CAUSE NO. 13-14-00570-CY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 

JAMES WILKINS, 

Appellant 

V. 

NIJECES COUNTY, TEXAS, 

Appellee 

On Appeal from Cause No. 2013-DCV-5868-D, 

In the 105 th Judicial District Court of 

Nueces County, Texas 

APPELLEE'S BRIEF 

LAURA GARZA JIMENEZ, 

NUECES COUNTY ATTORNEY 

BY: JENNY CRON 

Assistant County Attorney 

State Bar No. 00796237 

JUAN J. MALDONADO, III 

Assistant County Attorney 

State Bar No. 24083436 

901 Leopard, Room 207 

Corpus Christi, TX 78401 

(361) 888-0391 

(361) 888-0577 (fax) 

APPELLEE WAIVES ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

ORAL ARGUMENT 

ACCEPTED

13-14-00570-CV

THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

11/6/2015 3:05:28 PM

Dorian E. Ramirez

CLERK

 FILED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS 11/6/2015 3:05:28 PM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk
CAUSE NO. 13-14-00570-CY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 

JAMES WILKINS 

Appellant 

V. 

NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, 

Appellee 

On Appeal from Cause No. 2013-DCV-5868-D, 

In the 105th Judicial District Court of 

Nueces County, Texas 

APPELLEE'S BRIEF 

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF 

APPEALS: 

COMES NOW APPELLEE, NTJECES COUNTY, TEXAS, files this its Brief, and 

respectfully shows: 

1 
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

Mr. James Wilkins, Appellant 

Pro Se 

TDJC: 01970009 

SID: 10123934 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice 

Fabian Dale Dominguez State Jail 

6535 Cagnon Road 

San Antonio, Texas, 78252-2202 

Nueces County, Texas, Appellee 

Jenny Cron, Counsel for Appellee 

Assistant Nueces County Attorney 

State Bar No. 00785653 

Juan J. Maldonado, Counsel for Appellee 

Assistant Nueces County Attorney 

State Bar No. 24083436 

901 Leopard, Rm. 207 

Corpus Christi, TX 78401 

(361) 888-0391 

(361) 888-0577 Facsimile 

2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL .2 

TABLEOF CONTENTS .......................................................................................3,4 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................ 5,6,7,8 

STATEMENTOF THE CASE .................................................................................9 

RESPONSE TO ISSUES PRESENTED ................................................................. 10 

STATEMENTOF FACTS......................................................................................11 

I. Statement of Procedural History .....................................................................11,12 

II. Underlying Facts (Rebuttal) .........................................................................12,13 

STANDARD OF REVIEW.....................................................................................13 

I. Plea to the Jurisdiction .........................................................................................13 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT............................................................13,14,15 

ARGUMENT..................................................................................................... 15-29 

I. Plea to the Jurisdiction Pursuant to Governmental Immunity .............................15 

A. Preliminary Matter.................................................................................... 15,16,17 

B. Texas Tort Claims Act CPRC § 101.021 ......................................................17,18 

C. Requisite Waiver of Immunity Elements under CPRC§ 101.021(1 )(A)(B) ......18 

i. "Arises From" Motor-Driven Equipment & Vehicles ..................................18,19 

ii. Motor-Driven Vehicle or Equipment..................................................................19 

iii. Operation or Use ................................................................................................19 

1 
D. Requisite Waiver of Immunity Elements under CPRC § 101.021(2).................20 

i. Tangible Personal Property ..................................................................................20 

ii. Caused By ......................................................................................................20,2 1 

iii. Use of Property ..................................................................................................21 

iv. Were it a Private Person .....................................................................................22 

E. Application to Issues Presented .....................................................................22-29 

i. Subject Mailer Jurisdiction...................................................................................22 

a. CPRC §101.0121(1)(A)(B) ............................................................................22,23 

b. CPRC 101.0121(2) ............................................................................................23 

ii. Non-compliance to Rule of Texas Commission on Jail Standards.....................23 

a.Rule 277.8 Bedding & Linens..................................................... 23,24,25 

b.Rule 259.138 Holding Cells............................................................. 25,26 

iii. Alleged Negligent Misrepresentation, Fraud & Forgery ..............................26,27 

iv. Personal Injury .............................................................................................28,29 

II. Conclusion Concerning Plea to the Jurisdiction.................................................29 

PRAYER.................................................................................................................29 

SIGNATUREOF COUNSEL .................................................................................30 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................................31 

CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE................................................................................32 

APPENDIX.............................................................................................................33 

11 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

STATE STATUTES AND RULES 

37 TEx. ADMIN. CODE §§ 251-301 (West 2015)......................................................22 

37 TEx. ADMIN. CODE §297.9 (West 2015) .............................................................24 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (West 2015)..............................17,18 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(1)(A)(B) (West 2015) ..............18,22 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (West 2015) ............................. 23 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057 (West 2015) ........................21,26,27 

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(d) ............................................................................................9 

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) ............................................................................................16 

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g) ...........................................................................................11 

Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B) ..............................................................................9,11 

CASES 

Bland-I.S.D. v. Blue, 

34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) ....................................................................................13 

Boyles v. Kerr, 

855 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tex. 1993) ..........................................................................25 

Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 

696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.1985) ...........................................................................25 

City off. Richland Hills v. Friend, 

370 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex. 2012) .....................................................................2 1,23 

City of Tyler v. Likes, 

962 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. 1997) .....................................................................22,24 

Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 

968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998) ...................................................................19,21,24,25 

5 
Dallas v. Harper, 

913 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1995) ...................................................................................20 

Duhart v. State, 

610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. 1980) ..........................................................................28 

Estate of Banks v. Chambers Mern'l Hosp. Auxiliary, Inc., 

865 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1989) ..................................................................................21 

Federal Land Bank Assoc. v. Sloane, 

825 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.1991) ...................................................................................29 

