alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Stephen C. Chukumba, an Attorney, Respondent. Committee on Professional Standards, Petitioner.

[813 NYS2d 920]

Per Curiam.

Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 1999 and presently resides in Montclair, New Jersey.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey disbarred respondent by order dated December 14, 2005, for having engaged in a conflict of interest by representing both the buyer and seller in a real *1214estate transaction without obtaining an informed consent from either client, knowingly providing false information to a mortgage lender and to the purchaser, falsely certifying closing documents, failing to promptly pay off an open mortgage which resulted in the purchaser’s eviction from the premises, and misappropriating $88,000 in client funds to finance the purchase of his own home.

Petitioner moves for an order imposing reciprocal discipline *(see*22 NYCRR 806.19). Respondent has failed to appear on the motion.

We grant petitioner’s motion and conclude that respondent should be reciprocally disbarred *(see Matter of Recchione,*16 AD3d 902 [2005]).

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Spain, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that petitioner’s motion is granted; and it is further ordered that respondent is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys in the State of New York, effective immediately; and it is further ordered that respondent is commanded to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk or employee of another; respondent is forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority; or to give to another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice with relation thereto; and it is further ordered that respondent shall comply with the provisions of this Court’s rules regulating the conduct of disbarred attorneys *(see*22 NYCRR 806.9).
IWATER Jor LIFE

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7246

ROY FRANKLIN ECHOLS, Jr., Petitioner - Appellant, versusRONALD ANGELONE, Director of Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CA-01-155-3) Submitted: November 29, 2001 Decided: December 6, 2001 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Roy Franklin Echols, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Linwood Theodore Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Roy Franklin Echols appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Echols v. Angelone , CA-01-155-3 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2001). We deny Echols’ motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
##### 



Exhibit 32
 Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date:  November 14, 2005
    /s/ Robert M. CashillRobert M. CashillPresident and Chief Executive Officer Date:  November 14, 2005
    /s/ Domenick A. CamaDomenick A. CamaSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Registran's December 31, 1995 Form 10-KSB and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                         276,230
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,299,082
<ALLOWANCES>                                    15,958
<INVENTORY>                                    287,772
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,056,733
<PP&E>                                      17,200,166
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,979,998
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              17,923,932
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,980,327
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,487
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,966,381
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                17,923,932
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             8,577,421
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,886,650
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (176,156)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             785,371
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,081,556
<INCOME-TAX>                                   495,443
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            586,113
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   461,708<F1>
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .10
<FN>
<F1>The difference between Income from Continuing Operations of $586,113 and Net
Income of $461,708 related to $124,405 of dividends paid to minority interests
in subsidiaries in 1995.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs CASE NO: 5:00cr14

JASON DURAND COATNEY,

Defendant.

__________________________________________________/

ORDER REDUCING SENTENCE

Before the Court is the Government's Rule 35 motion (doc 60) and supplement

(doc 62) advising that a reduction in defendant's sentence may be warranted by his

cooperation and substantial assistance since his sentencing. The Court finds that a reduction

is proper to reward his cooperation and significant assistance to the Government in the

investigation and prosecution of others.

Defendant’s sentence of incarceration is hereby reduced from 165 months to “time

served.” He shall be released forthwith. In all other respects, the original sentence imposed

in the Judgment and Commitment Order filed 17 October 2000 shall remain unchanged.

ORDERED this 21st day of June 2006.

 s/L.A. Collier 

 LACEY A. COLLIER

 Senior United States District Judge

Case 5:00-cr-00014-LC Document 63 Filed 06/21/06 Page 1 of 1
Amendment No. 1 to Duke Energy Executive Cash Balance Plan



 Exhibit 10-7.1 
  
 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION 
 EXECUTIVE CASH BALANCE
PLAN 
 (As Amended and Restated Effective January 1, 1999) 
  
 AMENDMENT 1 
  
 Pursuant to Section 8 of the Duke Energy Corporation Executive Cash Balance Plan, as amended (“Plan”), Duke Energy Corporation
(“Corporation”) hereby amends Section 4.3 of the Plan, effective January 1, 1999, by adding a sentence to the end thereof that reads as follows: 
  
 Notwithstanding Sections 4.3 and 4.4 to the contrary, the Minimum Benefit feature of Section 4.3(e) of the Plan, as in effect prior to January 1, 1999, is
preserved herein and incorporated by reference. 
  
 IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, this amendment to the Plan is executed on behalf of the Corporation this 26 day of August, 1999. 
  

			
	DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	/s/    CHRISTOPHER C.
ROLFE        
	 Its:
	 	Vice President
	 	 	Corporate Human Resources
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kenneth Davis, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered April 18, 1978, convicting him of robbery in the second degree (two counts) and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of assault in the second degree, and the sentence imposed thereon, and the said count is dismissed. As so modified, judgment affirmed. The Court of Appeals stated in *People v Grier*(37 NY2d 847, 848), that "Where the verdict is comprised of inclusory concurrent counts a verdict of guilty on the greatest count is deemed a dismissal of every lesser count (CPL 300.40, subd 3, par [b]).” Under the circumstances of this case, the verdict of guilty of assault in the second degree was a verdict on an inclusory concurrent count of the count charging robbery in the second degree under section 160.10 (subd 2, par [a]) of the Penal Law. Since the defendant was also convicted of the robbery count, the assault conviction must be reversed and that count dismissed. (See *People v Thompson,*59 AD2d 672.) The People concede this point. As to defendant’s argument that the convictions of robbery in the second degree must fall due to an improper supplementary instruction by the Trial Judge on the definition of this crime, we hold that such error was harmless under the circumstances. Although the Judge’s initial charge on, the second degree robbery was proper in all respects, upon further instruction at the jury’s request, the court neglected to refer to the necessity of the People proving that physical force was involved in the commission of the crime. In most instances, the failure to charge a necessary element of a crime constitutes reversible error. (See *People v Katz,*290 NY 361; *People v Satisñeld,*68 AD2d 817.) In this case, however, defendant was also charged with assault in the second degree, for which proper instructions were given. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on this assault charge. Hence, there was necessarily a finding that physical force was employed in the execution of the crime, as the acts of assault and robbery were inextricably intertwined. Thus, any error in not charging the element of force as to the robbery in the supplementary instruction was overcome by the fact that force was initially charged and the obvious finding that force was, in fact, involved. We conclude, therefore, that the error was harmless. (See *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230.) We have considered defendant’s other arguments on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. O’Connor, J. P., Mangano, Rabin and Gibbons, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of China Resources Development, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,Wong Wah On Edward, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/ Wong Wah On Edward

Wong Wah On Edward

Chief Financial Officer

May 26, 2010

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Marshall Air Products Co., Inc., Respondent, v. Reynolds Fasteners, Inc., Appellant.

Order, entered on July 6, 1966, denying defendant’s motion to examine Consolidated Tube Corporation as a witness before trial, unanimously reversed, on the facts and the law, with $30 costs and disbursements to appellant, and motion granted. Defendant was, to a considerable degree, thwarted in its efforts to obtain information as to the goods which are the subject matter of the action on an examination of plaintiff. This was due to a lack of records and plaintiff’s professed inability to give the information sought. The goods were bought by plaintiff from the proposed witness. It was further shown that this latter corporation was owned and controlled by members of the same family who own and control plaintiff corporation, with overlapping officerships. . These circumstances dispense with the necessity of showing that the proposed witness was hostile. Settle order on notice fixing date for examination to proceed. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, McNally, Steuer and Witmer, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>         
                 This schedule contains summary financial  information 
                 extracted  from  Microtech   Medical  Systems,   Inc. 
                 unaudited  balance  sheet as of June 30, 1996 and the 
                 related  statement  of income for the six months then 
                 ended and is  qualified  in its entirety by reference 
                 to such financial statements. The earnings per share
                 for the period were less than $0.01 per share.                         
</LEGEND>                                                              
<CIK>             0000755720                                               
<NAME>            Microtech Medical Systems, Inc.                           

