NO. 85-403 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

MABLE RINGLING ANDERSON, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

RUSSELL ALVIN ANDERSON , 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicia.1 District, 

In and for the County of Madison, 

The Honorable Frank Davis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Lineberger & Harris; Peter S. Lineberger, Bozeman, 

Montana 

Kelly M. Hogan, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Jardine, McCarthy & Gra.uman; John Jardine, Whitehall, 

Montana 

Berg, Coil, Stokes & Tollefson; Ben Berg, Bozeman, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 19, 1985 

Decided: APR 3 19% 

Filed: &+% 4 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

The wife appeals from a judgment and order of the 

Madison County District Court dividing the marital estate 

between the parties. She claims that the District Court 

abused its discretion by miscalculating the value of certain 

marital assets and inequitably dividing the marital estate, 

and that the District Court's decision was not based on 

substantial credible evidence. We affirm in part and reverse 

and remand for additional findings. 

Mabel Ringling and Russell Anderson were married on 

November 12, 1949. Before their separation in May 1981 and. 

their divorce in April 1985, they jointly acquired and 

operated ranch properties. The down payment on the Harrison 

Ranch, the first property acquired, was made possible by 

financial assistance from the wife's family. The wife's 

family later partially financed some additional property and 

farm equipment for the ranch. The parties repaid loans from 

the family during the course of their marriage. In 1968, the 

parties acquired additiona.1 properties using jointly held 

assets. The parties negotiated a sale of these properties in 

1976, reserving 191 acres of the Harrison Ranch for their 

home. The proceeds from the sales were initially deposited 

into joint accounts and securities. Later, after their 

separation, the parties agreed to divide the payments 

equally. The wife has occupied the Harrison Ranch since 

their separation. 

In December 1978, the parties purchased a one-half 

interest in the "Bruce-Ridder contract." The husband 

testified that, when he and the wife separated, they agreed 

she would have the Harrison Ranch, he would have the 
Bruce-Ridder contract and that these were about equal in 

value. The wife disputes both the agreement and the 

valuation of this contract. 

The husband, in partnership with others, entered into 

two business ventures, the "Cameron Group" investment and the 

"Blue Anchor Bar and Cafe" in 1980 and 1981. The District 

Court found that he invested $21,000 of marital funds; that 

these investments, made only in the husband's name, have 

proved unprofitable; and that the husband currently 

discharges these obligations through monthly payments. 

Prior to their separation, the parties made a number of 

other investments using jointly held funds. Some lost money. 

Some were profitable. Generally, the parties shared the 

losses and profits equally. 

The District Court excluded the cash value of one-half 

of the investments in the Cameron Group and Blue Anchor Bar 

and Cafe, in addition to the wife's share of her family 

trust, from the net value of the marital estate. The wife 

received her family trust shares and the cash value of these 

investments. The District Court then divided the remaining 

amount equally, awarded the Harrison Ranch to the wife and 

awarded the Bruce-Ridder contract to the husband. They 

shared the income from the ranch sales equally. The husband 

also received his interest in the Cameron Group and Blue 

Anchor Bar and Cafe investments, some securities, his current 

home in Butte, one-half interest in his business partnership, 

and his personal property. The wife also received 

securities, her Arabian horse breeding business, her personal 

property, and some miscellaneous assets. 

In order to effect equal distribution, the District 

Court ordered the wife to pay the husband $82,912.24 or 
assign to him the equivalent of that sum from the ranch sale 

contracts. 

We address two issues on appeal: 

(1) Did the District Court correctly value the marital 

assets and the total marital estate? 

(2) Did the District Court equitably divid-e the marital 

estate? 

The parties agree on the standard of review. 

. . . In dividing property in a marriage 

dissolution the District Court has far-reaching 

discretion and its judgment will not be altered 

without a showing of clear abuse of discretion. 

The test of abuse of discretion is whether the 

trial court acted arbitrarily without employment of 

conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of 

reason resulting in substantial injustice . . . [Citations omitted. ] 

In re Marriage of Perry (Mont. 1985), 704 P.2d 41, 43, 42 

The wife argues in the first issue that the District 

Court clearly abused its discretion by accepting the 

husband's valuations of assets and the total estate. The 

evidence shows no substantial difference between the parties' 

valuation of assets claimed by and assigned to the wife. The 

parties disagree only on the value of the Bruce-Ridd.er 

contract, the Cameron Group, the Blue Anchor Bar and Cafe, 

and the husband's share of the R & J Amusements business, all 

claimed by and assigned to the husband. 

The District Court expressly valued the Eruce-Ridder 

contract using a 25% discount of the net value, with the 

husband's interest then valued. at $100,766.63. The wife 

argues that a discount in the value is unrealistic when the 

balance of the contract was due within one year of the trial 

date, as in this case. The husband testified that applying a 

discount of 25% is a normal procedure in the purchase and 

sale of contracts in the secondary market. He also testified 
that the upcoming balloon payment would probably not be made. 

As we stated in Marriage of Summerfelt (Mont. 1984) , 688 P.2d 

8, 11, 41 St.Rep. 1775, 1778, the fair market value of a 

contract rarely, if ever, equals the balance due. Under 

these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion when he adopted the husband's valuation of the 

Bruce-Ridder contract. 

