heavily equipment dependent (such as artillery) face the

greatest combat skill erosion when they participate in a peace operation,

particularly when they participate without their equipment and perform

tasks that are significantly different than the combat tasks to which they

train. This has been the case in recent operations. For example, a

mechanized infantry unit from the 3rd Infantry Division in Europe

experienced significant combat skill degradation during its 6-month

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deployment to Operation Able Sentry in 1994. Most of the required tasks

were different from the unit’s war-fighting tasks. For example, the major

task in Macedonia was to observe and report. However, the unit’s combat

tasks included breaching an obstacle, attacking, defending, and supporting

by fire. The unit deployed without its primary tactical vehicle, the Bradley

Fighting Vehicle, and did not have access to a Bradley simulator while in

Macedonia.1

 Furthermore, U.N. guidelines prohibited the unit from

engaging in maneuver or other collective training in Macedonia. Lack of

training in gunnery and maneuver skills resulted in degraded combat

capabilities. Upon redeployment, the unit received the lowest score in its

divisionwide Bradley qualification test. With 3 months of training, the unit

increased its readiness ranking to satisfactory.

Infantry units also experience combat degradation, particularly in

maneuver and collective skills, when they participate in a peace operation.2

However, the skill degradation is less than for the heavier, more

equipment-dependent units.

In its comments to a draft of this report, DOD noted that the greatest impact

comes from removing a unit from its normal training cycle managed by its

higher headquarters. Each of the services requires repetitive, cyclical

collective training events that are progressive in nature. At the higher end

of this progression, resources such as training areas and ranges, unit

combat equipment, and access to simulators become critical in

maintaining combat capability. In most instances, these resources are not

available at deployed peace operations locations. This problem can be

exacerbated if a unit is separated from its basic combat equipment, as is

the case with Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia. Further, the quality of

the maintenance on that stay-behind combat equipment during the

deployment is key to the eventual retraining process back to a war-fighting

focus upon return.

Support Forces Commanders of Army and Marine Corps support units that have

participated in peace operations stated that the operations did not

significantly degrade their capabilities.3

 In most cases, their capabilities

were enhanced, they said, because the support requirements for a peace

1

Deploying with a simulator would have created a divisionwide shortage of simulators, according to a

Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) official.

2

Maneuver skills involve employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination

with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a mission. Collective skills involve more than one unit operating

together.

3

Support forces include engineer, transportation, logistics, and military police units.

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operation are similar to those for war. For example, officials from the 10th

Division Support Command of the 10th Mountain Division (L) stated that

the Command’s expertise was enhanced by supporting a real logistics

mission. The primary limitation to maintaining skills, according to these

officials, was placing units in static locations as opposed to a fluid

battlefield environment, which requires coordinated actions. Similarly, the

Commander of the 10th Military Police Battalion told us that the Haiti

mission coincided with military police training and doctrine. However,

some skills directly related to the military police combat mission, such as

attack skills, did deteriorate because they were not used in the operation.

The return and maintenance of equipment is an important factor in

restoring combat readiness to support forces, since equipment such as

trucks, engineering equipment, and water purification units is an integral

part of support operations. After participating in the Somalia peace

operation, for example, some 10th Mountain Division (L) support units

encountered readiness difficulties due to the slow return of their

equipment and its poor condition once returned.

Special Operations Forces Representatives from special operations units stated that for Civil Affairs,

Psychological Operations, and most Special Forces units, the skills they

use in peace operations are similar to those they expect to use in war.4

They point out, however, that the different operating conditions may

require that some of their skills be used differently. For example, while

message dissemination is a requirement of Psychological Operations units

in both war and peace operations, the method of dissemination may differ.

Peace operations require more face-to-face contact with the local

population. While peace operations have generally enhanced the combat

capabilities of special operations units, representatives noted that the high

operating tempo since the end of Operation Desert Storm has, in some

cases, made it difficult for personnel to attend schools and accomplish

other requirements to maintain special skills (e.g., languages and other

regional skills).

Peace Operations Offer

Opportunity to Practice

Some Combat Skills, but

Others May Atrophy

Peace operations can provide excellent experience in many of the skills a

light infantry unit might require in a combat operation, such as command

and control, intelligence, logistics, individual and team training,

deployment training, and staff experience. The Commanders of the 10th

Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions (L) stated that their forces received

4

Special operations forces include Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Ranger

units.