Fed. Sign. v. Tex. S. Univ., 

951 S.W.2d 401, 409 (Tex. 1997) ..........................................................................28 

Griffin v. Hawn, 

161 Tex. 422, 341 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1960) ...........................................................28 

Hernandez v. Hernandez, 

318 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex.App.—E1 Paso 2010, no pet.) .....................................16 

Hosner v. DeYoung, 

iTex. 764, 769 (1847) ...........................................................................................28 

Inpetco, Inc. v. Texas Am. Bank/Houston N.A., 

722 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ refused) ...............16 

In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 

166 S.W.3d 7321 737 (Tex. 2005) ..........................................................................16 

Kassen v. Hatley, 

887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994) ......................................................................................19 

Kaufman County v. Leggett, 

396 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) ....................................17 

Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 

923 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1996) .........................................................................19,21,23 

Kirk v. Garza, 

875 S.W.2d 24, 24 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) ................16 
Lowe v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 

809 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) ...............20 

Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 

573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) ......................................................................16 

Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 

453 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex. 1970) .....................................................................28 

Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg By & Through Lindburg, 

766 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1989) ..................................................................................19 

Russell v. Texas Department of Human Resources, 

746 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied) .........................21 

Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 

453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015), reWg denied (Mar. 13, 2015) .......................... 18 

San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 

128 S.W.3d 244, 246 (Tex.2004) ...........................................................................19 

Tex. Dep 't of Grim. Justice v. Miller, 

51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001) ............................................................................18 

Tex. Dep 't of Health v. Rocha, 

102 S.W.3d 348, 353 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi, 2002, no pet.) .........................17 

Tex. Dep 't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 

133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004) .....................................................................17 

Tex. Dep 't. of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 

44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 2001) .......................................................................20,26 

Tex. Highway Dep 't v. Weber, 

147 Tex. 628, 219 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1949) ...............................................................28 

Tex. Nat Res. Gonserv. Comm 'n v. White, 

46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2001) ........................................................................19,24 

TRST Corpus, Inc. v. Financial Center, 

9 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14thDist.] 1999, pet. denied) .....................13 

7 
Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 

898 S.W.3d 773, 776 (Tex. 1995) ................................................................2 1,24,25 

Univ. of Tex. MD. Anderson Or. v. King, 

417 S.W.3d 1,4 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ...................21,23 

Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 

871 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. 1994) ......................................................................20,26 

Walton v. Tex. Dep 't of Crim. Justice, 

No. 13-07-00656-CV, 2008 WL 3868113 at *1 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 

21, 2008, pet. denied) .............................................................................................27 

W.D. Hat/en Co. v. Dodgen, 

158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838, 840 (1958) .............................................................28 

Wheeler v. Green, 

157 S.W.3d 439,444 (Tex.2005) ...........................................................................16 

Wise Reg '1 Health Sys. v. Brittain, 

268 S.W.3d 799, 807-08 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) ..........................21 

E. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Appellee is dissatisfied with Appellant's statement of the case because it is 

unsupported by record references and discusses the facts. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(d). 

Appellee offers the following statement of the case pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 

38.2(a)(1)(B): 

Mr. Wilkins originally sued Nueces County in district court for negligence, 

gross negligence, fraud, and code violations. [CR. 102]. Defendant removed the 

action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction [CR. 102]. The 

federal court dismissed all of Plaintiffs federal constitutional and statutory claims 

with prejudice and remanded Plaintiffs state law causes of actions to district court. 

[CR.102-107]. After, Defendant filed its Plea to the Jurisdiction and a hearing 

was held wherein the district court granted Nueces County's Plea to the 

Jurisdiction and dismissed all of Plaintiffs causes of action with prejudice, [RR. 1-

12], from which Mr. Wilkins appeals. 

IJ 
RESPONSE TO ISSUES PRESENTED 

1. The trial court did not err in granting Nueces County's Plea to the 

Jurisdiction as the allegations against Appellee do not fall within the scope of 

waiver of governmental immunity. 

2. The trial court did not en in granting Nueces County's Plea to the 

Jurisdiction because the negligence allegedly committed by Appellee does not fall 

within the specific scope of waiver of immunity provided by the Texas Tort Claims 

Act. 

3. The trial court did not en in granting Nueces County's Plea to the 

Jurisdiction because the intentional tort allegedly committed by Appellee does not 

fall within the specific scope of waiver of immunity provided by the Texas Tort 

Claims Act. 

4. The trial court did not err in granting Nueces County's Plea to the 

Jurisdiction because there is no proximate causation between the acts and 

omissions allegedly committed by Appellee and the Appellant's alleged injury and 

therefore Appellant's claims do not fall within the specific scope of waiver of 

immunity provided by the Texas Tort Claims Act. 

10 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Appellee is dissatisfied with Appellant's statement of facts because it includes 

pages of alleged facts and allegations not supported by record references, not 

pertinent to the proper issue or point presented on appeal, and because it urges 

arguments concerning the merits of Appellant's cause of action. Tex. R. App. P. 

38.1(g). Accordingly, Appellee denies all of the unsupported factual allegations, 

except those shown by the record. Appellee offers this statement of relevant facts for 

purposes of this appeal pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B): 

I. Statement of Procedural History 

On November 25, 2013, Mr. Wilkins filed his Original Petition in Cause No. 

2013-DCV-5868-D, James Wilkins v. Nueces County, in the 105th Judicial District 

Court of Nueces County, Texas. [CR. 22-26]. The gravamen of Wilkin's petition is 

that "the County of Nueces is liable for allowing myself to go without a mattress, 

sheet, and blanket for the 10 (1, 3, 3, and 3) days I was made to wait in the Nueces 

County holding cells." [CR. 22]. On January 6, 2014, Defendant removed this case 

to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction under the Eighth Amendment's 

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's 

guarantees of procedural and substantive due process. [CR. 38-40]. On June 19, 

2014, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Corpus 

Christi Division, dismissed all of Plaintiffs federal constitutional and statutory 

11 
claims with prejudice and remanded Plaintiff's remaining claims to the 105thJudicial 

District Court of Nueces County, Texas. [CR. 102-107]. 