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1996
<CASH>                                         1,054,942
<SECURITIES>                                     156,975
<RECEIVABLES>                                          0
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,211,917
<PP&E>                                                 0
<DEPRECIATION>                                         0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,373,222
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             99,746
<BONDS>                                                0
<COMMON>                                          33,290
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,193,020
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,373,222
<SALES>                                                0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                       0 
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  30,693
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  514,590
<INCOME-TAX>                                     133,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              373,590
<DISCONTINUED>                                    29,979
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                     403,569
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0.01
        


</TABLE>
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D19-1678

_____________________________

BRADFORD S. MATHENY,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Belated Appeal—Original Jurisdiction.

August 8, 2019

PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is denied on the merits.

LEWIS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Bradford S. Matheny, pro se, Petitioner.
2

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
32.803 Policies.       (a) 						            Any assignment of claims that has been made under the Act to any type of financing institution listed in 32.802(b) may thereafter be further assigned and reassigned to any such institution if the conditions in 32.802(d) and (e) continue to be met.                                          (b) 						            A contract may prohibit the assignment of claims if the agency determines the prohibition to be in the Government’s interest.                                          (c) 						            Under a requirements or indefinite quantity type contract that authorizes ordering and payment by multiple Government activities, amounts due for individual orders for $1,000 or more may be assigned.                                          (d) 						            Any contract of a designated agency (see FAR 32.801), except a contract under which full payment has been made, may include a no-setoff commitment only when a determination of need is made by the head of the agency, in accordance with the Presidential delegation of authority dated October 3,1995, and after such determination has been published in the *Federal Register.* The Presidential delegation makes such determinations of need subject to further guidance issued by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. The following guidance has been provided:                Use of the no-setoff provision may be appropriate to facilitate the national defense; in the event of a national emergency or natural disaster; or when the use of the no-setoff provision may facilitate private financing of contract performance. However, in the event an offeror is significantly indebted to the United States, the contracting officer should consider whether the inclusion of the no-setoff commitment in a particular contract is in the best interests of the United States. In such an event, the contracting officer should consult with the Government officer(s) responsible for collecting the debt(s).                                          (e) 						            When an assigned contract does not include a no-setoff commitment, the Government may apply against payments to the assignee any liability of the contractor to the Government arising independently of the assigned contract if the liability existed at the time notice of the assignment was received even though that liability had not yet matured so as to be due and payable.    **Parent topic:** Subpart 32.8 - Assignment of Claims
#### Alma Whitaker, Appellant, v. Donald L. Whitaker, Respondent.

Staley, Jr., J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered May 3, 1968 in Ulster County, which denied plaintiff’s motion for temporary alimony and counsel fees, and granted defendant’s cross motion to dismiss so much of the complaint as seeks support and maintenance. In this separation action brought by the appellant against her husband, the appellant sought temporary and permanent alimony. The parties were married in 1961 in Dutchess County, New York, and thereafter resided in Dutchess and. Ulster Counties. Marital difficulties arose in the spring of 1967, and the respondent resigned from his employment and moved to Florida in June, 1967 where the appellant concedes he acquired domicile. Apparently he left no property in the State of New York. This action was commenced on January 2, 1968 with the service of the summons and complaint being effected by personal service on the respondent in the State of Florida. On February 9, 1968 the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County, State of Florida, granted a decree of divorce to the respondent. The appellant contends that service having been effected personally upon the respondent in the State of Florida, the court acquired in personam jurisdiction over the respondent which would enable the court to award alimony and counsel fees. The basis of this contention is that CPLR 302 was intended to enlarge the in personam jurisdiction of the State courts and that the United States Supreme Court decisions have expanded the bases of jurisdiction. The appellant’s view finds no support in the law. While CPL^t 302 expanded the cireumstsances in which in personam jurisdiction might be obtained, its effect is limited only to the situations enumerated therein, and matrimonial actions are not included. It being conceded that the respondent has a bona fide domicile in the State of Florida, CPLR 302 is inapplicable to permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent. *(Tarshish*v. *Tarshish,*27 A D 2d 909; *Weiss*v. *Weiss,*
      *59620 A D 2d 824; *Cockrum*v. Cockrum, 20 A D 2d 642; *Lussier*v. *Lussier,*56 Misc 2d 532.) Order affirmed, without costs. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Aulisi, Staley, Jr., and Cooke, JJ., concur in memorandum by Staley, Jr., J.