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Capability

valuable experience by participating in the Haiti peace operation and that

many capabilities improved by participation. In responding to a question

from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs concerning his division’s combat

readiness, the Commander of the 25th Infantry Division (L) stated that

because of this participation, the Division’s overall mission capability

improved from a 7+ score (on a 10-point scale) before deployment to a 

9 afterwards.

While participating in a peace operation can improve a unit’s overall

operating capabilities, certain skills and capabilities may be degraded

because they are not practiced during the operation. According to the 

I MEF Commander, the skills at greatest risk for atrophy during an

operation other than war are technical skills that are not employed and

maneuver skills that require close coordination and integration. In Haiti,

there was no need for artillery, air defense, or Tube-launched,

Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missile fire, nor was there an

opportunity to practice those skills at a training range. The 10th Mountain

Division (L) deployed with some of its artillery personnel, but they

performed staff, security, and miscellaneous functions. Since the

personnel did not deploy with their howitzers, they could not engage in

fire support activities or train with their primary mission equipment. Upon

return from Haiti, artillery units rated lowest (along with air defense) of all

10th Mountain units in combat readiness. However, according to unit

commanders, the units recertified their ability to deliver artillery fire

within 6 weeks.

Even light infantry forces that participate in peace operations do not

always have the opportunity to fully use the skills they might encounter in

war. For example, the static security mission in Haiti (guarding the

Presidential Palace and other key facilities) required only limited combat

skills; however, commanders rotated military personnel to the training

range on a regular basis where they could practice to some extent the

skills not used in the actual operation.

Traditional peacekeeping operations, such as those ongoing in the Sinai

and in Macedonia, involve significantly different operating conditions than

can be expected in war, and many combat skills cannot be exercised. In

the Sinai, for example, U.S. battalion-size light infantry units are assigned

to the MFO for 6-month rotations to operate checkpoints and observation

posts and conduct reconnaissance patrols in security zones within the

Sinai Desert, Egypt, and Israel along the international border. While some

skills such as common soldier skills, individual weapons proficiency, land

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navigation, and situation reporting can be practiced during MFO

deployments, training for many combat skills, particularly at the company

level and above, is prohibited under the terms of U.S. participation in the

MFO. According to MFO officials, the following training cannot be conducted

during MFO deployments:

• movement to contact (at company level and above),5

• military operations in urban terrain,

• crew-served weapons,

• platoon-level patrolling,

• ambushes,

• secure communications, and

• airborne/airmobile operations.

DOD sources stated that once MFO units return to their home stations, they

generally require a month to restore individual skills and up to 3 months to

restore collective skills.

The Longer a Unit

Participates in a Peace

Operation the Greater the

Adverse Effect on Combat

Skills

Unit commanders estimated that missions lasting 4 to 6 months and longer

are more likely to cause more significant degradation of combat readiness

and require more extensive restoration periods than shorter missions. The

Commanders of the 10th Mountain Division (L) and the 25th Light Infantry

Division (L) attributed the relatively limited combat degradation of their

units during the Haiti operation in part to their limited

participation—about 4 months each. Similarly, the average deployment

time for Army units participating in the Somalia operation was 3 to 4

months. Units remaining beyond that time experienced more significant

combat skill degradation, according to unit commanders. Because the

Marine Corps’ role in peace operations generally has been of shorter

duration than the Army’s, the impact on Marine Corps combat skills has

been relatively minimal, according to Marine officials. In Haiti, for

example, the Marine Corps’ mission was to establish a secure and stable

environment in the Cap-Haitien area of northern Haiti. Since they were

replaced by Army troops after only about 2 weeks in-country, commanders

said that combat skills deteriorated very little and recovered quickly once

training resumed.

5

Movement to contact means finding and engaging the enemy.

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Establishing In-Theater

Training Opportunities

Reduces Combat Skill

Erosion

Recent peace operations have provided various opportunities for

in-theater training, particularly in individual skills. According to the I MEF

Commanding General, for example, commanders need to be creative and

take the initiative with regard to in-theater training. He firmly believes that

in most cases, in-theater training can be provided to minimize combat skill

loss.

In Haiti, 10th Mountain and 25th Light Infantry Division (L) personnel

rotated regularly to a sophisticated training facility constructed at a former

Haitian military firing range. The facility enabled units to conduct live fire

and maneuver training. According to 25th Infantry Division (L) officials,

infantry companies trained 2 or 3 days every 3 weeks, time permitting, and

support unit training occurred at the squad and team levels as time

allowed. This prevented skill loss, particularly for infantry personnel

assigned static security missions where they could not utilize all of their

infantry capabilities.