On July 9, 2014, Defendant filed seventeen special exceptions to Plaintiff's 

Original Petition [CR. 114-125] and on August 4, 2014, the Court entered an order 

sustaining all seventeen of Defendant's special exceptions and ordered Plaintiff to 

amend his Original Petition by August 14, 2014. [CR. 139-140]. On August 11, 

2014, Plaintiff filed Plaint?ff's Amended Pleadings that alleges causes of action 

against Defendant for negligence, gross negligence, forgery, and code violations. 

[CR. 146-153]. On September 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed Plaint jff's Second Amended 

Pleading superseding all of Plaintiffs prior pleadings and alleging, in singular, 

negligent misrepresentation against Defendant. [CR. 184-185]. Nueces County filed 

its Plea to the Jurisdiction on August 29, 2014. [CR. 173-181]. Hearing on that 

motion was held on September 15, 2014, [RR. 1-12], at which time the court 

dismissed the matter with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and issued 

a final order disposing of all claims against Defendant. [CR. 1931. 

H. Underlying Facts (Rebuttal) 

Mr. Wilkins alleges that Nueces County, Texas failed to provide him a 

mattress, sheet, and a blanket for a total of 10 days on four separate instances during 

his five month period of incarceration at the Nueces County jail and then, after 

Wilkins complained, provided him with falsified information allegedly to cover up its 

12 
infractions of Texas Commission on Jail Standards policies and rules. Wilkins also 

alleges that Nueces County kept him detained in a holding cell exceeding 48 hours, 

in violation of Texas Commission on Jail Standards policies and rules. Nueces 

County denies each and every, all and singular, allegation of Mr. Wilkins. [CR. 109-

111]. All incoming prisoners to Nueces County jail are secured into the second floor 

holding cells pending completion of the intake process. [CR. 216]. Mr. Wilkins was 

housed within 21 hours of arriving at the Nueces County jail. [CR. 216]. 

STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

I. Plea to the Jurisdiction 

Because the question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, the 

trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is reviewed under a de novo standard 

of review. TRBT Corpus, Inc. v. Financial Center, 9 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see also Bland I.S.D. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 

551-555 (Tex. 2000). 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

The trial court did not err in granting Nueces County's Plea to the 

Jurisdiction as the allegations against Appellee do not fall within the scope of 

waiver of governmental immunity. 

Nueces County's governmental immunity is presumed and neither 

Appellant's pleadings nor the evidence on record rebut this presumption. Mr. 

13 
Wilkins alleges that Nueces County, Texas failed to provide him bedding and linens 

for a limited period of time during his incarceration at the Nueces County jail and 

that upon his complaint, Wilkins was provided with falsified information allegedly to 

cover up Appellant's infractions of the Texas Commission on Jail Standards 

("TCJS") policies and rules. Appellant also alleges that Appellee detained him in a 

holding cell for longer than 48 hours, exceeding ThiS's policies and rules. 

Albeit, the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA") provides limited waiver of 

governmental immunity from suit, Appellant failed to meet his burden of 

affirmatively showing the trial court has subject mailer jurisdiction. Appellant did 

not plead nor does the evidence on record show that Appellee caused Appellant to 

sustain personal injury as a result of the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle. 

Neither does Appellant affirmatively show that Appellee proximately caused him 

personal injury by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property. Texas 

common law has long held that non-use of property does not fall under the waiver 

provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Moreover, the TTCA does not waive 

governmental immunity from suit for intentional torts. Notwithstanding the 

foregoing, Appellant's alleged personal injury is too remote and speculative to 

opine that it proximately resulted from Appellee's alleged omissions and acts. In 

regards to Appellant's allegation of being detained in a holding cell beyond 48 

hours, Appellant does not plead nor does the evidence on record show that the 

14 
holding cell constitutes either personal or real property. Appellant fails to 

affirmatively show a proximate cause between the detainment and his alleged 

injury. Finally, in regards to Appellant's allegation of negligent misrepresentation, 

fraud, and forgery involving the information he was provided by Appellee, the 

Legislature does not waive governmental immunity for negligence involving use, 

misuse, or non-use of information—and as discussed below, the TTCA does not 

waive immunity for intentional torts. Texas common law has also held that 

information is not personal property, even if it is reduced to writing. Thus, 

Appellant failed to affirmatively show any viable causes of action against Appellee 

and the trial court did not err in granting Nueces County's Flea to the Jurisdiction. 

Appellee respectfully prays that this Court dismiss this appeal, uphold the 

district court's grant of plea to jurisdiction, dismiss this action with prejudice, and 

tax costs against Appellant. 

ARGUMENT 

I. Plea to the Jurisdiction Pursuant to Governmental Immunity from Suit 

A. Preliminary Matter--Appellant waived all issues on appeal as a result of 

procedural irregularities and amended pleading 

As a preliminary matter, pro se litigants are held to the same standards 

as attorneys and shall comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 

("TRAPs"). Although appellate courts construe pro se filings liberally, the courts 

cannot excuse pro se litigants from complying with the TRAPs because doing so 

1k 
might give pro se litigants an unfair procedural advantage. Wheeler v. Green, 157 

S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex.2005); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-

85 (Tex. 1978). Appellate courts generally rule that inadequately briefed issues are 

waived. See TRAP 38.1(i); see e.g. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 318 S.W.3d 464, 

466 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (CA found that appellant waived all issues 

by not presenting argument, authority or cites to record). In addition, an amended 

pleading supersedes the pleading it amends, Kirk v. Garza, 875 S.W.2d 24, 24 

(Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied), and makes the superseded 

pleadings moot. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 

2005). 