The District Court found that the parties had orally 

agreed the wife would receive the Harrison Ranch and the 

husband would receive the interest in the Bruce-Ridder 

contract and found that these properties were substantially 

equal in value. The wife contends the District Court abused 

its discretion in finding the parties reached an agreement on 

this division of property. The wife's past financial 

statements listed the ranch as her property and the husband's 

financial statements listed the Bruce-Ridder contract as his 

property. The wife lived at the ranch and testified that, up 

to the time of trial, this division had been carried out. 

During the husband's testimony on the agreement, she objected 

only that the testimony was inadmissible as evidence of 

compromise negotiations. Even ignoring his testimony, the 

District Court had sufficient evidence with the wife's 

testimony and the parties' financial statements to award the 

Harrison Ranch to the wife and the Bruce-Ridder contract to 

the husband. We find no abuse of discretion on this point. 

The District Court's finding that the properties were 

approximatel-y equal in value is harmless error. Erroneous 

findings of fact that are not necessary to support the 

District Court's decision are not grounds for reversal. 

Eaton v. Morse (Mont. 1984), 687 P.2d 1004, 1010, 41 St.Rep. 

1708, 1715. Prior to their separation, the parties together 

owned the Harrison Ranch, valued at about $253,000 and 
one-half of the Bruce-Ridder contract, with a face value of 

about $135,000. Clearly these are not equal in value. 

However, the value of these assets did not affect which party 

received them and the lack of equivalent value had. no effect 

on the overall equitable division of property. Thus, this 

finding, although erroneous, is unnecessary to support the 

District Court's decision and is harmless. Therefore, we 

decline to reverse the decision on this basis. 

The financial statements submitted by the parties 

reflect contradicting values of the Cameron Group and the 

Blue Anchor Bar and Cafe. The wife asks for a return of 

one-half of the joint funds invested in these ventures. She 

questions the District Court's apparent acceptance of the 

husband's valuation of the net value of the properties and 

its finding that $15,000 and $6,000, respectively, of joint 

funds were invested initially. She concurs with the District 

Court's reduction of the marital estate by one-half of the 

amount of joint funds invested. 

This Court will not disturb a district court's findings 

unless there is a clear preponderance of evidence against 

such findings, Cameron v. Cameron (1978), 179 Mont. 219, 227, 

587 P.2d 939, 944. In this case, the record shows no support 

for valuing the joint funds invested in Cameron Group at 

$15,000. The husband's financial statement suggests an 

investment of $23,000 and the wife's evidence, part of the 

husband's tax return, shows a contribution of $20,000. The 

evidence on the amount of joint funds invested in the Blue 

Anchor Bar and Cafe is unclear as well. Since the evidence 

does not support the finding that a total of $21,000 of joint 

funds were invested in these ventures, we remand to the 

District Court for new findings on the amount of joint funds 

invested. 
The difference in the partiesi estimates of the total 

net value of the marital estate, excluding the Bruce-Ridder 

contract, result from the difference in their estimates of 

the net values of the Cameron Group, the Blue Anchor Bar and 

Cafe, and R & J Amusements. The District Court made no 

specific findings on the value of each of these investments 

and valued the total marital estate at $1,776,024.49. This 

finding must be reversed for lack of supporting evidence. 

Using the husband's valuation of their net worth, which 

did not include $10,000 worth of the wife's personal 

property, the total comes to $1,716,024.49. Using the wife's 

statements of value, the total net worth comes to 

$1,832,165.83. Neither figure reflects that used by the 

District Court, although a mathematical error may explain the 

difference between the District Court's and the husband's 

figures. This Court cannot determine the net worth from the 

findings. Given the wide disparity between the parties' 

valuations and an apparent mathematical error on the part of 

the District Court, we reverse and remand for findings which 

reflect the basis of the net worth. 

The wife questions the District Court's equal division 

of marital assets in the second issue. She asserts that 

without her family's funds and borrowing power, the parties 

would not have acquired their marital estate and wants a 

substantially larger share of the estate on this basis. 

This Court will not disturb an apportionment made by the 

District Court "unless there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion as manifested by a substantially inequitable 

division of the marital assets resulting in substantial 

injustice." In re Marriage of Brown (1978), 179 Mont. 417, 

422, 587 P.2d 361, 364. Section 40-4-202, MCA, requires a 

district court to consider property received by gift or 
bequest when apportioning marital assets. In re Marriage of 

Herron (1980), 186 Mont. 396, 401, 608 P.2d 97, 99-100. It 

goes on to require a District Court to consider the 

contributions of the non-acquiring spouse when dividing the 

property. "In determining the exact distribution of this 

type of marital asset, no set formula can be established as 

to how the assets should be equitably distributed. Each case 

has to be decided on its own merits." Herron, supra. In 

this case, funds borrowed from the wife's family during the 

early years of the marriage were mostly repaid from the 

parties' joint funds. Money inherited from the wife's family 

was invested in jointly-held property. The record shows the 

substantial marital estate resulted from the joint efforts of 

both parties in contributing to the maintenance and 

appreciation of their property throughout their thirty-five 

years of marriage. Where a gift or inheritance is not 

traceable and both parties contribute to the increasing 

value, "it is inequitable to award the non-acquiring spouse 

only a fraction of the value of the asset on dissolution." 

Herron, 186 Mont. at 404, 608 P.2d at 101. We hold that the 

District Court's division of property is an equitable one and 

shows no abuse of discretion. 

We reverse and remand for additional findigg~"consistent ,/ 

with the above opinion. 

We Concur: -