During the 1992-93 peace operation in Somalia, numerous training sites

were available to reduce combat skill atrophy. While the sites were not as

sophisticated as the training facility in Haiti, forces were still able to

practice individual weapon skills.

While in-theater training facilities enable general infantry forces to

maintain many of their combat skills, these facilities typically have not

provided training opportunities, beyond basic soldier skills, for artillery

and mechanized infantry personnel that participate in peace operations.

Using combat simulators is a way to obtain this training; however,

simulators have not always been available to deploying units, as in the

case discussed earlier of mechanized units that deployed to Macedonia.

Some Army commanders are making an effort not to deploy units whose

primary mission skills will degrade significantly by participating in a peace

operation. Because of a need for personnel, the 10th Mountain Division

Commander used artillery personnel to perform miscellaneous functions

in Haiti; however, they generally did not stay for more than 

2 months at a time.

Recovery Period Is

Longest for Ground

Combat Forces

According to the Secretary of Defense, it is difficult to estimate the

amount of time required to restore a unit’s combat effectiveness across the

full range of missions after participating in a peace operation because

restoration time varies greatly depending on the nature of the operation

and the type of unit involved. While each peace operation is different,

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Army commanders generally estimate a range of 3 to 6 months to fully

restore a unit’s war-fighting readiness after a peace operation. This period

includes block leave (usually 2 weeks), administrative duties, return and

maintenance of equipment, and retraining in combat skills. In addition, a

large amount of personnel turbulence can occur during this period,

particularly if it is summer. After returning from an operation, personnel

often move to other units, change jobs, or attend required training courses

at service schools. This turbulence affects the ability of the unit to return

to combat ready status. Table 3.1 shows the various phases a unit goes

through while returning to combat readiness.

Table 3.1: Phases Involved in a Unit’s

Return to Combat Readiness Phase Time requireda Common issues

Initial recovery 1-2 weeks Equipment accountability, weapon

maintenance, administrative

responsibilities, and family time.

Block leave 2 weeks Rest and recuperation.

Maintenance Light combat arms:

30 days, heavy

combat arms and

combat support: 3-6

months, combat

service support:

2-6 months

Total repair and maintenance of unit

equipment. May be delayed by slow return

of equipment.

Personnel

restructuring

3 months A very large number of permanent changes

of station will occur, changes of position

and command at all levels, and many

personnel will go to schooling delayed

because of the deployment.

Individual training 4-6 weeks Weapon qualification, renewal of basic

military occupational specialty skills, and

small unit exercises.

Collective training All combat arms

and some combat

support: 8-10

weeks, other

combat support and

combat service

support: 2-4 weeks

Tactical field training, including live-fire

exercises and gunnery for heavy units. This

training is in preparation for a major

combat training center exercise.

Transportation of

equipment

1-6 months Most major items of equipment will arrive

within 30-45 days of shipment, but some do

take longer.

Source: Center For Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

aMany of these phases run concurrently.

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The 3-to-6 month recovery period is based on units’ rotating or redeploying

from a peace operation absent the requirement to reinforce other forces

involved in a major regional conflict. Under more urgent conditions,

according to DOD, the recovery period would almost certainly be shortened

by freezing reassignments, curtailing leave and nonessential temporary

duty, and taking other measures. As previously noted, the recovery time

for Marine ground combat forces generally has been less because the

Marine Corps’ participation has been for shorter duration. For all ground

combat forces, maneuver and collective skills require the greatest

attention once participation in a peace operation is completed.

After participating in the Haiti operation, combat skills for Army ground

combat forces were restored in about 3 months. In assessing the condition

of their divisions following participation, the Commanders of the 10th

Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions (L), whose units were in Haiti for

approximately 4 months, believed that it would take about 3 months for

their Divisions to return to combat ready status.6

The Commander of the 10th Mountain Division (L) reported the Division

as combat ready on May 1, 1995, about 90 days after returning from its

4-month deployment to Haiti. He attributed the relatively quick recovery

period in part to the limited deployment time—from September 1994 to

January 1995, the high level of readiness beforehand, and the construction

of a live fire range in Haiti. Of key battlefield capabilities, fire support and

air defense, in particular, required the most training because they were not

practiced in Haiti. During the restoration period, the Commander

emphasized the need for division and brigade combined arms operations

and synchronization of all operating systems. In addition, collective

training needed emphasis, with an objective of building up to rigorous

brigade-level combat exercises scheduled for October and November 1995

at the Army’s JRTC. Although the Division was designated as combat ready,

unit commanders have identified key mission essential tasks that still

require a training emphasis. In April 1995, for example, both brigade

commanders assessed the movement to contact, attack, and defend tasks

as requiring additional training.