The Appellee argues that the Appellant waived all issues presented in this 

appeal because although Appellant's brief includes legal authorities, it does not 

discuss them or apply them to the facts of this case. TRAP 38.1(i); see Inpetco, 

Inc. v. Texas Am. Bank/Houston NA., 722 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1986, writ refused). Appellee also argues that Appellant's only appealable 

issue involves his "negligent misrepresentation" cause of action against Appellee 

as Appellant's second and final amended pleading only includes this single cause 

of action against Appellee. (CR. 184-185). Stated another way, Appellant's 

second and final amended pleading supersedes all of Appellant's previous causes 

of action and makes those actions moot and non-appealable. (CR. 184-185). 

16 
Appellee prays for the Court to dismiss all issues presented as a result of both 

Appellant's procedural irregularities and Appellant's amended pleading. 

Notwithstanding Appellee's request to the Court, Appellee addresses the issues 

posited by Appellant in their entirety. 

B. Texas Tort Claims Act CPRC §101.021 

A plaintiff who sues a political subdivision under state law must establish 

a waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity by (1) alleging legislative consent 

to sue and (2) pleading facts that fall within the scope of legislative consent. Tex. 

Dep't of Health v. Rocha, 102 S.W.3d 348, 353 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi, 2002, 

no pet.). Immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and 

is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep 't of Parks & Wildlife v. 

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject 

matter jurisdiction and whether a plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively 

demonstrate a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction are questions of law. Id. at 

226; Kaufman County v. Leggett, 396 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2012, pet. 

denied). A governmental unit's jurisdictional plea can be based on the pleadings 

or on the evidence. Id. The Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA") provides a limited 

waiver of the government's immunity to the following set of tort claims: 

(1) Property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the 

wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within 

his scope of employment if: 

WA 
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation 

or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and 

(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to 

Texas law; and, 

(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible 

personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private 

person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (West 2015). 

It should be noted that the mere invocation of the Texas Tort Claims Act in a 

petition does not waive sovereign immunity and confer jurisdiction on the trial 

court. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001). The 

claim raised must fall within the specific scope of the waiver of immunity provided 

by the Texas Tort Claims Act. Id. A court shall review the petition to ascertain the 

nature of the claim raised, examine the TTCA to determine the scope of waiver of 

sovereign immunity relevant to the claim, and finally consider the facts of the 

claim to decide whether it comes within the scope so as to invoke jurisdiction in 

the trial court. Id. 

C. Requisite Waiver of Immunity Elements under CPRC §101.021(1)(A)(B) 

i. "Arises from" Motor-Driven Equipment & Vehicles 

Pursuant with the Legislature's preference for a limited immunity waiver, 

the Texas judiciary is to strictly construe §101.021's vehicle-use requirement. 

Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 

0 
2015), reh'g denied (Mar. 13, 2015). The Supreme Court of Texas has defined the 

standard as a "nexus between the operation or use of the motor driven vehicle or 

equipment and a plaintiff's injuries." Id. at 928. 

ii. Motor-Driven Vehicle or Equipment 

"Motor-driven' means, quite simply, driven by a motor." Texas Nat. Res. 

Conserv. Comm 'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2001). 

iii. Operation or Use 

The Supreme Court of Texas has consistently defined "use" to mean "to put 

or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose." San 

Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244, 246 (Tex.2004). "Therefore, to 

invoke the Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity, [Plaintiffs] injury must have 

been caused by the [Defendant's] actual use of the [motor-driven vehicle], not the 

[Defendant's] failure to use it." White, 46 S.W.3d at 869. "[The Supreme Court of 

Texas] has never held that non-use of property can support a claim under the Texas 

Tort Claims Act." Id.; see e.g. Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of 

Lindburg By & Through Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1989); Dallas County 

Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998); 

Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1996); Kassen v. Hatley, 887 

S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994). 

19 
D. Requisite Waiver of Immunity Elements under CPRC §101.021(2) 

L Tangible Personal Property 

The Supreme Court of Texas has long held "that information is not tangible 

personal property, since it is an abstract concept that lacks corporeal, physical, or 

palpable qualities." Texas Dept of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 

2001); University of Tex. Med Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 179 

(Tex. 1994). In Dallas v. Harper, 913 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1995), the Texas Supreme 

Court concluded that simply reducing "information to writing on paper does not 

make the information 'tangible personal property." Id citing Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 

580. "Thus, while instructional manuals can be seen and touched, the Legislature 

has not waived immunity for negligence involving use, misuse, or non-use of the 

information they contain." Id. at 581. In fact, "it is technically possible to 

characterize any imaginable action as a case involving use of tangible personalty. 

Each of us deals daily with the tangible components of this material world. But 

creative pleading cannot replace the rule of immunity with its exception." Lowe v. 

Harris County Hosp. Dist., 809 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1989, no writ). 

ii Caused By 

"For this reason the statute requires that the injury be 'caused by a condition 

or use' of tangible personalty, and the courts have held accordingly." Id. citing 

ON 
Russell v. Texas Department of Human Resources, 746 S.W.2d 510, 513 

(Tex.App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied). Indeed, "the plaintiff must allege that 

the property's condition or use proximately caused the personal injury. . . ." Wise 

Reg'l Health Sys. v. Brittain, 268 S.W.3d 799, 807-08 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 

2008, no pet.). "Property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the 

condition that makes the injury possible." Dallas County Mental Health & Mental 

Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998); Union Pump Co. v. 

Allbritton, 898 S.W.3d 773, 776 (Tex. 1995). 

X. Use of Property 

Non-use of tangible personal property does not fall under the waiver 

provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 584; City of N. 

Richland Hills v. Friend, 370 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex. 2012); Univ. of Tex. M.D. 

Anderson Ctr. v. King, 417 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no 

pet.). In addition, the TTCA does not waive a defendant's immunity in regards to 

intentional torts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Aim. § 101.057 (West 2015). 

Finally, it is inappropriate to allow a plaintiff to bootstrap a failure to act case into 

a misuse case against the Defendant, a matter as to which, Texas retains sovereign 

immunity. Estate of Banks v. Chambers Mem'l Hosp. Auxiliary, Inc., 865 F.2d 696 

(5th Cir. 1989). 