The 25th Infantry Division (L), which replaced the 10th Mountain Division

(L) in Haiti, reported some atrophy in skills not practiced in Haiti such as

maneuver (company level and above), combined arms integration,

marksmanship, and rapid strategic deployment procedures. Upon

6

The 10th Mountain Division (L) was in Haiti from approximately September 1994 through

January 1995. The 25th Infantry Division (L) replaced the 10th Mountain Division in January, and most

remained until April 1995.

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redeployment, the Division planned to concentrate its training effort on

these four skills. Division officials estimated that battalion size units

would be combat ready after one 6-week training cycle. Building up to

higher level unit readiness would take longer. For example, the

Commander of the 2nd Brigade, who returned from Haiti in June 1995,

stated that it would take about 3 months for his brigade to be

combat-ready. The brigade could have been ready in 1 month if it had been

able to focus exclusively on training. However, other obligations, such as

assuming guard and other miscellaneous duties, supporting National

Guard annual training, attending required schools, and taking leave, meant

that the brigade could not train continually. Furthermore, the Division was

reorganized, which disrupted the remaining two brigades through

downsizing. According to the 2nd Brigade Commander, indirect fire

(artillery and mortars) and maneuver integration were the functions most

degraded as a result of the Haiti peace operation. Although the brigade

attained a combat ready status by the end of August 1995, he estimates

that the brigade will be fully trained in all mission essential tasks by

November or December 1995.

Aviation Forces Less

Affected by Peace

Operations, but Combat

Skill Restoration Is Still

Needed

The aviation skills required for war are not substantially different from

those required for peace operations. However, the flying conditions are

sufficiently different that retraining is required for most aircrew members

to restore combat proficiency. In March 1995,7

 we reported that peace

operations have resulted in (1) missed training exercises that provide the

most realistic combat training; (2) waivers for aircrews who could not

complete required training events; and (3) shortages of aircraft at home

stations, which limit training opportunities. The Air Force has taken some

measures to reduce the stress on their aviation units, but the operational

requirements of peace operations still affect their ability to train for more

combat-oriented missions.

Aircrews flying extended hours in peace operations sometimes do not get

the opportunity to train to the broad range of skills necessary for

maintaining combat proficiency. U.S. Air Forces in Europe said that

participation in peace operations requires most aircrews to retrain in one

or more combat events, such as air-to-air (basic fighter maneuvers, air

combat, and low altitude intercepts) or air-to-ground (weapon delivery,

surface attack, and terrain following radar at low levels). As a result, it can

take up to a month to ready these aircrews for a major conflict. The Air

7

Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts

(GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).

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Force believes the erosion of combat proficiency is manageable in the

short term by expanding the involvement of other units, particularly from

the United States, to allow participating units time to recover sufficiently

from an operation.

Due to Operation Deny Flight, F-15E squadrons forward deployed in

Aviano, Italy, had to defer much of their normal training in fiscal year

1994. Consequently, as of September 1994, all major war-fighting skills

were degraded, and half the pilots had not dropped a practice bomb 

2 months into the training cycle. F-15E and F-15C squadrons from

Lakenheath, United Kingdom, said that although 4- to 6-week rotations

help minimize the erosion of combat proficiency, over the long-term pilots

progress more slowly in their training for high-threat scenarios because of

periodic deployments to peace operations. They pointed out that

postponing or canceling major live-fire exercises, as was done in 1994,

exacerbates the problem. Because of Operations Deny Flight and Provide

Comfort,8

 the squadrons would need 3 weeks of combat training to be

ready for a major conflict. According to Air Force officials at Lakenheath,

no major exercise participation had been deferred or canceled in fiscal

year 1995.

F-15C, F-16, and A-10 squadrons based in Spangdahlem, Germany, also

encountered difficulty in maintaining currency on selected training events

as a result of their participation in peace operations. The recovery period

for an individual varied from a day or 2, to up to 3 weeks, depending on

the length of the peace operation deployment. One A-10 squadron

commander estimated a 4-week retraining period would be required to

regain full combat readiness. The only EF-111 squadron in the Air Force

participated in Operations Deny Flight, Provide Comfort, and Southern

Watch.9

 EF-111 crews gained valuable experience during the operations,

but they did not get to practice low-level flight, terrain following radar, or

emergency procedures. Squadron officials said several sorties would be

needed to prepare for combat.