21 
iv. Were it a Private Person 

"In evaluating [the] contentions [of the defendant] it is important to 

remember that the Tort Claims Act does not create a cause of action; it merely 

waives sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit that would otherwise exist. Thus, 

unless [the plaintiff himself] would have a claim ... under common law against a 

private defendant, [the Court] need not reach the question of whether [said claim] 

is a "personal injury" for which the Legislature has waived . . . sovereign 

immunity." City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. 1997). Under this 

reasoning, it is of importance to mention that the Texas Commission on Jail 

Standards does not provide for private causes of action for infractions to its policies 

and rules. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 251-301 (West 2015). 

F. Application to Issues Presented 

L Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

a. CPRC.S 101.021 (1) (A) (B) 

In applying Texas statutory and common law to the pleadings and evidence 

on record in this matter, neither the Appellant's pleadings nor the evidence on 

record establish a waiver of governmental immunity under CPRC § 

101.021(1)(A)(B). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(1)(A)(B) (West 

2015). Indeed, Appellant did not plead nor does the evidence show Appellant's 

injury was caused by Appellee's actual use of a motor-driven vehicle. Therefore, 

PAN 
Appellant failed to allege facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has 

subject matter jurisdiction and thus the trial court did not err in granting Appellee's 

plea to jurisdiction with respect to CPRC § 101 .021(1)(A)(B). 

b. CFRCt101.021(2) 

In regards to CPRC § 101.021(2), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 

101.021(2) (West 2015), the first issue to be addressed is the failure to timely 

provide bedding and linens to Appellant while he was incarcerated in Nueces 

County Jail. The second issue to be addressed is the failure to remove Appellant 

from a holding cell within 48 hours pursuant to rules and policies of the Texas 

Commission on Jail Standards. The third issue to be addressed is the failure to 

provide Appellant accurate information regarding the rules and policies of the 

Texas Commission on Jail Standards. The final issue to be addressed is 

Appellant's personal injury. Each issue is addressed below, respectively. 

ii. Non-compliance to Rules of Texas Commission on Jail Standards 

a. Rule 277.8 Bedding & Linens 

The failure to provide bedding and linens does not waive governmental 

immunity for a number of reasons. First, Texas common law has long held that 

non-use of tangible personal property, here the bedding and linens, does not fall 

under the waiver provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 

584; Friend, 370 S.W.3d at 372; King, 417 S.W.3d at 4. It would be a flagrant 

23 
deviation from case law precedent if it were otherwise. Indeed, broadening the 

scope of CPRC § 101.021(2) to include non-use of tangible personal property 

would be tantamount to abolishing governmental immunity altogether. See White, 

46 S.W.3d at 868. Secondly, Appellant's alleged personal injury from the non-use 

of bedding and linens is too remote and speculative to opine that it proximately 

caused Appellant's personal injury. "Property does not cause injury if it does no 

more than ftwnish the condition that makes the injury possible." Bossley, 968 

S.W.2d at 343; Allbritton, 898 S.W.3d at 776. It is just as reasonably possible that 

Appellant's mental anguish, if any, proximately resulted from his incarceration at 

the County Jail and the substantial disruption it had on the Appellant's daily life 

routine. Finally, governmental immunity cannot be waived for the failure to 

provide bedding and linens that are required by the rules and policies of the Texas 

Commission on Jail Standards ("TCJS") because the TJCS does not provide for 

private causes of action for infractions to such policies. Pursuant to 37 TEX. 

ADMIN. CODE § 297.9, the commission is the entity that institutes actions, "in its 

own name", to enforce or enjoin the violations of its orders, rules, or procedures. 

(West 2015). Thus, as the Appellant does not have a claim for himself against the 

Appellee, "[the Court] need not reach the question of whether [said claim] is a 

"personal injury . . . ." as governmental immunity is not waived. Likes, 962 

S.W.2d 489 at 494. Even assuming arguendo that Appellee were a private person, 

24 
the result involving Appellee's immunity from suit, in this fact situation, remains 

the same. This is because the Supreme Court of Texas holds that there is no 

general duty not to negligently inflict mental anguish. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 

593, 598 (Tex. 1993). In so rejecting, the Supreme Court of Texas stated that 

"[t]ort law cannot and should not attempt to provide redress for every instance of 

rude, insensitive or distasteful behavior, even though it may result in hurt feelings, 

embarrassment, or even humiliation." Id. at 601-02. Recognizing the need for an 

appropriate balance, Texas common law exclusively designed recovery for mental 

anguish in only those few types of cases involving injuries of such a shocking and 

disturbing nature that mental anguish is a highly foreseeable result, such as cases 

involving wrongful death. Id.; see Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 

S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.1985). Thus, the trial court did not err in granting 

Appellee's plea to the jurisdiction with respect to Rule 277.8 Bedding and Linens 

of the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. 

b. Rule 259.138 Holding Cells 

Appellee incorporates the foregoing paragraph to the extent it is applicable 

herein. Appellant did not plead nor does the evidence on record show that the 

holding cell constitutes either personal or real property. In either case, "property 

does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the 

injury possible." Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343; Alibritton, 898 S.W.3d at 776. 

25 
Here, Appellant establishes no proximate causation between being detained in a 

holding cell and his alleged personal injury. Moreover, the TTCA does not waive 

Appellant's immunity in regards to intentional torts, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 

Ann. § 101.057 (West 2015), and assuming arguendo, that confinement to the 

holding cell was intentional, governmental immunity is nevertheless retained. 

Finally, as previously stated, the TICS does not provide for private causes of action 

for infractions to its policies. Thus, given the foregoing analysis, the trial court did 

not err in granting Appellee' s plea to the jurisdiction with respect to Rule 259.138 

Holding Cells of the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. 

iii. Alleged Negligent Misrepresentation & Fraud/Forgery 

In regards to Appellant's allegation of negligent misrepresentation, fraud, 

and forgery as a result of Appellee's failure to provide Appellate accurate 

information regarding the rules and policies of the Texas Commission on Jail 

Standards, again there are a number of reasons why governmental immunity is not 

waived. First and foremost, as held by Texas common law, "information is not 

tangible personal property, since it is an abstract concept that lacks corporeal, 

physical, or palpable qualities." Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 580; York, 871 S.W.2d at 

179. Even reducing "information to writing on paper does not make the 

information 'tangible personal property." Id. citing Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 580. 