As with the Air Force, representatives of the naval air community said that

peace operations interrupt combat training and that patrolling no-fly

zones, for example, provides minimum combat training value. Also, quality

8

Operation Deny Flight is a peace operation in support of the U.N. no-fly zone over

Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mission of Operation Provide Comfort is to provide safe havens for the

population of northern Iraq.

9

The mission of Operation Southern Watch, a peace operation, is to monitor the repression of the

southern Iraq population.

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training time is difficult to obtain during peace operations either because

of flying restrictions (e.g., no bombing runs or low-altitude flight) or

because of the lack of time. These operations have required naval aviation

units to compress the time typically devoted to combat training.

Army and Marine Corps helicopter personnel have encountered similar

experiences in peace operations as personnel flying fixed-wing aircraft.

While they agree that peace operations can erode combat readiness, they

stressed that each operation is different in terms of skills used and not

used. According to 10th Mountain Division (L) officials, the Somalia

operation provided excellent training in helicopter attack, assault, and

support skills. The Haitian operation provided more limited experience.

For example, attack helicopters in Haiti had a surveillance, force presence,

and security role but did not engage in scenarios using more

combat-oriented skills. Unlike in combat, they flew high and slowly. At

night they used lights. While there were some training opportunities for

attack helicopters to practice low level, instrument, and night flying in

Haiti, as the mission progressed, assault and lift helicopters were in great

demand, and aircrews had little time to engage in more combat-oriented

skills. Some Army and Marine Corps helicopter pilots expressed concern

that certifications such as flying with night vision goggles could lapse

during peace operations. However, they pointed out that recertification

could be obtained quickly after returning to home station.

Naval Training Cycle

Disrupted

Peace operations have affected the Navy through lost training

opportunities and disrupted training schedules. Forward-deployed Navy

and Marine forces are designed so that they can respond rapidly to

contingency operations, such as peace operations, as well as to

war-fighting requirements. Deployed naval forces regularly participate in

Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard in Southern Europe and

Operation Southern Watch in Southwest Asia. Recent peace operations in

the Caribbean, however, required that nondeployed ships and crews be

used to meet mission requirements. In these cases, ships and their crews

were pulled out of basic training and sent to the Caribbean, generally

anywhere from 2 weeks to 3 months, with 1 month being the average.10

According to the Navy, ships were also pulled off other operations and

other ships had to rapidly fill the holes, affecting the entire Atlantic Fleet

schedule.

10Basic training lasts approximately 6 months and consists of various aspects such as ship

maintenance, independent steaming operations, propulsion examinations, and missile exercises.

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According to the Navy, this domino effect disrupted the entire training

program. Maintenance and training schedules were accelerated, shifted, or

deleted as a result of participating in these operations, creating a bow

wave of requirements that will carry through fiscal year 1995 and beyond.

For example, the Navy estimated that training for the USS Roosevelt

carrier battle group was reduced by 20 percent due to the Caribbean

operations. According to the Navy, although priority scheduling and a

compressed training period aided the participating ships in attaining

predeployment readiness status, the stress of having ships participate in

these peace operations at the same time they were to be preparing for

their regular 6-month deployments was a factor in the Navy’s recent

decision to create a special force to handle naval operations in the

Western Hemisphere.

Navy officials said it is difficult to quantify the impact of lost or delayed

training opportunities on combat readiness since various factors affect

how a unit performs during its 6-month deployment. According to naval

officials, some ships pulled from basic training have not performed as well

as other ships on the Combat Systems Inspection, the Total Ship

Survivability Test, and the Operational Propulsion Planning Exam—the

final evaluations before moving on to intermediate training. Also, naval

officials believe that participation in these operations has been a

significant drain on the crews and their families because the time ships

spend in port has been reduced. The time spent in the Caribbean and any

make-up training have come out of this period.

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DOD Is Identifying Equipment and

Technology Requirements

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and DOD

research organizations have been cooperating to identify requirements for

applying higher technology to operations other than war as well as to

combat. DOD agencies and offices have issued several reports1

 that discuss

equipment and technology requirements relevant to such operations. The

requirements center on three broad classifications: (1) force protection,

(2) equipment for military operations in urban areas, and (3) nonlethal2

weapons. The Army has conducted much of the research and development

toward meeting the requirements and is cooperating with the Marine

Corps in studying how to apply new technology to urban warfare. The field

is evolving, and to date the new technology has been used in only one

peace operation.