Moreover, the Legislature has not waived immunity for negligence involving use, 

26 
misuse, or non-use of information. Id. at 581. This being designed exclusively as 

the Texas statutory and common law, the "information" communicated to Appellee 

unmistakably does not constitute tangible personal property under the TTCA to 

waive immunity, even if the information was reduced to writing. In addition, 

Appellant's alleged negligent misuse of the "information" still would not invoke 

subject jurisdiction to the trial court, as held by Texas common law. 

Appellant also alleged fraud and forgery in regards to Appellee's failure to 

provide accurate information regarding the rules and polices of the Texas 

Commission on Jail Standards. Both fraud and forgery are intentional torts. See 

Walton v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, No. 13-07-00656-CV, 2008 WL 3868113 at 

* 1 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 21, 2008, pet. denied) ("appellant filed a 

lawsuit against appellees alleging a number of intentional torts and the court 

concluded that appellant's claims fall within the intentional tort exception to the 

TTCA. . . .). As noted, the TTCA does not waive Appellee's immunity in regards 

to intentional torts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057 (West 2015). 

Therefore, Appellant's intentional tort causes of action against Appellee do not 

waive immunity and the trial court did not err in granting Appellee's plea to 

jurisdiction. 

27 
iv. Personal Injury 

As thoroughly discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, personal injury alone 

does not waive governmental immunity from suit. The Supreme Court has long 

recognized that "it is the Legislature's sole province to waive or abrogate 

immunity." See Fed Sign. v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 409 (Tex. 1997); see 

also Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. 1980); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. 

Brownsville Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex. 1970); Griffin v. 

Hawn, 161 Tex. 422, 341 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1960); W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 

158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838, 840 (1958); Tex. Highway Dep't v. Weber, 147 Tex. 

628, 219 S.W.2d 70, 71(1949); Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847). 

As described, the TTCA prescribes the manner in which governmental 

immunity from suit is waived wherein a plaintiff can make a viable claim for 

personal injuries. The Appellant herein, however, has failed to establish any 

waiver of immunity from suit; and thus, the Court need not reach the question 

regarding personal injury. Indeed, Appellee did not cause personal injury to 

Appellant as a result of the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle. Neither did 

Appellee cause Appellate personal injury by a condition or use of tangible personal 

or real property. As previously noted, the non-use of tangible personal property 

does not fall under the waiver provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act to allow a 

plaintiff to make a claim for personal injuries. Finally, a claimant, here the 

rA*J 
Appellant, may not recover mental anguish damages in connection with negligent 

misrepresentation, pursuant to Texas common law. Federal Land Bank Assoc. v. 

Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1991). 

Thus, Appellant's alleged personal injury is non-compensable under Texas 

law as Appellant failed to affirmatively show waiver of governmental immunity 

from suit. 

II. Conclusion Concerning Plea to the Jurisdiction 

Because Appellant cannot demonstrate a waiver of governmental immunity, 

Appellant's causes of action against Appellee were properly dismissed with 

prejudice by the trial court in its grant of Appellee's Plea to the Jurisdiction. 

WHEREFORE, Appellee, Nueces County, prays the Court dismiss this 

appeal, uphold the district court's grant of plea to jurisdiction and dismissal of this 

action with prejudice, and tax costs against Appellant. 

29 
Respectfully submitted, 

LAURA GARZA JIMENEZ, 

NTJECES COUNTY ATTORNEY 

By:/s/ Juan J. Maldonado, III 

Jenny Cron 

Assistant County Attorney 

State Bar No. 00796237 

Juan J. Maldonado, III 

Assistant County Attorney 

State Bar No. 240834436 

901 Leopard, Room 207 

Corpus Christi, TX 78401 

(361) 888-0391 

(361) 888-0577 facsimile 

jenny.boydnuecesco.com 

juan.ma1donadonuecesco.com 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE, 

NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS 

30 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft Word 

2010 and contains 4,006 words, as determined by the computer software's word 

count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1). 

Is! Juan J. Maldonado, III 

JUAN J. MALDONADO,III 

31 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I IThREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this document was 

served on: 

VIA CMRRR 7014 1200 0001 0754 0659 

Mr. James Wilkins 

TDJC: 01970009 

SD: 10123934 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice 

Fabian Dale Dominguez State Jail 

6535 Cagnon Road 

San Antonio, Texas, 78252-2202 

on this the 6th day of November, 2015. 

Is! Juan J. Maldonado, III 

JUAN J. MALDONADO, Ill 

32 
CAUSE NO. 13-14-00570-CV 

JAMES WILKINS 

Appellant 

V. 

NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, 

Appellee 

APPELLEE' S APPENDIX 

LIST OF DOCUMENTS 

1. Trial Court's Appealable order dated 9/15/14 

Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction............................................Tab A 

2. Rules relied on 

37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 259.138, Holding Cells (West 2015) ..................Tab B 

37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 277.8, Bedding and Linens (West 2015) ............Tab B 

37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 297.9, Other Conirn'n Remedies (West 2015) ... Tab B 

2013 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS), 2013 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS) .......Tab B 

2014 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS), 2014 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS) .......Tab B 

33 
Signed on q/11 / 

PATSY PEi-IEZ, DISTRICT CLERK 

I NUECES COUNTY 

CAUSE NO. 2013-DCY-5868-D 

JAMES WILKINS 

NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS 

§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

§ 

§ 105" JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

§ 

§ NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

ON THIS DAY came on to be heard Defendant Flea to the Jurisdiction. It appears to 

the Court that the plea to the jurisdiction should be sustained because this Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff's action against Defendant Nueces County, Texas, is hereby dismissed for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. This is a final order disposing of all claims against Defendant 

Nueces County, Texas. 
§ 259138. Holding Cells, 37 TX ADC § 259.138 

37 TAC § 259.138 

Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 259.138 

§ 259.138. Holding Cells 

Currentness 

(a) One or more holding cells shall be provided to hold inmates pending intake, processing, release, or other 

reason for temporary holding. Inmates shall not be held for more than 48 hours and the cell shall include the 

following features. 