Force Protection

Requirements

Because U.S. military vehicles have been vulnerable to land mines and

rocket-propelled grenades, the Army has been developing ways for

vehicles to provide better protection. An improved armored HUMVEE will

help protect Army and Marine Corps personnel against some types of land

mines, armored tiles have been tested that can help protect personnel in

Bradley Fighting Vehicles from rocket propelled grenades and other

munitions, and a new armored security vehicle will enhance the protection

of military police. Research and development requirements to improve

force protection include methods to locate and neutralize explosives

through the use of robotics, unmanned vehicles, air sampling, chemical

trace detection, and imaging. Another requirement is better protective

armor for individuals against small arms fire or shell fragments.

Equipment for

Military Operations in

Urban Areas

An Advanced Research Projects Agency report placed priority on the

following requirements to improve the capabilities of U.S. forces for

operations other than war, which often occur in urban areas:

• advanced night vision equipment to improve current limitations in spatial

orientation, range, weight, and power;

1

A May 1994 Advanced Research Projects Agency report listed 27 technology requirements for

operations other than war. A November 1994 Defense Science Board task force report identified

required capabilities for military operations in urban areas. And a classified 1995 paper by the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict listed a number

of existing and conceptual technologies required for low-intensity conflict.

2

We use the term “nonlethal” because it is the most widely used and accepted term within DOD. As

acknowledged in DOD’s draft policy on nonlethal weapons, use of such weapons may inadvertently

result in fatalities. The Marine Corps prefers to use the term less lethal because it believes the term

more accurately reflects the nature of these systems.

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• low-signature unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance, intelligence

gathering, chemical testing, communications, and deceptions;

• mission-kill devices to disrupt equipment or weapons;

• invisible soldier technology to avoid detection by sensors or night vision

devices;

• reduced visibility aircraft to insert and retrieve troops and equipment in

hostile areas; and

• common language voice recognition translator to translate English

language voice communications into a foreign language (and the reverse)

in real time.

Among the additional desired capabilities—when technology and

resources permit—were antimortar, antisniper, stand-off precision

breaching, underground facilities destruction, and see-through capability

for buildings.

It is likely that future operations at any level of intensity will involve urban

areas; thus, the Army and the Marine Corps plan to jointly sponsor a

demonstration project (starting in fiscal year 1996) intended in part to

show what types of technologies can be applied to military operations in

urban areas. There are a number of potential applications of technology to

such operations. The Marine Corps, for example, is interested in improving

its artillery target acquisition capabilities, perhaps by combining cellular

communications technology with global positioning system technology.

According to a Marine Corps official, examples of potential applications of

technology to military operations in urban areas include

• reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition;

• situational awareness;

• communications;

• navigation;

• discriminate application of power;

• antisniper;

• mission planning; and

• combat service support.

Nonlethal Weapons Nonlethal weapons are particularly applicable to the lower end of the

spectrum of conflict: humanitarian and peace operations. The weapons

can be used to discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions, and they can

help prevent or limit the escalation of violence or allow military

intervention where lethal force would be undesirable. For example, sticky

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DOD Is Identifying Equipment and

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or slippery substances can be used to impede the mobility of hostile

forces, and nonlethal munitions can be used to control crowds or deal

with combatants who are intermingled with civilians. Further, nonlethal

weapons can help protect U.S. forces. At the higher end of the spectrum,

nonlethal weapons may also be applicable in certain situations to deny an

enemy the use of assets without destroying them or to avoid costly

reconstruction of infrastructure after the conflict.

Army Researching

Applications of New

Nonlethal Weapons

The Dismounted Battlespace Battle Laboratory at the Army Infantry

School, Fort Benning, Georgia, has the key responsibility within the Army

for identifying user needs for nonlethal weapons throughout the Army.

Because of its familiarity with the use of nonlethal weapons in law

enforcement, the Military Police School at Fort McClellan, Alabama, has

also played an important role in identifying nonlethal technology. Through

a Nonlethal Requirements Working Group, the Army has brought together

representatives of the Army Training and Doctrine Command and the

Army Materiel Command to plan for the use of nonlethal weapons.

In the near term (1995-97), the Army is researching and developing

technologies such as nonpenetrating projectiles, less-than-lethal

antipersonnel mines, foams and nets that entangle and immobilize

individuals, stun weapons to subdue or immobilize personnel, low-energy

lasers to temporarily disrupt vision, and calmative agents to incapacitate

personnel. For the long term (1997 and beyond), the Army has identified

technology programs to ensnare vehicles with nets and meshes, make

traction difficult, disable or destroy engines, prevent the movement of

personnel with super adhesives, disorient and confuse personnel with

high-intensity pulse lights, and disorient or incapacitate personnel with

noise.

Because peace operations usually take place in urban environments and,

therefore, involve combatants and noncombatant civilians, technology and

equipment requirements are predominantly a ground force issue. The Air

Force and the Navy have not been as involved in identifying technology

that applies to operations other than war because they operate similarly in

peace operations and combat operations. However, the Advanced

Research Projects Agency report suggested that technological

improvements will be needed to improve force projection capabilities

through all-weather, low-cost strategic airlift platforms to rapidly transport

multipurpose forces. The aircraft characteristics would include high

speed, high payload, long-range, and quick turn-around delivery. The

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report also suggests an offshore airlift and sealift capability in terms of a

floating logistics base that can be used for uninterrupted sustainment of

on-shore operations while minimizing the exposure of personnel and

equipment in-theater.

Marines Used Nonlethal

Weapons in Withdrawal

From Somalia

The first use of nonlethal equipment by U.S. forces occurred during

Operation United Shield to safely withdraw U.N. forces from Somalia. In

planning for the mission, the force Commander was concerned about the

potential intermingling of combatants with noncombatants in Somalia, a

tactic used by armed militiamen in the past. He decided to use nonlethal

weapons to avoid harming unarmed civilians and to keep mobs away from

U.S. or U.N. positions and activities.

Marines applied sticky foam, aqueous foam, and road spikes to help

protect the forces withdrawing from Somalia. These nonlethal weapons

were used as obstacles and barriers to prevent Somalis from coming into

direct contact with U.S. and U.N. forces. A number of other such weapons

were available had the situation required their use. For example, the

Marines brought stinger grenades and a variety of nonlethal munitions,

including rubber pellet cartridges, bean bag rounds, foam rubber rounds,

and wooden baton rounds. The Marines also had lasers for illumination

and targeting purposes.

The Commander obtained approval within the Marine Corps to acquire

and provide training on nonlethal systems. DOD authorized the use of

selected lower technology nonlethal weapons in Somalia under rules of

engagement similar to those for using lethal weapons. Because the

nonlethal weapons were not standard and approved systems, Marine

Corps officials reported delays in obtaining approval for using the

equipment and in receiving the rules of engagement. Some higher

technology items were not approved for use because they were not fully

developed and tested or because of legal and policy concerns. These items

included blinding lasers (which destroy or degrade optics or electronic

devices) and several antipersonnel systems such as dazzling lasers, low

frequency infrasound, and radio frequency systems.

The Marine Corps formed a team that (1) developed and provided training

on nonlethal systems and tactics to a selected battalion and (2) served as

advisors in Somalia. One company within the battalion was designated as

the primary force to use nonlethal equipment ashore. Marines from this

company, however, also carried lethal weapons or lethal ammunition that

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could be used in lieu of nonlethal weapons or munitions if the situation

required the use of deadly force. In addition, other Marines were armed

with lethal weapons to ensure force protection. The unit equipped with

nonlethal weapons received about 30 days of training on the equipment.

The Marine Corps learned a number of lessons from its experience with

nonlethal technology in Somalia. In responding to our questions on the use

on nonlethal equipment, senior I MEF officials who planned and

participated in the operation stated that the experience revealed

shortcomings in the U.S. capability to identify and deploy military

nonlethal systems. Specifically, because a joint task force commander

should have a wide range of alternatives to control belligerents, they

stated that nonlethal systems need to be developed and acquired in

sufficient quantities to deploy with a task force.

In a written response to us, the I MEF Commanding General expressed the

need for separate, distinct, and flexible rules of engagement for nonlethal

weapons and for training exercises to stress rules of engagement decisions

at the tactical level. According to the response, limiting the use of less

lethal technologies to the same conditions as deadly force in the rules of

engagement caused confusion at all levels during Operation United Shield

and was self-defeating. The systems could only be used under the same

circumstances as lethal weapons, which would be when the security

situation had already become critical. While the Marines made the

situation work, it was not how they would have preferred to operate,

according to the Commanding General. In responding to a draft of this

report, DOD took issue with I MEF’s position on rules of engagement, stating

that there should be one clear, unambiguous set of rules of engagement.