(1) Seating. A stationary bench or benches abutting the walls shall be provided. Benches shall be 17" to 

19" above the finished floor and not less than 12" wide. Seating shall be sufficient to provide not less than 

24 linear inches per inmate at cell capacity. 

(2) Plumbing. Cells shall be provided with adequate toilets, lavatories, and floor drains. The floor shall be 

properly pitched to drains. 

(3) Cell Size. The size of the cell shall be determined by the anticipated maximum number of inmates to be 

confined at any one time. Cells shall be constructed to house from one to 24 inmates and shall contain not 

less than 40 square feet of floor space for the first inmate and 18 square feet of floor space for each 

additional inmate to be confined. 

(4) Surfaces. Floor, wall, and ceiling material shall be durable and easily cleaned. 

(5) Supervision. The cell shall be located and constructed to facilitate supervision of the cell area and to 

materially reduce noise. 

V*[v;?Next © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
§ 259.138. Holding Cells, 37 TX ADC § 259.138 

(b) Remote Holding Cells. Holding cells that are separate from the facility and utilized for direct court holding, 

processing, or for inmates awaiting transportation. Inmates shall not be held for more than 4 hours and the cell 

shall include the following features. 

(1) Seating. A stationary bench or benches abutting the walls shall be provided. Benches shall be 17" to 

19" above the finished floor, and not less than 12" wide. Seating shall be sufficient to provide not less than 

18 linear inches per inmate at cell capacity. 

(2) Plumbing. Cells shall be provided with adequate toilets, lavatories capable of providing drinking water, 

and floor drains. The floor shall be properly pitched to drains. 

(3) Cell Size. The size of the cell shall be determined by the anticipated maximum number of inmates to be 

confined at any one time. Cells shall be constructed to house from one to 24 inmates and the capacity shall 

be determined by the amount of seating provided and posted at the exterior of the cell. 

(4) Surfaces. Floor, wall, and ceiling material shall be durable and easily cleaned. 

(5) Supervision. The cell shall be located and constructed to facilitate supervision of the cell area and to 

materially reduce noise. 

(6) Smoke Detection. Smoke detection capability shall be provided. The alarm shall annunciate at a staffed 

location in close proximity to the cell. Additional life safety items shall be compatible with the remainder 

of the building. 

(7) Audible Communication. Audible communications shall be provided. 

(c) Remote Holding Cells. Holding cells that are separate from the facility and utilized for direct court holding, 

processing, or for inmates awaiting transportation. Inmates shall not be held for more than 8 hours and the cell 

shall include the following features. 

4N4ext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No c(aim to origria! U. S. Government Works. 
§ 259.138. Holding Cells, 37 TX ADC § 259.138 

(1) Seating. A stationary bench or benches abutting the walls shall be provided. Benches shall be 17" to 

19" above the finished floor, and not less than 12" wide. Seating shall be sufficient to provide not less than 

24 linear inches per inmate at cell capacity. 

(2) Plumbing. Cells shall be provided with adequate toilets, lavatories capable of providing drinking water, 

and floor drains. The floor shall be properly pitched to drains. 

(3) Cell Size. The size of the cell shall be determined by the anticipated maximum number of inmates to be 

confined at any one time. Cells shall be constructed to house from one to 24 inmates and shall contain not 

less than 40 square feet of floor space for the first inmate and 18 square feet of floor space for each 

additional inmate to be confined. 

(4) Surfaces. Floor, wall, and ceiling material shall be durable and easily cleaned. 

(5) Supervision. The cell shall be located and constructed to facilitate supervision of the cell area and to 

materially reduce noise. 

(6) Smoke Detection. Smoke detection capability shall be provided. The alarm shall annunciate at a staffed 

location in close proximity to the cell. Additional life safety items shall be compatible with the remainder 

of the building. 

(7) Audible Communication. Audible communications shall be provided. 

Credits 

Source: The provisions of this § 259.138 adopted to be effective December 12, 1994, 19 TexReg 9376; 

amended to be effective August 16, 1996, 21 TexReg 7565; amended to be effective February 4, 1999, 24 

TexReg 591; amended to be effective May 3, 2000, 25 TexReg 3791; amended to be effective October 16, 

2007, 32 TexReg 7267. 

Current through 40 Tex.Reg. No. 7734, dated October 30, 2015, as effective on or before October 30, 2015 

k&1i4NeYt © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U. S. Government Works. 
§ 259.138. Holding Cells, 37 TX ADC § 259.138 

TAC 5259.138.37 TX ADC 5259.138 

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 

WI.vNext © 2015 Thomson Routers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
§ 277.8. Bedding and Linens, 37 TX ADC § 277.8 

Corrections 

on on Jail Standards 

, Personni Hygiene and Bedding 

37TAC § 277.8 

Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 277.8 

§ 277.8. Bedding and Linens 

Currentness 

A standard issue of bedding and linens to each inmate to be placed in housing shall include, but shall not be 

limited to, the following clean, safe, and serviceable items: 

(I) one mattress; 

(2) one sheet or mattress cover; 

(3) one towel; 

(4) one blanket, or more depending upon climatic conditions. Inmates detained in holding and/or detoxification 

cells maybe provided with the above items. 

Credits 

Source: The provisions of this §277.8 adopted to be effective December 20, 1994, 19 TexReg 9652; amended 

to be effective May 3, 1995, 20 TexReg 2867; amended to be effective March 31, 2014, 39 TexReg 2296. 