Because nonlethal weapons are new and evolving, neither the Marine

Corps nor any other service has doctrine or training standards for their

use. Consequently, to ensure the availability of nonlethal equipment and

trained personnel for future operations, the officials recognized the need

for doctrine, training, and approved nonlethal systems.

The officials also suggested that public information on the military’s use of

nonlethal weapons needs to convey that nonlethal means will be used to

control unarmed crowds and will not substitute for deadly force when it is

justified. Also, personnel using nonlethal weapons will always be

protected by others armed with lethal weapons. Lastly, the Marines

learned how certain equipment is best used, and they pointed out that the

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decision to employ nonlethal options needs to be made at the lowest

possible level due to the fluidity of situations and short response time.

Policy on Nonlethal

Weapons Is Being

Developed

Nonlethal weapons present unique legal and policy concerns. Because of

these concerns, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has drafted a policy

statement—currently under review—governing the use of nonlethal

weapons. The draft policy defines nonlethal weapons and would establish

the policy of using them to allow the maximum possible flexibility in the

employment of U.S. military forces across the spectrum of conflict. It

points out that nonlethal weapons might be used in some circumstances to

achieve military or political objectives while minimizing human fatalities

and undesired harm to property or the environment. In operations other

than war, the draft policy states that nonlethal weapons can be used to

discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; limit escalation; take military

action where intervention is desirable but use of lethal force would be

inappropriate; and better protect U.S. forces once deployed. Nonlethal

weapons can provide an effective, reversible, or more humanitarian means

of denying an enemy the use of human and material assets and may also

reduce the postwar economic cost of rebuilding.

The draft policy places responsibility on the military services for

developing and acquiring nonlethal weapons and developing doctrine,

employment concepts, tactics, training, and logistics support for fielded

systems. Priority is to be placed on acquiring the technology to support the

following tasks:

• neutralizing combatants intermingled with noncombatants;

• controlling crowds;

• disabling or disrupting military logistics;

• disabling or disrupting communication, transportation, and energy

infrastructure; and

• incapacitating/immobilizing weapons or weapon development and

production processes.

The military services recognize the need to develop doctrine and training

programs for this rapidly developing technology. The Army Training and

Doctrine Command has drafted a concept paper for nonlethal capabilities

in Army operations. It points out that crowd control in conducting

peacekeeping and humanitarian operations is as likely a task for the Army

as is destroying enemy armor and infantry forces in war. The paper

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Chapter 4 

DOD Is Identifying Equipment and

Technology Requirements

discusses how the Army will use nonlethal capabilities as a component of

“overwhelming, decisive power” in military operations at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels and describes implications for doctrine,

training, leadership development, organization, materiel, and support.

Types of capabilities needed include those that (1) immobilize, disorient,

impair, or disperse people; (2) disable systems; (3) provide security and

surveillance; and (4) attack material support systems and infrastructure.

The Marine Corps’ experience with nonlethal weapons in Somalia

underscored the need to ensure the proper use of nonlethal equipment in

the future. On the basis of lessons identified from I MEF, the Marine Corps

is considering doctrine for the use of nonlethal weapons.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with a draft of this report but noted that it should include

discussions of (1) peace operations training that has been conducted as

part of the Partnership for Peace Program and (2) reserve force

participation in peace operations. We have revised the report to include

information about training provided by recent Partnership for Peace

initiatives. We also revised our Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

section to state that we did not report on reserve component participation

in peace operations because the training provided for these missions was

not significantly different than training for standard reserve missions, and,

except in a few cases, the number of reserve component forces

participating in these operations was relatively small.

DOD took issue with I MEF’s view described in our report concerning rules

of engagement for the employment of nonlethal weapons, stating that

there should be one clear, unambiguous set of rules of engagement. We

believe that the difference of views within DOD on this matter underscores

the evolving nature of nonlethal technology and the need for DOD to

examine this issue further, particularly with regard to the operational use

of this technology.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director

Steven H. Sternlieb, Assistant Director

M. Elizabeth Guran, Evaluator-in-Charge

Richard A. McGeary, Senior Evaluator

European Office,

Frankfurt, Germany

Inez M. Azcona, Senior Evaluator

David G. Artadi, Evaluator

(701054) Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-96-14 Peace Operations
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