Current through 40 Tex.Reg. No. 7734, dated October 30, 2015, as effective on or before October 30, 2015 

37 TAC § 277.8, 37 TX ADC § 277.8 

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 

r7iTNCt © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works, 1 
§ 2979. Other Commission Remedies, 37 TX ADC § 297.9 

37TAC § 297.9 

Tex. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 297.9 

§ 297.9. Other Commission Remedies 

Currentness 

In addition to or in lieu of the remedial order remedies described in § 297.8 of this title (relating to Remedial 

Order by Commission) the commission may institute an action in its own name to enforce or enjoin the 

violation of its orders, rules or procedures, or the Local Government Code, Chapter 351. An action brought 

pursuant to this section is in addition to any other action, proceeding or remedy provided by law, and may be 

brought in a district court of Travis County, Texas. A suit brought under this section shall be given preferential 

setting and shall be tried by the Court, without a jury, unless the responsible officials request a jury, in 

accordance with the Local Government Code, Chapter 351. The commission shall be represented by the 

attorney general in such actions. 

Credits 

Source: The provisions of this § 297.9 adopted to be effective December 27, 1994, 19 TexReg 9882. 

Current through 40 Tex.Reg. No. 7734, dated October 30, 2015, as effective on or before October 30, 2015 

37 TAC S 297.9. 37 TX ADC S 297.9 

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No clams to original U.S. (Jovcrnmeol Works. 

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
2013 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS), 2013 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS) 

NETECAN 

2013 TX KEG TEXT 339463 (NS) 

Texas Regulation Text - Netscan 

37 TAC 277.8 

Proposed 

October 04, 2013 

Public Safety and Corrections 

Bedding and Linens 

The Texas Commission on Jail Standards proposes an amendment to s.277.8, concerning Bedding and Linens. 

The purpose of the proposed amendment is to give sheriffs discretion in providing bedding and linens to 

persons in holding/detoxification cells. 

37 TAC 277.8 

37 TAC 277.8 

TITLE 37. PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS 

PART 9. TEXAS COMMISSION ON JAIL STANDARDS 

CHAPTER 277. CLOTHING, PERSONAL HYGIENE AND BEDDING 

37 TAC §277.8 

The Texas Commission on Jail Standards proposes an amendment to §277.8, concerning Bedding and Linens. 

The purpose of the proposed amendment is to give sheriffs discretion in providing bedding and linens to 

persons in holding/detoxification cells. 

Brandon S. Wood, Executive Director, has determined that for the first five year period the amendment is in 

effect there will be no fiscal implications for state or local government as a result of enforcing or administering 

the amended section. 

Mr. Wood has also determined that for each year of the first five years the amendment is in effect the public 

benefits anticipated as a result of enforcing the amendment as proposed will be clarification of existing 

standards. There will be no effect on small businesses. There is no anticipated economic cost to persons who are 

required to comply with the amendment as proposed. 

Comments on the proposal may be submitted to Diana Spiller, P.O. Box 12985, Austin, Texas 78711; (512) 

463-5505. 

The amendment is proposed under Government Code, Chapter 511, which provides the Texas Commission on 

Jail Standards with the authority to adopt reasonable rules and procedures establishing minimum standards for 

the construction, equipment, maintenance, and operation of county jails. 

Et-Next © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U. S. Government Works 
2013 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS), 2013 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS) 

The statutes that are affected by this amendment are Local Government Code, Chapter 351, §351.002 and 

§351.015. 

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the 

agency's legal authority to adopt. 

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on September 18, 2013. 

TRD-2013 04077 

Brandon S. Wood 

Executive Director 

Texas Commission on Jail Standards 

Earliest possible date of adoption: November 3, 2013 

For further information, please call: (512) 463-8236 

End of Document Z2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 

II*ISfN 

INexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original US. Government Works. 2 
2014 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS), 2014 Tx REG TEXT 339463 (NS) 

Fl*$1*1 I 

2014 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS) 

Texas Regulation Text - Netsean 

37 TAC 277.8 

Adopted 

March 28, 2014 

Effective: March 31, 2014 

Public Safety and Corrections 

Bedding and Linens 

The Texas Commission on Jail Standards (TCJS) adopts an amendment to s.277.8, concerning Bedding and 

Linens, with changes to the proposed text as published in the October 4, 2013, issue of the Texas Register (38 

TexReg 6885). 

37 TAC 277.8 

37 TAC 277.8 

TITLE 37. PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS 

PART 9. TEXAS COMMISSION ON JAIL STANDARDS 

CHAPTER 277. CLOTHING, PERSONAL HYGIENE AND BEDDING 

37 TAC §277.8 

The Texas Commission on Jail Standards (TCJS) adopts an amendment to §277.8, concerning Bedding and 

Linens, with changes to the proposed text as published in the October 4, 2013, issue of the Texas Register (38 

TexReg 6885). 

The purpose of the proposed addition is to clarify the issuance of bedding and linens to inmates. 

Multiple comments were received from representatives of the Texas Jail Project opposing the proposed 

amendment. The commenters opposed giving sheriff or his or her designee the discretion to provide bedding 

and linen items to inmates detained in holding or in detoxification cells. TCJS chairperson appointed a 

committee to study the standard. 

The amendment is adopted under Government Code, Chapter 511, which provides the Texas Commission on 

Jail Standards with the authority to adopt reasonable rules and procedures establishing minimum standards for 

the construction, equipment, maintenance, and operation of county jails. 

The agency certifies that legal counsel has reviewed the adoption and found it to be a valid exercise of the 

agency's legal authority. 

W.LkNext 02015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original US. Government Works 
2014 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS), 2014 TX REG TEXT 339463 (NS) 

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on March 11, 2014. 

TRD-201401 125 

Brandon S. Wood 

Executive Director 

Texas Commission on Jail Standards 

Effective date: March 31, 2014 

Proposal publication date: October 4, 2013 

For further information, please call: (512) 463-8236 

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 

I1*fIMAWl 

VPJkNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2